Tag Archives: Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Taliban-Fueled Terrorism in Pakistan Threatens Afghans in Exile

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Torkham Gate area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a major crossing point and the location of Pakistan deportation efforts. Most Afghans holding a Pakistani visa are required to cross the border every 30 to 60 days to get their visa stamped. It is a dangerous and harrowing trip.

“One of the reasons for the detention and deportation of these migrants is their link to security issues in the country. We are witnessing the security incidents and attacks that are taking place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.”

The rise of Taliban-fueled terrorism in Pakistan threatens former U.S. and NATO allies hiding out in Islamabad awaiting relocation to the United States and other western destinations. According to the excerpted news clip from U.S.-funded VOA Dari on its Facebook page, “there are now massive arrests and operations in Islamabad” against Afghans living in the Pakistani capital. The crackdown comes amidst increasing terrorist activity from Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, i.e., the Pakistani Taliban. According to the VOA Dari news clip, the primary reason for the detention and deportation of these migrants is Pakistan’s belief that the terrorism taking place in Pakistan is in part fueled or supported by Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

The second clip, from Afghanistan International, also noted that Pakistani police were sweeping through neighborhoods detaining Afghans, and that in the past ten days, many Afghans have committed suicide rather than return to Afghanistan. The clip also noted that 400 Afghans were rounded up, including former journalists, civil society employees, and former military and security personnel, all of whom cannot return to Afghanistan for fear of imprisonment, torture, and death at the hands of the Taliban government.[i]

Former Afghan military personnel hiding out in Pakistan awaiting visas to the United States and other western countries corroborate the sweeps taking place throughout Islamabad. Many leave their temporary homes for days at a time waiting for the police to finish detention operations in their neighborhood.[ii] It is a perilous but necessary game of cat and mouse. U.S. visa applicants need to be near a U.S. consulate to process their visa. Also, an active Pakistan visa, which offers some protection from deportation, is harder and harder to get. Pakistan visas for Afghans have been substantially shortened and become more expensive, making it nearly impossible for former Afghan military and political individuals and their families to stay in Pakistan without a foreign donor.

Sources:


”پاکستان جمع آوری و اخراج مهاجران افغان فاقد مدرک را تشدید کرده است

(Pakistan steps up collection and deportation of undocumented Afghan migrants),” VOA Dari, 5 January 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U5_3InKmidg

There are now massive arrests and operations in Islamabad. Afghan harassment in different parts of Islamabad has accelerated in the past week, with a large number of Afghans complaining about this problem. Even today, we have had hourly videos and messages from Afghans saying that police are going from house to house at their workplaces and where they live. They arrest Afghans who are documented or undocumented, including women and children.

They were in Pakistan and cannot return to Afghanistan.

One of the reasons for the detention and deportation of these migrants is their link to security issues in the country. We are witnessing the security incidents and attacks that are taking place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.

بازرسی خانه‌به‌خانه برای بازداشت مهاجران افغان در اسلام‌آباد پاکستان”

(House-to-house search to arrest Afghan migrants in Islamabad, Pakistan),” Afghanistan International, 5 January 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPaijVV8eXM

Today, throughout Islamabad, the police are collecting [Afghan] refugees and not allowing anyone to remain.

In the past ten days, many people have taken their own lives. They are facing a very new problem. Their lives are in danger. And God forbid, this will not happen. I hope that these people who are trying to detain around 600-700 people in the city today.

They will transfer them to Afghanistan. I think that in the city where we live, around 400 people were taken. These were journalists, Afghans who served in civil society, from the military, they took everyone.

Notes:

[i] The United Nations published a report confirming 218 extrajudicial killings in the summer of 2023. See: “Afghanistan’s Taliban responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials,” UN News, 22 August 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139962; However, Afghans continue to post across various social media and messaging platforms, what is effectively a body count of former military and political officials killed or “disappeared” by the Taliban.

[ii] Author’s conversations with many former ANASOC personnel currently residing in Pakistan.

Image Information:

Image: Torkham Gate area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a major crossing point and the location of Pakistan deportation efforts. Most Afghans holding a Pakistani visa are required to cross the border every 30 to 60 days to get their visa stamped. It is a dangerous and harrowing trip.
Source: Global QRF on Instagram; https://www.instagram.com/p/DFaxW6vP5zj/?next=%2F
Attribution: By permission of Global QRF

Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Efforts Could Ignite Wider Conflict in the Region

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A map of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including part of the Paktika Province, Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, the latter of which is where a number of terrorist attacks have taken place.

“Islamabad has repeatedly demanded Kabul to take action against hideouts of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on its soil.”

Pakistan continues to be at odds with the Taliban government in Afghanistan for allowing the Pakistani Taliban safe haven to carry out attacks across the border into Pakistan. On 25 December 2024, Pakistan carried out an airstrike in the Paktika Province, Afghanistan, against members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, resulting in 46 people killed, including civilians. The airstrike was in response to a cross-border attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, by the Pakistani Taliban that killed 16 members of Pakistan’s security forces a few days prior.[i] Additional clashes between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani forces have taken place since the airstrike.

