Author Archives: Dr Charles Bartles

Russian Volunteer Force Highlights the Evolution of UAV Missions in Ukraine

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Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV.

“Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses the activities of the Volunteer Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Española Brigade. The Española Brigade—currently numbering no more than 100 individuals, according to the founder—began as a volunteer formation of soccer enthusiasts, which now provides trained UAV operators and UAVs to support Russia’s conventional force in the special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestia article, the Española Brigade operates its own UAV training center and is developing its own UAVs for use in Ukraine. Although state UAV development programs are entrenched in both Russia and Ukraine, the development of UAV technologies by volunteer units and their personnel in the field also appears to be increasingly common on both sides of the front. It would now seem that the traditional model of governments procuring defense articles from private industry and then supplying these materials to the military is simply no longer effective given UAVs’ rapidly evolving technology and newfound tactical uses. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are now collaborating closely with industry to quickly deliver new capabilities to the battlefield as the requirements are recognized.

The article also mentions the importance of the Baba Yaga class of large UAVs. The primary mission of the Baba Yaga-class of UAVs is not reconnaissance or bomb dropping, but logistics support. This development illustrates the expanding role of UAVs on the modern battlefield—UAVs are no longer being used just as a means of reconnaissance (intelligence) and/or fires. UAVs are now becoming key capabilities to enable success for other war-fighting functions.

Overall, although volunteer formations like Russia’s Española Brigade are relatively small, they help fill critical shortages of UAV expertise that the conventional force would be hard-pressed to stand up on its own.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Korneev, “«Птичья» школа: как в бригаде «Эспаньола» готовят операторов дронов

БПЛА (“Bird” school: how the “Espanola” brigade trains drone operators),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 7 November 2024.  https://iz.ru/1786422/dmitrii-korneev/ptica-skola-kak-v-brigade-espanola-gotovat-operatorov-dronov

The volunteer “Española Brigade”, the backbone of which is football fans, has a unique UAV combat training center…the commander and founder of the UAV Combat Training Center is respectfully called Petrovich…“With the start of the special operation, the idea came to organize a UAV combat training center. But it didn’t work out right away. It only opened in May 2023.  He notes that a wide variety of people came to the center.  “We invited those who had experience working with UAVs, even if it was minimal,” he recalls…They started training and preparing people on “commercial” UAVs. Gradually training switched to FPV [first-person-view] UAVs. The trainees first master the theory, and then go to the training grounds. The final stage of the program involves training on a relatively calm section of the front…There, people receive their first combat experience.  The center itself is relatively small. Its resources are designed mainly for the Española Brigade, Petrovich emphasizes…“We have been operating for only a year and a half. However, during this time, we have trained more than 100 qualified UAV operators in various areas” says Petrovich…

“Española”, like many other volunteer units, received special weapons manufactured by the so-called people’s defense industry, that is, developed and released outside the framework of the defense order…Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind…, – Petrovich points out, moving on to the scientific and practical activities of the center’s employees.  At Española, they work with the entire spectrum of UAVs…In cooperation with a young design bureau, we are currently developing and conducting experimental tests on two types of d UAVs: a night reconnaissance UAV and a high-speed Baba Yaga UAV.  Due to the abundance of FPV [first-person-view] UAVs, the enemy has problems supplying units on the front line.  “Five, seven, ten kilometers is a dead zone”, he explains.  The fact is that people who sit directly at the front, paradoxically, are sometimes safer than those who are trying to resupply them from the rear. And so the first request for such a Baba Yaga [class UAV] came from such rear detachments.

Petrovich says that the troops needed a fast “bird” that could carry a good load and do it quickly.  The primary mission is supplying provisions, ammunition, and medicine.  The secondary mission is to carry powerful munitions.  A load capacity of, for example, 10 kg allows you to transport an anti-tank mine. Moreover, ammunition can be varied. Now there is a whole line [of UAV munitions]. We call this project “Kikimora”. The active testing phase is underway…The center is also working on countering enemy electronic warfare…The second UAV currently being developed at the center is a night reconnaissance UAV. “It can stay in the air for up to an hour and a half…in terms of range, it’s at least 12 km, we want to increase it to 15-17 km”

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Additional Russian volunteer units have filled critical positions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially in the field of UAVs. See Charles Bartles, “Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service,” OE Watch, 07-2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-gains-combat-power-from-volunteer-service/

OE Insight Summary:

Both RUS and UKR are pursuing new ways to develop and use UAVs.  Due to the rapidly evolving technology, military personnel work directly with industry. UAVs are not just being used for the INTEL and FIRES WFF, but now necessary for all WFF.

Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg 
Attribution: АрміяІнформCC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Continues To Adapt Training, Incorporating Lessons From Ukraine

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Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.

“The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia, discusses how Russia continues to change soldier training based on lessons learned from its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestiya article, the changing character of war necessitates combining both traditional combined arms warfare tactics with new skills to achieve success in modern warfare. In addition, many Russian forces in the security services, including the Ministry of Defense, and private military organizations are fighting as assault detachments/companies/groups, a method of organization that was widely practiced during the Second World War and abandoned as the Soviets/Russians fielded a fully mechanized force during the Cold War. Therefore, Russia is now using a combination of Second World War, Soviet-era combined arms, and emerging tactics from its combat experience in Ukraineto train its force. Specifically, Russia has regained its dismounted infantry culture, a marked change from the start of the war in 2022, when Russia suffered an inordinate number of casualties among troops riding to battle within their armored vehicles.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Astrakhan, “«Нет понятия идеального штурма, каждая операция планируется индивидуально»: Как новобранцы учатся навыкам ближнего боя на полигоне в ДНР (‘There is no such thing as an ideal assault; each operation is planned individually’: How recruits learn close combat skills at a training ground in the Donetsk People’s Republic),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 3 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1768527/dmitrii-astrakhan/net-poniatiia-idealnogo-shturma-kazhdaia-operatciia-planiruetsia-individualno

The experience of the special military operation has a significant impact on combat training. Now volunteer assault troops practice close combat in confined spaces of trenches and buildings, approaching strongpoints, clearing, evacuating the wounded and many other specific exercises. Izvestia visited at one of the training grounds and learned how recruits practice vital skills under the guidance of instructors with combat experience.

[T]raining takes place every day. On one day, recruits practice interactions with infantry fighting vehicles, on another day they focus on combating drones. In particular, they practice shooting at UAVs by shooting at clay pigeons.  Camouflaging and stealth movement are also practiced to remain invisible to enemy UAVs…

Combination of the “old” school and the “new”

The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.  At the same time, the latest experience is being implemented on the fly, since the character of battles is constantly changing — a combination of the “old” and the “new.”

So, from the old school we take the experience of moving on armored vehicles, moving along a trench. But in any case, “adjustments” are always necessary in tactical terms, since FVP [first person view] UAVs have appeared now.  “There is no concept of an ideal assault, it is important to act quickly, harmoniously and carefully,” — says a fighter with the call sign Potap.

Each trench, each settlement has its own differences, and therefore each assault operation is planned individually, without a specific template, he clarified…

NATO learns from our fighters’ assaults

It is worth noting that NATO is also looking at the experience of fighting in small groups at equipped strong points with trenches and dugouts. Almost all exercises held in Europe and the US in the last year have included practicing scenarios for storming forest belts and trenches, both according to old instructions and taking into account the experience of the special military operation. In addition, fighting in trenches has become part of the reservist training program in the British Army.

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Interestingly, this was the same observation made by Chechens and outside observers during the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 1994. Russian armored columns attacked from multiple directions, but mechanized infantry did not dismount and were cut down in their vehicles or dismounting under ambush conditions, before they could protect themselves and the armored columns.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS is changing military training to incorporate the lessons learned from fighting in Ukraine.  This training will incorporate traditional elements of combined arms warfare with new aspects of war, such as the first-person-view UAVs.

Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/AssaultTraining2015-01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

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A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.

“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.

Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk

Russia Creating New Officer Academies to Support Armed Forces Expansion

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Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

“Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.”

In December 2022, Russia announced that it would increase the number of uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defense from approximately 1 million to 1.5 million personnel at a Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, attended by President Putin, former Minister of Defense General Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.[i]  At this event, and by way of subsequent pronouncements, Russia has made it clear that it will not revert back to its previous end strength when its special military operation ends.[ii] Although Russia has had to resort to partial mobilization to fill its ranks for the ongoing war in Ukraine, permanently raising the end-strength to 1.5 million will almost certainly entail recruiting more contract personnel and increasing the standard one-year conscription period to two years. It will also involve adding additional officers. In the Soviet/Russian system, inducting and training enlisted personnel can be done relatively quickly, but officer accessions are a different matter. Officers are typically only trained at specialized 4-to-5-year academies making the officer creation pipeline a long one.  This is problematic for Russia, as it shuttered many officer academies during major reforms in the early 2010s, so it does not have institutional training capacity to train the necessary number of officers for a 1.5 million personnel force.  The accompanying excerpted article from Russian newspaper Izvestiya, discusses how Russia is reopening military officer academies to support an expansion of the force that will likely not be fully implemented until well after the special military operation ends.

