Algeria Inches Closer to Russia Amid Frosty Relations with Morocco and Spain

Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.

Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.


“…Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level…”


In need of allies and with deteriorating relations with neighbors, Algeria’s relations with Russia are firm and potentially deepening following multiple military-diplomatic visits from Russia.  Russia-Algeria links “are reaching a new level,” according to statements Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently made to the Russian media outlet RT Arabic.  A new strategic cooperation document is being drafted to replace the 2001 agreement that currently guides bilateral relations.  According to the excerpted article from influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Algeria plans to hold joint military exercises with Russia in November.  In early June, the new director of Algeria’s Advanced Warfighting School led a group of officers on a tour of General Staff colleges in Russia.  Deepening Russian-Algerian relations may reflect an emerging strategic alignment that could turn the western Mediterranean into a new flashpoint in the brewing conflict between Russia and NATO.

This is all against the backdrop of Algeria’s perceived threats from Morocco and Spain.  Both Algeria and Morocco have taken steps to reinforce military presence along their shared border in recent months.  Earlier this year, the Moroccan military established a new “eastern military zone” along its border with Algeria.  More recently, as reported in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadid, the Algerian military conducted nighttime joint maneuvers and set up a new base near the oasis town of Tindouf, where the borders of Algeria, Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara converge.  Tindouf is home to the largest concentration of Western Saharan (Sahrawi) refugees, and a key center of gravity for the Polisario Front, Western Sahara’s pro-independence movement. 

In early June, Algeria downgraded its political relations with Spain in response to Spanish recognition of Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara earlier this year.  The Algerian government is threatening a near-total trade embargo with Spain, from which only natural gas exports would be excepted.  It has also threatened to shut off the remaining pipeline that carries Algerian gas to Spain.  Stopping the flow of Algerian gas to Spain would leave Italy as the only European country with pipelines bringing in Algerian natural gas.  Algeria’s diplomatic rupture with Spain also includes suspending cooperation on migration.  Given the Ukraine-related pressures on the EU’s eastern borders, increased immigration and decreased gas flows along Europe’s southern borders would undoubtedly put substantial strain on the European Union’s social and political order.


Source:

“لافروف: علاقاتنا مع الجزائر تصل إلى مستوى جديد

(Lavrov: Our relations with Algeria have reached a new level),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language news site), 26 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/228xnr4b

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level. He also emphasized the need to formalize them in a new document, the preparation of which is underway.

Source:

“الجيش الجزائري ينفذ مناورات تحاكي قتالاً ليلياً قرب الحدود مع المغرب

(The Algerian army carries out maneuvers simulating night combat near the border with Morocc”),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 7 June 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2cukk683

The Algerian army conduct nighttime military maneuvers with live ammunition. The exercises included various units and weapons, and the intensive use of missiles, rocket launchers and aircraft. They took place in the Tindouf region, which lies directly on the border with Morocco, not far from the disputed Sahara region between Rabat and t“e “Polisario Fro”t,” and coincided with the opening of a military base in the area.

Source:

“مسؤول روسي رفيع يبحث بالجزائر التعاون العسكري

(High-level Russian official discusses military cooperation in Algeri”),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2s3jt5ms

A senior official in the Russian Federation Council held discussion with Algerian officials yesterday regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, the development of military cooperation between the two countries, and the previously announced joint military exercises, scheduled for next November in the Algerian desert.

Source:“”Students of Algerian Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School visit Defence Universi”y,” Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defense, 6 June 2022. https://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/18878/poseta-polaznika-visoke-ratne-skole-oruzanih-snaga-alzira-univerzitetu-odbrane-18878

Students attending the Algerian Peo’le’s National Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School have visited the Defence University in Belgrade today, thus starting their study tour of the Republic of Serbia which will last for several days.


Image Information:

Image:  Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف
Source: Photo by Habib kaki via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tindouf_تندوف.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0., https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en

Degrading Environmental Conditions in Iraq Providing Cover for Terrorism

U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).

U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).


“…the number of dusty days increased from 243 days to 272 days per year over the past two decades, and is expected to reach 300 dusty days per year in 2050.”


Over a three-week span in April and May, the Iraqi news agency Shafaq News reported at least three separate attacks in which ISIS fighters took advantage of dust storms to attack Iraqi positions.  The attacks themselves are not novel, as ISIS and other rebel groups have used dust storms and sandstorms to conceal their movements during attacks in both Syria and Iraq for years.  Nor were the attacks particularly impactful, relegated to brief reports in local media.  The frequency and breadth of this year’s dust storms, however, have drawn substantial media attention.  As detailed in the accompanying excerpt from the influential Qatari outlet al-Jazeera, the number of annual “dusty days” is expected to reach 300 by the year 2050, up from 243 at the start of the millennium and 272 at present.  A major reason for this is Iraq’s accumulating environmental problems, which include ongoing drought, expanding desertification, extreme summer heat, and decreased water flows in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  Iraq’s dysfunctional political parties are unlikely to muster sustainable responses to these challenges, allowing the spiraling cycle to continue.  Those frustrated at the negative social impacts caused by environmental degradation are likely to channel this against authorities, giving ISIS and other insurgent groups an opening to continue recruiting among the increasingly disaffected population.