The accompanying excerpted article from Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn reports on a December 2024 press conference given by Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan’s Armed Forces and provides context to Pakistan’s efforts to deal with terrorism. General Chaudhry acknowledged the dispute surrounding the Pakistani Taliban safe haven and asserted that “Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to eliminate the terrorist networks and keep our citizens safe.” General Chaudry also referenced Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, launched in June 2024, in which Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif emphasized that Pakistan could strike targets in Afghanistan.[ii] Chaudhry also mentioned the high number of operations against terrorists that Pakistan carried out in 2024—a particularly deadly year for Pakistani security forces in the country’s fight against terrorism.[iii]

In addition to internal political pressure to combat terrorism,[iv] Pakistan is also under pressure from China to deal with terrorist groups. Attacks on Chinese nationals working on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure projects have escalated in recent years. These projects and Chinese support are vital to Pakistan’s economy. As Pakistan remains under pressure to combat terrorism, additional strikes or clashes by Pakistan against targets in Afghanistan are likely but may come with a cost of fueling a wider conflict with Afghanistan.

Sources:

“Banned outfits provided with sanctuaries, support on Afghan territory: ISPR,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 27 December 2024.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1881429

The press conference took place amid heightened security concerns, with a sharp uptick in the number of attacks targeting security forces and other law enforcement agencies, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa…

During the wide-ranging press conference today in Rawalpindi, the DG ISPR addressed counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan’s reservations with Afghanistan…“All evidence related to terrorism can be traced back to the safe havens enjoyed by terrorists in Afghanistan,” Gen Chaudhry said….“Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to eliminate the terrorist networks and keep our citizens safe.”

Islamabad has repeatedly demanded Kabul to take action against hideouts of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on its soil…

Gen Chaudhry said security forces conducted a total of 59,775 operations this year, noting that Pakistan has rendered a lot of sacrifices in its fight against terrorism.

“During these successful operations, 925 terrorists, including khawarij, were sent to hell while numerous were arrested,” he said, highlighting that the number of terrorists killed was the largest in the last five years…

Answering a query on the effectiveness of intelligence-based operations (IBOs), Gen Chaudhry responded: “In the war against terrorism, there is a fundamental thing that the army and the LEAs fight against the terrorist [but] the nation fights against terrorism. All segments and political parties agree on this point.”

Referring to the National Action Plan (NAP) of 2014, its revised version from 2021, and the Azm-i-Istehkam campaign, the ISPR DG stressed that it had been decided that the entire nation had to combat terrorism together with all state institutions…

Speaking on action taken against terrorism in Balochistan, the DG ISPR detailed that some high-value targets were eliminated in the region.

He said that “Baloch terrorists’ most-wanted leaders Sana urf Baro, Bashir urf Pir Jan, Niaz urf Gumman, Zareef Shah Jehan, Hazrat Ali urf Asad, Lak Jan Chakirabadi urf Sawara were also sent to hell”…

Notes:

[i] For more information on the airstrike, see: Mohammad Yunus Yawar, “Pakistani airstrikes on Afghanistan kill 46 people, Taliban official says,” Reuters (international news agency), 26 December 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/least-46-killed-pakistani-bombardment-afghanistan-afghan-taliban-spokesperson-2024-12-25/

[ii] For more background on Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, see: “Azm-e-Istehkam operation: Terrorist hideouts may be hit on Afghan soil, says minister,” The News International (English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 28 June 2024. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1204305-azm-e-istehkam-operation-terrorist-hideouts-may-be-hit-on-afghan-soil-minister

[iii] The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an independent think-tank based in Pakistan, published a study which noted that 2024 marked the largest number of casualties that Pakistan’s security forces sustained combating terrorists in a decade. Pakistan has been fighting not only the Pakistani Taliban, but also the Balochistan Liberation Army, a group that seeks to gain the independence of the Balochistan Province, in western Pakistan. For the full CRSS report, see: https://crss.pk/2024-marks-deadliest-year-for-pakistans-security-forces-record-high-fatalities-in-a-decade/

[iv] Terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and the Balochistan Liberation Army against civilian and military targets in Pakistan rose considerably in 2024 compared prior years, forcing the government of Pakistan to increase its response. The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, an NGO in Pakistan, published a report documenting the rise in the number of attacks in the country in 2024, see: https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Overview_PIPS-Security-Report-2024.pdf 

Image Information:

Image: A map of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including part of the Paktika Province, Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, the latter of which is where a number of terrorist attacks have taken place.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afghanistan-Pakistan_-_northern_border._LOC_2010594050.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Chadian President Threatens Withdrawal From Multinational Joint Task Force

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Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.

“The MNJTF is today hampered by the “lack of mutualization of efforts” needed to confront this common enemy [Boko Haram].”

On 28 October 2024, Boko Haram carried out a significant attack against Chadian soldiers in Barakaram on Lake Chad, killing at least 40.[i] Chadian President Mahamat Idris Deby Itno reacted to the Barakaram attack not by requesting greater collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[ii] which Nigeria has done in response to Boko Haram attacks. Rather, according to the excerpted article from the French-language website airinfoagadez.com, Deby Itno is considering withdrawing Chad from the MNJTF altogether, which could add further stress to the 20-year-old organization. Niger, which itself withdrew from the MNJTF in June after alleging the Economic Community of West African States was interfering in its internal affairs, had in late August reported to Nigeria that it would renew cooperation with the MNJTF. But now a Chadian withdrawal could undermine the force.

