China’s Expands Its Influence in Africa Through Economic and Security Cooperation

Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.


“The start of [China’s] joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania…”


China is supporting African countries in economic and infrastructure development alongside its growing military presence in the continent. Tanzania, where China has been showing increasing interest in both the security and economic realms, is indicative of this trend. In late July China held Peace-Unity 2024, a joint military drill with Tanzania, which involved counter-terrorism exercises. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) newspaper Global Times argued those exercises “reflected China’s power projection capabilities” in Africa.[i] After the exercises in Tanzania, China held similar counterterrorism and counter-piracy exercises in neighboring Mozambique, which has borne the brunt of Islamic State (IS) affiliated militant attacks in East Africa.

Consistent with China’s game plan in Africa to combine security with economic partnerships, on 8 October, the CCP website cctv.com published the excerpted Chinese-language article discussing the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group’s finalizing the construction of a bridge in Tanzania after four years of work. The article touts the two-mile long bridge, which connects Kigongo and Busisi on the banks of the Gulf on Mwanza in Tanzania’s north, as the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa. Given that the China Railway 15th Bureau Group, like other railway companies,[ii] has historically performed military-related construction missions, this bridge also has military significance for China’s power projection in Africa.

The combination of constructing major infrastructure projects in Tanzania followed by joint military training exercises with the same country and its strife-ridden neighbor reflects China’s modus operandi in Africa. Developing African infrastructure not only opens economic opportunities for Chinese commerce on the continent but also enables China to expand its military influence in Africa. In addition, large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa can obscure the arguably more significant military influence China is acquiring there, which China does not wish to highlight internationally for fear it could be perceived as threatening.

China will continue to exert influence and enhance its military footprint in African countries by linking its ability to support economic development and infrastructure projects with joint military exercises and potentially other objectives in those countries, such as basing rights. This promotes China’s Belt and Road Initiative and broader global security objectives. If there is a new “great game” in Africa, Tanzania is among the numerous countries on the continent where China is playing aggressively.


Sources:

“China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities,” Global Times (Chinese Communist Party news service focusing on international affairs from a Chinese nationalist and populist perspective). 6 August 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317509.shtml

On its way to Mozambique from Tanzania, the Qilianshan conducted joint search and rescue as well as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy training in preparation of the joint exercises, the PLA Navy confirmed. The start of the joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania, also under the banner of the “Peace-Unity 2024” joint exercises.

With a focus on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy in the joint exercises, Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military expert, told the Global Times that the drills are of pragmatic significance in Africa where terrorist and pirate attacks occur frequently

“中企承建非洲最长矮塔斜拉桥顺利合龙 (The longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa built by a Chinese company was successfully closed),” news.cctv.com (website of national television broadcaster of China, which reports to the Chinese Communist Party), 8 October 2024. https://news.cctv.com/2024/10/08/ARTIEo5gdghwYT812Y5y9lRG241008.shtml

The Magufuli Bridge in Tanzania, jointly constructed by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group, was successfully completed. After more than four years of non-stop construction, the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa has been fully connected, and the countdown to the completion and opening of the entire line has begun. The Magufuli Bridge is located on the southern shoreline of Lake Victoria, which is the largest lake in Africa.

There was no underwater casting during the entire pedestal construction process, which minimized the impact of construction on the water quality of the lake and effectively protected the “Mother Lake” of the African people. During the construction process, the construction team strictly implemented quality control standards. After completion, it will become the first bridge project on Lake Victoria, which is of great significance for enhancing Tanzania’s national image and promoting local social and economic development.


Notes:

[i] See Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, “China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities’”, Global Times (daily English language newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Daily newspaper), 30 July 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1317046.shtml

[ii] The China Railway 15th Bureau Group was formerly the fifth and sixth divisions of the Chinese Railways Corps, which was considered a “special force” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1949. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000700070455-8.pdf


OE Watch Insight:

CHN infrastructure projects in TZA coincide with joint military exercises, which allows CHN to present an image of supporting African nations while taking the focus off its increasing military influence in the region.


Image Information:

Image: Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.
Source: Xinhua, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:China-Tanzania_trade_agreement_signed.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


China Sets Sight on Gabon for Second African Military Base

Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.


“The visit of the [Chinese] Peace Ark highlights the friendly relations between Gabon and China, and brings glory and well-being to the Gabonese people.”


Beijing is targeting Gabon to host the second Chinese military base on the African continent, marking its first military base on Africa’s western coast. On 9 October, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation website published the excerpted Chinese-language article, which highlighted the Chinese naval visit to Gabon. The visit came amid a Chinese push to possibly establish its first military base on the western coast of Africa—and Gabon is a prospect to host this base.[i] The article indicates China’s goal was to cultivate goodwill in Gabon through the visit of its Peace Ark naval hospital ship to Gabon’s Owendo Port in the country’s capital. Among the participants in the farewell ceremony with the Gabonese Navy, for example, were non-military personnel, such as overseas Chinese businesspeople in Gabon, Confucius Institute[ii] representatives, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and medical teams.

The Peace Ark naval hospital ship held joint exercises with the Gabonese Navy on maritime rescue and evacuation between 26 September and 3 October. Yet, the most impactful mission of the hospital ship during the visit to Gabon was related to “soft power,” with it providing medical treatment to 6,934 Gabonese civilians, including 171 surgeries, and delivering four babies. Further, as part of the visit, Chinese medical teams were dispatched from the naval hospital ship to schools to promote health education and to hospitals to support Gabonese doctors, while also playing a friendly soccer match with the Gabonese military.

The Chinese campaign for influence in Gabon differs from Russia, which is unable to provide the same breadth of combined military and medical support to a country like Gabon. China is able to parlay its military support with significant investment, including more than 4 million Euros to Gabon in the weeks prior to this naval hospital ship’s visit to the country, which again Russia is unable to match.[iii] The Chinese campaign in Gabon is seeing results, with the Gabonese president publicly welcoming the Belt and Road Initiative’s expansion into the country.[iv] China is, therefore, primed to increase its influence in Gabon, including potentially establishing a base in the country, while also outflanking other geopolitical powers, such as Russia, for influence in Africa in the long run.


Sources:

““和平方舟”号医院船结束访问加蓬,离港时与加蓬海军举行联合演练 (The “Peace Ark” Hospital Ship Ends Visit to Gabon, Conducting a Joint Exercise with the Gabonese Navy When Leaving the Port),” focac.org, (official website of FOCAC, which is the official forum between all African states except Eswatini and China), 9 October 2024. https://www.focac.org/zfgx/hpaq/202410/t20241009_11504024.htm

The Chinese Navy’s Peace Ark hospital ship slowly sailed away from the Port of Owendo, Gabon, after successfully completing its visit to Gabon. More than 300 people, including Ambassador to Gabon Zhou Ping, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gabonese Navy Diwaku, embassy staff, overseas Chinese in Gabon, representatives of the Confucius Institute and the medical aid team to Gabon attended the farewell ceremony. This was the first joint maritime search and rescue exercise between the Chinese and Gabonese navies.

