Tag Archives: Red Sea

Iranian Navy Conducts Ballistic Missile Launches From Warship

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“The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024

“Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”

Iran has successfully test-fired two unidentified long-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers (1,056 miles) from the Shahid Mahdavi, a converted cargo ship operating in the Gulf of Oman. According to the excerpted article published by the news outlet Mehr News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami commented on the first-time launches with a warning: “Nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.” The Shahid Mahdavi functions as a multipurpose aircraft carrier capable of carrying an array of military hardware, including air defense systems, drones, radars, and missiles.[i] The ballistic missiles reportedly hit targets in the Kavir Desert in central Iran.

Iran has the most extensive and diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and North Africa. It is also the only country to possess a 2,000-kilometer range missile without a nuclear weapon capability.[ii] Iranian officials maintain that Tehran’s decision to acquire ballistic missiles was prompted by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in order to deter future missile attacks by enemy countries.[iii] Calling the launch a “success,” Salami was quoted in the first excerpted article as saying that “the range of influence of [Iran’s] sea power has increased to any desired point.”[iv] The second excerpted article from the Iranian media source Khabar Online reports that Salami highlighted that the IRGC is “determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements” of Iran. As tensions in the region remain elevated as part of the Gaza war, and as Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to attack ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, this new development underscores what happens when Tehran is unchecked by the international community.

Sources:

“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد از ناو جنگی سپاه (Launch of long-range ballistic missile from IRGC warship),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 12 February 2024.

https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6022735/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87

Referring to the strength of the IRGC Navy, Major General Salami stated: Our offensive power and naval defense, with the arrival of a multitude of drones, cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles with the ability to target combat vessels at sea, are very complex and show an interweaving of a combination of up-to-date, advanced, and modern capabilities.

He continued: “In the IRGC Navy, we had new achievements. The first issue was the joint work between the Air Force and IRGC Navy with the launch of a long-range ballistic missile from a warship that was successfully achieved, and with this new success, the range of influence of our sea power has increased to any desired point.”

The IRGC commander-in-chief, also referring to the other capabilities of the IRGC Navy, emphasized: “The oceanliner (warships) can appear anywhere in the oceans, and naturally, when they can launch missiles, nowhere is safe for powers who seek to threaten our security.”

“شلیک موشک بالستیک دوربرد سپاه پاسداران از روی یک ناو جنگی به روایت سردار سلامی (Firing a Revolutionary Guards long-range ballistic missile on a warship according to General Salami),” Khabar Online (Iranian news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 12 February 2024.

https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1872279/%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87

According to Khabar Online News Agency, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander-in-Chief General Hossein Salami said in a televised interview with the Revolutionary Guards program on Channel One: “In the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we are always ready to give our lives for the great Iranian nation and are determined to powerfully defend national security, national interests, and the achievements of the Islamic revolution and must stand against all threats and dangers with all our strength and prevent the formation of new equilibriums in the field of the country’s national security.”

Notes:

[i] The test launch on the Shahid Mahdavi, which was released on video, was a joint project between the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) and Air Force. The type of ballistic missiles used in the exercise was not verified, as several state media outlets have named various missiles with an array of ranges.

[ii] Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Iran Primer, 13 January 2021. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program

[iii] Kamran Taremi, “Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking,” Wilson Center, 14 October 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ballistic-missiles-irans-military-thinking

[iv] United Nations Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 2231, which once constrained Iran’s ballistic missile-related tests and transfers, expired in October 2023. For additional information, see: “Arms embargo on Iran expires despite US opposition,” Al Jazeera, 18 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/18/arms-embargo-on-iran-expires-despite-us-opposition

Image Information:

Image: “The moment the Dezful ballistic missile is fired from the Shahid Mahdavi warship in the form of a launch container,” Telegram video screenshot, 13 February 2024
Source: https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/83945
Attribution: IRGC Cyber Telegram Channel

Russia Possibly Courting Eritrea for Red Sea Naval Base

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Massawa harbour

“The [Russian and Eritrean] leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern.”