Sources:

“Мишустин поручил создать Саратовское высшее артиллерийское командное училище (Mishustin orders creation of Saratov Higher Artillery Command School),” Izvestiya (daily Russian newspaper), 8 July 2024.  https://iz.ru/1724553/2024-07-08/mishustin-poruchil-sozdat-saratovskoe-vysshee-artilleriiskoe-komandnoe-uchilishche

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to establish the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School. The document was signed on July 6 and published on the official legal information portal on July 8.

“To create a federal state military educational institution of higher education, the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the document states.

The staffing level of military and civilian personnel at the school should be 6,000 personnel…Several more military academies may be created in Ulyanovsk. As Governor Alexey Russkikh reported on social networks in February, the issue has already been discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, an inter-university military training center may be created in the city. Its base may be the former educational building of the Suvorov School in Krasnoznamenny Lane. In addition, a higher school of military transport aviation is planned to be located in Ulyanovsk on the basis of a former technical school.

Notes:

[i] “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии. Путин и Шойгу выступили в Минобороны (Changing the conscription age and increasing the size of the Army: Putin and Shoigu spoke at the Ministry of Defense),” TASS, 21 December 2022.  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079

[ii] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS creating new officer academies to support expansion of the Russian Armed Forces to 1,500,000 uniformed personnel.

Image Information:

Image: Saratov Higher Artillery Command School
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саратовское_высшее_военное_командно-инженерное_училище_ракетных_войск#/media/Файл:Артиллерийская_ул_2_Саратов.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service

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Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.

“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”

Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.

Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.

Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.

OE Insight Summary:

RUS volunteer formations, such as the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade, provide RUS additional avenues of generating combat power.

Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.

The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

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A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.

“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”

Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.

Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russian Engineer Troops Gain Assault Combat Mission

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Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)

“The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war.”

In most militaries, engineer units are combat enablers (support units) for maneuver units (infantry, armor, etc). Due to Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine, this may be changing, as Russia is envisioning engineer units assuming a combat role, capable of accomplishing independent assault operations in addition to typical engineer missions. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper Izvestia attributes this change to the fact that Russian troops have frequently had to assault heavily fortified areas.  The article also delves into how this reform will be implemented, to include organizational changes such as forming “assault detachments” in engineer units and engineer reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies, as well as the addition of new types of equipment such as the universal armored engineer vehicle. If this effort is perceived as a success, it is possible other militaries will consider emulating such reforms.

Source:

Alexey Mikhailov, Yulia Leonova, Andrey Fedorov, “В дело с техникой: инженерные войска переориентируют на штурмовые действия: Их оснащают боевыми машинами для разведки и разрушения долговременных укреплений (In business with technology: The engineer troops are reoriented to assault operations:), Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://iz.ru/1638123/aleksei-mikhailov-iuliia-leonova-andrei-fedorov/v-delo-s-tekhnikoi-inzhenernye-voiska-pereorientiruiut-na-shturmovye-deistviia

The Russian Ministry of Defense has approved a program to increase the combat capabilities of engineer regiments and brigades – this year they will get new units equipped with specialized assault and reconnaissance equipment…We are talking about universal armored engineer vehicles (UBIM) [Универсальная бронированная инженерная машина (УБИМ)]

From the first months of the special military operation, Russian troops were faced with the need to regularly storm fortified areas of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[i]  Particularly strong field fortifications were encountered in the Donbass that were erected over the course of eight years. This required Russian troops to adapt to new conditions and change tactics. Specialized assault detachments were formed with weapons and equipment to break through enemy defenses. Since last year, the military department decided to scale up this experience and create [engineer] reconnaissance-assault brigades in combined arms armies.In recent years, the Ministry of Defense has been carrying out a large-scale reform of the engineer troops. The engineer troops are being transformed from a support role into an independent strike force capable of participating in a modern war. The actions of the engineers are no longer limited to the construction of field fortifications, route clearance, and bridge building — now they also storm fortified areas, covertly place mines, and quickly conduct ​​explosive ordinance disposal.

Note:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: Universal Armored Engineer Vehicle (UBIM)
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-3/i-PfWbh5c/A 
Attribution: Vitaly Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Standardizing Munitions Used on First-Person View UAVs

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Russian Soldier with FPV UAV

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian military enthusiast website, Armeyskiy Standart, describes the role and importance of small first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are being used extensively in Ukraine. Many of these commercially produced UAVs have been repurposed from reconnaissance duties and modified to carry various munitions that can be effectively dropped on enemy personnel and/or equipment.[i] The second accompanying excerpted article from the Russian newspaper, Izvestia, discusses Russian efforts to further the FPV concept by developing standardized munitions for FPV UAVs. As the article explains, improvised explosives for use with small FPV UAVs are unstable and have resulted in crews being “blown up” by their own munitions. The impacts of the adoption of standardized munitions for FPV UAVs will likely extend long after Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine concludes. The en masse use of FPV UAVs is likely seen by the Russian military, and many others,[ii] as necessary for tactical success on the modern battlefield, especially in the conduct of close-range reconnaissance and fires. The adoption of standardized munitions will facilitate interoperability in the burgeoning Russian UAV industry and significantly lower already relatively low manufacturing costs. Standardization is a necessary step if Russia intends to place FPV UAVs into its table of organization and equipment structure, given their effectiveness and cost for delivering close-range reconnaissance and fires.