Sources:

“بالتزامن مع عاصفة ترابية.. داعش يهاجم الجيش في الموصل والحشد يدخل الإنذار

(ISIS attacks the army in Mosul during dust storm, as PMF goes on alert),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 6 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yck9dbmy

On Wednesday, ISIS militants attacked Iraqi army units in the city of Mosul, the center of Nineveh Governorate. A statement of the 44th Brigade in the Popular Mobilization (Ansar al-Marja’iya) stated that… “a very dense dust storm hit the city of Mosul at the time of the attack by ISIS.”

Source:

“جرحى بهجوم لداعش في الانبار مستغلا عاصفة ترابية تضرب المحافظة

(Injuries in ISIS attack in Anbar taking advantage of dust storm in the province),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 19 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8wz9xa

Imad Al-Dulaimi, the mayor of Al-Rutba district, western Iraq, revealed on Tuesday that six soldiers and civilians were wounded by ISIS militants who took advantage of a dust storm that hit the area.

Source:

“مسؤول حكومي: هجوم “البو طراز” خارج حدود ديالى وداعش استغل العاصفة

(Government official: Albu Tiraz attack outside of Diyala’s borders, as ISIS takes advantage of storm),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 2 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yndch5bj

Eyewitnesses in the village of Albu Tiraz revealed that ISIS militants took advantage of the dust storm and lack of vision to carry out the attack, as visibility did not exceed 10 meters.

Source:

“العواصف الترابية تضرب مدن وقرى العراق طوال السنة.. تعرف على الأسباب

(Reasons why dust storms hit Iraqi cities and villages throughout the year),” al-Jazeera (influential Qatari news outlet), 19 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/p793253f

…according to the statistics recorded by the General Meteorological Authority, the number of dusty days increased from 243 days to 272 days per year over the past two decades, and is expected to reach 300 dusty days per year in 2050. About 70% of agricultural land in Iraq is degraded or threatened with deterioration, as a result of climate change and the loss of vegetation cover, which is the main factor for soil stabilization…


Image Information:

Image:  U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).
Source: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/186799/sandstorm
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Sees Threat from Morocco as Western Sahara Conflict Threatens To Reignite

Morocco from space.

Morocco from space.


“…Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders…”


The long-frozen dispute over the Western Sahara, in which Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory and Algeria supports the Polisario Front’s independence aspirations, continues to thaw amid sporadic military activity.  The latest incident occurred in early April, when a Moroccan UAV purportedly struck a convoy near the border between Mauritania and the Western Sahara. There are conflicting reports of what happened.  The Algerian government, through its foreign affairs ministry, called it “a targeted assassination” carried out by Morocco outside of its internationally recognized borders.  The Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadid cites a source that claimed a Moroccan drone had fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks that had delivered their commercial cargo in Mauritania and were returning to the Algerian city of Tindouf.  The Moroccan government did not comment on the matter, but according to the Facebook page of the quasi-official Moroccan military chat forum FAR Maroc, Moroccan authorities had conveyed to the UN that 10 trucks transporting weapons and ammunition were struck within territory that the Polisario Front controls.  It added that Polisario had prevented UN forces from accessing the site for 72 hours, during which the group altered the scene to make it appear as if the missiles struck a civilian convoy. The Algerian military’s main articulated concern vis-à-vis Morocco are not UAVs, but rather the broader threat of “new generation warfare.”  In a speech immediately following the incident described above, Saïd Chengriha, Chief of Staff of the Algerian military, emphasized the importance of maintaining national cohesion amid external attempts to sow discord through misinformation and influence campaigns.  Chengriha has stated on more than one occasion that the key battle for Algeria’s youth is a battle of conscience, “in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people.” 


Sources:

Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter account, @Algeria_MFA, 12 April 2022. https://twitter.com/Algeria_MFA/status/1513918713086492676

Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders against innocent civilians from three countries of the region.

Source:

“قصف جديد لشاحنات جزائرية في الصحراء قرب الحدود الموريتانية

(New attack on Algerian trucks in the Sahara near the Mauritanian border),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 10 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/ydf7uemn

Local sources told al-Araby al-Jadid that Moroccan drones fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks, which caused their destruction and the injury of more than two people. They added that the two trucks had unloaded their cargo in Mauritania and were on their way back to the city of Tindouf, in southern Algeria.

Source: FAR Maroc (quasi-official Moroccan military news forum), Facebook page (Arabic), 21 April 2022. https://www.facebook.com/1529080437316937/posts/3255921981299432

Regarding the Bir Lahlu operation on April 10, the [UN] mission confirmed that Morocco had informed that it targeted, in a specific operation, about 10 trucks and vehicles loaded with ammunition and weapons targeting the security of Morocco. However, the Polisario prevented members of the mission from inspecting the site for 72 hours, after which they found only two trucks and a vehicle. It also monitored the presence of another operation near the location of the two trucks, confirming that Polisario had manipulated the scene to prove its allegation that Morocco had targeted civilians.

