Category Archives: China

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to China.

PLA Using Cognitive Domain Operations To Achieve Political Aims

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“[Cognitive domain operations] can… achieve the political purpose of “subduing soldiers without war” or “fight less but win all.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) newspaper PLA Daily recently published an article from the Academy of Military Science analyzing the concept of cognitive domain operations (CDO) in hybrid warfare.  As the Academy of Military Science is responsible for PLA doctrine, the article may provide insight into China’s doctrine on CDO.  The author proposes a new perspective of CDO in the hybrid domain.  The editor’s note prefacing the article explains that CDO is an extension of information operations, similar to how hybrid warfare is an extension of physical domain operations or traditional warfare. 

According to the article, militaries conduct CDO on three levels.  The first is “cognitive deterrence,” which entails deterring the enemy by demonstrating absolute military strength, paralyzing an enemy’s financial systems, conducting economic blockades, and imposing sanctions to deliver a psychological shock to the enemy.  The second is “cognitive shaping operations,” which entail altering the enemy’s values, political attitudes, religious beliefs, and mental state to conform to one’s objectives or cause confusion.  Finally, “cognitive deception” entails using public opinion propaganda, network attacks, and transmission of false information to influence the enemy’s decision-making in a desired direction.

The author posits that CDO can ultimately determine victory or defeat by seizing the initiative.  The author believes that CDO employing multiple means and methods—military, non-military, and specialized—can achieve decisive goals.  The author views CDO as part of the non-military methods to achieve maximum goals with minimum resources and risk.  The key components of CDO are continuous operations during peacetime and war, influencing the opponent’s cognition and disrupting its decision-making process.  The author views CDO as a full-spectrum offense and defense employing political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, and other means in multiple domains during both peacetime and wartime.  While broader in scope, aspects of the PLA’s concept of cognitive warfare resemble the more focused Russian concept of reflexive control developed during the Soviet era.  Reflexive control seeks to insert targeted messaging into an opponent’s collection, analysis, and decision-making process to shape the enemy’s cognition and cause them to act in a desired manner.

Source:

“混合战争视野下的认知域作战 (Cognitive Domain Operations from the Perspective of Hybrid Warfare),” PLA Daily (newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army), 6 June 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-06/07/content_317171.htm

Through the practice of several local wars in recent years, it has been found that hybrid warfare can be regarded as an extension of traditional physical domain operations to a certain extent, while cognitive domain operations can be regarded as a further extension of previous information domain operations. In other words, both hybrid warfare and cognitive domain operations were born out of yesterday’s traditional warfare, and the two are closely related and have different emphases. How to grasp the new characteristics and new laws of cognitive domain operations from the perspective of hybrid warfare is a new perspective for advancing the research on cognitive domain operations.

“On the surface, current cognitive domain operations mainly act on people’s perception, feeling, emotion, morale, thinking, judgment, spirit, belief, and other areas. However, at the practical level, cognitive domain operations are often a full-scale attack and defense in the multi-dimensional field by using political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, and other comprehensive means. If the physical domain operation is the premise and foundation to eliminate the enemy’s effective forces, and the information domain operation is the means and support to win victory in war, then the cognitive domain operation is the key to ultimately determine the victory or defeat of the war, force the enemy to yield, and achieve the war’s objective.

…Cognitive domain operations in the perspective of hybrid war start from the conscious level as the principal part of war to act directly on people’s will, belief, thinking, and psychology, etc., and [aim to] achieve the intended goals such as psychological attack, value shaping, cognitive influence, and mental control by maintaining one’s own cognitive advantages and attacking the enemy’s cognitive disadvantages.  Specifically, it can destroy the fighting will of the enemy’s officers and soldiers through cognitive attacks on them; Through the cognitive control of the enemy’s leadership, the purpose of influencing the decision-making and judgment of the enemy’s leaders can be achieved. Through the cognitive shaping of the enemy people, we can achieve the purpose of interfering with the enemy people’s recognition of the value of the country and the government, and finally achieve the political purpose of “subduing soldiers without war” or “fight less but win all”.

Cognitive domain warfare methods and means are mixed and diverse

Cognitive domain operations from the perspective of hybrid warfare, the multi-dimensionality of the space domain and the diversity of participating forces have spawned innovative improvements and enriched development of cognitive domain combat tactics.

In recent local wars, some foreign military combat methods and means in the cognitive domain have also shown a new trend of mixing and diversifying.

One is cognitive deterrence. By demonstrating absolute military strength, paralyzing the financial system, carrying out economic blockades, and imposing trade sanctions, the enemy is given psychological and spiritual shock and deterrence, so as to achieve the combat purpose of making the enemy cowardly, yield and retreat. Another example is to broadcast to the enemy a video of its advanced weapons and equipment accurately destroying the enemy’s important targets, causing it to have a psychological shadow, so as to actively give up resistance, etc.

The second is cognitive shaping operations. Through the induction and agitation of the enemy’s values, political attitudes, religious beliefs, mental states and other ideological fields, gradually make them abandon or form a new specific concept, cause value confusion, shake their will to fight, and thus affect their war. Attitude, etc.

