Category Archives: Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Terrorism and Transnational Crime.

Yemen’s Houthis Employ Iranian “358” Loitering Anti-Aircraft Missile

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One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).

One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).

“… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war…”

The Iranian “358” missile appears to be an increasingly important weapon for Yemen’s Houthi-led military forces.  The 358 missile is classified as surface-to-air, but in early January, it was seemingly used as a surface-to-surface missile to target the provincial leader of the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Shabwah Province.  On 14 January, a 358 was used to shoot down a Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Saudi-led coalition, according to several open-source analysts on Twitter.  It is unclear how many of these missiles are in Houthi possession.  Since 2019, several of them have been seized from Yemen-bound vessels in the Arabian Sea.  A 358 was also found in Iraq last October. 

According to an October 2021 article from the prominent Yemeni news website al-Masdar Online, the 358is a key Iranian weapon developed to counter U.S. aircraft, particularly UAVs.  The missile ships in three parts and once assembled can be launched from mobile positions, such as small trucks.  It does poorly against fast-moving targets but can be effective against helicopters and some UAVs.  The article from al-Masdar Online implies that it may be the Houthi-led military forces’ most effective air defense missile, potentially having been used to bring down a variety of aircraft, including an Apache helicopter, Wing Loong UAVs, Scan Eagle and RQ-20 UAVs manufactured by the United States, and the Karayel UAV manufactured by Turkey.  This sentiment is echoed by analysis from the Egyptian think tank Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, which considers the 358’s presence in Yemen and Iraq as indicative of “a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region,” one which puts new emphasis on defending against aerial attacks.

Source:

@3Mr_o_o (pro-Houthi, Iraq-based “Observer of political and military affairs”), Twitter, 3 January 2022. https://twitter.com/3Mr_o_o/status/1478359982097813511

#Yemen

The mercenary Ali al-Jabwani, head of the Transitional Council in Shabwa governorate, survived an attack in the Usaylan area yesterday. The images released from the attack show a missile similar to the famous 358 missile.

Source: @AlgerianAircra1 (Algeria-focused “Aircraft Tracker” account interested in “Aircraft News and Novelties related to Defense and Aviation”), Twitter, 14 January 2022.  https://twitter.com/AlgerianAircra1/status/1481988325774925825

It appears that the Houthis in Yemen have shot down another Wing Loong II UCAF aircraft from the Saudi coalition. Judging by the video, it seems that an Iranian missile known as the 358 was used – a large, relatively slow missile with large wings.

Source:

“من “صلاح الدين” العراقية الى “مارب” اليمنية.. صواريخ دفاع جوي إيرانية بأيدي مليشيات طهران

(From Iraq’s Salahuddin to Yemen’s Marib… Iranian Air Defense Missiles in the Hands of Tehran’s Militias),” al-Masdar Online (prominent Yemeni news website), 24 October 2021. https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284

But the situation has changed significantly since mid-2019, when the Houthi militia announced in June that its air defenses had managed to shoot down a U.S.-made MQ9 drone in Hodeidah Governorate, using a “domestically developed” missile. In August of the same year, the militia’s military spokesman said: “We have the ability to neutralize a large number of enemy aircraft.”… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war. Iran considers this missile as its armor against American aircraft…

Source:

“تهديد الأجواء.. ما وراء حائط الصواريخ الإيراني في الشرق الأوسط

(Threat to the skies… Behind the Iranian missile wall in the Middle East),” Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (Egyptian think tank), 2 November 2021. https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/64307/

The unique design of this missile, and its subsequent reappearance in other regions in the Middle East, was an indication that it might be the main player in all the shootdowns that have taken place in Yemen recently, such as the downing of a “Scan Eagle” drone last June, in Serwah District, Marib Governorate … In sum, the appearance of the “358” missile in Iraq, and before that in Yemen (and it may have been used recently in Syria), indicates a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region. This strategy now includes air defense, after it was previously limited to missile power, and then drones.

Image Information:

Image: One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).
Source: CENCTCOM, Steve McLeod, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2087998/us-dhow-interdictions/
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran-Backed Iraqi Group Attacks Abu Dhabi with UAVs in Support of Yemen’s Houthis

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Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.

Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.

“… the UAE has become vulnerable to attacks from more than one direction…”

A little-known group calling itself the “True Promise Brigades” claimed a 2 February attack on Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE), involving multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  The group’s only other known prior activity was an early 2021 UAV strike on the Yamama Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  The Abu Dhabi attack caused no known material damage.  It came on the heels of a two-week span that saw Yemen’s Houthi-controlled military forces launch three separate missile and UAV attacks targeting Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two main cities in the UAE.  The timing of the True Promises Brigades’ attack implied a potential link between them and the Houthis, reinforced by supportive tweets from the Houthi-led forces’ influential military spokesman, such as the first accompanying tweet, in which the spokesman thanked the group.  On social media, the True Promise Brigades eschew national identification and call themselves “sons of the Arabian Peninsula.”  The second and third accompanying passages from pro-Iran outlets hint that the group operates from the Iraqi desert, is associated with Iran-backed Iraqi militias, and is under the command of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ international wing, the Quds Force.  The article from the pro-Iran Lebanese influential daily al-Akhbar argues that the Abu Dhabi attack is directly tied to Iraqi politics.  Specifically, the article’s author sees it as a response to perceived Emirati meddling in Iraqi politics and its support for factions opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq.  The article from the pro-Iran Lebanese media channel al-Mayadeen, meanwhile, places the attack in the context of Yemen and sees it as a response to coalition escalation in Yemen.  The attack’s key message, according to the article, is that Iranian allies are capable of linking the Yemeni and Iraqi arenas and conducting semi-coordinated actions targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE from both directions.

