Tag Archives: China

Xi Urges Accelerated Development of Cutting-Edge Weaponry, Military Modernization

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GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).

GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).

“Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests…”

Speaking in October at the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) annual all-service equipment conference, which sets priorities for military modernization, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech describing China’s major efforts to catch up with other military powers, particularly since 2012.  In the accompanying excerpted article from the PLA’s official news outlet China Military Online, Xi describes China’s weapons development as having shifted from importation and imitation to indigenous development and greater self-reliance.  While Xi acknowledges continuing gaps, the Chinese military has tried to improve management of weapons and equipment development programs.  In 2016, China significantly restructured its top-level organizations guiding equipment development for the PLA, replacing the General Armaments Department with an Equipment Development Department (EDD) directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military body.

In a related development, the CMC and each of China’s Joint Theater Commands appear to have also established a Military Requirements Bureau under their Joint Staff departments.  The bureaus are intended to help their respective organizations more quickly address changing requirements, whether related to training or necessary equipment.  At the same time other organizations with oversight of long-term planning, particularly the Science and Technology Commission were also upgraded.  Engagement with non-traditional parts of the defense industry and expanding cooperation with scientists and institutions outside of the industry have also been prioritized to improve the PLA’s access to cutting-edge research.  Taken together, these efforts will enable the PLA to better coordinate efforts between services while also responding to technological change more swiftly.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had set several important milestones for military modernization, many of which are looming.  In the speech, Xi referred to the PLA’s centennial goal, which entails accelerating mechanization and integration of informationized and intelligent (smart) systems by 2027.  There is no guarantee that China will meet these deadlines.  For example, the goal of completing mechanization of the PLA by 2020 appears to have been revised.  Even more ambitious milestones lie ahead: the CCP wants the PLA to achieve world-class status as a military by mid-century.  Efforts set since 2012 to make the PLA a potent, modernized force, and to improve the underlying processes that drive modernization, are paying off.

Source:

“加快推进武器装备现代化——认真学习贯彻习主席在全军装备工作会议上重要指示(Accelerate the modernization of weapons and equipment——Conscientiously study and implement Chairman Xi’s important instructions at the military equipment work conference),” China Military Online (official news outlet for the People’s Liberation Army), 27 October 2021.

http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211031030653/http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

The PLA held an equipment work conference for all military services in Beijing. President Xi extended sincere greetings and important instructions to the delegates and all comrades working on the front lines of weapons and equipment and spoke highly of the leapfrog development and historic achievements of the Chinese military’s weapons and equipment development during the course of the “13th Five-Year Plan” (2016–2020), clarifying the fundamental, directional, and overall major issues of weaponry and equipment construction. This has important practical significance and far-reaching guiding significance for accelerating the implementation of the “14th Five-Year” plan (covering 2021-2025) and creating a new chapter in weaponry and equipment development.

Without adequate equipment, we cannot begin to discuss the art of war. Weapons and equipment are an important symbol of military modernization, an important foundation of the preparation for military struggle preparations, an important support for national security and national rejuvenation, and an important weight in international strategic competition. Only by possessing advanced weapons and equipment and truly improving our defensive capabilities can we offer a real deterrent. Building a People’s Army with advanced weapons and equipment is the goal of [the Chinese Communist Party]. In the course of its long-term development, our military has successively gone through the development stages of importation, imitation, and indigenous research and development. It has successively produced a large number of advanced weapons and equipment and high-precision technology as represented by the “Two Bombs and One Satellite” [China’s successful Manhattan Project-like effort to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs in the 1960s and launch an artificial satellite in 1970].

