China Debuts New Space Capabilities

CZ-7 (space launch vehicle).

CZ-7 (space launch vehicle).


If deorbit sails are configured, the orbit time can be shortened to less than ten years.


Since the beginning of 2022, new capabilities of several significant systems in China’s space program have been tested. These include space-based orbital debris tracking sensors, a new spaceplane, a new series of datalink satellites, and tests of a deployable “sail” to facilitate deorbiting of satellites. Chinese state media China News Online describes the success of an orbital space debris monitoring system.  As satellites and components from past launches accumulate in orbit, the danger of an accidental collision increases, threatening critical systems. “Space Domain Awareness” is crucial for both civilian and military applications as it involves precision tracking of known satellites and debris. While China has built an extensive ground-based system of radars, lasers, and optical sensors for tracking this debris, orbital sensors avoid many issues faced by ground-based systems, such as atmospheric distortion and sensor overload due to daylight.  The same article also notes that China has made improvements to on-orbit image processing, an increasingly important technology, as the volume of data to be sent to ground stations increases.

China’s National Space Administration media outlet China Space Culture describes the successful test of a “de-orbital sail,” which uses the minimal atmosphere present in low Earth orbit to gradually lower and finally deorbit a satellite.  Giving more control over deorbiting satellites is a priority as they can sometimes fail to burn up fully in the earth’s atmosphere.  As Chinese companies begin to test large-scale constellations of satellites for communications and other purposes, the ability to better control their reentry or remove them from orbit at the end of their service life is a significant development.

The third notable development is the launch of a new generation of “Tianlian” or “sky chain” data-relay satellites [1].  These satellites are a key component of China’s space-based infrastructure, passing massive volumes of data from communications and Earth observing satellites from orbits on the other side of the world to other communications satellites where they can then transmit the data to ground stations [2]. According to the article in government-run Science and Technology Daily, the new satellites enable the completion of China’s space-based data network, allowing a shift from “intermittent” to “continuous” communication.  The article also notes that the new generation of data-relay satellites capitalizes on the development of improved high-throughput communications satellites based on the Dongfanghong-4 bus. An even more capable Dongfanghong-5 system intended to operate in the Extremely High-Frequency Q/V bands was launched in January 2020 [3].

Finally, China recently tested a reusable sub-orbital spaceplane, which can travel much faster than conventional aircraft due to the lower atmospheric pressure at the altitudes where they operate. Spaceplanes capable of achieving orbit offer the ability to maneuver more readily than traditional satellites and may act as testbeds for orbital technologies, which can then be brought back to Earth to collect data or further research.  Much of the technologies required for both types of systems are similar.  China wants to be a leader in space-based services and next-generation technologies. The development of such transatmospheric vehicles offers China a chance to not only improve its ability to operate in the space domain but to lead in emerging technologies. Space capabilities are the epitome of systems of systems.  As the aforementioned developments show, China is rapidly developing not only its ground-based support systems but its capacity to launch, maneuver on-orbit, and field resilient space-based systems as well.


Source:

“天舟三号飞船搭载显成果 空间碎片探测载荷在轨运行超9个月 (The Tianzhou-3 spacecraft carried remarkable achievements, and the space debris detection payload has been in orbit for more than nine months),” China News Online (PRC State Media), 8 July 2022. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2022/07-08/9799106.shtml

According to the China Manned Space Engineering Office, the Tianzhou-3 cargo spacecraft launched on 20 September 2021 carried payloads, including space debris detection systems. As of March 2022, The space debris detection payload has acquired thousands of images in orbit. At present, the payload has been operating in a stable orbit for more than nine months.

According to reports, the space debris detection payload includes an optical camera, an on-orbit data processing unit, and a temperature control unit. At present, the payload has been running stably in orbit for more than nine months.

As of March this year, the space debris detection payload has acquired thousands of images on-orbit and made breakthroughs testing the design of the optical system of the large-field high-sensitivity detection system, on-orbit algorithmic detection and identification and processing of dim and weak space targets, and the rapid transfer of massive amounts of data.

“China’s Largest De-orbital Sail Successfully Deployed (国内最大离轨帆成功在轨展开),” China Space Culture (China National Space Administration [CNSA] Official Weibo Account), 5 July 2022. https://weibo.com/u/7480894382

On 23 June, the Long 2 March carrier rocket was successfully launched. On 26 June, it successfully deployed a deorbit sail device. This is the largest de-orbital sail used by China, with a surface area of over 25 square meters once fully unfolded. With the sail, a 300kg satellite will re-enter the atmosphere within two years, freeing up valuable orbits and reducing space debris.

