Author Archives: Timothy Thomas

“Russia On The Nature Of Future Conflict: Is This An Opening Discussion Of Russia’s New Military Doctrine?” by Timothy Thomas and Harold Orenstein (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Soviet Union stated that military doctrine “contains two closely interlinked and interdependent aspects—a socio-political aspect and a military-technical aspect.”1 The socio-political aspect contains the greatest stability while the military-technical aspect encompasses matters directly pertaining to military organizational development and technical equipment. It helps determine the forms and methods for conducting operations.2

Likewise, the dictionary states that the character/nature of war is composed of socio- political and military-technical components (the 2007 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Eksmo, did not define the term). The socio-political aspect includes economic and socio-political causes, conflicts which led to war’s occurrence, class thrusts and political aims of belligerents, and the degree to which these aims are in conformity with social progress. This character of the socio- political component may change during a war’s course. The military-technical component of war’s character includes conventional and nuclear military hardware, the forms and methods of the conduct of military operations, and the scope, scale, and duration of war.3 While dated, the definitions offer most of the basic elements of these concepts today. Even though the article that follows is about the nature of future conflict, it should be kept in mind that the analysis is also about how Russian military authors may be sizing up their next version of military doctrine.

“Russian Planning Visions for Large-Scale Warfare: “Planetary, Theater, and Territorial” Considerations” By Timothy Thomas (May 2021)

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Due primarily to geographic and threat variances, Russia’s military conducts geostrategic
planning differently from the United States. Russia is faced with a set of threats, real and
imagined, from several vectors across a huge expanse of territory with a rather small population, factors which the U.S. does not confront. This directly impacts the style of planning for the Russian military, as US and NATO planning models do not directly apply. Those seeking to understand Russia ignore these differences at their own peril.

This paper examines numerous aspects of Russia’s planning concepts that indicate how the
nation’s Defense Ministry has chosen to confront perceived Western and other territorial
challenges. U.S. planning is contrasted against Russian planning in some areas. For Russia,
primary planning concepts and organizations include the following:
* Theater of war (TV)
* Theater of military operations (TVD)
* Theater strategic operation
* Military districts
* Strategic region
* Strategic direction/axis
* Operational design
* Territorial defense forces.

After analyzing the Russian model, the conclusion reached is that Russia’s geostrategic planning for the initial period of war is underway and, if conflict erupts, the nation will be better prepared to gain the initiative than it has been in the past. Historically Russia has been caught unprepared for future conflicts, and President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov want to bypass that potential fate.

“Russia’s Conduct of War: How and with What Assets” by Timothy Thomas (2021-04-13)

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In 2019, during a presentation at the Russian Academy of Military Science, General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov summarized his presentation on strategy with the following statement:

The main thing for military science today is the cutting-edge, continuous, goal-oriented research to determine the possible nature of military conflicts, develop a system of forms and methods of operation of both a military and nonmilitary nature, and determine trends for the development of weapons and military equipment systems.

2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

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2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

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The following summary first offers several ways that Russian theorists have defined a robot, starting in 1991. Second, the analysis compares Russian and U.S. approaches to employing robotics (from a Russian perspective) as well as tasks and principles of their use. Third, some of the uses of robotics in Russia are detailed, focusing on descriptions in military periodicals—in urban environments, in conjunction with engineer support, in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, with artillery, and their use in Syria. Fourth, legal and organizational issues of contention are examined that affect robotic use worldwide and regarding Russia. Fifth, the numerous problem areas are covered that Russia has encountered in its development of robotic capabilities, followed by a few conclusions. There are two appendixes. Appendix One lists some robotic employment principles and Appendix Two offers some photos of robots under development in Russia along with their operating parameters (and several not shown in the photographs).

“Russian Electronic, Information, Navigation, And Reconnaissance-Strike And -Fire Operations: Definitions And Use” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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Russia has been investigating a host of strike and fire concepts for at least a few decades, with one of the first reconnaissance-strike discussions documented in 1984. The quotation above indicates that reconnaissance-strike is not the only strike means under consideration in Russia, and that the number has increased over the years. In terms of terminology and context, Russia’s strike and fire forms are different from those of other nations. The forms under discussion in Russia are radio-electronic-strikes (REU) and radio-electronic-fire strikes (REOU), information-strike and – fire operations (IUO for strike operations, no abbreviation offered for -fire operations), remotely controlled cyber operations (RCW, which appear to be part of information-strikes), navigation strikes, and reconnaissance-strike1 F2 and -fire complexes (RUK and ROK, respectively).