Promoting the leapfrog development of our military’s equipment construction and providing material and technical support for enhancing the country’s strategic capabilities, especially military strength, are the great mission placed on the PLA by the Party and the expectation of the PLA’s officers and enlisted. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests, or with the requirements for winning an informatized war, and compared with the world’s strongest military powers. At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution, industrial revolution, and military revolution are evolving rapidly. The degree of informatization of modern warfare continues to increase, and the characteristics of intelligence are increasingly emerging. This provides a rare opportunity for advancing the modernization of weaponry and equipment and also creates tougher demands. In the face of changing times, wars, opponents, and technological changes, we can only be determined and strengthen our sense of urgency. Only by working hard, focusing more proactively on tomorrow’s war to accelerate the development of weapons and equipment, and stepping up the construction of a modern management system for weapons and equipment can we fully create a new situation in weapons and equipment construction and make positive contributions to the realization of the goal of the army’s centennial struggle.

Image Information:

Image: GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Zhang_Youxia_%282017-12-07%29_02.jpg
Attribution: Zhang Youxia (2017-12-07) 02.jpg, CC BY 4.0

China Strengthening Position in Central America with Recognition by Nicaragua

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Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

“The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.”

At the end of 2021, Nicaragua’s dictator Daniel Ortega announced that his country would recognize China after severing over 30 years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (See “Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  One of the country’s oldest dailies, Confidencial, states that the diplomatic switch should be viewed through the lens of China’s escalating attempts to curtail Taiwan’s diplomatic relations; increasing Chinese interest in Central America; and an ideological alliance with Ortega, who also runs a single-party regime.  The move gives China momentum in terms of developing deeper relations in the region.  Panama and El Salvador have ruptured relations with Taiwan, and the election of Xiomara Castro in Honduras could see a similar maneuver in the coming months.  If Castro follows through on her campaign pledge to drop Taiwan, Guatemala and Belize would remain the only two countries in Central America to recognize Taiwan, potentially tipping the geopolitical balance decisively in favor of China.

Nicaragua now counts China, Russia, and Iran among its closest allies.  Another Confidencial article speculates that Ortega seeks to buffer against international isolation by recognizing China, something his existing relationships with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others cannot provide.  The outlet reports that Ortega will seek financing and export markets in China, especially in the face of international financial pressure and sanctions. 

Source:

“Ortega se adelanta a Ley Renacer y suspensión del CAFTA al alinearse con China (Ortega anticipates the Renacer Law and suspension of CAFTA by aligning himself with China),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 18 December 2021.  https://www.confidencial.com.ni/economia/ortega-se-adelanta-a-ley-renacer-y-suspension-del-cafta-al-alinearse-con-china/

In addition to challenging the United States, Ortega is also looking for options in the face of the… Renacer Law… excluding Nicaragua from the free trade agreement (CAFTA), and that Europe does the same with the Association Agreement, which would make Nicaraguan exports to both markets much more expensive.

Source:  “La “afinidad” de Ortega con China es que el gigante asiático tiene “un régimen de un solo partido” (Ortega’s “affinity” with China is that the Asian giant has “a one-party regime”),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 16 December 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/editorial/muerte-en-la-frontera-editorial-el-tiempo-643053 

The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.

Image Information:

Image:  Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidentialoffice/31429913323
Attribution:  Flickr

Beyond the Glitzy Projects: China’s Far-Reaching Impact on Kenya

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China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

“By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building [a] strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.”

In Kenya, China’s influence can be clearly seen in the high-profile Mombassa-Nairobi Railway, the Lamu deep seaport, and the towering Global Trade Centre.  However, beyond these massive projects built by Chinese companies, often with Chinese money and labor, there are numerous other means, including much smaller projects, through which China is making its mark in Kenya.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the Kenyan news agency Capital News explains, that mark is enormous, with China, and particularly Chinese technology, revolutionizing the country’s infrastructure and helping to supercharge its manufacturing base.  Chinese influence on Kenya includes charitable actions, such as delivering substantial amounts of medical supplies critical to helping Kenya deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, all the while garnering appreciation from the Kenyan population.  Chinese online education platforms also filled the gap created when 2,000 Kenyan students found themselves cut off from their university as the disease spread.

