Author Archives: Dr Charles Bartles

The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

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A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.

“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.

Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk

Russia Creating New Officer Academies to Support Armed Forces Expansion

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Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

“Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.”

In December 2022, Russia announced that it would increase the number of uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defense from approximately 1 million to 1.5 million personnel at a Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, attended by President Putin, former Minister of Defense General Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.[i]  At this event, and by way of subsequent pronouncements, Russia has made it clear that it will not revert back to its previous end strength when its special military operation ends.[ii] Although Russia has had to resort to partial mobilization to fill its ranks for the ongoing war in Ukraine, permanently raising the end-strength to 1.5 million will almost certainly entail recruiting more contract personnel and increasing the standard one-year conscription period to two years. It will also involve adding additional officers. In the Soviet/Russian system, inducting and training enlisted personnel can be done relatively quickly, but officer accessions are a different matter. Officers are typically only trained at specialized 4-to-5-year academies making the officer creation pipeline a long one.  This is problematic for Russia, as it shuttered many officer academies during major reforms in the early 2010s, so it does not have institutional training capacity to train the necessary number of officers for a 1.5 million personnel force.  The accompanying excerpted article from Russian newspaper Izvestiya, discusses how Russia is reopening military officer academies to support an expansion of the force that will likely not be fully implemented until well after the special military operation ends.

Sources:

“Мишустин поручил создать Саратовское высшее артиллерийское командное училище (Mishustin orders creation of Saratov Higher Artillery Command School),” Izvestiya (daily Russian newspaper), 8 July 2024.  https://iz.ru/1724553/2024-07-08/mishustin-poruchil-sozdat-saratovskoe-vysshee-artilleriiskoe-komandnoe-uchilishche

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School. The document was signed on July 6 and published on the official legal information portal on July 8.

“To create a federal state military educational institution of higher education, the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the document states.

The staffing level of military and civilian personnel at the school should be 6,000 personnel…Several more military academies may be created in Ulyanovsk. As Governor Alexey Russkikh reported on social networks in February, the issue has already been discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, an inter-university military training center may be created in the city. Its base may be the former educational building of the Suvorov School in Krasnoznamenny Lane. In addition, a higher school of military transport aviation is planned to be located in Ulyanovsk on the basis of a former technical school.

Notes:

[i] “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии. Путин и Шойгу выступили в Минобороны (Changing the conscription age and increasing the size of the Army: Putin and Shoigu spoke at the Ministry of Defense),” TASS, 21 December 2022.  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079

[ii] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS creating new officer academies to support expansion of the Russian Armed Forces to 1,500,000 uniformed personnel.

Image Information:

Image: Saratov Higher Artillery Command School
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саратовское_высшее_военное_командно-инженерное_училище_ракетных_войск#/media/Файл:Артиллерийская_ул_2_Саратов.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service

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Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.

“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”

Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.

Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.

Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS volunteer formations, such as the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade, provide RUS additional avenues of generating combat power.

Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.

The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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(Click image to download brief.)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

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A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.

“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”

Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.

Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russian Engineer Troops Gain Assault Combat Mission

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Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)

“The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war.”

In most militaries, engineer units are combat enablers (support units) for maneuver units (infantry, armor, etc). Due to Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine, this may be changing, as Russia is envisioning engineer units assuming a combat role, capable of accomplishing independent assault operations in addition to typical engineer missions. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper Izvestia attributes this change to the fact that Russian troops have frequently had to assault heavily fortified areas.  The article also delves into how this reform will be implemented, to include organizational changes such as forming “assault detachments” in engineer units and engineer reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies, as well as the addition of new types of equipment such as the universal armored engineer vehicle. If this effort is perceived as a success, it is possible other militaries will consider emulating such reforms.

