Peruvian President Castillo Oversees Dizzying Turnover in Government

The swearing-in of Peruvian President Pedro Castillo.

The swearing-in of Peruvian President Pedro Castillo.


“Castillo also recalled the political instability that Peru has experienced in the last five years, where there have been up to four presidents and a dissolved Congress.”


Peru’s President, Pedro Castillo, has had trouble retaining ministers.  Castillo announced yet another new cabinet—the fourth in his six-month tenure, according to Spanish-language CNN en Español.  Such rapid cabinet turnover has contributed to a sense of chaos engulfing the country and mounting questions over the president’s ability to survive the rest of his term.  Castillo’s approval ratings have fallen steadily since his inauguration.  Shortly after swearing in the new cabinet, the Spanish-language version of the popular British outlet BBC en Español, began reporting on scandals in the personal lives of newly appointed ministers.  The outlet reports that the hoped for centrist cabinet did not materialize; rather, most of Castillo’s chosen ministers are loyalists and Marxists from his Free Peru Party.  In recent years, Peru’s political climate has been highly volatile.  Presidents have rarely finished their terms.  In 2020, the country had three presidents in just one week.  Peru’s constitution pits the Congress against the President, with the Congress capable of impeaching the president for the vague and ill-defined idea of “moral incapacity.”  Peru’s political instability has the potential to spill over into international supply chains: the country is the second largest producer of copper in the world, and the sector has seen recent strikes at mining sites connected to the political environment.


Source:

“Pedro Castillo anuncia que nombrará a nuevo gabinete, su cuarto en seis meses (Pedro Castillo announces that he will appoint a new cabinet, his fourth in six months),” CNN en Español (Spanish-language version of the popular U.S. outlet), 4 February 2022.  https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/02/04/pedro-castillo-el-presidente-de-peru-anuncia-que-nombrara-a-nuevo-gabinete-su-cuarto-en-seis-meses-orix/   

Castillo will appoint a new president of the Council of Ministers, who, in turn, will appoint new heads of ministries.  It will be the fourth cabinet in just six months of government…Castillo also recalled the political instability that Peru has experienced in the last five years, where there have been up to four presidents and a dissolved Congress, and said that citizens, especially the poorest “do not want to see more confrontations, nor obstructionist and anti-democratic behavior, nor vacancy announcements, announcements of the closing of Congress.”

Source:  “Pedro Castillo nombra su cuarto gabinete en 6 meses, ¿por qué no consigue estabilizar a Perú? (Pedro Castillo appoints his fourth cabinet in 6 months, why can’t he stabilize Peru?),” BBC en Español (Spanish-language version of the popular British outlet), 5 February 2022.  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-60269518

The last government of Peru lasted just over 72 hours.  The ministerial cabinet that was sworn in by President Pedro Castillo on Tuesday, the fourth government in six months, is expected to last a little longer…The truth is that the short life of Castillo’s cabinets has exposed the instability that has characterized his presidency.  Since he came to power against all odds, Castillo has alternated executives of diverse orientation, which has led his critics to accuse him of leading the country in an erratic direction, and several of his ministers had to resign in the midst of the scandal and challenged in Congress.


Image Information:

Image caption:  The swearing-in of Peruvian President Pedro Castillo.
Source:  Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidenciaperu/51340618647
Attribution: CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Colombia’s Constitutional Court Halts Push for Aerial Spraying of Coca Crop

Aerial spraying of glyphosate.

Aerial spraying of glyphosate.


“The environmental authority could not make a decision about the modification… without first carrying out the process of prior consultation with all the ethnic communities likely to be affected by the spraying activity.”


In January, Colombia’s constitutional court halted President Iván Duque’s plan to return to aerial spraying of glyphosate as a means of eradicating coca.  According to an article posted in one of Colombia’s oldest dailies El Tiempo, the court stopped the order because the Colombian state had not sufficiently guaranteed the communities impacted by the decision to return to aerial spraying the right to prior consultation.  Prior consultation is a process that will take many months to complete, effectively shelving the decision on aerial spraying.  Environmental authorities, in conjunction with the police, will have to complete this process in accordance with regulations set forth by the constitutional court, according to center-leftArgentine news outlet Infobae.  The outlet states that in 2020, Colombia had nearly 150,000 hectares of coca cultivation.  Despite intensifying a program of manual coca crop eradication after signing a peace deal with guerrillas in 2016, Colombian officials want to return to aerial eradication to deal with a resurgence in violence and drug trafficking.  The timeline for a final decision outlined by the court kicks the decision into the ongoing presidential election, forcing candidates to debate the issue.  It also comes at a time when Colombia’s instability is high and its violence surging due to the expansion of drug trafficking activity along the border regions with Venezuela.


