Author Archives: Ryan Berg

Cracks Appear in Maduro Regime

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Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.

“Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.”

Recently, the Maduro regime has shown signs of schisms within the ruling Chavista Party,[i] now known as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The arrest and prosecution of regime insider, former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, is a watershed moment for elites in Maduro’s inner circle. According to the first excerpted article from the centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Maduro accused El Aissami of being behind the assassination attempt, as well as corruption, pilfering roughly $21 billion from the state-owned oil company while serving as oil minister.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from the Spanish outlet El País, El Aissami, in addition to the assassination accusation, fell for endangering the PSUV’s electoral prospects with his large-scale theft of public resources. . The outlet notes how the arrests of El Aissami and his associates sent a chill through many circles of regime elites. They come in the context of Venezuela’s July presidential election, in which Maduro faces stiff competition from an organized opposition that continues to lead Maduro in the polls. The fact that dozens have been arrested alongside El Aissami indicates a growing crisis of trust within Chavismo’s elite ranks.[iii] Further, the money that El Aissami stole to grease his corruption networks has restricted the Maduro regime from greater social spending during the campaign, contributing to his flagging prospects of winning the election.

Sources:

Source: “Traicionado por su propio círculo? Así fue cómo un ministro cercano a Nicolás Maduro casi implosiona al chavismo (Betrayed by his own circle? This is how a minister close to Nicolás Maduro almost imploded Chavismo),” El Tiempo (a Colombian daily generally considered politically centrist), 30 April 2024. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/los-conspiradores-estaban-con-maduro-como-un-ministro-casi-implosiona-al-chavismo-3338641

Less than a month ago, El Aissami was seen handcuffed, quite skinny, and with an emaciated appearance…even if it were true that El Aissami had been conspiring against Maduro, his imprisonment could be more related to the accusation than to the ‘loss’ of 21 billion dollars from PDVSA, a plot that leaves more than 60 detainees, all allies of the former minister…With the drone attack story, Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.

Source:  “Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently a close politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish outlet with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The tectonic plates of Chavismo have received a strong shock this Tuesday. The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust…The definitive fall of El Aissami—a powerful and feared operator of Chavismo, around whom important layers of current national capital had been organized—seems to close the chapter of an expensive fraud on the nation, orchestrated under the shadow of international sanctions, in a time in which…the country’s oil production and the economy, were completely bankrupt, in the midst of a massive emigration of people. This may be the most radical and merciless purge carried out by Chavismo since it came to power…El Aissami is not taken to prison for ideological differences, but for having endangered the revolution and abusing its authority.

Notes:

[i] Chavismo is the movement of those who follow Huge Chavez, which today is encapsulated in the party formally called PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, in English). Chavistas are followers of Chavismo.

[ii] To understand more about the unfathomable scale of this theft from PDVSA, and the use of crypto currency and middlemen, see: Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela’s PDVSA with $21.2 billion in Unpaid Bills,” Reuters, 21 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middlemen-have-left-venezuelas-pdvsa-with-212-billion-unpaid-bills-2023-03-21/

[iii] For more information on the opposition’s success in pressuring Maduro despite the long electoral odds, see: Ryan C. Berg, “This Could Be the Last Shot to Restore Democracy in Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 April 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-be-last-shot-restore-democracy-venezuela

Image Information:

Image: Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/globovision/6336412991/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Peru’s Stance On Megaport Is a Test of China’s Influence

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“Now the National Port Authority is trying to rescind the exclusivity, claiming it made a mistake…The Chinese company, however, remains firm and even hints that it could withdraw if it does not obtain exclusive access.”

China’s megaport in Chancay, Peru, just north of Lima, is set to be inaugurated by Chinese President Xi Jinping later this year during the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference. One of the largest deep-water ports of its kind, Chancay represents one of China’s most ambitious projects in South America. Built by state-owned enterprise Cosco Shipping, Chancay is meant to catalyze the China’s food security and dominance over critical minerals, while cutting shipping times to Asia by around one week. However, according to Argentine media outlet Infobae, Peruvian officials have announced an “administrative error” permitting Cosco Shipping to both build and operate the port exclusively.[i] According to the article, Peruvian regulators have rejected Cosco’s exclusivity, declaring it incompatible with having built the port under domestic law.[ii] As per the second excerpted article from Infobae, Cosco has said it will initiate legal action against Peruvian regulators, insisting on its economic model of exclusivity. The fallout from the Port of Chancay legal wrangling is notable, and likely to have a lasting impact. China sees the moment as precedent-setting for other countries with Chinese state-owned enterprises controlling key infrastructure projects, while Peru finds itself in a major bind after years of burgeoning Chinese influence over strategic sectors in the country. If Cosco manages to win exclusive control of Chancay, China will further solidify its control over strategic infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere; if Peru manages to safeguard its autonomy, it may furnish a blueprint for other regional powers willing to test the limits of China’s infrastructure ownership models.

