Category Archives: Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Terrorism and Transnational Crime.

Cartel Internecine Warfare Erupts in the State of Sinaloa

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Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.

“President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act “with a minimum of responsibility.”

The state of Sinaloa, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, is synonymous with cartels and home to one of the most notorious transnational criminal groups in the country.[i] Following the arrest of longtime cartel kingpin, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, at the U.S. southern border, violence has broken out between two opposing factions of the Sinaloa Cartel.[ii] Anticipating further violence between the two major factions, one controlled by the children of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera and the other by those loyal to El Chapo’s former business associate, El Mayo, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador pleaded with the cartel to “act with a minimum of responsibility,” according to the excerpted article from right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal. The newspaper reports that the Mexican government is downplaying the number of deaths in Sinaloa; however, the violence has escalated rapidly, triggering the cancellation of Mexico’s Independence Day celebrations in the state of Sinaloa.

Argentine news outlet Infobae reports that at least 18 people have reportedly died in a wave of violence that includes roadblocks, the destruction of public infrastructure, and the closure of businesses. The escalating turf war between the two factions of the Sinaloa Cartel has significant ramifications for the operational environment. First, incoming president Claudia Sheinbaum will likely start her term on 1 October with an escalating security crisis in the Sinaloa state. Second, whichever faction emerges victorious in this internecine battle will have more consolidated control over Mexico’s criminal landscape and lucrative routes to traffic, among other things, fentanyl to the United States.

Sources:

“AMLO llama a grupos criminales que se enfrentan en Sinaloa a actuar ‘con un mínimo de responsabilidad’ (AMLO calls on criminal groups fighting in Sinaloa to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility’),” El Universal (right-leaning Mexican daily), 13 September 2024. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-llama-a-grupos-criminales-que-se-enfrentan-en-sinaloa-a-actuar-con-un-minimo-de-responsabilidad/

After four days of violence in Culiacán, Sinaloa, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility.’ He said, ‘With the presence of the Armed Forces to ensure that there is no confrontation, to protect the population, they must also act with a minimum of responsibility. It is their family, their fellow countrymen, their municipality, their state and their country.’ At a press conference, the President considered that the violence in Culiacán so far ‘is not a major issue.’…Out of prudence, the Independence Day celebrations in Culiacán were cancelled.

Source: “Al menos 18 muertes en una nueva ola de violencia en Sinaloa (México) (At least 18 dead in a new wave of violence in Sinaloa (Mexico)),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 15 September 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/09/15/al-menos-18-muertes-en-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia-en-sinaloa-mexico/   

During the second week of September, 18 homicides, 36 carjackings and 28 reports of deprivation of liberty have been recorded, in an escalation of violence carried out by criminal groups in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, according to authorities…Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and has attributed these clashes to disputes between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos.

Notes:

[i] For an updated profile of the Sinaloa Cartel and its activities, see: Insight Crime, “Sinaloa Cartel,” last updated 15 March 2024. https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

[ii] The story of El Mayo’s arrival at the U.S. southern border is long and still not fully known, but for a comprehensive background on what may have transpired, see: José de Córdoba, “Betrayal and Capture of Sinaloa Cartel Leaders Spark Fears of Turf War,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/betrayal-and-capture-of-sinaloa-cartel-leaders-spark-fears-of-turf-war-d1a805f8

Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.
Source: https://picryl.com/media/booking-photo-of-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-front-873b60

Drone Warfare Is Becoming a Common Tactic in Mali

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A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.

“The use of drones by the CSP rebels, if it were to increase, could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels.”

Recent reporting indicates that both the Malian military and Tuareg separatist groups are utilizing drone warfare.[i] According to the first excerpted article from the Africa-focused UK-based news publication Qiraat Africa,rebel forces reported 21 civilian deaths, including 11 children, following Malian military air strikes on the village of Tinzaouatine.[ii] The strike was part of intensified fighting following the recent defeat of Malian Army and Africa Corps mercenaries by rebel fighters who allied with militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) is a coalition of Malian separatist groups fighting against government forces in northern Mali and is the latest evolution of the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg people, who inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya, have been fighting with the Malian government for autonomy on and off since the 1990s. While these separatist groups have been geographically close to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also based in northern Mali, their motivation has consistently been about independence as opposed to an Islamic caliphate. According to the rebels, the airstrikes allegedly targeted a pharmacy and groups of gathered people in the village. The Malian Armed Forces confirmed the attack but stated that the strikes were precise and specifically targeted terrorists. These strikes and associated civilian casualties are likely to continue as fighting persists, and government forces cannot conduct a persistent ground campaign in the Kidal region of the country.

Seemingly in retaliation for the Tinzaouatine attack, the rebels conducted a drone strike against a Malian Army camp. According to the second excerpted article from French news radio RFI, rebel forces struck a Malian Army camp approximately 60 miles from Timbuktu, though no casualties were reported. The strike marked an evolution in the conflict, with both sides now utilizing drone warfare. Although the rebel forces indicated they did not acquire the drones through Ukraine or JNIM, there are few open-source details on the type or quantity of drones they use. The leadership of the rebel faction did acknowledge that they have had access to the drones for ten months to train with and manufacture grenades. While still an effective tool, rebel forces are likely not using as technologically advanced drones as the Malian Army, who, alongside their Africa Corps counterparts, have been using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones with significant effect.[ii]

Drone warfare in Mali and possibly other non-state actors could signal a fundamental shift in the conduct of battles and the power balance in the region. The only other time rebel forces utilized drones was in July 2024, when they defeated Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces. Though the CSP currently denies drone use in conjunction with terrorist organizations like JNIM, their successful use in the region has the potential to also expand the usage by jihadist groups. Drone warfare on both sides will also likely impact civilian casualties and cause problems for the Malian armed forces, similar to what the Russian military is currently facing in Ukraine.

