Regional Analyst Questions Effectiveness, Sustainability of Russian Missile Strikes in Ukraine

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.


“Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.”


Although the intensity of Russian missile strikes against Ukraine increased from March and April 2023 to May 2023, the somewhat limited nature of the strikes may be an indication that Russia is running into a supply problem that could have a strategic impact on its ambitions in Ukraine and its ability to sell weapons on the international arms market. According to the recent accompanying article from Republic of Georgia-based Resonance Daily, which monitors the war in Ukraine and Russian military affairs in general, Russia may be squandering its missile stockpile in a somewhat piecemeal effort to break or find a weakness in Ukraine’s missile defense that it cannot currently exploit. From the perspective of the Georgian defense analyst quoted in the article, “Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.” This, the analyst points out, is due to Russia’s inability to achieve any breakthroughs in the ground war. The article, published in the wake of a barrage of Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv on 16 May, underscores that Russia is thought to possess only 80 Kinzhal (dagger) hypersonic missiles, and that Ukrainian missile defenses destroyed one “dagger” on 6 May and six more on 16 May. Accordingly, it asserts, Russia now likely has 73 “daggers” in its arsenal. Collectively, these developments suggest that the Kinzhal [RG1] , as well as other missiles in Russia’s arsenal, are quickly becoming a finite resource due to attrition and sanctions, the latter of which makes it much more difficult to manufacture more of these weapons.[i] If the estimations of Russia’s stockpiles are correct, and current sanctions hold, Russia will not be able to replenish its stockpiles in any meaningful way in the near future. As a result, Russia does not possess weapon systems in sufficient numbers to allow it to strike Ukraine with enough salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian missile defense. Moreover, Moscow will be severely impacted in its ability to wage war on any front, threatening its positions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as curtailing its ambitions elsewhere.


Source:

Tamta Chachanidze, “ყველაზე მასირებული სარაკეტო დარტყმა კიევზე და „სათაგური“ ბახმუტში – ბოლო ცნობები ფრონტიდან (The most massive missile attack on Kiev and the “keystone” in Bakhmut – latest news from the front),” Resonance Daily (Georgia based media outlet focused on foreign affairs)16 May 2023. http://www.resonancedaily.com/mobile/index.php?id_rub=8&id_artc=181367&fbclid=IwAR39bK06tvFq8JAzCvR9QhAJVVqUvU3uFI4iITkgHFPXru72jkKrz5f4yQQ

On May 16, Russia launched the most massive three-hour missile attack on Kiev in the history of war. Aeroballistic missiles of the “Kinjali” type were also used. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the air defense forces of the country neutralized all the missiles. The Russian side claims the opposite – that with one “Kinjali” the Ukrainians destroyed the air defense system “Patriot”….

From the footage spread on social networks, it can be seen that there were indeed fires in Kyiv after the May 16 rocket attack, however, according to the administration of the capital city, it was caused by the fragments of the downed rockets. According to military analysts, the Russians are already trying to force Ukraine to make some kind of concession with intense air strikes. Or is this a new strategy to “somehow look ugly” to the Western anti-aircraft systems transferred to Ukraine.

They also do not rule out that “Kinjal” was hit by “Patriot”, because there is no such thing as 100% and ideal air defense, and “one or two missiles will defeat even the best air defense”.

At dawn on May 16, the Russians launched the most massive missile attack on Kiev in the last year, which lasted more than three hours….

According to Valery Zaluzhn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the early hours of May 16, the Russian occupation forces attacked Ukraine from the northern, southern and eastern directions with 18 missiles. According to him, the opponent used 6 aeroballistic missiles “Kinjali”, 9 missiles “Calibre [RG1] ” from naval bases and 3 ground missiles “Iskander [RG2] “. Air defense forces destroyed all 18 missiles.

Several buildings and vehicles were damaged in different districts of Kyiv. 3 people were injured. According to Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, it was caused by debris from Russian missiles. However, the Russian side claims otherwise.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on May 16, a “Patriot” air defense system was destroyed with a “Kinjali” missile. In addition, according to the agency, “high-precision weapons struck warehouses of Ukrainian ammunition and weapons, which the West supplied to Kyiv”.