Sources:

Source: “El ‘error administrativo’ que pone en jaque al Perú: dio el control total a China del Megapuerto de Chancay (The ‘administrative error’ that puts Peru in check: it gave China full control of the Chancay Megaport),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 14 May 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/05/14/el-error-administrativo-que-pone-en-jaque-al-peru-dio-el-control-total-a-china-del-megapuerto-de-chancay/  

With a projected investment of more than three billion, China is now bringing out its true intentions and at the same time taking advantage of an ‘administrative error’ on the part of Peruvian officials by granting operational exclusivity to Cosco, which has put the project in check…a situation that the National Port Authority of Peru is currently trying to solve…The Peruvian government assumed that the Chinese shipping giant would simply use the port of which it will be the majority owner and would not have exclusive rights over it. But during the negotiations, Cosco somehow obtained precisely these rights. Now the National Port Authority is trying to rescind the exclusivity, claiming it made a mistake…The Chinese company, however, remains firm and even hints that it could withdraw if it does not obtain exclusive access.

Source: “Megapuerto de Chancay: Cosco Shipping no da su brazo a torcer y anuncia sus acciones legales por conflicto con el Estado peruano (Chancay Megaport: Cosco Shipping does not give in and announces its legal actions due to conflict with the Peruvian State),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 8 May 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/05/07/megapuerto-de-chancay-consorcio-chino-no-dara-su-brazo-a-torcer-y-anuncia-sus-acciones-legales-por-conflicto-con-el-estado-peruano/  Through a statement, the Chinese consortium Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru SA, in charge of the megaproject, recognized that the port infrastructure work in the country has been ‘seriously harmed’ by a change in the regulatory scheme…the company reported that they have found it necessary to initiate legal actions to defend its operating model and ensure its classification as private infrastructure, despite the public benefits it offers.

Notes:

[i] At an earlier period, U.S. officials warned Peru about China exerting control and exclusivity over Chancay. See: Michael Stott and Joe Daniels, “U.S. Raises Concern with Peru over Chinese Control of Infrastructure,” Financial Times, 3 October 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/2c77be69-60d7-4d5c-a0c6-c7978bde3888

[ii] According to noted analyst Elisabeth Braw, this situation is likely the result of Peru failing to read the fine print of the agreement. See: Elisabeth Braw, “Peru Learns to Read the Fine Print in China Deals,” Foreign Policy, 13 May 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/13/peru-learns-to-read-the-fine-print-in-china-deals/

Ecuador’s Raid on Mexican Embassy Fractures Regional Comity

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EcuadorianPresident Daniel Noboa has sought to project an image of being tough on crime and impunity. He has come under fire for authorizing the raid of Mexico’s embassy in the country.

“Glas was to receive safe passage from the Ecuadorian authorities allowing him to fly to Mexico City, but instead, Noboa ordered his immediate capture.”

Tensions between Ecuador and Mexico have been simmering since Mexican President Obrador questioned the legitimacy of Ecuadorian President Noboa’s election victory in October 2023. A short time later, in December 2023, Ecuador’s former Vice President, Jorge Glas, thrice convicted of corruption, exiled himself to Mexico’s embassy in Quito to avoid another prosecution.[i] According to the excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, President Noboa gave the order to raid Mexico’s embassy and detain Glas. The trigger for the action appears to have been President Obrador’s decision to grant Glas political asylum, which the Noboa government argues would have served the cause of impunity. In response, as the article from El País reports, Mexico accused Ecuador of contravening the Vienna Convention and broke diplomatic relations. The regional outcry was swift, according to the second excerpted article from the Argentine daily Clarín. Nicaragua immediately broke relations with Ecuador, while other countries expressed grave concerns, rebuked Ecuador’s actions and threatened to rupture their own bilateral relations. At the center of the debate appears to be the interpretation of the inviolability of embassies in the Vienna Convention and the need to balance with the Caracas Convention, which states that political asylum cannot be abused by those already convicted in competent domestic courts. The nature of the Noboa government’s raid on Mexico’s embassy and the uproar of condemnation has impacted the entire region. Latin America has fractured along familiar political lines in response to the raid, with leftist governments generally taking Mexico’s side and moving to sever relations with Ecuador, and governments ruled by the right decrying Ecuador’s actions while emphasizing Mexico’s abuse of asylum procedure. Many countries have observed others’ responses as a litmus test for their own sets of bilateral relations.[ii] For Noboa’s part, domestic politics likely drove much of the decision-making, as a truncated presidential term and the country’s security crisis have led him to project an image of tough-on-crime. Glas’ connection to organized crime, and foreign criminal organizations driving some of Ecuador’s surge in violence, made the decision to seize him politically popular among Ecuadorians.