Source:

Alexey Mikhailov, Yulia Leonova, Andrey Fedorov, “В дело с техникой: инженерные войска переориентируют на штурмовые действия: Их оснащают боевыми машинами для разведки и разрушения долговременных укреплений (In business with technology: The engineer troops are reoriented to assault operations:), Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://iz.ru/1638123/aleksei-mikhailov-iuliia-leonova-andrei-fedorov/v-delo-s-tekhnikoi-inzhenernye-voiska-pereorientiruiut-na-shturmovye-deistviia

The Russian Ministry of Defense has approved a program to increase the combat capabilities of engineer regiments and brigades – this year they will get new units equipped with specialized assault and reconnaissance equipment…We are talking about universal armored engineer vehicles (UBIM) [Универсальная бронированная инженерная машина (УБИМ)]

From the first months of the special military operation, Russian troops were faced with the need to regularly storm fortified areas of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[i]  Particularly strong field fortifications were encountered in the Donbass that were erected over the course of eight years. This required Russian troops to adapt to new conditions and change tactics. Specialized assault detachments were formed with weapons and equipment to break through enemy defenses. Since last year, the military department decided to scale up this experience and create [engineer] reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies.In recent years, the Ministry of Defense has been carrying out a large-scale reform of the engineer troops. The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war. The actions of the engineers are no longer limited to the construction of field fortifications, route clearance, and bridge building — now they also storm fortified areas, covertly place mines, and quickly conduct ​​explosive ordinance disposal.

Note:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-3/i-PfWbh5c/A 
Attribution: Vitaly Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Standardizing Munitions Used on First-Person View UAVs

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Russian Soldier with FPV UAV

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian military enthusiast website, Armeyskiy Standart, describes the role and importance of small first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are being used extensively in Ukraine. Many of these commercially produced UAVs have been repurposed from reconnaissance duties and modified to carry various munitions that can be effectively dropped on enemy personnel and/or equipment.[i] The second accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper, Izvestia, discusses Russian efforts to further the FPV concept by developing standardized munitions for FPV UAVs. As the article explains, improvised explosives for use with small FPV UAVs are unstable and have resulted in crews being “blown up” by their own munitions. The impacts of the adoption of standardized munitions for FPV UAVs will likely extend long after Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine concludes. The en masse use of FPV UAVs is likely seen by the Russian military, and many others,[ii] as necessary for tactical success on the modern battlefield, especially in the conduct of close-range reconnaissance and fires. The adoption of standardized munitions will facilitate interoperability in the burgeoning Russian UAV industry and significantly lower already relatively low manufacturing costs. Standardization is a necessary step if Russia intends to place FPV UAVs into its table of organization and equipment structure, given their effectiveness and cost for delivering close-range reconnaissance and fires.

Sources:

Rustem Klupov, “FPV— дроны завоевывают поле боя: В ходе СВО впервые широко применены новые средства поражения (FPV— UAVs are conquering the battlefield: The new weapons were widely used in the SMO for the first time),” Armeyskiy Standart (Russian military enthusiast website), 7 December 2023. https://armystandard.ru/news/20231261712-o0qQy.html

In reports of special military operations [SMO], there are more and more reports of the use of so-called FPV (First-Person View) UAVs on the line of combat contact in the tactical depth at close-range. FPVs are quadcopters, or multi-rotor UAVs, equipped with a camera that transmits video to the operator-pilot’s control device. The pilot controls the UAV using this video feed, giving him the feeling of actually being in the UAV’s cockpit…

We can say that FPV UAVs are the “know-how” of SVO. They have wide ranging capabilities to destroy a variety of enemy targets. Having a small mass, they can lift a load several times their own weight and carry it at a speed of 120–140 km/h over a distance of 15–16 km… At the same time, the cost of one UAV is on average from 30 thousand to 60 thousand rubles [$330-660].

The versatility of FPV UAVs also lies in the fact that they can carry out additional reconnaissance of an object, deliver high-precision strikes and can carry munitions for various purposes — high-explosive, shaped-charge, fragmentation, thermobaric, incendiary, and kinetic…

The ability to use FPV UAVs in the tactical depth at close-range, which is most saturated with troops, allows these UAVs to always find their target, and having the capability to employ specialized munitions to ensure the reliable destruction of a variety of objects.The comparative effectiveness of FPV UAVs with other traditional means of destruction distinguishes this type as cheaper and more pragmatic in terms of accuracy and range of use.

Roman Kretsul, Alexey Ramm, and Dmitry Astrakhan, “С легким — на подъем: для FPV-дронов начали выпускать штатные боеприпасы (Easy goings — standardized munitions have begun to be produced for FPV UAVs),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 1 December 2023. https://iz.ru/1613625/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm-dmitrii-astrakhan/s-legkim-na-podem-dlia-fpv-dronov-nachali-vypuskat-shtatnye-boepripasy

…Several enterprises of the Russian defense industry have established serial production of ammunition for FPV UAVs, regular deliveries to the troops began this fall, two sources in the military department told Izvestia and confirmed by an interlocutor in the military-industrial complex.