On the same day the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that, “Russian air defense systems shot down seven Storm Shadow [GRLCUT(3] long-range cruise missiles recently handed over to Ukraine by Britain, the same number of Hymars shells, as well as three Harm-type radar-detecting missiles. In addition, 22 Ukrainian planes were destroyed in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine responded to the deadly attack on Kiev and thanked the Air Force of Ukraine for its work and impressive results. “The next incredible success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Last night, our sky defenders shot down six Russian hypersonic ‘Daggers’ and 12 more missiles,” Reznikov wrote on Twitter.

In addition, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine wrote an arithmetic equation: “80-1-6=X”, implying the total number of “Kinjali” missiles possessed by Russia to be only 80. On May 6, the Ukrainians destroyed 1 and 6 additional “daggers” on May 16. Accordingly, the Russians now likely have 73 “daggers” in their arsenal.

Colonel Lasha Beridze states to Resonance Daily that the Russians no longer have the resources of a ground attack and are now trying to compensate for this with air strikes.

“Russia no longer has options for a ground attack. They understand very well that they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time, and that is why they are already trying to take Ukraine to some kind of favorable concession with such airstrikes, or it is simply a punitive operation.

“Ukraine already has “Patriot” systems that can fight with “Kinjals” and quite successfully. It has been neglected many times already. Even the best air defense will be hit by one or two missiles, there is no such thing as perfect. Many developed countries could not withstand airstrikes like Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians are successfully repelling the attacks, and as time goes by, these air defense capabilities will increase.

“At the end of the day, Russian armaments with Western technologies have no chance to win and turn the battlefield in their favor. It seems they will increase their airstrikes if they have the chance. However, no matter how they increase missile strikes, there are all indications that they will not be able to increase its effectiveness. Don’t get angry and the “daggers” will come out”, said Lasha Beridze to “Resonance”.

Caucasus International University professor and military analyst Vakhtang Maisaya told “Resonance” that massed strikes have become a common strategy of the Russians, which may be aimed at disrupting the existing anti-aircraft systems in Ukraine.“It seems that this is already a kind of strategy of the Russians, when they try to break through the anti-missile defense, which is very effective, and they increase the intensity to somehow find a loophole in these systems and break through them. When the Ukrainians started intercepting missiles, the Russians now switched to intensive strikes,” Maisaya said.


Notes:

[i] Missiles are not the only Russian weapon system to be in short supply. The number of Russian aircraft are also being diminished. For insight regarding the limited number of Su-35 fighter bombers, see: “Russia’s Su-35: Are Its Military Aircraft Exports Headed for a Fall?,” The Rand Blog, 20 October 2022. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/russias-su-35-are-its-military-aircraft-exports-headed.html


Image Information:

Image: Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K [RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_66.jpg
Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CCA 4.0 International

Retired SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff Shares His Thoughts on Russia’s War in Ukraine

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023.


“I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out.”


Former Vice Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff (France) believes that Russia’s stalled invasion of Ukraine cannot be won by any decisive Russian military campaign. He also believes Ukraine’s military is incapable of “winning” in its current condition. According to an 11 April interview published in the Krakow-based New Eastern Europe[i] foreign affairs journal, Yakovleff believes Russia is already engaged in an offensive of its own but that its forces are “so diluted all along the line in Donbas” that “it will not collapse the Ukraine line” and thus be inconsequential. He also believes Ukraine is unlikely to have any meaningful offensive and should instead wait for Russia to make an operational blunder of which it can take advantage.