The third is cognitive deception. Through public opinion propaganda, network attacks, thinking induction and other means, false information is transmitted to the enemy, thereby affecting its decision-making and judgment. For example, virtual reality and intelligent audio-visual synthesis technology are used to simulate the commander’s order, making it difficult to distinguish the true and false of the enemy, thereby causing confusion in the enemy’s command, disorder in actions, and failure of combat operations.”

PLA Combining Battlefield and Classroom Education To Develop Quality Officers

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PLA National Defense University Seal.

PLA National Defense University Seal.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is engaged in a long-term effort to reform military education and training.  As the accompanying articles from the official PLA Daily newspaper demonstrate, it seeks to combine the classroom and the battlefield to cultivate talent, as well as improve faculty and courses.  As the first accompanying article discusses, the Army Armored Force College conducted a graduation exercise in May at the Zhurihe Combined Arms Tactical Training Center.  The exercise entailed a student unit confronting the Blue Force Brigade from the training center.  The combined arms training included armor, infantry, artillery, army aviation, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare and provided the graduates with a realistic combat experience they could not gain in the classroom.  Students were exposed to problems of coordination of arms and support during operations.  The exercise also employed unmanned combat equipment.  According to the article, students began the training relying on what they had learned in the classroom but quickly realized the need for flexibility and innovation when executing operations.  Instructors assessed that the exercise provided a valuable experience compared to just book learning. 

As the second and third articles demonstrate, the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU) is also bringing the battlefield to the classroom.  A recent wargame lasted a month with hundreds of officers, students, instructors, and researchers participating.  The game employed innovations in traditional combat methods and the use of new type operational forces.  Officers from the Central Military Commission, theater commands, and military units have also lectured at NDU to provide expert experience and broaden the students’ knowledge.  Additionally, NDU arranged over 40 lectures by outside experts since March to broaden and enhance courses.

Collectively, these articles highlight important aspects of the PLA’s professional military education reforms to integrate the battlefield and active duty units into the classroom to provide realistic operational experience for students.  This includes military universities and colleges conducting field training and simulations to provide combat-related education, as well as recruiting active duty officers to teach classes in an effort to develop operationally oriented officers.

Image Information:

Image: PLA National Defense University Seal
Source: Wikimedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:National_Defence_University_Seal.png#/media/File:National_Defence_University_Seal.png

China To Reform Military Postgraduate Education

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“China is reshaping its military postgraduate system to make its armed forces “smarter,” including cultivating more technological talents…”

China’s Central Military Commission recently issued a document revealing that it will reshape military postgraduate education to make its armed forces “smarter.”  The new curriculum will include joint combat command, new type combat forces, high-level scientific and technological innovation, and high-level strategic management.  The accompanying article excerpts from Chinese sources provide some insight into this development.  China’s largest and most influential media source, Xinhua, reports that the document proposes creating a team of trainers with combat experience and improving standards to evaluate the quality of postgraduate education.  The document also emphasizes the importance of military postgraduate education in cultivating high-level military personnel, innovating military theory and national defense science and technology, and increasing combat effectiveness.  

South China Morning Post, Hong Kong’s most prominent online English daily, notes that the PLA expects the total number of students to remain steady.  However, the number of students enrolled in traditional military courses will decline while the number of students enrolled in new types of combat capability will increase.  Military recruitment will target students and graduates of science, engineering, and other skills necessary to prepare for war.  The article notes that the new emphasis on fostering military personnel with advanced technology backgrounds is part of China’s ongoing reforms intended to turn the People’s Liberation Army into a modern military force by 2027.  The article cites an earlier Xinhua report that said the enrollment of military postgraduates this year is intended to “closely meet the needs for war preparation and the development of new-type combat force talent.”

Source:

“中央军委办公厅印发《关于加快军队研究生教育改革发展的意见》(Opinions on Accelerating the Reform and Development of Military Postgraduate Education),” Xinhua (China’s largest and most influential media source), 23 May 2022. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2022/05-23/9761542.shtml

The (document) focuses on training talent in joint combat command, new-type combat forces, high-level scientific and technological innovation, and high-level strategic management. It proposes reforms, such as strengthening the creation of a team of tutors who are knowledgeable in actual combat, and improving the standards of evaluating the quality of postgraduate education.

The (document) emphasizes (the idea) that military postgraduate education plays an important role in cultivating high-level military personnel, innovating military theory and national defense science and technology, and serving the combat effectiveness of the troops.

Source: Amber Wang, “China Pushes for Smarter Armed Forces with Education Shake Up On Path to Modern Military,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong Chinese daily, once considered independent but now suspect of promoting China soft power abroad), 28 May 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3179428/china-pushes-smarter-armed-forces-education-shake-path-modern;

Enrollment numbers would remain stable but would include more students of new types of combat and plans to train personnel in military intelligence and aerospace.

China is reshaping its military postgraduate system to make its armed forces “smarter,” including cultivating more technological talents, a newly issued document shows.