The new ammunition is equipped with universal mounts that allow it to be suspended under almost all types of FPV UAVs used in the special military operation zone. Now the troops are receiving fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and cumulative warheads. In the future, their line is planned to be expanded.

Externally, a munition for an FPV UAV looks like a tube. New munitions are delivered to the troops in special protective plastic cases. As the publication’s interlocutors noted, the main advantage of the new products is their compactness combined with high power. This is achieved through the use of special explosives. Therefore, serial produced munitions are much superior improvised munitions…

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions…” said Dmitry Uskov, a volunteer and contributor to the “13 Tactical” Telegram channel, told Izvestia…[i] FPV UAVs are one of the most dynamically developing areas of unmanned aviation. The operator controls such a device while wearing virtual reality glasses, like a pilot. With the proper skill, this allows you to deliver a UAV with a warhead precisely to the target, for example, to the door of a dugout or a vulnerable projection of an armored vehicle. For most other weapon systems, such precision is unimaginable…

[i] 13 Tactical is a pro-Russia site on the Telegram platform, as found at: https://t.me/s/tactical_13/2665

Notes:

[i] For other Russian uses of drones on the battlefield, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] For a recent examination of Taiwan’s position regarding drones on the battlefield, see: John Lubianetsky, “Taiwan Addressing Drone Technology Gap With China,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-addressing-drone-technology-gap-with-china/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Soldier with FPV UAV
Source:
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russian Military Working To Respond to U.S. “Multi-Domain Operations”

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“The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers.”

Russia is working to understand the U.S. Army’s “multi-domain operations” (MDO) concept,[i] Which can roughly be described as the coordinated employment of the domains of war (land, air, sea, space, cyber, etc.) to achieve an operational-level objective.  The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly Russian military periodical, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the Russian Armed Forces’ understanding of the U.S. MDO concept, the potential effects of MDO if employed against the Russian Ground Forces, and what course of action a Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) should execute to best overcome it.[ii] The authors believe that a successful first strike on a Russian BTG by a U.S. Army MDO Brigade could be decisive due to the attrition of the BTG’s command and control and combat capabilities. The authors posit that the best defense for a BTG against an attacking MDO Brigade is the use of positional defense (as opposed to maneuver defense), and a preemptive attack. To achieve this, up to one-third of the combined arms subunits in the BTG should act as flanking or raiding detachments and conduct preemptive actions to hinder the enemy. These actions might include defeating artillery, air defense systems, and command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics, thereby disrupting the MDO Brigade’s ability to conduct a decisive counter-attack. It is important to note that the authors, and many other Russian commentators, see the so-called “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine as not only a testing ground for new Russian military technologies and tactics, but also as a testing ground for new U.S./NATO technologies and tactics by way of Ukrainian proxies. As such, this article will likely be the first of many analyses discussing the best ways for the Russian Armed Forces to counter  U.S. military technology and tactics based on the lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Sources:

R. Shaykhutdinov, I. Starodubtsev, “Оборона батальонной тактической группы в условиях «многосферного сражения» (The conduct of a defense by a battalion tactical group under conditions of «multi-domain battle»),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly Russian military periodical), October 2023. https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/521356/

Against the background of strengthening the military power of Russia and China, the United States began to develop new approaches that would ensure the superiority of its troops in military conflicts with an enemy of comparable combat capabilities. The basic principles and procedures for conducting combat operations as part of interservice and coalition groupings of troops in various operational environments at the strategic, operational and tactical levels were formulated…

Military experts F.I. Ladygin, S.V. Afanasyev and A.V. Khomutov argue that such a model provides for the creation in the US ground forces of “a new type of formations deployed in advance in forward areas – “ multi-domain brigade tactical groups”, which will be able to operate in all environments, in isolation from the main grouping of troops, in conditions of constant contact with the enemy to identify his vulnerabilities and ensure the involvement of the main forces in them”…

The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers. Also significant is the inevitable disunity of battalion defensive strong points during defense — when on a wide front these strong points cannot provide mutual fire support to one another, which can allow the enemy to employ flanking and raid actions to infiltrate the battalion’s combat formation….