Without using measures [such as the sail] to deorbit itself, a 15-kg satellite in orbit at an altitude of 700km will remain in orbit for 120 years or more after the end of its service life; if deorbit sails are configured, the orbit time can be shortened to less than ten years. Moreover, the deorbiting sail is used to implement deorbiting without consuming fuel. Even if the spacecraft fails or is out of control, deorbiting can be effectively implemented.

“天链新星 ‘入列’ 我国第二代中继卫星系统建成 (“New Tianlian ‘Enters Service’ China’s Second-generation Relay Satellite System Has Been Completed),”

Science and Technology Daily (State media outlet managed by the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology), 14 July 2022.

http://www.news.cn/techpro/20220714/c15e476cee634e85beb0d4f95913c6f7/c.html

On 13 July, the Tianlian-2-03 satellite, developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) 5th Academy, was successfully launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center aboard a Long 3 March B carrier rocket.

After achieving a stable orbit, the satellite will form a network with the previously launched Tianlian-2 01 and 02 satellites to create China’s second-generation data relay satellite system. Both generations will be in orbit at the same time, significantly improving space-based Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C), and data relay capabilities.

After the Tianlian-2 satellite is in orbit, it will work in cooperation with the Tianlian-1 system. It is mainly used to provide data relay and TT&C services for manned spacecraft, space laboratories, and space stations. It can also support remote sensing, mapping, meteorological and other satellites in medium- and low-earth orbits.

“我国亚轨道运载器重复使用飞行试验取得圆满成功 (China’s Test of Reusable Suborbital Vehicle Complete Success),” Xinhua (PRC State News Agency), 26 August 2022. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-08/26/content_5706929.htm

On 26 August, a flight test of a reusable lift-type suborbital vehicle independently developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), was a complete success.After the first successful flight test, the vehicle was inspected and recertified for launch and was launched vertically again from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, after which it completed its suborbital flight according to the plan and landed smoothly at the Alxa Youqi Airport, successfully realizing the suborbital transport in China. The complete success of this flight test has strongly promoted the leap-forward development of China’s space transportation technology from one-time use to repeated use.


Notes:

[1] “Tianlian” data-relay satellites [天链, lit. “sky chain”]

[2] For more information on the “Tianlian”, see Peter Wood, “China Launches New Communications Relay Satellite,” OE Watch May 2019.

[3] For more information on the Dongfanghong-5 system, see Peter Wood, “China Launches Test-bed For High-Bandwidth Communications Satellites,” OE Watch, May 2020.


Image Information:

Image: CZ-7 (space launch vehicle)
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/CZ-7.svg
Attribution: CS BY 4.0

New Chinese Aerial Refueling Aircraft Enters Service

Y-20 Aerial Refueling Aircraft.

Y-20 Aerial Refueling Aircraft.


The YY-20 aircraft represents China’s new generation of aerial refueling equipment


Chinese officials recently confirmed that an aerial tanker variant of the Y-20, the YY-20, strategic transport aircraft has entered service [1]. The Y-20 is China’s largest indigenously produced military transport aircraft. As China’s interests overseas continue to expand, the ability to deploy forces rapidly using the base transport variant of the Y-20 will continue to be more important. China’s armed forces previously relied on the HY-6, a modified variant of China’s H-6 bomber, a design that dates to the 1960s. While few details are forthcoming, Chinese media coverage has described the new tanker as having three times the capacity of the HY-6. The YY-20 now likely provides China’s PLA Air Force and PLA Naval Aviation with greater flexibility, endurance, and range, not only for strike aircraft but also for critical enablers such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft [2].  The new tanker could also be used to support China’s nascent aerial component of its nuclear triad, which includes an H-6 variant equipped with an aerial refueling probe.


Source:

“我军新一代空中加油机运油-20投入练兵备战 (The Chinese Military’s New Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft Has Entered Service),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 5 August 2022. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2022-08/05/content_4917374.htm

At the Air Force Aviation Open Event and Changchun Air Show press conference on 31 July, PLA Air Force spokesman Shen Jinke announced that recently, Air Force Yunyou-20 and J-16 aircraft have carried out aerial refueling training at sea, improving the level of realistic combat training.

Under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s thought on strengthening the military, the Air Force has developed high-tech weapons and equipment systematically in accordance with the strategic goal of “integrated air and space capability; simultaneous preparation for offensive and defensive operationsThe YY-20 aircraft represents China’s new generation of aerial refueling equipment, which can effectively enhance the long-range maneuverability of the aviation force while also undertaking the same aerial delivery tasks as the Y-20 aircraft.