In the interview, Yakovleff, a descendent of Russian emigrants, discussed critical issues surrounding the conflict, including the conditional transfer of arms from the West to Ukraine. He recognized that high-end weapon systems like fighter aircraft and longer-range artillery and rocket systems would likely continue to be given only with promises that Ukraine would not use the systems to attack Russian territory. Yet Yakovleff noted that Belarus posed an interesting dilemma possible for exploitation: “If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war.” According to Yakovleff, while Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story Yakovleff also expects, and favors, regime change in Russia. According to Yakavleff, “it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know… But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime.” His sentiment cuts to the heart of conflicting views of the war in Ukraine and the desirable outcomes. Ukraine views its conflict with Russia as total war, a fight for its very existence and thus the demise of Russia is the most favorable outcome. As the piecemeal and slower than requested weapons transfers might suggest, the West prefers to manage the war, to keep the war limited. Removing Putin may or may not be an objective of the conflict as a highly destabilized Russia and unknown leadership may be considered too high a cost for total Ukrainian victory.[ii]


Source:

“Russia has already taken “Ukrainium” and its fatal,” New Eastern Europe (Krakow based foreign affairs journal focused on Eastern Europe), 11 April 2023. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2023/04/11/russia-has-already-taken-ukrainium-and-its-fatal/

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: We recently marked the anniversary of the infamous Russian attempt –

or rather the failure – called “Take Kyiv in three days”. We are witnessing a new Russian

offensive gaining traction, as we speak. How do you rate their chances this time?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, pretty dismal. It looks like the Russians have been engaged in an offensive for three or four weeks now. But it is diluted all along the line in Donbas with a focal point around Bakhmut. Even if they achieve success in Bakhmut, beyond symbolic value it doesn’t take them much further than the next town of middling importance. So I don’t believe they will collapse the Ukrainian lines. So okay, they may conquer a few square kilometres of real estate at tremendous cost. I have a suspicion they are wasting their resources, both human and ammunition. It’s not a very pointed thrust.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: If that blunder does not come to pass, is the Ukrainian counter-offensive still a foregone conclusion? Must they attack?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I wouldn’t advise them to attack if they don’t have the necessary mass to do so. And the necessary reserves and ammunition and so on. They’ve been very good at this war without taking any advice of mine. So I’ve got to be humble about that. You know, and they know better in what situation they are.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: On the warplanes, French President Emmanuel Macron said that if France did send warplanes, he would not want any to be used to “touch Russian soil”. Do you see that becoming a pre-condition for the rest of the would-be donors as well?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I suspect so. And I do think that the Ukrainians get the message, that they’re reasonable themselves, they understand. In essence, we are in a limited war, as Russian doctrine written in the times of Putin calls it – a limited regional war. It’s not limited in terms of violence and assets involved and numbers. It’s limited in the geographical sense. So, the guarantee that warplanes wouldn’t be used to attack targets on Russian territory – I can understand why strategically it’s sound, because Russia is essentially sanctuary-ised in reality. It’s immoral and it’s not legally sound by the way – you have every right to strike an aggressor, including on his territory. And all nations have done that routinely, if I dare say so. But in this case, okay – it may be right, it may be legal, it may be moral – but it is not politically expedient. And it is not even politically expedient for the Ukrainians. So, of course, there would be guarantees. And I don’t doubt the Ukrainians would abide by them.

I must say there’s an interesting side story, which is Belarus. Because Belarus, legally speaking, is an aggressor to the same degree as Russia. If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war. It’s not complicit, it’s a participant. And in that respect, technically speaking – and it would be amusing to see how politically expedient this would be, you know maybe Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story. I think it’s an interesting discussion.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: To go back to the earlier argument that you made that the West is providing Ukraine with enough weaponry and just in time for it to save itself from being crushed. – every now and then we have distinctions being made between Ukraine winning this war and Ukraine not losing this war. And I would like to ask what this “not losing” stands for, what it might look like.

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, not losing means Ukraine is still alive and kicking, not necessarily in control of all this territory.

So it’s the situation now. Victory for me – the only measure of victory for Ukraine is that the bear

has been defanged, and that the fear of Russia coming back recedes seriously. I have a suspicion

that that does imply Ukraine recovering all its territory, if only so the Russian body politic

understands that there was no reward in aggression, starting from 2014. That is a very extreme

measure of victory, to be honest, and I don’t think it is achievable right now, much to my regret.

