Author Archives: Ryan Berg

El Salvador’s State of Emergency Marks One Year With No End in Sight

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 Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele delivers a speech on security policy.

 Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele delivers a speech on security policy.

“The state of exception suspends various constitutional guarantees. It allows arbitrary arrests without a warrant, interrupts freedom of association, the right to legal defense, and extends the term of administrative detention to 15 days (when it is normally 72 hours). Under this special regime, the government brought thousands of soldiers and police onto the streets to carry out mass captures. Bukele arrested more than 65,000 suspected gang members, according to official figures, although multiple organizations estimate that thousands could be innocent.”

As part of an effort to fight the notorious MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele declared a special state of emergency suspending habeas corpus and incarcerating fully 2 percent of the country’s adult population.[i] Recently, Bukele’s state of emergency turned one year old, reports France24, the public-private media partnership associated with the French state. The outlet details how popular the plan is among Salvadorans, reporting they appear willing to accept curtailment of rights in favor of greater security from the country’s gangs, suggesting El Salvador’s state of emergency is unlikely to end anytime soon.

Throughout his tenure, Bukele has shifted his strategy for fighting transnational organized crime, reports El Faro, the Salvadoran investigative outlet often at odds with the president. At the beginning of his presidency, El Faro broke the news that Bukele had negotiated a secret pact with the country’s gangs, seeking to lower the homicide rate and earn their political support in exchange for turning a blind eye to drug trafficking and other activities. After a spate of murders in March 2022, however, Bukele terminated the informal agreement and reversed course drastically. The media outlet reports a decline in homicides in many neighborhoods throughout the country. The perceived success fo Bukele’s crime-fighting strategy has inspired so-called “Plan Bukeles”—as multiple leaders repeat calls to imitate El Salvador’s internal security plan.[ii] Fighting transnational criminal organizations by deprioritizing human rights and allowing presidents to accrete greater power during states of emergency also risks democratic backsliding and consolidating authoritarian political projects.

Source: 

“Qué ha pasado en El Salvador tras un año bajo el régimen de excepción (What has happened in El Salvador after a year under the emergency regime?),” France24 (the public-private media partnership associated with the French state), 28 March 2023. https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20230327-qu%C3%A9-ha-pasado-en-el-salvador-tras-un-a%C3%B1o-bajo-el-r%C3%A9gimen-de-excepci%C3%B3n

After a year of emergency regime, El Salvador has not come out of its ‘war against gangs.’ The state of exception was originally approved at the end of March 2022 and was implemented by President Nayib Bukele to fight gang violence in the country…Since then, it has been renewed twelve times by the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador…a number that contrasts with what is permitted constitutionally…The Constitution of the Republic establishes very clearly that the emergency regime can only be extended once, that is, for 30 days.

“El año en el que la excepción se convirtió en la norma (The year the exception became the norm),” El Faro (the Salvadoran investigative outlet often at odds with the president), 23 December 2022. https://elfaro.net/es/202212/el_salvador/26652/lo-mejor-y-lo-mas-leido-en-este-ano-bajo-regimen.htm Bukele found his political crusade in the state of emergency in the face of the announcement that he would make six months later, his desire to run for re-election in 2024, violating several articles of the Constitution. Since then, brandishing his state of emergency, Bukele has presented himself as the strongman who will put an end to the criminal groups that have been bleeding and extorting Salvadorans for decades. Since March 2022, more than 60,000 Salvadorans have been detained, doubling the country’s prison population in nine months.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Bukele’s security plan and its impact on the country, and especially its democracy, see: “Democracy Dies Under Mano Dura: Anti-Crime Strategies in the Northern Triangle,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 April 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/democracy-dies-under-mano-dura-anti-crime-strategies-northern-triangle

[ii] For more information on the popularity of “Plan Bukele” regionwide, see: “Nayib Bukele’s Growing List of Latin American Admirers,” Americas Quarterly, 16 February 2023. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/nayib-bukeles-growing-list-of-latin-american-admirers/

Image Information:

Image: Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele delivers a speech on security policy.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Discurso_de_Nayib_Bukele.jpg  
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-SA 4.0

Colombia’s “Total Peace” Negotiations Face New Hurdles

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Senate President Roy Barreras at the inauguration ceremony of Colombian President Gustavo Petro.

Senate President Roy Barreras at the inauguration ceremony of Colombian President Gustavo Petro.

“The president of the Congress, Roy Barreras, expressed his concern about the rumors that are gaining more strength every day and that are related to alleged charges that include Nicolás Petro and the efforts of drug traffickers to benefit from the “total peace” policy of President Gustavo Petro.”