Notes:

[1] In Chinese military nomenclature both Transport [运 yun; transport] and Tanker [油 you; lit, gas/oil] start with Y, hence the YY designation.

[2] For a breakdown of likely capabilities and comparison to U.S. tankers, see: Peter Wood, “China to Modify Y-20 Transport Aircraft for Aerial Refueling,” OE Watch, January 2019.


Image Information:

Image: Y-20 Aerial Refueling Aircraft
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:11059@PEK_(20220208110459).jpg
Attribution: N509FZ, CC BY-SA 4.0

Commercial UAVs Creating “Revolution in Artillery”  

General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevsky, former chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008).

General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevsky, former chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008).


“Simple Chinese-made commercial quadrocopters have made a real revolution in the use of traditional cannon and rocket artillery, almost completely solving the age-old problem of reconnaissance, target designation and adjustment of artillery fire.” 

– former General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky


The accompanying excerpted article from Russian government news agency RIA Novosti features an interview with General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevsky, the former chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008).  General Baluyevsky states that commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have created a “revolution in artillery.”  He particularly notes the enhancement of reconnaissance, target designation, and adjustment of artillery fire for tube and rocket artillery systems, saying that UAVs are “almost completely solving” these “age-old problems.”  In today’s restricted environment of open-source information in Russia, such comments from a former senior officer serves as a signpost to future Russian military considerations.


Source:

“Генерал Балуевский рассказал о революции в артиллерии (General Baluyevsky discussed a revolution in artillery),” RIA Novosti (Russian government news agency), 11 August 2022. https://rb.gy/o4uxn

Simple Chinese commercial quadrocopters have made a real revolution in the use of traditional cannon and rocket artillery, said the former chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008), General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky. 

Earlier in August, the Almaz-Antey East Kazakhstan concern announced the creation of a new multifunctional drone.  According to experts interviewed by RIA Novosti, it can be used for reconnaissance and target designation during a special military operation in Ukraine. 

“Simple Chinese-made commercial quadrocopters have made a real revolution in the use of traditional cannon and rocket artillery, almost completely solving the age-old problem of reconnaissance, target designation and adjustment of artillery fire.”  Baluyevsky says in the author’s preface to the CAST [Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies] book “Alien Wars – a New Paradigm” published on Wednesday. 

The general noted that when adjusted with the help of a drone constantly hovering over the target area, it is possible to use artillery with conventional projectiles with accuracy and efficiency comparable to firing precision-guided munitions.  In particular, the number of shells and guns required for destruction has sharply decreased. 

“This, ironically, contributed to the return (most likely, still temporary) of traditional artillery to the pedestal of the god of war in a meaning comparable to its value during the First World War… 

“There is no doubt that the integration of UAVs with high-precision weapons has not yet exhausted the possibilities,” the former chief of the General Staff noted…  


Image Information:

Image: General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevsky, former chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008) 
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://rb.gy/o4uxn
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

China Carries Out Ballistic Missile Defense Test Amid Related Developments

“It is worth noting that this is not the first time the Chinese military has announced a successful land-based midcourse anti-missile test.”


In August, China fired ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) during mass military exercises, demonstrating that the mobility and survivability of its conventional and nuclear forces are improving.  In the past seven years, China’s strategic missile forces have been reorganized, expanded, and equipped with several new types of long-range precision cruise and road-mobile ballistic missiles (see “China’s New Road-Mobile ICBM DF-41 Official Unveiled,” OE Watch, November 2019). China continues to diversify its missile defense system platforms and the quality of training for its nuclear forces (see “China’s Rocket Forces Conduct Readiness Training,” OE Watch, April 2019).  A parallel development involves the development of anti-ballistic missile systems.  According to the excerpted article below, China successfully conducted another test of a ground-based mid-course ballistic missile defense system in June.  China is also developing an airborne leg of its nuclear forces to complement its existing nuclear ballistic missile submarines, road-mobile, and rapidly expanding silo-based missile force.  Along with its extensive use of decoys, hardened shelters, and other passive defenses, the addition of tested ballistic missile defense systems can only further improve the overall capability and survivability of China’s growing nuclear force.


Source:

“中国成功实施陆基中段反导拦截技术试验 (China Successfully Carries out Test of Ground-based Mid-course Intercepting Ballistic Missile Defense System),” The Observer Online (Independent PRC media), 20 June 2022. https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2022_06_20_645392.shtml 

According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s public Wechat account, on 19 June 2022, China successfully carried out a land-based mid-course anti-missile interception technology test within its territory.  This test is defensive in nature and not directed against any country. 