OE Insight Summary:

ECU government raid of MEX government embassy in Quito has sent regional relations spiraling and generated conversations about the appropriate use of granting political asylum.

Sources:

“México rompe relaciones con Ecuador tras el asalto policial a su Embajada en Quito (Mexico breaks relations with Ecuador after the police assault on its Embassy in Quito),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 6 April 2024. https://elpais.com/mexico/2024-04-06/mexico-rompe-relaciones-con-ecuador-tras-el-asalto-policial-a-su-embajada-en-quito.html 

Mexico has broken relations with Ecuador. The measure was adopted after the Ecuadorian police attacked the Mexican Embassy in Quito with armored cars and masked agents…and forcibly took away former vice president Jorge Glas, who hours before had received political asylum from the Government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador…In the following hours, Glas was to receive safe passage from the Ecuadorian authorities allowing him to fly to Mexico City, but instead, Noboa ordered his immediate capture.

“La canciller de Ecuador afirma que México violó primero las normas diplomáticas: ‘Hubo incumplimientos y respuestas negativas’ (The Foreign Minister of Ecuador affirms that Mexico first violated diplomatic norms: ‘There were non-compliance and negative responses’),” Clarín (Argentine daily that covers most of Latin America), 8 April 2024. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/canciller-ecuador-afirma-mexico-violo-primero-normas-diplomaticas-incumplimientos-respuestas-negativas_0_ozE6HjUzaH.html  

For Mexico, Ecuador violated the Vienna Convention, which has some 115 countries, and which regulates relations between states through treaties. It is considered one of the main sources of international law and its compliance is mandatory for the states that have ratified it…In response, [Foreign Minister] Sommerfeld noted that Mexico did not respect Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 or Article 3 of the Caracas Convention of 1954, regarding the fact that it is not lawful to grant asylum to people accused of common crimes, as was the situation of Glas in a case for alleged embezzlement of funds in the reconstruction of the province of Manabí after the 2016 earthquake.

Notes:

[i] President Noboa is grappling with a surge of gang-related violence, and Glas stands convicted of corruption, including links to transnational criminal organizations. For more information on the origins of Ecuador’s insecurity crisis, see: Ryan C. Berg, “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400849

[ii] For more information on how the international fallout could negatively impact the Noboa government, see: James Bosworth, “The Mexican Embassy Raid in Ecuador Will Backfire for Noboa,” World Politics Review, 8 April 2024. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ecuador-mexico-embassy-corruption/

Image Information:

Image: EcuadorianPresident Daniel Noboa has sought to project an image of being tough on crime and impunity. He has come under fire for authorizing the raid of Mexico’s embassy in the country.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidenciaecuador/53497882306 
Attribution: PDM 1.0 DEED.

Venezuela’s Maduro Targets Previous Allies Under Anti-Corruption Campaign

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El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.

“The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust.”

The Maduro government in Venezuela has launched an anti-corruption probe into politically motivated transnational criminal elements within its regime.[i] According to the first excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, top targets of the probe include Tareck El Aissami, a former vice president and oil minister, as well as his business partners Samark Lopez, former finance minister Simon Zerpa, and others yet to be identified. El Aissami and his associates stand accused of stealing billions via a cryptocurrency payment scheme at the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Maduro blames El Aissami and his associates for Venezuela’s moribund economy.

Meanwhile, according to the second excerpted article from the Spanish-language outlet CNN en Español, Maduro organized the extraterritorial assassination of a dissident member of the Venezuelan armed forces, Ronald Ojeda, who was living in Chile. The CNN story quotes the prosecutor in the case, who rules out any other cause of death. Given that Maduro faces a difficult scenario this year, discarding erstwhile allies now considered disloyal, such as El Aissami, appears to be crucial for him to consolidate and maintain his regime’s hold on power in an election year. Formerly, El Aissami was considered one of Maduro’s top allies.[ii] However, as the extraterritorial assassination of Ronald Ojeda shows, the Maduro regime’s criminal links remain strong and capable of operating transnationally within Latin America in service of his regime’s consolidation.

OE Insight Summary:

VEN regime of Nicolas Maduro has undertaken a highly questionable anticorruption campaign that seeks to eliminate challengers to the regime and blame those arrested for its economic woes.

Sources:

“Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently an intimate politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust. El Aissami was in legal limbo since a mega corruption scheme was uncovered that affected PDVSA, the state oil company that he managed as minister. There is talk of embezzlement in the realm of 21 billion dollars.