On 31 May, the Russian government-affiliated TASS news agency, published the excerpted article about Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Putin. According to the article, the leaders discussed Russia’s war in Ukraine and other issues, such as academic exchanges and trade. Russia is interested in Eritrea because of its location adjacent to the Red Sea and its demonstrations of loyalty to the Kremlin, according to a second article from the Ukrainian publication focus.ua. This article notes that Eritrea was the only African country to vote against a UN General Assembly decision for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in March 2022.[i] Russia had previously signed an agreement with Sudan to base four Russian ships and 300 soldiers in Port Sudan, seeking a foothold on the Red Sea, according to the focus.ua article. The article notes that Sudan has not ratified the agreement, and the country’s ongoing conflict and Western pressure may cause the country’s authorities to reverse the deal. Eritrea, which borders Sudan, would provide Russia with an alternate base location near the Red Sea should the Sudan agreement not materialize. The Red Sea has strategic importance for Russia. Not only does 10 percent of global maritime traffic pass through it, but Russia’s competitors and other major powers, such as the United States and China, have naval bases along the Red Sea in Djibouti, which borders Eritrea to the south.[ii] However, Russia’s naval presence near one of the world’s major trade arteries represents expansionist intentions from the Ukrainian perspective represented in the article.

“Путин начал переговоры с президентом Эритреи (Putin Begins Discussions with the President of Eritrea),” tass.ru (Russian government-affiliated publication), 31 May 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/17892945

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the head of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, who is in Russia on an official visit. The leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern. The current talks were the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries. 

According to data for 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Eritrea amounted to $13.5 million, while exports from Russia to Eritrea accounted for $12.7 million. Since 2015, Eritreans have been provided with scholarships to study at Russian universities.

“Завоевание Африки. Зачем Кремлю военная база в Красном море (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” focus.ua (Russian and Ukrainian language Ukrainian magazine focusing on global economics), 16 February 2023. https://focus.ua/world/550262-zavoevanie-afriki-zachem-kremlyu-voennaya-baza-v-krasnom-more

Russia does not abandon attempts to expand control over African states.

Wherever there are “Wagners”, companies associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin gain access to the natural resources of these countries and a certain political influence on them (usually they are authoritarian regimes). There is information about the presence of this group of mercenaries in Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and possibly Eritrea. 

Most likely, the military authorities of Sudan intend to receive weapons from the Russian Federation for their army, and also consider Russia’s military presence as one of the factors guaranteeing the preservation of the political processes in the country after the presidential and parliamentary elections. For Russia, hosting a base carries a wide range of political benefits. First of all, it is a presence in a region that is strategically important for the entire planet. The Red Sea has played an important role in world trade since the beginning of navigation. Now 10% of all maritime trade passes through it.We are mentioning that at a hypothetical military base (most likely it will be in Port Sudan) no more than four ships and 300 soldiers can be located at the same time. Time will tell how Sudan behaves in such circumstances. However, the growing influence of Russia in Africa, especially in the area of important trade routes, should be a wake-up call for the democratic part of the world.

Notes:

[i] In March 2023, five countries, including Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Eritrea, and Russia itself, voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that “demand[ed] that Russia “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Sudan, in contrast, was one of 35 countries that abstained from the vote. See UNGA, “General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine,” 2 March 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

[ii] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened a “logistical support facility” in Djibouti in 2017 with the potential to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa and the Middle East more broadly. Chinese ambitions in Djibouti were also reflected in China’s desire to compete with Russia, which itself had strengthened its base in Tartus, Syria during the Syrian civil war. Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2020), “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29:125, 731-747.

Image Information:

Image: Massawa harbour
Source: Reinhard Dietrich, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Massawa_harbour.JPG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sudanese Conflict Harms Russian Military and Mining Interests

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Darfur report - Page 3 Image 1

Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1.

“The war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging for the seizure of power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.”