According to the accompanying article, Deby Itno sees insufficient “mutual” contributions to the MNJTF, perhaps implying that Niger’s wavering about staying in the organization contributed to the inability to stop Boko Haram from augmenting its ranks on the lake or that Chad is shouldering an excessive burden in the force. More specifically, the president’s office alleged that the MNJTF had become “lethargic,” which hindered Chad’s ability to engage in counterterrorism operations. The article suggested that if Chad operated outside the MNJTF, it could operate more autonomously and secure the country’s borders. The article did, however, claim that a Chadian withdrawal from the MNJTF would exacerbate the security vulnerabilities of other Lake Chad countries, including Niger, even though the Chadian president hinted that withdrawing from the MNJTF would not cause Chad to abandon its commitment to the regional fight against terrorism.

It is possible that Chad simply no longer needs the MNJTF for counterterrorism against Boko Haram, or at least that Deby Itno is confident in relying on his own army, despite tactical defeats such as that in Barakaram. Alternatively, Deby Into may be using the threat to withdraw from the MNJTF to solicit more international support for the force, a demand he has also made.[iii] Indeed, given that the MNJTF is based in N’Djamena, Chad, Deby Itno’s comments represent an existential threat for the MNJTF if they become reality.

Sources:

“Le Tchad envisage un retrait de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) (Chad Considers Withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force),” airinfoagadez.com (media group combining Aïr-Info Agadez, RADIO Sahara FM, Agadez Web TV in Agadez, Niger and covering Sahelian political and security affairs), 3 November 2024. https://airinfoagadez.com/2024/11/03/le-tchad-envisage-un-retrait-de-la-force-multinationale-mixte-fmm/

Chad announced it is considering a possible withdrawal of its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), citing a “lack of mutualization of efforts” in this regional coalition against Boko Haram. This decision, announced on November 3, comes after a recent deadly attack by the Boko Haram sect against Chadian forces in Barkaram, in Lake Chad province. On the ground, [President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno] oversaw security reinforcement measures and ordered the launch of Operation Haskanite to track down the attackers.

The MNJTF “seems to be falling into lethargy,” which undermines the effectiveness of the joint fight. If the withdrawal were confirmed, Chad could opt for autonomous operations and concentrate resources on securing its borders. Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno reaffirmed the duty to protect Chadian citizens first and foremost, while emphasizing that the country would continue to uphold its commitments in the regional fight against terrorism.

Notes:

[i] The recent Boko Haram attack on Barakaram is the deadliest since a raid on the Chadian base in Bohoma along Lake Chad in 2020. Nearly 80 soldiers were killed in the Bohoma raid, showcased in a Boko Haram video revealing beheadings, soldiers fleeing the base, and a helicopter flying overhead to assess the situation in the aftermath of the attack.

[ii] The MNJTF was founded in 1994 to curb banditry. In 2015, the force, which by then comprised Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin, expanded its scope to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its headquarters was also in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, but the force was largely Nigeria-centric, given that it collaborated alongside multiple Nigerian counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram.

[iii] “Chad urges international community to boost support after Boko Haram attack,” france24.com. 30 October 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241030-chad-urges-international-community-to-boost-support-after-boko-haram-attack

Image Information:

Image: Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.
Source: André Kodmadjingar (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahamat_Idriss_Deby_(en_boubou_blanc).png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Nigerian Senator Proposes Employment of Private Military Companies Against Boko Haram

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Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.

“These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

Nigeria is a country that has historically shied away from employing private military companies (PMCs) as a matter of national sovereignty. When the country has employed PMCs, including a South African-led contingent[i] that combatted Boko Haram in 2015, it has not yielded success beyond short-term gains. However, the excerpted Daily Trust article indicates that an influential politician in Boko Haram’s heartland, Borno State, is now calling for Nigeria to again employ PMCs. According to the article, Borno South Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume[ii] is urging Nigerian President Bola Tinubu to temporarily hire PMCs because the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force are making progress against Boko Haram but are unable to secure victory. However, the claims that progress is being made against Boko Haram is debatable. For example, the article notes that, among other larger attacks, Boko Haram (likely the faction of the late Abubakar Shekau[iii]) had just raided Ngoshe in the Gwoza local government area and abducted numerous civilians and killed six farmers.

In addition, Ndume’s suggestion that the PMCs would only operate “temporarily” raises questions about whether they could secure victory, given the late Shekau faction and the stronger Islamic State in West Africa Province faction and their predecessors have been fighting since 2009. Since then, neither the Nigerian military nor the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising Nigeria and its four land neighbors and previous PMCs, has come close to defeating[iv] these factions. Furthermore, Ndume has hinted that the PMCs would not only finish Boko Haram in this “temporary” time frame but also combat the possibly even more widespread problem of banditry in northwestern Nigeria. Defeating either Boko Haram or the bandits, let alone both, would be an insurmountable task for Nigeria’s military even if several thousand PMC personnel were operating alongside them.

Ndume did not mention the company or origin of the PMCs whom he is advising Tinubu to employ. Nevertheless, the main option in the region would seem to be Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor of the Wagner Group. The recent pro-Russian sentiment exhibited during anti-corruption protests in northern Nigeria, as well as the Russian efforts to displace the West, including France in the Sahel and potentially the United States in Nigeria, could represent the beginning of Russian efforts to pull Nigeria closer into its orbit for the first time since the end of the Soviet era. If Ndume’s proposal gains traction, it could herald new geopolitical contestation in Nigeria, but few favorable outcomes for counterinsurgency or counter-banditry in the country.