Source:

Yahya Sare’e (Houthi-controlled military spokesman), Twitter, 3 February 2022. https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1489295787616047106

We send our congratulations on the jihadist operation carried out by the True Promise Brigades-Sons of the Arabian Peninsula against the Emirati enemy yesterday, Wednesday. We thank them for this honorable, responsible and solidary stance with our dear people against the client Emirati enemy.

Source:

“المأزق الإماراتيّ يتعمّق: جبهة جديدة… من العراق

(The Emirati Impasse Deepens: A New Front… from Iraq),” al-Akhbar (pro-Iran influential Lebanese daily), 4 February 2022. https://tinyurl.com/w7xb8a88

Whatever the group’s identity, the event itself confirms that the UAE has become vulnerable to attacks from more than one direction. This creates greater risks for Emirati security, against the background of its aggression in Yemen and its blatant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Washington seems to have handed over the file of the new ruling arrangement to the UAE following the October 10 elections, in which Muqtada al-Sadr, Massoud Barzani and Muhammad al-Halbousi achieved the largest victory, all of whom are allies or friends of Abu Dhabi. The latter has also moved closer to Turkey, allowing for arrangements to be made resulting in the unification of the al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar blocs, and the re-election of al-Halbousi, who is considered the UAE’s man in Iraq, as Speaker of the House of Representatives. This in turn opened the way for the installation of a “majority coalition” that excluded Iran’s allies, which is a great risk for Iraqi security and for which the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, bears responsibility…

Source:

“دخول “ألوية الوعد الحق” العراقيّة على خطِّ حرب اليمن.. اشتباك أو تشبيك؟

(Iraq’s ‘True Promises Brigades’’ Entry into the Yemen War… Clashes or Linking),” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media channel), 8 February 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3p4skytc

This Iraqi group is very interested in the Yemen war, and it is almost specialized in it. In addition, it seems that it is interested in standing up to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular… It is very likely that the strike on Abu Dhabi carried a political message: “Don’t forget that the arenas can be linked when the time comes.” Let us note that the strike came after a crazy escalation carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and after American supplies to Abu Dhabi, including warplanes, and the dispatch of the American destroyer “USS Cole” to the Gulf to support the UAE navy, and talk of a possible ground attack from the Yemeni coast… These intensive messages, whether military or political, come in the context of a clear linking of the arenas, especially since leaders in Ansar Allah wrote on their Twitter accounts that the confrontation would not be with Sanaa alone in the event of any major US invasion of Yemen.

Image Information:

Image:  Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.
Source: Abuk Sabuk via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Middle_east_CIA.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Somalia: Puntland Troops Fight Each Other, Not Terrorists

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While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

Puntland’s armed forces are expected to fight al-Shabaab and Islamic State terrorists.  However, according to the excerpted accompanying article from a Kenyan media group’s publication, The East African, the military members from this autonomous, federal state of Somalia recently turned their weapons on each other in the port town of Bossaso.  Specifically, fighting occurred between forces loyal to Puntland’s government and an elite antiterrorism brigade known as the Puntland Security Force (PSF).  Heavy and light arms were used in the fighting, reportedly intense at times, resulting in both combatant and civilian casualties.

Purportedly, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni’s attempt in November to sack Mohamud Osman Diyaano, the director of the PSF, was the cause of the hostilities.  The same decree that dismissed Diyaano also appointed Brigadier General Mohamed Amin Abdullahi as his replacement.  As the article notes, Diyaano rejected the move and, along with top PSF officers, declared the dismissal and replacement to be illegal.

There are concerns that the clash between the two components of the armed forces will weaken its capabilities and resolve to combat al-Shabaab and the Islamic State.  Unlike neighboring Somaliland, which has declared its independence from Somalia and wishes to be recognized as a sovereign nation, Puntland has decided to remain part of Somalia.  Puntland’s contribution to combating al-Shabaab and the Islamic State is valued and important, and any distraction from its military objective benefits these terrorist organizations.  Unfortunately, the terrorists threaten the stability not just of Puntland but of the entire geostrategic nation of Somalia, whose neighboring waters see tremendous amounts of tanker traffic helping to supply the world with oil.

