FMSO

Open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

China Justifies Naval Pressure Against Japan

Posted on June 1, 2023 by Jacob Zenn

JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.

“When Sino-Japanese relations become extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.”

On 10 May, the Chinese-language website sohu.com published the below excerpted article, which justifies Chinese naval activities in the East Sea as a response to perceived hostile actions by Japan. Moreover, the article indicates that Chinese pressure against Japan is achieving positive results. According to the article, a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait between South Korea and Japan, sailed around Japanese territory, and came within only six nautical miles the Japanese coast.[i] While the article refrains from claiming any strategic benefits, it argues the operation succeeded in frightening and thus sending a message to Japan.

The article also claims that Japanese media has interpreted the Chinese naval activities as treating Japan as an enemy. It suggests that as long as Sino-Japanese relations remain tense, Chinese naval reconnaissance ships will continue performing missions in the waters surrounding Japan. Likewise, the article notes that China dispatched several destroyers and other naval ships to conduct live fire drills in the East Sea after pro-Taiwan remarks were made by officials at the G7 foreign ministers meeting in Nagano, Japan. The end of the article alludes to the alliance between China and Russia, where it notes that Japan erred by trying to restore militarism and embracing confrontation with China and Russia.[ii] As a result of this, the article argues that Japan was exhausting its Self-Defense Forces in dealing with both Chinese and Russian military pressure. This implies that China is employing a strategy of weakening the Japanese military through over-extending its forces and wearing it down, a strategy China continues to use against Taiwan.

Source:

“解放军军舰横穿日本，距离海岸仅6海里，海自如临大敌 (The warships of the People’s Liberation Army went across Japan, only 6 nautical miles from the coast, and freely encountered the enemy),” sohu.com (popular pro-government Chinese-language website targeting a youth and gaming readership), 10 May 2023. https://www.sohu.com/a/674302624_121462986

Japan has become an anti-China bridgehead, and the reconnaissance ships of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approached its territorial waters to frighten the Self-Defense Forces sufficiently. According to the news released by the Ministry of Defense of Japan, the reconnaissance ship sailed around Japan in three weeks…. At the closest time, it was only about 6 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland.

When Sino-Japanese relations are extremely tense, there will be another reconnaissance ship that will continue to perform missions in the waters surrounding Japan.

In response to remarks related to Taiwan made at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, China not only rejected such ludicrous remarks diplomatically. At the same time, a destroyer from the navy in the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA was dispatched to conduct live-fire shooting training in a specific area of the East China Sea.In recent years, Japan has had to face regular military pressure from China and Russia, which has exhausted its Self-Defense Forces.

Notes:

[i] The Tsushima Strait was the site of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 in which Japan was victorious. More than one century later, since 2020, Japan has observed an increase in Russian naval ships that have passed through the Tsushima Strait and Soya Strait to its north nearly twice as often than a decade earlier. This has concerned the Japanese Ministry of Defense. See Japan Ministry of Defense, “Development of Russian Armed Forces in the Vicinity of Japan,” mod.go.jp, September 2021. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ru_d-act_e_210906.pdf

[ii] Although Japan has been upgrading its military capabilities over the past several years, this has been amid—and generally in response to—a military build-up by China. Further, Japan has consistently since the 1990s spent only between .09% and 1% of its GDP on the military. China, however, has viewed Japan as engaging in “military expansion planning” and has strongly criticized Japan for this. For more, see: Sheila A. Smith, “How Japan Is Upgrading Its Military,” CFR, February 24, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-japan-upgrading-its-military

Image Information:

Image: JS Kurama sails in the East China Sea during a trilateral exercise, June 2021.
Source: Paul Kelly https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JS_Kurama_sails_in_the_East_China_Sea_during_a_trilateral_exercise,_-21_Jun._2012_a.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield

Posted on June 1, 2023 by Thomas Shrimpton

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword [RG1] (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).

“The manned-unmanned combat team has rewritten the modern battlefield formation model, with manned platforms leading unmanned platforms to form an integrated combat team.”

Researchers with China’s Air Force Research Institute recently published an article in China’s PLA Daily outlining five trends in coordinating manned and unmanned battlefield operations. Except for the potential for clustered autonomous systems to increase battlefield uncertainty, the authors argue that recent efforts to divide labor between complementary manned and unmanned systems have provided more options for tactical configuration and combat synergy. The authors, Guo Yilun and Ma Quan assert there are three types of manned-unmanned platforms: 1) direct transmission of unmanned information for rear control, 2) interoperability between manned and unmanned platforms under limited control, and 3) completely controlled manned-unmanned platforms. As autonomous platforms continue to develop, the Chinese military will be able to combine manned and unmanned platforms into combat groups that will facilitate information processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation of operations to provide flexibility in constantly developing battlefield postures. A second benefit the authors believe will result from closer man-machine coordination is increased battlefield situational awareness. A real-time tactical “cloud” system will rapidly detect, process, and distribute requirements based on developing target data. Information from space platforms, sensors, and weapon systems in the land, sea, air, and space domains will be cross-verified and integrated into a unified framework that coordinates manned and unmanned data. Third, distributed command-and-control systems will be able to disaggregate computing, collection, and decision-making functions and assign sub-problems to collaborative manned-unmanned groups. Fourth, the authors argue that systems of higher autonomous control bring greater uncertainty in warfare; as such, autonomous systems should be classified by the degree to which they are integrated with manned systems. The authors suggest four levels of autonomy: non-autonomy, single-machine autonomy, multi-machine autonomy, and clustered autonomy. Finally, the authors assert that further integrating unmanned systems will save more than 60 percent the cost of manned operations and double their effectiveness.