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro arrived in office in the summer of 2022 promising a radical change in the way the government deals with criminal organizations, touting a broad-based peace plan with the country’s remaining guerrilla groups. Petro calls his plan “Total Peace,” which seeks to end six decades of armed conflict that has left hundreds of thousands dead.[i] According to the excerpted article in Columbia’s major newspaper, El Tiempo, Columbia’s Attorney General has opened an investigation into Petro’s son, Nicolás, as well as the President’s brother, Juan Fernando, for alleged corruption related to the peace negotiations. The two men stand accused of accepting bribes from criminal organizations seeking to profit from the peace negotiations before they started. Columbia’s largest weekly, Semana, also reported that Roy Barreras, Colombia’s Senate president and a key ally of Petro’s, has asked the government to suspend the talks. Barreras’ support of Petro’s Total Peace plan is critical since reduced sentences to members of criminal organizations who surrender themselves, hand over earnings, and reveal drug trafficking routes cannot be granted without Colombia’s Congress first passing enabling legislation granting the authority to reduce sentences. The investigation of Petro’s son and brother, as well as Barreras’ apparent shift away from the Total Peace plan, cast serious doubt on Petro’s signature policy of achieving peace with guerrillas and criminal organizations, with which the government has already entered a ceasefire.

Sources:

“Procuraduría le abre investigación a Nicolás Petro por acusaciones sobre campaña (Attorney General opens investigation into Nicolás Petro for campaign accusations),” El Tiempo (the daily with the highest circulation in Colombia), 3 March 2023. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/nicolas-petro-procuraduria-abre-investigacion-contra-hijo-del-presidente-747067

The ex-wife of Nicolás Petro assured in an interview…that President Petro’s eldest son allegedly received money from Santander Lopesierra, “El hombre Malboro” and Alfonso “El Turco Hilsaca,” both former defendants of Colombian justice, for the presidential campaign… According to the woman’s version, Petro’s son received them at his apartment in Barranquilla and there they gave him one billion pesos.

“Roy Barreras le pide al presidente Petro suspender cualquier tipo de diálogo con narcotraficantes (Roy Barreras asks President Petro to suspend any type of dialogue with drug traffickers),” Semana (the largest weekly magazine in Colombia), 6 March 2023. https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/atencion-roy-barreras-le-pide-al-presidente-petro-suspender-cualquier-tipo-de-dialogo-con-narcotraficantes/202338/  The president of the Congress, Roy Barreras, expressed his concern about the rumors that are gaining more strength every day and that are related to alleged charges that include Nicolás Petro and the efforts of drug traffickers to benefit from the “total peace” policy of President Gustavo Petro. For this reason, Barreras asked the Colombian president to stop negotiations and thus any possibility that there are people who profit from peace…“I ask to suspend the official or unofficial negotiation dialogue with the drug traffickers, as it must be clear that they are not necessary,” he said.

Notes: 

[i]For an understanding of the broad contours of Petro’s plan, see: Ryan Berg, “Colombia Deemphasizing Coca Eradication in Counterdrug Strategy,” OE Watch, 03-2023, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437260; Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Congress Authorizes “Total Peace” Negotiation With Guerrilla and Criminal Groups,” OE Watch, 01-2023, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434199

Image Information:

Image: Senate President Roy Barreras at the inauguration ceremony of Colombian President Gustavo Petro
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/142236467@N07/52274493713  
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY 2.0

Western Efforts To Isolate Russia and Iran Falter in Latin America

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Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

“In recent days, Russian media in Spanish, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of…Berlin. ‘The arms race in Ukraine does not have the support of South America,’ the outlets declared.”

Latin American countries have often spoken in terms of “neutrality” as they have tried to remain “non-aligned” regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.[i] While some countries in the region have condemned Russia’s invasion, none has joined the Western-led sanctions campaign. Nor has any of the six Latin American countries with old Soviet weaponry stepped forward to donate it to Ukraine. Underscoring these trends is the first article from the Spanish-language outlet BBC Mundo, covering German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. At each stop, Scholz implored his counterparts to consider donating their Soviet weapons systems to Ukraine.[ii] All three leaders firmly declined. For his part, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva even blamed both Russia and Ukraine for the current conflict. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he would rather see Colombia’s equipment become “junk” than send it to Ukraine where it could prolong the war. Latin American countries have been similarly reluctant to turn away from Iran. According to the second accompanying article from Argentina’s leading daily newspaper, La Nación, two Iranian warships sanctioned by the United States recently docked in Rio de Janeiro. Taken together, these developments suggest neither Russia’s war in Ukraine nor Iran’s domestic crackdowns on protestors and its provision of kamikaze drones to Russia for use in Ukraine have managed to isolate these countries in Latin America.