Source:

“Glifosato: Corte tumba plan de manejo ambiental y ordena consulta previa (Glyphosate: Court buries environmental management plan and orders prior consultation),” El Tiempo (one of Colombia’s oldest dailies generally described as politically-centrist), 20 January 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/cortes/glifosato-corte-tumba-plan-de-manejo-ambiental-y-ordena-consulta-previa-645910  

The environmental authority could not make a decision about the modification… without first carrying out the process of prior consultation with all the ethnic communities likely to be affected by the spraying activity, taking into account that the court itself noticed partial overlaps between these groups and the areas of influence of the project… The Court determined that in the process, in effect, the right to participation of the peasant communities residing in the municipalities where the program will eventually be carried out was ignored.

Source:  “Corte frustra planes de Duque de reanudar fumigaciones antidrogas en Colombia (Court frustrates Duque’s plans to resume anti-drug spraying in Colombia),” Infobae (Argentine news outlet generally seen as center-left politically), 19 January 2022.  https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2022/01/19/corte-frustra-planes-de-duque-de-reanudar-fumigaciones-antidrogas-en-colombia/   

In 2020, Colombia had 143,000 hectares of coca, the plant that serves as the raw material for cocaine, according to the most recent UN report.  The government, which links drug trafficking with the resurgence of violence after the peace process with the Marxist guerrillas in 2016, intensified the program of manual eradication of drug crops.  However, the government insisted on the need to fumigate with glyphosate to significantly reduce the cultivation area.


Image Information:

Image caption:  Aerial spraying of glyphosate. 
Source: Carolyn Parsons via Wikimedia,  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Palouse_Aerial_Spraying_02.jpg
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 4.0

Indonesia Takes Measures Against Chinese Naval Incursions

Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.

Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.


“China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on [Indonesia’s] own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia.”


On 15 January, the mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka, dunia.rmol.id, published the excerpted article on Indonesia’s evolving strategy towards China in the South China Sea and adjacent waters.  According to the article, China forced Indonesia into conflict due to Chinese coast guard ships’ encroachment into the Natuna Sea, and Chinese demands that Indonesia not extract resources from that sea.  The article notes that Indonesia argues the sea is part of its internationally recognized exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and is unwilling to acknowledge in the international arena that any dispute exists over its own maritime territory.

The article examines Indonesia’s strategy of outreach to navies in Southeast Asia, which are also seeing China make competing assertions to their own South China Sea territorial claims.  For example, Indonesia invited maritime security officials from five other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, including Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to a meeting in early 2023 to discuss responses to China’s assertiveness in the sea.  However, the article also concludes that China may take retaliatory actions against those countries if they participate in the proposed meeting.

In particular, the article focuses on Indonesia’s relationship with Vietnam.  The Vietnamese Coast Guard and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, Baklama, signed a memorandum of understanding in January to cooperate on mutual maritime security.  In addition, the article noted that Indonesia was discussing with Russia’s state oil company to connect a pipeline from the Natuna Sea to Vietnam’s offshore network.  Indonesia already completed the drilling for this project, which, according to the article, Indonesia considered a Baklama victory over China.  It is unclear, however, what effect Russia’s increasing reliance on China because of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine might have on Indonesia’s pipeline project with Russia.

In anticipation of any Chinese naval actions to take control of the Natuna Sea, the article notes that Indonesia is strengthening its defenses.  This includes building an additional runway to improve aerial surveillance of the sea, as well as a new submarine base.  Further, the country is expanding defense cooperation with three countries outside of Southeast Asia, including Japan, India, and Australia, to deter Chinese naval operations in the Natuna Sea.


Source:

“Indonesia Bersiap Menantang China di Laut China Selatan, Akankah Diikuti Negara ASEAN Lainnya? (Indonesia Prepares to Challenge China in the South China Sea, Will Other ASEAN Countries Follow?),” dunia.rmol.id (mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka), 15 January 2022.  https://dunia.rmol.id/read/2022/01/15/519533/indonesia-bersiap-menantang-china-di-laut-china-selatan-akankah-diikuti-negara-asean-lainnya

China has officially opened another front in its hostilities in the South China Sea. China’s behavior ultimately pushed Jakarta to confront the defend its own territory because the disputed area by China was actually in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Jakarta has gone its own way by seeking support from the Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft to construct a pipeline in the Natuna Sea to link up with Vietnam’s offshore network. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) has claimed success in the endeavor, which some analysts have called “Indonesia’s great victory over China.” China had repeatedly reminded Indonesia to stop the project and stated it was a violation because it infringed on Chinese territory. China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on its own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia

The latest initiative that Indonesia has taken is to invite officials in charge of maritime security from five other ASEAN countries to meet early next year to discuss how to respond to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Vietnam Coast Guard and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency last month also signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in strengthening maritime security and safety between the two powers. And the Indonesian military is extending the runway of an air base so that additional aircraft can be deployed, along with constructing a submarine base and developing defense cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.