Source:

郭一伦 (Guo Yilun) and 马权 (Ma Quan), “撬动战争形态衍变的新支点 (Prying a New Lever in Evolving Warfare Patterns),” PLA Dailv (PLA-owned media), 27 April 2023. http://www.81.cn/bz_208549/10165050.html

In the face of future intelligent battlefield environments, the use of a large number of intelligent, unmanned weapons and equipment will reshape battlefield combat force systems. Manned/unmanned combat forces will be flexibly organized as needed, and can be combined into different types and sizes of combat groups, which can be linked for information fusion processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation operations according to combat tasks and battlefield posture.

Image: Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1] (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hongdu_GJ-11#/media/File:Gongji-11_20221020.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Beijing Expands Counter-Espionage Law To Crack Down on Foreign Access to Chinese Information

Posted on June 1, 2023 by Thomas Shrimpton

“Activities carried out, instigated or funded … to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security.”

In April 2023 Chinese lawmakers passed a wide-ranging update to Beijing’s counter-espionage legislation banning the transfer of “all documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests” and broadening the definition of spying.[i] The amendments, as published in the excerpted statement from the Chinese government’s China.gov website, note that they will take effect on 1 July 2023. The amendments appear to target foreign information-gathering efforts, especially by limiting access to key government and economic data and expanding the range of legal definitions of espionage.[ii] Since the introduction of the legislation in 2014, Beijing has detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage.[iii] Several high-profile incidents have emerged, including those involving an Australian journalist and former TV anchor; a Japanese executive; and even a U.S. citizen who has been detained in China since 2016 on charges of espionage related to research he published using open-source information that the Chinese government later deemed to be “state secrets.” Collectively, these incidents have brought attention to Beijing’s unclear definition of what constitutes “espionage.” Earlier this year, Chinese government raids on foreign firms conducting due diligence work in China further underscored the often-questionable lengths to which Beijing will go to control access to information that could be used for a variety of efforts that run counter to the Chinese Communist Party’s interests. [iv]

Source:

“中国人民共和国反间谍法 (People’s Republic of China’s Counter-Espionage Law),” China.gov (Official Website of the People’s Republic of China’s Central People’s Government), 27 April 2023. http://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm.

Article 4: “Acts of espionage” as used in this Law refers to the following conduct:

(1) Activities that endanger the national security of the People’s Republic of China that are carried out, prompted, or funded by an espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(2) Participation in an espionage organization or acceptance of tasks from an espionage organization and its agents, or seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents;

(3) Activities carried out, instigated or funded by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their representatives, or in which domestic institutions, organizations or individuals collude, to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security, or in which state employees are incited, enticed, coerced, or bought over to turn traitor.

(4) Network attacks, intrusions, obstructions, control, or disruptions targeting state organs, units involved with secrets, or critical information infrastructure, that are carried out, prompted, or funded by a espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(5) indicating targets for enemies;

(6) conducting other espionage activities.

This law applies where espionage organizations and their agents engage in espionage activities targeting a third country within the territory of the People’s Republic of China or using citizens, organizations, or other conditions of the PRC, endangering the PRC’s national security.

Article 14: No individual or organization may unlawfully obtain or possess any documents, data, materials or items that are state secrets.

Notes:

[i] For an English-language translation of the Counter-Espionage Law, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/counter-espionage-law-2023/

[ii] For a detailed analysis of China’s Counter-Espionage Law and the new amendments, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/bad-as-it-ever-was-notes-on-the-espionage-law/

[iii] The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) has determined many foreign citizens, including U.S. citizens, have been denied due process rights and that they are arbitrarily detained in violation of international law. In March 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry released a report accusing the United States of arbitrary detention of individuals at home and abroad one month prior to releasing its amendments to its counter-espionage legislation. See: “The United States’ Arbitrary Detention at Home and Abroad: Truth and Facts,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 29 March 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202303/t20230329_11050809.html

[iv] In addition to due diligence firms, Beijing has blocked access to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), China’s largest academic database, in an effort that analysts assess is aimed at limiting foreign researchers’ access to public discourse and government data. For more on Beijing’s restriction of access to CNKI, see: Lin Yang, “China to Limit Access to Largest Academic Database,” Voice of America, 30 March 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-limit-access-to-largest-academic-database-/7029581.html

People’s Liberation Army Changing Mission of Civilian Personnel

Posted on June 1, 2023 by Kevin McCauley

Emblem of People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

“Civilian personnel can not only provide support for forward combat operations but also independently undertake non-contact operational tasks. They play an irreplaceable and important role in preparing for war and are a new support for combat effectiveness.”

Civilian personnel have previously served in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) primarily in administrative and support roles. However, the regulations on the management of civilian personnel within the Chinese military[i] were revised in January 2023 to improve recruitment, career development, incentives, and retirement. The revision is another effort to increase the quality of talent within the PLA[ii] but also indicates an expansion of the missions that civilian personnel will be tasked to conduct. A recent article in China’s official military newspaper, PLA Daily, discusses the roles civilians play in the world’s militaries and describes the importance of civilian personnel to operational support missions in China’s own Strategic Support Force.[iii] The article reiterates the need to improve talent to prepare for war and take on more mission responsibilities. Civilian personnel are a resource to increase scientific and technological innovation in the military, which the PLA currently views as insufficient. The article notes that as modern warfare becomes more intelligent, unmanned, and non-contact, the PLA should deeply integrate civilian personnel into the operational support system to play a key role in winning future wars. This indicates that within the Strategic Support Force civilian personnel will conduct non-contact combat operations possibly including intelligence, electronic warfare, and information warfare function.