“Caso Ronald Ojeda: fiscal de Chile dice que el crimen se ‘organizó y se solicitó’ desde Venezuela (Ronald Ojeda case: Chilean prosecutor says the crime was ‘organized and requested’ from Venezuela),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language version of the Atlanta-based outlet), 12 April 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/04/12/caso-ronald-ojeda-chile-venezuela-orix/

Héctor Barros, prosecutor in charge of the case investigating the murder of former Venezuelan military officer Ronald Ojeda in Chile, stated in an interview with Chilevisión broadcast…that, according to the investigations, the crime ‘was organized and requested from Venezuela.’ Asked by the Chilevisión journalist about the possibility that the motive for the crime was political, Barros said that he has ‘no precedents that point us in the other direction.’

Notes:

[i] For more information on the criminal nature of the Maduro regime, see: Moises Rendon and Mia Kazman, “Maduro’s Mafia State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduros-mafia-state

[ii] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has an excellent profile of El Aissami and his importance to the Maduro regime: “Former Venezuelan Oil Minister and Vice President Arrested for Corruption,” OCCRP, 11 April 2024. https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/18646-former-venezuelan-oil-minister-and-vice-president-arrested-for-corruption

Image Information:

Image: El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/tareckpsuv/8139341461/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED.

Mexico’s Cartel-Related Violence Spikes as Elections Approach

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Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.

“No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna.”

Mexico has long suffered high levels of violence related to its powerful drug cartels. Violence often spikes during election season, as cartels seek to elect politicians aligned with their agendas and eliminate those opposed. According to the Spanish daily El País, recent assassinations in Mexico have contributed to growing fears that the country’s upcoming elections could witness more violence than in many previous election cycles.[i] The paper reports on two mayoral candidates in the municipality of Maravatío recently assassinated within hours of one another. The article mentions that earlier in the campaign season, cartels abducted and killed a third mayoral candidate from Maravatío. This area of the country features three powerful cartels contesting territory: the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Michoacán Family, and the Knights Templar. According to the second excerpted article by Diario de México, which highlights the research of NGO group Data Cívica, 36 aspirants to public office or members of their families were assassinated in January and February alone.[ii] Mexico’s cartels continue to accrete power, and during election season, seek to play a primary role in the selection of candidates. While candidates for federal office receive security protection from the government, local candidates do not. In Mexico, it is often control of local candidates that proves most important for cartel operations.

Sources:

“El terror en Maravatío: asesinados dos precandidatos a la alcaldía en menos de 12 horas (Terror in Maravatío: two mayoral candidates murdered in less than 12 hours),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 27 February 2024. https://elpais.com/mexico/elecciones-mexicanas/2024-02-27/el-terror-en-maravatio-asesinados-dos-precandidatos-a-la-alcaldia-en-menos-de-12-horas.html 

No more than 12 hours passed between the shooting of the Morena precandidate Miguel Ángel Zavala Reyes, and the shooting of the PAN precandidate, Armando Pérez Luna; two of the people who were seeking to become the next municipal president of Maravatío, a municipality of 80,000 inhabitants in the State of Michoacán…According to the group Data Cívica, ‘In Mexico, electoral violence has become a tool of organized crime to influence the public life of states and municipalities’…During the month of January, at least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico.

“Febrero fue letal para aspirantes a cargo de elección popular: ONG (February was lethal for candidates for popular election positions: NGO),” Diario de México (one of the country’s oldest dailies), 15 March 2024. https://www.diariodemexico.com/mi-nacion/febrero-fue-letal-para-aspirantes-cargo-de-eleccion-popular-ong   At least five candidates or aspirants for elected office were murdered in Mexico during February, bringing the total to 10 in the first two months of the year, the non-governmental organizations Data Cívica reported this Friday. The number of homicides related to political violence rises to 36 when public officials and relatives of politicians are also considered, which are detailed in the report ‘Voting between bullets’ in February.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the potential criminal realignment in Mexico’s elections, see: Parker Asmann, “Mexico’s 2024 Election Could Spark Violent Criminal Realignments,” InSight Crime, 15 January 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-2024-election-violent-criminal-realignments/

[ii] To read more about the project to track election violence by Data Cívica, see: “Voting Between Bullets, Understanding Criminal-Electoral Violence in Mexico,” https://votar-entre-balas.datacivica.org/

Image Information:

Image: Mexico has responded to security threats by deploying its army on the streets.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/isan/3740048960 
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED.

Venezuela Seeks To Rectify Deteriorating Relations With Iran

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Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.

“Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts.”