Image Information:

Image: Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.
Source: Dispen Koarmada II (II Fleet Command Information Service)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Singaporean_Navy_RSS_Tenacious_and_RSS_Justice_along_with_Indonesian_Navy_KRI_Diponegoro_and_KRI_Malahayati_during_2021_Eagle_Indopura_Joint_Exercise_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Armenia Acquires Russian Helicopters as Part of Armed Forces Modernization

Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.


“The air force received the four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…”


A few months after the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in significant Armenian losses, the Armenian government announced it would modernize the country’s armed forces.  At the August 2021 Russian-sponsored International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2021” in Moscow, Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan stated that he was looking to acquire modern weapons and equipment from Russia and noted a need for unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  While Karapetyan did not announce any acquisitions made during the forum, the accompanying excerpted article reports on the recent delivery of Russian helicopters to Armenia and provides a look at one area where Armenian officials are modernizing the country’s armed forces.

The article from independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that the Armenian Air Force received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in January.  The article notes this variant of the Mi-8 helicopter can conduct a variety of tasks and referenced Karapetyan’s statement from last year.  The Armenian Air Force reportedly has 11 Mi-8MTVs already in service, though they are older variants and less versatile than the Mi-8MTV-5.  Overall, the helicopters are not as significant as the Armenian acquisitions of the Iskander ballistic missile system or the Su-30SM multirole fighters before the 2020 war; however, the helicopters mark an acquisition that took place during the modernization of the Armenian Armed Forces and will play a role in this.  It also illustrates how Russia continues to be one of the main providers of military equipment for Armenia.


Source:

“Армянская армия пополнилась боевыми вертолëтами (The Armenian army is being reinforced with combat helicopters),” Eurasia Daily (independent Russian-language news website), 25 January 2022.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/01/25/armyanskaya-armiya-popolnilas-boevymi-vertoletami

The Armenian Air Force received new multipurpose helicopters on 25 January, reports the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia…

It is noted that the helicopters that entered service are designed to perform landing, fire support, transport, and medical tasks… The air force the received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…

Armenia will take practical steps to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia, then Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan said in an interview on 24 August 2021. Yerevan, as part of an ongoing modernization of the Armenian Army after the war in Karabakh, plans to purchase only modern weapons, Karapetyan said…


Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-17-V5_(Mi-8MTV-5),_Russia_-_Air_Force_AN1905918.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Service Rifles and Fighter Jets: Pakistan’s Defense Acquisition Priorities

A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.


For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets…”


In late 2015 Pakistan announced it would conduct trials to find a new infantry rifle as the country’s army sought to phase out the Heckler & Koch G3.  After a few years of testing, the government did not select a rifle from bids of several well-known companies and instead looked to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for a potential replacement (See: “A New Domestically Produced Service Rifle in Pakistan?” OE Watch, December 2019).  While Pakistan’s Army has yet to acquire a new service rifle, the accompanying excerpted articles report on a possible replacement for the G3 and other defense acquisition priorities.

The article from Pakistani defense focused news website Quwa.org reports on the POF’s introduction of the BW20 and BW21.  The article notes that the POF is “pitching the BW20” as the next-generation rifle and that the cost of it could be lower due to “existing production infrastructure” for the G3.  It also notes that BW20 “has some commonality with the G3,” though it is considered a new rifle and not an upgrade.  The article also mentions that Pakistan’s Army “did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption” and that one reason for not selecting a new rifle was that “the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design.”  While the cost of the BW20 and BW21 might be lower than purchasing a foreign rifle, it could still be some time until it is in a position to become the standard service rifle in Pakistan’s Army.

The article from independent Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn reports on the country’s recent acquisition of J-10 multirole fighters from China.  The article mentions the new fighters, but only in reference to them appearing as part of a fly over during Pakistan Day ceremonies on 23 March 2021.  Pakistan did not make a widely publicized announcement of the acquisition of a reported two dozen J-10s, which are estimated to cost $28 million each.  Dawn quoted the country’s Interior Minister as saying that the J-10s are an answer to India’s 2021 purchase of Rafale jets from France.


Source:

“Pakistan Reveals New Rifles – POF BW20 and POF BW21,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 19 December 2021. https://quwa.org/2021/12/19/pakistan-reveals-new-rifles-pof-bw20-and-pof-bw21-2/

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) took the shrouds off its new in-house, original rifle projects – the BW20 and BW21. The POF BW20 and BW21 are chambered for 7.62×51 mm rounds.