Source:

“发挥文职人员在作战支援保障任务中的重要作用 (Give Full Play to the Important Role of Civilian Personnel in Operational Support Missions),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 20 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-01/20/content_332257.htm

A clarion call that civilian personnel are indispensable in preparing for war. With the deepening development of the world’s new military revolution and profound changes in forms of war and combat styles, developed countries generally allocate and use civilian personnel as an important operational support force, and civilian personnel has become an important human resource for modern armies. At present, China is facing extremely severe and complex security challenges, and it is necessary to accelerate the preparation for military struggle and comprehensively improve the quality and level of preparation for war. This requires keeping up with the trend of military development, building a modern military force system, integrating civilian personnel into all aspects and the entire process of military training and preparation, allowing the vitality of all combat effectiveness elements to erupt and fully flowing the source of military modernization construction.”

Notes:

[i] PLA civilian personnel wear military-style uniforms with emblems to distinguish them from military personnel.

[ii] For additional information, see: “构建新时代中国特色军队文职人员制度体系(Building a Civilian Personnel System of Systems in the Military with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era), “PLA Daily, 7 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-01/07/content_331347.htm; also see Kevin McCauley, PLA Education Reforms: Problems Remain After More Than Twenty Years, OE Watch, 10-2022 file:///C:/Users/knpmc/OneDrive/Kevin/Pictures/a%20Twitter/OE%20Watch,%20Vol%2012,%20Issue%2010,%202022.pdf

[iii] China’s Strategic Support Force is responsible for strategic missions such as space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures, signals intelligence, information warfare, and communications.

Image Information:

Image: Emblem of People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force#/media/File:Emblem_of_People’s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force.png
Attribution: Public Domain

China Celebrates Eyes Opportunity To Expand ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ With Mexico

Posted on June 1, 2023 by Ryan Berg

A Mexican state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping, held by former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.

“This year marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.”

China-Mexico relations date back to 1972, when Mexico broke diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). For much of Mexico’s recent history, however, its economic and diplomatic relations have been dominated by its neighbor to the north. While its relationship with Mexico pales in comparison to that of the United States, China’s presence in Mexico continues to grow.[i] As noted in the excerpted article from business-focused Mexican daily El Economista, 2023 marks the tenth anniversary of the China-Mexico “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest form of partnership China maintains with foreign countries and one of seven such relationships in the Latin America region. The “comprehensive strategic partnership” category implies the full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs. As noted in the article, China’s direct investment in Mexico grew 18 percent in 2022.[ii] Yet, the relationship goes beyond trade and investment. At a reception for Chinese Culture Day, Zhang Run, China’s Ambassador to Mexico, said China has a desire to strengthen its ties to Mexico and push together toward a multipolar world and the “democratization” of international affairs. Indeed, more recent controversies in the bilateral relationship have not managed to knock it off course. China’s role in producing chemical precursors for fentanyl, which have come to major public attention in recent years, has not damaged its ties to Mexico. President López Obrador insists that Mexico does not produce fentanyl but simply transits the finished product through the country to the United States after it arrives from China. López Obrador has sought help from the Chinese, according to Spanish daily El País. The outlet reported that China’s Foreign Ministry responded by proclaiming that there is no fentanyl trafficking between China and Mexico.[iii] While China-Mexico ties must be understood in the context of U.S.-Mexico relations, which continue to dominate Mexico’s orientation, China’s increased ties to Mexico have economic, diplomatic, and security implications for the operational environment, especially under López Obrador, who wants to build a buffer between Mexico and the United States by leveraging ties to China.

Sources:

“China ve potencial en la relación con México (China sees potential in relations with Mexico),” El Economista (a Mexican newspaper focused on business and economics), 15 April 2023. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/internacionales/China-ve-potencial-en-la-relacion-con-Mexico-20230415-0017.html

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries…Mexico and China have potential in exchange and cooperation in various areas such as culture, education, and tourism. In addition, the two countries are closely linked in the global industrial and supply chains, while direct investment from the Asian country to Mexico increased 18% in 2022.

“López Obrador insiste en que México no produce fentanilo y afirma que llega de China(López Obrador insists that Mexico does not produce fentanyl and that it arrives from China),” El País (the Spanish newspaper with hemispheric coverage), 5 May 2023. https://elpais.com/mexico/2023-05-05/lopez-obrador-insiste-en-que-mexico-no-produce-fentanilo-y-afirma-que-llega-de-china-tenemos-pruebas.htmlLópez Obrador affirmed that the shipment, intercepted this week in the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, is the latest evidence that the substance [fentanyl] is not produced in the country, but that it arrives finished to be sold in the U.S. market. “We already have proof,” said the president at a press conference. López Obrador announced that he will send a new letter to request the cooperation of the Xi Jinping government in the fight against drugs to identify suspicious shipments and prevent them from leaving Asia.

Notes:

[i] For a more comprehensive history of Mexico’s ties to China, see: “The Evolution of PRC Engagement in Mexico,” Global Americans, 24 August 2022. https://theglobalamericans.org/2022/08/the-evolution-of-prc-engagement-in-mexico/

[ii] For more information on China’s expansion of investment in Mexico, see: “Why Chinese Companies are Investing Billions in Mexico,” New York Times, 3 February 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html

[iii] For information on how cartels use social media to market and sell their product, see: Ryan Berg, “Latin America’s Cartels Embrace Social Media to Sell Drugs and Narco Culture,” OE Watch, 01-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380363

Image Information:

Image: A Mexican state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping, held by former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cena_de_Estado_que_en_honor_del_Excmo.Sr._Xi_Jinping,_Presidente_de_la_Rep%C3%BAblica_Popular_China,_y_de_su_esposa,_Sra._Peng_Liyuan%288959188433%29.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

Vietnam Defense Exhibition Shows Diversified International Partnerships To Balance Against China

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Jacob Zenn

Vietnam claims Paracel and Spratly islands.