Sources:

“Por qué los países latinoamericanos se han negado a enviar armas a Ucrania (Why Latin American countries have refused to send weapons to Ukraine),” BBC Mundo (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular British state-owned network), 3 February 2023. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-64506590

During a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is visiting several Latin American countries this week, Fernández clarified that Argentina “is not thinking of sending weapons” to the conflict zone. A few days earlier, his peers in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil had made similar claims…In recent days, Russian media in Spanish such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of Berlin.

“Brasil permite que dos buques de guerra iraníes atraquen en Río pese a las presiones de EE.UU (Brazil allows two Iranian warships to dock in Rio despite US pressure),” La Nación (Argentina’s leading daily newspaper), 28 February 2023. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/brasil-permite-que-dos-buques-de-guerra-iranies-atraquen-en-rio-pese-a-las-presiones-de-eeuu-nid28022023/

Once Lula’s trip [to the White House] ended, the docking of the ships was authorized. Vice Admiral Carlos Eduardo Horta Arentz, deputy chief of the Brazilian Navy General Staff, gave his approval for the ships to dock in Rio between February 26 and March 4, according to an announcement published on February 23…The Brazilian Navy authorizes a foreign ship to dock in Brazil, but only with prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes into account the request of the embassy in question and the logistics…Diplomacy with Iran was one of the highlights of Lula’s attempts to bolster Brazil’s international position during his previous presidential terms. In 2010, he traveled to Tehran to meet then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as he tried to broker a US-Iran nuclear deal.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Latin America’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America Has Been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more information on the estimated six countries in the region that could donate Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine, see: Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Pushing Central, South American Countries to Give Ukraine Quick Military Boost,” Voice of America, 20 January 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-pushing-central-south-american-countries-to-give-ukraine-quick-military-boost-/6927591.html

Image Information:

Image:  Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ceremony_to_welcome_the_33rd_and_send-off_the_34th_naval_groups_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Navy_%2813%29.jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-4.0

Chinese Spy Balloon Over Latin America Elicits Minimal Response

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Chinese surveillance balloon hovers over the Americas.

Chinese surveillance balloon hovers over the Americas.

“The Colombian Air Force said that the balloon did not present a threat to national security and defense and that it launched investigations to establish the origin of the object… Costa Rica also did not report threats to its national security.”

In February 2023, a Chinese surveillance balloon that traversed North American airspace captured the attention of policymakers and civil society in the United States and Canada for more than a week. In contrast, a similar balloon floating simultaneously over Latin America hardly garnered attention.[i] According to Spanish-language CNN Español, around the same time, a Chinese balloon passed over Costa Rica and Venezuela, ultimately hovering over Colombia’s northern region for some time. Regional coverage of the balloon over Latin America generally refers to the “balloon” without mentioning its capacity to conduct surveillance operations. According to reports in one of Colombia’s most important news dailies, El Tiempo, the Colombian air force discussed options to defend its airspace. In the end, however, Latin American leaders opted to observe the balloon’s passage rather than take action.The muted response from regional leaders is telling of their desire to remain out of the fray in an international order that they recognize is increasingly contested by China’s rise. It also comes months before important planned visits to China by the presidents of Colombia and Costa Rica, both of which are seeking development assistance.

Sources: 

“Lo que sabemos sobre el globo chino que sobrevoló Colombia y Costa Rica (What we know about the Chinese balloon that flew over Colombia and Costa Rica),” CNN Español (Spanish-language version of the popular U.S. news outlet), 7 February 2023. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2023/02/07/globo-chino-colombia-costa-rica-orix/

A spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted for the first time that a balloon seen over the skies of Latin America belongs to the country… Two Latin American countries reported that they saw a balloon transit in their skies. One of them was Colombia, whose Air Force reported that its National Air Defense System “detected an object above 55,000 feet, which entered Colombian airspace in the northern sector of the country.”…The Air Force said that the balloon did not present a threat to national security and defense and that it launched investigations to establish the origin of the object… Costa Rica also did not report threats to its national security.

“Globo espía chino: Colombia podría derribar objeto que entró al espacio aéreo? (Chinese spy balloon: Could Colombia shoot down an object that entered its airspace?),” El Tiempo (one of Colombia’s most important dailies), 7 February 2023. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/globo-espia-chino-colombia-podria-derribarlo-si-entro-al-espacio-aereo-739897  Colombia is another country where an object “similar to a balloon” passed into its airspace in recent days. According to the Colombian Air Force, it will react by constant monitoring of its airspace and looking to guard its national interest…While a range of potential responses was discussed, the balloon passed from the country’s airspace without representing “a threat to security and national defense” according to the Colombian Air Force.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the differences in regional coverage of the Chinese balloon over Latin America, see: Margaret Myers, “‘O Globo Chino’ Floats Over Latin America,” Wilson Center, February 10, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/globo-chino-floats-over-latin-america

Image Information:

Image: A Chinese surveillance balloon hovers over the Americas.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Balloon_over_MYR.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Colombia Deemphasizing Coca Eradication in Counterdrug Strategy

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An aerial eradication operation conducted by helicopter.