The new talent development plan, which focuses on fostering military personnel with advanced technology backgrounds and combat skills, is part of the massive ongoing reforms intended to turn the People’s Liberation Army into a modern military force by 2027.

An earlier Xinhua report said the plan for enrolling military postgraduates this year would “closely meet the needs for war preparation and the development of new-type combat force talent.”

Besides the postgraduate sector reform, the overall military recruitment this year will give priority to university students and graduates majoring in science and engineering, and those with the skills needed for war preparedness, according to a teleconference on conscription in January.

Chinese Military Scholars Call out Russia for Invading Ukraine

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“In the age of liberalization of global trade, countries don’t have to gain power through… grabbing land.  This can be done through technology and capital… but Russia is still obsessed with owning land.”

The accompanying article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), a Hong Kong-based, ostensibly-independent newspaper, notes a growing list of Chinese intellectuals who have publicly questioned Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine.  This suggests that Chinese thinkers do not widely approve of China’s support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine despite the “no limits” relationship between the two countries that Chinese authorities stated prior to the Winter Olympics.

The focus of the SCMP article is an article by a recently retired Chinese military scholar published on Chinese social media site WeChat.  That article disappeared shortly after it was posted but, according to the accompanying SCMP publication, the author of the article, Gong Fangbin questioned Moscow’s assertion that Ukraine was on the brink of invading Russia, instead suggesting that the real reason Russia invaded Ukraine was that “Russian leaders have taken the wrong path for rejuvenation.”  The author suggested that Russia’s obsession with land as an indicator of strength was misguided and obsolete in the 21st century.  According to the SCMP article, another Chinese intellectual, Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, recently said that Russia would pay “a huge price” for its invasion of Ukraine.  Finally, Hu Wei, a political scientist affiliated with China’s State Council called on Beijing “to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war on Ukraine.”  Finally, the intellectuals suggest multiple negative repercussions for China. The SCMP article also notes that although China has said it supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denied suggestions that it might offer military assistance to Russia, it has not outright condemned Russia’s invasion, has not conducted a head of state visit with Ukrainian President Zelensky, and has criticized U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Russia.

Source:

Jun Mai, “Russia’s war on Ukraine based on flawed logic, Chinese military scholar wrote in article scrubbed from the web,” South China Morning Post (a Hong Kong-based, ostensibly-independent newspaper), 21 May 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3178631/russias-war-ukraine-based-flawed-logic-chinese-military?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage

Russia’s security rationale for attacking Ukraine was flawed and the aftermath underlines the importance of diplomatic flexibility, a Chinese scholar formerly with Beijing’s top military academy has said.

“I still don’t see how any country would have dared to invade the world’s No 2 military power,” Gong Fangbin, a retired professor of the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University, wrote in a recent online article.

“Russia has shown the world time and again that no one dares touch an inch of its land,” he said, countering Moscow’s argument that it was cornered by the West and NATO into invading Ukraine.

“What’s the real reason [for Moscow] to attack Ukraine? I think it’s because the Russian leaders have taken the wrong path for rejuvenation.”

Gong argued that the rationale to attack Ukraine over so-called security concerns was flawed. And the dilemma faced by Russia as it took heavy losses on the ground was the result of having chosen a path “long forsaken by human civilisation”, he wrote in his article posted on WeChat last Tuesday.

The article, however, has since disappeared from the social media platform.

Gong confirmed to the Post that he wrote the article but declined a request for an interview.

Gong, a military veteran who fought in the China-Vietnam war of 1979, is among a small but growing number of Chinese intellectuals voicing scepticism about Moscow’s rationale for its military aggression against Kyiv, despite heavy censorship of the sharing of such views.

“In the age of liberalisation of global trade, countries don’t have to gain power through … grabbing land. This can be done through technology and capital,” Gong wrote. “But Russia is still obsessed with owning land.”

At a Beijing seminar in April, China’s ambassador to Ukraine between 2005 and 2007, Gao Yusheng, argued that Russia had shown signs of having lost the war and its global status was set to decline. A summary of his remarks, first published by news outlet ifeng.com in mid-May, was quickly censored.

But there are others making their opinions known. Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, said earlier this month that China had not benefited from the war and Russia was set to pay “a huge price”.

And in March, Hu Wei, a political scientist affiliated with the State Council – China’s cabinet – called on Beijing to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war on Ukraine.

As the war enters its third month, Beijing still refuses to condemn Russia’s act of aggression, despite mounting pressure from the US and its allies. It has also sought to rally international support to criticise the sweeping sanctions imposed on Russia, citing disruption to the global economy.

Since Russia launched its military assault on February 24, China has repeatedly said it respects Ukraine’s sovereignty. However President Xi Jinping is among the very few world leaders yet to hold direct talks with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky.

Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats have sought to contain damage from the country’s close, “no limits” relationship with Moscow, as declared in a joint statement issued after Russian President Vladimir Putin met Xi in Beijing ahead of the Winter Olympics.

The diplomatic damage control has involved firmly denying suggestions that China might offer military assistance to Russia, and trying to isolate the Ukraine issue from Beijing’s relations with Europe.

