A narcosub of the type found in a clandestine shipyard in Colombia.
“Navy men located two semi-submersibles that were ready to be loaded with eight tons of cocaine… During the year 2021 and so far in 2022, 43 semi-submersible naval devices have been seized.”
Colombia’s criminal organizations have always proven capable of evading detection through innovation. According to Colombian weekly magazine Semana, the country’s navy discovered a clandestine shipyard meant for building “narco-subs” for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group. The shipyard was found in Nariño, a department on the southern border with Ecuador. According to the article, the shipyard contained two half-built, 82-foot semi-submersibles with a full range of modern equipment. Colombian authorities have seized more than 40 semi-submersibles since the beginning of 2021.
Right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal says that traffickers have employed semi-submersibles with increasing frequency in the Pacific Ocean. Colombian groups have recently started using this maritime route to move their products to Mexican criminal organizations rather than the land route. Each narcosub can carry about four tons of cocaine.
Other semi-submersible submarines have been making trans-Atlantic and Pacific crossings in recent years. Although there are no known instances of drug traffickers accomplishing this feat, it suggests that it is plausible that criminal organizations can ship their own product, even across the Atlantic, rather than hiding it in shipping containers or having to pay off corrupt customs officials. Such a development would remove several points of vulnerability from the drug trafficking supply chain, making detection and interdiction more difficult in the vast oceans.
Navy men located two semi-submersibles that were ready to be loaded with eight tons of cocaine…Semi-submersibles are used by drug traffickers to ship tons of cocaine undetected…During the year 2021 and ..in 2022, 43 semi-submersible naval devices were seized.
The celebration was used by Colombian and U.S. agents to infiltrate and find out the details of the Mexican-Colombian criminal alliance to traffic cocaine in semi-submersibles through a maritime corridor of the Pacific Ocean that leaves the coast of San Juan de la Costa en route to…Mexico and the US. The corridor covers the Pacific coasts of Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico, and in the 21st century it became a vital drug trafficking route from South to North America.
“According to the National Army, these offensive operations are carried out within the framework of security provided by the Armed Forces in the midst of the 2022 Democracy Plan, in which they seek to counteract ‘the terrorist actions of the criminal armed groups in this region of the country.”
In 2016, the Colombian government signed a groundbreaking peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The agreement was intended to put an end to over 50 years of conflict. Colombia’s military, however, continues to fight dissident members of the FARC who rejected the agreement and did not lay down their arms. Aided by the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela, FARC remnants remain a deadly and powerful force in Colombia, especially in rural and border regions as they push to expand their control of lucrative drug trafficking routes. According to the excerpted article from the politically centrist Columbian daily El Tiempo, in recent months, Colombia’s military has clashed with members of FARC dissident groups as it increases the pace of special military operations. The outlet reports that in one such operation in Arauca, the military killed 23 dissidents, including a top leader. The excerpted article from Colombia’s most famous weekly magazine, Semana, tells the story of similar captures of important FARC dissidents in Tumaco state. FARC dissidents are not only reconstituting themselves with the safe haven provided by Venezuela, but also competing internally between various dissident factions for territorial control. Currently, the FARC is under heavy scrutiny in Colombia as the country is in the midst of a heated presidential campaign where security is, as always, an important topic.
The newspaper established that for 20 days intelligence from the National Police had been monitoring the structure of ‘Arturo,’ who crossed the border from Venezuela with at least 35 of his men…It was established that after the intelligence group located the camp, a bombing operation was planned by the Colombian Air Force, and the Army Special Forces immediately entered and fought with part of the guerrilla. Then the Judicial Police entered and managed to recover 23 bodies, including Arturo’s.
According to the National Army, these offensive operations are carried out within the framework of security provided by the Armed Forces in the midst of the 2022 Democracy Plan, in which they seek to counteract ‘the terrorist actions of the criminal armed groups in this region of the country’…the Ombudsman’s Office warned at the end of February of a rearrangement of criminal dynamics…that seek to control this strategic corridor and the access roads to the city of Bogotá through the use of violence.