China is one of the few countries that has mastered land-based mid-course missile interception technology.  Only China, the United States, and Japan have conducted similar tests.  It is worth noting that this is not the first time the Chinese military has announced a successful land-based midcourse anti-missile test. 

According to public information, the PRC Ministry of National Defense previously announced that it had “successfully carried out a test of ground-based anti-ballistic missile technology” or “achieved the expected purpose” five times… 

In an interview with CCTV News, military expert Shao Yongling [邵永灵] previously commented on CCTV News that land-based mid-course anti-missile technology is a strategic investment in scientific and technical reserves [技术储备] (Note: this term refers to small-scale testing which lays the foundation for more significant capabilities in the future). She said that all countries currently emphasize both offense and defense. China has stated that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict and has limited the scale of development of its nuclear forces. Therefore, it is necessary to develop appropriate defensive capabilities to ensure the survivability of its nuclear force. 

China Issues New White Paper With Special Emphasis on Taiwan

Map of Taiwan.

Map of Taiwan.


“…let there be no doubt – we will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country, and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation. The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.”


Recently, China issued a new white paper on Taiwan and Reunification, building on two previous white papers published in 1993 (The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China) and 2000 (The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue) and a significant speech by Xi Jinping in January 2019.  A close comparison of these sources indicates some important shifts in emphasis, such as the current policy description of a post-reunification Taiwan and the urgency of achieving rejuvenation to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.

The first two white papers went into considerable detail regarding the “One Country, Two Systems” approach to peaceful reunification.  The 1993 white paper promised “a high degree of autonomy” where Taiwan would be a special administrative region with its own governmental system, a degree of independence in foreign affairs, and its own military forces.  The 2000 white paper similarly promised that China would not “send troops or administrative personnel” to the island.  The new paper uses less explicit language but notes that “We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law” and that Taiwan’s “social system and its way of life will be fully respected.”  

Other elements of the paper have close similarities with Xi’s 2019 speech, in which he argued that reunification was a historical necessity, such as the statement “Our country must be reunified and will surely be reunified.  This is a historical conclusion drawn from the evolution of cross-straits relations over the past seven decades; it is also critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.”  The new paper also echoes’ Xi’s commitment to “make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means.”  While this latest white paper and China’s five-year plans have continued to express commitment to deepening economic and social ties with Taiwan, this document appears to be an attempt to more strongly lay out a vision for a post-reunification future as much as it is a restatement of the CCP’s policy regarding Taiwan.  


Source:

“《台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业》白皮书 (全文) (The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era),” State Council Information Office, 10 August 2022. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1728489/1728489.htm 

We Chinese will decide our own affairs.  The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China’s core interests and the Chinese people’s national sentiments, and no external interference will be tolerated.  Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China’s internal affairs or obstruct China’s reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan.  No one should underestimate our resolve, will, and ability to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification.  But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.  This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities.  In no way does it target our fellow Chinese in Taiwan.  Use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances.  We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines. 

We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements.  Our ultimate goal is to ensure the prospects of China’s peaceful reunification and advance this process.

The journey ahead cannot be all smooth sailing.  However, as long as we Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits devote our ingenuity and energy to the same goal, let there be no doubt – we will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country, and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation.  The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized. 

Source: “White Paper—The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,” Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office State Council, August 1993. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110654.htm  

Source: “White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council, 21 February 2000.  

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110655.htm   Source: Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification – Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Taiwan Affairs Office, 2 January 2019. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201904/t20190412_12155687.htm


Image Information:

Image: Map of Taiwan 
Source: USG, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ed/Taiwan_CIA_map_updated.jpg 
Attribution:  Public Domain

China Probably Expanding Its Nuclear Testing Capability 

“Extensive coverings have been erected on a mountainside in this arid region, and broken rocks piled up nearby are believed to be evidence of excavation of a new “sixth tunnel” for [nuclear] testing hidden beneath.” 


Satellite images suggest that China is expanding its nuclear test facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.  Popular Tokyo-based news website Nikkei Asia said the images appear to show newly installed power transmission cables and a facility that could be used to store high-explosives and extensive coverings.  Also, broken rocks appear to be piled up along a nearby mountainside, evidence that China could have been excavating a new “sixth tunnel” for testing.  Other evidence, according to the article, includes a notice in which the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization under the China Communist Party, invited bids for “10 radiation dose alarms,” “12 protective suits,” and “one detector of wound, site taints.”  These items could be part of “a project for emergency monitoring of nuclear and radiation accidents.”  Also raising the author’s suspicion is that, while there are no nuclear power plants in Xinjiang, the XPCC had stated it will “make 2022 the starting year for strengthening the capacity to monitor radioactivity” (see “XPCC: The Militarization of Agriculture and Construction,” OE Watch, October 2015).  According to the article, President Xi Jinping could be contemplating reunification with Taiwan by force if needed.  However, as “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided a sobering warning about the risks of military adventures,” an added nuclear capability, perhaps small nuclear weapons, could be the force needed to deter Taiwan from seeking independence and the United States from interfering.