An aerial eradication operation conducted by helicopter.

“The government of Gustavo Petro is taking increasingly decisive steps to achieve the reversal in the drug policy that the president of Colombia proposed on the campaign trail.”

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro campaigned on a platform of changing the country’s policies toward illicit drugs,[i] and he is making good on that promise. According to Spain’s largest daily, El País, which has excellent coverage of Latin America,the Petro government has announced plans to reduce counterdrug strategic efforts aimed at forced eradication of coca. Previously, these efforts constituted some of the country’s main strategies to curb coca, the raw ingredient in cocaine. Instead, Petro plans to pursue drug traffickers, especially those who do not participate in the ongoing peace negotiations. As an outcome, an end to forced eradication means a far less ambitious effort to reduce the number of hectares under coca cultivation. In the second article, U.S.-funded Spanish language news service Voz de América reports that Colombia now aims to reduce a mere 20,000 hectares under coca cultivation, compared to 50,000 hectares, which was its goal in 2022. Petro’s predecessor, President Ivan Duque, eradicated 130,000 hectares of coca cultivation in 2020. Of note, since assuming office, Petro has also reversed course on fighting guerrilla groups and sought a broad truce with criminal organizations in a plan he calls “Total Peace.”[ii] Bridging the two concerns, the new, less ambitious coca eradication efforts will probably drive instability in Colombia and encourage criminal groups to control more territory to plant coca. Indeed, one outcome of this new counterdrug plan is that it has the potential to undercut Petro’s attempt to bring about “Total Peace” in the country.

Sources: 

“El vuelco de Petro en la política de drogas empieza por reducir la erradicación forzada de coca (Petro’s turnaround in drug policy begins by reducing the forced eradication of coca),” El País (Spain’s largest daily with excellent coverage of Latin America), 12 January 2023. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-01-12/el-vuelco-de-petro-en-la-politica-de-drogas-empieza-por-reducir-la-erradicacion-forzada-de-coca.html   

The government of Gustavo Petro is taking increasingly decisive steps to achieve the reversal in the drug policy that the president of Colombia proposed on the campaign trail. After having prepared the ground to bury once and for all the aerial spraying with glyphosate against coca crops, this week the National Police set its goal of eradicating illicit crops in 2023 at 20,000 hectares, a notable reduction of 60% with respect to the 50,000 that was proposed for 2022… At the end of 2021, the total area shot up from 143,000 to 204,000 hectares under cultivation, according to the latest annual report of the United Nations Integrated System for Monitoring Illicit Crops (Simci), the official measurement. Cocaine hydrochloride production potential reached 1,400 tons. Both are the highest figures since records were kept.

“Colombia anuncia reducción en su meta de erradicación de cultivos ilícitos (Colombia announces reduction in its goal of eradication of illicit crops),” Voz de América (the Spanish-language version of the state-owned network), 20 January 2023. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/colombia-anuncia-reduccion-meta-erradicacion-cultivos-ilicitos-/6927613.html Colombia reduced its goal of eradicating illicit crops to 20,000 hectares in 2023, a total of 30,000 fewer hectares compared to last year’s figure, which was set at 50,000… President Gustavo Petro has described the current anti-drug policy, which has been implemented since by previous governments, as a failure, and recently at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, once again assured that this is a failed policy – the main factor in the generation of violence in Colombia.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Petro’s campaign and his policy shift on illicit drugs, see: Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Gustavo Petro Promises New Approach to Security and Drugs,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428038; Missy Ryan, “In Test of Ties with U.S., Colombian Leader Proposes Shift on Drugs,” Washington Post, 27 September 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/27/united-states-colombia-drugs/

[ii] For more information on Petro’s views on guerrilla groups and Colombia’s security challenges more generally, see: Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Congress Authorizes “Total Peace” Negotiation With Guerrilla and Criminal Groups,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434199; Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Leftist President Seeks To Resume Negotiations With National Liberation Army,” OE Watch, 9-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425694; Christina Noriega, “Colombia’s Radical New Approach to Cocaine,” Foreign Policy, 30 October 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/30/colombia-cocaine-coca-industry-policy-war-drugs-gustavo-petro/

Image Information:

Image:  An aerial eradication operation conducted by helicopter.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/umpquawild/28702214956
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0


Venezuela’s Dictatorship Strengthens While Opposition Is in Disarray

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Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

“A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive.”

