Tag Archives: China

Tajikistan and China Deepen Security Cooperation

Posted on by
Gorno-Badakhshan map

Gorno-Badakhshan map.

“A temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises.”

The government of Tajikistan has, in recent years, only rarely released information about its security cooperation activities with China.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from Tajikistan’s independent news website Asia Plus reports on a recent agreement signed by the governments of Tajikistan and China to carry out a series of joint biennial exercises focusing on counterterrorism. While the Tajik government again provided few details about the agreement, there is enough information to gauge how it fits within broader expectations of Tajik-Chinese security cooperation going forward. The article reports that the agreement calls for joint counterterrorism exercises between Tajikistan and China to take place “at least once every two years” and that their purpose is “to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.” The article also mentions that both sides are looking to increase coordination between special forces units as well as tactical skills for counterterrorism. Special purpose units from Tajikistan and China have carried out a handful of joint exercises over the past seven years, all focusing on a counterterrorism scenario, though none of them had been part of a series of exercises.[ii] 

The article goes on to note that a “temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises” and that both sides will “not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.” It is likely that each side will release some information about future exercises after they take place, but this aspect of the agreement demonstrates how Tajikistan continues to develop a deeper partnership with China. Lastly, the article provides a reminder that China provided 55 million Chinese yuan (around $8 million) last year for a facility for Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. This new facility appears to be for Tajikistan and is not another Chinese base. Ultimately, Tajikistan’s agreement with China to carry out joint counterterrorism exercises may not appear as significant as Tajikistan’s partnership with Russia, but it does signal a more consistent effort from both sides to develop the partnership.

Source:

Mazhab Juma, “Не реже одного раза в два года. Таджикистан и Китай договариваются, как проводить антитеррористические учения (‘No fewer than one time every two years’. Tajikistan and China agreed to carry out counterterrorism exercises),” Asia-Plus (independent news website in Tajikistan), 21 November 2022. 

https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20221121/ne-rezhe-odnogo-raza-v-dva-goda-tadzhikistan-i-kitai-dogovarivayutsya-kak-provodit-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya

Tajikistan intends to carry out counterterrorism exercises with China at least once every two years. The text of the agreement between the governments of Tajikistan and China, published on the information and legal portal of the (Tajik) Ministry of Justice), states that the purpose of the exercise is to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Another goal is to increase the level of coordination between the special counterterrorism units, the level of interaction between the units, and the training and tactical skills of the two countries…

… It is also noted that a temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises… the parties will take strict secrecy measures and will not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.

…in October last year, the Parliament of Tajikistan approved an agreement in which China is building a special base in the Wakhan Gorge of the Gorno Badakhsahn Autonomous Oblast… The base will be built in accordance with an agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. “As part of the cooperation agreement between the two countries, China will provide grant assistance for the construction of the base for the rapid response team of the Organized Crime Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan…

The cost of building the base is 55 million Chinese yuan (approximately 100 million somoni)…

Notes:

[i] For instance, the 2019 revelation that China had established a base in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan region near the Tajik-Afghan border only came out after a Western journalist had traveled to the remote region.

[ii] For more information on joint Tajik-China exercises, see: Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” 20 January 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/360801

Image Information:

Image: Gorno-Badakhshan map
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gorno_badakhshan_map.png
Attribution: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Hong Kong Firm To Develop Satellite and Rocket Launch Site in Djibouti

Posted on by
Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

“The MOU signed this time not only involves the construction of 7 satellite launch pads and 3 rocket testing pads, but also covers supporting projects such as power stations, water plants, aerospace ports, roads, and ports.”

On 9 January 2023, Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group (HKATG)[i] and Touchroad International Holdings[ii] to develop a $1 billion satellite and rocket launch site in Djibouti. The project includes seven launch pads and three rocket test pads in addition to power stations, water plants, spaceports, roads, and maritime ports in Djibouti’s northern Obock region. The MOU stipulates that the government of Djibouti will provide the necessary land (a minimum of 10 square kilometers) with a co-managed lease that runs for a minimum of 35 years. The government of Djibouti will take over the lease after 30 years of co-management.

According to the state-affiliated China Daily, the project would alleviate high demand for commercial satellite launching facilities in China, which are largely dependent on the Wenchang Space Launch Site and Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center for commercial launches. China currently maintains four official space launch centers, all state-owned and operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A 2021 State Council Information Office white paper identified the country’s demand for “commercial launch pads and launch sites to meet different commercial needs” as a priority for China’s space capabilities through 2026.[iii]

For its part, Africa’s expanding space industry relies heavily on international partners, including private firms, universities, and national space programs. Several countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Tunisia, have already ventured into the space domain relying on Beijing’s capabilities. In 2007, China launched Nigeria’s first communications satellite. Moreover, Beijing launched Algeria’s first communication satellite, and in 2019 it launched Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s first satellites. In 2020, China’s launch of a second satellite for Ethiopia from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center was aired live on Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation.