Military scholar Gong had argued in another article earlier this month that the Ukraine war underlined how foreign policy flexibility might suffer if it was too closely tied to domestic politics.

This came after he had referenced the situation in yet another article in March, where he argued that countries only made decisions based on their own interests, and hence it was wrong to consider any country as a “strategic buffer”, as Russia says it had hoped Ukraine would be.

Failure to understand this, Gong argued, would lead one to also believe in the narrative that China’s economic development in the last 50 years owed much to Russia’s confrontation with the United States.“If a country is full of convictions related to strategic barriers and buffer zones, it will tie itself to the vehicles of others and thus lose autonomy, consistency and necessary flexibility,” he warned.

Two Retired Chinese Officials Offer Conflicting Perspectives on Russia’s Prospects in Ukraine

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“The United States is the real planner, instigator, organizer, commander and financier of the war in Ukraine.”

Chinese experts have taken to a number of domestic platforms to offer a more nuanced view of Russia’s war in Ukraine.  While mainstream Chinese media has closely adhered to talking points established in the first weeks of the conflict, the accompanying excerpted articles by two retired Chinese officials suggest alternative narratives of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  Retired officials often have the greatest capacity to speak truth to power in the Chinese system as they have no risk of damaging their careers or have sufficiently powerful friends to shield them from the worst consequences.  While some may hold with the standard party line, their perspectives may provide some insights into the real conversations happening behind closed doors and signal whether the Party is continuing a particular effort or open to change.  In this case, the authors, a career military officer and diplomat respectively, offer contradictory views on Russia’s success in the conflict and likely outcomes.

In the excerpted article posted on Red Culture Net, career military officer Peng Guangqian portrays the war as simply an extension of Russian-U.S. competition, with Ukraine simply an unfortunate proxy being used, as he says, as “cannon fodder.  He goes on to repeat the conspiracy theory that the United States was operating biowarfare labs in Ukraine and concludes by praising Russia’s efforts and predicting a Russian victory.  Peng’s military background, generation, and the fora used to publish this article suggest that he represents a more conservative thread in Chinese Communist Party thinking.  His almost blind acceptance of Russia’s position should not be taken as indicative of broader Chinese support for Russia.  His attitudes may be more due to his generation (for comparison Peng is 78, while President Xi Jinping is 68).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the broader Chinese public is more jaded and acknowledges Russia’s high losses, even when they accept Chinese government media narratives. 

In the second excerpted article from Phoenix News, veteran diplomat Gao Yusheng examines the broader implications of the conflict.  Censors quickly deleted the post, but his opinions are likely representative of a much more realistic group of retired and senior leaders.  In a stark contrast with Peng’s commentary, Gao argues that Russia’s “coming defeat is increasingly clear.”  He acknowledges that Putin has been trying to re-establish the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and “has never really recognized the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other former Soviet states.”  He notes “Russia has frequently violated their territoriality and sovereignty” and concludes that “Russia’s political, economic, military and diplomatic power will be significantly weakened and isolated. Russia will be…punished.  Russia’s power will weaken even more.” China further formalized its increasing alignment with Russia shortly before the war broke out (see “China-Russia Pledges of Deeper Cooperation Show Tangible Results,” OE Watch, #3 2022).  The outbreak of war raised fierce internal debates about Russia’s chances for victory in Ukraine and the ultimate consequences of the war for China.  The continuing promotion of pro-Russia narratives, and suppression of even moderate views like Ambassador Gao’s, along with other diplomatic actions, point toward a decision to stand firmly, albeit rhetorically, with Russia.

Source:

Peng Guangqian, “谁是乌克兰战场的胜利者和失败者? (Who are the Winners and Losers on the Ukrainian Battlefield?)” Red Culture Net (PRC State-approved NGO), 16 May 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220518222056/https://www.hswh.org.cn/wzzx/xxhq/oz/2022-05-15/75413.html

The United States is the real planner, instigator, organizer, commander and financier of the war in Ukraine. Although the United States tried its best to urgently send people, money, and guns, it failed to turn the tide of the war. U.S. military weapons have become the spoils of the Russian army, and the military advisers sent by the United States became the prisoners of the Russian army. The severe economic crisis in the United States has made things worse, and the domestic contradictions and infighting of the ruling clique have become more acute.

What makes the United States especially desperate and fearful is that the Russian army successfully conquered the biological laboratory hidden in Ukraine with the purpose of exterminating human beings, and has a large amount of ironclad evidence that the United States has long denied the secret development of biological weapons.

…

Russia’s just actions against [NATO] expansion, encirclement, and hegemony have been supported by all peace-loving forces. To measure the outcome of a war, it is not just a simple comparison of offensive and defensive situations, casualties, and positional gains and losses, but more importantly, the political underpinnings and goals of combat operations. In this contest, Russia represented the interests of the majority of the people and did not hesitate to sacrifice its nation. It not only safeguarded Russia’s own national security and strategic frontiers, but also destroyed the nest of the U.S. biological laboratories in Ukraine, exposing the evil face of the U.S. against humanity. This is a victory for Russia and a great victory for the cause of contemporary world peace and human progress. No matter what tests will be faced in the future, Russia’s brilliant achievements will be glorified in the annals of history.