Sources:

“Ndume asks Tinubu to hire military contractors to flush out Boko Haram,” Daily Trust (most widely circulated newspaper in northern Nigeria, which covers the region’s affairs from a critical perspective), 2 October 2024. https://dailytrust.com/ndume-asks-tinubu-to-hire-military-contractors-to-flush-out-boko-haram/

Senator representing Borno South, Mohammed Ali Ndume, has called on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to temporarily hire the services of “military contractors” to wipe out the remnants of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State. Ndume, who hailed the gallant performance of the military and Civilian JTF, said they are ill-equipped to carry out the task of eliminating the remaining insurgents who operate within. “All across the world, governments hire the services of military contractors to engage in certain places. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu can consider this as a short measure. These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

“These contractors will come with their equipment and military hardware. In a very short time, they’ll eliminate those Boko Haram terrorists. The contractors can also be used to eliminate those bandits operating in the North West. His comment comes after Boko Haram terrorists launched a fresh attack in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno, where they  slaughtered six farmers and  abducted five others including women.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, ISWAP lost territory after the armies of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and South African PMCs led by a former apartheid-era South African Defence Force officer supported the Nigerian army to expel ISWAP from towns it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. Nevertheless, disputes over payments of the PMCs, ISWAP’s retreat into rural areas, and ISWAP’s retaliatory attacks against Niger, Chad, and Cameroon undermined the counter-ISWAP offensive’s momentum. The PMCs and Nigeria’s three neighboring countries all eventually left Nigeria and ISWAP and the Shekau faction both renewed operations in 2017 to recapture territories and overrun Nigerian military outposts and bases.

[ii] Ndume himself was suspected of supporting Boko Haram and even jailed early in the insurgency in 2012 when he reportedly contacted Boko Haram leadership 73 times in one month. It later surfaced that he was, however, attempting to negotiate.

[iii] Since the Shekau faction split from ISWAP in 2016, Gwoza has remained one of its strongholds. In addition, mass abductions and killings of civilian farmers is typical of the Shekau faction’s brutality, whereas ISWAP has generally avoided tactics that alienate and brutalize the local population.

[iv] The Nigerian president from 2015 to 2023, Muhammadu Buhari, notoriously claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” after coming into office only to see the two main factions resurface stronger than before by 2017.

Image Information:

Image: Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.
Source: VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9sMaiduguri2016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Arabic-Language Media Divided on Hezbollah’s Future

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Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.

“If [Nasrallah’s] lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…”

Hezbollah’s future has become a subject of intense speculation in Arabic-language media following the group’s loss of its top leadership in Israeli strikes earlier this year, including that of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. [i] Hezbollah’s friends and foes alike agree that the leadership decapitation was a painful blow, but they disagree on the degree to which the group will be able to adapt and reconstitute in the aftermath. Ultimately, predictions of Hezbollah’s future hinge largely on whether Hezbollah is seen primarily as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy or as a grassroots Lebanese political movement. Those who view Hezbollah as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy are more likely to see the leadership decapitation as a critical blow, while those who emphasize its grassroots Lebanese identity tend to view the losses as difficult but surmountable.

The first two accompanying excerpts, from the UAE think tank Emirates Policy Center and the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, illustrate the type of analysis that emphasizes Iranian influence and hierarchical organization as central components to Hezbollah’s strength. The first excerpt warns that the loss of old-guard leadership and the transition to a younger generation beholden to Iran is unlikely to be seamless and risks creating fissures that will fracture the group into smaller—arguably more dangerous—territorial-based factions. The second excerpt, meanwhile, suggests that Tehran may seek greater direct control over Hezbollah to prevent fragmentation and ensure organizational cohesion.

On the other hand, however, supporters and sympathizers of Hezbollah argue that the movement is resilient enough to reconstitute internally in the aftermath of the losses. Although the loss of Nasrallah and other top leaders is significant, they view it as a setback rather than a death blow for an organization designed to be adaptable. Writing in the wake of Nasrallah’s death, the editor-in-chief of the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar explains how the group can be expected to restructure and rebuild in a way that addresses the vulnerabilities that allowed Israel to decimate its leadership.

Ultimately, despite varied predictions—whether of fragmentation, increased Iranian control, or adaptive transformation—all analyses seem to agree on one point: Hezbollah, even after these substantial leadership losses, will continue to exert a powerful influence on the regional strategic landscape.