“The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries Of 2010-2017: What Did They Teach Us About Russia’s New Way Of War?” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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From 2010 to 2017 Russian Colonel (reserves) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov wrote 13 interesting articles in the journal Military Thought (nine of them are summarized below) that had a major impact on how Western analysts understood Russian military affairs and way of war. Though the authors have not written publicly since 2017, their impact continues to be felt as the West grapples with how to confront Russian activities across all domains. Asymmetric and indirect actions, the initial period of war, deterrence, military art, forecasting, strategy, new generation warfare, and other topics were discussed, ending with an article in 2017 discussing war in the 21st century. Numerous aspects of these themes remain under discussion in Russia.

Russian Military Art and Advanced Weaponry (Timothy Thomas)

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Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has continually requested that the Academy of Military Science provide him with ideas about new forms and methods of warfare. One source defined “methods” as the use of weaponry and military art. Weaponry is now advanced and is characterized by new speeds, ranges, and agilities, which introduce new ways for Russian commanders to apply force. Military art takes into consideration advanced weaponry’s contributions to conflict along with a combination of both old and new combat experiences, the creativity and innovative capabilities of commanders, and new ways for considering or adding to the principles of military art (mass, surprise, etc.).

In its simplest form, Russian military art is the development of recommendations for the application of military and nonmilitary actions. Military art changes in accordance with contemporary developments. Proof of this statement lies in the various and unexpected ways that Russian forces can now disorganize an opponent’s command and control systems, are developing strategic aerospace axes for deep operations, are considering new forms of maneuver and geophysical weaponry, and are developing new applications of electronic warfare and military stratagems. In addition, Russian military art avoids stereotyping, which along with several other items have serious implications for commanders of multi-domain operations (MDO) to take into consideration.

This study expands discussion of all these issues.

The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed? (Timothy L. Thomas)

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The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed? (Timothy L. Thomas)

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The Chinese way of war has changed dramatically from what it was 20 years ago, but that does not mean everything is new. Some components of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) historic thought (deception, stratagems, etc.) remain as important elements and are being integrated into technologies. However, China’s intelligentization of operations and focus on joint and all-domain capabilities (to include some domains not currently under consideration in the US) create new challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) is now being used to help design warfare and provide control over conflicts, ensuring that the PLA has a future deterrent force to confront other nations. It appears that China will remain a formidable opponent for many years to come.

“Russia’s “New” Military Theory: Updating Classical and Asymmetric Techniques” by Timothy Thomas (2020-04-01)

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A new understanding of warfare appears under development in Russia. Whether it is actually “new” is open for discussion, but ideas were advanced by Russia’s top leadership indicating that is the case. In June 2019 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated that modern conflict requires new approaches and that developing a new theory of warfare is the main task of the Armed Forces. Shoygu offered that “conflicts of a new generation involve a combination of classical and asymmetrical methods of conducting armed combat, where hostilities are fleeting, and there is simply no time for correcting mistakes.”[1] He added that new reconnaissance assets, along with weapons based on hypersonic and laser energy technologies, are impacting the forms and methods of troop operations.

[1] No author or title provided, Interfax, 18 June 2019.

“Russian Information and Propaganda Activities” by Timothy Thomas (2020-04-31)

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Russia has long been captivated by the power of information as a weapon, most notably in a historical sense using propaganda to influence and persuade audiences. With the onset of the information age, the concept’s development and application increased dramatically. The power of information-technologies when applied to weaponry increased the latter’s capabilities due to increased reconnaissance and precision applications. The power of social media was used to influence populations both at home and abroad. Both developments fit perfectly into Russia’s information warfare concept, whose two aspects are information-technical and information-psychological capabilities. Information’s universality, covertness, variety of software and hardware forms and implementation, efficiency of use when choosing a time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make it a formidable commodity when assessed as weaponry.