In addition to the main platform for treatment, the hospital ship also sent expert teams and patrol teams to local hospitals for diagnosis and treatment The visit of the Peace Ark hospital ship was highly appreciated by the Gabonese government.


Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish A Military Base In Gabon,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] China’s Confucius Institutes are often situated at university campuses abroad “to promote the Chinese language and cultural activities among students and researchers” but they “unswervingly” serve the Communist Party’s goals and are, therefore, part of Chinese soft power projection. As a result of Confucius Institutes’ ties with the Communist Party, an increasing number of them have been shut down in the West, but they are still expanding in Africa and the Middle East. Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Soft Power Projection Strategy: Confucius Institutes in the MENA Region,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 25 July 2023. https://besacenter.org/chinas-soft-power-projection-strategy-confucius-institutes-in-the-mena-region/

[iii] “Le Gabon attire 4,3 milliards $ d’investissements chinois (Gabon attracts $4.3 billion of Chinese investment),” Agence Ecofin [Cameroon— and Switzerland-based French-language website primarily covering African political economics]. 4 September 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0409-121241-le-gabon-attire-4-3-milliards-dinvestissements-chinois

[iv] See: “(FOCAC) Interview: China is a true friend that stands with Gabon through thick and thin, says Gabonese president,” news.cn [website of the official state news agency of the People’s Republic of China]. 5 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240905/11512527b9eb47799078488bbb0c3e31/c.html


OE Watch Insight:

A CHN naval hospital ship visited GAB to participate in joint maritime search and rescue exercises. Another key mission was to provide medical care to GAB military personnel and civilians to build goodwill amid a possible attempt by CHN to build its first West Africa military base in GAB.


Image information:

Image: Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.
Source: Brian Ecton, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:POG-Airport.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


China Debuts Fifth-Generation Stealth Fighter

An image of the J-35A released by CCTV Military’s official Weibo account.


“The debut of the J-35A marks China becoming the second country in the world, after the United States, to simultaneously field two stealth fighter jets.”


China hosted the 2024 International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai from 12 to 17 November 2024. The event showcased a range of new and upcoming advanced weapons, including attack helicopters, UAVs, and robots. Notably, it marked the debut of China’s newest fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-35A.[i]

The first excerpted article, published by the Global Times, a CCP tabloid newspaper, features an interview with Wang Yongqing, director of the Science and Technology Committee at Shenyang Aviation Industry Corporation of China.[ii] Wang Yongqing highlights that the J-35A incorporates enhanced stealth capabilities through breakthrough technologies, with a focus on all-domain warfare. The J-35A could be tasked with a range of missions, including seizing and maintaining air superiority, engaging ground and sea air defense systems, and intercepting enemy fighters, bombers, cruise missiles, and other airborne threats. Furthermore, Wang Yongqing elaborates that the J-35 is a “one machine with multiple types” platform, highlighting its versatility in supporting the development of multiple variants tailored to specific mission requirements while enabling efficient scaling for rapid production. This versatility includes a J-35 variant’s anticipated deployment aboard China’s Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier.[iii]

The second excerpted article, published by Direct News, a news outlet controlled by the propaganda department of the Shenzhen municipal committee, disputes claims that the J-35 is merely a copy of the U.S. F-35. The article states the two stealth jets share some design similarities but differ in stealth effectiveness, bomb bay design, engine performance, and aerodynamic shape, reflecting China’s unique combat assumptions and tactical approaches, which diverge from those of Western countries. The debut of the J-35A demonstrates China’s advancement in stealth technology and broader aviation engineering, yet challenges and uncertainties remain in achieving parity with the United States.

China’s progress in fighter development is undeniable; however, noticeable differences exist in the operational and combat experience of Chinese fifth-generation fighters compared to their U.S. counterparts.[iv] For example, U.S. F-22s and F-35s have flown numerous combat missions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, providing invaluable real-world insights into their capabilities while also demonstrating the proficiency of their pilots. Additionally, while the unveiling of the J-35A underscores China’s ambition to challenge U.S. military capabilities, the absence of detailed specifications and lack of real-world operational insights make it difficult to assess whether the J-35A’s technological sophistication and performance rival or exceed the U.S. fifth-generation fighters.[v]


Sources:

Fan Wei and Liu Xuanzun, “歼-35A研制单位首席专家:研制新装备,根本还是为了让人民过上好日子 (The chief expert of the J-35A development unit: the fundamental purpose of developing new equipment is to ensure a better life for the people),” Global Times (a tabloid newspaper under the CCP), 11 November 2024. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1815388616265828340&wfr=spider&for=pc

The debut of the J-35A positions China as the second country in the world, after the United States with its F-22 and F-35, to operate two stealth fighters simultaneously. Wang Yongqing, director of the Science and Technology Committee at the Shenyang Institute of Aviation Industry Corporation of China, told the Global Times during the Zhuhai Airshow that the J-35A strengthens China’s combat system network. He emphasized that the development of new equipment is fundamentally aimed at preventing aggression, promoting national development, and ensuring a better quality of life for the people.

In response to questions from Global Times about the new features of the J-35A, Wang highlighted the aircraft’s advancements in stealth, information integration, networking, and intelligence. He explained that the J-35 adopted several new technologies to enhance its stealth capabilities and noted the significant progress and innovation made in these areas. Wang also emphasized the aircraft’s focus on information warfare, coordinated warfare, and all-domain operations.

Regarding the J-35A’s technical features and its potential to cooperate with other fighter jets, Wang provided insight into the aircraft’s design. He stated that the J-35A is capable of seizing and maintaining air control, attacking enemy third and fourth-generation fighters, and defending against ground and sea-based air defense systems. The fighter is also designed to intercept enemy aircraft, bombers, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats.

Wang further asserted that the J-35A can engage previous-generation aircraft while staying outside the enemy’s effective detection range, achieving “one-way transparency” on the battlefield. This gives China an overwhelming advantage, allowing for the detection and neutralization of the enemy first. Against aircraft of the same generation, the J-35A’s lethality and survivability, along with its advanced coordinated combat capabilities, allow it to disrupt the enemy’s targeting abilities and gain a tactical advantage. He correlates the role of the J-35A as the “point guard on the basketball court.”

Wang also discussed the J-35’s development as a “one aircraft, multiple types” platform. The aircraft’s overall layout and technology research have matured key technologies, reducing research and production costs. This approach, he explained, will enable China’s air defense forces to scale up quickly and enhance their combat capabilities.