The announcement represents a major expansion of China’s involvement in Djibouti, where it has hosted its first official overseas military base since 2017. It remains to be seen what launch capabilities the site will support or to what extent Chinese firms will use the facility upon its projected completion in 2028. However, the involvement of HKATG and Touchroad, with their close ties to state-owned corporations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects—coupled with a permanent PLA presence and other strategic investments—may allow China to be looked to as African states’ space partner of preference.[iv]

Sources:

“与吉布提政府合作建太空港 助力商业航天突破限制 (Partnership with Djibouti Government to Build Spaceport Aids Commercial Aerospace Breakthroughs),” China Daily (PRC state-affiliated media), 12 January 2023. https://tech.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202301/12/WS63bfb3d4a3102ada8b22ae3e.html

The construction of the spaceport in the Republic of Djibouti is expected to take at least five years, that said, from a commercial point of view, the project is still of great benefit to the business of HKATG.

At present, most commercial satellites are launched in the new mode of “carpooling” of shared rockets, that is, “one rocket with multiple satellites” at the Wenchang Space Launch Site and China’s Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. Facing the high demand for commercial satellite launches in China in recent years, the demand for launch pads has been far outstripping supply, the development of Djibouti’s Spaceport will break the restrictions of the existing business model and have a positive impact on HKATG’s business development.

It is noteworthy that the parties will work together to establish research centers, universities and provide aerospace technologies, products, services and programs in addition to infrastructure development.

“驻吉布提大使胡斌会见香港航天科技集团有限公司 (Ambassador to Djibouti Hu Bin Meets with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. Vice-President),” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 5 January 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/jghd_673046/202301/t20230106_11002946.shtml

Ambassador Hu Bin expressed his affirmation of the cooperation between Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. and encouraged the enterprise to strengthen feasible research, to establish a firm sense of compliance, to balance corporate interests and social responsibilities, to promote the diversified economic development of Djibouti, and to contribute to Sino-Djiboutian cooperation. The embassy will actively provide the necessary support and assurances.

He Liehui, vice president of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, attended the meeting.

Notes:

[i] HKATG (香港航天科技集团有限公司) maintains close ties with Chinese state-owned and affiliated giants Huawei Technologies (华为) and China Aerospace Technology Corporations (中国航天科技集团公司), both of which are main players in China’s military-civil fusion research and development programs. HKATG’s board members maintain strong ties to the CCP and its united front system. Vice Chairman and Executive Director Claire Ku previously served as the founding CEO of the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), a documented CCP united front organization. Vice President of Business Development, Allen Fung, is a member of the CCP’s All-China Youth Federation and a Standing Committee Member of the Guangdong Youth Federation.

[ii] Touchroad International Holdings is owned by Africa-focused Chinese investor He Liehui, who is the current Vice President of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, another known united front organization with development projects across the African continent.

[iii] For more on China’s space ambitions, see “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office, 28 January 2022, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465645/n6465648/c6813088/content.html

[iv] Other strategic BRI investments include China Merchant Ports Holdings’ operation and ownership stake in the Port of Doraleh’s Terminal Container and a high-capacity standard gauge railway that terminates at the Port of Doraleh.

Image Information:

Image:  Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).
Source: Djiboutian Government https://twitter.com/IsmailOguelleh/status/1612488089603309568
Attribution:  Public Domain

China Addresses Challenges to Critical Mineral Supply

Posted on by
PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

“International geopolitics has become an important factor affecting China’s resource supply.” – Wang Yunmin

In an interview with Chinese party-owned media outlet People’s Daily this January, Chinese Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua explains that Beijing will launch a new round of domestic strategic mineral mining operations to offset dependence on foreign suppliers of critical energy resources. Recent external shocks, including a global pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a growing trend toward “resource nationalism,” threaten to disrupt Beijing’s access to the strategic minerals necessary to power its economy and military technologies.[i] The new Chinese initiative includes policies to stimulate domestic exploration, prospecting, and processing of raw strategic minerals, with particular emphasis on oil- and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts.[ii] According to the director of the State Key Laboratory of Safety and Health for Metal Mines, Wang Yunmin, around two-thirds of China’s strategic mineral production and supply for minerals like iron, chrome, manganese, cobalt, nickel, copper and oil is highly dependent on foreign sources.

One of Beijing’s greatest concerns over strategic minerals lies in its ability to transition energy supply from fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal to cleaner alternatives. China is the world’s single largest consumer of lithium-ion batteries, relying on them to not only power its electric car and renewable energy industries, but also military weaponry, including drones and submarines.[iii] Three core ingredients for the lithium-ion battery traditional recipe include cobalt, lithium, and nickel.