…It seems that POF is pitching the BW20 for the PA’s next-generation rifle requirements…the BW20 is a new rifle design that delivers cost savings by re-leveraging POF’s existing production infrastructure, which is geared for the HK G3.

Though the BW20 has some commonality with the G3 (around 30%), the BW20 is not an upgrade of the HK G3. It is a new rifle…

In 2015, the Pakistan Army issued a tender for a new-generation assault rifle. It had tested many designs from all over the world, including the FN SCAR, Beretta ARX-200, CZ BREN, AK-103 and others. In the end, however, the Army did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption…

Ultimately, it seems that POF was given the greenlight to design an original rifle. Part of the reason seems to stem from a sense that none of the foreign designs substantially improved upon the G3 in terms of its accuracy and durability. This is not to say the other rifles were not good, but the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design…

Source: Aamir Yasin, “Every party seeks patronage of establishment, says minister,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper from Pakistan), 30 December 2021.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1666604

Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed on Wednesday said every party and politician wanted to be patronised by the establishment, terming the debate on the return of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif useless…

“It does not matter whether he comes or not; it will not make any difference to the government,” he said, adding it was strange that people who spent most of their lives in this country eventually left it instead of loving it…The minister reiterated his offer of a one-way ticket to Pakistan for Nawaz Sharif.

Talking about the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of opposition parties, the minister said he wanted the alliance to move the date of its protest from March 23 to the 30th as it coincided with Pakistan Day celebrations.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets,” Mr Ahmed said…


Image Information:

Image: A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengdu_J-10#/media/File:J-10B_with_PL-10_and_PL-12.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Algeria Obtains Chinese Integrated EW Reconnaissance/Jamming System

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.


“…The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems…”


Algeria’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities have been bolstered by recent acquisitions, including the Russian Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza ELINT system and the Chinese DWL002 passive detection radar.  The latest acquisition is an integrated EW system from China.  A handful of Twitter users focused on Algerian military affairs first noticed the delivery.  They identified it as a CHL-906, based on visual similarities to a model exhibited last November at EDEX 2021, Egypt’s recently established annual arms show.  The Algeria-focused military blog MenaDefense quickly picked up news of the delivery, and several Arabic-language media outlets subsequently reported it.  The CHL-906 is manufactured by the China Electronics Corporation (CEC) and sold for export by the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) and ELINC China (ELINC), a CEC subsidiary.  The ELINC website describes it as an integrated EW system that provides comprehensive “reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems.”  The chassis-mounted CHL-906 has a purported 600 km detection radius and a 300 km jamming radius.  The latest Algerian acquisition is almost certainly in part a reaction to its neighbor, Morocco, recently bolstering its UAV arsenal.


Source:

@kmldial70. “#Algeria probably received a package of very modern #Chinese EW systems recently,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/kmldial70/status/1477238084823658496

Source: @Aln54Dz “Electronic warfare department acquires the system CHL-906 ELINC

#AlgerianArmy,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/Aln54Dz/status/1477404225168683014)

Source: “Un nouveau système de guerre électronique pour l’Algérie (A new electronic warfare system for Algeria),” MenaDefense (Algeria-focused military blog), 1 January 2022. https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/un-nouveau-systeme-de-guerre-electronique-pour-lalgerie/

This is the Integrated Electronic Warfare system from the Chinese company ELINC and CEIC… which is used to:

  • Detect enemy radio and radar emissions over a distance of 600 km
  • Determine the position, identify and classify enemy emissions over these distances
  • Protect radars and anti-aircraft systems from anti-radiation missiles by “covering” radar frequencies
  • Block communications over a distance of 300 km
  • Prohibit the enemy (air, sea, land) from using GNSS satellite positioning systems (GPS, Baidu, Galileo, Glonass) over a distance of 300 km
  • Jam frequencies from 0.5 to 40 GHz
  • Detect stealth aircraft and ships
  • Detect remotely piloted drones and sever their data link to the ground
  • Detect AEW aircraft over a distance of 500 km
  • “Fry” certain radio-electric equipment thanks to the directed emission power of 500 Kw

Source:  “Integrated EW System,” ELINC Company Website (China Electronics Corporation Subsidiary), undated. https://www.elinc.com.cn/business/defense/IntegratedElectronicWarfare/

The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems such as early warning detection, communication transmission, multi-dimensional reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, and guided fire control. Combat operations such as ground-to-air defense, air interdiction, border control, anti-terrorism and stability maintenance, seize and maintain the battlefield system information rights.


Image Information:

Image:  The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Ford Williams, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5149959/190305-n-ji086-036
Attribution: Public Domain

The Collective Security Treaty Organization Demonstrates Its “Peacekeeping” Capabilities

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.


