China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion

“…the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.”


Amid tensions across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan media has been reporting about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of cognitive warfare to reunite the two Chinas.  One such article was published in the Military Affairs Forum of Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (The Youth Daily), a government-sponsored daily that reports on military, government, and general news.  According to the accompanying excerpts, the CCP is using non-military, gray zone tactics to change people’s perception of China.  The CCP uses both traditional media and various forms of internet media to carry out its war of public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. As an example, the article describes how the CCP will tell the “Chinese story” in an effort to “expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts.”  It transmits false information to various foreign media outlets or “infiltrate social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish [China’s] own image and perception both domestically and abroad.”  According to the article, behind the war of influence is the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which is in charge of propaganda; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department, which focuses on external propaganda and control domestic public opinion; and the Ministry of State Security, which combines both civilian hackers, who launch cyber-attacks, with false information produced on content farms.

The second article, published in Taiwan’s English-language publication Taipei Times explains, “the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its ‘united front’ strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its target, including Taiwan.”  To accomplish this, it resorts to both hard and soft power (i.e. culture, education, sports exchanges, media organizations, and economic means) “to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.”  While none of this is particularly new, this recent spotlight in Taiwanese media shows that the cognitive warfare strategy that China uses to win without fighting is persistent, far-reaching, and controlled by the CCP (as opposed to spontaneous, independent media).


Source:

Shu Hsiao-huang, “反制認知作戰 抵禦灰色地帶威脅 (Countering Cognitive Warfare and Resisting Gray Zone Threats),” Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (Youth Daily News: Published by the government of the People’s Republic of China), 9 December 2021. https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1467725&type=forum

Cognitive warfare is the use of information or various communication platforms to change the mindset of an opponent in order to change his or her behavior. The Chinese Communist Party has been waging a united war against Taiwan for many years, carrying out “The Three Warfares” of public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare.  It uses old wine in new bottles, along with both traditional print and electronic media, as well as Internet media (platforms) and other means to carry out its war of influence.

The United Front Department is in charge of propaganda.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department focus on external propaganda and control internal public opinion, and the Ministry of State Security combines cyber-attacks, carried out by civilian hackers, with fake information produced on content farms to carry the war of influence.

…(The CCP) shares the “China story” to expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts. The modus operandi includes spreading falsehoods and spreading them rapidly across platforms; it uses foreign media or infiltrates social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish its own image and perception both domestically and abroad.

Source: Change Yan-ting and Paul Chiou, “Resolutions to Engage with China,” Taipei Times (Taiwan based English-language publication), 11 January 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/01/12/2003771189

As we embark upon a new year, tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to heighten by the day.

However, the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.

The regime consistently uses soft and sharp power, such as culture, education and sports exchanges, as well as media organizations and economic means, to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.

Chinese Army Division Independently Improves Integrated Reconnaissance System

“After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.”


According to a recent article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website, a Chinese division has fielded a new type of integrated reconnaissance system.  The new system is supposed to enable more rapid reconnaissance and strike capability against enemy targets.  The article explains that China had developed past reconnaissance equipment in piecemeal fashion over extended periods, often making systems incompatible and therefore inefficient at reconnoitering and strike.  Hoping to improve efficiency, the unidentified army division set up a team of experts who spent nearly half a year tackling key problems, as well as researching, developing, and testing equipment interconnections.  Their efforts reportedly streamlined levels of command and improved the interconnection and communication between the different reconnaissance systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.  While this article does not indicate whether or not this sort of localized innovation is a common practice in the PLA, it is at least a demonstration of alignment with President Xi Jinping’s general directive for more innovation in PLA.


Source:

Zhang Jin and Hu Wenbo, “陆军某师紧盯战斗力建设难点问题推进科研攻关自主革新挖掘侦察装备潜能 (Army Division Focuses on Difficult Issues in Building Combat Power, Promotes Key Scientific Research, Independently Innovates and Explores Potential of Reconnaissance Equipment),” Chinese Ministry of Defense website, 17 December 2021. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2021-12/17/content_4901281.htm.