Once considered to be one of the Maduro regime’s staunchest allies, the Venezuela-Iran relationship has entered a rocky period.[i] Beyond military cooperation, Iran has long provided critical support to the Maduro regime in the areas of sanctions evasion and diluents for crude oil refining. According to the first excerpted article from the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, the bilateral relationship began to deteriorate when the West partially lifted oil sanctions on Venezuela following pledges for freer and fairer presidential elections this year. The article reports that the Maduro regime shifted production and export to Western markets, falling woefully behind in its scheduled oil deliveries to Iran. The article also details that part of an earlier three-year agreement aimed at sanctions evasion saw Iran offload much of Venezuela’s sanctioned crude.[ii] The second excerpted article, from the business-focused Venezuelan news outlet Banca y Negocios, cites people familiar with the deal that helped boost Venezuela’s crude exports and mitigate fuel shortages while under previous sanctions. Under the deal, Iran also committed to renovating several of Venezuela’s large oil refineries. The Maduro regime’s decision to abandon the terms of its agreement with Iran has irked Iranian officials, according to the reporting by Banca y Negocios. At the same time, it speculates that the Maduro regime is motivated to return to the Iran deal as it anticipates the return of Western sanctions, having failed to comply with its prior commitments toward freer and fairer presidential elections. Returning to this agreement with Iran will be critical for the Maduro regime to survive the possible reimposition of Western sanctions on its oil sector.

Sources:

“Venezuela se apresura a mejorar su relación con Irán mientras se avecinan sanciones de EEUU (Venezuela rushes to improve its relationship with Iran as US sanctions loom),” El Nacional (Venezuelan daily focused on the politics of the Maduro regime), 13 March 2024. https://www.elnacional.com/economia/venezuela-se-apresura-a-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-mientras-se-avecinan-sanciones-de-ee-uu/  

Iran and Venezuela are trying to rebuild an oil alliance that began to crumble last year after Venezuela fell behind in oil trades…A review of PDVSA data and shipping documents shows that Venezuela fell behind on payments to Iran, a shortfall that worsened when the United States began issuing licenses in late 2022. Those authorizations led the state firm to reallocate shipments…to save the partnership, Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts. Nicolás Maduro’s government is trying to settle outstanding debt by accelerating deliveries of heavy crude oil and fuel shipments to Iran.

“Venezuela busca mejorar su relación con Irán tras presentar retrasos en el intercambio petrolero (Venezuela seeks to improve its relationship with Iran after presenting delays in the oil exchange),” Banca y Negocios (a Venezuelan digital portal focused on financial and economic reporting), 12 March 2024. https://www.bancaynegocios.com/venezuela-busca-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-tras-presentar-retrasos-en-el-intercambio-petrolero/    Six people familiar with the matter stated that the agreement between both nations helped boost crude oil exports and alleviate the fuel problem that Venezuela suffered…the possible reimposition of sanctions by the United States would make the alliance between Venezuela and Iran essential to keeping the Venezuelan oil sector afloat…Venezuela is rushing to comply with the agreement and pay off the debt, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in oil exchanges and contracts, by accelerating the delivery of heavy hydrocarbons and fuel to the nation located in the Middle East.

Notes:

[i] For more historical background on the importance of the bilateral relationship, see: Moises Rendón and Claudia Fernandez, “The Fabulous Five: How Foreign Actors Prop Up the Maduro Regime in Venezuela,” CSIS Policy Brief, 19 October 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela

[ii] For more information on the deal signed between Iran and Venezuela, see: Deisy Buitrago and Vivian Sequera, “Iran, Venezuela Eye Trade Increase, Sign Petrochemical Deal,” Reuters, 12 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-caracas-kicking-off-regional-tour-2023-06-12/

Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Venezuela%E2%80%99s_Top_Diplomat_Visits_Iran-9.jpg  
Attribution: CC-BY-4.0.

Ecuador Faces Reprisals for Indirect Support to Ukraine

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A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.

“The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago.”

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Latin American and Caribbean countries have been reticent to get involved.[i] Specifically, they have resisted calls to send Russian military equipment stockpiles to support either side of the conflict. For this reason, Ecuador stood out when, following the recent declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” Spanish wire agency EFE reports that President Noboa expressed his country’s desire to trade Soviet-era military equipment for a $200 million security package of new equipment from the United States. This security package is meant to bolster the government’s position in the current domestic security crisis.[ii] The Soviet-era equipment, six Mi-8 [RG1] helicopters, a rocket launcher, and anti-aircraft systems, from previous arms deals with Russia would then be transferred to Ukraine.  To avoid provoking the ire of Russia by signaling overt support for Ukraine’s cause, EFE reports that the Noboa government has referred to this equipment, as inoperative “junk.” Nevertheless, Russia responded angrily and referred to original contracts for the equipment, which allegedly prohibit the export of this equipment to third parties. In addition, following Noboa’s announcement, according to the second excerpted article from the Argentine regional outlet Infobae, Russia’s phytosanitary agency halted imports of Ecuadorian bananas, claiming an uptick in flies. The article also notes that Russia is Ecuador’s second-largest customer for banana exports, and a halt in Russia’s imports of Ecuadorian bananas will hurt Ecuador economically and force it to quickly divert exports to other countries. While the quantity and types of weapons Ecuador plans to send to the United States (and eventually on to Ukraine) will not, by themselves, change Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield, the decision is a potential watershed moment for Latin America because its governments have generally pursued a studious policy of “non-alignment,” with several regional leaders declining to send Soviet-era equipment in their stockpiles.[iii] It is possible that Ecuador may pave the way for the region to assist Ukraine despite the threat of economic reprisals.