“The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…”


The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance of select post-Soviet states, made history on 6 January 2022, when the organization’s leadership agreed to a request from the government of Kazakhstan to deploy peacekeepers to support Kazakh security forces after a few days of civil unrest across the country.  This marked the first time the CSTO sent units from its Collective Operational Reaction Force and demonstrated how the organization can respond to an incident on short notice.

According to the excerpted article in semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, the CSTO Security Council agreed to Kazakhstan’s request for peacekeepers based on Article 4 of the organization’s treaty.  The article notes that this section of the treaty provides for a collective response in the event of a threat to the “security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” of a member state.  It also points out “the authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, but did not say by who.”  The article mentions how previous requests to the CSTO for military support, in 2010 by Kyrgyzstan and in 2021 by Armenia, were not granted.  The CSTO did not respond to Kyrgyzstan with military support in 2010 because its articles at the time did not allow a response to an internal security issue.  After the 2010 unrest, CSTO member states changed the articles to allow the collective forces to be used to respond to an internal security threat of a member state.  The lack of a response to Armenia in 2021 is notable as it involved clashes with Azerbaijan, an external threat to Armenian security, but the CSTO had not previously provided the Armenian government support for its conflict with Azerbaijan and stated the 2021 clashes were a border incident, which essentially did not require an actionable response.

The article from Central Asia-focusedindependent news website Fergana Agency reports on the units deployed and breaks down contributions from member states.  The majority of these came from Russia, including companies of the 31st Airborne Brigade, 98th Airborne Division, and the 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade.  A company of the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade from Belarus, soldiers of the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade from Kyrgyzstan, as well as special forces units from Armenia and Tajikistan also deployed.  The units in this peacekeeping force closely match the units that conduct annual joint military exercises of the CSTO’s collective forces.  The article also notes that the peacekeeping force tasks included protecting key infrastructure and airfields and that “the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies.”  This included Russian forces at Almaty’s international airport.  While the CSTO peacekeeping forces reportedly began withdrawing on 13 January, the deployment demonstrated the capabilities of the CSTO to respond to an incident involving a member state.


Source:

Kiril Krivosheev, Yelena Chernenko, Yuri Barsukov, and Arshaluis Mgdesyan, “ОДКБ спешит на помощь (The CSTO is hurrying to help),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 6 January 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156017

…Around midnight (on 5 January), President Tokayev held a meeting of the Security Council, at which he announced a “counter-terrorist operation.” “The groups are, in fact, international, which have taken part in serious training abroad and their attack on Kazakhstan should be regarded as an act of aggression,” President Tokayev explained. “In this regard, today, I turned to the CSTO heads of state to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.”…

A confirming response to this request was sent overnight. The statement was, ironically, made by a politician who himself unsuccessfully sent a similar request not long ago, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who is the current head of the CSTO Collective Security Council…

the Council made a decision in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty…It involves collective assistance, including military, if “one of the participating states is subjected to aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty).”…The authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, by did not say by who…

It is unknown how long the peacekeeping mission will last…It should be noted that the CSTO collective forces are being used for the first time. In 2010, authorities in Kyrgyzstan asked for a deployment of the organization’s forces (against the backdrop of interethnic conflict in the south) as well as in 2021, when authorities of Armenia requested it (against the backdrop of an armed confrontation with Azerbaijan). However, these requests were not granted…

Source: Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 7 January 2022.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/

On the night of 6-7 January, the first units of the Russian Airborne Forces arrived in Almaty and took control of the airport of the largest city in Kazakhstan…The total number of the peacekeeping force in Kazakhstan should stand around 2500. This includes a company from Belarus (around 150-200), 200 from Tajikistan, 150 from Kyrgyzstan and another 100 from Armenia. The remainder are from the Russian Army.

All of the Russian units in Kazakhstan have previously been involved with military operations in the post-Soviet period.

The 31st Airborne Brigade, which is permanently garrisoned in Ulyanovsk, took part in the Second Chechen campaign and the war in South Ossetia in 2008…Since 2013, the 31st has been part of the Rapid Reaction Forces.

The 98th Airborne Division is located in Ivanovo. This unit has experience in participating in peacekeeping missions – in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, in Georgia-Abhazia in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999…The 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces is one of the most elite units in the Russian Army…

A peacekeeping company from the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade deployed from Belarus…Kyrgyzstan sent 150 soldiers from the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade to Kazakhstan…It is still unknown which units Tajikistan and Armenia deployed, but, according to local media, they are special forces…

As stated by the ministries of the CSTO governments, which agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan, the military personnel will carry out task to protect key infrastructure and airfields. The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…


Image Information:

Image: CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_collective_peacekeeping_forces_in_Kazakhstan_2022-JAN-11,_Kyrgyzstan_soldier_in_Almaty_Power_Station-2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.