Source:

“Satellite Photos Show China’s New Nuclear Test Site in Xinjiang,” Nikkei Asia (Tokyo-based news website that focuses on the Asian continent), 1 August 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-age-of-Great-China/Satellite-photos-show-China-s-new-nuclear-test-site-in-Xinjiang. 

…Nikkei has viewed Satellite photographs with a number of experts that appear to confirm China is strengthening its nuclear testing capability. 

Extensive coverings have been erected on a mountainside in this arid region, and broken rocks piled up nearby are believed to be evidence of excavation of new “sixth tunnel” for testing hidden beneath. 

Power transmission cables and a facility that could be used for storing high explosives have recently been installed, while unpaved white roads lead from a command post in various directions. 

China has 2.04 million military personnel.  Although that is already the largest standing force in the world – and 1.5 times larger than that of the U.S. – it has been unable to recruit enough troops of late, according to one retired military officer.  This is a combination of the old “one-China policy” and a preference among the younger generation for less physically demanding work in the private sector.  

The Xi administration may be contemplating the reunification of China, and that would involve taking Taiwan by force.  But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided a sobering warning about the risks of military adventures, not least for the serious shortcomings in the quality of Russian military equipment.  Russia supplies China with over 66% of its imported military hardware. 

There is also telling evidence to be found in tenders invited from the region.  In April, an official Chinese procurement website invited bids for “10 radiation dose alarms,” “12 protective suits,” and “one detector of wound site taints.”  This was ostensibly part of “a project for emergency monitoring of nuclear and radiation accidents.”  The invitations were issued by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization under the CCP.  

Although there are no nuclear power plants in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the XPCC said that it will “make 2022 the starting year for strengthening the capacity to monitor radioactivity.”  Procurement of related equipment has increased in the region. 

Russia has threatened the use of small nuclear weapons on airports and underpopulated areas in Ukraine.  The U.S. has so far had no direct involvement in the war there, and some analysts have argued that the possible use of nuclear firepower has made it even more wary of any entanglement. 

Iran’s Flawed Statistics and Growing Drug Addiction

Iranian police display Afghan opium seized inside Iran.

Iranian police display Afghan opium seized inside Iran.


“This means a human capital disaster in the country.” 


Iran has dealt with a long history of drug addiction.  For centuries, Iranians openly cultivated opium and used it both medicinally and recreationally.  In the first decade of the 20th century, Iran participated in a number of international opium conferences to try to reduce and regulate the opium trade.  Because addiction was so great, however, it sought to slowly devolve access rather than end it precipitously.  In the years immediately prior to the revolution, clerics pointed to the prevalence of opium addiction to societal corruption under the shah and promised a new, cleaner order. 

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the clerical leadership took Draconian measures to end drug addiction.  Imprisonment and public execution of addicts and traffickers became commonplace.   It did not work.  Opium cultivation exploded in Afghanistan against the backdrop of the Soviet invasion, civil war, and state failure.  Iran became both a transit and consumer country as Afghan drug smugglers struck deals with corrupt Iranian clerics and security officials.  Ultimately, the Ministry of Health formed a counternarcotics headquarters and the high-level Expediency Council established the Independent Committee against Drugs and Narcotics to combat addiction.

In the excerpted interview from prominent reformist newspaper Aftab-e Yazd, Ali Hashemi, the former chairman of the Independent Committee, discusses the latest statistics on addiction and abuse.  His assessment is that the Islamic Republic’s ninth government, which correlates to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term, corrupted statistics.  In the article, Hashemi shows that, contrary to the Ahmadinejad-era claims, the rate of addiction has increased steadily.  Unstated but underlying his interview is technocratic disdain for the denial of reality inside the Islamic Republic under hardline administrations.  While he references the lack of current statistics, he omits mention that the current Iranian administration of Ebrahim Raisi is rooted, like Ahmadinejad’s, more in the camp of hardliners.  Regardless, Iranian government efforts to stamp out addiction have clearly failed.  Hashemi expresses special concern that the recent increase in drug addiction is among the young.  This has profound implications both for society and the military. It both suggests that many young Iranians have given up hope for their future, suggests problems with both crime and health loom, and can affect military readiness (see “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards To Expand Drug Treatment Center,” OE Watch, Issue 8, 2022).