China’s critical mineral supply faces challenges from resource rich countries where local governments have announced restrictions on mining and exports of cobalt, lithium, and nickel. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Zimbabwe are among China’s top lithium supplier states while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Indonesia are among its largest cobalt and nickel suppliers respectively. Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, collectively known as the ‘lithium triangle’ for their prospected vast lithium reserves, are reportedly discussing a possible OPEC-like agreement for lithium.[iv] In December 2022, Indonesia and Zimbabwe announced export restrictions requiring firms to processing raw materials in-country.[v] While Chinese lithium-ion battery production firms like CATL and SVOLT have recently reported production of lithium-ion batteries that rely on little or no nickel or cobalt, China is still far off from integrating these technologies across its military-economic structure.[vi]

Sources:

Shi Yimin (施毅敏), “工程院院士：中国战略性矿产对外依存度高地缘政治影响资源供给 (Chinese Academy of Engineering Scholar: High Degree of Chinese Foreign Dependence on Strategic Mineral Production, Geopolitics Influencing Resource Supply),” Caixin News (Beijing-based Chinese non-state media organization), 24 December 2022. https://companies.caixin.com/m/2022-12-24/101981473.html

Wang Yunmin introduced, Chinese foreign dependence on 10 types of minerals exceeds 50%. Among these, iron ore at 82%, chrome ore at 98%, manganese ore at 96%, cobalt ore at 95%, nickel ore at 90%, and both copper ore and oil at 78%. Wang said, “This determines the external environment’s strong influence over China’s resource supply and production.”

“优化要素保障 建设美丽中国 (Optimizing Factors to Ensure Construction of a Beautiful China),” People’s Daily (official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), 5 January 2023. http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0105/c1001-32599955.html

China has a high degree of foreign dependence on some important mineral resources, and once the international situation changes, it will certainly affect economic security or even national security.

A new round of domestic prospecting for strategic minerals will be launched in an all-round way. The focus will be on strategic minerals, particularly important oil and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts. New policies will be implemented to promote exploration, prospecting and processing.

Notes:

[i] Resource nationalism (资源民族主义) refers to the tendency of people and governments to assert control over natural resources located within their territories.

[ii] In 2021, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published its plan to facilitate the development of the country’s raw materials industry during the 14th Five-Year Period (2021-2025).

[iii] For more on China’s use of lithium-ion batteries in military weaponry, see: Stephen Chen, “China’s submarine fleet may soon be powered by lithium batteries,” 29 October 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3197670/chinas-submarine-fleet-may-soon-be-powered-lithium-batteries; Zhang Tong, “Chinese scientists’ new gel filling could triple lifespan of lithium batteries for EVs, drones,” 4 November 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3198333/chinese-scientists-new-gel-filling-could-triple-lifespan-lithium-batteries-evs-drones

[iv] Connor Mycroft, “China’s lithium hold won’t be undercut by Opec-style cartel as Argentina, Chile, Bolivia consider alliance,” 5 November 2022, South China Morning Post,  https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3198440/chinas-lithium-hold-wont-be-undercut-opec-style-cartel-argentina-chile-bolivia-consider-alliance

[v] For more on recent Indonesia and Zimbabwe’s export restrictions, see: Fransiska Nangoy and Bernadette Christina, “Indonesia confirms bauxite export ban to proceed as scheduled,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/indonesia-announce-ban-exports-commodity-without-saying-which-2022-12-21/ and “Zimbabwe bans raw lithium exports to curb artisanal mining,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-bans-raw-lithium-exports-curb-artisanal-mining-2022-12-21/

[vi] Keith Bradsher and Michael Forsythe, “Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries,”” 22 December 2021, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/business/china-catl-electric-car-batteries.html and “Completely Cobalt-Free Battery Cells from SVOLT Available for Order Now,” 2 February 2021, SVOLT, https://svolt-eu.com/en/completely-cobalt-free-battery-cells-from-svolt-available-for-order-now/

Image Information:

Image: PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua
Source: Chinese Government, https://baike.baidu.com/item/王广华/69366
Attribution: Public Domain

A Chinese Perspective on the Pitfalls of Military Intelligentization

Posted on by

“The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis.”

Chinese military strategists are increasingly focused on developing practices of military “intelligentization,” the next generation of warfare expected to improve the military’s combat efficiency.[i] Intelligentization, also referred to as intelligent warfare, is the Chinese concept of applying machine speed and processing power of artificial intelligence (AI) to military planning, operational command, and decision support.[ii] The rate of developing intelligent weapons and systems is progressing at such a rapid pace, however, that it comes with potential risks, according to the following article published in the People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper PLA Daily. According to the article, the anti-jamming ability of current intelligent systems is too weak, making intelligent systems more vulnerable. For example, drone command and control relies on communication links that connect the drones to rear personnel. If the communication link is jammed, the operator will lose control of the drone. Therefore, improved anti-jamming capability is necessary to ensure communications links are not disrupted. The article also explains that the reliability of today’s AI technology is questionable. While the AI systems’ level of intelligence is superior to that of a human, there is not yet a reliable test to ensure they will not fail in a complex combat scenario.