The influence of Chinese companies is vast: they have donated food, established industrial parks, held educational workshops, and are transferring technology to Kenyan factories.  However, as the article notes, perhaps the most important impact China has had on Kenya is the growing attitude among young Kenyans that through hard work and knowledge, the country can accomplish projects of all sizes important to national development.  This outlook is in large part a result of Kenyans witnessing, and learning from, successful Chinese businesspeople living and working in Kenya.

The article does not mention any of the pushback against China often discussed in other publications, such as that concerning an unsustainable debt load, poor quality of some Chinese goods, and Chinese workers doing jobs that Kenyans could fill.  However, despite this editorial omission, the article does bring to light the influence China has in Kenya beyond the “glitzy” projects, which tends to be underreported and as a result possibly underappreciated.  China’s influence in Kenya is far larger than just the high-profile projects would indicate, and as the article describes, that influence is building strong relationships, including diplomatic, between the two countries.  It behooves other countries wanting to deal with Kenya to take note of how China has grown that relationship through the breadth and depth of its business activities.

Source:

Adhere Cavince, “How Chinese firms have changed the face of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi,” Capital News (a Kenyan news agency), 22 December 2021. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/how-chinese-firms-have-changed-the-face-of-kenyas-capital-nairobi/

The 8th Ministerial of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation held in Senegal last month resolved to support private sector partnerships between China and African countries. Given the strong record of Kenya to attract and sustain high caliber international businesses, more Chinese firms should consider investing in the country and further promote economic integration of the two countries. By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.

There is increasing confidence that Kenyans too, can follow the footsteps of their Chinese counterparts and improve their socio-economic standing. As more Kenyans get a chance to interact with Chinese firms, more learning points emerge. Nairobi is for instance home to young and skilled professional in rail and road construction, capable of providing their services beyond Kenya.

In the course of implementing big-ticket infrastructure projects across the country, Chinese enterprises have also engaged in building community roads, setting up water pans and upgrading learning institutions through donation and renovation of classrooms and provision of learning materials. During the floods and landslides witnessed in West Pokot in 2019, for example, Chinese firms donated food and non-food items in a show of solidarity with the affected households.

Yet, beyond these glitzy projects, the firms have equally been engaging in small acts of charity that have equally left inedible marks in the lives of individuals and households across the country.

Image Information:

Image: China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.
Source: Macabe5387/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nairobi_Terminus.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion

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“…the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.”

Amid tensions across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan media has been reporting about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of cognitive warfare to reunite the two Chinas.  One such article was published in the Military Affairs Forum of Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (The Youth Daily), a government-sponsored daily that reports on military, government, and general news.  According to the accompanying excerpts, the CCP is using non-military, gray zone tactics to change people’s perception of China.  The CCP uses both traditional media and various forms of internet media to carry out its war of public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. As an example, the article describes how the CCP will tell the “Chinese story” in an effort to “expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts.”  It transmits false information to various foreign media outlets or “infiltrate social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish [China’s] own image and perception both domestically and abroad.”  According to the article, behind the war of influence is the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which is in charge of propaganda; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department, which focuses on external propaganda and control domestic public opinion; and the Ministry of State Security, which combines both civilian hackers, who launch cyber-attacks, with false information produced on content farms.

The second article, published in Taiwan’s English-language publication Taipei Times explains, “the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its ‘united front’ strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its target, including Taiwan.”  To accomplish this, it resorts to both hard and soft power (i.e. culture, education, sports exchanges, media organizations, and economic means) “to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.”  While none of this is particularly new, this recent spotlight in Taiwanese media shows that the cognitive warfare strategy that China uses to win without fighting is persistent, far-reaching, and controlled by the CCP (as opposed to spontaneous, independent media).