Sources:

“Faz-e Jadid Markaz-e Daman-e Shahid Ziadian bezudi Ahdas Mishavad (The Old Wound of Addiction in Iran and the 800 Million Rial Cost Per Addict Each Year),” Aftab-e Yazd (prominent reformist newspaper published in Yasd), 31 July 2022. https://aftabyazdonline.ir/4913-زخم-کهنه-اعتیاد-در-ایران-و-خسارت–۸۰۰-میلیونی-هر-معتاد-به-کشور-در-سال.html 

[Former chairman of the Expediency Council’s Independent Committee against Drugs and Narcotics] Ali Hashemi, while examining the status of addiction in the country and Iran’s performance in the field of countering narcotics and reducing the rate of addiction, says, “In the strategic study of addiction status in the country… there are two basic indicators based on the prevalence rate of addiction and the incidence rate of addiction, according to which we can comment on the performance of the country, the current situation and future approaches in the field of addiction.”  

In this regard, he provides statistical indicators of the state of addiction in the country and adds, “In the year 1987-88, there were two million drug users in the country.  In 2004-2005, an addiction study was carried out in coordination with the cooperation of the Headquarters of the Fight against Narcotics and the Ministry of Health.  This study placed the number of users at 3.76 million. 

The Drug Control Headquarters of the ninth government [2012-2016] placed the prevalence of addiction in the country at 800,000 drug users, but because the statistics were not correct, they had to correct these statistics and, two years later, the Drug Control Headquarters announced there were 1.2 million consumers in the country.  This too was wrong and based on manipulated statistics but, in 2015, the then-Secretary General of the Headquarters was forced to announce the statistics so that the total number of consumers was 4.4 million. 

The former secretary general of the country’s drug control headquarters, citing the existing statistics on the incidence of addiction, continues, “Currently, the official statistics are that 4.4 million Iranians use drugs, among whom 2.8 million are addicts and the others occasional recreational users. Of course, we don’t have the statistics from 2015 to the present, however. Still, the statistics show that in just one decade, from 2005 to 2015, the number of drug used increased by 630,000 people. 

Hashemi notes, “Unfortunately, so far, scientific research has not been conducted in a comprehensive way at the national level but, what is known, is that according to official statistics, from 2005 to 2015, the number of consumers has increased from 3.76 million to 4.40 million people, which means that the number of new people came from the “young” stratum.  This means a human capital disaster in the country…. 

Hashemi continues, “If we want to consider only this one indicator [arrests], it shows the depth of its tragedy, i.e. in the last 43 years, of the approximately 19 million people arrested, 65 percent of them were directly and indirectly (including repeat offenders) related to drug offenses.” 


Image Information:

Image: Iranian police display Afghan opium seized inside Iran 
Source: Islamic Republic News Agency (Government)
https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2019/06/25/4/156425841.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran Unveils Stealth Speedboats 

The IRGC displays speedboats it alleges have stealth capability.

The IRGC displays speedboats it alleges have stealth capability.


“Our Navy is a complete strategic force.” 


The excerpted article from Serat News, an outlet associated with the state-run, hardline Kayhan newspaper, reports on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-N)’s unveiling of new, supposed stealth speedboats at the Malik Ashtar festival held just outside Iran’s main Persian Gulf port Bandar Abbas. The IRGC often names exhibitions, exercises, units, and festivals after either religious figures or religious artifacts as part of an effort to imbue the Guards with a religious patina.

That the IRGC-N would mass produce speedboats is consistent with long-held tactics and strategy.  The chief lesson the IRGC learned in the wake of their clash with the U.S. Navy during Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 is that they could not confront the U.S. Navy directly given the superiority of American ships.  They then turned to small speedboats to harass slower, larger shipping.  Speedboats are cheaper and quicker to manufacture than large ships.  Should the IRGC-N load these speedboats with explosives and conduct suicide strikes against larger ships, they hope they can do enough damage both to cripple a ship and to cause enough casualties to get the American domestic audience to question the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region.  The drawback of the IRGC-N speedboats is their range.  They might be able to operate throughout the relatively narrow and shallow Persian Gulf, but they are of little value in the northern Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea.  This, alongside the IRGC’s financial interest in the security of Iran’s offshore gas and oil infrastructure, explains why the IRGC-N claims the entirety of the Persian Gulf as its area of operation while the regular Iranian Navy operates outside the Gulf.  In practice, this makes the Persian Gulf more harrowing for international shipping.  Commercial shipping, Arab militaries, and the U.S. Navy report more professional communications and de-confliction with the regular Iranian Navy than with the IRGC-N. 