The article also warns that using intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis. For example, military operations that rely on intelligent weapons and equipment could surpass the speed of political decision making. This could weaken the decision-maker’s ability to control the situation. The article further warns that the use of intelligent weapons and equipment in large-scale combat could increase tension between countries as well as lead to changing the psychology of combatants, potentially causing them to become more desensitized to killing because of their greater distance from the battlefield and gradually reducing caution in decision-making.

The article notes that countries are increasingly pouring money into AI technology to gain military advantage, and this struggle for predominance could lead to a dangerous arms race. With current AI technology, for example, the algorithms used to distinguish civilians from combatants are not yet reliable, thereby potentially putting the lives of civilians at risk. Based on the article, there is still a long way to go before China has perfected the software to not only drive AI weapons and equipment, but also to test them to ensure they are ready to meet all the demands of the battlefield.

Source:

Luo Zhaocheng, “关注智能化武器装备运用风险 (Pay Attention to Risks in Using Intelligentized Weapons and Equipment),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 5 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/ll/2023-01/05/content_10209877.htm

… Currently, the world’s major countries are vigorously pursuing the development of military intelligentization of weapons and equipment across the different operational domains. While the new technology greatly enhances combat capabilities, it also could pose some great risks.

…the anti-jamming capability of intelligent weapons and equipment is weak. This could cause a loss of operational control over systems. The intelligent weapons and equipment currently used by various countries often require command and control to be conducted by rear area personnel who rely on communications links. As these links are jammed, it will be difficult to return them to operational effectiveness… Iran’s successful capturing of U.S. drones through jamming technology is a typical example…

Artificial intelligence technology in certain fields is shown to far exceed human intelligence. However, its reliability and interpretability are questionable… Presently, countries have conducted repeated simulation tests and even actual combat using intelligent weapons and equipment. However, there is still no reliable testing method to ensure its dependability should it run into a complex battlefield environment.

Wide-scale application of intelligent operations could trigger an arms race, leading to the risk of disposition for unsafe AI systems…

The use of intelligent weapons and equipment can impact the international strategic balance and increase the risk of war breaking out. The use of smart weapons and equipment increases the risk of “firing the first shot.”

The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis…

…Intelligent weapons and equipment put participating personnel further away from the battlefield. Participants’ apathy will grow as distance increases…

Notes:

[i] For other Chinese insights on intelligentization, see Cindy Hurst, “China: ‘New Concepts’ in Unmanned Combat,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376077 and Peter Wood, “A Chinese Perspective on Intelligent Warfare and Future Urban Operations,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376999

[ii] For an example of intelligent warfare, see Cindy Hurst, “The ‘Blade of Victory’: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms,” OE Watch, March 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/358341

New Domain Forces and Combat Capabilities in Chinese Military Thinking

Posted on by
“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.”

In 2021 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted “Multidomain Precision Warfare” as its core operational concept. While few sources address this topic in much detail, a related concept has remained prominent in Chinese media. In October 2022, in his speech at the 20th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping declared that China must “increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities.[i] New-domain forces with new combat capabilities are also a focus area for Chinese military force development for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). While these concepts are abstract and rarely include more than vague descriptions of what they entail, Chinese media emphasize them as essential to the PLA’s evolution from informatization toward intelligent warfare. The following excerpt from Chinese party-owned media outlet PLA Daily provides some insights into what is meant by these ideas and how they may take shape in coming years.

The excerpt, a commentary, acknowledges that clarity about the “newness” of some of the domains covered in this effort is important. The author provides an overview of the characteristics of these new domain forces and capabilities, which include flexible architectures, dynamic reorganization, and mutation of operational concepts in response to new technologies.

Terms[ii]Characteristics and Examples
New Domain ForcesFlexible architecturesReliant on intelligent systems (integrated command platform, etc.)Dynamic reorganizationMutability in response to technological developmentsCross-domain strikesFocus on achieving strategic paralysis of the enemy
New Combat Capabilities[iii]Uncrewed systems (air, sea, and ground-based)PLA Strategic Support Force[iv]PLA Ground Force long-range rocket artillery (MLRS)[v]

Fundamentally, these concepts demonstrate a recognition that the most effective use of combat capabilities will not be the single-domain clash between similar forces and that the PLA must instead be able to flexibly deploy forces across domains against enemy weaknesses to maximize their effects. Of course, Chinese military thinking does not develop in a vacuum. Multi-domain precision operations appear to have many of the same core assumptions about the future of war as in other countries’ concepts, such as “Multidomain Operations” (MDO).[vi]  However, despite the rhetorical similarities to U.S. concepts, at a more basic level, Chinese warfighting is likely to unfold differently due to core differences resulting from the direction and structure of PLA, which has Chinese Communist Party committees and political officers throughout as an essential part. The PLA’s development of an integrated command platform and other informatized tools, such as those referenced in the article, appear intended to not only make its forces more survivable in modern informatized or intelligentized war but also to be “designed to” the PLA’s structure itself and improve the speed of decision making that its structure might otherwise impede.[vii] While China’s focus on achieving multidomain effects is noteworthy, in the interim much of these concepts may remain aspirational for the PLA, a military that has, for much of its recent history by its own admission, struggled to effectively train to the standard of being able to carry out combined arms operations, much less joint operations.