Qiu Yatong, “美媒承认:所谓“歼-35抄袭F-35”根本是无稽之谈 (US media acknowledges: the so-called “J-35 copying the F-35” is completely nonsense),” Direct News (news outlet controlled by the propaganda department of the Shenzhen municipal committee), 09 November 2024. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1815256338816862194&wfr=spider&for=pc

On November 12, the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition will be held in Zhuhai, featuring the much-anticipated J-35A stealth fighter, which recently made a surprise appearance at Zhuhai Jinwan Airport. Reuters confirmed the J-35A’s participation, describing it as a medium-stealth, multi-purpose fighter and highlighting it as the biggest draw of the air show. Reuters emphasized that advancing aerospace design and manufacturing capabilities, exemplified by the J-35, has become a critical strategic priority for China.

The debut of the J-35A positions China as the second country, after the United States, to operate two stealth fighters simultaneously, marking the beginning of its “double fifth-generation aircraft” era. While little is publicly known about the fighter’s performance and combat specifications, it is widely believed that the J-35A will serve aboard the Chinese Navy’s Type 003 aircraft carrier, Fujian.

For years, Western media have baselessly accused China of copying weapons designs, including claims that the J-35 is a direct imitation of the U.S. F-35. However, significant differences exist between the two aircraft, such as nose shape, engine tail nozzle, wing shape, and tail design, making these accusations unfounded and misleading.

Wu Wei, senior editor at Direct News, remarked that the Western tendency to compare the J-35 with the F-35 stems from subconscious bias. He noted that while the two aircraft share similar model numbers and overall appearance, the J-35 is distinct in reflecting China’s unique assumptions about combat scenarios and tactical priorities. Differences include stealth effectiveness, bomb bay design, engine performance, and aerodynamic shape, all of which highlight China’s independent approach to stealth fighter development and application.


Notes:

[i] To watch an official news segment on the J-35A unveiling, see CCTV7 news coverage, CCTV7 Military Report, 14 November 2024. https://tv.cctv.com/2024/11/14/VIDEf28pCkOpF9xOoD1NcEKJ241114.shtml

[ii] To watch an interview with Wang Yongqing discussing the J-35A, see Global Times’ official video interview, Global Times, 12 November 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=5212300448341909343

[iii] Maya Carlin, “J-35A vs. F-35: Can China’s New Fighter Jet Match Up?,” National Interest, 18 November 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/j-35a-vs-f-35-can-chinas-new-fighter-jet-match-213760

[iv] Lin Nai-Chuan, “China showcases new stealth fighter at Zhuhai air show,” Voice of America, 13 November 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-showcases-new-stealth-fighter-at-zhuhai-air-show/7863356.html

[v] Sebastien Roblin, “China Is Unleashing a New Stealth Fighter, And It’s a Direct Challenge to America,” Popular Mechanics, 14 November 2024. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a62906352/china-new-stealth-fighter-j-35a/


OE Watch Insight:

CHN has become the second country, after the USA, to simultaneously operate two stealth fighters, demonstrating a significant expansion of its air and sea combat capabilities, along with its technological advancement as a rising military power. 


Image Information:

Image: An image of the J-35A released by CCTV Military’s official Weibo account.
Source: https://weibo.com/6189120710/OEODkqT6a?layerid=5097277586408330
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


China Unveils New High-Power Microwave Weapon Systems

“High-power microwave weapons represent not only a leap forward in military technology, but also a major shift in the future war model. Whoever can seize the strategic commanding heights may gain the upper hand in future wars.”


China unveiled at least three mobile, ground-based, high-power microwave-directed energy weapon systems during the Zhuhai Air Show in November. According to the excerpted article published on Chinese blog and news outlet Sina, these weapons are capable of paralyzing hundreds of drones with one strike and could give China an advantage in future wars. The article argues that the new weapon system will be an especially important counter-drone technology. The article outlines several key advantages of the high-power microwave weapons:

  1. They can quickly deploy, lock onto, and attack a target the moment it comes into range
  2. They produce electromagnetic pulses over a wide area and can attack multiple drones simultaneously
  3. They are economical to employ, do not consume ammunition, such as missiles and artillery, and can be launched multiple times in succession
  4. They are ideal in more complex environments, including urban settings, compared to traditional kinetic weapons, preventing civilian casualties and preserving necessary infrastructure

Specifically, China North Industries Group Corporation unveiled the Hurricane 2000 and Hurricane 3000 high-power microwave weapons systems. The article describes the first system as a large, flat array mounted on top of an 8×8 light armored vehicle chassis[i] or similar variant. The system features a small rotating radar for target detection and tracking. The second system, larger than the first, is mounted on a Shaanxi Auto SX2400/2500 series 8×8 truck. It also includes “planar arrays and radars.” Some sources claim the Hurricane 2000 and Hurricane 3000 have an effective range of 2000 to 3000 meters, an order of a magnitude higher than the U.S. manufactured Leonidas high-power microwave weapon system.[ii] The article also describes a third high-power microwave weapon system, which comes from China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Like the Hurricane 3000, it rides atop the Shaanxi Auto SX2400/2500 series 8×8 trucks.

According to the article, China has achieved major breakthroughs in the field of high-energy microwave weapons, which could indeed give it an edge in future warfare. Finally, China’s microwave weapon systems underscore its commitment to developing advanced weapons technologies, particularly to counter emerging aerial threats, such as UAVs.


Sources:

“无人机的新克星:国产高功率微波武器现身 (A New Drone Opponent: Unveiling the Domestic High-Powered Microwave Weapon),” Sina (Chinese blog and news outlet), 18 November 2024. https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2024-11-18/doc-incwmras0246638.shtml

At this year’s China Air Show, at least three domestically-produced large-scale mobile ground-based high-power microwave directed energy weapons were unveiled. This type of weapon can be regarded as a killer weapon to deal with drone swarm attacks. It has not only become a hot spot of the air show, but also once again highlighted the strength of China’s military industry.

In recent years, the use of drones for reconnaissance and attack on the battlefield by militaries around the world has increased… This has made armies of various countries strongly aware of the urgency to expand their defense systems against drone threats. However, traditional air defense systems are not always effective against these types of small and flexible aerial targets. In this context, high-energy microwave weapons have emerged as a new way to counter drones and have significant advantages in actual combat.

The primary advantages of high-energy microwave weapons in anti-UAV operations are: First…rapid response… Second, they cover a wide area. The third is they are more efficient… The fourth is non-lethal…

China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) has launched two high-power microwave weapons systems, the “Hurricane 2000” and the “Hurricane 3000.”