Source: “Les nouveaux défis exigent la consolidation du front interne,” Algeria Press Service (Algerian oficial news agency), 8 May 2022. https://www.aps.dz/algerie/139409-les-nouveaux-defis-exigent-la-consolidation-du-front-interne-et-une-confiance-totale-dans-les-institutions-de-l-etat

According to El Djeich, “the various challenges which Algeria is currently facing, and which it will have to take up in the future, have led the High Command of the People’s National Army (ANP)… to carry out a vast program of modernization and capacity-renewal of the ANP battle corps and its implementation on the ground, in order to achieve a high level of competence at all levels and therefore operational availability”

… “The real battle that our young people must win today is essentially a battle of conscience, Lieutenant General Saïd Chengriha has said on numerous occasions,” per the Editorial. “It is a battle in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people…”


Image Information:

Image:  Morocco from space
Source: NASA, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/751371/morocco-image-day]  
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia

“… the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war are strongly present in these diplomatic moves, by virtue of Algeria’s strong strategic relationship with Russia and its stable relations with Western countries…”


Algeria has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but historical strategic relations with Russia and growing security concerns on its borders may draw it closer to Russia.  As noted in the excerpts from the Saudi-funded Independent Arabia and the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, these relations were on display during a late March visit to Algiers by a high-level Russian military delegation, during which the two sides agreed to hold joint anti-terror military exercises in southern Algeria in November.  Algeria is a key buyer of advanced Russian weaponry and an attractive strategic partner for Russia in the current geopolitical climate due to its location on NATO’s underbelly and its abundant natural gas resources.  Russia can help Algeria with two of its vital concerns: securing its southern border, particularly with Mali, and militarily balancing Morocco.  Relations with Morocco have soured over the past year, and Morocco’s blossoming military partnership with Israel threatens to tilt the balance in its favor.  Although the Algerian military has recently turned to China for some advanced weaponry, Russia remains its main security partner and possibly the only country willing to help Algeria maintain a favorable military balance with Morocco.

On 4 April, the speaker of the People’s National Assembly, Algeria’s lower house of parliament, hosted the Russian ambassador and reaffirmed Algeria’s commitment to its deep strategic relationship with Russia, in comments that were reported by the country’s official news agency Algeria Press Service.  However, Algerian in-depth cooperation with Russia does not equate to enthusiastic support for Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.  Like other countries of the region, Algeria hopes to stay out of a Russia-NATO conflict.  Algeria has been explicit in endorsing a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and its foreign minister has been active in an “Arab Contact Group” that seeks to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.  Still, Algeria’s relations with Russia run deeper than those of many other Arab countries, particularly when it comes to defense cooperation.  Algeria joined Syria in the vote against expelling Russia from the UN Human Rights Commission, making them the only two Arab countries to do so.  Most other Arab countries either abstained or refused to vote.  Mali’s government, which is increasingly close to Russia and a strategically important partner of Algeria’s, also voted against the resolution. 


Source:

“روسيا تسبق بلينكن إلى ‘حلبة الجزائر’

(Russia beats Blinken to ‘the Algerian Arena’),” Independent Arabia (Saudi-funded news website), 27 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mr2czhan

The Algerian Ministry of Defense announced that the Chief of Staff of the Army, Said Chengriha and other high-ranking officers met with members of a Russian delegation at the conclusion of their visit to Algeria. The Russian delegation was led by the Director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation of Russia, Dmitry Shuvaev, and also included the Russian ambassador to Algeria. The meeting came at the end of the Russian delegation’s visit, from March 23 to 25, to attend the regular meeting of the Algerian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee in charge of military and technical cooperation…

Said Hadef, a researcher in Maghreb affairs, told The Independent… “It is difficult to predict what Russia was expecting from its allies, but it seems that the visit of the director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation came under the weight of one month of war for Russia, and the consequent sanctions and Moscow’s fear of losing its allies.” He noted that the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war are strongly present in these diplomatic moves, by virtue of Algeria’s strong strategic relationship with Russia and its stable relations with Western countries.  This is making it move cautiously, as it seeks to preserve its positions and its allies, and at the same time avoids “angering” the West, led by Washington.