Sources:

“EE.UU. confirma que equipos soviéticos de Ecuador irán a Ucrania para guerra contra Rusia (The US confirms that Soviet equipment from Ecuador will go to Ukraine for war against Russia),” EFE (Spanish wire agency), 8 February 2024. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com/noticias/ee-uu-confirma-equipos-sovi%C3%A9ticos-215123186.html

The president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, described the equipment as ‘scrap’ so his country will receive new equipment worth about 200 million dollars…the Russian government transmitted to the Ecuadorian government its position regarding these supplies, ‘indicating the specific points of the agreements and contracts’ linked to Russian military supplies to Ecuador that the South American nation would violate if it re-exported them.

“Ecuador se ve obligado a buscar nuevos mercados para sus bananas tras el cese de exportaciones a Rusia (Ecuador is forced to look for new markets for its bananas after the cessation of exports to Russia),” Infobae (Argentine regional outlet), 14 February 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/02/14/ecuador-se-ve-obligado-a-buscar-nuevos-mercados-para-sus-bananas-tras-el-cese-de-exportaciones-a-rusia/ 

The decision unleashed the fury of the Kremlin, which defended the parts sold to Ecuador years ago…The measure ordered by Vladimir Putin will considerably affect Ecuadorian exporters and, consequently, the profits that the Ecuadorian government receives from bananas. Now, Noboa must campaign to relocate one of its top products in the world, outside of nations that interpose their political interests on commercial ones. At the same time, the president continues with his war against gangs, launched in early January, which he hopes to promote with new equipment.

Notes:

[i] For greater detail on how the region has remained “non-aligned,” see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 27 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more, see: Ryan Berg “Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare ‘Internal Armed Conflict’,” OE Watch, 02-2024. Need Link

[iii] For more on Latin America’s response to the war in Ukraine, read: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Rubi Bledsoe, “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian military Mi helicopter of the kind Ecuador was prepared to donate to Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-8MTV-5_Hip_82_yellow_%288587491042%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED

Mexican Truckers Protest Rise in Cartel’s Cargo Theft

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A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.

“49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies.”

Since the beginning of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidential term in 2018, 85,000 trucks have been targeted for cargo theft by transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico.[i] In protest, truckers organized a national strike blocking highways around the country. According to the first excerpted article in the business-focused daily El Financiero, truckers have demanded an action plan from the Ministry of Interior, as well as greater protection from Mexico’s National Guard. According to the article, an average of 49 truckers per day are subject to hijacking, kidnapping, and even murder, while their trucks are seized by criminal groups, emptied for content, and stripped and sold for parts. The second excerpted article in digital news platform Eje Central notes that cargo thefts now cost companies $400,000,000 per year. With this pressure, the Mexican government has acknowledged truckers’ insecurity and committed to reinforcing highway security with 2,000 new patrols, 620 National Guard units, and 800 more Interior Ministry agents. The rise in cargo theft and truck hijackings in Mexico displays a concerning shift in the behavior of transnational criminal organizations. Whereas previously groups exercised territorial control to dominate drug and human trafficking routes, cargo theft has become one of the rising sources of cartel income derived from the loss of territorial control by the Mexican government, especially in rural areas.[ii]

Sources:

“Paro Nacional de Transportistas ‘sigue en pie:’ En estas carreteras hay protestas hoy 5 de febrero (National Strike of Transporters ‘still standing:’ There are protests on these roads today, February 5),” El Financiero (business daily), 5 February 2024. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2024/02/05/paro-nacional-de-transportistas-sigue-en-pie-en-estas-carreteras-se-movilizan-hoy-5-de-febrero/

The drivers of heavy vehicles confirmed that their mobilization is still ‘on’ and they will concentrate in various parts of the country this Monday, February 5…about 150,000 drivers are expected to participate…the Security Ministry agreed to the installation of a dialogue to continue the conciliation work and thereby reach agreements regarding the demands of the transporters, who ask for solutions on the issue of extortion and the insecurity they suffer in their daily work…According to the members of the blockade, 49 assaults on cargo drivers in Mexico are recorded daily, situations that not only put their physical integrity at risk but, in some cases, have resulted in fatal tragedies. Cargo drivers mainly demand safety guarantees to carry out their daily operations without putting their lives at risk.