Source:

Liu Haijiang (刘海江), “新域新质作战力量 ‘新’在哪里 (Explaining the ‘new’ in new-domain forces with new combat capabilities),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of China’s armed forces), 29 November 2022. hxxp://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-11/29/content_328869.htm

With the expansion of the scope of human activities and the development of national interests, where military struggle takes place has moved beyond traditional domains such as land, sea, and air and continues to expand into the deep sea, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains. As required by the times, forces and types of combat power to be fielded in these domains have emerged.

Driven by advanced technology, new domain and new quality combat forces have broken through traditional spaces such as land, sea, air, and space, and the scope of activities has become more three-dimensional and diverse. Deep sea, space, underground, and polar regions have all become new territories where new domains and new quality combat forces compete.

New-domain forces with new combat capabilities involve dynamic reconfiguration and cross-domain integration of combat elements. With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.

Notes:

[i] “New combat capabilities” is the more anodyne translation used in the official version of Xi’s remarks, but the Chinese here means something closer to “enabled by new capabilities.” For consistency, “new combat capabilities” is used throughout.

[ii] This table is partially constructed from other articles in PLA Daily that were either too short or did not have enough details and explanation to warrant translation.

[iii] The delineation between “new combat capabilities” and “New Type Combat Forces” [新型作战力量], another buzzword of PLA modernization, is unclear.

[iv] China’s 2019 Defense White Paper describes the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The PLASSF is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities. China’s National Defense in the New Era [新时代的中国国防] State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室] 24 July 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm

[v] One article in August 2022 described new long-range rockets launched by PLA ground force units belonging to the Eastern Theater Command toward the vicinity of Taiwan in response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit using the same language. “Our ground forces’ development of new combat capabilities continues to advance long-range rocket forces represent a new era of precision firepower” [我陆军新质作战力量建设持续推进 远程火箭炮兵成为新一代火力精兵], PLA Daily, 29 October 2022. http://www.81.cn/xue-xi/2022-08/29/content_10180334.htm

[vi] In his article, Liu Haijiang also highlights the U.S. Army’s fielding of the AI decision-making assistant FIRES Synchronization to Optimize Responses in Multi-Domain Operations (FIRESTORM) as indicative of the future direction of intelligent warfare.

[vii] Peter Wood, “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400756

Image Information:

Image: “Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Author-created

People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition (Kevin McCauley) (January 2023)

Posted on by

(Click image to download brief.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The PLA develops generic offensive, defensive, and special conditions campaign models
    to support planning and training for operational scenarios it believes are relevant to
    potential conflicts. These generic campaigns provide planning factors, force organization,
    and operational methods for combat.

  • The choice of campaigns reveals that Taiwan and Indian conflict scenarios are the key
    scenarios for which the PLA is planning and training.

  • Some of the campaigns do not appear to represent operational situations the PLA is likely
    to face in the near to mid-term.

  • PLA doctrinal change is evolutionary, and in the past slow. The available PLA sources on
    Army doctrine appear to show incremental change to date due to developing technologies
    such as artificial intelligence or research on operational methods exhibited in recent foreign
    conflicts such as the United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

China Deepening Cooperation in Latin America’s Sizeable Lithium Sector 

Posted on by
Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

“China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.”

The price of lithium, a key ingredient in battery technology, has skyrocketed amid the rush for critical minerals. Lithium can be found in abundance throughout South America’s so-called “Lithium Triangle,” which comprises Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile and contains approximately 55 percent of the world’s known lithium deposits.[i]  Mexico also has known lithium deposits. Collectively, Latin America’s lithium reserves has attracted global attention, especially from China. According to the first excerpted article from China’s state-run Global Times, Chile’s Consul General in Chengdu vowed to increase the country’s cooperation with China to stabilize the global supply and price of lithium. In Mexico’s case, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has sought to nationalize the metal known as “white gold.” According to the second excerpted article from privately held popular media outlet Radio Formúla, a new state company called Lithium for Mexico will control the metal in Mexico, demanding foreign partners to enter joint ventures and junior partnerships. The article reports that only one company has received a unique exception to this rule—China’s Ganfeng Lithium. Mexico’s government justifies this exception on the basis that Ganfeng had an existing agreement to control lithium at the Bacanora site before the mineral’s nationalization. These developments demonstrate China’s advances in Latin America with respect to its critical minerals strategy, as well as the success of its economic diplomacy in achieving carveouts for its companies.