Source:

“مناورات عسكرية جزائرية ـ روسية تحاكي محاربة الإرهاب 

(Algeria-Russia anti-terror military maneuvers),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 6 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3k8r9fuc

Yesterday, the Russian TASS news agency quoted the Russian Southern Military District as saying that joint anti-terror exercises of the Russian and Algerian ground forces will take place next November in Algeria. The upcoming maneuvers were discussed, according to the press office of the Southern Military District in the Russian city of Vladikavkaz, during the “first planning conference to prepare for joint Russian-Algerian ground forces anti-terror maneuvers.” The same source also announced that the military exercises will take place at a base located in the Adrar Governorate, in the far south of Algeria. According to the Russian Agency, during the conference, “the exercise’s scenario and the organization of logistics, including accommodation procedures, were coordinated.” It added that the maneuvers “will consist of tactical moves to search, detect and destroy illegal armed groups. On the Russian side, about 80 soldiers from the Southern Military District are scheduled to participate in the exercises.”

Source:

“رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني يستقبل السفير الروسي لدى الجزائر

(People’s National Assembly Speaker welcomes the Russian ambassador to Algeria),” Algeria Press Service (official Algerian news service), 4 April 2022. https://www.aps.dz/ar/algerie/124089-2022-04-04-14-29-34

On Monday, the Speaker of the People’s National Assembly, Mr. Ibrahim Bougali, received the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Algeria, Mr. Igor Belyaev, in a meeting centered on the “outstanding bilateral relations” that unite the two countries, according to a statement from the parliament.… In addition, Mr. Bougali affirmed “Algeria’s commitment to its in-depth strategic partnership with Russia” and called for “exploiting all available possibilities to diversify the areas of cooperation.”

Iran Digs into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left by Russia

the spread of pro-Iranian militias and the Fourth Division coincided with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian forces from some military sites in eastern Homs…”


Iran and its allies are fortifying their positions in the central Syrian desert.  The accompanying article from the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat delves into the recent repositioning of Iranian proxies and allies in central Syria.  The article cites an early 2022 deal between the Syrian military’s 4th Division and Iran, in which they agreed to establish nearly a dozen bases throughout central Syria.  These moves coincided with Russia turning its focus to Ukraine and Iran’s recent escalation with Israel, which likely added urgency to Iranian efforts to strengthen its military position in Syria.  To that end, Iran and its allies have focused on supplying and fortifying weapons depots across central Syria.  According to the report from al-Sharq al-Awsat, Iran has provided its Syrian proxies and allies with vehicles, communications devices, and anti-tank missiles.  Russia has also given Iran and its allies control of the massive weapons depot in Mheen, in the Homs desert.  Iran recently established a new militia in Syria, drawing from its various local proxy forces, in order to guard all these weapons depots.  Pro-Iranian forces in central Syria are likely to employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to secure their positions.  Local outlets have reported on recent drone transfers, and in late March, Iranian forces held a UAV training session for some of their Syrian proxies.  In early April, the Iranian Arabic-language news channel al-Alam aired footage showing Iran’s proxy forces in Iraq employing Iranian Shahed-129 drones against ISIS targets, suggesting Iranian proxies in Syria would be similarly capable.


Source:

“إيران توسع انتشار ميليشياتها وسلاحها في سوريا 

(Iran expands the reach of its militias and weapons in Syria),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 7 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yp83a5pu


In a new Iranian military tactic aimed at extending Iran’s influence over the largest area of ​​Syrian territory, the Revolutionary Guards have recently strengthened… their presence in about 120 sites and military headquarters in the eastern countryside of Homs, Hama desert, Raqqa desert, and Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo governorates.  They have reinforced these sites with about 4,500 members of the militias loyal to them, and a number of missile launchers, heavy weapons, drones and communications devices. They recently took control of the strategic Mheen warehouses east of Homs, after expanding their influence in the Nairab military airport in Aleppo governorate, at the expense of the Russian and regime forces. They have also established training camps for Syrian volunteers to join militias loyal to Iran.

In the desert of Homs and eastern Hama, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “an agreement was reached at the beginning of 2022. Military leaders in the Fourth Division, led by Maher al-Assad, brother of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, established about 11 headquarters, headed by officers and military experts from both sides, in the areas of Hasya, Palmyra, Mahin, Al-Qaryatayn, Al-Sukhnah, Al-Kum and Al-Taybeh, east of Homs, and the Salamiyah, Al-Saan, Athria and Sheikh Hilal areas, east of Hama.

… “the spread of pro-Iranian militias and the Fourth Division coincided with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian forces from some military sites in eastern Homs. This includes their recent withdrawal from the Mheen warehouses, which were handed over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah”…

On March 27, Iran moved 10 Iranian Muhajir drones from its warehouses in the city of Palmyra, east of Homs, to a camp for drones that was recently established in the al-Tabani area, southwest of Deir ez-Zor. There, they established a UAV training project, imposing a security cordon around the area.

… Syrian activists said that “the IRGC recently formed a new militia called Fajr al-Islam. It is led by Iranian officers and made up of elite elements from the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade, the Iraqi Harakat al-Nujaba, and Lebanese Hezbollah, in addition to groups of Alawites loyal to Iran and young Syrian Shiites.” Its mission is to guard Iranian military depots in Hama, Homs, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Palmyra, and Sukhnah, east of Homs

Source:

“بالفيديو..مسيرة  شاهد ١٢٩ تستهدف اوكار الدواعش في العراق

(Video… Shahed-129 drone targets ISIS hideouts in Iraq),” al-Alama (Iranian Arabic-language news channel), 9 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/376pba2u

Video footage emerged showing members of the Popular Mobilization Forces using the Iranian Shahed-129 drone to target the hideouts of ISIS terrorist gangs in Iraq.