Officers and soldiers utilized a new type of independently developed, integrated reconnaissance system to achieve rapid reconnaissance and rapid strikes against “enemy” targets.

According to information provided, due to the incompatibility of reconnaissance equipment distributed at different times in the past, the efficiency of reconnoitering and striking targets was not high. With respect to this issue, the division set up a team that sought to collect expertise and tackle key problems. Under the guidance of relevant experts, the team repeatedly tested the interconnection sequences of equipment, streamlined levels of command, researched and built new types of connecting cables and interfaces for the equipment, and achieved interconnection and communication among various kinds of reconnaissance equipment, including reconnaissance UAVs, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.

… After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.

PLA Practices UAV-Delivered Logistical Support for Airborne Operations

PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels)  
PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao.

PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels)  PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao.


The brigade plans to further test combat support functions for the drones and improve logistical sustainment methods for airborne operations to improve combat effectiveness.


China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to refine the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for tactical resupply through their integration into exercises. As noted in state media outlet Science and Technology Daily, a recent exercise held in the mountainous terrain of central Yunnan province describes a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps brigade using UAVs to resupply units engaged in a firefight and help evacuate casualties.

The “key point seizure” exercise featured a drone swarm working in concert with the airborne assault team as it maneuvered, resupplying units just as they reached defensive positions determined by a company commander.  Other reporting on the exercise indicated that medium UAVs could deliver 50kg of ammunition.  Participants in the exercise noted that the addition of UAVs greatly simplified logistical resupply for the units.

Exercises in 2020 involving the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force tested delivering munitions to front-line units, and in a separate exercise, providing hot meals and water to border troops in politically sensitive or logistically difficult-to-access areas. (See “PLA Fields New Rapid-Assembly Camp System,” OE Watch, November 2020). The same month the PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted tactical replenishment exercises in Hubei province. (See “China: Improving Capability in Replenishment Operations Through Drones”).


Source:

Peng Yueyun and Qi Yongqiang, “无人机参与助攻空降作战有了新帮手(Drones participate in assists and airborne operations have new helpers),” Science and Technology Daily (State media outlet managed by the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology), 10 December 2021.

http://www.stdaily.com/kjrb/kjrbbm/2021-12/10/content_1237995.shtml

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211215134431/http://www.stdaily.com/kjrb/kjrbbm/2021-12/10/content_1237995.shtml

“Begin the attack on the closest position!” Following the command of Li Qilong [李齐龙], the commander of a company under an airborne brigade, members of the unit charged bravely towards the “enemy” position. The unit is engaged in a ‘key point seizure’ exercise in an unidentified location in central Yunnan.

After their initial charge, the enemy was able to suppress the attackers. The lead assault team leader called out “Running low on ammunition! Requesting resupply!”

Standing by the radio in the rear, commander Li marked Ren’s location on the drone control terminal, issuing orders for supplies and a flight path. One minute later, a medium UAV with nearly a hundred kilograms of heavy equipment quickly lifted off and flew toward the battle. Thanks to the timely resupply, the attacking unit could renew their assault.

In this exercise, the brigade embedded transport drones in its support operations, making full use of their advantages in terms of ability to cover long distances quickly, with great precision and in spite of rugged terrain—advantages that traditional resupply methods overland or via large, vulnerable transport lack.

On the front lines of the battle, the firing is intense, and the support team has continued to take casualties even as neither side has gained the advantage.  “Requesting casevac.” A signal from the assisting team came from the radio. In the rear, the rotors of a large UAV spin up under the operated by Chen Yao [陈遥], leader of the integrated support team. Hugging the ground, the drone dodges enemy fire while making its way toward the requested location of the ‘wounded,’ beaming back information to the support team.

“Found them,” Chen Yao said as he put the drone into a rapid descent. With the assistance of ground combatants, one of the simulated casualties was dispatched to the rear.

“Shift your position and prepare to defend!” After pushing the assault, company commander Li Qilong quickly pivoted to defense while coordinating resupply using the UAVs. A few minutes later, as coordinates for defensive positions were issued [to the attacking units], a “swarm” composed of eight quadrotor drones took off in succession, beginning “multi-target precision resupply operations.” Despite being spread out over more than ten kilometers, the “swarm” independently coordinated and accurately positioned themselves to quickly deliver emergency supplies from the rear to the new defensive positions.