The first system consists of a large flat array mounted on the top of an 8×8 light armored vehicle chassis. The system is equipped with a small rotating radar, which is likely used for target detection and tracking. Its chassis resembles the one used in the 625E self-propelled short-range air defense system. The latter system is larger than the former, mounted on the Shaanxi Auto SX2400/2500 series 8×8 trucks. It also includes planar arrays and radars. Video broadcast at the scene showed a small drone being shot down by one of the systems, and infrared camera footage was also seen. Electro-optical and infrared cameras are usually used with directional It can be combined with anti-UAV systems to help accurately identify and track targets. It is estimated that the “Hurricane 2000” should be mainly used for field mobile accompanying air defense, while the “Hurricane 3000” may be used for fixed-point air defense missions in key areas.

In addition, photos of a third high-power microwave weapon system also appeared at the air show. This system comes from China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and is also installed on Shaanxi Automobile SX2400/2500 series trucks. The microwave array is mounted on an articulated bracket of a different style at the rear of the vehicle. There should also be sensors such as radar in the dome on the retractable mast at the end of the cab…

China has made major breakthroughs in the field of high-energy microwave weapons and has begun to enter the international arms market. As the frequency of use of weapons such as drones and cruise missiles in modern warfare increases, countries are also increasingly demanding means to counter these threats. High-energy microwave weapons, as a type of weapon with strong anti-drone capabilities and relatively The lower-cost option is likely to attract global attention. In the future, China is expected to become a leading country in the export of such equipment.


Notes:

[i] The referenced Hurricane 2000 sits on top of a vehicle resembling one used in China’s Type 625E self-propelled short-range air defense system, which the country unveiled during the November 2022 Zhuhai Air Show. To read more about the Type 625E air defense system and view an image, see Emma Helfrich, “This is China’s Beastly New Air Defense Vehicle,” The Warzone (a U.S. online magazine that looks at national security and geopolitical coverage and analysis, with an emphasis on military technology, strategy, and foreign policy), 18 November 2022. https://www.twz.com/this-is-chinas-beastly-new-chinese-air-defense-vehicle

[ii] “反无人机利器,“飓风”微波武器,有效距离比美高出一个数量级 (The“Hurricane Anti-Drone Weapon has an Effective Range an Order of Magnitude Higher Than That of the United States),” Net Ease (one of China’s largest internet companies, subject to government regulatory oversight and censorship), 18 November 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/JHA8HFMA0553OOJA.html


OE Watch Insight Summary:

During the Zhuhai Air Show, CHN unveiled at least three mobile ground-based, high-power microwave directed energy weapons, capable of paralyzing hundreds of drones with one strike, which could give the country an advantage in future war.


Damage to Undersea Cables in Baltic Hint at China – Russia Collusion

The Baltic Fulmar was sold to a Chinese shipowner in 2023 and renamed the NewNew Polar Bear. The NewNew Polar Bear is suspected of severing undersea cables in the Baltics.


“Investigators suspect that a Chinese vessel is the perpetrator of the incident. The incident was sharply reacted to by German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who said that it ‘is not an accidental accident, but a deliberate sabotage.’”


On 19 November, the Danish Navy detained the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Pang 3 under the suspicion that it had damaged undersea cables connecting Finland and Germany and cables connection Sweden and Lithuania. As per the first excerpted article in the Polish defense publication Defense24, the Yi Pang 3 had sailed from the Russian port of Ust-Lugu before passing through the Baltic Sea. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius called the incident deliberate sabotage but did not delineate a responsible party. According to the second excerpted article from the Indian publication The Week, Russia may be the culprit, given that the Yi Pang 3 was captained by a Russian. Additional western sources point to Russia as well.[i] However, the incident is the second involving a Chinese-flagged ship damaging undersea cables in the Baltic.[ii] It also comes on the heels of Western efforts to isolate China from the undersea cable network in the Indo-Pacific and suspicion of Chinese hacking into existing undersea cables in the region.[iii] Two months prior, in September 2024, Chinese officials excoriated the U.S. and its allies’ efforts to control the global undersea cable network.[iv]

It is highly probable that both Russia and China are complicit in the acts of sabotage against critical Western infrastructure. Both China and Russia have a shared interest in degrading Western capabilities: China’s confrontations with the West regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea and Russia’s confrontations with the West over control of Ukraine. Both China and Russia have recently engaged in hybrid or non-lethal forms of warfare, leading multiple Western leaders to suspect and accuse them of sabotage.


Sources:

“Danish Navy Stopped Chinese Ship Suspected of Damaging Undersea Cables,” Defense24 (Polish based security focused news outlet), 20 November 2024. https://defence24.com/armed-forces/danish-navy-stopped-a-chinese-ship-suspected-of-damaging-undersea-cables?utm_source=archives.internationalintrigue.io&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=tense-moments-at-this-year-s-g20&_bhlid=0108ca30f9c9a3a247f66f2e0da3ce1af250d1cd

The detention took place in the area of Danish territorial waters, in the Danish Straits at the exit of the Great Belt. The detention of the vessel was carried out by the Danish Navy patrol vessel P525. After a few hours, another vessel HDMS Soeloeven, which is specialised for underwater work, reached both vessels. The detention of the vessel occurred on the evening of 19 November.

There is no information on whether there was an inspection of the vessel by the Danish MW’s boarding group. The Chinese vessel was sailing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga.

There is no official announcement from the Danish authorities as yet either, but the Chinese bulk carrier is suspected of damaging telecommunications cables lying on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. The vessel was said to have sailed over the damaged cables between Finland and Germany, the so- called C-Lion1, and between cables connecting Sweden and Lithuania.

Investigators suspect that a Chinese vessel is the perpetrator of the incident. The incident was sharply reacted to by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, who said that it “is not an accidental accident, but a deliberate sabotage.”

This is not the first time that a Chinese naval vessel has been responsible for damaging strategic infrastructure in the Baltic. In October 2023, the Balticconenctor gas pipeline connecting Estonia and Finland was unsealed. The gas pipeline was damaged by an anchor dropped from the deck of the Chinese container ship NewNew Polar Bear. The vessel was suspected of being the perpetrator of that incident from the outset, but it was not decided to detain it and it escaped from the Baltic Sea without consequences.

Source: “Not Russia? Chinese cargo vessel “Yi Peng 3” likely behind the sabotage of undersea cables in Baltic,” The Week (India based news service), 21 November 2024. https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2024/11/21/not-russia-chinese-cargo-yi-peng-3-likely-behind-the-sabotage-of-undersea-cables-in-baltic.html

A Chinese cargo vessel ‘Yi Peng 3’ is said to be “of interest” in connection with the alleged sabotage of two undersea communication cables in the Baltic Sea. The ship is said to have passed two cables on Sunday and Monday around the same time they were found to be severed, said reports.