…I don’t think liberating all its territory is within reach now of the Ukrainian army in the foreseeable future. And that is months, not years. The only real chance for Ukraine to recover its territory is the demise of the Putin regime, and bitter infighting inside Russia and the crumbling of Russia, and that will reopen the discussion. That is, that’s not something I call for, advocate or desire. But I think it is the logic of this war. That’s what I call Ukrainium. Ukrainium is the same as polonium. You know, it’s Russian, and it’s fatal. And it’s tearing through the fabric of Russia now. Even if they win the war, by the way, the Russians, I think society has been too much stressed. So ultimately, I believe that the desirable outcome for Ukraine will he a change of regime in Moscow.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: How far-fetched a future are we talking about here?MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: I think it’s the logic of what’s happening now – it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know. And I am not very good at predicting. But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out. And then, part of the sorting out will be Georgia, Transnistria, maybe Chechnya, Dagestan and other places, and of course, Ukraine [would] include Crimea.


Notes:

[i] New Eastern Europe (NEE) foreign affairs journal is based in Krakow, Poland. While relatively unknown, it’s readership has expanded greatly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also subscribed to by significant research and academic institutions in the West. Most of the experts and authors featured in the journal are from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, giving the NEE an Eastern European perspective, counterbalancing the Western European and U.S. publications that look at the conflict from further afar.

[ii] Yakovleff has not been spared Russian criticism for his outspokenness regarding how the war in Ukraine should be fought and the future of Russia. His comments and publications have earned him a spot on the Russia-run Foreign Combatants website, which tracks foreigners fighting in Ukraine. According to Foreign Combatants, Yakovleff “became famous for a number of public statements fueling conflict,” including statements in August 2022 suggesting the French government should “introduce French armed forces into Ukraine.” For additional information from a pro-Russian perspective see: Michel Yakovleff, Foreign Combatants, https://foreigncombatants.ru/en//index.php?title=Michel_Yakovleff


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023
Source: Author’s own and given by permission
Attribution: Dodge Billingsley, Combat Films and Research

Georgian Separatist Republic Conducts Military Exercises

Map of Abkhazia.

Map of Abkhazia.


“As part of a three-day exercise, employees of the State Security Service… will practice measures to counter terrorist attacks. The exercises of the security forces began on March 12 in the Gal[i] district, where military equipment and personnel were transferred.”


In March 2023, the government of the Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia conducted a series of military exercises in response to demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi calling for the retaking of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[i] According to the excerpted article from the independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet Abkhaz World, Abkhazia conducted a series of military and counterterrorism exercises in the Gali sector, the de facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia. The Gali sector is defined by the Ingury River, a natural but not impenetrable barrier between Georgia and Abkhazia and the scene of periodic infiltration, insurgency, and sabotage by Georgian nationals since 1993.[ii] According to the excerpted article from Bulgaria-based Bulgaria News, Abkhazian Major General Dmitry Dbar told reporters “that the Gal[iii] exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

The current tension between Abkhazia and Georgia is being fueled by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For months, Ukrainian officials have called on Georgia to open a second front against Russia by reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia to diverting Russian forces and attention from Ukraine. Yet, while this scenario might help Ukraine, it could be a military disaster for Georgia, which has taken a more neutral position regarding Ukraine despite numerous anti-Russian and pro-West public protests and hundreds of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine. There is a common presumption that Georgia could only attack Abkhazia if a Western power, most usually said to be the United States, were to facilitate the operation. At the same time, nearly everyone in Georgia and many in the West continue to think of Abkhazia only being able to defend itself with Russian forces.[iv] The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and the recent Abkhazian military exercises are meant to demonstrate to Georgia that Abkhazia can and will take care of itself, regardless of current nationalist and regional pressures to reignite the conflict.


Sources:

“Abkhazia’s Law Enforcement Agencies Practise Measures to Combat Terrorism and Sabotage,” Abkhaz World (independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Turkey), 13 March 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2223-practice-measures-to-combat-terrorism-and-sabotage

The head of State Security Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, Dmityr Dbar, stated that the exercises will simulate combat situations and will take place in several stages.

“We will conduct these exercises frequently to prepare for anti-terrorist threats. The fighters must know each other, interact, and be able to carry out coordinated combat missions,” he said.