Sources:

“Au moins 21 civils tués par un drone dans le nord du Mali, selon un groupe dirigé par des Touaregs (At least 21 civilians killed by drone strike in northern Mali, Tuareg-leg group says),” Qiraata Africa (independent UK-based magazine focused on sub-Saharan Africa), 26 August 2024.
https://qiraatafrican.com/fr/12604/au-moins-21-civils-tues-par-un-drone-dans-le-nord-du-mali-selon-un-groupe-dirige-par-des-touaregs/

Airstrikes on a village in northern Mali near the Algerian border killed 21 civilians on Sunday, including 11 children, a spokesman for a coalition of predominantly Tuareg pro-independence groups said. The attack on the village of Tinzaouatine marks the highest number of civilians killed by drones since the breakdown of a peace deal between the country’s ruling military junta and pro-independence armed groups in northern Mali last year.

The Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups fighting for the independence of northern Mali, which they call Azawad. Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy, followed by additional strikes targeting people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “The provisional toll of these criminal strikes stands at 21 civilians killed, including 11 children and the head of the pharmacy, dozens of injured and enormous material damage,” said the statement signed by Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the rebel coalition present in the village.

In a statement broadcast on national television, the Malian armed forces confirmed these strikes. “The army general staff confirms the airstrikes in the Tinzaouatine sector on the morning of August 25, 2024. These precision strikes targeted terrorists,” the press release states. The strikes come weeks after the Malian army and mercenaries from the Russia-based Wagner Group were defeated by Tuareg rebels and fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a group linked to al-Qaeda.

Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy; then others targeted people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “Both Malian forces and Russian mercenaries lack a strong ground presence in the Kidal region, so using air assets, including drones, is the only way for them to engage armed groups in the region,” said Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan think tank. “Therefore, airstrikes, including on civilians, are likely to increase as revenge for the recent major setback suffered by Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali”

Source: “Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones (Mali: CSP rebels now fight with drones),” RFI (French-based radio station and part of the France Medias Monde group), 12 September 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240912-mali-les-rebelles-du-csp-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-avec-des-drones

In Mali, the rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) are now fighting with drones. They used them on September 11, 2024, against a Malian army camp about a hundred kilometers from Timbuktu. No casualties were reported. But it was on this occasion that the rebels revealed that they had drones and that it was the second time they had used them. A new addition to their arsenal could change the shape of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the rebels in the North.

The rebels claim to have used it [drones] for the first time at the end of July in Tinzaouatène, during their only but important victory against the Malian soldiers and the Wagner group, who had lost several dozen men and were forced to turn back. Where do these drones come from? How many do the rebels have? What model exactly? No details have been released. CSP spokesman Mohamed el Maouloud Ramadane says only that they were “purchased,” and assures that they were not supplied by Ukraine – nor by the al-Qaeda-linked Jnim (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The jihadists, who are also fighting the Malian army in northern Mali , use drones to film their propaganda videos. To date, JNIM has not claimed responsibility for any drone attacks.

According to several CSP fighters contacted by RFI, the rebels have had these drones for about ten months now. “We had to train people and make the grenades; it’s dangerous, and it takes time,” explains one of them. Regarding their use in Tinzaouatène at the end of July, the rebels assure that it was ” decisive “, particularly ” against the armored vehicles”. At the time, the CSP rebels had not communicated on the unprecedented use of these drones. Nor had the Malian army, which had exceptionally acknowledged ” a significant number of losses in human and material life ” (press release of July 29).

The Fama (Malian Armed Forces) and their Wagner auxiliaries themselves use armed drones. The first Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, acquired by the Malian army, were received in December 2022. Other deliveries followed, always relayed on state media to illustrate the army’s “rise in power”. These drones actually proved decisive during the capture of Kidal, a rebel stronghold, last November. The strikes forced the CSP men to withdraw, without even attempting ground combat. If the use of drones by the CSP rebels were to increase, it could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels. It could help to rebalance the forces because, until now, the Malian army and Wagner dominate the terrain. Since the use of armed drones requires particularly reliable intelligence and careful targeting, it could also increase the risk for civilians, whom the CSP rebels have made it their mission to protect.

Notes:

[i] The linked article by Le Monde goes in-depth on the Tuareg rebellion that has been going on in Mali since the 1990s. For more information, see: Philippe Baqué, “For the Tuaregs, unite or disappear (Mali’s Tuaregs: ‘For us, this war is existential’),” Le Monde, April 2024. https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/13mali

[ii] The Bayraktar TB2 is described as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of a 27-hour maximum flight time and a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. For additional information see: “Bayraktar TB2,” Bayraktar, n.d. https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/

Image Information:

Image: A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729

OE Watch Insight:

Former RUS Wagner paramilitary forces, now referred to as Africa Corps, have been redeployed from MLI to RUS in wake of UKR invasion of RUS’s Kursk region.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

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Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.

Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”

Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/

OE Insight Summary:

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in RUS’s war on UKR have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse UKR of supporting terrorist organizations.

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

The Failure To Deter Houthi Vessel Attacks May Deepen Saudi-China Security Ties

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.