Though there is no official confirmation in this regard, the Danish Navy is said to have detained the Chinese-registered cargo ship, allegedly helmed by a Russian captain. The detention allegedly took place inside the Danish territorial waters by the Danish Navy patrol vessel P525. Soon another vessel HDMS Soeloeven, which specialises in underwater work, joined the P525.

However, it is not clear whether the Danish Navy officials boarded the Chinese vessel which was said to be sailing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga.

Besides Denmark, Sweden too is taking an active interest in the ship. Sweden’s National Operative Department said it is “part of the sphere of interest, but there may be more.”

As per the data by Vesselfinder tracking data, Yi Peng 3’s last port visit was on November 15 in Ust-Luga in western Russia, close to the border with Estonia.

It stopped overnight on Tuesday to Wednesday in the Kattegat strait between Denmark and Sweden. The ship was then said to be moving along a strange route and stopped overnight on Tuesday to Wednesday in the Kattegat strait between Denmark and Sweden.

The ship was travelling 78 km at an average speed of 10.4 km/h and the transponder, which relays the data of the ship, at the time was inactive. Though the vessel’s AIS data shows that it circled just off Bornholm for about an hour, this is attributed to strong winds at that time and in that region.

However, Russian maritime pilot Alexander Stechentsev, who boarded the ship to guide it out of port, told The Guardian that there “was nothing unusual about the vessel.” He added that he took the ship to a receiving buoy located 11 miles offshore before disembarking.This isn’t the first that a Chinese vessel is destroying an underwater asset in the Baltic Sea. In 2022, the Chinese container vessel, the ‘NewNew Polar Bear’ had damaged a gas pipeline after its anchor dragged it across the seabed. China acknowledged the incident but claimed that the vessel accidentally damaged the pipeline due to stormy conditions that were prevailing at the time.


Notes:

[i] The view that Russia is behind the sabotage is also supported by at least one article in the U.S press. See: “Chinese-Registered Ship Is Held in Baltic Sea Sabotage Investigation,” The Wall Street Journal, 20 November 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/chinese-registered-ship-is-held-in-baltic-sea-sabotage-investigation-27929472

[ii] In October 2023 the Chinese flagged NewNew Polar Bear cut an undersea pipeline and communications cable in the Baltic. That ship was also piloted by a Russian crew and escaped the area without being detained.  China eventually said the NewNew Polar Bear had indeed damaged the critical undersea infrastructure but noted it was an accident. For an Australian perspective see: Cynthia Mehboob, “Commentary: Beijing’s Baltic confession exposes undersea vulnerability,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based news service), 15 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/china-ship-pipeline-accident-sabotage-damage-undersea-cable-europe-asia-4545766

[iii] For background information on the recent undersea cable dispute with China, see: Dodge Billingsley, “China Creating Undersea Cable Network In Response To United States Isolation Efforts, OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-creating-undersea-cable-network-in-response-to-united-states-isolation-efforts/; and Dodge Billingsley, “Potential Flashpoint Stemming From Undersea Cable Network Access Restrictions,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/potential-flashpoint-stemming-from-undersea-data-cable-network-access-restrictions/

[iv] “US politicization of undersea cables opposed,” Global Times (English language newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily), 24 September 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1320312.shtml


OE Watch Insight:

CHN flagged ship suspected of two recent incidents of damaging undersea cables in the Baltics. RUS crews could suggest an element of collusion between RUS and CHN to sabotage European infrastructure.


Image Information:

Image: The Baltic Fulmar was sold to a Chinese shipowner in 2023 and renamed the NewNew Polar Bear. The NewNew Polar Bear is suspected of severing undersea cables in the Baltics.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newnew_Polar_Bear – /media/File:Baltic_Fulmar_(ship,_2005)_IMO_9313204,_Maasmond,_Port_of_Rotterdam_pic4.JPG
Attribution: Public Domain


China To Cement Strategic Relationship With Peru

The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.


“We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation.”


China has long held a special interest in Peru, both for its critical mineral endowments and its position in the Pacific. Peru was the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with China and is one of the largest destinations for Chinese investment in Latin America.[i] To further cement its influence and commercial ties, China is constructing a megaport at Chancay, one of its largest and most comprehensive in the Americas, to increase its access to critical minerals and the bountiful harvest of soy, wheat, and other agricultural products from Latin America.[ii] State-owned Cosco Shipping will own and operate the port, giving China outsized control over port operations.[iii]

According to the first excerpted article from the digital outlet Energiminas, once operational, the Chancay port will shorten the main route to Asia by 10 days. The second article from the Peruvian outlet Gestión, notes that Xi Jinping will inaugurate the port later this year at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and that the Chinese delegation promises to include 750 Chinese investors visiting alongside President Xi. The outlet conveys Peru’s hope that Chancay will catalyze further Chinese investments in sectors such as telecommunications and electric vehicles. Earlier in the summer, China hosted Peruvian President Dina Boluarte for a state visit, where, according to the Gestión Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged support for elevating relations with Peru to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

The strategic implications of the Chancay megaport’s inauguration as Peru hosts the APEC Summit this year are significant. Most importantly, these actions demonstrate China’s march to gain influence in Latin America, where it already maintains several dozen agreements to own, operate, or upgrade port facilities. More importantly, many of these ports are deep water and feature docks with wide berths sufficient for the People’s Liberation Army Navy to make port calls for refueling and logistics.


Sources:

“Cosco Shipping espera inaugurar megapuerto de Chancay en noviembre (Cosco Shipping expects to open Chancay megaport in November),” Energiminas (a digital platform focused on energy and mining), 27 June 2024. https://energiminas.com/2024/06/27/cosco-shipping-espera-inaugurar-megapuerto-de-chancay-en-noviembre/

The president emphasized that the Chancay megaport will be inaugurated in November, with the presence of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. She (Xi) indicated that, to strengthen this work, the implementation of the Ancón industrial zone is planned near the port. ‘Hopefully, an electric vehicle assembly plant can be installed there, it is in the interest of both Peru and China to take care of the environment. In our country we also have copper and lithium,’ she (Xi) said…For his part, Wan Min, president of Cosco Shipping, said…‘We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation. Once its construction is completed, Chancay will become the most modern and intelligent port in South America.’

“Perú buscará capitalizar la llegada de inversores chinos y coreanos en la APEC 2024 (Peru will seek to capitalize on the arrival of Chinese and Korean investors at APEC 2024),” Gestión (a Peruvian daily focused on business and economics), 15 August 2024. https://gestion.pe/economia/apec-2024-peru-busca-capitalizar-la-llegada-de-empresarios-chinos-y-coreanos-al-foro-de-cooperacion-economica-asia-pacifico-voices-of-the-future-noticia/

The upcoming APEC Economic Leaders week, which will take place in November in Peru, will not only bring together heads of state and senior officials from the 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The arrival of a significant delegation of businessmen is also anticipated, with the participation of up to 750 investors from China…It should be noted that Peru has, to date, trade agreements with 14 of the 21 economies that are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.