Source: “中国驻乌克兰前⼤使⾼⽟⽣：俄乌战争的⾛势和对国际秩序的影响 (Former PRC Ambassador to Ukraine Gao Yusheng: The Dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian War and the Implications for the International Order),” Phoenix News (PRC State affiliated media), 10 May 2022. https://archive.ph/20220510105105/https://news.ifeng.com/c/8Fu9YlXw7qR

The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most important international event of the post-Cold War period. It marks the end of the post-Cold War period and the beginning of a new international order. First, Russia has lost the initiative in the Russo-Ukrainian war and this failure is already apparent.

The main reasons why Russia is now heading towards defeat are:

First, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has always been in a historical process of continuous decline. This decline is first and foremost a continuation of the decline of the Soviet Union before the disintegration, and is also related to the mistakes of the Russian ruling clique in domestic and foreign policies. Western sanctions have intensified this process. The proposition of a so-called revival or revitalization of Russia under Putin’s leadership is totally false, and the decline of Russia has manifested in its economy, military, science and technology, politics, society and other fields, with serious negative consequences for the Russian military and its combat power.

Second, the failure of the Russian blitzkrieg and the failure to achieve a quick victory signaled the beginning of the Russian defeat. The Russian military’s economic and financial strength, which are not commensurate with its status as a so-called military superpower, could not support a high-tech war costing hundreds of millions of dollars a day. The embarrassing defeat of the Russian army due to its poverty was evident everywhere on the battlefield. Every day that the war continues represents a heavy burden for Russia.

Third, Russian military and economic advantages over Ukraine have been offset by the resilience of Ukraine and the huge, sustained and effective aid provided to Ukraine. The generational differences between Russia and the U.S. and other NATO countries in terms of weapons and technology, military concepts, and modes of warfare make the advantages and disadvantages of both sides even more pronounced.

Fourth, modern wars are necessarily hybrid wars, which encompass military, economic, political, diplomatic, public opinion, propaganda, intelligence, and information fields. Russia is not only in a passive position on the battlefield, but has also lost in other areas. This means that it is only a matter of time before Russia is finally. It is only a matter of time before Russia is finally defeated.Fifth, Russia is no longer in a position to determine when and how the war will end. Russia has already failed to end the war as soon as possible to preserve its gains. In this sense, Russia has lost its strategic leading position and the initiative.

China Expands Naval Expeditionary Capability With New Ship and Helicopter Variants

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Type 075 (Yushen) Amphibious Assault Ship.

Type 075 (Yushen) Amphibious Assault Ship.

“The [Guangxi’s] complement of amphibious vehicles, tanks and helicopters is more complete and efficient in ship-to-shore movement.”

Captain Xu Ce [许策] – Captain of the Guangxi

China’s state-run television CCTV7 recently showed the Guangxi, China’s second Type 075 (Yushen) Amphibious Assault Ship, or a landing helicopter dock (LHD) in U.S. parlance, participating in workup exercises.  The second of its class, the Guangxi incorporates refinements learned from the development of the Hainan, China’s first Type 075.  Per China’s ship naming conventions, the amphibious ship is named after a Chinese province.  As noted by Captain Xu in state-run media outlet The Paper, the ship’s crew was able to quickly bring new systems online and begin training.  The Type 075 class LHDs can carry 1,687 troops and 30 helicopters, as well as two Type 726 air-cushion landing craft (see: “China: Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Launched,” OE Watch, November 2019).  The Type 075 class LHDs also have a defensive suite that includes HHQ-10 missile launchers, similar to the U.S. SeaRAM system; two 30mm H/PJ-11 CIWS; as well as jammers, chaff, and decoy launchers.

China is building multiple additional Type 075s, with the goal of fielding an extensive expeditionary force capable of executing “three-dimensional operations” involving power projection through air, sea, and amphibious land from multiple directions.  The growing force will complement the Chinese Navy’s rapidly expanding Marine Corps, which has grown from two divisions less than a decade ago to six operational brigades according to public reporting. In a related development, according to Chinese blog and media outlet Sina, the Z-20, a medium multi-role helicopter derived from the S-70 Blackhawk has entered service with the Chinese Navy.  The helicopter, which has superior capabilities compared to China’s indigenous Z-8 and Z-9 helicopters, has already entered widespread use in China’s ground force, but the apparent induction of navalized variants for anti-submarine warfare and other roles is a significant development, particularly for China’s naval expeditionary force.

Sources:

Nan Boyi, [南博一], ‘两栖攻击舰 广西舰’ 首次公开亮相，进一步提升海军两栖战力 (Amphibious assault ship “Guangxi Ship” made its first public appearance, further enhancing the naval amphibious combat capability),” The Paper (state affiliated media outlet), 21 April 2022. hxxps://j.eastday.com/p/1650522083043935

Recently, the Guangxi, a newly commissioned amphibious assault ship began basic training exercises, focusing on the requirements of future amphibious operations and expeditionary operations, while continuing to test the crew on essential tasks such as navigation, damage control and other subjects.