Sources:

تداعيات تغييب الجيل المؤسس لـ «حزب الله» اللبناني: إعادة التشكيل، أم التشظّي والانفراط؟

“The repercussions of the absence of the founding generation of the Lebanese Hezbollah: Restructuring, or fragmentation and disintegration?” Emirates Policy Center (UAE think tank), 9 October 2024. https://www.epc.ae/ar/details/brief/tadaeiat-taghyib-aljil-almuasis-li-hezbollah

In the case of Hezbollah, the absence of the “charismatic leader” is accompanied by strategic shocks and numerous major absences, which have put the fate of the entire party in question…

The new leadership of the party is likely to be formed from the generation of youth who were educated and trained in Iran, a generation that speaks Persian fluently no less than Arabic. These sons grew up in a time of prosperity, when the party had abundant resources, its revenues were abundant from various sources, and its weapons were advanced and plentiful…

But the sudden absence of the older generation, and the rise of the new generation of sons will create a huge void. It is a generation that does not enjoy the same historical ties that their fathers enjoyed; its decisions are controlled by Shiite doctrine and Iranian directives without any significant influence from Lebanese motives…

Perhaps the greatest danger to Lebanon and the region is the possibility of Hezbollah splitting and fragmenting into a group of competing terrorist organizations and gangs spread across the Lebanese arena… Such a dangerous scenario should never be allowed to be repeated in Lebanon…

In short, the series of Israeli assassinations against Hezbollah leaders has a tactical effect that Israel wants on the battlefield; it will reduce the party’s ability to manage and fight the battle, but it will open the doors of Lebanon and the region to the unknown, and put Hezbollah on the brink of fragmentation, sliding into more extremism, chaos, and the rise of warlords…

إيران تعيّن «وصياً» على «حزب الله»

“Iran appoints Hezbollah ‘guardian’,” al-Jarid (Kuwaiti daily), 10 November, 2024. https://www.aljarida.com/article/77625

A source in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps revealed to al-Jarida that Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the assistant commander of the force, has been appointed as a “supervisor” of the Lebanese Hezbollah, pending the appointment of the party’s new secretary-general after the assassination of its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah…

The source indicated that Fallahzadeh, who was the shadow of the former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and who has extensive experience in managing wars and field battles, will temporarily supervise the party, and his appointment will not require any organizational procedures within the party, nor will it result in any change in the party’s political structure. He stressed that the party’s political decision will remain in the hands of its “Lebanese leaders,” who will remain in their positions and communicate with other Lebanese forces and with the Lebanese authorities, explaining that Fallahzadeh’s mission lies only in helping to manage the current war with Israel, and securing communication and logistical support for the party.

المقاومة أطلقت ورشة ترميم هيكليتها وقدراتها

“The resistance launched a workshop to restore its structure and capabilities,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 10 October 2024. https://www.al-akhbar.com/Politics/385253/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87

First, the blow that the resistance received at the level of its central leadership was very harsh, very large, and very broad, and left a direct impact on everything…

Until now, it can be said that the hierarchy and mechanism for issuing essential and urgent decisions, and the sequence of work and implementation orders, are being organized in a way that provides the best organizational environment for the work of the resistance military units, whether those present in the field or those awaiting orders to join…

[Nasrallah’s] role had grown after the martyrdom of leaders from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran during the past two decades, which forced him to distribute their tasks to others, but he had his share of every issue, which was reflected in the past ten years in an extreme centralization in the leadership structure and decision-making in the party. This is what made the enemy bet that the assassination of the Sayyed constitutes a blow to the backbone not only of Hezbollah, but of an entire axis.

Therefore, we must all adapt to the new situation, and not place the burden on whoever takes over the matter after him as was the case before, and not ask anyone, not even God, to bring us an identical copy of the martyred Sayyed. If his lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…

Notes:

[i] The speculation is hardly confined to Arabic-language media. For a sample of the debate within the U.S. think tank community, see for instance: Sarah E. Parkinson and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. “Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah,” Foreign Affairs, 11 November 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/targeted-killings-wont-destroy-hezbollah; Bruce Hoffman. “The Nasrallah Killing Is a Crushing Blow to Hezbollah,” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 September 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/nasrallah-killing-crushing-blow-hezbollah; “Experts react: Hassan Nasrallah is dead. What’s next for Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran?” Atlantic Council, 28 September 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-hassan-nasrallah-is-dead-whats-next-for-hezbollah-israel-and-iran/

Image Information:

Image: Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sayyid_Nasrallah.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Terrorist Attack in Togo Reveals Turkish Counter-Terrorism Role

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Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.

“The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border.”

The littoral West African country of Togo, along with its neighbor Benin, is a main target of expansion for the al-Qaeda affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).[i] As discussed in a French-language article in the Burkinabe publication, 24heures.bf, on 2 October, JNIM attacked a construction site in northern Togo engaged in the building of trenches to defend against JNIM incursions. The attack claimed the lives of nine Togolese soldiers and 10 civilians. This is not the first time JNIM has specifically destroyed trench-building projects and killed construction workers. The article notes that Togolese Army reinforcements accompanied by Turkish instructors in helicopters, finally repelled the attack by firing on the JNIM militants.

Although Turkish instructors have reportedly operated in Niger alongside Russian Africa Corps personnel, it was previously unclear whether Turkish instructors operated in Togo.[ii] The article, in fact, asserts that two Turkish instructors have been killed in previous JNIM attacks in Togo, which suggests Turks may be more involved in counter-insurgency operations in Togo than previously known.