Source:

Shu Hsiao-huang, “反制認知作戰 抵禦灰色地帶威脅 (Countering Cognitive Warfare and Resisting Gray Zone Threats),” Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (Youth Daily News: Published by the government of the People’s Republic of China), 9 December 2021. https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1467725&type=forum

Cognitive warfare is the use of information or various communication platforms to change the mindset of an opponent in order to change his or her behavior. The Chinese Communist Party has been waging a united war against Taiwan for many years, carrying out “The Three Warfares” of public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare.  It uses old wine in new bottles, along with both traditional print and electronic media, as well as Internet media (platforms) and other means to carry out its war of influence.

The United Front Department is in charge of propaganda.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department focus on external propaganda and control internal public opinion, and the Ministry of State Security combines cyber-attacks, carried out by civilian hackers, with fake information produced on content farms to carry the war of influence.

…(The CCP) shares the “China story” to expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts. The modus operandi includes spreading falsehoods and spreading them rapidly across platforms; it uses foreign media or infiltrates social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish its own image and perception both domestically and abroad.

Source: Change Yan-ting and Paul Chiou, “Resolutions to Engage with China,” Taipei Times (Taiwan based English-language publication), 11 January 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/01/12/2003771189

As we embark upon a new year, tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to heighten by the day.

However, the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.

The regime consistently uses soft and sharp power, such as culture, education and sports exchanges, as well as media organizations and economic means, to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.

Chinese Army Division Independently Improves Integrated Reconnaissance System

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“After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.”

According to a recent article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website, a Chinese division has fielded a new type of integrated reconnaissance system.  The new system is supposed to enable more rapid reconnaissance and strike capability against enemy targets.  The article explains that China had developed past reconnaissance equipment in piecemeal fashion over extended periods, often making systems incompatible and therefore inefficient at reconnoitering and strike.  Hoping to improve efficiency, the unidentified army division set up a team of experts who spent nearly half a year tackling key problems, as well as researching, developing, and testing equipment interconnections.  Their efforts reportedly streamlined levels of command and improved the interconnection and communication between the different reconnaissance systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.  While this article does not indicate whether or not this sort of localized innovation is a common practice in the PLA, it is at least a demonstration of alignment with President Xi Jinping’s general directive for more innovation in PLA.

Source:

Zhang Jin and Hu Wenbo, “陆军某师紧盯战斗力建设难点问题推进科研攻关自主革新挖掘侦察装备潜能 (Army Division Focuses on Difficult Issues in Building Combat Power, Promotes Key Scientific Research, Independently Innovates and Explores Potential of Reconnaissance Equipment),” Chinese Ministry of Defense website, 17 December 2021. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2021-12/17/content_4901281.htm.

Officers and soldiers utilized a new type of independently developed, integrated reconnaissance system to achieve rapid reconnaissance and rapid strikes against “enemy” targets.

According to information provided, due to the incompatibility of reconnaissance equipment distributed at different times in the past, the efficiency of reconnoitering and striking targets was not high. With respect to this issue, the division set up a team that sought to collect expertise and tackle key problems. Under the guidance of relevant experts, the team repeatedly tested the interconnection sequences of equipment, streamlined levels of command, researched and built new types of connecting cables and interfaces for the equipment, and achieved interconnection and communication among various kinds of reconnaissance equipment, including reconnaissance UAVs, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.

… After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.

Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing

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Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.

Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.

“For years, the Russian government has been focused on occupying Nicaragua as a platform for cyber and electronic operations… This agreement is a delivery of the country’s security to the Russians.”

Nicaragua held presidential elections in early November under highly repressive conditions, with seven major opposition candidates imprisoned and hundreds of political prisoners.  Incumbent President Daniel Ortega ran practically unopposed.  Pre-election polls revealed that majorities of Nicaraguans would have voted for an opposition candidate over Ortega if given the chance.  Facing international isolation, a significant element of Ortega’s survival strategy leans on extra-hemispheric actors, including Russia, for support.  Spanish-language digital military journal Diálogo relays that Nicaragua’s National Assembly recently ratified an agreement to permit Russia a larger role in Nicaragua’s cyberspace.  Russia has promised to help Nicaragua monitor its cyber domain, which includes bringing forth evidence that would fall under the country’s repressive “cybercrimes” legislation, reports the outlet.  Most recently, according to popular U.S. Spanish-language outlet CNN Español, Nicaragua announced official relations with China, dropping diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Facing criticism from much of the international community, the Ortega regime is eager to bolster its hold on power by deepening its partnership with Russia and China.  Further, given that the country’s opposition has used the internet to criticize and to organize itself politically (including in exile abroad), authoritarian great power rivals could ensure Ortega a much greater level of control over the domestic security apparatus.  As Ortega becomes increasingly isolated and desperate, Nicaragua will likely become an important platform for rivals to project power.