Members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, which operates along the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, pose with their weapons.
“Very early in 2022, the horror of the war showed its face again in Arauca, where not only have the effects of peace with the FARC not been seen, but, on the contrary, violence has reached levels of the crudest stages of the armed conflict.”
The border region between Colombia and Venezuela is experiencing some of its worst violence in years. Since 2 January 2022, several dozen have died in what could be a series of contract killings, according to center-left Colombian daily El Espectador. The daily states that originally, Colombian prosecutors suspected the dead were members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerrilla group operating along the border, contesting territory with the National Liberation Army (ELN), another prominent guerrilla group. According to an article in the politically centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Colombian President Iván Duque has increased the troop presence in the border region to combat drug trafficking and establish greater state presence in these remote stretches.
Violence along the border between Colombia and Venezuela is certainly nothing new. However, this flare-up is a reminder of the criminal sanctuary provided to Colombia’s FARC and ELN by the Maduro regime in Venezuela, and the instability fomented throughout Latin America by the actions of these groups. Unlike previous flare-ups in Apure state in Venezuela, these incidents have not led to migratory flows but underscore that Colombia has yet to realize fully the fruits of its demobilization efforts with guerrilla groups. Lastly, with Colombia’s presidential election slated for May 2022, guerrilla groups and demobilization efforts will be key issues in the campaign.
Since January 2, 27 dead have been found in different rural areas of Arauca, the Prosecutor’s Office reported on Wednesday. The attorney general, Francisco Barbosa, provided a new hypothesis based on what investigators have found in the field and in the autopsies of the deceased: apparently, there were no combats, but the people were murdered in the form of contract killers.
Early in 2022, the horror of the war showed its face again in Arauca, where not only have the effects of peace with the FARC not been seen, but, on the contrary, violence has reached levels of the crudest stages of the armed conflict…All this within the framework of the complicity, when not open participation in the crime, of the authorities of the Nicolás Maduro regime…Understanding the challenge posed by the natural conditions of the border and the lack of collaboration from the authorities on the other side to curb crime, it is clear that more efficient efforts and strategies are still needed.
Image Information:
Image: Members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, which operates along the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, pose with their weapons. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/brasildefato/32317009638 Attribution: Flickr
“… there is a 100% likelihood that ISIS will launch more attacks on the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army in the coming period…”
Recent ISIS attacks in northern Iraq’s “disputed territories” have raised concerns that the group is ramping up disruptive activities and seeking to re-emerge as a key player in the country. The “disputed territories” lie at the edge of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and control over them is contested by the Erbil-based KRG and the Baghdad-based central government. When it comes to these territories, the absence of effective security coordination between the two parties has created a security vacuum that ISIS fighters are exploiting, according to several media reports.
The attacks, which have mostly targeted Kurdish villages and Peshmerga checkpoints, have prompted high-level meetings and promises of better coordination between the KRG and the central government. Kurdish leaders have criticized central government forces for failing to provide them with proper support and equipment, most notably surveillance drones, as noted in the accompanying excerpt from the Saudi news website Independent Arabia. A second article from Independent Arabia details how the attacks have exposed fissures between the KRG’s two main political factions, one based in Erbil and the other in Sulaymaniyah. Further entrenching the security vacuum, as explained in the accompanying excerpt from the pan-Arab daily al-Quds, is the likelihood of Shiite factions linked to Iran obstructing central government-KRG coordination, for reasons of their own. Meanwhile, a Peshmerga official, cited in the excerpted article from the Kurdish media outlet Rudaw, claimed that ISIS is receiving unspecified “financial and logistical support from abroad” and that 200 militants had recently entered Iraq from Syria to carry out attacks on the group’s behalf.