“…as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find a more comfortable space for itself against Russia.”


Turkey’s recent purchase of S-400 systems from Russia has led to questions about Turkey’s “western-ness” and trustworthiness as a NATO ally.  Traditionally a pro-Western country, Turkey’s increasing shift towards Russia despite their complex relationship is one of the biggest geopolitical shifts since the Cold War.  As such, the evolution of Turkish-Russian relations will have implications for the United States, NATO, and great power competition.  The accompanying articles from Turkish sources provide an outlook on Turkish-Russian relations, discussing both issues of contention and cooperation.

The articles, one from pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet and another from the Istanbul-based independent think tank Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), note that the points of friction between Turkey and Russia are the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh; developments in Libya; tensions in Syria’s Idlib Province; and changes in eastern Ukraine.  The Syrian conflict has the potential to impact Turkish-Russian relations the most because, as the Hürriyet article highlights, Russia continues to strike Turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces around Idlib and Turkey’s areas of operation.  The tensions between Russia and Turkey will likely increase once the Russia-backed Syrian regime launches an operation on Idlib.  Both articles note the Ukrainian conflict will be another high-level point of friction between Turkey and Russia because of Turkey’s drone sale to Ukraine.  However, according to the EDAM publication, despite these frictions, Turkey and Russia cooperate in the energy sector, including Russia supplying natural gas to, and building a nuclear power plant in, Turkey.  Russia also maintains strong trade relations with Turkey, investing in its tourism and defense industry.  The Hürriyet article also refers to President Erdoğan’s statement from September 2021 that Turkey will deepen its defense cooperation with Russia and is considering purchasing other weapons systems in addition to the recently purchased S-400s.

The EDAM article states that the foundation of Turkish-Russian relations is built on a personal dialogue between their presidents rather than on an institutional foundation, and Presidents Erdoğan and Putin have managed to de-escalate tensions so far when they rise.  However, considering the points of friction, Turkish-Russian relations remain fragile.  Finally, the Hürriyet article notes Turkish-Russian relations are asymmetrical and the scale will further tilt in Russia’s favor if Turkey continues to drift away from its Western allies.  Therefore, the article suggests that Turkey should ensure its relations with its Western allies remain strong to counterbalance Russia.


Source:

Sedat Ergin,“2021’den 2022’ye Türk Dış Politikası (5)-Rusya ile çatışarak işbirliği modeli ilerlemeye devam ediyor (Turkish Foreign Policy from 2021 to 2022 (5)- Adversarial Cooperation model with Russia continues),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish newspaper),04 January 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/2021den-2022ye-turk-dis-politikasi-5-rusya-ile-catisarak-isbirligi-modeli-ilerlemeye-devam-ediyor-41974354

The Russians see no harm in continuing their air operations in a region where TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] units are present. We can guess that with these attacks, Russia wants to maintain a certain pressure on Turkey, which prevented the regime’s army from entering Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria…

The previous day also witnessed the first telephone conversation of the New Year between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Brief statements with largely similar content were made from both sides. In the Kremlin’s statement, there was an indirect reference to the Ukraine-linked NATO-Russia tension. Apart from this, it was stated that the topics of the Caucasus, Libya, and Syria were on the agenda in both of statements. Intention and determination to further the cooperation between the two countries were also emphasized as an important common theme in the texts.

Meanwhile, the importance of 2021 was that it was a year…[of] cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations that would extend to the coming years… President Erdoğan went to Sochi at the end of September and during the meeting he held with Putin, he proposed to his counterpart the construction of two new nuclear power plants in Turkey, in addition to Akkuyu… Putin also offered to cooperate with Turkey on launching rockets into space by establishing platforms at sea and on land.

A more critical development was that Erdoğan also suggested to Putin “deepening cooperation” in the defense industry during this meeting. In this context, the President announced that they discussed the further development of the S-400 project, and listed aircraft engines, warplanes, warship, and submarine construction as new potential areas of cooperation.

In this respect, Erdoğan is also trying to intimidate the USA and European countries by stating that the weapon systems that Turkey cannot obtain or have difficulty in obtaining from the West can very well be obtained from Russia. Although the second chapter of the S-400 project has not been signed, it remains on the table…

President Erdoğan keeps cooperation with Russia as a bargaining card in his hand against the West…

… Erdoğan followed a delicate balance between the USA and Russia throughout 2021… In any case, the continuation of cracks, conflicts, and tensions within the Western alliance, as well as the realization of new potential arms sales to Turkey, will be developments that will please the Kremlin.