Li described the transport drones as “Fast, stealthy and precise,” noting that “[due to their support] the length of the battle was reduced by nearly an hour and the number of casualties has been greatly reduced.”

The brigade plans to test combat support functions for the drones further and improve logistical sustainment methods for airborne operations to improve combat effectiveness.


Image Information:

Image: PLAAF Airborne Z-8 Helicopter (says airborne in white over the wheels) PLAAF Changhe Z-8KA – Zhao. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/PLAAF_Changhe_Z-8KA_-_Zhao.jpg
Source: Allen Zhao, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Attribution:

Chinese Military Uses AI To Develop World’s Smallest and Most Powerful Coilgun

“Artificial intelligence can outperform humans in designing futuristic weapons…”


A group of Chinese researchers from the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan, China, used artificial intelligence (AI) to develop the world’s smallest and most powerful coilgun.  The coilgun, which is about the size of a pistol with a 4.5-inch barrel, contains three battery-powered coils that generate an electromagnetic field.  As described in the following excerpts, published in Hong Kong-based English-language daily South China Morning Post, the kinetic energy of the bullet flying through the barrel has more than twice the energy needed to fire a fatal shot.  The researchers claim the weapon is ideal for counterterrorism and stability operations.  The advantage of the coilgun over a conventional gun is its “adjustable speed and very short response time.”

AI is playing a key role in developing China’s electromagnetic weapons.  The article describes the coilgun as more sophisticated than a typical firearm and too complex for traditional weapons software to handle.  AI, however, can continuously improve an imperfect design through self-learning.  According to the article, “it would have been impossible to achieve this level of performance without using AI in the design process.”  Chinese researchers have also been using AI to develop large-scale electromagnetic weapons, such as railguns, which have a range of “hundreds of kilometers.”  The Chinese navy now has a test facility in which AI is used to develop smart railgun munitions capable of enduring extremely high pressure and intense magnetic fields.


Source:

Stephen Chen, “Chinese Researchers Turn to Artificial Intelligence To Build Futuristic Weapons,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong’s most prominent online English-language daily), 5 December 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3158522/chinese-researchers-turn-artificial-intelligence-build.

Artificial intelligence can outperform humans in designing futuristic weapons, according to a team of Chinese naval researchers who say they have developed the world’s smallest yet most powerful coilgun.

The prototype weapon developed by professor Zhang Xiao and her team at the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan has a 12cm (4.5-inch) barrel, about the size of a pistol, which contains three battery-powered coils that generate an electromagnetic field.

This electromagnetic field means that, unlike a conventional gun, the bullet does not touch the sides as it passes through the barrel.

Researchers found the bullet’s kinetic energy as it was could reach almost 150 joules, more than twice the energy needed to fire a fatal shot.

The bullet speed can vary depending on factors such as size and weight, and the scientists said one of the major advantages of using a coil gun was that, unlike a conventional gun, it could be adjusted to fire deadly shots or non-lethal ones.

In a paper published in the Transactions of the China Electrotechnical Society last month, Zhang said the gun had the advantage of “adjustable speed and a very short response time”, adding that it had great potential to be used for counterterrorism and maintaining stability.

The researchers say it would have been impossible to achieve this level of performance without using AI in the design process.

China Continues To Beef Up Border and Coastal Defense

“…the international situation is complex and changeable. Border and coastal defenses face security threats and challenges from all quarters and in various forms.”


In October a group of Chinese experts met to discuss their views on China’s progress and efforts to build up the border and coastal defense infrastructure.  The following article, published in the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army Jiefangjun Bao, offers an interesting overview of their thoughts regarding future expectations.  China first launched its border and coastal defense infrastructure project in 1996.  According to the article, the country has since gone from “having nothing to having something.”  It went from “not being centralized and complete to being scalable and systematic.” 