The involvement of Turkish instructors in Togo seemingly differs from that of African Corps personnel operating in the Sahel, who not only engage in counterinsurgency operations against JNIM but are also involved in propping up post-coup junta military regimes in the Sahel, including Burkina Faso. Notably, Africa Corps has suffered numerous setbacks in battles with JNIM. The Turkish private military company, Sadat, had reportedly been active in Niger and Burkina Faso. The presence of Turkish instructors in Togo implies a likely expansion of the Turkish PMC and instructor presence in West Africa

Sources:

“Attaque terroriste au Togo: 19 morts près de la frontière du Burkina (Terrorist attack in Togo: 19 dead near the Burkina border),” 24heures.bf (independent French-language Burkina Faso-based publication with a focus on defense and security affairs), 4 October 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/attaque-terroriste-au-togo-19-morts-pres-de-la-frontiere-du-burkina/

A terrorist attack struck, on October 2, the town of Fanworgou in the Kpendjal region in northern Togo, exactly on the border with Burkina. The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling along the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border. The result: 19 dead, including 9 soldiers and 10 civilians, including EBOMAF machine operators and technicians.

Reinforcements, especially airborne, were deployed to the site to counter the attackers, who were repelled by military units supported by helicopters and piloted by Turkish instructors. Despite the construction of trenches, the terrorists seem to continue to adapt their tactics.

Notes:

[i] Jacob Zenn, “Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo,” OE Watch, 07-2022, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420353?pi296680=2

[ii] According to Africa Defense Forum, “some of Sadat’s Syrian fighters in Niger have ended up under Russian command fighting violent extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in the Liptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” Africa Defense Forum, “Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence,” adf-magazine.com, 30 July 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/

Image Information:

Image: Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.
Source: EC-JRC/ECHO, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Togo_Base_Map.png
Attribution: CC x 2.

Mexico’s Sheinbaum Launches Plan To Address Security Crisis

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Journalists protest rising violence in Mexico.

“During López Obrador’s six-year term, crime claimed a record number of more than 190,000 lives, but the new president has ruled out confronting violence with more violence.”

Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum assumed power in October in the middle of a full-blown security crisis. In just a few weeks, the State of Sinaloa has witnessed hundreds of deaths at the hands of warring factions within the Sinaloa Cartel.[i] Several public officials were assassinated, in one case—the mayor of Chilpancingo, the capital of Guerrero State—within a week of assuming office. Therefore, Sheinbaum presented her new security plan for Mexico at a critical moment. The excerpted article from left-center Argentine daily Página 12 emphasizes the continuity of Sheinbaum’s plan with that of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s, security plan, dubbed “hugs, not bullets.” The article characterizes López Obrador as seeking to attack crime at its social roots. However, there will also be some innovations in Sheinbaum’s security plan. The Página 12 article reports that Sheinbaum will concentrate security efforts on the top ten most violent cities in Mexico. The second excerpted article from Mexican business-focused daily El Economista notes that almost half of all homicides occur in six districts in Mexico. In these districts, the fight for territorial control between the two largest cartels, Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation, is most intense.

The success or failure of Sheinbaum’s security plan will have significant implications for the operational environment. Given their importance in the illicit drug and human smuggling routes, Mexico’s criminal cartels operate transnationally and drive much of Latin America’s criminal dynamics. A successful security plan in Mexico may have salutary effects for other countries, such as Ecuador, which are suffering from the expansion efforts of Mexican criminal organizations throughout Latin America.[ii]

Sources:

“Sheinbaum presentó su nuevo plan de seguridad (Sheinbaum presented her new security plan),” Página 12 (an Argentine daily known for a leftist bent), 9 October 2024. https://www.pagina12.com.ar/773339-sheinbaum-presento-su-nuevo-plan-de-seguridad

The former mayor of the federal district, who took office on October 1, pledged to maintain the strategy of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who chose to employ a series of social policies to attack crime at its roots during his term…In her proposal, Sheinbaum projects what she calls a ‘100-day security strategy,’ according to which national security would focus on the 10 most dangerous cities and states in the country…During López Obrador’s six-year term, crime claimed a record number of more than 190,000 lives, but the new president has ruled out confronting violence with more violence…‘What are we going to use? Prevention, attention to the causes, intelligence and presence,’ she said.

“Sheinbaum presenta su plan de seguridad que busca abatir la espiral de violencia de otros sexenios (Sheinbaum presents her security plan that seeks to reduce the spiral of violence of other six-year terms),” El Economista (a Mexican daily focused on business and economy), 8 October 2024. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/sheinbaum-presenta-plan-seguridad-busca-abatir-espiral-violencia-otros-sexenios-20241008-729110.html 

The president will launch her strategy after the mayor of Chilpancingo, the capital of the state of Guerrero, one of the six districts of the country that account for almost half of all homicides, was beheaded last Sunday, a few days after taking office. Violence in Mexico is concentrated in strategic points (drug routes, borders, ports of entry for Chinese fentanyl components, and avocado and lemon producing regions). In these areas, the two main cartels in the country, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), operate and fight each other…Sheinbaum has only been in office for a week and the violence is relentless: the decapitation of the mayor of Chilpancingo, the discovery of 12 bodies in the state of Guanajuato, and some 150 people killed in three weeks in the state of Sinaloa.

Notes:

[i] For more on the internecine fighting within the Sinaloa Cartel, see: Christine Murray, “US Arrests Spark Cartel ‘War’ in Northern Mexico: ‘Like a Narco Pandemic,’” Financial Times, 28 September 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/0f883ce4-c922-48a7-b9e8-7793fccbf0c9

[ii] For more information on the presence of Mexico’s criminal organizations in Ecuador, see: Ryan Berg, “Why Ecuador’s Security Crisis Demands Global Action,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 July 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-ecuadors-security-crisis-demands-global-action

Image Information:

Image: Journalists protest rising violence in Mexico.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/knightfoundation/5569178904. 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Cartel Internecine Warfare Erupts in the State of Sinaloa

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Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.