Interior Minister Watler Butba added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff will practice measures to release hostages and neutralize attackers at the state border checkpoint.

“Абхазия следи с тревога събитията в Грузия (Abkhazia is watching events in Georgia with concern),” News Bulgaria (Bulgarian news source), 14 March 2023. https://news.bg/int-politics/abhaziya-sledi-s-trevoga-sabitiyata-v-gruziya.html

The head of Abkhazia’s State Security Service, Major General Dmitry Dbar, told reporters on Monday that “the exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

“We used to conduct such exercises regularly once a quarter, but given the situation in Georgia and possible threats, we will conduct such events more often, to work out mechanisms to ensure anti- terrorist protection of the population,” he said.

We remind you that on March 7 and 8 thousands of people protested against the foreign agents law in Tbilisi, which led to clashes between police and demonstrators. On March 7, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence”, developed by a group of deputies from the “People’s Power” faction, was adopted in the first reading by the Georgian parliament. On the morning of March 9, the ruling party “Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia” withdrew the bill.

Peskov: Russia is worried about what is happening in Georgia The Kremlin spokesman hinted that an outside power was trying to bring in an anti-Russian element

We recall that Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent more than a decade ago. Moscow has a significant military presence there. Georgia condemns the ongoing Russian “occupation” of the territory.


Notes:

[i] South Ossetia and Abkhazia are/were ethnic enclaves within Georgia that petitioned unsuccessfully for independence at the end of the 1980s. Georgia resisted the moves and a war between South Ossetia and Georgia was fought in 1990-1991. A year later war broke out between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993). Georgia lost both conflicts and both territories became de facto independent. Georgia has always maintained that it was defeated in both ethnic enclaves by Russia. The truth is complicated and subject to debate, but the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia (South Ossetia) consolidated the de facto independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

[ii] There has been much speculation and rumor as to the nature of the Georgian paramilitary individuals and units raiding Abkhazia. While many believe the Georgian government is behind the low-grade Georgian insurgency in Abkhazia, there are many individuals and groups that appear to be operating on their own initiative—a characteristic of Georgian forces during the war for Abkhazia 1992-1993. See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgia’s Lingering Border Security Issues,” OE Watch, 08-2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/315067

[iii] Georgian place names frequently end in “i,” whereas Abkhazian placenames omit the Georgian spelling and pronunciation.  For example, “Gali” in Georgian becomes “Gal” in Abkhazian.  Most Western scholarship and media coverage of Abkhazia refers to Abkhazian locations using the Georgian language spellings.

[iv] See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgian Defense Minister Offers Modernization Plan in Face of Russia Threat.” OE Watch, 09-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/395195


Image Information:

Image: Map of Abkhazia
Source: Sémhur, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abkhazia_map-fr.svg
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Anticipating Russian Collapse, Chechen Diaspora Groups Jockey for Position


“These congresses became a kind of political duel between the two leaders of the Diaspora: some participants in the events spoke openly about the division of the Ichkerians into opposing camps.”


Russia’s so-called “special military operation (SMO)” in Ukraine has breathed life into the Chechen diaspora hungry for Russian defeat and the chance to liberate Chechnya. However, the excerpted article from the Caucasus news service Kavkaz Realii describes how two separate Chechen diaspora groups have become bitter enemies as they seek to capitalize on what many Chechens believe is their best chance to reclaim their ancestral homeland.[i] At the core of the contention are two summits that members of the Chechen diaspora held to discuss their future: one in Antwerp and another outside of Paris. The Antwerp summit, held in November 2022, was headed by former minister and commander Akhmed Zakaev, who has taken a leadership role within the Chechen diaspora since he left Chechnya in 2000 after being wounded in battle. He has many followers and has held the title of prime minister of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile” for more than a decade. However, many Chechens do not consider Zakaev or his government in exile to be the legitimate heirs to a future independent Chechnya. For its part, the summit outside of Paris, which occurred a day before Zakaev’s summit in Antwerp, was organized by the Tolam movement. This was arranged under the direction of Jambulat Suleymanov and Anzor Maskhadov, the latter the son of former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Since the summit occurred, Tolam has morphed into United Force.[ii]