From its appearance, it can be seen that the Guangxi (hull number 32) is the same class as the Hainan, China’s first Type 075 amphibious assault ship (LHD).

According to a previous report by Xinhua News Agency, the Hainan (hull number 31) was launched in Shanghai on September 25, 2019.

According to previous CCTV reports, China’s first indigenously developed [class of LHDs] can carry amphibious armored vehicles, multi-role helicopters, hovercraft and tanks, and is equipped with missiles, naval guns, electronic warfare and other weapon systems.

Source: “国防军事早报 (Morning Report on Defense),” CCTV 7 (state TV military channel), 22 April 2022.

On April 22, CCTV Channel 7’s “Military Report” program displayed a images of an anti-submarine variant of the Z-20 helicopter taking off and landing on a Type 055 destroyer….The Z-20 is a new generation of 10-ton tactical general-purpose transport helicopters independently developed by China. It made its public debut at the 70th National Day military parade in 2019.

Source: “直-20反潜直升机首次公开，将进一步提升海军反潜能力 (Z-20 ASW Aircraft Publicly Shown for the First Time, Advancing the PLA Navy’s Anti-Submarine Capability),”Sina (Chinese blog and news outlet), 23 April 2022. hxxps://news.sina.com.cn/c/2022-04-23/doc-imcwipii5939966.shtml

Image Information:

Image: Type 075 (Yushen) Amphibious Assault Ship
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Creator, Peter Wood, grants permission to use

China’s PLA Explores “Battlefield Metaverse” Training Base To Simulate Future Warfare

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“In the face of the surging wave of new technological revolution, military construction can continue to develop and advance only by adhering to integrity and innovation. Keeping an eye on the frontiers of scientific and technological development, constantly absorbing the latest scientific and technological achievements, and applying them to the practice of military reform and preparation for military struggle in a timely manner are the only way and effective measures to win future wars.”

According to a recent article in the official People’s Liberation Army Daily newspaper, the PLA has been reforming its training methods to enhance combat capabilities and create realistic combat environments for troops, in part to overcome a lack of combat experience.  The PLA believes that a “battlefield metaverse” simulating future combat environments can be created where troops can experience a future multi-domain space approaching actual combat conditions.  Such a complex, dynamic, and harsh battlefield environment requires the use of advanced technologies such as virtual reality, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, brain-computer interface technologies, “super bionic” technology, and the Internet of Things.  

The PLA describes a metaverse as a highly technologically developed virtual world existing in parallel and reacting to the real world.  The battlefield metaverse can simulate the effects of new concept weapons such as meteorological weapons creating harsh environments or an unmanned “blue army” to prepare troops in a complex immersive environment.

Creating such a battlefield metaverse to simulate future warfare would not only increase unit combat capabilities.  It would also improve tactics and test emerging technologies required to prepare for and win future military struggles.  The PLA currently employs Battle Labs for testing tactics and new technologies, but short of actual combat, a truly immersive experience would better prepare troops to win future conflicts.

Source:

“Create a realistic and applicable ‘battlefield metaverse’ (打造逼真适用的“战场元宇宙),” PLA Daily (official People’s Liberation Army newspaper), 14 April 2022, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-04/14/content_313630.htm

In recent years, with the development of information network technology, various new terms, new concepts and new things emerge one after another. After big data, cloud computing, Internet of things and blockchain, the “meta universe” has attracted more and more attention.In fact, “metaverse” is not a new term. It originated from a sci-fi concept in the novel “Avalanche” 30 years ago, and now refers to the Internet applications and social life forms that are formed by technologies such as extended reality, digital twins, blockchain, and artificial intelligence. Although it is not known how the “metaverse” will develop in the future, it at least provides us with an idea: with a series of advanced technologies such as the Internet of Things, blockchain, artificial intelligence, etc., it is possible to create a “battlefield element” that simulates future wars. “Universe” provides a super space-time environment that combines virtual reality and Internet of Things for training and preparing for war.

China’s PLA Increasing Use of Simulators and Simulations

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“In order to build a real training scene to the greatest extent, the brigade makes comprehensive use of photoelectric, information, audio, virtual reality and other technologies to simulate the actual feeling of equipment operation, set up a variety of combat environments and complex special situations, ensure that officers and soldiers of different specialties can be effectively tempered in a near real operating environment, and promote the rapid generation of combat effectiveness. At the same time, the simulation training platform can flexibly set the training difficulty, and automatically store the operation process, time, and other training data to further improve the training quality and efficiency. It is understood that relying on the simulation training platform, many new soldiers of the brigade have obtained work qualification certificates, and the talent training cycle has been significantly shortened.”