Source:

Abdulkadir Khalif, “Puntland soldiers turn weapons on each other,” The East African (a Kenyan media group), 25 December 2021.  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/puntland-soldiers-turn-weapons-on-each-other-3662910

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

In the past couple of weeks, an armed clash in the port city, some 1,500km northeast of Mogadishu, has seen the law enforcers mostly engage in vicious fights, rather than guarding civilians.

Neither the pro-government side nor the PSF officers have issued clear information on the status of the fighting and the casualty levels.

Bossaso, the commercial capital and the main port of Puntland, had become a ghost town as residents fled for cover on Tuesday. Businesses remained largely closed.

Image Information:

Image: While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.
Source: Wargeyska Saxafi, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Godane.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Guerrilla Groups Continue To Threaten Colombia Along Border with Venezuela

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Members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, which operates along the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, pose with their weapons.

Members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, which operates along the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, pose with their weapons.

“Very early in 2022, the horror of the war showed its face again in Arauca, where not only have the effects of peace with the FARC not been seen, but, on the contrary, violence has reached levels of the crudest stages of the armed conflict.”

The border region between Colombia and Venezuela is experiencing some of its worst violence in years.  Since 2 January 2022, several dozen have died in what could be a series of contract killings, according to center-left Colombian daily El Espectador.  The daily states that originally, Colombian prosecutors suspected the dead were members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerrilla group operating along the border, contesting territory with the National Liberation Army (ELN), another prominent guerrilla group.  According to an article in the politically centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Colombian President Iván Duque has increased the troop presence in the border region to combat drug trafficking and establish greater state presence in these remote stretches. 

Violence along the border between Colombia and Venezuela is certainly nothing new.  However, this flare-up is a reminder of the criminal sanctuary provided to Colombia’s FARC and ELN by the Maduro regime in Venezuela, and the instability fomented throughout Latin America by the actions of these groups.  Unlike previous flare-ups in Apure state in Venezuela, these incidents have not led to migratory flows but underscore that Colombia has yet to realize fully the fruits of its demobilization efforts with guerrilla groups.  Lastly, with Colombia’s presidential election slated for May 2022, guerrilla groups and demobilization efforts will be key issues in the campaign.

Source:

“No hubo Combate:” Fiscalía elevó a 27 los muertos en Arauca y dio nueva hipótesis (There was no combat:” Prosecutor’s Office raised the dead in Arauca to 27 and gave a new hypothesis),” El Espectador (Colombian daily generally considered to be center-left in its political orientation), 5 January 2022.  https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/no-hubo-combate-fiscalia-elevo-a-27-los-muertos-en-arauca-y-dio-nueva-hipotesis/   

Since January 2, 27 dead have been found in different rural areas of Arauca, the Prosecutor’s Office reported on Wednesday.  The attorney general, Francisco Barbosa, provided a new hypothesis based on what investigators have found in the field and in the autopsies of the deceased: apparently, there were no combats, but the people were murdered in the form of contract killers.

Source:  “Muerte en la frontera (Death on the Border),” El Tiempo (one of Colombia’s oldest dailies generally described as politically-centrist), 4 January 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/editorial/muerte-en-la-frontera-editorial-el-tiempo-643053 

Early in 2022, the horror of the war showed its face again in Arauca, where not only have the effects of peace with the FARC not been seen, but, on the contrary, violence has reached levels of the crudest stages of the armed conflict…All this within the framework of the complicity, when not open participation in the crime, of the authorities of the Nicolás Maduro regime…Understanding the challenge posed by the natural conditions of the border and the lack of collaboration from the authorities on the other side to curb crime, it is clear that more efficient efforts and strategies are still needed.

Image Information:

Image:  Members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, which operates along the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, pose with their weapons.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/brasildefato/32317009638
Attribution:  Flickr

Southeast Asia Sees Decrease in Terrorism

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DSA 2016 - Close Quarters Battle.

DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.

“The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain.” 

On 10 January, Malaysian business news outlet malaymail.com covered a report from a Singaporean think tank, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.  According to the article, the report indicated that terrorism was decreasing in Southeast Asia due to factors associated with COVID-19.

The article noted lockdowns forced militants, like all citizens in Southeast Asia, to reduce their activities, but it also noted that the lockdowns may have produced longer-term security risks.  During the lockdowns youths spent more unsupervised time online and could have been exposed to radical ideas as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continued its online recruitment efforts.

In Peninsular Malaysia itself, the article noted that there were no terrorist arrests at all in 2021, which is consistent with the trend line of reduced terrorism in the region.  In Sabah of Malaysian Borneo there were 15 terrorist arrests in 2021, roughly one-fifth the number of arrests there in 2019.  As reported in Singapore’s Straits Times, the terrorist arrests in Sabah relate to Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf’s maritime activities, including piracy and kidnapping, that are carried out between the borders of the Philippines and Malaysia and also involve Indonesian militants.  The malaymail.com article attributed the reduction in terrorism in the Philippines to the army’s capturing of militant bases in southern Mindanao.