“Transportistas levantan protesta contra inseguridad en carreteras de México (Transporters raise protest against insecurity on Mexican roads),” Eje Central (digital news platform), 15 February 2024. https://www.ejecentral.com.mx/transportistas-levantan-protesta-contra-inseguridad-en-carreteras-de-mexico/ The union agreed with the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to increase surveillance on the main roads.The Ministry of the Interior indicated in a statement that security would be reinforced with 2,000 new patrols and 620 National Guard troops. In addition, he added that 800 more agents will join in July. Thefts from cargo transportation cost more than 7 billion pesos each year, according to the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico.

Notes:

[i] For more information on cargo thefts and their impact on Mexico’s economic performance, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Will Mexico’s Insecurity Scuttle Its Nearshoring Moment?,” in Bringing Supply Chains Back to Mexico, Center for Strategic & International Studies, pgs. 24-26 October 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/bringing-supply-chains-back-mexico

[ii] For estimates on the loss of the government’s territorial control in Mexico, see: “AMLO has adopted a passive attitude towards cartels,” The Yucatan Times, 28 April 2021, https://www.theyucatantimes.com/2021/04/amlo-has-adopted-a-passive-attitude-towards-cartels-chris-landau/

Image Information:

Image: A port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most Mexican truckers are bound with their cargo.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/36205567@N07/7314437264
Attribution: CC BY 2.0.

Venezuela’s Maduro Regime Threatens Annexation of Guyanese Territory

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Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.

“The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory.”

In December 2023, the Maduro regime of Venezuela oversaw a referendum about a long-disputed region called the Essequibo, which represents more than two-thirds of neighboring Guyana’s territory.[i] The Essequibo region—roughly the size of the state of Florida—has been administered by Guyana for more than 100 years, according to an arbitral award in Paris in 1899. The Maduro regime announced that 95 percent of Venezuelans who voted approved all five questions on the referendum.  This included an explicit rejection of the recent jurisdiction granted to the International Court of Justice upon referral of the case by the UN’s Secretary General, as well as a commitment by the Venezuelan state to recover the territory by all means necessary “within the law.”[ii] Accordingly, the first excerpted article from Chilean news outlet La Nación reported that Maduro announced the creation of a new Venezuelan state called Guayana Esequiba, constituted by the territory of Essequibo. Maduro followed the announcement by encouraging state-owned enterprises to exploit the natural resources of the Essequibo area, as well as a small mobilization of troops and equipment near the border.[iii] According to La Nación, this has given rise to the possibility of inter-state conflict, a rare worry in Latin America.  However, many countries in the region, as well as Venezuela’s political opposition, have interpreted Maduro’s threats to annex the Essequibo as a domestic ploy aimed at distraction. In the excerpted article from Argentina’s Urgente24, Venezuelan opposition leaders claimed that the referendum was a nationalistic distraction. The outlet says that Maduro is looking for a change in narrative after the recent successes of the country’s opposition, including the election of María Corina Machado, as the unified opposition candidate to face Maduro. Distraction or not, Maduro’s actions have engendered an environment that is rife with possibilities for miscalculation as both sides stake out maximalist positions.[iv]

Sources:

“Maduro propone ley que busca anexar esequibo a Venezuela: Pide explotar recursos naturales (Maduro proposes a law that seeks to annex Essequibo to Venezuela: He asks to exploit natural resources),” La Nación (a Chilean daily with over one hundred years reporting on the region), 6 December 2023. https://www.lanacion.cl/maduro-propone-ley-que-busca-anexar-esequibo-a-venezuela-pide-explotar-recursos-naturales/

The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory. Through a government act broadcast on radio and television, the president ordered that they immediately proceed ‘to grant operating licenses for the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the entire area of our Guayana Esequiba.’

“Referéndum y nueva ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distrae (Referendum and new ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distracts),” Urgente24 (an Argentine outlet with both opinion and news) 6 December 2023. https://urgente24.com/mundo/referendum-y-nueva-guyana-esequiba-maduro-distrae-n564799

For her part, the Venezuelan presidential candidate María Corina Machado, who won the opposition primaries and who could dethrone Maduro if there is no fraud, spoke about it…and described it as a distraction from the success of the opposition primaries. ‘It is a way to distract attention from the monumental success that the primaries were and create cohesion in the different sectors of the ruling party around an element that awakens patriotic sentiment but that had a very low participation rate.’

Notes:

[i] For more information and background on the manufactured crisis and Venezuela’s claims, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “The Entirely Manufactured and Dangerous Crisis over the Essequibo,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/entirely-manufactured-and-dangerous-crisis-over-essequibo

[ii] For more information on the referendum questions and the dispute itself, see: Julia Symmes Cobb, “Explainer: What is the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana?,” Reuters, 6 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/what-is-border-dispute-between-venezuela-guyana-2023-12-06/

[iii] For more information on troop and equipment deployments to the border with Guyana, bolstered with satellite imagery analysis, see: Christopher Hernandez-Roy et al., “Miscalculation and Escalation over the Essequibo: New Insights Into the Risks of Venezuela’s Compellence Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 9, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/miscalculation-and-escalation-over-essequibo-new-insights-risks-venezuelas-compellence.