Venezuela’s long struggle against the Maduro dictatorship began 2023 with yet another setback. In 2019, the opposition established an interim government structure to push for a democratic transition in Venezuela, replete with an interim president (Juan Guaidó) who was recognized by nearly 60 countries. That experiment was recently terminated when three of the country’s four main opposition parties voted to dissolve the interim government structure, a move that had been rumored for several months.[i] Since voting to dissolve its own constitutional arrangement, the opposition to Maduro’s regime has fractured.[ii] According to an article from Peruvian media conglomerate Redacción RPP, three of the opposition parties voted to dissolve the structure because it had failed to achieve its objective of a democratic transition away from Maduro’s dictatorship. The article also notes that opacity in the financing and management of international assets had made some opposition legislators uneasy about extending the arrangement. The second excerpted article from Spanish daily La Voz de Galicia reports that the Maduro regime has transitioned to a more offensive posture after several years of being on the back foot, rattled by the opposition’s interim government structure that had been recognized by dozens of countries. Maduro is looking to reassert himself diplomatically and shore up key allies. The Maduro regime’s survival and strengthening serves as a conduit for Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in South America and the Caribbean because of their support for Maduro during the regime’s darkest days.[iii] Close security relationships with other authoritarian states mean that Venezuela will continue to represent a hemispheric security threat and an important staging ground for countries like Russia and Iran.

Sources: 

“Venezuela: El ‘Gobierno interino’ de Juan Guaidó se extinguió sin claridad en sus cuentas (Venezuela: The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó was extinguished without clarity in its accounts),” Redacción RPP (the largest radio and television broadcasting company in Peru), 10 January 2023. https://rpp.pe/mundo/actualidad/venezuela-el-gobierno-interino-de-juan-guaido-se-extinguio-sin-claridad-en-sus-cuentas-noticia-1459150?ref=rpp

The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó, eliminated… by the majority of the former deputies who supported him in 2019, leaves a shadow in Venezuela due to poor accountability. No one knows how much money he managed or what this sort of parallel power that had the support of foreign powers spent it on… in the next 45 days, Guaidó is obliged to account for the period given to him by the former anti-Chavista deputies who abolished the interim government, considering that the structure did not achieve its objectives, not to mention that they do not know the status of the resources managed under this arrangement.

“Maduro pasa a la ofensiva tras la disolución del Gobierno interino de Guaidó (Maduro goes on the offensive after the dissolution of the interim government of Guaidó),” La Voz de Galicia (a Spanish daily newspaper with good coverage of Latin America), 2 January 2023. https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/internacional/2023/01/03/maduro-pasa-ofensiva-tras-disolucion-gobierno-interino-guaido/0003_202301G3P18993.htm 

A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive… Maduro also stated in the interview that he awaits the release of the country’s resources frozen in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Notes:

[i] For more information on some of the international legal implications of this decision to dissolve Venezuela’s interim government, see: Ryan C. Berg and Alexandra Winkler, “The Interim Government of Venezuela was Dissolved by its Own Promoters,” CSIS Commentary, 12 January 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/interim-government-venezuela-was-dissolved-its-own-promoters

[ii] For information on infighting in the opposition and its impact on the Venezuelan opposition’s standing among voters, see: Luis González Morales, “Knives Out: Venezuelan Opposition Edition,” Caracas Chronicles, 29 December 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/12/29/knives-out-venezuelan-opposition-edition/

[iii] For more information about Venezuela’s deep security relationship with Russia, in particular, see: Vladimir Rouvinski, “Russia’s Continued Engagement with Venezuela in 2019 and Beyond,” Wilson Center, February 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-continuing-engagement-venezuela-2019-and-beyond-update

Image Information:

Image: Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/oasoea/49499293397
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Russian Interference in Colombian Election Roils the Region

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Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.

Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.

“Gustavo Petro’s presidential campaign received a strong boost from Russia with fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags and mentions that sought to position the then candidate of the Historical Pact.”