“President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act “with a minimum of responsibility.”

The state of Sinaloa, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, is synonymous with cartels and home to one of the most notorious transnational criminal groups in the country.[i] Following the arrest of longtime cartel kingpin, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, at the U.S. southern border, violence has broken out between two opposing factions of the Sinaloa Cartel.[ii] Anticipating further violence between the two major factions, one controlled by the children of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera and the other by those loyal to El Chapo’s former business associate, El Mayo, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador pleaded with the cartel to “act with a minimum of responsibility,” according to the excerpted article from right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal. The newspaper reports that the Mexican government is downplaying the number of deaths in Sinaloa; however, the violence has escalated rapidly, triggering the cancellation of Mexico’s Independence Day celebrations in the state of Sinaloa.

Argentine news outlet Infobae reports that at least 18 people have reportedly died in a wave of violence that includes roadblocks, the destruction of public infrastructure, and the closure of businesses. The escalating turf war between the two factions of the Sinaloa Cartel has significant ramifications for the operational environment. First, incoming president Claudia Sheinbaum will likely start her term on 1 October with an escalating security crisis in the Sinaloa state. Second, whichever faction emerges victorious in this internecine battle will have more consolidated control over Mexico’s criminal landscape and lucrative routes to traffic, among other things, fentanyl to the United States.

Sources:

“AMLO llama a grupos criminales que se enfrentan en Sinaloa a actuar ‘con un mínimo de responsabilidad’ (AMLO calls on criminal groups fighting in Sinaloa to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility’),” El Universal (right-leaning Mexican daily), 13 September 2024. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-llama-a-grupos-criminales-que-se-enfrentan-en-sinaloa-a-actuar-con-un-minimo-de-responsabilidad/

After four days of violence in Culiacán, Sinaloa, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility.’ He said, ‘With the presence of the Armed Forces to ensure that there is no confrontation, to protect the population, they must also act with a minimum of responsibility. It is their family, their fellow countrymen, their municipality, their state and their country.’ At a press conference, the President considered that the violence in Culiacán so far ‘is not a major issue.’…Out of prudence, the Independence Day celebrations in Culiacán were cancelled.

Source: “Al menos 18 muertes en una nueva ola de violencia en Sinaloa (México) (At least 18 dead in a new wave of violence in Sinaloa (Mexico)),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 15 September 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/09/15/al-menos-18-muertes-en-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia-en-sinaloa-mexico/   

During the second week of September, 18 homicides, 36 carjackings and 28 reports of deprivation of liberty have been recorded, in an escalation of violence carried out by criminal groups in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, according to authorities…Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and has attributed these clashes to disputes between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos.

Notes:

[i] For an updated profile of the Sinaloa Cartel and its activities, see: Insight Crime, “Sinaloa Cartel,” last updated 15 March 2024. https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

[ii] The story of El Mayo’s arrival at the U.S. southern border is long and still not fully known, but for a comprehensive background on what may have transpired, see: José de Córdoba, “Betrayal and Capture of Sinaloa Cartel Leaders Spark Fears of Turf War,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/betrayal-and-capture-of-sinaloa-cartel-leaders-spark-fears-of-turf-war-d1a805f8

Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.
Source: https://picryl.com/media/booking-photo-of-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-front-873b60

Drone Warfare Is Becoming a Common Tactic in Mali

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A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.

“The use of drones by the CSP rebels, if it were to increase, could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels.”

Recent reporting indicates that both the Malian military and Tuareg separatist groups are utilizing drone warfare.[i] According to the first excerpted article from the Africa-focused UK-based news publication Qiraat Africa,rebel forces reported 21 civilian deaths, including 11 children, following Malian military air strikes on the village of Tinzaouatine.[ii] The strike was part of intensified fighting following the recent defeat of Malian Army and Africa Corps mercenaries by rebel fighters who allied with militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) is a coalition of Malian separatist groups fighting against government forces in northern Mali and is the latest evolution of the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg people, who inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya, have been fighting with the Malian government for autonomy on and off since the 1990s. While these separatist groups have been geographically close to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also based in northern Mali, their motivation has consistently been about independence as opposed to an Islamic caliphate. According to the rebels, the airstrikes allegedly targeted a pharmacy and groups of gathered people in the village. The Malian Armed Forces confirmed the attack but stated that the strikes were precise and specifically targeted terrorists. These strikes and associated civilian casualties are likely to continue as fighting persists, and government forces cannot conduct a persistent ground campaign in the Kidal region of the country.

