Author Archives: Dr Lester Grau

Respected Russian Academic Speculates on War in the Arctic

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“The Northern Fleet can only effectively counter American nuclear submarines in close proximity to its bases on the Kola Peninsula, and further to the East the adversary can operate more or less freely.”  

A recent article in the pro-Kremlin news outlet Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer sees the possibility of a military conflict breaking out in the Barents Sea region of the Arctic Ocean.  The author envisions a scenario emanating from a U.S. Navy freedom of navigation test of the Northern Sea Route (See: “Freedom of the Seas to Be Tested in Arctic?” OE Watch, April 2019). Well-known Russian political scientist Aleksandr Khramchikhin, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, is the article’s author.  He has long argued that China is Russia’s primary security threat and that the United States is looking to the Global Strike Command to defeat Russia’s nuclear capability with non-nuclear strikes.  Khramchikhin lacks a military background, but his reasoning and commentary are respected.  Khramchikhin’s description of the Arctic operational environment includes scenarios of engagements that are narrow in their potential locations and application of forces.  Paratroop drops, submarine missile launches, fighter aircraft engagements, and ground force incursions with limited objectives seem to capture the nature of conflict, according the author.  He admits that “imagining a battle in this region is very difficult indeed.”

Source:

Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Очень холодное поле боя: Война за акватории высоких широт может начаться с провокации на Северном морском пути (A very cold battlefield: A war for the high-latitude waters could begin with a provocation on the Northern Sea Route),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (pro-government weekly focused on Russian military and military-industrial complex), 22 November 2021.  https://vpk-news.ru/articles/64758

Competition for the Arctic, possibly spilling into war over the region, is a subject at least two decades old.  As the Arctic ice melts, interest is growing fast in a region where near-free navigation, unfettered access to offshore hydrocarbons, and military operations are becoming possible. 

Nobody is planning to share out the Arctic lands, since they were claimed long ago.  This is about sharing the waters, where the picture is not quite so clear and the number of potential competitors is limited.  The air forces of Finland…and Sweden…have some potential but these countries do not directly border onto the Arctic Ocean so there is nothing for them to fight over.  Iceland does not have an air force so it has nothing to fight with, even if it wanted to. 

Canada’s forces…are generally somewhat feebler than Finland’s and Sweden’s, and are either stationed in the south of the country (on a similar latitude to Moscow) or are busy in various American wars in the Middle and Near East.  Canadian forces in the Arctic are purely symbolic, without even a proper northern regiment in total and armed with only light weapons.

The Danish Air Force is weaker even than the Canadian and is practically all stationed in Denmark itself, that is, on the Jutland peninsula and adjacent islands.  In Greenland there is only the Sirius ski patrol — 30 men, that is, a single platoon, and also armed with only light weapons.  One or two patrol boats are also based there.

So any involvement by Denmark and Canada in a fight for the Arctic is purely theoretical (regarding the military component of the fight).  Deployment of Canadian and Danish forces to the Arctic is in practice unrealistic — they are too few and anyway do not train for war on ice.  The most that Ottawa and Copenhagen could do is send to the Arctic a few warships (one or two submarines, three or four frigates from Canada and two or three frigates from Denmark) and to airfields in the Arctic — up to 10 or so warplanes (Canadian F-18A/Bs, Danish F-16A/Bs).  You cannot do much fighting with those.

Fairly large groups of US air and ground forces are stationed in Alaska.  They could capture Chukotka, where there are no Russian forces, with ease.  And the USAF could safely block the deployment to there of Russian contingents from Kamchatka, not to mention from the Vladivostok region.  Strange as it may seem, it would be easier for Russia to send Airborne Troops units to Chukotka from the European part of the country.  The Americans could in theory even land forces in Yakutiya (in the Tiksi area, for example).  True, Russian paratroopers could just as successfully turn up on the islands of Canada’s Arctic archipelago, which also have nothing and nobody to defend themselves with.  However, the point is that all these reciprocal assault landings are completely senseless and would create more problems for the protagonists than for the other side.  This is simply because an American expeditionary force in Chukotka and Yakutiya and a Russian one in northern Canada would be at a hopeless dead end with no chance of developing an offensive to the south, and with desperate supply issues.