In addition to Zakaev’s government in exile and the United Force, there are at least two other organizations—the Presidium of the Chechen Republic and Chechen Democrats—vying for a leadership role in the independence effort. In a bid to strengthen their respective positions, both the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile and the United Force have military presences in Ukraine, fighting against Russia. The second excerpted article from Paris-based Intelligence Online describes the Chechen political movement’s connections to military units in Ukraine. For his part, Zakaev and his government in exile founded the Separate Special Purpose Battalion (OBON), which is attached to the Ukraine Foreign Legion. Underscoring the importance that he places on Ukraine, Zakaev has also placed his appointed defense minister, Magomed Dikiev, in Kyiv. Zakaev’s OBON will join two notable Chechen units already fighting within the Ukraine Foreign Legion: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, believed to have several hundred men, and the smaller Djokhar Dudayev Battalion. However, as the article notes, the battalions are close to Suleymanov’s United Force faction and therefore do not recognize Zakaev’s authority. Notably, neither article mentions more radical Chechen movements operating out of Turkey, which are also vying to lead a would-be independent Chechen Republic. If an independent or autonomous Chechnya could emerge, the infighting between these groups described above, which fractured the Chechen independent movement during earlier wars with Russia, is likely to again hamper the movement.


Sources:

“Раздор в чеченской диаспоре? В Европе прошли съезды противоборствующих сторонников Ичкерии (Discord in the Chechen diaspora? Congresses of opposing supporters of Ichkeria were held in Europe),” Kavkaz Realii (U.S. government supported but independent news service focused on the Caucasus), 29 November 2022. https://www.kavkazr.com/a/razdory-v-chechenskoy-diaspore-v-evrope-proshli-sezdy-protivoborstvuyuschih-storonnikov-ichkerii-/32152173.html

According to the chairman of the congress Suleymanov, the purpose of the event was the formation of a new social movement. The presidium was attended by veterans of the Chechen political movement: social activist Makhmud Bibulatov, Chechen activist Yaragi Sulumov living in Germany, as well as new figures in the person of the head of the Chechen opposition movement 1ADAT Ibragim Yangulbaev, Saikhan Muzaev (mentioned in the media as a refugee in Georgia and a friend of the one killed in Berlin in 2019, former Ichkerian field commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili) and others.

…Speaking on behalf of the Chechen diaspora, Maskhadov and the Yangulbaev brothers (the youngest of them, Baysangur, who was recently included in the list of extremists in the Russian Federation, was also here) called for intensifying political activity and confronting certain forces that, in their opinion, lead to disunity among supporters independent Ichkeria. No one has been able to pinpoint what these powers are.

An unnamed representative of the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion, who is fighting on the side of Ukraine, expressed support for Suleymanov. On his personal Facebook page, Bogdan Chechensky, a representative of the Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion also expressed support for the leader of “Tolam”.

Suleimanov himself spoke sharply about the so-called government abroad, headed by Akhmed Zakayev, and accused the latter of “a trail of adventures and state crimes.” He did not go into details.

…Khusein Dzhambetov, a member of the [Zakaev’s] Separate Special Purpose Battalion participating in the war on the side of Ukraine, and his deputy Hadji-Murat Zumso said that their military units will become the base of the army of Ichkeria in the future.

“Divided Chechen diaspora redoubles efforts to woo Kyiv,” Intelligence Online (Paris-based subscription news outlet), 28 November 2022. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2022/11/28/divided-chechen-diaspora-redoubles-efforts-to-woo-kyiv,109868303-eve

Both groups are striving for the same goal: to free Chechnya from what they consider to be its illegal occupation by Ramzan Kadyrov’s pro-Russian regime, an aim shared by other opposition groups and some members of the Ukrainian government. On other matters, however, the two factions are deeply divided, which is why they are holding separate events.