Iran Repositions Its Proxies in Syria as Russia Turns Focus to Ukraine

Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.

Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.


“…Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…”


Local media reports indicate that Iran is “repositioning” in Syria, perhaps seeking to take advantage of the Russian military’s focus on Ukraine.  A late February report by Syria-focused Turkish think tank Jusoor Center for Studies speculates that Russia’s focus on Ukraine may detract from its involvement in Syria, “and Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors.”   The report mentions several signs of Iran’s repositioning in Syria, including increased activities and weapons transfers by Iran-backed militias in regime-controlled areas of the Syrian desert and the Middle Euphrates River Valley, near the border with Iraq.  Tensions were rising between Russian and Iranian proxies in Deir Ezzor Province during the build up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the accompanying excerpt from the Syrian opposition media source Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.  Russian airstrikes on ISIS positions in the desert have declined substantially since the start of the war in Ukraine, even as the group has ramped up its attacks in the Syrian desert, according to a report from the pro-Syrian opposition Lebanese news website al-Modon.  The Quds Brigade, Russia’s key ally in anti-ISIS efforts in the Syrian desert, withdrew precipitously to Damascus.  Meanwhile, local media reports claim several Iraqi militias have returned to Iraq and Iranian proxies in the Fatemiyoun Brigade have redeployed in the area.  The logic behind these movements remains murky, but the accompanying excerpt from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat speculates that they relate to strengthening supply lines and transit corridors between Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria.


Source:

“6 مؤشرات على إعادة تموضع إيران في سورية

(Six indicators that Iran is repositioning in Syria),” Jusoor Center for Studies (Turkey-based think tank focused on Syria), 4 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8tnvv4

Since the beginning of 2022, Iran has begun to undertake a series of political, military, economic and security activities in coordination with the Syrian regime, which indicates its repositioning in Syria…

… the continuation of conflict in Ukraine may lead to a decline in Russia’s interest in Syria.  Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…

Source:

“تصاعد ملحوظ في الحرب الباردة بين الجانبين الروسي والإيراني في محاولة لكسب ود أهالي القرى السبع شرقي الفرات

(Notable Escalation in the Cold War between Russia and Iran in an attempt to gain allegiance from the ‘Seven Villages’ east of the Euphrates),” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (Syrian opposition media source), https://tinyurl.com/2p85pm2x, 16 February 2022.

Recently, the competition between Russia and Iran has escalated in the countryside of Deir Ezzor governorate, specifically in the so-called “seven villages” under the influence of the Iranians and the regime east of the Euphrates, and the corresponding areas on the western bank of the river…

Source:

“إيران تتمدد في سوريا..إثر تراجع النشاط الروسي

(Iran expands in Syria… following decline in Russian activities),” al-Modon (pro-Syrian Lebanese news website), 12 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8v8v9y


Russian military activities throughout the Syrian territory have declined as the Russian attack on Ukraine enters its third week. At the same time, Iranian militias are sending military reinforcements to the city of Palmyra and its surroundings.

…“the Russian aerial bombardment on the Syrian desert is half of what it was before the war on Ukraine”…


On Friday, the Palestinian “Quds Brigade” militia withdrew from the city of Palmyra, located in the eastern countryside of Homs. Militia members left the city heading towards the governorate of Damascus. The motives for this withdrawal remain unknown and it is unclear whether they will return later. According to the sources of the Syrian Observatory, the Quds Brigade’s withdrawal came without prior warning or coordination with the regime’s security services located in Palmyra and its surroundings.

Source:

“مئات من ميليشيات إيران يغادرون سوريا إلى العراق 

(Hundreds of Iranian miliitas leave Syria for Iraq),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 7 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mrdd5r2m

Syrian activists reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard began withdrawing a large number of militia members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghani) and Iraqi (Shiite) militias from military sites in the areas of Palmyra and Sukhna, east of Homs, into Iraqi territory, through unauthorized crossings. Other fighters from the (Afghan Fatemiyoun) Brigade were deployed to new camps east of Palmyra. The sites in Homs countryside and a number of military vehicles and equipment were handed over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The development was described by activists in the region as “remarkable,” at a time when (ISIS) launched repeated attacks against regime forces and Iranian militias in the Homs desert and Deir Ezzor, incurring losses in life and equipment.


Image Information:

Image:  Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021. 
Source: Spc. Isaiah J Scott, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6705061/sdf-conducts-patrol-syria
Attribution: Public Domain

Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense

Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).

Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).