On 18 April, the French-language website francetvinfo.frfrancetvinfo.fr published the excerpted article, which covers a French think-tank’s perspectives on Russian interests in Sudan amid that country’s conflict between two warring factions loyal to two different generals. The article notes that, according to the deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory think-tank, the conflict harms Russia’s interests in Sudan because Sudan has long allied with Russia in return for supplies of Russian grain and arms.[i] However, the instability and uncertain result of the war in Sudan could put the alliance in jeopardy, while undermining Russian military and economic objectives in the country. According to the article, beyond Sudan’s diplomatic support to Russia, Russia also engages in mining in Sudan, such as for gold, which helps Russia mitigate the impact of international sanctions. In addition, Russia has aspirations to use Port Sudan as a naval base.[ii] According to the second excerpted Russian-language article from gazeta.ru, the port would be significant for Russian geopolitical power projection by extending Russian influence to the Red Sea and, more broadly, the Indian Ocean. As a result, Russia’s concerns about these negative outcomes of the war in Sudan explains why Russia has been vocal in calling for ceasefire between the warring parties in Sudan.

Sources:

“Pourquoi la guerre des généraux “n’est pas un scénario très favorable aux intérêts russes”, selon un expert (Why the War of the Generals ‘is Not a Very Favorable Situation for Russian Interests”, according to an expert),” francetvinfo.fr (French public service radio network), 18 April 2023. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/soudan/soudan-pourquoi-la-guerre-des-generaux-n-est-pas-un-scenario-tres-favorable-aux-interets-russes-selon-un-expert_5777636.html

By consistently opposing UN resolutions condemning Russia and its war on Ukraine, Sudan has proven itself a staunch ally of Moscow. This is no surprise when one knows that Russia is its main supplier of arms and grain. And the war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging to seize power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.

Sudan has become one of the main entry points for Russian influence on the African continent, explains Igor Delanoë, deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory in Moscow: “Russian companies in the field of extraction, mining, and more have actually been working there for years… It gives a window for Russia to the heart of the African continent”. 

A Russian naval base project in Port Sudan in the Red Sea is even on the table. But the current crisis is not helping Moscow’s affairs… Hence Russia is making repeated calls for ceasefires to end the Sudanese generals’ war as soon as possible.

Source:

“Зачем России база на Красном море? (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” 14 February 2023, gazeta.ru (pro-government Russian publication focusing on socio-political affairs) https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2023/02/14/16251997.shtml

The diplomats of modern Russia should proceed exclusively from long-term national interests. Russia repeatedly tried to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean in both the 19th and 20th centuries. In the recent past, aspirations to create naval bases in the Indian Ocean did not end in success either.There is hope that in the 21st century the country will finally establish itself both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, as well as in other critical points of the world oceans that are important from the geopolitical and geostrategic points of view.

Notes:

[i] After the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia in October 2019, Moscow began to show growing importance to the continent. However, Russia developed particularly close cooperation with Sudan, which raised hopes in Moscow that it had acquired a foothold on the continent to access other countries of the continent, such as being able to increase its influence politically and economically in the Central African Republic. Even when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was removed from power by the Sudanese military in 2019, Moscow, which had supported al-Bashir, was still able to maintain close ties with Sudan. See: Sergey Kostelyanets, “Russia-Sudan Relations in the Early 21st Century: A Lost Opportunity or the Foundation for a New Beginning?” Asia and Africa Today 9 (2019): 56-62.

[ii] Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) visited Russia for one week just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The reasons for the meeting remain unclear, but Russia reportedly smuggled hundreds of tons of illegal gold from Sudan as part of efforts to protect itself from expected international sanctions over the war in Ukraine. More broadly, attempting to mitigate the impact of international sanctions is an important feature of Russia’s policy in Africa, including in Sudan as well as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Since the military’s overthrow of the civilian-led transitional government in 2021, Sudan had also been suffering an economic crisis, which was at least partly a result of the West halting financial aid to Sudan. This brought Russian and Sudan closer together ahead of the Russian war in Ukraine. Hamdi Abdel Rahman, “Uncovering the reasons behind Sudan’s Hemedti visit to Moscow amid the war in Ukraine,” futureuae.com, 10 March 2022. https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/7191/a-silovik-as-the-best-choice-uncovering-the-reasons-behind-sudans-hemedti-visit-to-moscow-amid-the-war-in-uk

Image Information:

Image: Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1
Source: Sean Woo https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darfur_report_-_Page_3_Image_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0