There are reportedly 18,639 miles of border and coastal defense duty routes.  Blockades and video monitoring cover key areas.  China has stationed hundreds of thousands of militia forces along the border and coastal defense frontlines.  They have added transportation support facilities including duty roads, bridges, and docks, focused on connecting border villages to the larger border security infrastructure.   

Part of the infrastructure buildup of China’s border and coastal defense includes an increased capacity to conduct information-driven operations (informationization).  China has built several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along key areas in border and coastal defense.  It has also laid nearly 6,213 miles of transmission lines.  A portion of the border and coastal areas now also includes video monitoring and a “control network for ‘vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.’”

In coming years, China will likely push to automate its border and coastal defense capability, through the “intelligentization” of its processes.  A senior engineer, cited in the article, explained that he hopes to shape a “smart chain” that will use new-generation information technologies, such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things, to discover, report, make decisions, handle, and evaluate border and coastal defense situations to enhance the three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities.


Source:

Pan Di, “筑起坚不可摧的钢铁防线 ——军地共话合力推进边海防基础设施建设 (Building an Indestructible Steel Defensive Line- Joint Military-Civil Promotion of Border, Coastal Defense Infrastructure Building),” Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army), 13 October 2021, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/13/content_300707.htm

China is a major border and coastal defense country. Chairman Xi profoundly pointed out that order and coastal defense work is a major matter for national security and is related to the overall national security and developmental situation.

… since the launch of border and coastal defense infrastructure building in 1996 with unified planning on land and at sea, we have built a large number of duty transport, physical barrier, and informationized management and control facilities.

Liu Jun explained that China has now built more than 30,000 kilometers of border and coastal defense duty routes, with blockades and video monitoring essentially covering key management and control segments. It has taken the first steps in constructing a “three-in-one” management and control system including human, material, and technical defense. It has built a solid defensive line along its vast land and maritime borders.

In recent years, on border and coastal defense frontlines, hundreds of thousands of militia forces are stationed all year round, and their reconnaissance and monitoring, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities have steadily improved. With the completion of a large number of transportation support facilities such as duty roads, bridges, and docks, many border villages have been connected to roads and offshore islands connected to navigation routes, thus further consolidating the foundation for the development of industries with special advantages such as border trade, cross-border tourism, and island development.

“The continuous advancement of border and coastal defense infrastructure building is the result of joint efforts by the Party, government, military, and police. According to an arrangement made by the Third National Border Defense Work Conference in 1994, a border and coastal defense infrastructure building system was launched in 1996 on the basis of organizing pilot projects.

…a “five-in-one” border management structure with the Party committee providing direction, the government running overall coordination, the military serving as a backbone, the police taking charge of administration, and the people as a foundation, making the iron wall of border and coastal defense even more impenetrable.

In recent years, China’s border and coastal defense infrastructure has intensified its informatization efforts, building several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along important sections for border and coastal defense and laying nearly 10,000 kilometers of transmission lines. A portion of border and coastal areas have formed a video monitoring and control network for “vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.” Li Guangwei, senior engineer at the Air Force Research Academy, is full of hope for the prospects of smart border and coastal defense. He hopes to shape a “smart chain” in which the whole process of discovering, reporting, making decisions, handling, and evaluating border and coastal defense situations through the application of new-generation information technologies such as big data, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, breaks through data barriers between the military and civilian sectors to enhance three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities for border and coastal defense.”

“People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition” by Kevin McCauley (2020-09-01)

(Click image to download brief.)


This monograph examines current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army campaign doctrine, with a discussion of PLA theorists’ vision of the evolutionary development of warfare to provide context for current doctrine as well as potential future direction. The PLA develops doctrinal joint and service campaign scenarios for possible offensive and defensive operations. PLA campaigns represent the operational level of war between strategic operations and tactical combat. The PLA’s current focus on specific campaigns provides insight into Beijing’s perception of potential conflict scenarios. The campaign scenarios provide commanders and staff data on command and control, coordination, combat actions, support, and other critical campaign elements for specific operational environments. The description of each campaign’s operational environment and combat actions provides valuable support to operational planning and a context for staff and unit training for their specific operational mission. The Army campaigns are executed as components of a joint campaign, or as a primarily independent Army campaign with support from other services.