Sources: 

“Chile vows to enhance cooperation with China in lithium sector,” Global Times (state-owned media outlet under the auspices of the People’s Daily), 9 November 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279134.shtml  

Chile’s consul general in Chengdu…Gustavo Díaz Hidalgo, on Wednesday vowed to further enhance cooperation with China in the lithium sector, in a bid to stabilize the global supply of the vital mineral for making batteries…Díaz predicted that the global demand for lithium each year would surpass 1 million tons by 2025, crossing 2.5 million tons by 2030.
 
The consul general said that China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.

“Litio para México: Empresa estatal lo explotará en exclusiva…salvo una excepción china (Lithium for Mexico: State company will exploit it exclusively…with one Chinese exception),” Radio Formúla (a popular outlet owned by the large media conglomerate Grupo Formúla), 24 August 2022. https://www.radioformula.com.mx/economia/2022/8/24/litio-para-mexico-empresa-estatal-lo-explotara-en-exclusiva-salvo-una-excepcion-china-728919.html

The Secretary of Energy, Rocío Nahle, explained that the current concession for exploration and exploitation of lithium at the hands of a private company will be maintained… Although concessions will no longer be granted to explore and exploit the mineral…the only one in force for exploitation before the reform to the Mining Law, in the hands of an Asian company, will remain in force.

Notes:

[i] For more information on U.S. opportunities in the Lithium Triangle and how the United States might effectively compete, see: Ryan C. Berg and T. Andrew Sady-Kennedy, “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden administration,” 17 August 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration

Image Information:

Image:  Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/earthworks/47617675391
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0

India Moves To Compete With China in Africa

Posted on by
3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

“Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.”

India has taken various steps to counter China since a series of border clashes took place along the Line of Actual Control in 2017 and 2020.[i] While most of these initiatives involved developing operational and tactical capabilities in the Indian Army, the Indian government has also taken a few strategic-level measures to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific region against China.[ii] However, a new playing field for Indian and Chinese competition is showing itself: the accompanying excerpted articles report on recent Indian efforts to sell weapon systems to governments in Africa, offering insights into Indian efforts to counter China at the strategic level.

The excerpted article from India’s independent think-tank Center for Land Warfare Studies examines Chinese exports of weapons in Africa. The author notes how China has been increasing arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa in recent years and that this has been taking place alongside the use of ports in the region. The author also points out how China is in a position to continue sales of weapons in Africa as the war in Ukraine could reduce Russia’s share of the arms market in the region. While India’s defense industry has yet to export significant numbers of weapon systems in the way that China can, a second article provides insight into Indian plans to change this status quo.

This excerpted article from India’s independent English-language news website, The Print, reports on the India-Africa Defense Dialogue, held in October in India alongside the most recent iteration of the country’s defense exposition. The article states that a number of participants from Africa attended and that India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh wanted to explore new areas of security cooperation between India and African states, “including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.” Singh also stated that India and Africa are “important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.” He further commented that India will partner with any African country on the “basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect.” Lastly, the article references an extensive list of weapons that might be of interest to African militaries, which could give India another opportunity to counter China if New Delhi is able to supply these systems as part of a different partnership than Beijing offers. 

Sources:

Dr. Manjari Singh, “China’s Increasing Arms Supply to the Middle East and Beyond: Another Dimension to the New Silk Road?,” Center for Land Warfare Studies (independent think-tank in India), 28 October 2022, No. 367.

https://www.claws.in/publication/chinas-increasing-arms-supply-to-the-middle-east-and-beyond-another-dimension-to-the-new-silk-road/

China has been expanding its arms export beyond Asia and for the last half a decade, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have become its favourite destinations. From the region’s side, China is emerging as the second-best choice for arms imports after the US. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has added a new dimension to the existing global arms industry with an anticipated boost to China’s overall arms diplomacy particularly in the Middle East…

China has been exporting armed drones to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan since 2020…This change in position is also reflective of the East Asian economy’s

increasing weapon’s platform outreach—from 40 countries to 53, over a span of one decade from 2010 to 2019…

It is noteworthy that between 2015 and 2022, China has leased ownership of as many as

10 ports. Apart from these ports, China has been building seven more ports which are strategically significant, and serves as economic and political outposts for its expansionist approach. The Karachi Deepwater Port in Pakistan, Sokhna port in Egypt, CICT Terminal in Sri Lanka, Chittagong and Payra Ports in Bangladesh, CSP Terminal, Khalifa Port in the UAE, Sudan Port, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam Ports in Tanzania, and Lamu & Mombasa ports in Kenya, are some of the other ports developed by Chinese firms…

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is likely to dent Russian economy and the former’s aggression will presumably lead to its diplomatic isolation, both of which are likely to provide a favourable environment to Chinese arms market. Additionally, maritime connectivity and building of Chinese ports in the Western Indian Ocean will further facilitate China’s arms sale…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “To counter China’s influence, India seeks to boost defence cooperation with African countries,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 18 October 2022.

https://theprint.in/defence/to-counter-chinas-influence-india-seeks-to-boost-defence-cooperation-with-african-countries/1173223/

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.