Russia’s digital influence operations are robust throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In the past, Russian bots and other digital interference strategies have worked to amplify divisive messages and pour fuel on social movements and protests in the regions.[i] More recently, Russia has engaged in robust propaganda and disinformation campaigns regarding the war in Ukraine.[ii] Recently, Colombia’s largest weekly magazine, Semana, published a report on Twitter’s release of materials about the country’s 2022 presidential campaign. Those materials, the outlet reports, show a strong level of support for then-candidate Gustavo Petro and false news about Petro’s principal rivals for the presidency. Moreover, they also amplified anti-U.S. and anti-Western rhetoric. Further, many of the message regarding Petro revolved around security cooperation and the so-called war on drugs, amplifying his message of the previous administration’s failure.[iii] The second excerpted article from Medellin’s leading daily newspaper, El Colombiano, states that Russia’s support for Petro included bots and fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags, mentions, and use of its outlets like Russia Today to support the candidate’s election and sow propaganda. The disclosures generated wide reaction among Colombia’s political class and generated further division between parties. Russia’s strong influence on Latin America’s information environment highlights its capacity to place propaganda in Spanish and Portuguese and elevate the messaging of fringe candidates who threaten constitutional order and stability throughout the hemisphere. Colombia is certainly not an isolated case. Latin American governments are often poorly equipped to deal with these challenges and for their parts, social media entities are often slower to take down fake news in Spanish and Portuguese than they are in English.

Sources: 

“Twitter desclasifica archivos secretos y estalla polémica contra el Gobierno: hubo injerencia indebida desde Rusia a favor de campaña de Gustavo Petro (Twitter declassifies secret files and controversy erupts against the Government: there was undue interference from Russia in favor of Gustavo Petro’s campaign),” Semana (Colombia’s largest weekly magazine and major news source in the country), 3 January 2023. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/atencion-archivos-secretos-de-twitter-revelan-injerencia-indebida-desde-rusia-a-favor-de-la-campana-presidencial-de-gustavo-petro/202343/  

Gustavo Petro’s presidential campaign received a strong boost from Russia with fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags and mentions that sought to position the then candidate of the Historical Pact. This is evidenced by secret Twitter documents that were recently declassified by order of the CEO of the social network, Elon Musk… During the campaign, it was discovered that Sebastián Guanumen, one of the leaders of Petro’s digital strategy, gave the order to ‘run the ethical line’ to discredit then-candidate Petro’s main contenders. In this sense, digital narratives were created in which lies, insults and slander were then amplified.

“La campaña de Petro en Twitter tuvo ayuda rusa (Petro’s Twitter campaign had Russian help),” El Colombiano (the city of Medellín’s leading daily newspaper), 4 January 2023. https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/politica/rusia-habria-influido-en-las-elecciones-presidenciales-para-apoyar-a-petro-KJ19760596  

In one of the confidential texts, it was stated that in the midst of monitoring Twitter activity in South America, with special analysis in Venezuela, Cuba and Colombia, accounts were discovered that talked about the Petro campaign… In addition to the alleged support of Russian bots, the presidential campaign of the candidate of the Historical Pact was also involved in other controversies. The one that caused the most commotion was that of the ‘Petrovideos,’ in which conversations about communication strategies were recorded so that Petro would stand out by discrediting his competitors.

Notes:

[i] For more on Russia’s attempt to sow chaos and social division in Latin America, especially when protests break out, see: Lara Jakes, “As Protests in South America Surged, So Did Russian Trolls on Twitter, U.S. Finds,” New York Times, 29 January 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/us/politics/south-america-russian-twitter.html

[ii] For more details on Russia’s propaganda campaign and disinformation operations in Latin America regarding its war in Ukraine, see: Jessica Brandt and Valeria Wirtschafter “Working the Western Hemisphere: How Russia Spreads Propaganda about Ukraine in Latin America and the Impact of Platform Responses,” Brookings Institution, December 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/working-the-western-hemisphere/

[iii] For more information on President Petro’s drug policies and critique of the war on drugs, see coverage of his inaugural speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022: “Irrational War on Drugs, Destruction of the Amazon, Expose Humanity’s Failures, Colombia’s Petro tells the U.N.,” United Nations, 20 September 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127151

Image Information:

Image: Colombia President Gustavo Petro’s campaign received strong support from Russian bots and disinformation campaigns.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/gustavopetrourrego/21474562099 
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0

Colombia’s Congress Authorizes “Total Peace” Negotiation With Guerrilla and Criminal Groups 

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Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.

“The law…empowers the president to initiate peace negotiations with groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who rejected a 2016 agreement and returned to the armed struggle, and another group that never signed the pact.”

Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, came to power promising to negotiate a peace deal with the country’s notorious guerrilla groups and sundry criminal organizations. As with the 2016 Peace Accords, which ended the decades-long conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Petro’s plan for what he calls “Total Peace” has become controversial. Broadly speaking, Petro plans to offer a blanket immunity in exchange for the demobilization of guerrilla groups, the disarming of criminal organizations, and the cessation of drug trafficking.[i] In the first excerpted article from CNN en Español, the Spanish-language affiliate of the popular U.S. outlet, the authors report that Colombia’s Congress approved enabling legislation permitting Petro to embark on peace negotiations with nearly all armed groups in the country. The article also notes that the legislation would set aside money to ensure development investment in demobilized areas. The second article, from Colombia’s generally left-leaning El Espectador, notes that rather than experiencing a decline, violence has instead surged under Petro, confounding the expectations of peace negotiations.