This asymmetry will be widened further [in Russia’s favor] as Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorate… It should not be forgotten that as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find itself in a more comfortable space against Russia. The decline in Turkey’s foreign relations with the west will also weaken Turkey’s hand against Russia.

Source: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Üstün,“2022’de Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri: İşbirliği-Rekabet İkileminin Devamı Beklenirken… (Turkey-Russia Relations in 2022: Expecting the Continuation of Cooperation-Competition Dilemma…),” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (Istanbul-based an independent think tank), 13 January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

Although relations with Russia have been handled on the axis of cooperation, especially in the energy and defense sectors in recent years, it is not a relationship model free from crises and problems… Because Turkey’s relations with Russia are based on bilateral relations between leaders rather than on institutional foundations, it has a relationship model that is difficult to be called sustainable…

​​The ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, the possible developments in Libya, the tensions in and around Idlib, Ukraine and Belarus are noticeable issues that have the potential to affect relations.

Of course, it should not be ignored that as much as their problems [need a resolution], there are areas where Turkey and Russia are trying to develop cooperation. After the Blue Stream, the Turkish Stream project is a step taken to strengthen the energy ties between Russia and Turkey. Energy takes first place in Turkey’s imports from Russia.

Considering the problems experienced in its relations with the West, both the EU and the USA, it is expected that Turkey’s relations with Russia will continue to be economically important. However, every step taken towards Russia has risks to further wear down Turkey’s relations with its Western allies… the issues that occupied the agenda in 2021 also occupy the agenda in 2022, and that it is more important to benefit economically and geopolitically for Russia in the framework of possible tensions, than to provide a permanent peace environment in the region…


Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Source: Russian Presidential Executive Office, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62936, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_(2020-03-05)_04.jpg, Files from Kremlin.ru | CC-BY-4.0 | Russia photographs taken on 2020-03-05

A Turkish Perspective on Great Power Competition in 2022 and Beyond

Map showing the US, Russia, China.

Map showing the US, Russia, China.


“In the new international environment… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time… In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount.” 


The accompanying passages from the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research, a reputable and independent Turkish think tank, provide a foreign and balanced perspective on how great power competition may evolve in 2022 and beyond.  The passages also include astute observations about the current strategic competition among what they call “the prominent players”—the United States, Russia, and China.

First, the authors note that each of these actors is trying to expand its partnership network.  For the United States, this includes the G7, NATO, the U.S.-EU Summits, the Democracy Summit, and the security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the United States (AUKUS).  They note that the United States and its partnerships revolve around common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law.  In contrast, they note China is focused on expanding its partnership network by providing economic opportunities to certain countries, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative.  Meanwhile Russia is trying to “transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself.”  The Ukraine crisis is a case in point.  Second, they note the world is becoming polarized between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes.  In this context, they warn that democracy is regressing in some Western democracies and claim it is critical to reverse this trend. 

Third, they note that the United States is trying to protect its technological superiority over the others.  On this point, they suggest that even though China is investing more and allocating more resources to gain superiority, “the return on this investment…will not turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.”  They write that each player is investing in groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and biotechnology to achieve technological superiority and become more resilient, especially in their supply chains.  They note that the use of these technologies and the hybrid warfare they enable is eroding the distinction between peacetime and conflict. 

Finally, they claim that the deciding factor for the future of the international system will be whether, or to what extent, competing countries can cooperate on global challenges such as climate change or pandemics; as well as on contentious issues that are zero-sum games.


Source:

Sinan Ülgen and Tacan Ildem, “2022’ye Bakış (A Look at 2022),” EDAM.org.tr [Turkish] Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research (a reputable, independent Turkish think tank based in Istanbul), January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

…Today’s international environment is witnessing a systemic and strategic competition. The USA, China and to some extent Russia are the prominent players in this strategic competition. …Each of these players is trying to expand their partnerships to gain superiority over the other. For the USA, this means keeping its partnership network (such as the G7, NATO, USA-EU Summits, Democracy Summit and finally AUKUS) strong, which brings together the countries that share common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. For China, this means developing its partnership network by providing economic opportunities, especially [via] the Belt and Road Initiative.  Russia… is trying to transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself… The Ukraine crisis should be read in this context.

In the new international environment where strategic competition is felt more… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time.  Global polarization is taking place between groups of democratic countries and authoritarian systems.  In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount. 

Meanwhile… emerging and groundbreaking technologies create game-changing challenges and opportunities in an increasingly complex security environment where strategic competition is increasing.  In fact, we are witnessing that the USA, together with its allies and global partners, focusing more on protecting its technological superiority against its rivals.  Although China invests more and allocates more resources to gain superiority in technology against its competitors, the return on this investment, at least for the moment, is not in a size that will turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.  … Competing countries are trying to gain technological superiority and strengthen their resistance and resilience capacities, especially in the supply chain… In this context, access to emerging and groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and bio technologies is a priority.