The analysis of the views of the US and NATO command on the offensive and the experience of conducting a special military operation in Ukraine raises the need to search for new ways of conducting combat actions at the tactical level. The enemy’s use of modern weapons supplied by the united West, especially during shelling of Donetsk, Lugansk and other liberated areas, requires improved methods of action of combined arms formations when defeating the enemy.

The extreme saturation of modern armies with guided anti-tank weapons, air defense and missile defense systems has sharply increased the importance of the positional defense. The combat formation of a battalion tactical group in positional defense is built primarily in one echelon and includes: the first echelon, combined arms reserve, artillery units, air defense units, anti-tank reserve, as well as regular and attached units and fire assets that remain directly subordinate to the commander of the battalion tactical group…

An analysis of the possible distribution of forces and means of a battalion tactical group shows that with a “typical distribution” of forces and means of a battalion, taking into account the fact that before an attack the enemy will inevitably lay indirect and direct fires, shows that most of the fire will fall on strong points of the first echelon companies (on 50–60% of the battalion’s forces). Losses of the battalion tactical group can reach up to 70%.  Consequently, the existing methods of conducting the defense of a battalion tactical group raise questions regarding the capabilities of successfully completing a combat mission.  To increase the effectiveness of the defense of a battalion tactical group, it must conduct “preemptive actions”.

The method is based on active use of offensive actions when conducting defense, going beyond the front line. At the same time, up to 1/3 of combined arms subunits, acting as flanking and raiding detachments, carry out preemptive actions against the enemy, such as defeating artillery, air defense systems, command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics.The essence of preemptive attack is to defeat enemy targets by flanking and raid groups of combat vehicles operating forward of the front line of defense in order to prevent further enemy offensive actions…

Notes:

[i] “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations – 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), iii. https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf

[ii] For an in-depth analysis of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG), see: Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Royal United Service Institute, 14 April 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/getting-know-russian-battalion-tactical-group

Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons to Engineer Units

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A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.

“The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…”

The war in Ukraine continues to drive changes in military units and doctrine. Innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been a common theme for both Russia and Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Both countries have modified UAVs to lay mines. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian monthly Военная мысль (Military Thought) discusses Russian plans to formalize this capability by creating a “special mining platoon” within certain engineer units. Although this is one of the first mentions of how adaptations from the so-called “special military operation”[i] are being implemented into Russia’s version of a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E), it is unlikely to be the last. Other novel uses of UAVs, including as “suicide drones,” will likely be integrated into Russian MTO&E structures soon.

Sources:

D.F. Evmenenko and S.I. Melnik, “Дистанционное минирование местности при помощи

Малых беспилотных летательных аппаратов (The use of small unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct remote mining),” Военная мысль [Military Thought] (monthly Russian military periodical), September 2023. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/

Combat actions in the special military operation do not have the characteristics of high intensity [warfare] and rapid battlefield changes due to widescale usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The most widespread among them are multi-rotor helicopter-type devices (multicopters). Simple, cheap and reliable, they are easy to control and very maneuverable at low speeds and low altitudes. These systems can easily change targets in the field. In addition, such systems are easy to transport, scalable in size and load capacity…

The Second World War, military conflicts of recent decades, especially in the Persian Gulf region (Operation Desert Storm), and the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan show that their effectiveness increases several times when used suddenly and unexpectedly…

Although remote mining by aviation and artillery troops can be carried throughout the entire operational depth of an enemy formation, the remote mining capabilities of engineer troops are substantially more limited… The UMZ [R1]  and GMZ-K [R2]  universal minelayers only have a range of up to 200 m…

The need arose to develop a system that would allow the creation of minefields under any combat conditions in compliance with the requirements for safe the use of remote mining means for our troops.  As part of solving this problem, specialists from the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (TVVIKU) developed a device for discharging antipersonnel POM-2R mines…

The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…It is proposed to use UAV crews with mine containers in a special mining platoon (SMP) with 6 UAVs…The platoon consists of two squads, each with 6 personnel, 3 UAVs, and an all-terrain vehicle such as a UAZ ‘Wolverine’.

Characteristics of a Mine-Laying Multicopter-Type UAV (exact model unspecified in source)

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POM-2_mine#/media/File:POM-2S.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0