These events are unfolding as Iraq’s political factions continue to squabble over the results of the recent, low-turnout parliamentary election and as the US-led anti-ISIS coalition completed its transition from a combat to an advisory role at the end of 2021. The uptick in ISIS activities also coincides with the four-year anniversary of what may prove to be a premature declaration of victory over ISIS in Iraq, made by then-president Haidar al-Abadi in December 2017.
Source:
“داعش يصعد هجماته ضد الأكراد
(ISIS Increases Attacks Against Kurds),” Independent Arabia (Saudi news website), 2 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/mr4385mn
Peshmerga Minister Shorsh Ismail…criticized the performance of the federal army, saying that “its very slowness in taking measures gave ISIS an opportunity to reorganize itself. The army is unable to fill this vacuum, and the Peshmerga alone is unable to uproot ISIS, as it lacks aerial surveillance capabilities to monitor the group’s movements and the federal state will not provide us with the drones that we have been requesting for a long time, nor will the United States due to the federal government’s rejection.”
Source:
انقسام كردي حول أسباب خسائر البيشمركة أمام هجمات “داعش”
(Kurdish Divisions on Peshmerga Losses from ISIS Attacks),” Independent Arabia (Saudi news website), 7 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/3awp35wd
Representatives and officials from the two parties that govern the semi-autonomous region, the “Democratic” party led by Massoud Barzani and the “Patriotic Union” led by the late President Jalal Talabani, disagreed on the nature of the problem in military coordination and different decisions, due to conflicting political orientations. The commander of the Patriotic Union Party organizations in the Qarachogh area of Makhmour district accused Barzani’s party of openly “cooperating with ISIS” by “publicly providing supplies to its gunmen,” as he put it, noting that “there are federal forces in Qarachogh Mountain and about a brigade of the Peshmerga led by Sirwan Barzani at the top of the mountain. This prevents any other force from coming to the area. ISIS fighters can be seen comfortably roaming around, and they go to the surrounding villages, despite the presence of 35 mounds held by the brigade there. When the attack occurred, they did not respond, or provide assistance, except for the regiment consisting of locals”… For years, Washington has been leading mediation efforts to unify the divided Peshmerga forces between the two parties, who had concluded an agreement in 2006 to unify the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations, after they fought a civil war, and are still facing difficulties in implementing the terms of the agreement…
According to Kurdish leaders, ISIS militants have recently begun to change their fighting methods and expanded the scope and type of their attacks, moving beyond the stage of just planting explosive devices, killing individuals and displacing others, and now engaging in military operations aimed at asserting their presence, following the recent arrival of a group of fighters coming from Syria, calling themselves “Jund Allah,” which swore allegiance to ISIS.
Source:
“معلومات استخبارية: 200 مسلح لداعش تسللوا إلى الأراضي العراقية قادمين من سوريا
The official of the Qarah Tapah – Hamrin II axis of the Peshmerga forces, Major General Mardan Jawshin, announced that they had received intelligence information that a force calling itself “Guardians of Religion,” consisting of 200 militants, “has pledged allegiance to ISIS and infiltrated into Iraqi territory coming from Syria”… regarding the recent increase in ISIS activities… he said that that ISIS is reorganizing its ranks and did not hide his belief that the organization “receives financial and logistical support from abroad,” referring to information that says that “the organization pays salaries to its militants and also pays salaries to the families of its dead…” Major General Jawshin pointed to the security vacuum between the Iraqi army and the Kurdistan Peshmerga forces as “the reason for the increase in ISIS attacks”… He noted that the ISIS threat had reached a very high level, especially after the arrival of the aforementioned 200 militants from Syria, and said that there is a 100% likelihood that ISIS will launch more attacks on the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army in the coming period.