Petro’s plans for “Total Peace” will face increasing challenges as negotiations take off in earnest. First, the Colombian government’s dialogue with leaders of the Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN) is a gamble. It is unclear how much control the leadership, exiled in Cuba for years, still has over the guerrillas operating in Colombia’s borderland area with Venezuela. During previous negotiations with the FARC, the Colombian government quickly realized the autonomy that some FARC groups had from its central leadership structure, meaning an inability to impose the terms of agreement on individual groups. Second, the Colombian government may find it difficult to commit to concessions and simultaneously entice guerrilla groups to lay down their arms. During previous negotiations with the FARC, vacuums created by the demobilized guerrillas quickly were filled by other criminal groups, suggesting at least some Colombian criminal organizations will not commit to this latest peace process so they can take advantage of the lack of law enforcement pressure to increase territory and revenues from illicit economies.

Sources: 

“Congreso de Colombia aprueba ley para negociar la paz con grupos armados como el ELN, facciones de las FARC y otros (Colombian Congress approves law to negotiate peace with armed groups such as the ELN, FARC factions and others),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language affiliate of the popular U.S. outlet), 27 October 2022. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/10/27/congreso-colombia-aprueba-ley-negociar-paz-reuters-reux/   

The law approved by the plenary session of the House of Representatives and previously by that of the Senate, empowers the president to initiate peace negotiations with groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who rejected a 2016 agreement and returned to the armed struggle, and another group that never signed the pact.

The legislation also authorizes the president to initiate dialogues with criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking and illegal mining such as the Clan del Golfo, whose leaders and members may receive benefits such as reduced sentences and non-extradition in exchange for the disclosure of routes to export cocaine and the delivery part of the fortunes obtained illegally.

“Violencia contra población civil: uno de los desafíos para alcanzar la Paz total (Violence against the civilian population: one of the challenges to achieve Total Peace),” El Espectador (Colombia’s oldest daily that generally leans left), 15 November 2022. https://www.elespectador.com/politica/violencia-contra-poblacion-civil-uno-de-los-principales-desafios-para-alcanzar-la-paz-total/

During the first 100 days of the current government, the highest peak of massacres of the year occurred.  The number of victims of acts of massacre and forced displacement in the country also increased.  The number of cases and victims of forced confinement…increased and was concentrated in three departments, specifically in territories inhabited by indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.

Notes:

[i] For greater context into Petro’s campaign promise and the outlines of his negotiation strategy, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Colombia’s Leftist President Seeks to Resume Negotiations with National Liberation Army,” OE Watch, Issue 9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425694

Image Information:

Image: Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jefa_de_Estado_participa_en_ceremonia_de_la_Firma_de_la_Paz_entre_el_Gobierno_de_Colombia_y_las_FARC_E.P._(29953487045).jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-2.0

China Deepening Cooperation in Latin America’s Sizeable Lithium Sector 

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Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

“China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.”

The price of lithium, a key ingredient in battery technology, has skyrocketed amid the rush for critical minerals. Lithium can be found in abundance throughout South America’s so-called “Lithium Triangle,” which comprises Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile and contains approximately 55 percent of the world’s known lithium deposits.[i]  Mexico also has known lithium deposits. Collectively, Latin America’s lithium reserves has attracted global attention, especially from China. According to the first excerpted article from China’s state-run Global Times, Chile’s Consul General in Chengdu vowed to increase the country’s cooperation with China to stabilize the global supply and price of lithium. In Mexico’s case, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has sought to nationalize the metal known as “white gold.” According to the second excerpted article from privately held popular media outlet Radio Formúla, a new state company called Lithium for Mexico will control the metal in Mexico, demanding foreign partners to enter joint ventures and junior partnerships. The article reports that only one company has received a unique exception to this rule—China’s Ganfeng Lithium. Mexico’s government justifies this exception on the basis that Ganfeng had an existing agreement to control lithium at the Bacanora site before the mineral’s nationalization. These developments demonstrate China’s advances in Latin America with respect to its critical minerals strategy, as well as the success of its economic diplomacy in achieving carveouts for its companies.