“An exhibition was officially opened for international partners and domestic citizens to observe the capacity, technological progress, and weapons and equipment manufactured by Vietnam.”

According to the first excerpted 6 April article from Vietnam’s national television broadcaster vov.com, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy spokesperson denounced the National Natural Science Organization of China’s plans to conduct surveys in 33 areas of the South China Sea. Among the archipelagos in the South China Sea are the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa), which are claimed and controlled by Vietnam but are also claimed by China. Vietnam considers the Chinese survey’s encompassing of the Spratly Islands as an act of aggression. One way Vietnam has responded to China’s more aggressive military posture in the South China Sea, such as through surveying, is by branching out to multiple international actors to balance against China, if not also China’s ally, Russia. This was demonstrated at the 2022 International Defense Exhibition in Hanoi last December.[i] As the second excerpted article on the government-funded Voice of Vietnam website vtv.com noted, the exhibition was intended to highlight Vietnam’s military modernization and diversified international partners.[ii] While Russian artillery systems, which Vietnam has historically acquired for its army, were on display alongside Vietnamese ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, there were also weapons from companies of Western countries and their partners, such as the United States, Czechia, Israel, and India. China was not among the nearly 70 countries that attended. The weapons at the exhibition are among those that Vietnam could acquire and employ during any future confrontation without relying on Chinese allies.[iii]

Sources:

“Việt Nam phản đối việc Trung Quốc công bố khu vực khảo sát bao trùm Trường Sa (Vietnam opposes China’s announcement of conducting a survey area throughout the Spratly Islands),” vov.vn (official website of the Voice of Vietnam radio broadcaster), 6 April 2023. https://vov.vn/chinh-tri/viet-nam-phan-doi-viec-trung-quoc-cong-bo-khu-vuc-khao-sat-bao-trum-truong-sa-post1012290.vov

Regarding the information that the National Natural Science Organization of China announced 33 survey areas, including some lines covering the Truong Sa archipelago in Vietnam’s waters, Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pham Thu Hang at the press conference on April 6 stated, As it has repeatedly affirmed, Vietnam has a full legal basis and historical evidence to affirm its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes based on international law.

“Người dân Hà Nội háo hức với Triển lãm quốc phòng quốc tế 2022 (Hanoians are enthusiastic about the 2022 International Defense Exhibition),” vtv.vn (Vietnamese government’s national television broadcaster), 8 December 2022. https://vtv.vn/xa-hoi/nguoi-dan-ha-noi-hao-huc-voi-trien-lam-quoc-phong-quoc-te-2022-20221208183916675.htm

On the morning of December 8, an exhibition was officially opened for international partners and domestic citizens to observe the capacity, technological progress, and weapons and equipment manufactured by Vietnam…. Many Vietnamese people witnessed the modern weapons of the army for the first time

Notes:

[i] Among the purposes of the exhibition was to “diversify defense equipment procurement sources” and to “introduce Vietnam’s defense capabilities and Vietnamese-made weapons” to the international community. Although Russia has historically been Vietnam’s main weapons supplier, the presence of Western countries at the exhibition indicates Vietnam’s interest in gradually diversifying by engaging in weapons transfers with them. See: “Vietnam hosts its first international defense expo.” rfa.org, 8 December 2022. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/vietnam-defense-expo-12082022030531.html

[ii] Unlike Truong Sa, the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) have been under Chinese control since the Chinese navy expelled the South Vietnamese navy from the islands in 1974. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has inherited the South Vietnamese claims over the islands since 1975, as well as concerns about China attempting to occupy Truong Sa in the future.

[iii] After 1991, Vietnam sought to “multilateralize and diversify” its foreign ties by normalizing its relations with China and all Southeast Asian states and becoming a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). By 2001, Vietnam and Russia revived bilateral relations in the form of a strategic partnership and Vietnam and the United States signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Vietnam’s broader goal was to insulate the country from Sino-U.S. competition or other major power rivalries and protect its independence and self-reliance. See Carlyle A. Thayer (2017), “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence,” Asian Security, 13:3, 183-199.

Image Information:

Image: Vietnam claims Paracel and Spratly islands.
Source: Tonbi Ko https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_claims_Paracel_and_Spratly_islands.JPG
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Chinese Seeking To Use AI Disinformation Database for Cognitive Defense

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Thomas Shrimpton

Rumor Crusher.

“The models built by AI still need further language training. For example, some users’ share [rumors] with irony, sarcasm, or as a metaphor, and machines find it difficult to judge whether they are true expressions of emotion or not. Therefore, we should focus on improving the public’s media literacy so that they are more serious about interacting and sharing content ….”

According to the excerpted article from PLA-owned strategic communications journal Military Correspondent, the PLA is exploring an early warning mechanism for monitoring and combating digital disinformation utilizing the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)’s[i] “AI Rumor Crusher.”[ii] While the article is not a definitive accounting of how the CAC will use artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor and counter digital disinformation, it does provide insight into a methodology employed across China’s information environment to control flows of information. The author, Li Beibei, a researcher at China’s National Defense University’s College of Politics, suggests that an ideal approach for countering disinformation would include a multipronged strategy that includes expansion of China’s legal framework, improvement of data-sharing among social media platforms and the government, and improved media literacy.