Source:
“تعاون بغداد وأربيل ضد «داعش» بين الضرورة وفقدان الثقة
(Baghdad-Erbil Cooperation Against ISIS Between Cooperation and Loss of Trust),” al-Quds (pan-Arab daily), 11 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p8s5hay
On the fourth anniversary of Baghdad’s declaration of the elimination of ISIS in 2017, Iraqis are following with concern the resurgence of attacks in many Iraqi provinces, despite all the security campaigns to hunt down the group’s remnants… observers fear that the state Shiite forces, which thwarted the Baghdad and Erbil agreement on the normalization of the situation in Sinjar, west of Mosul, will obstruct the agreement to deploy the Peshmerga in the disputed areas. This is especially true given that [Prime Minister] al-Kazemi, who was committed to concluding those agreements with the regional government, may not retain his post in the next government.
Therefore, the mutual accusations of exploiting terrorist organizations such as the Turkish Workers’ Party and ISIS and supporting their presence on Iraqi soil to achieve local and regional political agendas are not limited to Kurdish parties on the one hand, and the Shiites and Turkmen on the other hand, but rather also extends to leaders of the al-Fateh Alliance, which includes pro-Iranian factions, and which considers that the recent attacks in Kirkuk were intentional and motivated by political agendas aimed at providing justifications for the presence of US forces in Iraq, which are scheduled to depart at the end of this year. They also accuse the Kurdish leadership of fabricating or exploiting ISIS attacks in order to seek to restore the region’s control over Kirkuk and the areas disputed between the Baghdad and Erbil governments, after the expulsion of the Peshmerga from those areas in 2017, following the referendum on secession from Iraq.
“Jamaah Islamiyah is estimated to have 6,000 to 7,000 members and sympathizers spread throughout Indonesia in its various branches and is thought to have infiltrated various government and civc institutions.”
Indonesia’s special counterterrorism detachment, Densus 88, conducted a series of arrests in late November targeting members of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). According to the excerpted article from Indonesian site tribunnews.com, which focused on domestic affairs, the scope of the arrests was unprecedented. The article notes the arrests extended not only to JI itself, but also to the Indonesian Ulema [Islamic Scholars] Council (MUI).
According to the article, JI has up to 7,000 members, some of whom have infiltrated government agencies and civic organizations. The justification for arresting MUI members, therefore, is not that MUI itself supports JI, but that JI has infiltrated MUI. The solution to JI’s infiltration of MUI, according to Indonesian officials cited, is for MUI to conduct more robust background checks of members it recruits. Although the recent arrests by Densus 88 of JI members has affected MUI, the latter’s scholars have shown approval for Densus 88. The article reports that MUI announced that it supports the government’s efforts to root out terrorism and maintain the security and territorial integrity of Indonesia. By working with the MUI, Indonesian authorities have been able to arrest JI and MUI members suspected of involvement in terrorism without alienating the MUI more broadly. Indonesian-language kompas.com also reported on 13 December that Densus 88 finally arrested one of the JI-affiliated suspects in the March 2021 bombing of a church in Makassar.
Densus 88 Anti-terror Police have again arrested suspected terrorists who are affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyah, one of whom is an active member of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). Jamaah Islamiyah is estimated to have 6,000 to 7,000 members and sympathizers spread throughout Indonesia in its various branches and is thought to have infiltrated various government and civic institutions.
The head of FOKSI emphasized that Jamaah Islamiyah should not only be viewed from the angle of terror attacks because its movement has entered into a socio-religious institutions in the community. Regarding the arrest of MUI individuals who are suspected of being linked to terrorism, he argues that terrorist network cells have infiltrated various circles and groups. He hoped that MUI would not be permissive to its administrators who support ideas of radicalism and terrorism. FOKSI conveyed that it supports the government’s efforts in eradicating terrorism in order to maintain the integrity of the country because the Indonesian people must receive safety and freedom from radicalism and terrorism.
The Special Detachment (Densus) 88 Anti-terror Police arrested a suspected terrorist in South Sulawesi. The Head of Banops Densus 88 Anti-terror Police confirmed the information. He said the arrest was made last week. According to him, the perpetrator was included on the terrorist wanted list (DPO) and suspected of being linked to the bombing at the Makassar Cathedral Church in South Sulawesi on March 28, 2021.