“Some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the [Houthis], as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea…”

Arabic-language media analysts and commentators widely agree that the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian – formed in December 2023 to address Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea — has not effectively deterred Yemen’s Houthis from targeting commercial maritime traffic.[i] However, they are divided on whether this failure is due to deliberate strategic choices or poor planning.[ii] Some commentators suggest that the real target of the operation is China, not the Houthis. They argue that the United States may be intentionally allowing Houthi attacks to weaken China economically and justify military presence in a region with increasing Chinese naval activity. The first excerpt, from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, reflects this view, with several Yemeni political analysts indicating that the United States is colluding with the Houthis for a broader strategic aim.[iii] This perspective, however, is not universally accepted across the region. Pro-Houthi media outlets, for example, attribute the lack of deterrence to Yemeni strength and U.S. shortcomings. The second excerpt, from the Houthi news website al-Masirah, illustrates the Houthi narrative on Prosperity Guardian, whereby Yemeni forces have shattered U.S. military prestige and effectively deterred U.S. forces in the region. The third excerpt, from the Qatari daily al-Sharq, offers a more mainstream explanation, attributing the operation’s deterrent failure to poor planning and misjudgments about the Houthis. According to the author, effectively securing trade routes in the area will require patience and the involvement of more acceptable mediators, such as China.

Prosperity Guardian’s ineffective deterrence – regardless of the reasons – may be leading Saudi Arabia to seek help from China. Saudi Arabian leadership opted against joining Prosperity Guardian due to their interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Houthis.[iv] In mid-June 2024, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman and top Saudi military officials visited Beijing for discussions that reportedly included a request for Chinese assistance to contain Yemeni attacks.[v] Whatever the ultimate reasons behind Prosperity Guardian’s ineffectiveness, one of its consequences – presumably unintended – could be deepening Saudi-Chinese security coordination in the Red Sea.

Sources:

بعد 8 أشهر من التصعيد… لماذا لم يردع التدخل الأميركي هجمات الحوثيين؟

“After 8 months of escalation… Why did the US intervention not deter Houthi attacks?” al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi daily), 18 July 2024. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5041521-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-8-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%9F

Despite the passage of eight months since the start of the Houthi attacks on ships under the pretext of supporting the Palestinians in Gaza, the American intervention under the name of the “Prosperity Guardian” has not succeeded in putting an end to the threat of the Iranian-backed group…

[Yemeni researcher and political analyst Abdul Sattar Al-Shamiri] claims in his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that the continuation of the navigation crisis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden does not affect America and Israel economically, but rather affects China the most in the long term…

This part related to China is consistent with what Tawfiq al-Jund, a Yemeni researcher at the Sana’a Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat… “The American military presence in the Red Sea needs justification before world powers, and the Houthi threat to maritime navigation is a strong justification for that, and it must remain for a period of time,” Al-Jund continues…

“Futile restoration attempts…they end in the collapse of Zionism,” al-Masirah (Houthi news outlet), 5 August 2024. https://www.almasirahnews.com/136216/

It was only a few days until the “Prosperity Alliance” found itself in a major predicament, as it was unable to provide protection for the ships of the Zionist entity and ships heading to the ports of the occupied territories. The scope of targeting for our country’s naval forces expanded to include commercial ships of the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, especially American and British ships, and the bottom of the sea became a stable for a number of them.. Under the pretext of redeployment to carry out other missions in other areas, the (Eisenhower) was withdrawn away from the danger zone, after our national army expanded the geographical scope of its naval military operations to include the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and later the Mediterranean Sea.

Instead of imposing a supposed deterrent against our people and revolutionary leadership, the picture was reversed, and the forces called the Prosperity Alliance were deterred. As a result, the reputation of the US administration collapsed, its prestige fell, and its deterrent image, which its presence in the Middle East aimed to restore, was shattered.

لماذا فشل تحالف الازدهار في هزيمة الحوثيين؟

“Why did the Prosperity Alliance fail to defeat the Houthis?” al-Sharq (Qatari daily), 30 July 2024. https://al-sharq.com/opinion/30/07/2024/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

Perhaps the main source of confusion or astonishment in Washington as well is that it does not imagine that defeating the Houthis would be this difficult. As a result, some have gone so far as to assert that there is American collusion with the group, as Washington does not intentionally target the group’s main command centers in Yemen, nor its main leaders. The reason for the collusion is to harm Chinese trade in the Red Sea.

The issue of American collusion with the Houthis or Iran, their main supporter, can basically be ruled out simply when considering the huge amount of spending on the operation, which has reached an estimated $30 billion dollars so far, without any result, in addition to the development of the group’s threat to Israel, the American red line.

There are many interconnected reasons for the failure of the campaign against the Houthis. The first and most important is the American-Western miscalculation of the group’s true strength. So in principle, the Prosperity Coalition should have adopted more robust and rigorous plans in its war against the Houthis, and the Pentagon acknowledged this by saying that defeating the Houthis requires a more robust and rigorous strategy… It can be said that defeating an ideological group like the Houthis, operating in a complex mountainous terrain, is next to impossible… Therefore, betting on neutralizing these groups and undermining their threats should be primarily a political bet. It should address the roots of the crisis, not its symptoms. The solution must start from within Yemen itself by intensifying efforts for a comprehensive reconciliation in which the Houthis are recognized as an authentic political and social component. This requires patience and the intervention of more acceptable mediators, led by China.