As for Indonesia, the malaymail.com article suggested Jamaah Ansharut Daulah’s stagnation since 2020 and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor’s decline was caused by increased cost of movement, a result COVID-19 travel restrictions.  The only country that saw similar numbers of violence in 2020 as 2021, according to the article, was Thailand, where an insurgency has festered for more than a decade in the country’s majority Muslim south.  In general, however, the article points to the combination of COVID-19 travel restrictions and successful counter-terrorism operations to arrest militants as key factors behind the downturn in militancy in Southeast Asia.

Source:

“Terrorist threats in South-east Asia decline in 2021, according to Singapore report,” malaymail.com (Malaysian business news outlet), 10 January 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/01/10/terrorist-threats-in-south-east-asia-decline-in-2021-according-to-singapore/2034142

Terrorist threats in South-east Asian countries declined in 2021, a Singapore think-tank said in its annual threat assessment. There were fewer terror-related incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as governments battled Covid-19. In Thailand in 2021, meanwhile, violent incidents connected to an insurgency in the far south were similar to those in the previous year, the researchers found.

The report specifically linked the Covid-19 pandemic to the drop in terror activities in Malaysia last year. Authorities made no terror-related arrests in Peninsular Malaysia last year, but made about 15 in Sabah between May and September. The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain. Around the region, groups such as IS have increased their recruitment and radicalisation efforts through social media during the pandemic.

Elsewhere, the armed forces of the Philippines drew praise for retaking terror bases in the southern region of Mindanao.

Source: “Malaysia’s Sabah is South-east Asian terrorists’ preferred transit point: Experts,” straitstimes.com (Singapore based news outlet), 5 September 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-sabah-is-south-east-asian-terrorists-preferred-transit-point-experts

As security threats posed by extremists rise in South-east Asia, Malaysia’s Sabah state has emerged as a preferred route for Indonesian militants to enter the southern Philippines to carry out their terrorist activities, according to a regional intelligence source.

Sabah appeared to be a transit point for Indonesians who want to join terror groups or learn to make IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in the Philippines, according to the source.

Source: “Annual Threat Assessment,” rsis.edu.sg (Singapore based think tank), 1 January 2021. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CTTA-January-2022.pdf

Whilst this reflects a continuous declining trend of attacks and plots compared to the years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 terrorist landscape was particularly marked by aggressive counterterrorism (CT) operations that hauled in more than three hundred terrorist suspects – the largest figure since 2018 – including key militant group leaders.

Image Information:

Image: DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.
Source: Rizuan
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSA_2016_-_Close_Quarters_Battle.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sahel Drug Trade Mixes with Militancy

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2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.

2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.

“All in all, drug trafficking is intensifying and constitutes a funding opportunity for crime and a threat to the security of states.” 

On 11 January, the Burkina Faso-based Norbert Zongo Cell for Investigative Journalism in West Africa (CENOZO) wrote the attached, excerpted French-language article on criminal drug trafficking in the Sahel.  CENOZO was founded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to report on corruption, organized crime, bad governance, and violations of human rights. According to the article, a number of factors are contributing to drug financing of terrorism in the region, including the lack of state authority, weak judicial systems, the collapse of the traditional pastoral economy, and corruption.

In particular, the article points to northern Mali as a transit point for cocaine in West Africa, which disrupts the stability of state institutions and benefits from the complicity of political or military figures.  The article also notes that drugs often pass through the three coastal West African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo and suggests that drug lords in Burkina Faso remain unknown and have evaded security forces crackdowns.  Although the article acknowledges UNODC has launched several programs to counter drug trafficking, including surveillance at airports, the indifference and corruption of government officials has limited the ability of such programs to curtail the drug trade in the Sahel.

One of the drugs that the article highlights with concern is tramadol, often used by laborers. However, the northern Nigeria-focused news outlet Daily Trust noted in a 5 June article that the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has intercepted tramadol shipments from the coastal city of Lagos. These were destined for Boko Haram in the country’s northeast.  The drug is used to keep fighters awake and vigilant during long battles or when hiding in the bush to evade security forces.

Besides high-level officials and militant group involvement in the drug trade, the article argues the abuse of drugs by impoverished youth can also result in their being recruited by armed groups.  Consistent with previous reporting from as early as January 2014 by the Geneva-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the excerpted article by globalinitiative.net states that the origin of some of the drugs in the Sahel is Latin America, including Colombia and Brazil, as well Bombay, India.  Therefore, the problem of drug trafficking and its inter-relation with terrorism and militancy in the Sahel remains complex, with distinct local and global factors contributing to its perpetuation.

Source:

“Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: Sur les routes criminelles de la drogue au Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: On the criminal drug routes in the Sahel),” cenozo.org (UN sponsored media consortium based in Burkino Faso), 11 January 2022.  https://cenozo.org/burkina-mali-niger-sur-les-routes-criminelles-de-la-drogue-au-sahel/

Several types of drugs transit through Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with Europe as their destination. Facilitated by porous borders and insufficient means of control, this traffic fuels crime in the Sahel. Between January and October 2021, Burkina Faso customs seized at least 78.11 tons of drugs.