“…With its technological development, China has been able to surpass Russia, which has unsuccessfully tried to market its equipment to Saudi Arabia since 2007…”


Chinese weapons manufacturers were among the key winners at the World Defense Show 2022 (WDS 2022), Saudi Arabia’s new and much-vaunted annual international weapons fair.  The Saudi government meant for the show to serve as a catalyst for its Vision 2030 development plan, which aims to localize half of all defense spending by 2030.  Riyadh also meant for the show to help fulfill Saudi Arabia’s immediate military needs, which are currently dictated by the war in Yemen and are primarily focused on low-altitude air defense.  In that regard, the Saudi Arabian government inked a deal with China’s Poly Technologies to procure a laser air defense system, known as the “Silent Hunter.”  As described in the accompanying excerpt from the Arabic-language military news site and chat forum defense-arabic.com, the system uses lasers to target low-altitude UAVs of the type used by the Houthi-controlled military in Yemen.  The report notes that China has now succeeded in penetrating the Saudi air defense market, something that Russian companies have unsuccessfully tried to do since 2007.  Russian air defense offerings at WDS 2022 included the Tor-M2KM, a self-contained module version of the Tor short-range air defense platform.  In a further sign that Chinese companies are making inroads where their Russian counterparts have failed, the other accompanying excerpt from defense-arabic.com highlights Saudi interest in obtaining the Chinese HQ-17AE system, which is based on the Russian Tor platform.


Source:

“السعودية توقع عقد استحواذ على منظومات دفاع جوي صينية

 (Saudi Arabia signs contract to acquire Chinese air defense systems),” defense-arabic.com (Arabic-language military news site and chat forum), 10 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yc77ktna

The Saudi version of the Silent Hunter system is different from other versions offered by Poly Technologies. The kingdom has been using Chinese weapons for a long time, so the purchase itself is not novel. What is novel is to include them in one of the Kingdom’s most sensitive sectors, which is air defense. With its technological development, China has been able to surpass Russia, which has unsuccessfully tried to market its equipment to Saudi Arabia since 2007. Silent Hunter is an anti-drone laser weapon developed in China by Poly Technologies. It is an improved version of the 30 kW low-altitude defensive laser system, and is available in both fixed and mobile versions.

Source:

“السعودية تسعى للحصول على منظومة الدفاع الجوي HQ-17AE الصينية الصنع

(Saudi Arabia seeks to obtain Chinese HQ-17AE air defense system),” defense-arabic.com (Arabic-language military news site and chat forum), 16 January 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mrxrec6c

After acquiring the Chinese 3D TWA radar system, the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces are seeking to acquire HQ-17AE air defense systems, according to press sources. China had announced that the HQ-17AE air defense missile system, dubbed the “Low-Altitude Aircraft Hunter,” is available for export.


Image Information:

Image:  Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-1/i-4ZccFz9/A
Attribution: CC 4.0

Yemen’s Houthis Employ Iranian “358” Loitering Anti-Aircraft Missile

One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).

One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).


“… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war…”


The Iranian “358” missile appears to be an increasingly important weapon for Yemen’s Houthi-led military forces.  The 358 missile is classified as surface-to-air, but in early January, it was seemingly used as a surface-to-surface missile to target the provincial leader of the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Shabwah Province.  On 14 January, a 358 was used to shoot down a Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Saudi-led coalition, according to several open-source analysts on Twitter.  It is unclear how many of these missiles are in Houthi possession.  Since 2019, several of them have been seized from Yemen-bound vessels in the Arabian Sea.  A 358 was also found in Iraq last October. 

According to an October 2021 article from the prominent Yemeni news website al-Masdar Online, the 358is a key Iranian weapon developed to counter U.S. aircraft, particularly UAVs.  The missile ships in three parts and once assembled can be launched from mobile positions, such as small trucks.  It does poorly against fast-moving targets but can be effective against helicopters and some UAVs.  The article from al-Masdar Online implies that it may be the Houthi-led military forces’ most effective air defense missile, potentially having been used to bring down a variety of aircraft, including an Apache helicopter, Wing Loong UAVs, Scan Eagle and RQ-20 UAVs manufactured by the United States, and the Karayel UAV manufactured by Turkey.  This sentiment is echoed by analysis from the Egyptian think tank Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, which considers the 358’s presence in Yemen and Iraq as indicative of “a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region,” one which puts new emphasis on defending against aerial attacks.


Source:

@3Mr_o_o (pro-Houthi, Iraq-based “Observer of political and military affairs”), Twitter, 3 January 2022. https://twitter.com/3Mr_o_o/status/1478359982097813511

#Yemen

The mercenary Ali al-Jabwani, head of the Transitional Council in Shabwa governorate, survived an attack in the Usaylan area yesterday. The images released from the attack show a missile similar to the famous 358 missile.

Source: @AlgerianAircra1 (Algeria-focused “Aircraft Tracker” account interested in “Aircraft News and Novelties related to Defense and Aviation”), Twitter, 14 January 2022.  https://twitter.com/AlgerianAircra1/status/1481988325774925825

It appears that the Houthis in Yemen have shot down another Wing Loong II UCAF aircraft from the Saudi coalition. Judging by the video, it seems that an Iranian missile known as the 358 was used – a large, relatively slow missile with large wings.