Source:

“Nicaragua rompe relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwán y solo reconoce a China

(Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Taiwan and only recognizes China),” CNN Español (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular U.S. outlet), 9 December 2021.  https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2021/12/09/nicaragua-taiwan-china-orix/

The Nicaraguan government decided to break relations with Taiwan and will only recognize China, as announced by Foreign Minister Denis Moncada at a press conference this afternoon…Nicaragua’s announcement leaves just over a dozen countries around the world with official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including Honduras and Guatemala.

Source:  “Rusia interviene en seguridad informática de Nicaragua (Russia intervenes in Nicaraguan IT security),” Diálogo (a Spanish-language digital military journal), 15 October 2021.  https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/rusia-interviene-en-seguridad-informatica-de-nicaragua/#.YWnYwxrMI2y  

For years, the Russian government has been focused on occupying Nicaragua as a platform for cyber and electronic operations…This agreement is a delivery of the country’s security to the Russians…and it will serve to launch, from a closer place in the hemisphere, cyber-attacks or interference in elections.

Image Information:

Image caption:  Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/mfarussia/49212557647/
Attribution:  Flickr

Central Asian States Take the Initiative in Security Cooperation

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Map of Central Asia.

Map of Central Asia.

“Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this.”

Much of the security cooperation analysis that takes place with Central Asian states often focuses on Russian, Chinese, or U.S. efforts in the region.  While important, this particular scope overlooks how Central Asian states have been increasingly carrying out bilateral security cooperation with each other in recent years.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on recent security cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and provide insight on how governments in the region are cooperating with each other outside of the influence of other partners.

The article from Central Asia-focused independent news website Fergana Agency reports that the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan recently signed a “Declaration of Allied Relations.”  The agreement allows for increased cooperation between the two sides in a number of areas, including defense.  Additionally, both governments confirmed they have the same position on “countering challenges to security and stability in the region” in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. 

The first article from Uzbek news website Kun.uz reports on a recent joint military exercise carried out by Kazakh and Uzbek units.  The exercise involved engaging “with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border” and that Kazakh and Uzbek forces used multiple systems to eliminate the threat.  The exercise marks another example of Central Asian forces conducting bilateral exercises annually for the past several years focused on eliminating a terrorist group.  The majority of Russia-led or China-led joint military exercises in the region involve similar scenarios.

The second article from Kun.uz reports on a November meeting between the defense ministers of both countries.  The article notes that the ministers “discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it,” signing an agreement at the end of the meeting, which included “a number of measures for defense cooperation.”  While there has been no indication of the bilateral security cooperation between Central Asian governments replacing what takes place with Russia or other partners, it demonstrates growing partnerships where Central Asian states take the initiative.

Source:

“Государства-союзники (Government-allies),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 6 December 2021.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124124/

Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Qasym Jomart-Tokyaev signed a Declaration of Allied Relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan on 6 December…Within the framework of the visit, which took place 5-6 December, 22 documents were signed…including a plan of action to bring trade turnover between the two states to $10 billion in the next five years…

Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this…

Among the signed documents are agreements in the customs sphere, in the prevention and elimination of emergency situations, the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes as well as documents on further cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, energy, communications and defense…

Source: “В Термезе завершились совместные узбекско-казахские учения (The joint Uzbek-Kazakh exercise has finished in Termez),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 25 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/25/v-termeze-zavershilis-sovmestnyye-uzbeksko-kazaxskiye-ucheniya

The soldiers of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan carried out the main stage of the joint exercise “Hamkorlik-2021” in Termez this week…

According to the plan of the exercise, the combined units of the two countries engaged with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border with the support of fifty vehicles and three hundred service members.