Notes:

[i] As of July 2024, Houthi attacks had not ceased. See: William Clough, “Military and Security, The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2024,“ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 15 July 2024. https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/april-june-2024/22886

[ii] The stated goal of Operation Prosperity Guardian is “ensuring freedom of navigation for all countries and bolstering regional security and prosperity.” See: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

[iii] This perspective is most widespread among anti-Houthi factions in Yemen, particularly among members and supporters of the Saudi-based Internationally Recognized Government.

[iv] For more see: Lucas Winter, “Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape,” FMSO Foreign Perspectives Brief, June 2024, page 9, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/gaza-wars-impact-on-the-middle-east-strategic-landscape-lucas-winterjune-2024/

[v] For more details see: Adam Lucente, “Saudi defense chief in China in bid for help with Houthis, boost military ties,” Al Monitor, 25 June 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/06/saudi-defense-chief-china-bid-help-houthis-boost-military-ties; The Saudi delegation included Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Fayyad bin Hamid Al-Ruwaili, Saudi Ambassador to China Abdulrahman bin Ahmed Al-Harbi; Commander of the Strategic Missile Force Lt. Gen. Jarallah bin Mohammed Al-Alweet, Director General of the Office of the Minister of Defense Hisham bin Abdulaziz bin Saif, head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority Maj. Gen. Misfer Al-Ghanem, and Military Attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing Commodore Salem bin Saleh Al-Maliki. The Chinese delegation included Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Central Military Commission Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation at the Central Military Commission Maj. Gen. Li Bin, and several other senior officials. See: “Chinese and Saudi Defense Ministers Discuss Bilateral Relations,” Saudi Press Agency, 25 June 2024, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2128876

OE Insight Summary:

Arabic commentaries view the USA-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to stop Houthi attacks from YEM as a failure but are divided on causes. This failure may deepen SAU-CHN security cooperation.

Image Information:

Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) 31 January 2024.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Christopher J Krucke, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8254865/operation-prosperity-guardian. 
Attribution: Public Domain

Burkina Faso Reels From Continued Terrorist Attacks

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Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.

“Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – have been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced.”

Summary: Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Even with exceptional monetary investment in military equipment by Burkina Faso, the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) continues to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against government targets. According to the first excerpted article from French language news agency specializing in African economics, Agence Ecofin, a speech by the Minister of the Economy, Aboubakar Nacanabo, revealed Burkina Faso had spent more than $1 billion to acquire military equipment in the fight against terrorism.[i] While this amount might not be notable for many nations, these purchases totaled 30% of the entire state budget in 2023 and contributed to the government’s 6.7% budget deficit. To help with funding, Burkina Faso implemented a voluntary Patriotic Support Fund and, later, compulsory taxes on telecommunications systems and land to assist with funding defense purchases. Minister Nacanabo indicated that the government planned a similar financial allocation for defense equipment purchases in 2024, totaling 29.49% of the state budget.

Despite its considerable spending, Burkina Faso continues to struggle with organized and frequent terrorist attacks by armed jihadist groups such as JNIM. JNIM, originally based in Mali, has spread through many parts of Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo, and Cote d’Ivoire.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from French-language public service news channel TV5 Monde, JNIM conducted a deadly attack on 11 June 2024, at the military installation in Mansila, near the border with Niger. The attack targeted homes and businesses in the town as well as the local military detachment. The government is yet to release an official report on the number of killed or wounded. The 11 June attack is just one in a long history of terrorist attacks affecting the country, with the article noting that over 20,000 have been killed by jihadist groups and over 2,000,000 have been displaced in Burkina Faso alone.

Nearly one third of the Burkinabe state budget is being spent on defense equipment purchases, and the ongoing armed conflict throughout the country raises questions about the efficacy of these purchases. Much of the military equipment purchased by the new regime is likely originating from Russia, as Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries have moved away from Western aid.[iii] Though the country’s deteriorating security situation is currently a regional issue, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism strategy and effective combat operations against groups like JNIM have broader U.S. policy implications. Transnational terrorist organizations have had a resurgence in conducting international attacks, which brings to the forefront the importance of stopping the spread of JNIM and the Islamic State from expanding to other neighboring African nations.

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: 1 milliard $ investis dans du matériel militaire en 2023 (Burkina Faso: $1 billion invested in military equipment in 2023),” Agence Ecofin (French language Geneve-based news agency), 7 June 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0706-119330-lien-burkina-faso-1-milliard-investis-dans-des-materiels-militaires-en-2023

Burkina Faso has been facing a security and humanitarian crisis for many years due to terrorist attacks, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending. Burkina Faso spent around $1 billion (more than 600 billion CFA francs), or 30% of the state budget, for the acquisition of military equipment in 2023. This information was revealed by Aboubakar Nacanabo (photo), minister of the Economy, during the program “Tribune of Accountability” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

According to the minister, this investment aims to strengthen the operational capabilities of the national armed forces in the fight against terrorism. Burkina Faso has, in fact, been facing a security and humanitarian crisis due to terrorist attacks for many years, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending, according to the government. However, Minister Nacanabo reassured the public by affirming that after these acquisitions, the government will gradually increase spending in other sectors. A move that could underline the administration’s commitment to ensuring balanced national development, despite pressing security challenges.