Sources: 

“Chile vows to enhance cooperation with China in lithium sector,” Global Times (state-owned media outlet under the auspices of the People’s Daily), 9 November 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279134.shtml  

Chile’s consul general in Chengdu…Gustavo Díaz Hidalgo, on Wednesday vowed to further enhance cooperation with China in the lithium sector, in a bid to stabilize the global supply of the vital mineral for making batteries…Díaz predicted that the global demand for lithium each year would surpass 1 million tons by 2025, crossing 2.5 million tons by 2030.
 
The consul general said that China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.

“Litio para México: Empresa estatal lo explotará en exclusiva…salvo una excepción china (Lithium for Mexico: State company will exploit it exclusively…with one Chinese exception),” Radio Formúla (a popular outlet owned by the large media conglomerate Grupo Formúla), 24 August 2022. https://www.radioformula.com.mx/economia/2022/8/24/litio-para-mexico-empresa-estatal-lo-explotara-en-exclusiva-salvo-una-excepcion-china-728919.html

The Secretary of Energy, Rocío Nahle, explained that the current concession for exploration and exploitation of lithium at the hands of a private company will be maintained… Although concessions will no longer be granted to explore and exploit the mineral…the only one in force for exploitation before the reform to the Mining Law, in the hands of an Asian company, will remain in force.

Notes:

[i] For more information on U.S. opportunities in the Lithium Triangle and how the United States might effectively compete, see: Ryan C. Berg and T. Andrew Sady-Kennedy, “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden administration,” 17 August 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration

Image Information:

Image:  Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/earthworks/47617675391
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0

Ecuador Seeks New Relationship With China After Debt Deal

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Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.

“The idea is that part of the oil is released, and it is allowed to be sold at market price, which is an additional benefit for Ecuador.  And with those resources, the president can further strengthen social investment.”

Ecuador is performing a balancing act as it undertakes a strategic review of its with China while making overtures to Washington. Under President Rafael Correa (2007-2017), Ecuador racked up billions in debt, with China as the country’s largest lender. Since Correa’s departure, Ecuador has struggled to repay China, making repeated requests to restructure debt deals. In contrast, current President Guillermo Lasso recently announced the renegotiation of Ecuador’s debt, reports center-right daily El Universo. According to the article, the agreement will free Ecuador’s oil production, previously tethered to the repayment of the Chinese debt, to be sold on the spot market. The newspaper notes that this should provide additional revenues for the government, which it badly needs to invest in both social programs and to combat rising insecurity and criminality. The debt renegotiation is part of a broader repositioning of the Ecuador-China relationship, notes another El Universo article.  One large source of debt is the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam project, which has generated controversy throughout the country. The project is mired in cost overruns, environmental degradation, and questions over the structural integrity of the infrastructure (it has thousands of cracks and is unstable). As a result, a review commission within Ecuador’s government recommended a rejection of the project, with a threat to withhold repayment of the loan that financed it if China does not fix the structural deficiencies.

Sources:

“Presidente Guillermo Lasso anuncia renegociación de deuda con China en Nueva York (President Guillermo Lasso announces debt renegotiation with China in New York),” El Universo (one of Ecuador’s largest dailies, generally seen as center-right), 19 September 2022. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/presidente-guillermo-lasso-anuncia-renegociacion-de-deuda-con-china-en-nueva-york-nota/  

The government… said that, in general, these agreements represent a relief of $1.4 billion in debt service for Ecuador until 2025, since amortizations to the China Development Bank will be reduced by more than $745 million over the next three years and amortizations to Eximbank will be reduced by about $680 million over the next four years… The idea is that part of the oil is released and it is allowed to be sold at market price, which is an additional benefit for Ecuador.  And with those resources, the president can further strengthen social investment.

“Informe de Fiscalización recomienda no recibir central Coca Codo y revisar designación del Ministro de Energía por conflicto de intereses (Audit report recommends not receiving Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and reviewing the appointment of the Minister of Energy due to conflict of interest),” El Universo (one of the country’s largest dailies, generally considered center-right), 9 September 2022. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/informe-de-fiscalizacion-recomienda-no-recibir-central-coca-codo-y-revisar-designacion-del-ministro-de-energia-por-conflicto-de-intereses-nota/  

At least 121 conclusions and 13 recommendations, which include asking the President of the Republic, Guillermo Lasso, that his government reject the work of the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant (due to its multiple structural problems) and that it review the appointment of the current Minister of Energy, Xavier Vera Grunauer, for allegedly having a conflict of interest, came out of a final report of the investigation carried out by the Supervisory Commission of the National Assembly, on the contract and construction of the largest hydroelectric power plant, the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecuador_y_China_firman_11_convenios_de_cooperaci%C3%B3n_(30958228411).jpg
Attribution: CCA BY 2.0