Fighters, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, artillery, motorized rifle units and unmanned aerial systems were used to eliminate the mock enemy group…

Source: “Главы Минобороны Узбекистана и Казахстана обсудили региональную безопасность (The head of the Ministries of Defense of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan discussed regional security),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 23 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/23/glavy-minoborony-uzbekistana-i-kazaxstana-obsudili-regionalnuyu-bezopasnost

On 22 November, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Lieutenant General Bakhodir Kurbanov, met with a military delegation led by the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan, Lieutenant General Murat Bektanov…the two sides discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it…

Following the meeting, the ministries of defense signed an agreement, which includes a number of measures for defense cooperation…

Image Information:

Image: Map of Central Asia.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Central_Asia.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

PLA Practices UAV-Delivered Logistical Support for Airborne Operations

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PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels) PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao.

PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels)  PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao.

The brigade plans to further test combat support functions for the drones and improve logistical sustainment methods for airborne operations to improve combat effectiveness.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to refine the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for tactical resupply through their integration into exercises. As noted in state media outlet Science and Technology Daily, a recent exercise held in the mountainous terrain of central Yunnan province describes a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps brigade using UAVs to resupply units engaged in a firefight and help evacuate casualties.

The “key point seizure” exercise featured a drone swarm working in concert with the airborne assault team as it maneuvered, resupplying units just as they reached defensive positions determined by a company commander.  Other reporting on the exercise indicated that medium UAVs could deliver 50kg of ammunition.  Participants in the exercise noted that the addition of UAVs greatly simplified logistical resupply for the units.

Exercises in 2020 involving the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force tested delivering munitions to front-line units, and in a separate exercise, providing hot meals and water to border troops in politically sensitive or logistically difficult-to-access areas. (See “PLA Fields New Rapid-Assembly Camp System,” OE Watch, November 2020). The same month the PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted tactical replenishment exercises in Hubei province. (See “China: Improving Capability in Replenishment Operations Through Drones”).

Source:

Peng Yueyun and Qi Yongqiang, “无人机参与助攻空降作战有了新帮手(Drones participate in assists and airborne operations have new helpers),” Science and Technology Daily (State media outlet managed by the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology), 10 December 2021.

http://www.stdaily.com/kjrb/kjrbbm/2021-12/10/content_1237995.shtml

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211215134431/http://www.stdaily.com/kjrb/kjrbbm/2021-12/10/content_1237995.shtml

“Begin the attack on the closest position!” Following the command of Li Qilong [李齐龙], the commander of a company under an airborne brigade, members of the unit charged bravely towards the “enemy” position. The unit is engaged in a ‘key point seizure’ exercise in an unidentified location in central Yunnan.

After their initial charge, the enemy was able to suppress the attackers. The lead assault team leader called out “Running low on ammunition! Requesting resupply!”

Standing by the radio in the rear, commander Li marked Ren’s location on the drone control terminal, issuing orders for supplies and a flight path. One minute later, a medium UAV with nearly a hundred kilograms of heavy equipment quickly lifted off and flew toward the battle. Thanks to the timely resupply, the attacking unit could renew their assault.

In this exercise, the brigade embedded transport drones in its support operations, making full use of their advantages in terms of ability to cover long distances quickly, with great precision and in spite of rugged terrain—advantages that traditional resupply methods overland or via large, vulnerable transport lack.

On the front lines of the battle, the firing is intense, and the support team has continued to take casualties even as neither side has gained the advantage.  “Requesting casevac.” A signal from the assisting team came from the radio. In the rear, the rotors of a large UAV spin up under the operated by Chen Yao [陈遥], leader of the integrated support team. Hugging the ground, the drone dodges enemy fire while making its way toward the requested location of the ‘wounded,’ beaming back information to the support team.