Several recent articles published in the People’s Liberation Army Daily highlight the increased use of training simulators and simulations to improve unit training, lower training costs, reduce wear on equipment during field training, and enhance unit combat capabilities.   A combined brigade of the 74th Group Army in the Southern Theater Command employs simulator platforms for driver and firepower training.  The armor simulator provides training for desert, jungle, snow, and other complex environments encountered in the Southern Theater.  The first article claims that using simulators accelerates the training cycle for crew members compared to field training, providing practical experience and training qualification certificates.  Simulator platforms include multi-function, networked training systems for armor, artillery and other combat disciplines.  The article also indicates that the increased use of simulators provides both quality training and an efficient means to rapidly generate combat power within units.

The second People’s Liberation Army Daily article illustrates how the Southern Theater Navy uses simulations to boost the combat capability of its destroyer detachments.  The destroyer formation found that use of training simulations was an efficient means to supplement actual combat training.  Units can execute various operational scenarios and missions including logistics functions.   The third??? excerpted article from People’s Liberation Army Daily examines standardization of military medical simulation platforms for medical support at the brigade and battalion level.  The combat medical system is a pilot project by the Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission.  The article states that the system consists of multiple pieces of equipment simulating various injuries, wound treatment, and wartime rescue.  The brigade-level system provides medical training for advanced first aid and some emergency treatment.  The battalion-level system provides medical training for basic treatment of battlefield casualties.

Sources:

“第74集团军某旅: 模拟训练平台加快人才成长(A brigade of the 74th Group Army: Simulation training platform accelerates talent growth),” People’s Liberation Army Daily (official news outlet of the PLA), 4 April 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-04/04/content_312941.htm

The leader of the brigade said that the traditional training model has a long training cycle and slow accumulation of practical experience. It takes a long time to train a qualified combatant. In order to effectively solve this problem, they actively innovated training methods, and introduced simulation training platforms in accordance with the idea of ​​”multi-functional training systems, networked training platforms, and practical training standards”, covering armor, artillery and other major combat disciplines, officers and soldiers. You can complete a variety of equipment operation training in the virtual environment, and quickly master the basic skills of professional operation.

Source: “南部战区海军某驱逐舰支队模拟训练助推实战能力提升(Simulation training of a Southern Theater Navy destroyer detachment enhances actual combat capability),” People’s Liberation Army Daily (official news outlet of the PLA), 11 April 2022. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2022-04/11/content_4908646.htm

“The combination of overseas training and indoor simulation training has effectively improved the technical and tactical level of officers and soldiers,” said the leader of the detachment. Not long ago, they conducted a maritime confrontation exercise. When encountering “enemy” ships, the officers and soldiers seized the opportunity to occupy a favorable position and carried out fire strikes, successfully reversing the passive situation.”

Source: “全军规范旅营卫勤战救模拟训练器材配备标准 (All army standardization of combat rescue simulation training equipment for brigade and battalion medical service),” People’s Liberation Army Daily (official news outlet of the PLA), 10 April 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-04/10/content_313260.htm

The battlefield medical aid simulation training equipment is mainly used to simulate common injuries in wartime and provide relatively realistic training conditions for military personnel, which is of significance for the generation of wartime rescue capabilities….

The standards include11 types of simulation training equipment for the battlefield medical aid in 6 categories, basically covering the primary first aid, advanced first aid, and some early treatment requirements as specified in the provisions on medical aid in wartime.

Among others, the military medical aid training platform at battalion level, equipped with two types of simulation training equipment for CPR and field first-aid, mainly functions to provide training for self-rescue and mutual medical aid skills for service members, including ventilation, hemostasis, bandaging, fixing, transferring, CPR, respiratory tract opening and respiratory maintenance.

The military medical aid training platform at brigade level mainly serves for advanced first aid and some emergency treatment simulation training targeting medical professionals. It is equipped with 6 types of simulation training equipment for CPR, advanced airway management, puncture training, and so on.

Chinese Observations on the Role and Impact of Social Media in Cognitive Warfare

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“Cognitive warfare through social media can directly interfere with relevant government decisions and influence the direction of the war.”

Drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, Chinese military strategists see social media as a highly effective tool in both warfare and politics.  The accompanying excerpted article published in the nationalistic-leaning Chinese daily Huanqui Shibao notes that cognitive warfare is playing a historic role in shaping the war, which is the first time combatants have incorporated it into a large-scale physical conflict.  The author notes that cognitive warfare tactics such as “deepfakes” and “accelerationism” over social media deliberately manipulated the world’s emotions and collective consciousness to sway public opinion and exacerbate polarization.  He notes that social media has elevated the role and effectiveness of cognitive warfare to new heights.  It has interfered with government decisions and influenced the direction of the war.

According to the author, cognitive warfare extends beyond propaganda and psychological warfare.  It can be carried out in conjunction with both the physical and information domains.  It can be used in wartime or peacetime and on a daily basis.  It can be waged through public diplomacy, academic exchanges, culture and art, or simply hidden in seemingly innocuous areas such as social media.  The author also describes how cognitive warfare has evolved through technological advances.  The digital technology available during the 1991 Gulf War allowed round-the-clock, real-time televised coverage of wartime events as they unfolded.  This play-by-play coverage had a psychological impact on the entire world, which helped to shape the narrative, but not the outcome, of the war.  Three decades later social media is seen as a weapon in the Ukraine conflict.