Notes:

[i] For more information on investment flows from China to Latin America, see: Inter-American Dialogue, “China-Latin America Finance Databases,” accessed 13 October 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/

[ii] For additional coverage of the various phases of Chancay’s development, see: Ryan Berg, “China Nears Completion of Large Port in Peru with Dual-use Capabilities,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-nears-completion-of-large-port-in-peru-with-dual-use-capabilities/

[iii] For more information on the state of Chancay and the concerns about this megaport project, see: Henry Ziemer, “The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas


OE Insight Summary:

CHN president Xi Jinping to visit PER in November for APEC Summit inaugurating a new megaport at Chancay. Potential dual-use implications of this project. CHN influence in PER growing to concerning levels.


Image Information:

Image: The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/marirc19/8284806040.
Attribution: CC BY-NA-SA 2.0


Taiwan’s Plan To Deter China With Submarines Faces Scrutiny

Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.


“The threat the submarines are intended to guard against was highlighted anew this week, as Beijing on Monday held a day of large-scale military drills surrounding Taiwan.”


Last year Taiwan unveiled its first attack submarine, the Hai Kun. Taiwan’s ruling party and defense officials have pitched the Hai Kun as a critical deterrent to China’s ever-expanding naval capability. However, according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei Asia, plans to build seven more submarines based on the Hai Kun prototype from 2025 to 2038 are facing stiff opposition in Taiwan from political rivals and analysts asking questions about the cost of and viability of the submarines themselves.[i]

According to the article, there are calls within Taiwan and from the United States to urgently “develop asymmetric weapons in large quantities and learn how to use them effectively.” Some experts doubt whether the submarines are an appropriate response to counter China’s far more extensive firepower. According to the Nikkei Asia article, Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, stated that Taiwan’s new submarines are not up to par to operate in “this threat environment” and that to launch them from Taiwan makes no sense. But not all agree. Head of Taiwan’s National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, Adm. Huang Shu-kuang,[ii] had previously claimed that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack, or a blockade.” The article does note that Taiwan is serious about acquiring large numbers of relatively inexpensive sea drones, taking a page out of Ukraine’s playbook, which “deployed mobile coastal defense cruise missiles and ‘kamikaze’ sea drones, which acted as smart mines.”However, another Taiwanese defense analyst noted that the submarine program could be valuable in creating “a defense economy in Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s success in thwarting a potential Chinese invasion may depend on Taipei’s ability to correctly determine whether submarines or drones, or a combination of both, will give it the best chance of winning a war with China.


Sources:

“Taiwan submarine program faces mounting questions over tactical merits,” Nikkei Asia (Japan based news service that specifically covers the Indo-Pacific region), 15 October 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-submarine-program-faces-mounting-questions-over-tactical-merits

Taiwan faces fresh questions over its most ambitious defense program — a government plan to build seven more submarines — as opposition parties push back and some experts call for complementary reforms.

President Lai Ching-te and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, have pushed the submarine program as a means to deter an aggressive Communist China, which claims Taiwan as its own. Political divisions over the subs reflect broader disagreements over Taiwan’s security and defense reforms that could have global consequences as Beijing ratchets up coercive measures while refusing to rule out an invasion….

Some experts doubt whether the submarines fit into this strategy for countering China’s far more extensive firepower. Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at a recent Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club briefing… questioned the wisdom of the submarine endeavor if it comes at the expense of smaller weapons such as sea drones. “The technology in Taiwan’s new submarine isn’t up to par to operate in this threat environment. Basing submarines here in the heart of the contested area is not smart. Submarines are going to be very useful if they’re coming from a thousand miles away but Taiwan doesn’t have an overseas base, so it begs the question,” he said. “Sending out large numbers of expendable sea drones would make a lot more sense…”

The defense ministry has indeed announced plans to acquire defense drones. Experts say Taiwan could consider establishing a vast drone operation based on lessons from the Ukraine war…

Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, then-head of the National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, told Nikkei Asia last year that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack or a blockade.”

But one diplomat involved in Taiwan affairs argued that Lai’s administration may need to reconsider its submarine-centric approach… “The problem is that Taiwan’s government has now framed this as their most important reform against Chinese threats.”

Others disagree, seeing broad benefits. Su Tzu-yun, a defense expert at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research think tank, emphasized the importance of submarines not only in fending off China’s blockade attempts, but also in driving Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry and strategic development.

“A submarine can create a counter or balance force to stop or reduce a blockade or quarantine operation by the PLA,” Su said during another TFCC briefing. “But there are additional benefits to the project. … Building a fleet can create a defense economy. Taiwan can build submarines with a permanent shipyard and it can create an economic motor.”


Notes:

[i] “Taiwan earmarks billions to build 7 more Submarines in bid to deter possible PLA attacks.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based media outlet), 24 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3275605/taiwan-earmarks-billions-build-7-more-submarines-bid-deter-possible-pla-attacks?share=cnt17jZj5x2IHbTcgP1CgdsGujXmS1xu8Cd5o4Kyc5t3kKRdk3KmSsGYcdjokCp9+rof+rs4CNVI9dikc5HG%2FWDLPW2KQ9cqIjDI0iJnb80InWHGNkf8Z1txcJ9f33PsihBnLZXWcX%2F4gdgwywk6Pw==&utm_campaign=social_share

[ii] Admiral Huang Shu-kuang had offered his resignation in April 2024 due to, in his words, “unfounded accusations and slander targeting the IDS program.” His resignation was refused, and he currently heads up the submarine program. See: “Retired Navy Admiral to Stay on Sub Program,” Taipei Times (Taiwan English language news service), 16 May 2024.https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/05/16/2003817950


OE Summary Insight:

TWN debates the strategic value of proposed submarine building program to deter CHN.


Image Information:

Image: Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/09.28_總統主持「潛艦國造原型艦命名暨下水典禮」_-_Flickr_id_53219332200.jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-2.0


China Blurs Lines Between Military Drills and War

PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.


“As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war.”


China’s military exercises, which include many incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), have begun to blur the lines between military exercises and actual war, according to the first article excerpt, published in the online newspaper Taiwan News. In May 2024, after Taiwan’s newly elected president, Lai Ching-te delivered a pro-independence speech, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched Joint-Sword-2024A, a series of exercises surrounding Taiwan and its outer island territories. China referred to these exercises as a “powerful punishment for separatist forces seeking independence.”[i] Five months later, while Taiwan celebrated National Day of the Republic of China (Taiwan Independence Day),[ii] the PLA launched Joint-Sword-2024B, during which they sent planes across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. This was another stern warning against Taiwan’s independence. The second excerpt published on Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense website noted the exercises lasted multiple days, with the biggest incursion taking place on 14 October. On that day, as many as 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan were detected, with 111 of the aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.