In June, Zakayev, who has appointed himself prime minister in exile, brokered an agreement that was signed by a Ukrainian deputy defence minister, to create a special battalion of Chechen fighters, OBON, within the regular Ukrainian army under contract. OBON currently has around 20 members. The new unit joins other Chechen troops, which have been in Ukraine since 2014: the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, which has several hundred men in rotation, and the smaller Djokhar- Dudayev Battalion. Both battalions are close to the Suleymanov faction and do not recognise Zakayev’s authority.

Zakayev has been active in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion. As early as February, he made public appeals from London to President Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraging the head of state to create a clear framework for foreign volunteers to become legally involved in the fighting. He regularly visits Kyiv, where he has placed his defence “minister”, Magomed Dikiev, in a permanent diplomatic role.


Notes:

[i] The inability of the Chechens to unite is complicated and has to do with many factors including culture, the importance of family clan, and the national myth, which values every male as a warrior. In an interview for a documentary film, former Chechen warlord and field commander Salman Raduev said, “We are a nation of one million people, we are a nation of one million generals… every Chechen is a general.” Although intended as hyperbole, Raduev’s comment speaks volumes about the Chechens’ inability to fight or govern together. See; Immortal Fortress: Inside Chechnya’s Warrior Culture,” Combat Films and Research for PBS, 1999. https://vimeo.com/ondemand/immortalfortress

[ii] Both movements draw their followers from about 200,000 Chechens who emigrated to Europe during the first and second Russian-Chechen wars between 1994 and 2009.

Chinese Military Scholars Call out Russia for Invading Ukraine

“In the age of liberalization of global trade, countries don’t have to gain power through… grabbing land.  This can be done through technology and capital… but Russia is still obsessed with owning land.”


The accompanying article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), a Hong Kong-based, ostensibly-independent newspaper, notes a growing list of Chinese intellectuals who have publicly questioned Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine.  This suggests that Chinese thinkers do not widely approve of China’s support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine despite the “no limits” relationship between the two countries that Chinese authorities stated prior to the Winter Olympics.

The focus of the SCMP article is an article by a recently retired Chinese military scholar published on Chinese social media site WeChat.  That article disappeared shortly after it was posted but, according to the accompanying SCMP publication, the author of the article, Gong Fangbin questioned Moscow’s assertion that Ukraine was on the brink of invading Russia, instead suggesting that the real reason Russia invaded Ukraine was that “Russian leaders have taken the wrong path for rejuvenation.”  The author suggested that Russia’s obsession with land as an indicator of strength was misguided and obsolete in the 21st century.  According to the SCMP article, another Chinese intellectual, Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, recently said that Russia would pay “a huge price” for its invasion of Ukraine.  Finally, Hu Wei, a political scientist affiliated with China’s State Council called on Beijing “to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war on Ukraine.”  Finally, the intellectuals suggest multiple negative repercussions for China. The SCMP article also notes that although China has said it supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denied suggestions that it might offer military assistance to Russia, it has not outright condemned Russia’s invasion, has not conducted a head of state visit with Ukrainian President Zelensky, and has criticized U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Russia.


Source:

Jun Mai, “Russia’s war on Ukraine based on flawed logic, Chinese military scholar wrote in article scrubbed from the web,” South China Morning Post (a Hong Kong-based, ostensibly-independent newspaper), 21 May 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3178631/russias-war-ukraine-based-flawed-logic-chinese-military?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage

Russia’s security rationale for attacking Ukraine was flawed and the aftermath underlines the importance of diplomatic flexibility, a Chinese scholar formerly with Beijing’s top military academy has said.

“I still don’t see how any country would have dared to invade the world’s No 2 military power,” Gong Fangbin, a retired professor of the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University, wrote in a recent online article.

“Russia has shown the world time and again that no one dares touch an inch of its land,” he said, countering Moscow’s argument that it was cornered by the West and NATO into invading Ukraine.

“What’s the real reason [for Moscow] to attack Ukraine? I think it’s because the Russian leaders have taken the wrong path for rejuvenation.”