Source:

Sun Jiashan, “俄乌冲突中认知战对我们的启示 (What Cognitive Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Teaches Us),” Global Times (daily newspaper known for its nationalistic take on world affairs), 10 March 2022. https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/477wrRCvjHx. 

The role and effectiveness of cognitive warfare based on social media in the Russia-Ukraine war has reached new historical heights since the 1991 Gulf War.

More than 30 years have passed since the 1991 Gulf War, but we still have a clear visual image of it because, for the first time in history, television media had followed it every step. The information technology that allowed round the clock digital broadcasting of modern warfare by the American television media had a great psychological impact on the entire world.

The 1991 Gulf War, despite near-live digital broadcasting of the war, (however), only offered a narrative of the war and had no direct impact on the war itself. The biggest difference between the role and effectiveness of the 1991 Gulf War and the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that the advent of social media has affected the media and directly impacting the war. Whether it was the so-called “Ghost of Kyiv,” in which it was eventually revealed that footage had been taken from an air combat simulation game at the beginning of the conflict… or the spreading of rumors such as the Nuclear leak of the Zaporozhye nuclear plant… “deepfake,” “accelerationism,” and other cognitive warfare tactics, which can impact cognition through social media, are now being applied in large-scale situations over the course of the war.

…cognitive warfare can no longer be simply seen as propaganda warfare and psychological warfare (as it was previously)…. Cognitive warfare through social media can directly interfere with relevant government decisions and influence the direction of the war. This has been a historical wake-up call for us by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

New Development in PLA Close Air Support

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The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles.

The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles.

“In view of the issue of air combat support, they organized special training for command, reconnaissance and special operations officers and soldiers of the services and arms, compiled training materials, arranged specialized forces such as flight instructors and aviation engineers to give lectures, carried out inspection and training based on tactical live fire, and improved the joint quality of officers and soldiers in one move.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force recognizes strikes close to maneuver units are difficult and is taking steps to improve their efficacy. The accompanying excerpt from a recent PLA Daily article discusses a new development to improve PLA combat effectiveness by training Army officers from reconnaissance units to provide guidance for air-to-ground strikes.  The PLA Air Force defines “close air fire support” as air strikes in support of the Army or Navy against enemy forward and shallow targets, usually according to a predetermined plan.  Strike targets are those that directly affect the maneuver unit.  Key enemy targets for air strikes include tactical missiles, artillery, armor groupings, landing ships, fire support ships, command posts, communications facilities, and ammunition and oil depots.  Target guidance groups identify the target, time, and other requirements, coordinating with Army maneuver and fire support units in the area.  The target guidance group designates the target via radio communication using landmarks, smoke, and other means.

The PLA Air Force has sent these target guidance groups from bomber and air assault units to the Army and Navy to coordinate and guide air strikes against surface targets.  The team leader is usually flight personnel with staff that includes combat pilot and communications personnel.  They guide the aircraft to the target, providing parameters such as time and distance, as well as observe the strike effect and correct for subsequent strikes.

However, the PLA Air Force has too few target guidance groups to provide to the Army or Navy and is working to remedy this problem.  The article describes a base in the Western Theater Command Air Force that is training Army officers from reconnaissance units to provide guidance for air-to-ground strikes.  Reportedly hundreds of guidance personnel from different military branches including command, reconnaissance, and special operations officers and troops have been trained.  In one training event, a guide designated a camouflaged enemy command post that an aircraft struck with precision munitions.  At the same time, the article states that problems remained between the services in the integration of data standards, terminology, and tactical understanding.  An example was a failed training event where aircraft could not strike the intended target due to poor communications signals and a misunderstanding in terminology despite advanced planning.  Training of Army personnel to provide target guidance removes the burden from the Air Force and likely will increase the ability of ground maneuver units to call in close air support against targets that artillery cannot address.  The article also states that this development will increase jointness across the PLA.

Source:

“A Base of the Western Theater Air Force Improves the Terminal Execution Capability of the Joint Operations System of Systems – Army Guides are Active at the Air Force Drill Grounds (西部战区空军某基地提升联合作战体系末端执行力 — 陆军引导员活跃在空军演兵场)” People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 20, 2021, February 10, 2020. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-02/10/content_309058.htm

Taking combat training and jointness as a guideline, we must implement the concept of joint training to all levels of strategy, campaign and tactics, and solve the problems existing in the training field to a certain extent, such as joint immobility, joint incompatibility and joint disjointedness and other problems. In particular, we should solve the chronic disease of “form and spirit are not connected” at the end of combat effectiveness, so as to lay a good foundation and gather strength for the gradual development of higher-stage joint training. A base of the air force in the Western Theater has promoted the front-line officers and soldiers of the services and arms to improve their joint literacy and joint combat skills, which is worthy of recognition.

Image Information:

Image: The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles
Source: https://tinyurl.com/yc3p7atc
Attribution: Wiki Commons