Tramadol is trafficked for non-medical use and is widely consumed by people performing physical work: gold miners, agricultural producers, workers on major construction sites. Its trafficking constitutes a great threat in West, Central and North Africa, underlines the UNODC.

The drugs usually come from Bombay in Asia and Colombia and Brazil in Latin America. UNODC describes the Sahelian region as a trade and migration route where “the lack of state authority, weak judicial systems, the collapse of the traditional pastoral economy, corruption and the presence of fire have created an ideal conducive environment for illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, corruption and money laundering.” The UNODC cites Mali in its 2013 report as one of the main transit countries for cocaine in West Africa, combining several related activities that dangerously disrupt the stability of institutions.


Source: “Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future,” globalinitiative.net (Geneva based civil society organization), January 2014.  https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Illicit-Trafficking-and-Instability-in-Mali-Past-present-and-future.pdf

Cocaine first entered these networks in 2002, after South American wholesalers began using West African ports as an intermediate step in reaching consumers in Europe. The consequent rise of organized criminal syndicates in coastal states such as Nigeria and Ghana gained the attention of international bodies and policymakers. Although some amount of cocaine arrives by boat or plane directly to Mauritania and Morocco, the main ports of entry for South American wholesalers to the region are still believed to be Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.


Source: “NDLEA Seizes 34,950 Tramadol, Diazepam Capsules Enroute To Boko Haram,” dailytrust.com (news outlet covering social and political affairs of northern Nigeria), 5 June 2021. https://dailytrust.com/ndlea-seizes-34950-tramadol-diazepam-capsules-in-lagos

Spokesman of the agency, Femi Babafemi said in Abuja that a 25-year-old, Mohammed Isah, was recruited to move the drugs from Lagos to Borno was arrested. The suspect claims he accepted the offer because of the monetary benefit due to pressure on his finances as his wife and three children displaced by Boko Haram activities.

Image Information:

Image: 2014 02 19 Handover of Uniform to Somali Custodial Corps 07.
Source: AMISOM Public Information https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2014_02_19_Handover_of_Uniform_to_Somali_Custodial_Corps_07_(12632984573).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

ISIS Ramps Up Attacks in Iraq’s “Disputed Territories”

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Disputed areas in Iraq.

Disputed areas in Iraq.

“… there is a 100% likelihood that ISIS will launch more attacks on the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army in the coming period…”

Recent ISIS attacks in northern Iraq’s “disputed territories” have raised concerns that the group is ramping up disruptive activities and seeking to re-emerge as a key player in the country.  The “disputed territories” lie at the edge of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and control over them is contested by the Erbil-based KRG and the Baghdad-based central government.  When it comes to these territories, the absence of effective security coordination between the two parties has created a security vacuum that ISIS fighters are exploiting, according to several media reports.

The attacks, which have mostly targeted Kurdish villages and Peshmerga checkpoints, have prompted high-level meetings and promises of better coordination between the KRG and the central government.  Kurdish leaders have criticized central government forces for failing to provide them with proper support and equipment, most notably surveillance drones, as noted in the accompanying excerpt from the Saudi news website Independent Arabia.  A second article from Independent Arabia details how the attacks have exposed fissures between the KRG’s two main political factions, one based in Erbil and the other in Sulaymaniyah.  Further entrenching the security vacuum, as explained in the accompanying excerpt from the pan-Arab daily al-Quds, is the likelihood of Shiite factions linked to Iran obstructing central government-KRG coordination, for reasons of their own.  Meanwhile, a Peshmerga official, cited in the excerpted article from the Kurdish media outlet Rudaw, claimed that ISIS is receiving unspecified “financial and logistical support from abroad” and that 200 militants had recently entered Iraq from Syria to carry out attacks on the group’s behalf.

These events are unfolding as Iraq’s political factions continue to squabble over the results of the recent, low-turnout parliamentary election and as the US-led anti-ISIS coalition completed its transition from a combat to an advisory role at the end of 2021.  The uptick in ISIS activities also coincides with the four-year anniversary of what may prove to be a premature declaration of victory over ISIS in Iraq, made by then-president Haidar al-Abadi in December 2017.

Source:

“داعش يصعد هجماته ضد الأكراد 

(ISIS Increases Attacks Against Kurds),” Independent Arabia (Saudi news website), 2 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/mr4385mn

Peshmerga Minister Shorsh Ismail…criticized the performance of the federal army, saying that “its very slowness in taking measures gave ISIS an opportunity to reorganize itself. The army is unable to fill this vacuum, and the Peshmerga alone is unable to uproot ISIS, as it lacks aerial surveillance capabilities to monitor the group’s movements and the federal state will not provide us with the drones that we have been requesting for a long time, nor will the United States due to the federal government’s rejection.”