Source:

“من “صلاح الدين” العراقية الى “مارب” اليمنية.. صواريخ دفاع جوي إيرانية بأيدي مليشيات طهران

(From Iraq’s Salahuddin to Yemen’s Marib… Iranian Air Defense Missiles in the Hands of Tehran’s Militias),” al-Masdar Online (prominent Yemeni news website), 24 October 2021. https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284

But the situation has changed significantly since mid-2019, when the Houthi militia announced in June that its air defenses had managed to shoot down a U.S.-made MQ9 drone in Hodeidah Governorate, using a “domestically developed” missile. In August of the same year, the militia’s military spokesman said: “We have the ability to neutralize a large number of enemy aircraft.”… It seems that Iran has transferred this type of missile to its allies in Yemen to test it against the American planes owned by the Saudi and Emirati air forces participating in the war. Iran considers this missile as its armor against American aircraft…

Source:

“تهديد الأجواء.. ما وراء حائط الصواريخ الإيراني في الشرق الأوسط

(Threat to the skies… Behind the Iranian missile wall in the Middle East),” Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (Egyptian think tank), 2 November 2021. https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/64307/

The unique design of this missile, and its subsequent reappearance in other regions in the Middle East, was an indication that it might be the main player in all the shootdowns that have taken place in Yemen recently, such as the downing of a “Scan Eagle” drone last June, in Serwah District, Marib Governorate … In sum, the appearance of the “358” missile in Iraq, and before that in Yemen (and it may have been used recently in Syria), indicates a new shift in Tehran’s strategy in using its proxies in the region. This strategy now includes air defense, after it was previously limited to missile power, and then drones.


Image Information:

Image: One of the five, near-fully assembled uniquely Iranian-designed and manufactured Three-Five-Eight surface-to-air missiles that were a part of the shipment seized by the USS FORREST SHERMAN in November (2019).
Source: CENCTCOM, Steve McLeod, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2087998/us-dhow-interdictions/
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran-Backed Iraqi Group Attacks Abu Dhabi with UAVs in Support of Yemen’s Houthis

Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.

Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.


“… the UAE has become vulnerable to attacks from more than one direction…”


A little-known group calling itself the “True Promise Brigades” claimed a 2 February attack on Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE), involving multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  The group’s only other known prior activity was an early 2021 UAV strike on the Yamama Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  The Abu Dhabi attack caused no known material damage.  It came on the heels of a two-week span that saw Yemen’s Houthi-controlled military forces launch three separate missile and UAV attacks targeting Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two main cities in the UAE.  The timing of the True Promises Brigades’ attack implied a potential link between them and the Houthis, reinforced by supportive tweets from the Houthi-led forces’ influential military spokesman, such as the first accompanying tweet, in which the spokesman thanked the group.  On social media, the True Promise Brigades eschew national identification and call themselves “sons of the Arabian Peninsula.”  The second and third accompanying passages from pro-Iran outlets hint that the group operates from the Iraqi desert, is associated with Iran-backed Iraqi militias, and is under the command of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ international wing, the Quds Force.  The article from the pro-Iran Lebanese influential daily al-Akhbar argues that the Abu Dhabi attack is directly tied to Iraqi politics.  Specifically, the article’s author sees it as a response to perceived Emirati meddling in Iraqi politics and its support for factions opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq.  The article from the pro-Iran Lebanese media channel al-Mayadeen, meanwhile, places the attack in the context of Yemen and sees it as a response to coalition escalation in Yemen.  The attack’s key message, according to the article, is that Iranian allies are capable of linking the Yemeni and Iraqi arenas and conducting semi-coordinated actions targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE from both directions.


Source:

Yahya Sare’e (Houthi-controlled military spokesman), Twitter, 3 February 2022. https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1489295787616047106

We send our congratulations on the jihadist operation carried out by the True Promise Brigades-Sons of the Arabian Peninsula against the Emirati enemy yesterday, Wednesday. We thank them for this honorable, responsible and solidary stance with our dear people against the client Emirati enemy.