Note that Captain Ibrahim Traoré, president of the transition, has placed the fight against terrorism and the reconquest of the territory at the heart of his priorities; what is considered “essential” before the organization of national elections. As a result, several reforms have been put in place to respond more effectively to the crisis, notably the creation of the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP) in January 2023. Initially funded by voluntary contributions, the government introduced compulsory contributions on certain products and services to support the Fund. For the 2024 budget year, the Burkinabe government plans to allocate 29.49% of its budget to security-related expenses.

“Burkina Faso: quel bilan dans l’attaque djihadiste meurtrière à Mansila (Burkina Faso: what results in the deadly jihadist attack in Mansila),” TV5 Monde (Multi-nationally funded French language news outlet), 15 June 2024.  https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burkina-faso-quel-bilan-dans-lattaque-djihadiste-meurtriere-mansila-2726176

The town of Mansila located in the northeast of Burkina Faso near Niger, was the target of a deadly jihadist attack on June 11, according to local and security sources. The authorities have not communicated on the attack claimed by the GSIM, affiliated with Al Qaeda.

A deadly jihadist attack, the exact toll of which is unknown, targeted the town of Mansila on Tuesday, in the north-east of Burkina Faso, near Niger, we learned on Sunday from local and security sources. On June 11, “ill-intentioned individuals stormed the detachment (military, editor’s note), our homes, our businesses and all other representations of the country”, indicates the association of pupils and students of Mansila, in a published press release on Facebook.

“At present, while we have not finished mourning our dead, many of our fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters are missing,” continues this association, which calls on the authorities to “restore peace.”  A security source confirmed the attack to AFP. “It is difficult to give a precise assessment, but there were losses in Mansila. Many elements are missing,” said this source.

The military detachments deployed in the various localities of Burkina generally comprise around 150 elements. No official report has been released, and the authorities have not communicated about this attack, which was claimed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Friday, the head of the military regime in power in Burkina Faso appeared on national television news, donating blood in the capital Ouagadougou, after two days of uncertainty following the fall of a shell in the courtyard of public television located near the presidency.

On Sunday, the presidency of Faso posted a message wishing a happy Eid to the country’s Muslims, accompanied by a photo of Captain Traoré praying. Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – has been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced. The authorities regularly claim to obtain victories over the jihadists, but the attacks continue, and part of the territory remains beyond the control of the army

Notes:

[i] Aboubakar Nacanabo’s speech took place in June 2024 during the “Tribune de la redevabilité (Tribune of Accountability)” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

[ii] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a foreign terrorist profile on JNIM, located here: “Jama’at Nursrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Counter Terrorism Guide, Updated October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[iii] The M-DIME Research Project details Russia’s total Military DIME influence in Burkina Faso, including arms transfers. Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham, “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/

OE Insight Summary:

Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, JNIM has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Image Information:

Image: Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burkinabe_soldiers_respond_to_an_ambush_during_training_at_Exercise_Flintlock_2019_near_Po,_Burkina_Faso,_Feb._26,_2019.jpg Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan Under Pressure To Protect China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Projects

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China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

“Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs.”

Summary: After several terrorist attacks against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in 2024, China is pressuring Pakistan to launch counterterrorism operations to protect Chinese interests. However, such operations would incur significant costs to Pakistan at a time when its economy is struggling.

Pakistan has been under pressure for years from its partners to do more to counter violent extremist groups operating within its territory. On 26 March 2024, a suicide bomber struck a bus in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, killing five Chinese nationals and the vehicle’s driver. It marked the third attack on Chinese interests in Pakistan that month, though no group claimed responsibility for the bombing.[i] The Chinese nationals were engineers working on the Dasu Dam, a hydroelectric dam under construction by a joint Pakistan-China venture set to begin operation in 2025. The accompanying excerpted articles report on the fallout of the attack and how China could push Pakistan to do more to deal with violent extremist groups in its territory.

The first excerpted article from Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn reports that Pakistani officials recently completed an investigation into the 26 March attack. However, it may not be enough to satisfy China that Pakistan can deal with the threat from extremist groups. The author points out that an operation against those responsible for the 26 March attack that killed the Chinese engineers is not feasible, as Pakistan believes the group responsible for the attack is based in Afghanistan and any operation would be costly and likely lead to broader conflict in the region.[ii]

The second excerpted article from Dawn reports on an official visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China in early June. Sharif, accompanied by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, met with President Xi Jinping, who stated China supports Pakistan but noted security issues. While the article does not mention China specifically requesting Pakistan carry out a counterterrorism operation in light of the recent attacks, it does mention that President Xi Jinping asked Sharif to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan. This is in addition to Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Sharif holding a meeting, and both pledging to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor “from its detractors and adversaries.” For the time being, China is not openly pressuring Pakistan to launch an operation against extremist groups. However, the attacks earlier this year and the June meeting show that Pakistan remains under considerable pressure to deal with extremist groups for the sake of its relations with China and its economy.

Sources:

Muhammad Amir Rana, “Chinese advice,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 2 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1837210

Pakistan’s law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time. This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.

On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists…A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.

The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf…

International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan…China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region…

Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs…

Syed Irfan Raza, “Beijing vows to uphold Pakistani sovereignty,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 8 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1838561

Acknowledging the all-weather strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, President Xi Jinping on Friday renewed his resolve to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity besides extending financial support through investment in different sectors.

“China will, as always, firmly support Pakistan and safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” President Xi told Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif…

Besides federal ministers and senior officials, Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir is also a part of the delegation. This was the first meeting of PM Shehbaz with President Xi since assuming office…At the meeting, President Xi told the premier that the two neighbours should focus on “promoting the joint construction of CPEC”, and asked PM Shehbaz to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan.