The only place where potential “fighters for the Arctic” might come into direct contact is northern Europe.  The greater part of Norway’s air force…is stationed in the north of the country and in close proximity to the group of forces of Russia’s Northern Joint Strategic Command on the Kola Peninsula.  The Russian presence is of course more powerful, especially in terms of the two countries’ ability to grow their forces.  Imagining a battle in this region is very difficult indeed.  Between 1941 and 1943 on the entire gigantic Soviet-German front, the Arctic was the sole sector in which the Germans captured nothing, other than a few hundred square kilometers of lifeless tundra.  Imagining that the Norwegians will be more effective and successful than the Germans is, to put it mildly, hard.  It is even harder to imagine how the Norwegians’ NATO allies would come to their aid in the ice and snow.  On the other hand, in the fall of 1944 the Soviet army liberated only the Norwegian border county of Finnmark, and went no further.  The Supreme Command could not see any point in fighting for frozen mountains crisscrossed by fjords.  Modern-day Russia needs them even less.

It is practically impossible to conceive of an armed conflict in the Arctic over a disputed oil or gas field.  Hydrocarbons extraction in the region is a highly complex and expensive business, so no oil or gas company will start work on a deposit unless the legal status and national affiliation are settled.

Much more realistic is an incursion into Russia’s Arctic waters by American nuclear submarines, which from there could in theory fire Tomahawk cruise missiles at numerous military and economic targets in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East.  The Northern Fleet can only effectively counter American nuclear submarines in close proximity to its bases on the Kola Peninsula, and further to the East the adversary can operate more or less freely.  In that case, the hopes lie with air rather than submarine defenses, that is, with eliminating the Tomahawks rather than their carriers.  But this kind of scenario could materialize only if matters get to the stage of full-scale war between Russia and the United States.

However, a dispute over “freedom of navigation” in peacetime cannot be discounted.  Washington believes that both Russia’s Northern Sea Route and Canada’s Northwest Passage are international waters in which civilian and military ships of any country may sail freely without the need to notify anybody.  A direct conflict between the United States and Canada, close allies, over the Northwest Passage is unlikely, and anyway, it is not greatly needed as a transport route (easier to take the Panama Canal).  The Northern Sea Route, which greatly shortens the time from Europe to Asia and back, is much more in demand.

On more than one occasion, American warships have sailed across the South China Sea, which Beijing regards as its own.  Matters have not yet reached the stage of direct confrontation with ships of the PLA, but it cannot be ruled out.  Similarly, nothing is stopping the Americans from just turning up and sending one or a number of warships through the Northern Sea Route without officially notifying Russia first.  Will Moscow be as restrained as Beijing?  Or will it require the Americans to scrupulously comply with Russian law and in the event of a refusal do what is necessary to head them off, including forcibly?  In that case, how far might the dispute go?  It is possible that Washington will allow us to find out, and very soon:  It badly wants to prove to the whole world and to itself as well that America can still do anything, including what others cannot.

Russian Airborne Receiving Modernized SVD “Sniper Rifle”

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“Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.” 

The standard-issue infantry Kalashnikov family of weapons are not particularly accurate and have a modest effective range of 300 meters.  Their purpose is to conduct suppressive automatic fire to keep the enemy pinned down. The rifle squad and platoon needed a specialty weapon to engage the enemy from 300 to 800 meters.  The answer was the SVD Dragunov semiautomatic longer-range rifle.  While titled a sniper rifle, it is really a rugged expert marksman’s rifle that routinely engages targets to 800 meters.  Designed in 1963 and combat tested initially in South Vietnam, the SVD is older than most currently serving in the Russian military.  According to a recent article in the pro-government newspaper Izvestia, the Dragunov has now been upgraded and airborne and reconnaissance troops are first in line for the upgrade.  This is not the top-of-the-line professional Russian sniper rifle but seems ideal for rough-and-tumble field soldiering.