Source:

انقسام كردي حول أسباب خسائر البيشمركة أمام هجمات “داعش”

(Kurdish Divisions on Peshmerga Losses from ISIS Attacks),” Independent Arabia (Saudi news website), 7 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/3awp35wd

Representatives and officials from the two parties that govern the semi-autonomous region, the “Democratic” party led by Massoud Barzani and the “Patriotic Union” led by the late President Jalal Talabani, disagreed on the nature of the problem in military coordination and different decisions, due to conflicting political orientations. The commander of the Patriotic Union Party organizations in the Qarachogh area of Makhmour district accused Barzani’s party of openly “cooperating with ISIS” by “publicly providing supplies to its gunmen,” as he put it, noting that “there are federal forces in Qarachogh Mountain and about a brigade of the Peshmerga led by Sirwan Barzani at the top of the mountain. This prevents any other force from coming to the area. ISIS fighters can be seen comfortably roaming around, and they go to the surrounding villages, despite the presence of 35 mounds held by the brigade there. When the attack occurred, they did not respond, or provide assistance, except for the regiment consisting of locals”… For years, Washington has been leading mediation efforts to unify the divided Peshmerga forces between the two parties, who had concluded an agreement in 2006 to unify the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations, after they fought a civil war, and are still facing difficulties in implementing the terms of the agreement…

According to Kurdish leaders, ISIS militants have recently begun to change their fighting methods and expanded the scope and type of their attacks, moving beyond the stage of just planting explosive devices, killing individuals and displacing others, and now engaging in military operations aimed at asserting their presence, following the recent arrival of a group of fighters coming from Syria, calling themselves “Jund Allah,” which swore allegiance to ISIS.

Source:

“معلومات استخبارية: 200 مسلح لداعش تسللوا إلى الأراضي العراقية قادمين من سوريا

(Intelligence: 200 ISIS militants infiltrated Iraqi territory from Syria),” Rudaw (Kurdish media outlet), 30 November 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/301120211

The official of the Qarah Tapah – Hamrin II axis of the Peshmerga forces, Major General Mardan Jawshin, announced that they had received intelligence information that a force calling itself “Guardians of Religion,” consisting of 200 militants, “has pledged allegiance to ISIS and infiltrated into Iraqi territory coming from Syria”… regarding the recent increase in ISIS activities… he said that that ISIS is reorganizing its ranks and did not hide his belief that the organization “receives financial and logistical support from abroad,” referring to information that says that “the organization pays salaries to its militants and also pays salaries to the families of its dead…”  Major General Jawshin pointed to the security vacuum between the Iraqi army and the Kurdistan Peshmerga forces as “the reason for the increase in ISIS attacks”… He noted that the ISIS threat had reached a very high level, especially after the arrival of the aforementioned 200 militants from Syria, and said that there is a 100% likelihood that ISIS will launch more attacks on the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army in the coming period.

Source:

“تعاون بغداد وأربيل ضد «داعش» بين الضرورة وفقدان الثقة

(Baghdad-Erbil Cooperation Against ISIS Between Cooperation and Loss of Trust),” al-Quds (pan-Arab daily), 11 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p8s5hay

On the fourth anniversary of Baghdad’s declaration of the elimination of ISIS in 2017, Iraqis are following with concern the resurgence of attacks in many Iraqi provinces, despite all the security campaigns to hunt down the group’s remnants… observers fear that the state Shiite forces, which thwarted the Baghdad and Erbil agreement on the normalization of the situation in Sinjar, west of Mosul, will obstruct the agreement to deploy the Peshmerga in the disputed areas. This is especially true given that [Prime Minister] al-Kazemi, who was committed to concluding those agreements with the regional government, may not retain his post in the next government.

Therefore, the mutual accusations of exploiting terrorist organizations such as the Turkish Workers’ Party and ISIS and supporting their presence on Iraqi soil to achieve local and regional political agendas are not limited to Kurdish parties on the one hand, and the Shiites and Turkmen on the other hand, but rather also extends to leaders of the al-Fateh Alliance, which includes pro-Iranian factions, and which considers that the recent attacks in Kirkuk were intentional and motivated by political agendas aimed at providing justifications for the presence of US forces in Iraq, which are scheduled to depart at the end of this year. They also accuse the Kurdish leadership of fabricating or exploiting ISIS attacks in order to seek to restore the region’s control over Kirkuk and the areas disputed between the Baghdad and Erbil governments, after the expulsion of the Peshmerga from those areas in 2017, following the referendum on secession from Iraq.

Image Information:

Image:  Disputed areas in Iraq.
Source: Rafy, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Disputed_areas_in_Iraq.svg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Indonesia Casts Wide Net in Terrorism Arrests

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Densus 88 element raid.

Densus 88 element raid.

“Jamaah Islamiyah is estimated to have 6,000 to 7,000 members and sympathizers spread throughout Indonesia in its various branches and is thought to have infiltrated various government and civc institutions.” 

Indonesia’s special counterterrorism detachment, Densus 88, conducted a series of arrests in late November targeting members of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).  According to the excerpted article from Indonesian site tribunnews.com, which focused on domestic affairs, the scope of the arrests was unprecedented.  The article notes the arrests extended not only to JI itself, but also to the Indonesian Ulema [Islamic Scholars] Council (MUI).