…Earlier, PM Shehbaz met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Beijing, where they resolved to protect CPEC “from its detractors and adversaries”, the Foreign Office said.

Notes:

[i] Earlier in March, insurgents in the Balochistan, Province, Pakistan attacked a Pakistani naval facility that helps provide security for the Gwadar Port, an important component of Chinese economic activity in Pakistan, in addition to an attack on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex, see: Avinash Mohananey, “Attacks on Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan disrupt CPEC, raise security concerns,” Economic Times, 28 March 2024. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/attacks-on-chinese-infrastructure-in-pakistan-disrupt-cpec-raise-security-concerns/articleshow/108829369.cms

[ii] One estimate from an analyst with Pakistan’s National Defense University put the cost of Operation Zarb-i-Azb alone at nearly $2 billion, with the government of Pakistan also spending an unknown amount on the creation of additional security forces in the wake of the operation to help protect projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), see: Bhaswar Kumar, “Pakistan Army can’t afford China’s expensive security demand. What is it?,” Business Standard, 3 June 2024.

https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/china-s-latest-demand-is-a-bitter-pill-to-swallow-for-pakistan-here-s-why-124060200665_1.html

OE Insight Summary:

After several terrorist attacks against CPEC projects in 2024, PAK is under pressure by CHN to launch a counterterrorism operation to protect CHN interests, while any operation will incur significant costs at a time when PKN economy is struggling

Image Information:

Image: China Pakistan Economic Corridor
Source:   
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Criminal Organizations Mar Mexican Elections

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Claudia Sheinbaum, former Mexico City mayor, won a resounding victory in the elections and will be the next president of Mexico.

“Without a doubt, this is a weakening of democracy because citizens are afraid to go out to vote, or they do not see the point in going out to vote, if it seems that crime is dominating, who defines who can be a candidate, who does campaign.”

Summary: Recently completed elections in Mexico, the largest in the country’s history, were also the most violent in its history. Election-related violence portends greater control of criminal organizations over politics.

Mexico’s 2 June elections were highly anticipated, and the results closely watched. It was the largest election in Mexico’s history, with more than 20,000 seats contested at local, state, and federal levels.[i] While coverage of the election tended to focus on breaking the glass ceiling—both major candidates were women, a first in a country known for “machismo”—the elections were also marred by intense violence, assassinations, and kidnappings.[ii]

The business-focused Mexican daily El Economista, reported that as the campaign closed, more than 30 candidates for public office, and approximately 50 people close to candidates or working for candidates, had been assassinated during the campaign season—the most violent campaign season on record. There were also countless attacks, threats, and intimidation against family members and friends of candidates, and hundreds more were murdered at campaign events, the outlet states. Further, the newspaper relays that most of the victims were candidates for local office, where organized crime groups seek to control public officials. 272 separate attacks were recorded during the campaign season, many of them in central and southern Mexican states afflicted by violence and contestation between criminal groups. Spanish international news agency EFE, says that election violence dampens democratic enthusiasm and participation. The outlet cites a datapoint of note: each assassination can reduce participation rates by up to 3 percent in a locality. EFE also reports that at least 168 polling stations around the country did not operate due to violence and security concerns.

Election-related violence also indicates the changing model of territorial control most criminal organizations seek to implement. Criminal organizations have taken to assassinating political opponents and candidates they deem as too independent.[iii] And, rather than corrupting sitting politicians, criminal groups seek to install their candidates in the most important local offices. Mexico’s election-related violence demonstrates the country’s slide into greater insecurity has grave consequences for the operational environment.

Sources:

“Los mexicanos salen a votar en las elecciones más grandes de la historia y también las más violentas (Mexicans go out to vote in the largest elections in history and also the most violent),” El Economista (a Mexican daily mostly focused on business and finance), 2 June 2024. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Los-mexicanos-salen-a-votar-en-las-Elecciones-mas-grandes-de-la-historia-y-tambien-las-mas-violentas-20240602-0003.html

Since the political campaigns began, 30 candidates for public office and nearly 50 leaders or sympathizers related to the electoral process have been murdered…The elections, in which just over 20,000 public positions will be elected…are being held under the shadow of violence that has left a record of murdered candidates, fueling concerns about democracy in the country…The fatalities are mostly aspirants, pre-candidates, or candidates for municipal positions.

“Las elecciones más grandes de México también pasarán a la historia como las más violentas (Mexico’s biggest elections will also go down in history as the most violent),” EFE (a Spanish international news agency with regional coverage), 2 June 2024. https://efe.com/mundo/2024-06-02/las-elecciones-mas-grandes-de-mexico-tambien-pasaran-a-la-historia-como-las-mas-violentas/ The largest election in Mexico will also go down in history this Sunday as the most violent…Integralia, a political consultancy, reported 150.5% more attacks in this electoral process, which officially began in September, compared to the last midterm elections in 2021, which includes murders, armed attacks, threats, kidnappings and disappearances…When analyzing previous elections, Data Cívica found that for each attack on a candidate, participation in the locality in question drops 1.3%, and if the victim is a serving politician, such as the mayor, the drop is 3%…‘Without a doubt, this is a weakening of democracy because citizens are afraid to go out to vote, or they do not see the point in going out to vote, if it seems that crime is dominating, who defines who can be a candidate, who does campaign.’