Li explains AI Rumor Crusher’s operational methodology as an eight-step iterative process composed of recognition, word separation, comparison with a rumor database, determination of credibility, analysis of rumor and non-rumor features, and finally supervised and reinforcement learning. In the first two steps, AI Rumor Crusher identifies the source of a piece of information and analyzes the disseminator. Next, it analyzes the information against preexisting rumor samples and tracks sources for their credibility (website, publisher, professionals, etc.). Finally, the key arguments are labeled and cross-referenced with authoritative knowledge databases[iii] to verify the veracity of the information. Li argues that AI, when compared to human counterparts, possesses a superior ability to work around the clock, identify and eliminate rumors in a timely way, track disseminators of disinformation, judge the veracity of information, and even determine the disseminator’s motivation for sharing rumors. Li further advocates for a multipronged approach to digital disinformation governance that would include the expansion and strengthening of China’s relevant legal regulations and public media literacy to reinforce social values and ensure both originators and disseminators (witting or unwitting) do not exacerbate the issue.[iv]

Sources:

“利用人工智能技术治理网络谣言探析 (An Exploration of the Uses of Artificial Intelligence in Governing Digital Rumors),” Military Correspondent (PLA-owned strategic communications journal ), 23 February 2023. http://www.81.cn/rmjz_203219/jsjz/2023nd1q_244462/yldzgzyj_244467/16203061.html.

Management of digital rumors has become an urgent issue. We can establish an early warning mechanism for digital rumors based in artificial intelligence technologies. With AI “Rumor Crusher” we can build a data-sharing platform for disinformation to monitor the trajectory of digital rumors and prevent them from spreading in order to effectively combat digital disinformation.

With the promotion of new media interactive platforms, the difficulty of Internet rumor management is gradually increasing, and users’ behavior and speech on the Internet are difficult to be effectively and timely restrained, making rumor suppression a more complicated and difficult task.

The most central factor in the formation and dissemination of digital rumors is the openness and ambiguity of incoming information. People are most likely to generate and spread rumors in the absence of reliable information. … people use their virtual identities to send and receive information over their various accounts without temporal, spatial, or moral constraints … resulting in many online rumors leading to serious consequences. Since August 2020, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)’s Reporting Center has organized more than 10 website platforms such as Weibo, Douyin and Baidu to carry out digital rumor tagging and labeling work. This ensures that digital rumor samples are promptly exposed, thereby minimizing the space for digital rumors to survive. However, despite the active measures relevant government departments have taken to control digital rumors, there is still a long way to go. In particular, the legal punishment for digital rumors should be strengthened so the disseminators of rumors can be punished according to the degree to which the rumor is malign and causes a negative impact.

Notes:

[i] Cyberspace Administration of China’s Reporting Center (网信办举报中心, literally, “Illegal and Harmful Information Reporting Center, 违法和不良信息举报中心). As early as 2004, under the Internet Society of China, the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center was established with the stated goal of standing up for “virtue and right thinking” while opposing pornography, violence, and fraud. See: Sumner Lemon, “Chinese website lets users report illegal content,” Computer World, 15 June 2004. https://www.computerworld.com/article/2565362/chinese-web-site-lets-users-report-illegal-content.html

[ii] “Rumor (谣言)” is both a colloquial and legal term in the PRC. Colloquially, it connotes a similar meaning to the term “rumor” in English. According to the Cyberspace Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室，简称：网信办), internet rumors网络谣言 refers to “false information that intentionally fabricates facts to cause harm to society and others.” This definition partly aligns with Western conceptions of disinformation (often translated as 虚假信息, lit. fake information). For further exploration of the PRC’s unclear use of similar terms in legal matters, see: 谣言型犯罪中“谣言”该如何理解 (How Should “Rumor” be Understood in Rumor Crimes), The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China, 12 February 2022. https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/llyj/202202/t20220212_544221.shtml

[iii] While not explicitly stated, these would likely include both open source, commercial, and classified government databases accessible by government, military, and commercial personnel. Much of the labeling and tagging until recently has been conducted by human regulators working on behalf of social media companies like Alibaba, Baidu, ByteDance, and Tencent.

[iv] Many of these same issues are addressed in China’s preexisting legal infrastructure managing cyberspace including the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures. For more on China’s vision for global cyberspace governance, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/433067

Image Information:

Image: Rumor Crusher.
Source: https://szzx.sust.edu.cn/info/1005/2532.htm
Attribution: Public Domain

People’s Liberation Army Exploring Military Applications of ChatGPT

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Thomas Shrimpton

ChatGPT Logo.

“[ChatGPT’s] role and impact on the military domain cannot be ignored.”

Chinese regulators have acted swiftly since ChatGPT’s launch in November 2022 to manage perceived political risks by laying out draft rules on the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI).^[i] However, this has not stopped the Chinese military’s PLA Daily from inviting security scholars to consider the potential applications of generative AI in the military.

In the three excerpted PLA Daily pieces, Hu Xiaofeng, Zhao Jingxuan, and Hu Yushan explore the risks and opportunities associated with integrating AI technologies and large language models (LLMs) in military planning, operational, and combat systems. Hu Xiaofeng, a professor at China’s National Defense University, argues that the integration of ChatGPT with future information-based and intelligent warfare systems would bring a “qualitative leap to the commander’s decision-making ability.”^[ii] Hu Xiaofeng and Hu Yushan argue ChatGPT will likely trigger an expansion of China’s intelligence collection capabilities due to its ability to summarize large swathes of scientific and academic information, providing commanders with near real-time information perception and allowing them to make an accurate threat assessment. Hu Xiaofeng and Hu Yushan also discuss the integration of ChatGPT with other military systems to complete more complex tasks, including training scenario preparation, combat plan generation, combat plan arrangement, action plan drafting, exercise result commentary, as well as higher-level planning tasks like war plan analysis, supply chain risk analysis, and crisis response plan evaluation. At an operational level, Hu Yushan identifies ChatGPT as a useful tool to produce fake news, fake emails, and imitate human language for information deception in cognitive domain operations and cyberattacks. PLA researchers are also wary of the potential negative implications of overreliance on AI technologies in military decision-making. Zhao Jingxuan draws upon the Roman mythology of Janus. Janus is the two-faced god of gates, transitions, doorways, and duality, with the front facing the future and the back facing the past. Zhao likens the use of AI technologies in military decision-making as a doorway presenting serious security, legal, and ethical dilemmas, echoing sentiments expressed at the call to action set forth in February 2023 at the first summit on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM).^[iii]

Sources:

Hu Xiaofeng (胡晓峰), “ChatGPT, 我们该怎么看” (How Should We View ChatGPT),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 21 March 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-03-21&paperNumber=07&articleid=901476&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email.