Fifty African countries participated in the India-Africa Defence Dialogue initiated during the last DefExpo held in Lucknow in 2020. Among the attendees were defence ministers of 20 African countries…

During his address Tuesday, the Defence Minister stressed the need to explore new areas of convergence for defence engagements between India and Africa, including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security and counterterrorism. He added that India and African countries are important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

“We do not believe in making or becoming a client or satellite state, and so, when we partner with any country, it is on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect…” he said.

Sources in the defence establishment also said equipment of interest to Africa includes light combat helicopters, patrol vessels, small arms, shoulder-fired rockets, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and surveillance drones, among others…

Notes:

[i] For more background on the clashes, see: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China,” War on the Rocks, 2 July 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/

[ii] The government of India increased its security cooperation with Vietnam in 2022 as one strategic-level measure to counter China. For more see: Matthew Stein, “India Strengthens Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” OE Watch, Issue #8, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/422297

Image Information:

Image: 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:3rd_India-Africa_Forum_Summit_4.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance

Posted on by

“Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.” 

China identifies the Internet and cyberspace as a critical domain for ensuring national security, economic and social stability, and ultimately, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Recently, Beijing presented its vision for international cooperation in cyberspace via a white paper from the State Council Information Office. The white paper reflects Beijing’s tightening grip on information flows and fundamental freedoms, its growing concerns over Western digital advantages in its operational environment, and its expanding efforts to export digital authoritarianism to the developing world.

For Beijing to realize its global superpower aspirations and compete with the United States as a cyber superpower, it must present a vision for an equitable and inclusive global community. The 2022 white paper lays out Beijing’s vision for such a community through “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and promot[ion of] a multilateral, democratic, and transparent international internet governance system.” The document further highlights Beijing’s achievements in internet development (e.g. expansion of its internet penetration, digital economy, and tech sector) and cyberspace governance (e.g. the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures)[i] while advocating for the rights of all countries to formulate their own national cybersecurity strategies. However, these seemingly liberal themes are trumped Beijing’s emphasis on cyber sovereignty as its core guiding principle in international cyberspace governance.

Cyber sovereignty is the notion that individual countries should maintain the exclusive right to govern their own territory’s cyberspace, superseding any supposed rights for the mutual interest of a future shared community in cyberspace. As such, reliance on the principle of cyber sovereignty serves to justify the CCP’s long-term strategic control over information flows available to Chinese internet users and to facilitate Beijing’s digital security apparatus’ ability to enforce social stability to buttress CCP legitimacy.

Simultaneously, China looks to promote this version of internet governance abroad.  This conception of cyberspace governance diverges from the principles of an “open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet” advocated for by the United States and 61 partner nation signatories of the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet.”[ii] Indeed, Beijing’s white paper presents China’s achievements and vision of shared internet development and cyberspace governance in stark contrast to its vision of Western “cyber hegemonism,” the idea that “certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance.” Despite the liberal rhetoric framing a “community with a shared future in cyberspace,” the more Beijing can affiliate cyber sovereignty with equitable and inclusive participation in cyberspace governance to developing countries, the wider its brand of digital authoritarianism will spread.

Source:

“携手构建网络空间命运共同体 (Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace),” State Council Information Office, 7 November 2022. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1732898/1732898.htm (Chinese) http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2022-11/07/content_78505694.htm (English).

Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.

Certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance, raising the risk of conflict in cyberspace.

Some countries attempt to decouple with others, and create schism and confrontation in cyberspace. The increasingly complex cybersecurity situation calls for more just, reasonable and effective cyberspace governance. Global threats and challenges in cyberspace necessitate strong global responses.

All countries have the right to formulate public policies, laws, and regulations on cyberspace in the context of their national conditions and international experience. No country should seek cyber hegemony; use the internet to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs; engage in, incite, or support cyber activities that endanger other countries’ national security, or infringe on other countries’ key information infrastructure.

Notes:

[i] For more on the PRC’s evolving cyberspace and data governance legislation see: “China’s Evolving Data Governance Regime,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 July 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/Chinas_Evolving_Data_Governance_Regime.pdf

[ii] For more on the Biden administration’s articulation of the United States’ vision for cyberspace governance see: “A Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” The White House, 28 April 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf

China Addresses Food Security at Home, Uses “Food Diplomacy” Abroad

Posted on by
China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

“China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation.”

The combination of COVID-19 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine have demonstrated the vulnerability of the global food supply through prevalence of price shocks leading to increasing hunger. For its part, China is taking threats caused by food insecurity seriously. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, included food security in his 2014 articulation of a “Holistic National Security Concept.”[i] As illustrated in the following excerpts, food security remains a driving force for Chinese policy, including efforts to improve its self-reliance and insulate itself from global food market shocks, while at the same time advancing relations with strategically important trade partners and diversifying its trade partners to reduce impacts from market fluctuations.