Source:

“Qayeqha-ye Tondaru Sepah Radar Gariz Shod (IRGC Stealth Speedboats Evaded Radar),” Serat News (media outlet associated with the state-run hardline Kayhan newspaper), 25 July 2022. https://www.seratnews.com/fa/news/593277 

Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy [IRGC-N],said on the sidelines of the Malik Ashtar Festival that based on the orders of the Supreme Leader…we have been witnessing the festival for 12 years.  He stated that additions have been made to this [IRGC-N] force: Over the past three years, we have had eight additions.  Generally, these were of domestic equipment provided to our warriors and by God’s grace, we will witness such happy events again in the future. 

Tangsiri remarked that it was one of the honors of the Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be able to use domestic knowledge and products developed by Iranian scientists.  He continued: “We have everything from tanks to amphibious tanks to fixed-wing aircraft and drones….” Tangsiri stated, “We in the Navy are proud that our equipment is made by knowledge-based companies. Some of the drones and quadcoptors that we use are actually from our knowledge-based companies, and we have put the order of the Supreme Leader, who said to use our knowledge-based companies, intro practice. And we are proud that the Navy has done this for years.  

The commander of the IRGC-N also spoke about the new radar-evading speedboats: We have made the hulls of our boats radar evasive and we are trying to use domestically made hulls.  Emphasizing that the extent and quality of our presence in the region has caused the enemy to flee from the Persian Gulf, he said, “We have always told the countries of the region that we can establish security ourselves and, by the grace of God, with the departure of the Americans, more security has been established in this sensitive and strategic region.” 


Image Information:

Image: The IRGC displays speedboats it alleges have stealth capability  
Source: Tasnim News https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1400/09/20/14000920165842669242530410.jpeg 
Attribution: CC SA 4.0

Iran Reportedly Using New Carrier, Submarines To Expand Reach of Drones 

Drones onboard Iran’s first “drone carrier” assigned to Iran’s southern fleet, July 2022.

Drones onboard Iran’s first “drone carrier” assigned to Iran’s southern fleet, July 2022.


Combat UAVs were flown from the Iran-made Fateh submarine[RG1] .” 


Iran was among the first countries in the Middle East to recognize the military utility of drones.  Whereas Turkey developed its indigenous drones only a decade ago, Iran began building drones in 1985 to fly over and surveil Iraqi trenches during the Iran-Iraq War.  Over subsequent decades, the stable of Iranian drones proliferated with different models available to the regular Iranian military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and domestic law enforcement agencies.  While drones allowed Iran to project force within range of its land borders, unless the Iranian military was to outsource drone operation to its proxies—as it has in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—it was unable to utilize them farther afield.  The problem with outsourcing drone operations, however, is that it gives control to militias that are not always in sync with Iranian aims and objectives. 

The excerpted article from the Iranian Students News Agency, a semi-official agency supposedly run by students, but which projects the government’s official line, discusses July exercises in the northern Indian Ocean in which the Iranian Navy unveiled a “drone carrier” capable of launching numerous drones with surveillance, general attack, and kamikaze capabilities.  It is unclear from the reporting if the drone carrier will be able to recover the drones it launches.  Such a capability enables the Iranian military to strike with drones over the open ocean where, previously, Iran’s capabilities were limited.  A greater concern for those seeking to counter Iranian aggression would be the article’s claim that Iran also launched drones from both its domestic-made submarine and its Russian-built Kilo-class import.  While the range and underwater endurance of Iranian submarines are limited compared to U.S. nuclear submarines or the German-built diesel submarines, which Israel uses, submarine-launched Iranian drones would enhance Iran’s special operations by enabling the Iranian military to evade radar when conducting offensive drone operations throughout the region.


Source:

“Ravanmaye az Avalin Navdasteh Pehpadbar Niruye Daryayi (Unveiling of the Navy’s First Drone Carrier),” Iranian Student News Agency (semi-official student led news agency projecting the government line), 15 July 2022. https://www.isna.ir/news/1401042416384 

The army’s first strategic navy drone fleet was unveiled with the presence of Army Commander-in-Chief Amir Maj. Gen. Mousavi in the Navy’s Southern Fleet.  According to the Iranian Student News Agency quoting the public affairs department of the Army, the regular Navy unveiled its first drone carrier fleet in the presence of both the commander-in-chief of the Army and the Navy.  It consisted both of surface and sub-surface units carrying all types of combat, surveillance, and suicide drones in the southern fleet of the regular Iranian Navy. 

In the unveiling ceremony for this flotilla, a variety of advanced and cutting-edge drones produced by the Army and the Ministry of Defense including the Pelican, Homa[RG1] , Arash, Chamrosh, Zhubin, Ababil-4, and Bavar-5 drones flew over the waters of the Indian Ocean. 