“In order to allow the state of siege to quickly restore peace in Ituri and North Kivu, the deputies supported during the debate the pooling of the Ugandan and DRC armed forces to hunt down the ADF and other negative forces.”
On 1 December, the Rwanda-based website Taarifa Rwanda reported on Uganda and Congo’s joint special forces operations against Allied Defense Forces (ADF) militants in Congo. ADF is loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The article noted that Uganda and Congo believe they are preempting the siege of towns in Ituri and North Kivu, Congo by the militants. It was also noted that the Congolese National Assembly unanimously voted to support joint special forces operations and that there would be a long and protracted hunt by the two countries’ special forces in the jungle to root out the militants.
In August, Rwanda itself deployed soldiers to Mozambique to combat ISIS-loyal militants in that country. This was the first-ever foreign military excursion for Rwanda to coastal East Africa. More than one month later, according to the excerpted 25 September article in Kenya-based The East African, Rwandan president Paul Kagame pledged to continue counterterrorism operations in Mozambique. The article noted that Kagame traveled to the epicenter of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province to address the joint forces of the Mozambique Armed Defence Force and Rwanda Defence Force, stating that Rwandan troops would not leave Mozambique until the security situation was stable.
According to the The East African, Rwanda’s contingent in Mozambique includes 1,000 soldiers, who Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi regards as heroes. Both Nyusi and Kagame justified the Rwandan troop deployment as necessary to fight the ADF and other ISIS-loyal militants, who Kagame described as a regional threat. Kagame, for example, noted that the militants included Kenyans, Tanzanians, Congolese, Somalis, and Rwandans. The two articles demonstrate how East African states are increasingly viewing counterterrorism through a regional lens and how cross-border counterterrorism operations, such as Uganda in Congo or Rwanda in Mozambique, will likely become more common in the region.
Members of the Congolese national assembly unanimously voted to support joint Ugandan and DRC operations to be more effective in tracking down the ADF, because, according to them, “before the state of siege is equal to during the state of siege.” In order to quickly restore peace in Ituri and North Kivu, the deputies supported during the debate the pooling of the Ugandan and DRC armed forces to hunt down the ADF and other negative forces.
President Paul Kagame has praised the Rwandan troops deployed to fight insurgents in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique for their good work fighting insurgents. While addressing the joint force of Mozambican Armed Defence and Rwanda Defence Force on Friday at Cabo Delgado, he also said the soldiers will stay put to stabilize and facilitate the return of displaced civilians to their homes. He was accompanied by his Mozambican counterpart Filipe Nyusi.
The Rwandan contingent is 1,000-soldier strong, made up of the army and the police who recently launched offensives against the insurgents in Cabo Delgado province. Botswana later sent a contingent of 296 and South Africa deployed 1,500 soldiers. President Kagame has defended the deployment, and said his country is footing the deployment bill for now, and the mission will stay on to train the Mozambican army, pointing out that the nature of the threat was regional given that the insurgents not only included Mozambicans, but also Tanzanians, Ugandans, Kenyans, Somalis, Yemenis, Congolese and Rwandan fighters.
Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.
“The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.”
Mozambique’s northernmost province, Cabo Delgado, has been under attack by Islamist insurgents since 2017. Initially the government declined offers of outside help by other nations, instead depending on its own military, which was poorly equipped and not well trained in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency tactics. As the excerpted article from the South African think tank Institute for Security Studies notes, Mozambique turned to Russia for help after two years of disastrous results. In September 2019, Russian military contractor Wagner Group arrived in Cabo Delgado.