Source:

Roman Kretsul and Aleksei Ramm, “Точнее, и не смажешь: войсковую разведку перевооружат на новые винтовки (More Precision, No Lubrication. Tactical Reconnaissance Upgrades to New Rifles. Specialized Sniper Subunits to Get the SVDM),” Izvestia (pro-government newspaper), 7 November 2021.

https://iz.ru/1245135/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/tochnee-i-ne-smazhesh-voiskovuiu-razvedku-perevooruzhat-na-novye-vintovki

Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.  According to experts, this greatly increases reconnaissance troops’ opportunities to eliminate targets at long range.”

The Defense Ministry has decided to upgrade tactical reconnaissance and special-purpose units with the SVDM sniper rifle…  The move should enhance these troops’ battlefield capabilities. The first consignments have already arrived in the Southern Military District.  The Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD) has served the forces well for half a century and in its class has become a brand, like Kalashnikov for assault rifles. Even a less than expert soldier is sure to hit targets with it at ranges of up to 800 meters.  The Dragunov combines greater firepower and range than an assault rifle with exceptional reliability and relative simplicity of use.  Back in Soviet times the role of sniper armed with an SVD was inserted into the standard complement of a motorized infantry squad.  This gave Soviet infantry a substantial increase in firepower compared to foreign armies.

Russian engineers have been working in recent decades on various options for modernizing this tried and true weapon. The latest modification is the SVDM.  Made of advanced materials, it has improved ergonomics and greater accuracy.

The gun mounts Picatinny rails on which accessories to suit the mission at hand, such as optical or night sights or a silencer may be mounted in minutes.  The SVDM has backup iron sights and a fixed point for a folding bipod.  Many older models of the gun required some disassembly in order to mount the accessories, which is a lengthy process.

“In the army a sniper is actually a low-altitude precision weapon,” military expert Vladislav Shurygin stated.  “The Dragunov sniper rifle means you can deliver accurate fire over medium distances.  In battle it is used to take out important targets.  The sniper usually accompanies the commander and is tasked by him.  A modernization for the Dragunov is further confirmation that this gun was created with future upgrades in mind, and it still has great potential today.”

Albert Bakov, general director of TsNIItochmash [Central Scientific Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering] told Izvestiya in an interview in 2019 that the Dragunov was so perfectly designed from the outset that in the category of army rifles for shooting at ranges between 500 and 800 meters “it cannot be made any better” — only individual elements can be improved.  You can paddle with it, you can throw it around — and it works fine over ranges of 500 to 800 meters.” The company is now working on larger-caliber rifles.

The Kalashnikov concern is currently upgrading the Chuvakin sniper rifle (SVCh), which should hit individual targets at ranges of up to a kilometer with the first shot. It is designed to take two types of cartridge — the powerful Russian 7.62×54 mm flanged and the NATO 7.62×51 mm rifle cartridge. When it will acquire its final shape and enter serial production is unknown.

Until the Chuvakin is inducted into service, the Dragunov will remain the best sniper rifle option for the regular troops.  There are longer-range and more powerful rifles in existence but they are far more expensive and technically complex, and are intended not for use in battle but for particular types of missions.  These weapons are supplied in limited numbers to special-purpose subunits in the army and the security and law enforcement agencies.

The military has already begun to rearm its marksmen:  Airborne Troops reconnaissance subunits have received the brand-new AK-12 assault rifle.  Outwardly it resembles the classic Kalashnikov, but this is a fundamental redesign.  It has acquired the ability to fire in fixed bursts of two rounds per trigger pull, it has a longer-lasting barrel, additional detachable accessories, and easier switching between shooting modes.  New thermal imagers, silencers, and collimator sights are in production for it, enabling accurate fire at silhouette targets from ranges of up to 500 meters.The new weapons and kit now arriving at the Airborne Troops are radically extending their capabilities.  Izvestiya already reported that the blue berets’ reconnaissance subunits have received the new Arbalet-2 parachute, with which they can jump from altitudes of up to 4,000 meters, or higher if they have oxygen tanks.  The parachute’s special canopy means that it can be steered while in flight, which means that troopers can travel dozens of kilometers while descending, to penetrate behind enemy lines undetected.