Sources:

Rustem Klupov, “FPV— дроны завоевывают поле боя: В ходе СВО впервые широко применены новые средства поражения (FPV— UAVs are conquering the battlefield: The new weapons were widely used in the SMO for the first time),” Armeyskiy Standart (Russian military enthusiast website), 7 December 2023. https://armystandard.ru/news/20231261712-o0qQy.html

In reports of special military operations [SMO], there are more and more reports of the use of so-called FPV (First-Person View) UAVs on the line of combat contact in the tactical depth at close-range. FPVs are quadcopters, or multi-rotor UAVs, equipped with a camera that transmits video to the operator-pilot’s control device. The pilot controls the UAV using this video feed, giving him the feeling of actually being in the UAV’s cockpit…

We can say that FPV UAVs are the “know-how” of SVO. They have wide ranging capabilities to destroy a variety of enemy targets. Having a small mass, they can lift a load several times their own weight and carry it at a speed of 120–140 km/h over a distance of 15–16 km… At the same time, the cost of one UAV is on average from 30 thousand to 60 thousand rubles [$330-660].

The versatility of FPV UAVs also lies in the fact that they can carry out additional reconnaissance of an object, deliver high-precision strikes and can carry munitions for various purposes — high-explosive, shaped-charge, fragmentation, thermobaric, incendiary, and kinetic…

The ability to use FPV UAVs in the tactical depth at close-range, which is most saturated with troops, allows these UAVs to always find their target, and having the capability to employ specialized munitions to ensure the reliable destruction of a variety of objects.The comparative effectiveness of FPV UAVs with other traditional means of destruction distinguishes this type as cheaper and more pragmatic in terms of accuracy and range of use.

Roman Kretsul, Alexey Ramm, and Dmitry Astrakhan, “С легким — на подъем: для FPV-дронов начали выпускать штатные боеприпасы (Easy goings — standardized munitions have begun to be produced for FPV UAVs),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 1 December 2023. https://iz.ru/1613625/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm-dmitrii-astrakhan/s-legkim-na-podem-dlia-fpv-dronov-nachali-vypuskat-shtatnye-boepripasy

…Several enterprises of the Russian defense industry have established serial production of ammunition for FPV UAVs, regular deliveries to the troops began this fall, two sources in the military department told Izvestia and confirmed by an interlocutor in the military-industrial complex.

The new ammunition is equipped with universal mounts that allow it to be suspended under almost all types of FPV UAVs used in the special military operation zone. Now the troops are receiving fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and cumulative warheads. In the future, their line is planned to be expanded.

Externally, a munition for an FPV UAV looks like a tube. New munitions are delivered to the troops in special protective plastic cases. As the publication’s interlocutors noted, the main advantage of the new products is their compactness combined with high power. This is achieved through the use of special explosives. Therefore, serial produced munitions are much superior improvised munitions…

“Previously, we had to independently manufacture, adapt, and “collectively develop” munitions. All this is unsafe. Now having a standard munition will make everyone’s job easier and safer…It’s no secret that some crews were blown up by their own munitions…” said Dmitry Uskov, a volunteer and contributor to the “13 Tactical” Telegram channel, told Izvestia…[i] FPV UAVs are one of the most dynamically developing areas of unmanned aviation. The operator controls such a device while wearing virtual reality glasses, like a pilot. With the proper skill, this allows you to deliver a UAV with a warhead precisely to the target, for example, to the door of a dugout or a vulnerable projection of an armored vehicle. For most other weapon systems, such precision is unimaginable…

[i] 13 Tactical is a pro-Russia site on the Telegram platform, as found at: https://t.me/s/tactical_13/2665

Notes:

[i] For other Russian uses of drones on the battlefield, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] For a recent examination of Taiwan’s position regarding drones on the battlefield, see: John Lubianetsky, “Taiwan Addressing Drone Technology Gap With China,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-addressing-drone-technology-gap-with-china/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Soldier with FPV UAV
Source:
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense, CC BY-SA 4.0