According to the Taiwan News article, Defense Minister Wellington Koo believes China is testing its ability to attack in various ways, including through gray zone tactics and cognitive operations, joint sea and air training, and targeted military exercises. Its gray zone tactics and cognitive operations can be seen in the ongoing military exercises, which could instill a sense of complacency within Taiwan and among its allies as Chinese military exercises surrounding Taiwan become more normalized. However, one day, a training scenario could unexpectedly escalate into all-out war.[iii] Koo warns that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be increasingly difficult to discern when the PLA is transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”


Sources:

Lily LaMattina, “Taiwan Says China’s Growing Military Activity Makes Exercise and War Harder to Differentiate,” Taiwan News (Taiwan-based English language news service), 19 September 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5938651

As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war, said Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄).

Koo stressed, “We must consider how we differentiate between peacetime and wartime.” He said that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be more difficult to discern when Chinese troops are transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”

Taiwan has counted 2,076 incursions this year by China’s People’s Liberation Army into its air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Beijing has also sent non-military government ships such as coastguard, marine research, and maritime safety vessels.

“Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan),” Ministry of National Defense website (official website of the Ministry of National Defense), accessed 17 October 2024. https://x.com/mondefense?lang=en

October 10: Taiwan celebrates its National Day of the Republic of China.

14 October (up until 0600): 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan detected. 111 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.


Notes:

[i] For more information, see Cindy Hurst, “Taiwan President’s Inaugural Speech Prompts Chinese Military Drills,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-presidents-inaugural-speech-prompts-chinese-military-drills/

[ii] National Day of the Republic of China commemorates the start of the Wuchang Uprising, overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Shortly after, on 1 January 1920, they established the Republic of China. In 1949, pushed out of power by Mao Zedong’s Communists, the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan.

[iii] There are similarities between the recent Chinese exercises and events that led up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine when Russian forces began massing troops near the borders of Ukraine, calling it military exercises, right before the invasion. “Timeline: The Events Leading Up to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Reuters, 1 March 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/


OE Watch Insight Summary:

CHN’s increasing military exercises, gray-zone tactics, and cognitive warfare, could blur the lines between peacetime and wartime, causing TWN and its allies to grow complacent. 


Image Information:

Image: PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.
Source: Dmitriy Pichugin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Air_Force#/media/File:PLAAF_Sukhoi_Su-30_at_Lipetsk-2_(modified).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


China Concludes Military Drills Near Taiwan

The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”


“Every time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will push forward. The closer the separatist forces align with external forces, the tighter our ‘chain’ around Taiwan will be.”


On 14 October, China conducted large-scale military drills, Joint Sword-2024B, around Taiwan and its surrounding islands. These drills expand upon the previous Joint Sword-2024A drills from late May 2024 and serve as a direct response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei.[i]

The  Beijing Daily, the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published the first excerpted article featuring Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, a professor from the National Defense University, and Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, a researcher from the Naval Military Academic Research Institute. According to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, the Liaoning carrier group conducted joint exercises east of the Bashi Channel with the aim of enhancing joint combat capabilities between the army, navy, air force, and rocket force. A bomber formation accompanied the carrier group to enforce a maritime barrier, practicing the prevention of intervention and interference by external forces.[ii] Senior Colonel Zhang Junshe stated that in the event of mainland military strikes against Taiwan, the Liaoning carrier group would also be capable of targeting the island’s eastern cave bases, such as those in Hualien and Taitung, which are designed to preserve Taiwan’s military combat power. The exercise also highlighted organized blockade drills on key major ports, which account for the majority of Taiwan’s imports, potentially causing significant disruptions to Taiwan’s energy supply, economy, and society during wartime.[iii] Lastly, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) emphasized the use of ships 1305, 1303, and 2102 for conducting law enforcement inspections around Taiwan to “control the island” and to practice preventing Taiwan independence elements from evading sanctions or escaping using civilian vessels. Notably, this marked the first time they patrolled around the entire island of Taiwan and the islands of Dongyin and Matsu, including the first use of the 2901 Zhoutou-class ship for this type of patrol, the largest armed coast guard cutter in the world. Senior Colonel Zhang Chi reaffirms China’s official statements made during Joint Sword-2024A, asserting that the PLA will deploy additional assets, improve joint operational capabilities, and progressively tighten Taiwan’s defense perimeter with each successive exercise.[iv]

The significance of the CCG patrols is further elaborated in the second excerpted article, published by Yuyuan Tantian, a news outlet under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP. First, the CCG deployed six fleets, twice as many as the previous exercise. Second, diagrams released by the CCG indicate that not only did patrol ships encircle Taiwan for the first time, but they also suggest that the CCG will adopt a flexible and unpredictable approach to future patrols to enhance operational effectiveness and maintain strategic ambiguity. Lastly, the CCG entered restricted waters around the Matsu Islands, setting a precedent for future law enforcement patrols.[v] Joint Sword-2024B ultimately establishes a precedent of the PLA edging closer to Taiwan’s periphery, employing salami-slicing tactics to normalize the increasing displays of military force. This gradual increase in military deployments and restricted geographic scope aims to shorten Taiwan’s response time while minimizing international pushback.[vi]


Sources:

Bai Bo, “辽宁舰航母编队位台岛以东演练,让“台独”势力无处可藏!(The Liaoning aircraft carrier group is conducting exercises east of Taiwan, “Taiwan independence” forces has nowhere to hide!),” Beijing Daily (the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/8jt4jbye

On 14 October 2024, the Eastern Theater Command released a statement announcing that the PLA organized its army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other units to execute the ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ exercise in the Taiwan Strait and in areas to the north, south, and east of Taiwan. Later that evening, the Command issued another statement concluding the exercise, which was deemed successful in testing the joint capabilities of theater forces. This exercise came just days after Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei on 10 October 2024, where he promoted separatist rhetoric and inflamed tensions between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. According to military expert Zhang Junshe, who spoke to the Beijing Daily, the PLA’s exercise directly targeted the “Taiwan Independence” remarks in Lai’s speech.

During the exercise, the Eastern Theater Command conducted drills on blockading key ports, seizing regional power, sea assaults, and land strikes around Taiwan. These drills tested multi-domain coordination and precision strike capabilities. Professor Zhang Chi of the National Defense University emphasized that each time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will respond by advancing. He added that the closer separatist forces align with external actors, the tighter the PLA will draw the “chain” encircling Taiwan.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier group was also deployed east of Taiwan to conduct joint exercises with the army, navy, air force, and rocket force, focusing on integrating the capabilities of all services. The carrier group was accompanied by bomber formations to establish a maritime barrier, simulating the blocking of external intervention and interference. Zhang Junshe further noted that Taiwan’s military has built large cave bases in Hualien and Taitung in eastern Taiwan to preserve combat power in the event of a mainland strike. However, the Liaoning carrier group will enable the PLA to target these cave bases.