The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles)

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Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and more assertive behavior along its borders have piqued interest in the Russian Armed Forces. This increased interest has caused much speculation about their structure, capabilities, and future development. Interestingly, this speculation has created many different, and often contradictory, narratives about these issues. At any given time, assessments of the Russian Armed Forces vary between the idea of an incompetent and corrupt conscript army manning decrepit Soviet equipment and relying solely on brute force, to the idea of an elite military filled with Special Operations Forces who were the “polite people” or “little green men” seen on the streets in Crimea. This book will attempt to split the difference between these radically different ideas by shedding some light on what exactly the Russian Ground Forces consist of, how they are structured, how they fight, and how they are modernizing.

Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Perspectives on High-Altitude Combat (Les Grau and Charles Bartles)

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There is long history of writings on mountain combat that include such luminaries as Clausewitz and Engels. Yet the allied force in Afghanistan frequently displayed a reluctance to go and remain in the mountains. Les Grau has been writing on mountain combat before the US invasion of Afghanistan. During a trip to Afghanistan, Les and Chuck Bartles decided to do a book on foreign perspectives of mountain combat. Their goal was to share this information with units deploying to Afghanistan and mountain training centers. This book is a collection of foreign articles and foreign source-based articles on mountain operations, tactics, movement, maneuver, training, artillery and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications and logistics. This book is not US Army doctrine, rather it offers alternative views to help forces adapt to a challenging environment and carry out their mission.

Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontiers (General Sir Andrew Skeen. Les Grau and Robert Baer)

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This is a reproduction of a 1932 book published by General Skeen, who began fighting the Pushtun in 1897. His military career took him to fighting Boxers in China, the “Mad Mullah” in Somaliland and Germans on the Western Front of World War I. He always returned to British India where fighting the fractious Pushtun continued to be a problem. He was a brigade commander during the Third-Anglo-Afghan War, commanded the Kohat-Kurran field force and fought in the Waziristan campaign. He commanded the Northwest Frontier District and in 1924-1928, served as the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army. He knew the Pushtun and frontier fighting better than almost any other British officer. He wrote this book as a guide for company-grade officers fighting the Pushtun. Les Grau had read General Skeen’s book during the Soviet-Afghan War and, after the United States invaded Afghanistan, decided that this would be a welcome addition to the field libraries of allied commanders who were fighting the Taliban-who are ethnic Pashtun. Les and Bob Baer added copious footnotes to General Skeen’s work to explain the “Britishisms” and terms and concepts. They also wrote an introduction to explain the history, context, geography and application of Skeen’s classic work.

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Ali A. Jalali and Lester Grau)

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In 1996, The USMC commissioned Ali Jalali and Les Grau to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to interview Mujahideen commanders about their combat experience in fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War. Ali was a former Afghan Colonel who attended the Soviet Frunze Academy, fought as a Mujahideen against the Soviets and was a radio journalist for the Pushtu and Dari Voice of America broadcasts. Ali is famous throughout the Afghan community and had amazing entre with all factions. Ali and Les conducted in-depth interviews of Mujahideen commanders in order to gain their tactical insights. This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, although enough history is included to place the events by time and external factors. It is a series of combat vignettes related by Mujahideen participants that shows the good and the bad, the mistakes and successes of guerrillas fighting conventional forces. It is not about right and wrong, rather it is about surviving against the overwhelming firepower and technology of a superpower. It is the story of combat from the guerrilla’s perspective-the story of brave people who fought without hope of winning because it was the right thing to do. The book has been translated into Dari and distributed within the Afghan Armed Forces.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Les Grau)

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This book was written by Soviet officers who had served in Afghanistan and returned for the extensive Command and Staff course at the Frunze Combined Arms Academy in Moscow. While they were at the Academy, the History of the Military Art Department had the Afghanistan veterans write vignettes of their experience. They analyzed these, edited the best and added commentary as lessons learned for future war in mountain-desert terrain. The department published them as an in-house a book in 1991. The book was intended for internal use only, and, as such, shows both the good and the bad. Mistakes and successes both illustrate the hard lessons learned in fighting guerrillas on rough terrain. It is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, rather it is a series of snapshots of combat as witnessed by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders, staff officers and advisers to the Afghan government force. It is not a book about right and wrong, rather it is a book about survival and adaptation as young men come to terms with a harsh, boring and brutal existence punctuated by times of heady excitement and terror. This book was part of a US/Russian military exchange following the collapse of the Soviet Union.