“In future information and intelligent warfare, ChatGPT can be used for basic data analysis and decision support, natural language processing, and the processing of massive volumes of battlefield information to facilitate a qualitative leap in commanders’ decision-making abilities. On this basis, it may lead to transformational mutations in some traditional operational positions, thus triggering changes in established military systems. If it is professionally trained to work with other systems, it can be used for more complex work such as training idea preparation, combat program generation, combat plan arrangement, operational planning and preparation, exercise result evaluation, etc. This will induce many adjustments to command and decision-making institutions, it may even reshape the command and decision-making process. If it continues to iterate and mutate in the future, it may also be involved in completing other higher-order work involved in war plan analysis and crisis management program evaluation, among others. ChatGPT technology may also be used to produce fake news, fake emails, or even imitate human language to implement information decoys, or be used in cyber-attacks.

Zhao Jingxuan (赵静轩), “雅努斯的两副面孔 (The Two Faces of Janus),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 21 March 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-03-21&paperNumber=07&articleid=901476&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

When a large number of intelligent combat systems are applied to the battlefield, the cost of war will be greatly reduced, and the ‘zero casualties’ of combatants is expected to become a reality. However, in a complex battlefield environment, the intelligent combat system is very likely to have problems such as indiscriminate killing of innocent people due to identification errors, which will bring infinite hidden dangers to human beings.

Hu Yushan (胡玉山), “作战+ChatGPT，会撞出来什么样火花 (Combat + ChatGPT, What Kind of Sparks Will be Struck )” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 21 March 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-03-21&paperNumber=07&articleid=901477&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email. Based on ChatGPT’s powerful analysis and judgement capability, it can act as a super scheduler and quickly solve issues arising in the logistics supply chain with the support of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, cloud computing, and big data. In the procurement link, through analysis of past material procurement data, it can automatically predict future material demand, and at the same time, according to market fluctuations, independently set funding budgets to improve the military’s economic efficiency. In warehousing processing, it can analyze a series of data such as the number of materials in storage, reserve time, and maintenance to carry out intelligence allocation between personnel and people and materials and equipment. In the transportation link, it can determine the best means of delivery by intelligently analyzing demand, resources, and means of delivery to optimize transportation plans.

Notes:

[i] The Cyberspace Administration of China (网信办) released draft measures to lay out the ground rules that generative AI services must follow, including the type of content these products are allowed to generate. Importantly, Article 4 stipulates that all AI generated content must reflect the core values of socialism and should not subvert state power. For the full Chinese text, see: “《生成式人工智能服务管理办法（征求意见稿)” (Generative AI Service Management (Draft for Comments)),” Cyberspace Administration of China, 11 April 2023. http://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-04/11/c_1682854275475410.htm

[ii] Hu Xiaofeng explicitly mentions integration with AlphaGo (阿尔法狗). AlphaGo is a computer program that was designed to play the strategy board game Go. AlphaGo uses a combination of deep neural networks and tree search techniques and was trained using a combination of supervised and reinforcement learning. In 2016, AlphaGo made headlines when it was the first program to publicly defeat a professional Go player. PLA researchers have discussed military applications of AlphaGO for over half a decade, but Hu admits it has made little progress in effectively applying the program to PLA decision-making processes.

[iii] For more on REAIM and the call to action that 60 countries including the United States and China signed, see: “REAIM 2023 Program,” Government of the Netherlands, 20 April 2023. https://www.reaim2023.org. While China has yet to publish its own vision for governance of AI in military systems, the United States’ “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy” can be seen here: “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” U.S. Department of State, 16 February 2023. https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy/

Image Information:

Image: ChatGPT Logo.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT#/media/File:ChatGPT_logo.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

China Now Claims To Have World’s Top Destroyer Force

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Cindy Hurst

The Nanchang, China’s first launched Type 055 destroyer.

“Now, as the four Type 055 destroyers of the first Destroyer Detachment of the PLA Navy are fully operational, they will provide more solid support for the Chinese Navy to penetrate the island chains and cruise the ocean.”

According to the Hong Kong-based pro-Beijing news source Ta Kung Pao, the Chinese Navy recently saw its sixth Type 055 [GRLCUT(1] stealth-guided missile destroyer, “Wuxi,” achieve “total combat capability.” The article also claims that by having the Type 055 stealth guided-missile destroyers now fully combat ready, “the detachment has become the world’s top destroyer force.” The second article excerpt, published in the Chinese state-run Global Times, explains that the Wuxi recently participated in a rigorous three-day trial in the Yellow Sea, where it conducted comprehensive air defense, missile defense, sea attack, and anti-submarine operations in a complex electromagnetic environment. The tests, focusing on “future missions, environments, and opponents,” incorporated surface ships, submarines, fighters, and other forces to produce multiple air, underwater, and surface threats that put to test the Wuxi’s integrated combat capability.