Notes:

[i] For more information on the election at a granular level, see: “Mexico Elects: Ongoing Coverage of the 2024 Race,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/mexico-elects-ongoing-coverage-2024-vote

[ii] For more information on the election results and the dominant performance of the ruling Morena Party, see: Ryan C. Berg and Rubi Bledsoe, “Claudia Sheinbaum: the Most Powerful Woman in the World?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 7 June 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/claudia-sheinbaum-most-powerful-woman-world

[iii] To listen to more analysis on the cartels’ changing operational methods and its relationship to election violence, see: Ryan C. Berg, “The Long Shadow of Violence in Mexico’s Elections,” 35West Podcast, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 June 2024. https://www.csis.org/podcasts/35-west/long-shadow-violence-mexicos-elections

OE Insight:

Recently completed elections in MEX, the largest in the country’s history, were also the most violent in its history. Election-related violence portends greater control of criminal organizations over politics. 

Image Information:

Image: Claudia Sheinbaum, former Mexico City mayor, won a resounding victory in the elections and will be the next president of Mexico.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/eneas/53678721694/.     
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

West African Joint Task Force’s “Psychological” Approach Sees Increased Boko Haram Defections

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Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states

“The success of Operation Nashrul Salam underscores the effectiveness of psychological operations in counter-terrorism efforts.”

In February 2024, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)[i] launched Operation Nashrul Salam to dislodge Boko Haram from its bases around Lake Chad in the border region between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Although operations with similar objectives have been carried out regularly for several years,[ii] the MNJTF has renewed hopes that this time the operation will be more lasting and decisive. The excerpted article in Daily Nigerian from 3 May detailed the MNJTF’s optimism about the operation, and highlighted how it differs from previous operations, namely in its use of psychological operations.

According to the article, written by the MNJTF chief of military public information, Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar Abdullahi, the Lake Chad basin region is the lynchpin of security in West Africa. This was home to some 30 million people until Boko Haram launched an insurgency in 2010 that created widespread unrest and displacement in the region. This time, to dislodge Boko Haram, the MNJTF is not relying on the “hard approach” to countering terrorism[iii] but rather on what Abdullahi describes as a psychological operation.

The operation involved dropping fliers over islands where Boko Haram has hideouts in Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, the five languages spoken around Lake Chad. According to the article, many Boko Haram members surrendered after receiving information about how to defect and enter rehabilitation programs. The article also credits another non-kinetic program called Quick Impact Projects for assisting large numbers of villagers from the Chadian portion of Lake Chad to return to their home villages. MNJTF then provides security so the villagers can recommence their fishing activities and regain their livelihoods. In total, 95 Quick Impact Projects have been implemented in 31 villages, which have impacted an estimated 3,200 people. While Abdullahi may have embellished the success of the operations, the article illustrates that the MNJTF is prioritizing “soft approaches” to counter-terrorism. Such approaches have long been called for by civil society as a complement to the MNJTF and Lake Chad basin region armies’ own kinetic operations and will likely be considered a welcome development.

Sources:

“How troops of MNJTF are progressing towards Lake Chad Basin stabilization,” Daily Nigerian (English and Hausa-language newspaper covering important matters affecting Nigeria, including corruption and military affairs), 8 May 2024. https://dailynigerian.com/troops-mnjtf/#google_vignette

The Lake Chad Basin serves as lifeblood for tens of millions, a unique ecological sanctuary, and a lynchpin in regional stability. Amidst its abundant resources, however, the region has faced its share of turmoil, exacerbated by the shadow of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.

Enter the MNJTF, a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin Republic, established with the purpose of counteracting the threat posed by these insurgent groups. Its multifaceted approach, combining kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, has proven effective. Notable successes include the dislodgement of insurgents from its strongholds, rescue of hostages, and reductions in the frequency and severity of attacks in the region. Moreover, the MNJTF has played a major role in facilitating the return of displaced persons and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas.

The MNJTF has conducted Operation Nashrul Salam, a non-kinetic approach to break the cycle of terror. This psychological operation was tailored to foster surrender and disrupt unity among the terrorist factions. Operation Nashrul Salam disseminated messages across the Lake Chad region in 5 languages, Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic, French, and English, to ensure widespread comprehension. These tailored messages were air-dropped over specific islands known to harbour terrorists, targeting them directly in their hideouts. The operation’s impact was profound, culminating in a significant number of terrorists surrendering.The MNJTF has executed Quick Impact Projects throughout the four sectors of the MNJTF. In particular, after successful kinetic operations, over 3,200 residents of the Bagatelerom community in Chad have returned to their ancestral homes, with MNJTF personnel assisting their resettlement in partnership with relevant agencies.

Notes:

[i] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprises the four Lake Chad basin states, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as Benin and is intended to involve “sharing plans and intelligence, committing troops for longer operations and improving troops’ human rights compliance.” The MNJTF has not significantly reduced Boko Haram attacks or border incursions around Lake Chad, despite claiming several offensives against the group have been successful. See: , “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?,” Report #291, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

[ii] See: Jacob Zenn, “Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/multinational-joint-task-force-lauds-counterterrorism-success-against-boko-haram/

[iii] The “soft approach” refers to “all non-military measures adopted by a government in addressing the root causes and containing the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.” This would include flier drops to encourage Boko Haram members to surrender as well as programs to reduce socio-economic inequality, create jobs, and foster political inclusion. In contrast, the “hard approach” to counter-terrorism refers to all military actions taken to contain terrorism, such as the use of air strikes and raids into Boko Haram hideouts. See: Ugwueze, M. I., Onuoha, F. C., “Hard Versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria.” Journal of Applied Security Research, 15(4), 547–567, (2020).