Source:

“المأزق الإماراتيّ يتعمّق: جبهة جديدة… من العراق

(The Emirati Impasse Deepens: A New Front… from Iraq),” al-Akhbar (pro-Iran influential Lebanese daily), 4 February 2022. https://tinyurl.com/w7xb8a88

Whatever the group’s identity, the event itself confirms that the UAE has become vulnerable to attacks from more than one direction. This creates greater risks for Emirati security, against the background of its aggression in Yemen and its blatant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Washington seems to have handed over the file of the new ruling arrangement to the UAE following the October 10 elections, in which Muqtada al-Sadr, Massoud Barzani and Muhammad al-Halbousi achieved the largest victory, all of whom are allies or friends of Abu Dhabi. The latter has also moved closer to Turkey, allowing for arrangements to be made resulting in the unification of the al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar blocs, and the re-election of al-Halbousi, who is considered the UAE’s man in Iraq, as Speaker of the House of Representatives. This in turn opened the way for the installation of a “majority coalition” that excluded Iran’s allies, which is a great risk for Iraqi security and for which the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, bears responsibility…

Source:

“دخول “ألوية الوعد الحق” العراقيّة على خطِّ حرب اليمن.. اشتباك أو تشبيك؟

(Iraq’s ‘True Promises Brigades’’ Entry into the Yemen War… Clashes or Linking),” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media channel), 8 February 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3p4skytc

This Iraqi group is very interested in the Yemen war, and it is almost specialized in it. In addition, it seems that it is interested in standing up to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular… It is very likely that the strike on Abu Dhabi carried a political message: “Don’t forget that the arenas can be linked when the time comes.” Let us note that the strike came after a crazy escalation carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and after American supplies to Abu Dhabi, including warplanes, and the dispatch of the American destroyer “USS Cole” to the Gulf to support the UAE navy, and talk of a possible ground attack from the Yemeni coast… These intensive messages, whether military or political, come in the context of a clear linking of the arenas, especially since leaders in Ansar Allah wrote on their Twitter accounts that the confrontation would not be with Sanaa alone in the event of any major US invasion of Yemen.


Image Information:

Image:  Map of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula.
Source: Abuk Sabuk via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Middle_east_CIA.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia Highlighting Use of “Cube” and “Lancet” Loitering Munitions in Syria

ZALA Lancet loitering munition.

ZALA Lancet loitering munition.


“…government tests of the KYB loitering munition have been completed, and the results of the tests are considered positive… it was recommended that the Russian army be armed with this new type of strike attack drone…”


As reported in the accompanying December 2021 article from Russia’s Arabic-language media outlet RT Arabic, the KYB-UAV “kamikaze drone” (also referred to as KUB-BLA or “Cube”) has passed government field tests and is now ready for procurement by Russian forces, which is expected to begin this year.  The KYB-UAV is made by ZALA AERO, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Concern, itself a subsidiary of Rostec.  The KYB-UAV was first made public at Abu Dhabi’s 2019 weapons expo (IDEX-2019).  In December 2020, Rostec’s CEO explained that the KYB, along with a more advanced ZALA AERO loitering munitions platform called the Lancet, distinguishable by its double x-shaped tail, had both been tested in Syria that year.  A documentary that aired last December on the state-owned Russian-language news channel Russia 24 includes an interview with a purported Russian Lancet operator who oversaw more than 40 strikes in Syria, including a pair of targeted assassinations in Hama Province in April 2020.  Recently, Russian state television networksfeatured several clips of Lancets being used in Syria to target rebel positions and infrastructure.  As the article from the Syrian opposition news network Shaam News Network notes, a recent clip shows a Lancet targeting a small oil refinery in rural Hama Province.    However, the accuracy of Syrian opposition media reports on these platforms is limited, given the difficulty in distinguishing them from other weapons, and because Iranian and Syrian government forces operate similar, though more rudimentary, kamikaze drones. 


Source:

“مصدر روسي يعلن إنجاز اختبارات الدرون الانتحاري كوب


(Russian Source Announces Success of ‘Cube’ Suicide Drone Tests),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language news network), 16 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p86e54n

A source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense said that government tests of the KYB loitering munition have been completed, and the results of the tests are considered positive. The source added: “As a result of these tests, it was recommended that the Russian army be armed with this new type of strike attack drone.” The source indicated that the delivery of these drones to the armed forces will most likely start in 2022.

Source:

“الدفاع الروسية تستعرض مسيرات لانسيت الانتحارية بمقاطع تظهر استخدامها بسوريا

(Russian Defense Ministry Displays Use of ‘Lancet’ Suicide UAV in Video Clip from Syria),” Shaam News Network (Syrian opposition news network), 26 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/bddd8f9p

The Russian Ministry of Defense published a video clip showing the use of “Lancet” Russian suicide drones, which it said shows the destruction of a small oil refinery factory belonging to the rebel factions in the countryside of Hama. Sham News Network was unable to determine the target location. Video clips were also posted on the telegram channel of Russia-1 journalist Alexander Rogatkin. The full version will be shown on Saturday on the Russia 24 TV channel. The journalist explained on his channel: “A small oil refinery belonging to Syrian militants was destroyed in the Hama countryside with the help of two munitions by the special operations forces of the Russian Armed Forces. It is assumed that Lancet drones were used.”

Source:  “Война Дронов – 2021 (Drone Wars – 2021),” Russia 24 (State-owned Russian-language news channel), 25 December 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Me7shKOc0c


Image Information:

Image: ZALA Lancet loitering munition.
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin Military Blog, https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2019-Exhibition-pavilions/i-HwGLLZC/A
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Copyright-policy