“Found them,” Chen Yao said as he put the drone into a rapid descent. With the assistance of ground combatants, one of the simulated casualties was dispatched to the rear.

“Shift your position and prepare to defend!” After pushing the assault, company commander Li Qilong quickly pivoted to defense while coordinating resupply using the UAVs. A few minutes later, as coordinates for defensive positions were issued [to the attacking units], a “swarm” composed of eight quadrotor drones took off in succession, beginning “multi-target precision resupply operations.” Despite being spread out over more than ten kilometers, the “swarm” independently coordinated and accurately positioned themselves to quickly deliver emergency supplies from the rear to the new defensive positions.

Li described the transport drones as “Fast, stealthy and precise,” noting that “[due to their support] the length of the battle was reduced by nearly an hour and the number of casualties has been greatly reduced.”

The brigade plans to test combat support functions for the drones further and improve logistical sustainment methods for airborne operations to improve combat effectiveness.

Image Information:

Image: PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels) PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/PLAAF_Changhe_Z-8KA_-_Zhao.jpg
Source: Allen Zhao, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Attribution:

Chinese Military Uses AI To Develop World’s Smallest and Most Powerful Coilgun

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“Artificial intelligence can outperform humans in designing futuristic weapons…”

A group of Chinese researchers from the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan, China, used artificial intelligence (AI) to develop the world’s smallest and most powerful coilgun.  The coilgun, which is about the size of a pistol with a 4.5-inch barrel, contains three battery-powered coils that generate an electromagnetic field.  As described in the following excerpts, published in Hong Kong-based English-language daily South China Morning Post, the kinetic energy of the bullet flying through the barrel has more than twice the energy needed to fire a fatal shot.  The researchers claim the weapon is ideal for counterterrorism and stability operations.  The advantage of the coilgun over a conventional gun is its “adjustable speed and very short response time.”

AI is playing a key role in developing China’s electromagnetic weapons.  The article describes the coilgun as more sophisticated than a typical firearm and too complex for traditional weapons software to handle.  AI, however, can continuously improve an imperfect design through self-learning.  According to the article, “it would have been impossible to achieve this level of performance without using AI in the design process.”  Chinese researchers have also been using AI to develop large-scale electromagnetic weapons, such as railguns, which have a range of “hundreds of kilometers.”  The Chinese navy now has a test facility in which AI is used to develop smart railgun munitions capable of enduring extremely high pressure and intense magnetic fields.

Source:

Stephen Chen, “Chinese Researchers Turn to Artificial Intelligence To Build Futuristic Weapons,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong’s most prominent online English-language daily), 5 December 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3158522/chinese-researchers-turn-artificial-intelligence-build.

Artificial intelligence can outperform humans in designing futuristic weapons, according to a team of Chinese naval researchers who say they have developed the world’s smallest yet most powerful coilgun.

The prototype weapon developed by professor Zhang Xiao and her team at the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan has a 12cm (4.5-inch) barrel, about the size of a pistol, which contains three battery-powered coils that generate an electromagnetic field.

This electromagnetic field means that, unlike a conventional gun, the bullet does not touch the sides as it passes through the barrel.

Researchers found the bullet’s kinetic energy as it was could reach almost 150 joules, more than twice the energy needed to fire a fatal shot.

The bullet speed can vary depending on factors such as size and weight, and the scientists said one of the major advantages of using a coil gun was that, unlike a conventional gun, it could be adjusted to fire deadly shots or non-lethal ones.

In a paper published in the Transactions of the China Electrotechnical Society last month, Zhang said the gun had the advantage of “adjustable speed and a very short response time”, adding that it had great potential to be used for counterterrorism and maintaining stability.

The researchers say it would have been impossible to achieve this level of performance without using AI in the design process.