According to Ta Kung Pao, Type 055 destroyers are equipped with China’s most advanced air defense, anti-missile, anti-ship, and anti-submarine weapons. They have “strong information perception, command and coordination, air defense and anti-missile, sea-to-sea and sea-to-land strike capabilities” and possess strong anti-ship capabilities that can “crush any opponent.” Previous reporting claimed that a dual-band radar system gives the Type 055 anti-stealth and anti-satellite capabilities in low-Earth orbit providing “Chinese forces a key edge over their opponents in modern warfare.”[i]

The Type 055 destroyer’s primary mission is expected to be as an aircraft carrier escort: to provide a wider detection range and early warning capability, stronger firepower, and overall increased protection for the aircraft carrier. The Type 055 also has the capacity to serve as a command ship and is expected to help the Chinese navy break through the island chains[ii] and ultimately achieve a blue-water capability. There are currently eight operational Type 055 destroyers. The first four have been assigned to the First Destroyer Detachment in the North Sea Fleet, while the next four have been assigned to the Ninth Destroyer Detachment in the South China Fleet. The North Sea Fleet safeguards the country’s northern maritime borders from the Bohai and Yellow Seas. According to Ta Kung Pao, China is currently constructing its ninth Type 055 destroyer, which is expected to be assigned to the East Sea Fleet.

Sources:

“055型四剑合璧护航母破岛链 (Four Type 055 Destroyers Escort the Aircraft Carrier Liaoning to Break Through the Island Chains), Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong-based, pro-Beijing news source), 3 April 2023, http://www.takungpao.com/news/232108/2023/0403/835819.html

Wuxi, the Chinese Navy’s sixth Type 055 stealth guided-missile destroyer, has recently passed a full-course test, officially achieving total combat capability. So far, all four 10,000 ton-class destroyers of the first destroyer detachment under the North Sea Fleet (NSF) have achieved full combat capability, and the detachment has become the world’s top destroyer force.

The 13,000-ton Type 055 guided missile destroyer has been praised by U.S. media as the world’s second most powerful guided missile destroyer after the U.S. Zumwalt-class. From January 2020, when Nanchang, the first Type 055 destroyer, came into service, to February 2023, when Xianyang joined the navy, eight 10,000 ton-class destroyers of this type have sailed across our country’s vast seas in a short period of three years. …As a result, the Type 055 destroyers have more robust comprehensive capabilities.

Destroyers are the indispensable main ships in the surface combat system. The Type 055 10,000-ton large destroyers are equipped with the Chinese Navy’s most advanced air defense, anti-missile, anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons, with strong information perception, command and coordination, air defense and anti-missile, sea-to-sea and sea-to-land strike capabilities. In particular, equipped with the hypersonic anti-ship YJ-21 missile, the 055 large destroyers has the anti-ship ability to crush any opponent. The formation of several large destroyers of this type also enables the PLA Navy to adopt more flexible and diversified methods of warfare.

Now, as the four Type 055 destroyers of the first Destroyer Detachment of the PLA Navy are fully operational, they will provide more solid support for the Chinese Navy to penetrate the island chains and cruise the ocean.”

Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy’s Type 055 large destroyer Wuxi achieves operational capability, ‘boosting North Sea Fleet’s far sea capabilities’,” Global Times (Chinese state-run news outlet), 26 March 2023. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287983.shtml

Organized by a vessel training center affiliated with the PLA Northern Theater Command Navy, the Type 055 large destroyer Wuxi recently went through a three-day full-course acceptance test in the Yellow Sea over training subjects including comprehensive air defense, missile defense, sea attack and anti-submarine actions in a complex electromagnetic environment, China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Saturday.The vessel training center dispatched other forces including surface vessels, submarines and fighter jets to confront or support the Wuxi during the test, so the Wuxi could display its capabilities in dealing with all kinds of emergencies under multiple surface, underwater and air threats, CCTV reported.

Notes:

[i] For more information see: Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Type 055 Destroyer has Anti-Stealth, Anti-Satellite Capabilities: Report,” Global Times, 11 October 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202010/1203103.shtml

[ii] The island chain strategy was originally conceptualized in 1951 by the West to contain the Soviet Union and China by surrounding them with naval bases in the West Pacific to project power and restrict access. There are currently three island chains in the Pacific Ocean. The First Island Chain begins at the Kuril Islands and runs through the Japanese Archipelago, Ryuku Islands, Taiwan, northwest Philippines, and ends around Borneo. The Second Island Chain consists of the Bonin Islands, Volcano Islands, Mariana Islands, western Caroline Islands, and Western New Guinea. The Third Island Chain begins at the Aleutian Islands and runs through the center of the Pacific Ocean through the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa, Fiji, and New Zealand. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Island Chains became an area of focus in and around China. To break out of the island chains, among other things, China must have a “blue water” capable navy that can control the seas at wide ranges. See Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific ‘Island Chains,” The National Interest, 5 February 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-islands-still-matter-asia-15121; and Joe Fallon, “Breaking the Island Chains,”Defence Viewpoints from the UK Defence Forum, 10 February 2020, https://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/breaking-the-island-chains

Images and Charts:

Chinese Type 055 Destroyers

Image Information:

Image: The Nanchang, China’s first launched Type 055 destroyer.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer#/media/File:PLANS_Nanchang_(DDG-101)_20210427.jpg
Attribution: Japan Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff Office; CC-BY 4.0

Micronesian President Warns Against Chinese External Influence Operations

Posted on April 1, 2023 by Thomas Shrimpton

Federated States of Micronesian President David Panuelo.

“I believe that our values are presently being used against us. One of the reasons that China’s political warfare is successful in so many arenas is that we are bribed to be complicit, bribed to be silent.”