According to the article, JI has up to 7,000 members, some of whom have infiltrated government agencies and civic organizations.  The justification for arresting MUI members, therefore, is not that MUI itself supports JI, but that JI has infiltrated MUI.  The solution to JI’s infiltration of MUI, according to Indonesian officials cited, is for MUI to conduct more robust background checks of members it recruits. Although the recent arrests by Densus 88 of JI members has affected MUI, the latter’s scholars have shown approval for Densus 88.  The article reports that MUI announced that it supports the government’s efforts to root out terrorism and maintain the security and territorial integrity of Indonesia.  By working with the MUI, Indonesian authorities have been able to arrest JI and MUI members suspected of involvement in terrorism without alienating the MUI more broadly.  Indonesian-language kompas.com also reported on 13 December that Densus 88 finally arrested one of the JI-affiliated suspects in the March 2021 bombing of a church in Makassar.

Source:

“Forum Santri Dukung Densus 88 Polri Tangkap Terduga Pelaku Teroris (Santri Forum Supports Detachment 88 Police Arrest Suspected Terrorist), tribunnews.com (Indonesian public affairs focused media outlet), 25 November 2021. https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/11/25/forum-santri-dukung-densus-88-polri-tangkap-terduga-pelaku-teroris

Densus 88 Anti-terror Police have again arrested suspected terrorists who are affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyah, one of whom is an active member of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). Jamaah Islamiyah is estimated to have 6,000 to 7,000 members and sympathizers spread throughout Indonesia in its various branches and is thought to have infiltrated various government and civic institutions.

The head of FOKSI emphasized that Jamaah Islamiyah should not only be viewed from the angle of terror attacks because its movement has entered into a socio-religious institutions in the community. Regarding the arrest of MUI individuals who are suspected of being linked to terrorism, he argues that terrorist network cells have infiltrated various circles and groups. He hoped that MUI would not be permissive to its administrators who support ideas of radicalism and terrorism. FOKSI conveyed that it supports the government’s efforts in eradicating terrorism in order to maintain the integrity of the country because the Indonesian people must receive safety and freedom from radicalism and terrorism.

Source: Densus 88 Tangkap Buron Teroris, Diduga Terkait Bom Gereja Katedral Makassar (Detachment 88 Arrests Fugitive Terrorist, Allegedly Related to Makassar Cathedral Church Bombing), kompas.com (Indonesian language news outlet), 13 December 2021. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/12/13/22194981/densus-88-tangkap-buron-teroris-diduga-terkait-bom-gereja-katedral-makassar

The Special Detachment (Densus) 88 Anti-terror Police arrested a suspected terrorist in South Sulawesi. The Head of Banops Densus 88 Anti-terror Police confirmed the information. He said the arrest was made last week. According to him, the perpetrator was included on the terrorist wanted list (DPO) and suspected of being linked to the bombing at the Makassar Cathedral Church in South Sulawesi on March 28, 2021.

Image Information:

Image: Densus 88 element raid.
Source: multimedianews.polri.go.id
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Densus_88_element_raid.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

East African Special Forces Commit to Cross-Border Counterterrorism Operations

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Rwandan Defense Force combat lifesaver training.

Rwandan Defense Force combat lifesaver training.

“In order to allow the state of siege to quickly restore peace in Ituri and North Kivu, the deputies supported during the debate the pooling of the Ugandan and DRC armed forces to hunt down the ADF and other negative forces.”

On 1 December, the Rwanda-based website Taarifa Rwanda reported on Uganda and Congo’s joint special forces operations against Allied Defense Forces (ADF) militants in Congo.  ADF is loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The article noted that Uganda and Congo believe they are preempting the siege of towns in Ituri and North Kivu, Congo by the militants.  It was also noted that the Congolese National Assembly unanimously voted to support joint special forces operations and that there would be a long and protracted hunt by the two countries’ special forces in the jungle to root out the militants. 

In August, Rwanda itself deployed soldiers to Mozambique to combat ISIS-loyal militants in that country.  This was the first-ever foreign military excursion for Rwanda to coastal East Africa.  More than one month later, according to the excerpted 25 September article in Kenya-based The East African, Rwandan president Paul Kagame pledged to continue counterterrorism operations in Mozambique.  The article noted that Kagame traveled to the epicenter of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province to address the joint forces of the Mozambique Armed Defence Force and Rwanda Defence Force, stating that Rwandan troops would not leave Mozambique until the security situation was stable.

According to the The East African, Rwanda’s contingent in Mozambique includes 1,000 soldiers, who Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi regards as heroes.  Both Nyusi and Kagame justified the Rwandan troop deployment as necessary to fight the ADF and other ISIS-loyal militants, who Kagame described as a regional threat.  Kagame, for example, noted that the militants included Kenyans, Tanzanians, Congolese, Somalis, and Rwandans.  The two articles demonstrate how East African states are increasingly viewing counterterrorism through a regional lens and how cross-border counterterrorism operations, such as Uganda in Congo or Rwanda in Mozambique, will likely become more common in the region.