[iv] In response to the possibility of conflict, Brazil brought both parties to the table on the island nation of St. Vincent, negotiating the Argyle Declaration, which commits both sides to a peaceful resolution of the border dispute. However, the Maduro regime abrogates agreements frequently. For more information on the Argyle Declaration, see: “The Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace between Guyana and Venezuela,” Government of Barbados, 14 December 2023. https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-joint-declaration-of-argyle-for-dialogue-and-peace-between-guyana-and-venezuela/.

Image Information:

Image:  Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/125816678@N05/39329361431 
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Rising Violence Prompts Ecuador To Declare “Internal Armed Conflict”

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Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity.

“President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’”

Ecuador has been reeling from a dramatic increase in homicides over the past four years as gangs have evolved into transnational criminal organizations linked to Mexico’s drug cartels.[i]. The country’s homicide rate rose from 6.7 per 100,000 citizens in 2019 to an estimated 45 per 100,000 in 2023.[ii] In a recent 48-hour period, two notorious gang leaders escaped prison, gangs laid siege to the University of Guayaquil, and one group stormed a live news broadcast, televising the bedlam for nearly 20 minutes before cutting the transmission, reports center-left Argentine news outlet Clarín. In response to this spate of violence, the recently elected Noboa government declared a state of emergency. However, the continued threat posed by multiple criminal groups has led Noboa to dramatically increase the sense of urgency, declaring instead an “internal armed conflict.” This empowered the nation’s armed forces to enforce a 60-day curfew and restore domestic security, according to Ecuadorian digital news outlet Primicias. The decree enumerated nearly two dozen armed groups and classified them as domestic terrorist organizations, the outlet says. Noboa is only a few months into his term, following a presidential campaign that featured the assassination at the hands of criminal groups of Fernando Villavicencio, a popular anticorruption candidate.[iii] To complement his presidential decree, Noboa announced a package of increased measures, including the construction of additional maximum-security prisons and the expropriation of criminal assets. The effectiveness of these measures bears watching throughout 2024 to see if Ecuador follows down a similar path as El Salvador or continues to spiral down into criminality and violence.

Sources:

“Súplicas de ‘no me maten’ y una granada en el bolsillo: así tomó en vivo un grupo narco el canal de televisión en Ecuador (Pleas of ‘don’t kill me’ and a grenade in the pocket: this is how a drug group took over a television channel in Ecuador live),” Clarín (Argentina’s oldest outlet that is generally considered center left), 9 January 2024. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/grupo-armado-irrumpio-transmision-vivo-canal-television-ecuador_0_0okSuT5tJC.html

An armed group stormed the live broadcast of a television channel in Ecuador, threatening those who were in charge of the programming with guns and weapons of war. There were also violent episodes at the University of Guayaquil and on commercial premises…the security forces stated only two hours after the assault that they were able to recover the taken buildings.

“Noboa declara conflicto armado interno y dispone la salida de militares (Noboa declares internal armed conflict and orders the departure of soldiers),” Primicias (a digital news outlet based in the capital, Quito) 9 January 2024. https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/noboa-conflicto-armado-interno-militares/President Daniel Noboa issued…an executive decree that reforms the current state of emergency and recognizes the existence of an ‘internal armed conflict.’ Therefore, it provides for the immediate mobilization and intervention of the Armed Forces and the Police in the national territory. The decree was issued minutes after armed attackers took over the TC Television facilities and broadcast live. This new decree establishes the identification of…organized crime groups as ‘terrorist organizations and belligerent non-state actors.’

Notes:

[i] Previous governments, unable to stem the growth in criminal potency, have issued pleas to the international community for a “Plan Ecuador,” akin to the wide-ranging security assistance plan and social makeover that helped save Colombia from similar threats in the 1990s and 2000s. For more information, see: Ryan Berg “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, 12-2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-40-08-49/2021_2D00_12_2D00_01-President-Lasso-Calls-for-_1C20_Plan-Ecuador_1D20_-Amid-_2800_Berg_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

[ii] For more information on rising homicide figures in Ecuador, see: “How Ecuador Became Latin America’s Deadliest Country,” The Economist, 10 January 2024. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/01/10/how-ecuador-became-latin-americas-deadliest-country

[iii] For more on Villavicencio, see: Ryan Berg, “Presidential Candidate Assassination Shows New Depths of Ecuador’s Insecurity,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/presidential-candidate-assassination-shows-new-depths-of-ecuadors-insecurity/

Image Information:

Image: Noboa, the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, faces a crisis of insecurity. Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidenciaecuador/53367780040/  
Attribution: Flickr, PDM 1.0 DEED