According to the excerpted article from the Asia-focused outlet, The Diplomat, outgoing Micronesian President David Panuelo recently warned of Beijing’s efforts to shape his country’s external operational environment via “political warfare”^[i]and “gray zone operations.” To mitigate the China’s influence, Panuelo suggested that Micronesia switch diplomatic allegiance from China to Taiwan in exchange for Taiwan providing Micronesia with $50 million. The 13-page warning^[ii] letter detailed Chinese covert, coercive, and corrupting influence activities in Micronesia, including bribery, spying, and other external interference.

Panuelo provided examples stating a former Chinese ambassador had tried to bribe Vice President Palik with an envelope of cash to be seated in a place of prominence at a Chinese Embassy Banquet. When Palik refused, the Chinese ambassador said something to the effect of “you could be President someday.” At the July 2023 Pacific Islands Forum, Paneulo relayed that he was followed by a People’s Liberation Army intelligence officer stationed at the Chinese Embassy in Fiji. The letter also recounts Chinese efforts to manufacture international support for China at the China-Pacific Island Countries Political Dialogue by having a Micronesian private citizen represent the Micronesia when the Micronesian government declined to attend a meeting of the regional multilateral forum. In response to these claims, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson derided Panuelo’s assertions as “smear[s] and accusations…completely inconsistent with the facts,” adding Beijing has “always respected Micronesia’s development path that it has chosen in light of its own national conditions and has supported the Micronesian side in safeguarding its independence.” While it remains to be seen if Micronesia will pursue the diplomatic shift Panuelo proposed after he steps down from office, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu has expressed concerns over the burden such “dollar diplomacy” would put on Taiwan.^[iii]

Source:

“Micronesia’s President Writes Bombshell Letter on China’s ‘Political Warfare’,” The Diplomat (international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region), 10 March 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/micronesias-president-writes-bombshell-letter-on-chinas-political-warfare/

It is on this basis that Political Warfare and Grey Zone activity occur within our borders; China is seeking to ensure that, in the event of a war in our Blue Pacific Continent between themselves and Taiwan, that the FSM is, at best, aligned with the PRC (China) instead of the United States and, at worst, that the FSM chooses to ‘abstain’ altogether.

We understand that Mr. Wu [Beijing’s choice for ambassador to FSM] would, upon his arrival, be given the mission of preparing the FSM to shift away from its partnerships with traditional allies such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia. We know that Mr. Wu would expand PRC security activity, awareness, and interest in the FSM … I declined the Ambassador-designate his position … they’re simply awaiting the new President to take power so Mr. Wu can become the Ambassador of China to the FSM.

You can imagine my surprise when I was followed this past July in Fiji during the Pacific Islands Forum by two Chinese men; my further surprise when it was determined that they worked for the Chinese Embassy in Suva; my even further surprise when it was discovered that one of them was a PLA intelligence officer; and my continued surprise when I learned that I had multiple Cabinet and staff who had met him before, and in the FSM. To be clear: I have had direct threats against my personal safety from PRC officials acting in an official capacity.

Ambassador Qian was formerly the ambassador to Fiji – and by extension was the one responsible for authorizing the two Chinese to follow me in Suva. ,,, Ambassador Qian also would have been present during the 2nd China-PICS Political Dialogue. That itself is noteworthy insofar as that was the public meeting where the FSM Government found itself represented not by myself or a Cabinet member or even a member of our Foreign Service – indeed not by anyone in our Government at all but, rather, a private citizen named Mr. Duhlen Soumwei. I said to the PRC that we would not have formal representation at the meeting, and the PRC went to the extent of taking one of our citizens and then publicly having that citizen formally represent us. To say it again: China has established a precedent of taking out private citizens in multilateral meetings to formally represent our country without our Government’s awareness or approval thereof.

In November, 2021 – after the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and myself had changed cellphone numbers due to incessant calls from Ambassador Huang – the FSM signed an agreement that we accept the Chinese vaccines. We included various stipulations, such as that they were to be used only for citizens of China in the FSM; but that wasn’t what China wanted. What China wanted was for the FSM to be on the list of countries that they could publicly promote as having accepted their vaccines. China got exactly what it wanted.

Senior officials and elected officials across the whole of our National and State Governments receive offers of gifts as a means to curry favor. The practical impact of this is that some senior officials and elected officials take actions that are contrary to the FSM‘s national interest, but are consistent with the PRC‘s national interests.

This isn’t rare. This happens all the time, and to most of us – not just some of us. It is at this point that I relay, simply as a point of information, that 39 out of 50 members of Parliament in Solomon Islands received payments from China prior to their vote on postponing elections that were otherwise scheduled for this year. Have you personally received a bribe from the PRC? If the answer is “no,” you are in the minority.When we sent our own patrol boats to our own Exclusive Economic Zone to check on PRC research vessel activity, the PRC sent a warning for us to stay away.

Notes:

[i] Political warfare [政治战] seeks to mobilize and utilize the spectrum of strategic resources (party, state, military, commercial, and civilian) to influence the conduct, policies, motives, and perceptions of foreign actors in a manner favorable to the strategic objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Political warfare differs from public diplomacy in its lack of transparency and calculated manipulation of a target to influence its norms, policies, and strategies through inducive and coercive methods of persuasion. For a more detailed exploration of the CCP’s political warfare and political work concepts, see: Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Institute, 14 October 2013, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf and for more on the PLA’s conception of political warfare, see: Peter Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, 30 January 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/

[ii] For the full report see: LinkedIn Post, 10 March 2023. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cleopaskal_panuelo-letter-on-switch-to-taiwan-prc-activity-7039672476045340672-8RmJ/

[iii] “MOFA Response to Comments that Taiwan is Seeking New Allies through ‘Dollar Diplomacy’,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), 10 March 2023. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1330&s=99863

Image Information:

Image: Federated States of Micronesian President David Panuelo
Source: https://www.fsmgov.org/ngovt.html
Attribution: Public Domain