Image Information:

Image: Major General Ibrahim Sallau Ali commands the MNJTF and greets officers from contributing states
Source: NAweb, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gen_Ali_with_the_MNJTF.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mali Launches Successful Counterterrorism Operations

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Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.”

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) recently publicized a series of successful counter-terrorism operations against armed extremist groups throughout the country. According to the first excerpted article from Arabic-language Moroccan electronic newspaper Tamaghrabit, FAMA announced that it had successfully eliminated Abu Hudhayfah, a former Polisario Front separatist and one of the leaders of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Prior to his time with the ISGS, Hudhayfah was allegedly trained by the Algerian Army and his joint affiliation has signaled a connection between separatist and terrorist organizations in the region. Hudhayfah was also suspected to have assisted with attacks on U.S. and Nigerian forces in Niger in 2017. Mali and the greater Sahel region have faced a significant and sustained threat from armed extremist groups for multifaceted reasons ranging from weak governmental leadership, less international counterterrorism support, and instability in neighboring nations.[i] Although Hudhayfah will undoubtedly be replaced, the FAMA’s successful operation against ISGC is a needed disruption and morale boost for local forces.

Following FAMA’s successful operation against Hudhayfah, the Malian military claimed several other successful counterterrorism operations throughout the Diafarabé area, Ségou region. According to the second excerpted article from Burkina Faso’s French-language independent newspaper, 24heures, the General Staff of the Armed Forces announced air strikes and ground operations that targeted training camps and logistical bases near Nouh Bozo, a village in the center of the country located along the bank of the Niger River. Before kinetic operations, FAMA used information derived from “specialized services” to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance on each target. It was believed that the unnamed terrorist organizations operating the camps intended to “transform the area into sanctuaries to prepare their dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” In addition to the destruction of training camps and logistical storage areas, FAMA claimed to have destroyed fuel shipments destined for terrorist organizations throughout the country. The security situation in the Sahel continues to be plagued with instability and terrorism. External players like Russia continue to garner influence in the region. With U.S. troops withdrawing from neighboring Niger, the forces to counter a growing terrorist threat in the Sahel are even more sparse. Mali’s ability to independently conduct kinetic operations against high-value targets may indicate a renewed focus on securing their nation, which could have a positive impact across the region.

Sources:

“الجيش المالي يعلن القضاء على الانفصالي “أبو حذيفة” ويؤكد علاقة البوليساريو بالإرهاب (The Malian army announces the elimination of the separatist “Abu Hudhayfah” and confirms the Polisario’s relationship with terrorism),” Tamaghribit (Moroccan newspaper), 1 May 2024. https://www.tamaghrabit.com/?p=19302

The Malian army announced the elimination of the former Polisario Front separatist and leader of ISIS in the Sahara region, called “Abu Hudhayfah” and nicknamed “Hugo,” in a qualitative operation in northern Mali.

It is noteworthy that “Abu Hudhayfah” had previously received intensive training in the Tindouf camps under the supervision of Algerian army officers… before he was sent to northern Mali to join what calls itself the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. He will then be succeeded by Adnan Abu Al-Walid Sahrawi, who was in turn a leader in the Polisario terrorist organization, before leading ISIS.

The liquidation of the so-called “Abu Hudhayfah” confirms Morocco’s view that the terrorist phenomenon and the separatist phenomenon are linked, and that terrorism is a form of secession… given that terrorist organizations seek to establish political entities on the outskirts of countries where the security focus is less… and thus create “zones of savagery.” “It is managed to reach what is called in the organizational literature the “empowerment stage.”

Source:  “Des regroupements de terroristes identifiés et traités avec succès (Groups of terrorists identified and successfully treated),”24heures (Burkina Faso newspaper), 9 May 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/mali-des-regroupements-de-terroristes-identifies-et-traites-avec-succes-communique/

The harvest seems good for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). From May 6 to 8, they began a “hunt” against armed terrorist groups in several parts of the country. Several terrorists have been “neutralized” according to a press release from the General Staff of the Armed Forces dated May 8. A “major local terrorist leader” was also reportedly killed.

“Based on information obtained by specialized services, the FAMA has been carrying out an active surveillance and reconnaissance campaign for several days in the Diafarabé area, Ségou region,” indicates the General Staff of the Armed Forces. This requires, he says, careful work and patience. These operations led to the location and identification of several fallback bases located in forest areas. According to the Malian Army, armed terrorist groups plan to transform this area into sanctuaries. To prepare their “dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” Air strikes followed by ground action targeted training camps and logistical bases around Nouh Bozo, on the right bank of the Niger River, on May 6 and 7, 2024.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.The Malian Forces are thus on the hunt for armed terrorist groups who sow terror and desolation both within the Defense and Security Forces and among civilians. In this context, several air and land operations are carried out in several parts of the national territory. This Sahel country also intends, in its drive to fight terrorism, to cut off the sources of fuel supply for armed groups.

Notes:

[i] Mali has faced multiple radical Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), and the Islamic State’s Islamic State in Greater Sahara affiliate branches, which have been responsible for numerous deadly attacks throughout the country and have even been able to control territory. The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker published a detailed background and analysis on violent extremism in the Sahel to provide contextual information on the issued faced in Mali and neighboring nations. See: “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, Updated 14 February 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

Image Information:

Image: Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Assimi_Goita,_August_2021.png
Attribution: Public Domain