Gong argued that the rationale to attack Ukraine over so-called security concerns was flawed. And the dilemma faced by Russia as it took heavy losses on the ground was the result of having chosen a path “long forsaken by human civilisation”, he wrote in his article posted on WeChat last Tuesday.

The article, however, has since disappeared from the social media platform.

Gong confirmed to the Post that he wrote the article but declined a request for an interview.

Gong, a military veteran who fought in the China-Vietnam war of 1979, is among a small but growing number of Chinese intellectuals voicing scepticism about Moscow’s rationale for its military aggression against Kyiv, despite heavy censorship of the sharing of such views.

“In the age of liberalisation of global trade, countries don’t have to gain power through … grabbing land. This can be done through technology and capital,” Gong wrote. “But Russia is still obsessed with owning land.”

At a Beijing seminar in April, China’s ambassador to Ukraine between 2005 and 2007, Gao Yusheng, argued that Russia had shown signs of having lost the war and its global status was set to decline. A summary of his remarks, first published by news outlet ifeng.com in mid-May, was quickly censored.

But there are others making their opinions known. Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, said earlier this month that China had not benefited from the war and Russia was set to pay “a huge price”.

And in March, Hu Wei, a political scientist affiliated with the State Council – China’s cabinet – called on Beijing to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war on Ukraine.

As the war enters its third month, Beijing still refuses to condemn Russia’s act of aggression, despite mounting pressure from the US and its allies. It has also sought to rally international support to criticise the sweeping sanctions imposed on Russia, citing disruption to the global economy.

Since Russia launched its military assault on February 24, China has repeatedly said it respects Ukraine’s sovereignty. However President Xi Jinping is among the very few world leaders yet to hold direct talks with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky.

Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats have sought to contain damage from the country’s close, “no limits” relationship with Moscow, as declared in a joint statement issued after Russian President Vladimir Putin met Xi in Beijing ahead of the Winter Olympics.

The diplomatic damage control has involved firmly denying suggestions that China might offer military assistance to Russia, and trying to isolate the Ukraine issue from Beijing’s relations with Europe.

Military scholar Gong had argued in another article earlier this month that the Ukraine war underlined how foreign policy flexibility might suffer if it was too closely tied to domestic politics.

This came after he had referenced the situation in yet another article in March, where he argued that countries only made decisions based on their own interests, and hence it was wrong to consider any country as a “strategic buffer”, as Russia says it had hoped Ukraine would be.

Failure to understand this, Gong argued, would lead one to also believe in the narrative that China’s economic development in the last 50 years owed much to Russia’s confrontation with the United States.“If a country is full of convictions related to strategic barriers and buffer zones, it will tie itself to the vehicles of others and thus lose autonomy, consistency and necessary flexibility,” he warned.

Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars, 1994-2009 (Dodge Billingsley with Dr. Lester Grau)

(Click image to download book.)


Books on guerrilla war are seldom written from the tactical perspective and from the guerrilla’s perspective. Fangs of the Lone Wolf: is an exception. These are the stories of low-level guerrilla combat as told by the survivors. They cover fighting from the cities of Grozny and Argun to the villages of Bamut and Serzhen-yurt, and finally the hills, river valleys and mountains that make up so much of Chechnya. Dodge Billingsley, the primary author was embedded with Chechen guerrilla forces after the first war, so he knows the country, the culture, the key actors and the conflict. Yet, as a Western outsider, he is able to maintain perspective and objectivity. He traveled extensively to interview Chechen former combatants who are now in hiding or on the run from Russian retribution and justice. Commissioned by the USMC, the military professional will appreciate the book’s crisp narration, organization by type of combat, accurate color maps and insightful analysis and commentary. The book is organized into vignettes that provide insight on the nature of both Chechen and Russian tactics utilized during the two wars. The vignettes show the chronic problem of guerrilla logistics, the necessity of fighting positions, the value of the correct use of terrain and the price paid in individual discipline and unit cohesion when guerrillas are not bound by a military code and law. Guerrilla warfare is probably as old as man, but has been overshadowed by maneuver war by modern armies and recent developments in the technology of war. Fangs of the Lone Wolf provides a unique insight into what is becoming modern and future war.