According to this report, in addition to the flight of vertical and sea-based UAVs from the deck of surface units, for the first time, combat UAVs were flown from the Iran-made Fateh submarine and Kilo-class Tareq[RG2]  submarine…. 

Major General Seyyed Abdul Rahim Mousavi, commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, expressed his satisfaction with the successful deployment of combat drones…  He added, “As seen, surveillance drones have actually increased the intelligence capability of our vessels by hundreds of kilometers beyond the country’s borders, and combat and kamikaze drones are considered the Islamic Republic of Iran’s long hand in international waters and the open sea.  Both deter threats and, if necessary and the enemy makes a mistake, they will ensure the enemy will face a regrettable response. 


Image Information:

Image: Drones onboard Iran’s first “drone carrier” assigned to Iran’s southern fleet, July 2022 
Source: Iranian Students News Agency (Government)
https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2022/07/15/3/62319318.jpg?ts=1657874350773
Attribution: Public Domain

PLA Army Efforts Integrate New Technology and Equipment Into Units

PLA Soldiers March in Parade.

PLA Soldiers March in Parade.


“Whether it is to strengthen the training of new equipment, new forces, and new fields, or to innovate and develop training methods such as “technology +” and “network +” and others; whether it is to solve the major and difficult problems in the construction of combat effectiveness, or to improve the scientific and technological literacy of officers and soldiers, it is difficult to rely on the strength of the troops alone. Only by opening the door, accepting wisdom, borrowing a ladder and go upstairs, only by giving full play to the external knowledge of military scientific and technological experts can we transform scientific and technological advantages and equipment advantages into talent advantages and winning advantages.”


A recent PLA Daily article, whose author is affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army Research Institute in Beijing, chronicles methods for integrating new equipment and improving the technological knowledge of troops.  This is one example of many articles that the PLA produces to help with the learning curve related to employing new, more technologically advanced equipment. The article recounts a training program that the Ministry of Defense introduced during in 2022 to help integrate new equipment into units.  Developing a new system of training is reportedly part of the effort to accelerate combat effectiveness of newly modernized units. Overall, the training methods described in the article are foundational. For example, one recommendation is to improve the scientific and technological literacy of officers and troops by sending technology experts to support unit training, which enhances the researchers’ knowledge by better understanding unit requirements.  The article also notes that military research institutes should provide classes, assist in solving problems assimilating new equipment into units, and cultivate scientific talents within units.  The author believes that an expanded program, which integrates research institutions with units, could accelerate the PLA’s modernization effort and transformation.  However, the article laments the current limited scope of cooperation between military and scientific institutions, pointing to a lack of technological expertise in active duty units and a lack of coordination between military research institutions and units.  These issues are reportedly hindering the quality of research and assimilation of new technologies and equipment into the PLA, thereby slowing the development of combat effectiveness.


Source:

“把科技专家请进演训场 (Invite technology experts to the training ground),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army), 27 July 2022. https://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-07/27/content_320703.htm

… The army’s training ground is the main battlefield for scientific research and innovation. The battlefield asks questions of scientific research, and scientific research answers the battlefield. The front line of military training is in urgent need of a group of military science and technology experts who really know what to do. They regard the need to win as a scientific research requirement and the problem of preparing for war as a scientific research topic, and use their own ingenuity and scientific research innovation results to serve the preparation for military struggle. At the same time, only by aiming the “sight” of scientific research at the “bull’s eye” of actual combat can military science and technology experts move from the frontier of science and technology to the frontline of the battlefield, truly set up a clear orientation of scientific research as a battle, and improve the contribution rate of scientific research innovation to the growth of combat effectiveness.

If you cannot win on the battlefield, everything equals zero. Regardless of military training or military scientific research, we should insist on focusing on war preparations and combat, comparing them with war preparations, and testing them with war preparations and wars, so that the standards of combat effectiveness can truly be established. Inviting military science and technology experts to the front line of exercises and training is not only conducive to improving the combat effectiveness of the troops, improving the fit between research and warfare, but also helping to realize the self-value of scientific and technological experts. However, due to constraints such as ideas and concepts, the scope of cooperation between the army and military scientific research institutes is limited, and the mechanism is not perfect enough. How to let more military science and technology experts go to the front line of training needs further exploration.


Image Information:

Image: PLA Soldiers March in Parade
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_China_Victory_Day_Parade#/media/File:The_military_parade_in_honor_of_the_70-th_anniversary_of_the_end_of_the_Second_world_war_01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0