Source:

“Uganda-DRC Special Forces Search Bombed ADF Areas,”  taarifa.rw (Rwandan based news website), 1 December 2021.  https://taarifa.rw/uganda-drc-special-forces-search-bombed-adf-areas/

Members of the Congolese national assembly unanimously voted to support joint Ugandan and DRC operations to be more effective in tracking down the ADF, because, according to them, “before the state of siege is equal to during the state of siege.” In order to quickly restore peace in Ituri and North Kivu, the deputies supported during the debate the pooling of the Ugandan and DRC armed forces to hunt down the ADF and other negative forces.

Source: “Kagame says troops will stay put in Cabo Delgado to ensure stability,  theeastafrican.co.ke (Kenya based publication covering regional developments), 25 September 2021.  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kagame-says-troops-will-stay-put-in-cabo-delgado-3562164

President Paul Kagame has praised the Rwandan troops deployed to fight insurgents in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique for their good work fighting insurgents. While addressing the joint force of Mozambican Armed Defence and Rwanda Defence Force on Friday at Cabo Delgado, he also said the soldiers will stay put to stabilize and facilitate the return of displaced civilians to their homes. He was accompanied by his Mozambican counterpart Filipe Nyusi.

The Rwandan contingent is 1,000-soldier strong, made up of the army and the police who recently launched offensives against the insurgents in Cabo Delgado province. Botswana later sent a contingent of 296 and South Africa deployed 1,500 soldiers. President Kagame has defended the deployment, and said his country is footing the deployment bill for now, and the mission will stay on to train the Mozambican army, pointing out that the nature of the threat was regional given that the insurgents not only included Mozambicans, but also Tanzanians, Ugandans, Kenyans, Somalis, Yemenis, Congolese and Rwandan fighters.

Image Information:

Image: Rwandan Defense Force combat lifesaver training.
Source: US Army Africa from Vicenza, Italy
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rwandan_Defense_Force_combat_lifesaver_training,_March_2011_-_Flickr_-_US_Army_Africa.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mozambique: Foreign Mercenaries Not Enough To Beat Terrorism

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Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.

Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.

“The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.”

Mozambique’s northernmost province, Cabo Delgado, has been under attack by Islamist insurgents since 2017.  Initially the government declined offers of outside help by other nations, instead depending on its own military, which was poorly equipped and not well trained in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency tactics.  As the excerpted article from the South African think tank Institute for Security Studies notes, Mozambique turned to Russia for help after two years of disastrous results. In September 2019, Russian military contractor Wagner Group arrived in Cabo Delgado.

The terms of the agreement with Wagner Group were never made public.  However, the Russian mercenaries were only in Cabo Delgado for about two months.  Apparently they wanted to bomb various locations where terrorists were purportedly located.  This strategy was at odds with what their Mozambican counterparts had planned.  Also, during their short time in Mozambique, a number of the Russians were killed, reportedly including some who were beheaded during botched missions.  The abrupt departure of Wagner Group personnel has been attributed to their failures and possibly confusion sown by the discord between the Wagner Group and Mozambican military. Mozambique next turned to the South Africa-based Dyck Advisory Group (DAG).  In April 2020 DAG arrived in civilian helicopters converted into gunships.  While helpful, it was unable to stem extremist attacks.  One year later DAG was gone and replaced by trainers and advisers from a South Africa-Dubai consortium. However, as the article explains, it was not until Mozambique finally agreed to let foreign troops, beginning with a relatively large contingent from Rwanda, assist in the fight, that real progress was made against the insurgents, including dislodging them from their bases. While it is not clear why Wagner Group and DAG were not more effective, it appears that that unlike the mercenaries, trained militaries from other nations made swift and significant gains against the Islamists.

Source:

Borges Nhamirre, “Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado?” Institute for Security Studies (a South African think tank) 5 November 2021. https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado

The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.

Faced with the inability of government forces to stop the insurgency, even with private military support, liberation struggle veterans in Maconde-dominant districts of Cabo Delgado formed local militias to fight the insurgents. The contribution of the militias has not yet been studied in depth, but it seems that they were useful in blocking the insurgents’ advance towards districts such as Mueda and Muidumbe.

Rwanda’s quick achievements were due to better combat experience, but also better equipment, which allowed them great superiority over the insurgents. While the insurgents’ bases had already been identified by the Mozambican military, they did not have the capability to dislodge the insurgents. The attempts that had been carried out in the past had resulted in failures and in some cases, tragedies.

Despite progress in combating violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, there is still a long way to go. After more than a decade of the radicalisation of local populations and a multi-year armed insurgency, three months of foreign intervention is just the start of the process towards building peace and stability in Cabo Delgado.

Image Information:

Image: Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.
Source: Sgt. Heather Doppke/SETAF/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/48640726723/
Attribution: CC BY 2.0