The terms of the agreement with Wagner Group were never made public. However, the Russian mercenaries were only in Cabo Delgado for about two months. Apparently they wanted to bomb various locations where terrorists were purportedly located. This strategy was at odds with what their Mozambican counterparts had planned. Also, during their short time in Mozambique, a number of the Russians were killed, reportedly including some who were beheaded during botched missions. The abrupt departure of Wagner Group personnel has been attributed to their failures and possibly confusion sown by the discord between the Wagner Group and Mozambican military. Mozambique next turned to the South Africa-based Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). In April 2020 DAG arrived in civilian helicopters converted into gunships. While helpful, it was unable to stem extremist attacks. One year later DAG was gone and replaced by trainers and advisers from a South Africa-Dubai consortium. However, as the article explains, it was not until Mozambique finally agreed to let foreign troops, beginning with a relatively large contingent from Rwanda, assist in the fight, that real progress was made against the insurgents, including dislodging them from their bases. While it is not clear why Wagner Group and DAG were not more effective, it appears that that unlike the mercenaries, trained militaries from other nations made swift and significant gains against the Islamists.
The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.
Faced with the inability of government forces to stop the insurgency, even with private military support, liberation struggle veterans in Maconde-dominant districts of Cabo Delgado formed local militias to fight the insurgents. The contribution of the militias has not yet been studied in depth, but it seems that they were useful in blocking the insurgents’ advance towards districts such as Mueda and Muidumbe.
Rwanda’s quick achievements were due to better combat experience, but also better equipment, which allowed them great superiority over the insurgents. While the insurgents’ bases had already been identified by the Mozambican military, they did not have the capability to dislodge the insurgents. The attempts that had been carried out in the past had resulted in failures and in some cases, tragedies.
Despite progress in combating violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, there is still a long way to go. After more than a decade of the radicalisation of local populations and a multi-year armed insurgency, three months of foreign intervention is just the start of the process towards building peace and stability in Cabo Delgado.
Image Information:
Image: Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique. Source: Sgt. Heather Doppke/SETAF/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/48640726723/ Attribution: CC BY 2.0
Diversion of funds to fight COVID-19 has left the Burkinabe military with fewer resources to combat terrorism.
“The Sahel is reeling under escalating Islamist attacks. Is Africa’s fight against the coronavirus eating up resources urgently needed to combat insurgency?”
The COVID-19 pandemic may have weakened security in the Sahel, according to the excerpted article from German international media outlet Deutsche Welle. With so many resources devoted by Sahelian nations to combating the pandemic, fewer resources have been available to combat terrorist groups. Those resources are more than just financial; they include soldiers who regional governments have pressed into public health services. It is uncertain if the terrorist groups are aware of, or have been able to take advantage of the current crisis but, according to the article, armed terrorist attacks have increased in Mali and Burkina Faso.
The situation has become so bad in Mali that there is concern the government might fall to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda–linked militant group whose territory has been steadily expanding. In Burkina Faso, Nadiagou became the first village in the country to fall to armed Islamists. A man who escaped the attack said the two police officers guarding the village fled because they could not do anything, a sentiment echoed on a larger scale by a retired Senegalese general who explained that the limited capacities of national militaries in the region are allowing terrorist groups to claim additional territory. Additional factors, such as the flow of weapons from Libya and interethnic tensions, also fuel the growth of terrorist groups. African heads of state, at the recent Dakar Forum for Peace and Security, discussed the need for foreign aid to fight COVID in the Sahel and free funds to build up militaries to combat the growing presence of Islamist terrorist groups.
The Sahel is reeling under escalating Islamist attacks. Is Africa’s fight against the coronavirus eating up resources urgently needed to combat insurgency?
African economies were massively hit by the pandemic, he told DW in Dakar where he was attending the forum, adding that “this economic impact also had consequences on the capacities of African countries to design counter-terrorism strategies.
African heads of state meeting earlier this week at the Dakar Forum for Peace and Security called for easier access to international funding and stronger strategic support to combat Islamist groups.
“They were two [police officers] against many. Even if they had tanks, they couldn’t have done anything,” he said describing how easy it was for the armed group to captured Nadiagou, the first village in Burkina Faso to fall into the hands of Islamists.