China Continues To Beef Up Border and Coastal Defense

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“…the international situation is complex and changeable. Border and coastal defenses face security threats and challenges from all quarters and in various forms.”

In October a group of Chinese experts met to discuss their views on China’s progress and efforts to build up the border and coastal defense infrastructure.  The following article, published in the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army Jiefangjun Bao, offers an interesting overview of their thoughts regarding future expectations.  China first launched its border and coastal defense infrastructure project in 1996.  According to the article, the country has since gone from “having nothing to having something.”  It went from “not being centralized and complete to being scalable and systematic.” 

There are reportedly 18,639 miles of border and coastal defense duty routes.  Blockades and video monitoring cover key areas.  China has stationed hundreds of thousands of militia forces along the border and coastal defense frontlines.  They have added transportation support facilities including duty roads, bridges, and docks, focused on connecting border villages to the larger border security infrastructure.   

Part of the infrastructure buildup of China’s border and coastal defense includes an increased capacity to conduct information-driven operations (informationization).  China has built several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along key areas in border and coastal defense.  It has also laid nearly 6,213 miles of transmission lines.  A portion of the border and coastal areas now also includes video monitoring and a “control network for ‘vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.’”

In coming years, China will likely push to automate its border and coastal defense capability, through the “intelligentization” of its processes.  A senior engineer, cited in the article, explained that he hopes to shape a “smart chain” that will use new-generation information technologies, such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things, to discover, report, make decisions, handle, and evaluate border and coastal defense situations to enhance the three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities.

Source:

Pan Di, “筑起坚不可摧的钢铁防线 ——军地共话合力推进边海防基础设施建设 (Building an Indestructible Steel Defensive Line- Joint Military-Civil Promotion of Border, Coastal Defense Infrastructure Building),” Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army), 13 October 2021, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/13/content_300707.htm

China is a major border and coastal defense country. Chairman Xi profoundly pointed out that order and coastal defense work is a major matter for national security and is related to the overall national security and developmental situation.

… since the launch of border and coastal defense infrastructure building in 1996 with unified planning on land and at sea, we have built a large number of duty transport, physical barrier, and informationized management and control facilities.

Liu Jun explained that China has now built more than 30,000 kilometers of border and coastal defense duty routes, with blockades and video monitoring essentially covering key management and control segments. It has taken the first steps in constructing a “three-in-one” management and control system including human, material, and technical defense. It has built a solid defensive line along its vast land and maritime borders.

In recent years, on border and coastal defense frontlines, hundreds of thousands of militia forces are stationed all year round, and their reconnaissance and monitoring, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities have steadily improved. With the completion of a large number of transportation support facilities such as duty roads, bridges, and docks, many border villages have been connected to roads and offshore islands connected to navigation routes, thus further consolidating the foundation for the development of industries with special advantages such as border trade, cross-border tourism, and island development.

“The continuous advancement of border and coastal defense infrastructure building is the result of joint efforts by the Party, government, military, and police. According to an arrangement made by the Third National Border Defense Work Conference in 1994, a border and coastal defense infrastructure building system was launched in 1996 on the basis of organizing pilot projects.

…a “five-in-one” border management structure with the Party committee providing direction, the government running overall coordination, the military serving as a backbone, the police taking charge of administration, and the people as a foundation, making the iron wall of border and coastal defense even more impenetrable.

In recent years, China’s border and coastal defense infrastructure has intensified its informatization efforts, building several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along important sections for border and coastal defense and laying nearly 10,000 kilometers of transmission lines. A portion of border and coastal areas have formed a video monitoring and control network for “vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.” Li Guangwei, senior engineer at the Air Force Research Academy, is full of hope for the prospects of smart border and coastal defense. He hopes to shape a “smart chain” in which the whole process of discovering, reporting, making decisions, handling, and evaluating border and coastal defense situations through the application of new-generation information technologies such as big data, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, breaks through data barriers between the military and civilian sectors to enhance three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities for border and coastal defense.”