Seemingly in retaliation for the Tinzaouatine attack, the rebels conducted a drone strike against a Malian Army camp. According to the second excerpted article from French news radio RFI, rebel forces struck a Malian Army camp approximately 60 miles from Timbuktu, though no casualties were reported. The strike marked an evolution in the conflict, with both sides now utilizing drone warfare. Although the rebel forces indicated they did not acquire the drones through Ukraine or JNIM, there are few open-source details on the type or quantity of drones they use. The leadership of the rebel faction did acknowledge that they have had access to the drones for ten months to train with and manufacture grenades. While still an effective tool, rebel forces are likely not using as technologically advanced drones as the Malian Army, who, alongside their Africa Corps counterparts, have been using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones with significant effect.[ii]

Drone warfare in Mali and possibly other non-state actors could signal a fundamental shift in the conduct of battles and the power balance in the region. The only other time rebel forces utilized drones was in July 2024, when they defeated Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces. Though the CSP currently denies drone use in conjunction with terrorist organizations like JNIM, their successful use in the region has the potential to also expand the usage by jihadist groups. Drone warfare on both sides will also likely impact civilian casualties and cause problems for the Malian armed forces, similar to what the Russian military is currently facing in Ukraine.

Sources:

“Au moins 21 civils tués par un drone dans le nord du Mali, selon un groupe dirigé par des Touaregs (At least 21 civilians killed by drone strike in northern Mali, Tuareg-leg group says),” Qiraata Africa (independent UK-based magazine focused on sub-Saharan Africa), 26 August 2024.
https://qiraatafrican.com/fr/12604/au-moins-21-civils-tues-par-un-drone-dans-le-nord-du-mali-selon-un-groupe-dirige-par-des-touaregs/

Airstrikes on a village in northern Mali near the Algerian border killed 21 civilians on Sunday, including 11 children, a spokesman for a coalition of predominantly Tuareg pro-independence groups said. The attack on the village of Tinzaouatine marks the highest number of civilians killed by drones since the breakdown of a peace deal between the country’s ruling military junta and pro-independence armed groups in northern Mali last year.

The Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups fighting for the independence of northern Mali, which they call Azawad. Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy, followed by additional strikes targeting people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “The provisional toll of these criminal strikes stands at 21 civilians killed, including 11 children and the head of the pharmacy, dozens of injured and enormous material damage,” said the statement signed by Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the rebel coalition present in the village.

In a statement broadcast on national television, the Malian armed forces confirmed these strikes. “The army general staff confirms the airstrikes in the Tinzaouatine sector on the morning of August 25, 2024. These precision strikes targeted terrorists,” the press release states. The strikes come weeks after the Malian army and mercenaries from the Russia-based Wagner Group were defeated by Tuareg rebels and fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a group linked to al-Qaeda.

Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy; then others targeted people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “Both Malian forces and Russian mercenaries lack a strong ground presence in the Kidal region, so using air assets, including drones, is the only way for them to engage armed groups in the region,” said Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan think tank. “Therefore, airstrikes, including on civilians, are likely to increase as revenge for the recent major setback suffered by Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali”

Source: “Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones (Mali: CSP rebels now fight with drones),” RFI (French-based radio station and part of the France Medias Monde group), 12 September 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240912-mali-les-rebelles-du-csp-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-avec-des-drones

In Mali, the rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) are now fighting with drones. They used them on September 11, 2024, against a Malian army camp about a hundred kilometers from Timbuktu. No casualties were reported. But it was on this occasion that the rebels revealed that they had drones and that it was the second time they had used them. A new addition to their arsenal could change the shape of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the rebels in the North.

The rebels claim to have used it [drones] for the first time at the end of July in Tinzaouatène, during their only but important victory against the Malian soldiers and the Wagner group, who had lost several dozen men and were forced to turn back. Where do these drones come from? How many do the rebels have? What model exactly? No details have been released. CSP spokesman Mohamed el Maouloud Ramadane says only that they were “purchased,” and assures that they were not supplied by Ukraine – nor by the al-Qaeda-linked Jnim (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The jihadists, who are also fighting the Malian army in northern Mali , use drones to film their propaganda videos. To date, JNIM has not claimed responsibility for any drone attacks.

According to several CSP fighters contacted by RFI, the rebels have had these drones for about ten months now. “We had to train people and make the grenades; it’s dangerous, and it takes time,” explains one of them. Regarding their use in Tinzaouatène at the end of July, the rebels assure that it was ” decisive “, particularly ” against the armored vehicles”. At the time, the CSP rebels had not communicated on the unprecedented use of these drones. Nor had the Malian army, which had exceptionally acknowledged ” a significant number of losses in human and material life ” (press release of July 29).

The Fama (Malian Armed Forces) and their Wagner auxiliaries themselves use armed drones. The first Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, acquired by the Malian army, were received in December 2022. Other deliveries followed, always relayed on state media to illustrate the army’s “rise in power”. These drones actually proved decisive during the capture of Kidal, a rebel stronghold, last November. The strikes forced the CSP men to withdraw, without even attempting ground combat. If the use of drones by the CSP rebels were to increase, it could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels. It could help to rebalance the forces because, until now, the Malian army and Wagner dominate the terrain. Since the use of armed drones requires particularly reliable intelligence and careful targeting, it could also increase the risk for civilians, whom the CSP rebels have made it their mission to protect.

Notes:

[i] The linked article by Le Monde goes in-depth on the Tuareg rebellion that has been going on in Mali since the 1990s. For more information, see: Philippe Baqué, “For the Tuaregs, unite or disappear (Mali’s Tuaregs: ‘For us, this war is existential’),” Le Monde, April 2024. https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/13mali

[ii] The Bayraktar TB2 is described as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of a 27-hour maximum flight time and a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. For additional information see: “Bayraktar TB2,” Bayraktar, n.d. https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/

Image Information:

Image: A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0