By making use of these technologies… hybrid warfare methods are increasingly being used to achieve strategic goals without the need to resort to conventional power by using tactics in military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, information and other fields… This makes the distinction between peacetime and conflict, where the use of kinetic force used to be decisive, less clear. Increasing social resilience and resilience against hybrid activities is gaining importance. Cyber ​​attacks and disinformation campaigns are a threat and test for every society. As such, the protection of critical infrastructure emerges as a vital issue.

What will be decisive for the future of the international system is to what extent competing countries can develop cooperation in other fields, as well as the contentious areas that are seen as a zero-sum game in this strategic competitive environment. For example, will the USA and China, which seem to be facing an increasingly fierce competition in technology, be able to set common goals in the fight against climate change? Likewise, will it be possible to include China in the negotiation of international agreements … in the field of arms control and disarmament? …


Image Information:

Image: Map showing the US, Russia, China.
Source: Keith via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Second_Cold_War_locator.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

FARC Dissident Groups’ High-Level Leaders Killed

Colombian FARC dissident, Iván Márquez, is the most significant remaining leader of the Second Marquetalia.

Colombian FARC dissident, Iván Márquez, is the most significant remaining leader of the Second Marquetalia.


“Although so far no evidence is known in this regard, the deaths of both dissident leaders occurred very close to the border with Colombia…However, the authorities do not rule out any theory.”


Colombia’s continued struggle against dissidents of the now-disbanded Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) communist guerrilla group has achieved notable successes of late.  Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in separate shootouts in Venezuela, according to Medellin-based daily newspaper El Colombiano.  Both were high-ranking commanders in the FARC guerrilla group, known as the Second Marquetalia, who continued their struggle against the Colombian state after the broader group signed the 2016 peace accords with the Colombian government.  The outlet reminds readers that the deaths come on the heels of the killing of Seuxis Pausias Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” another prominent commander of the Second Marquetalia killed recently in Venezuela.  This leaves Iván Márquez alone in his struggle to maintain the relevance of the Second Marquetalia. Although conflict along the Colombia-Venezuela border is nothing new, the intensity and number of actors involved is increasing, according to Columbia’s politically centrist daily El Tiempo.  Numerous groups have flocked to the area for a lucrative slice of Venezuela’s illicit economies.  El Tiempo reports the presence of several Colombian guerrilla groups, drug trafficking groups, and Venezuelan security groups.  The vacuum left by the deaths of Paisa and Romaña is a significant blow to the Second Marquetalia and has created room for other groups to compete for territory.  Further, while the Colombian state claims victory, it is unclear whether Colombian state security forces had a hand in the deaths of Paisa and Romaña.  The possibility that the two were killed by rival groups and not by Colombia’s security forces speaks to the shifting realities of the border area as a corridor for illicit goods.


Source:

“Romaña, El Paisa y Santrich: en 6 meses cayeron tres narcos de exFarc en Venezuela (Romaña, El Paisa and Santrich: in 6 months three ex-FARC drug traffickers fell in Venezuela),” El Colombiano (the major daily of the city of Medellín), 8 December 2021.  https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/muerte-de-romana-revela-cruel-guerra-por-coca-en-venezuela-PE16129372

Both Romaña and El Paisa supported Márquez in the creation of the so-called Second Marquetalia—announced in August 2019—to return to arms under the excuse of non-compliance by the government with the agreement.  But with the death of these two former members of the former Secretariat, and the murder of alias Jesús Santrich in May 2021, Márquez is left alone.

Source:  “Las hipótesis sobre la autoría de los ataques a ‘Romaña’ y ‘el Paisa’ (The hypotheses about the origin of the attacks on ‘Romaña’ and ‘El Paisa’),” El Tiempo (one of Colombia’s oldest dailies generally described as politically-centrist), 9 December 2021.  https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/romana-y-el-paisa-las-hipotesis-sobre-quienes-mataron-a-los-disidentes-637796   

The first hypothesis, of which the Colombian Public Force has spoken, is that they died at the hands of another dissident group…second, it has been said that they could have been assassinated by their own men…there is also another possible scenario: that the deaths were caused by Colombian forces…Although so far no evidence is known in this regard, the deaths of both dissident leaders occurred very close to the border with Colombia…However, the authorities do not rule out any theory.


Image Information:

Image:  Colombian FARC dissident, Iván Márquez, is the most significant remaining leader of the Second Marquetalia.
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ivan-Marquez-GoraHerria.jpg
Attribution:  Wikimedia