Additionally, the Chinese Coast Guard carried out patrols around Taiwan, inspecting the waters surrounding the island. Notably, this marked the first time the Coast Guard’s 2901 Zhoutou-class ship was used in such patrols, as well as the first complete patrol of Taiwan’s entire island. The Coast Guard aims to prevent “Taiwan independence” elements from evading sanctions or escaping the island using civilian ships or other means during wartime.

Yuyuan Tantian, “环台岛巡航管控的三个突破 (The three breakthroughs in the patrol and control around Taiwan island),” China Media Group (a news media under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/y3xyrmfp

On 14 October 2024, the Fujian Coast Guard organized a fleet of ships to conduct law enforcement inspections in the waters near Taiwan Island, Dongyin Island, and Matsu Island. According to exclusive information provided to this news source, this coast guard operation marked three significant breakthroughs.

Firstly, a total of six fleets were deployed, twice as many as in previous operations. Notably, this marked the first time the coast guard’s largest 10,000-ton vessel, No. 2901, was used for a mission targeting Taiwan. This ship is equipped with a 76mm caliber rapid-fire naval gun and can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. The 2901 ship has considerable advantages over other law enforcement vessels in the region.

Secondly, a diagram released by the coast guard illustrated the fleets sailing around the waters near Taiwan, expanding from the eastern region to encompass the entire island. However, the diagram did not provide a specific navigation route or detailed latitude and longitude for each point. Instead, arrows were used to broadly indicate the direction of the operation, implying that there would be no fixed route and that the fleets would operate in multiple areas.

Lastly, during this operation, the coast guard entered the waters near Matsu Island and penetrated restricted areas established by Taiwan authorities. This indicates that the coast guard has successfully completed law enforcement patrols around all of Taiwan’s outer islands and may implement regular patrols around Matsu Island in the future.


Notes:

[i] To watch the PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) official response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech and to the Eastern Theater Command exercise, see the MOD’s video post, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/yy3dervp

[ii] Li Chun, “What signal does the Liaoning aircraft carrier formation’s participation in ‘Joint Sword’ exercise send?” China News Network (China state news agency), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/rkfzbw4n

[iii] Zhao Xi, “东部战区演习演练封控台湾主要港口 (Eastern Theater Command exercises to seal off Taiwan’s main ports),” Beijing News (Newspaper for the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/24r82nhw

[iv] To watch Senior Colonel Zhang Chi discuss and analyze ‘Joint Sword-2024B,’ see his CCTV7 interview, CCTV7 Military Report, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/nukx75wk

[v] Sean Lin, “4 Chinese coast guard ships expelled as PLA conducts drills near Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan (National news agency of the Republic of China), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ypkcywaf

[vi] Helen Regan and Wayne Chang, “Taiwan condemns Chinese military drills around island as ‘unreasonable provocation’,” CNN, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/3a83zshc


OE Watch Insight:

CHN concluded its ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ military drills, expanding on ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ to strengthen blockade and isolation strategies against TWN and improve its ability to transition from exercises to invasion operations.


Image Information:

Image: The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”
Source: https://tinyurl.com/mwdk2ru7
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Chinese Icebreaker Makes Port Call in Murmansk

Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 docked at Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, 2024.


“The research icebreaker that is owned and managed by the Chinese Polar Institute is on its annual Arctic expedition…. But the state-owned vessel is also on a political mission.  The visit to Murmansk is the first ever of its kind and comes as relations between Murmansk and Beijing get increasingly intimate.”


China keeps pushing itself into the Arctic, and Russia is partnering in the effort. The excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer notes that the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 recently visited the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk for the first time. The article notes that the Xue Long 2 is on a scientific mission but also suggests that there is a political mission and that the port call reflects the deepening of relations between Moscow and Beijing. China is eager to expand its presence in the Arctic and have access to its resources.[i] The docking of the Xue Long 2 will likely not be the last Chinese vessel in Russia’s Arctic waters: “Beijing is increasingly interested in the Arctic and is building new vessels designed for shipping through the remote and icy waters.”[ii]Under diplomatic, military, and economic pressure, Russia has thus far been pleased to oblige, granting China more access than before to Russian Arctic waters and ports.


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Chinese icebreaker makes port call in Murmansk,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 29 August 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/chinese-icebreaker-makes-port-call-murmansk

The Russian Arctic region actively seeks to strengthen ties with Beijing. This week, a Chinese icebreaker for the first time paid a visit to Murmansk.  The Xue Long 2 set out from the Chinese port city of Qingdao on the 7th of July and subsequently set course for the Bering Strait.  Following its passage into the Chukchi Sea, the 122-meter-long ship is believed to have sailed towards the North Pole.  One and a half months later it sailed into the Kola Bay and moored in a downtown port.  Locals in the Russian Arctic city could see the vessel being assisted by tugs into the harbor area on the 28th of August.

The research icebreaker that is owned and managed by the Chinese Polar Institute is on its annual Arctic expedition. About 100 expedition members take part in research geology and geophysics of the Arctic seabed and conduct investigations of atmospheric, sea ice and marine environments.

But the state-owned vessel is also on a political mission.  The visit to Murmansk is the first ever of its kind and comes as relations between Murmansk and Beijing get increasingly intimate.  In May 2023, Murmansk Governor Andrei Chibis paid a visit to Shanghai as part of a major Russian delegation to the China-Russia Business Forum.  During the event, a special emphasis was made on the development of the Northern Sea Route and new joint industries, among them in production and processing of minerals.

In September 2023, Chibis welcomed a Chinese business delegation to Murmansk. “We are entering a new level of partnership with China,” the regional leader said during the visit.  The Chinese businessmen representing port and shipping companies stated that they were interested in the development of the Northern Sea Route.  In August 2024, the Chinese MCC International Incorporation Ltd will join the development of the Kolmozerskoye lithium resources in the Kola Peninsula.

Beijing is increasingly interested in the Arctic and is building new vessels designed for shipping through the remote and icy waters. In early July this year, Chinese authorities officially commissioned its new icebreaking research vessel, the Jidi (“Polar”). At the same time, China is expanding its research activities in the far northern region, including in the Norwegian Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard.


Notes:

[i] See: Les Grau, China and Russia in Joint Venture To Mine Lithium in Arctic, OE Watch, 08-2024. (URL not yet available)

[ii] See: Les Grau, “Chinese Icebreaker Sails To The Arctic,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-the-arctic/


Image Information:

Image: Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 docked at Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, 2024.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Xue_Long_2 – /media/File:202404_Xuelong-2_in_Hong_Kong.jpg