In March 2021, China issued its latest five-year plan, which will guide policy through 2025. The excerpted portion of the plan below lays out some of the core elements of China’s domestic initiatives to improve food security. These include efforts to better use mechanization and bring small agricultural plots together for greater efficiency. The plan also called for increasing soil restoration projects to return arable land that had been polluted. In January 2022, the State Council commissioned a national soil survey to systematically study the level of pollution, which previous surveys had found to be significant.[ii] In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi reinforced many of these themes, calling for greater efforts to ensure that China’s target of arable land is protected, existing land is used more efficiently, and better seed technologies are incorporated. 

Xi also sees food security as central to his foreign policy. Xi’s Global Development Initiative,[iii] introduced in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021 as a complement to China’s Belt and Road, makes food security and “food diplomacy” an important plank.[iv] The excerpted article by Zhang Lubiao, Director of China’sMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ Foreign Economic Cooperation Center in People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, lays out some examples of China’s food diplomacy. Zhang cites China’s historical commitment to the export of these technologies and the training of thousands of technical personnel since 1979. Notably, the article highlighted how China had helped several countries, including Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, improve yields and the variety of key staples, leading Nigeria to become a major rice-producing country itself. Going forward, food security—and China’s sprint to reduce its exposure to global markets—are likely to remain a major theme of both its foreign and domestic policies.

Sources:

“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要 (Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035),” Xinhua (PRC State Media), 13 March 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm

We will consolidate the foundation of grain production capacity and ensure the supply of important agricultural products…We will enforce the strictest possible system for protecting farmland, strengthen the protection of the quantity of available farmland and enhance its quality to ensure that the total area of China’s farmland remains above the red line of 120 million hectares [十八亿亩耕地红线] (~296.5 million acres[i]), prevent the use of farmland for non-agricultural and non-grain purposes… Focusing on functional zones for grain production and protected areas for the production of major agricultural products, we will build a ‘national food security industrial belt’, implement high-quality farmland development projects, and build contiguous high-quality farmland of more than 71.67 million hectares.

It is essential to improve the systems to guarantee the supply of major agricultural products and to the production, purchase, storage, marketing, and sale of grain, to ensure absolute security of staples, basic self-sufficiency of grain, and adequate supply of major agricultural products and byproducts products. Efforts will continue to develop grain production, further implement the strategy of sustainable farmland use and innovative application of agricultural technology for national food security, carry out research to overcome the technological bottleneck of superior seed sources, and improve self-reliance and control[ii] of seed types.

Zhang Lubiao, “中国杂交水稻技术助力维护全球粮食安全 (Hybrid Rice Technology is a Hallmark of China’s International Agricultural Cooperation),” People’s Daily (Official Newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee), 13 November 2022. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-11/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20221113_7-03.htm

While simultaneously addressing the problem of domestic self-sufficiency, China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation and working with all parties to enhance global sustainable agricultural production capacity…. China has also trained more than 14,000 hybrid rice professionals from more than 80 developing countries through international training courses.

In order to promote hybrid rice technology, China has sent a large number of agricultural technical experts. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 2021, under the framework of China-FAO South-South Cooperation alone, China has sent nearly 1,100 agricultural experts and technicians to more than 40 countries and regions, accounting for nearly 60% of the total number of dispatched experts.

…

Cooperative hybrid rice projects involving China, Nigeria, Uganda and other countries have also achieved remarkable results. China has helped Nigeria make great progress in the field of rice planting by sending experts, promoting improved crop varieties, and providing technical support, and has become one of the major rice-producing countries in Africa.

Sources Notes:

[i] The original phrase is 1.8 billion “mu,” a Chinese unit of measure. For comparison, in 2021 the U.S. had 895 million acres of farmland. While China is slightly larger than the U.S. in size, much of its land is mountainous, plateaus, or desert areas unsuitable for farming. See: “Farms and Land in Farms 2021 Summary,” USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, February 2022. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/fnlo0222.pdf  

[ii] Here, control is referring to rights including patents. China still relies heavily on seed types that are patented by foreign countries.

Notes:

[i] “Holistic National Security Concept” [总体国家安全观].

[ii] “The State Council Notice on the Third National Soil Survey” [国务院关于开展 第三次全国土壤普查的通知], PRC State Council (Chinese Government), 29 January 2022.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/16/content_5673906.htm

[iii] Global Development Initiative (GDI) [全球发展倡议].

[iv] Food security was mentioned second after poverty alleviation in a list of specific measures in a section discussing development. See: Xi Jinping, “Speech by Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (full text),” [ 习近平在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话（全文）], Xinhua, 22 September 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/22/content_5638597.htm

Image Information:

Image: China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).
Source: US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/rssiws/al/crop_production_maps/China/China_Total_Rice.jpg
Attribution: USG/Public Domain