Author Archives: Dr Lester Grau

Russia Seeks To Expand Military Force Creation to Its Republics

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“New legislation opens up the establishment of regional military companies that will be in charge of “guarding the state border in times of war.”  The amendments that were announced by Member of the State Duma Andrei Kartapolov on the 25th of July will allow Russian governors to build their own private military companies.”

Russia is looking for additional military forces and private military groups for use in the event of a national emergency. Draft Russian legislation may allow the formation of republic/regional armed forces that could be used to defend Russia in a time of crisis. According to the Norway-based The Barents Sea Independent Observer, the new Russian units would have the mission to “protect the state border, fight illegal armed groups, and combat foreign sabotage and intelligence formations.” Details are sparse on important details, including whether these regional armies would belong to the republics or to the seven federal regions, and how they would interact with the traditional instruments of state power, including the Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service, and the National Guard (Rosgvardia).

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russian governors could soon start building Regional Armies,” The Barents Sea Independent Observer (online in English and Russian), 27 July 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/07/russian-governors-could-soon-start-building-regional-armies

New legislation opens up the establishment of regional military companies that will be in charge of “guarding the state border in times of war.” The amendments that were announced by Member of the State Duma Andrei Kartapolov on the 25th of July will allow Russian governors to build their own private military companies.

According to Karapolov, the military formations will be “specialised state unitary companies that on the decision of the Russian President can be established to protect public order.” They will also be used to “protect state borders in times of mobilisation, as well as in times of martial law and war,” Kartapolov explained. Andrei Kartapolov chairs the State Duma Committee on Defense. He is also General in the Russian Armed Forces and was in charge of  the Army’s so-called Military-Political Department ahead of his election to parliament in 2021.

The new legislation comes as part of controversial amendments in the Russian Law on Draft Age. It is not clear how the new military formations will interact with Russia’s existing forces, among them the Armed Forces, the FSB and the National Guard (Rosgvardia). But the new regional units will be armed and allowed to use force. And they will “interact with the Interior Ministry, the FSB and Ministry of Defense to protect the state border, fight illegal armed groups and combat foreign sabotage and intelligence formations,” the Russian version of the Barents Observer reported.

In addition, they will reportedly be commissioned to take action in issues of public law and order, which could mean that they can be applied to repress protest actions. They will also engage in fighting drones, in the air, under water, as well as unmanned surface vehicles.

The formations will have extensive authorities and face little consequences for their actions. Reportedly, members of the new forces will bear no responsibility for inflicted damage of moral, physical and material character, and citizens will have no right to oppose their demands.According to Kartapolov, the law is “made for a big war, and the smell of such a big war can already be scented.”  The new legislation comes into force on the 1st of January 2024.

Russia and China Expanding Coast Guard Cooperation in Arctic

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“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation. The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it.”

A new agreement with Russia’s Coast Guard will give China greater access to the Arctic, according to the following excerpted article in Norway-based The Barents Observer.This is something China has sought as a “near Arctic” nation. China has long claimed a special status in Arctic relations since its proclamation that the “Arctic belongs to the world and China has the largest portion of the earth’s population.” Cooperation between the Russian and Chinese Coast Guards can be an important step in China’s ability to gain more access to Arctic waters. The agreement on joint coastal operations could also give China a stronger voice in dictating Arctic policy. An analyst quoted in the article sees this as a significant policy shift for Russia, concluding that “Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations.” The article suggests the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolling Arctic waters, should it come to that, will make Norway’s cooperation with Russia’s Coast Guard even more difficult.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert

On 24 April, a groundbreaking memorandum on extensive cooperation in Artic waters was signed with FSB Coast Guard. The Chinese Coast Guard was then invited to observe the long-planned “Arctic Patrol 2023” maritime security exercise. On 27 April, Governor Andrei Chibis met Chinese diplomats and discussed a roadmap for increased business, shipbuilding and Northern Sea Route developments. Amid the Ukraine war and halt in cooperation with the other seven Arctic nations, Russia turns east for new partners. Opening the door for China is a significant geopolitical change.

“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation,” explained Andreas Østhagen, an expert on Arctic security with the Firdtjof Nansen Institute. “The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it,” Osthagen stated. Government officials in Beijing have for years said China is a “near-Arctic state,” but so far, its presence up North has been limited to participating in conferences, annual research voyages, some few investments in Russia’s natural resource developments, and a few Asia-Europe shipments along the Northern Sea Route.

“China’s Polar Silk Road project seems to be more wait-and-see,” write researchers Frédéric Lasserre and Hervé Baudu in a report  published in April about the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the Arctic. The report, however, underlines that China is readily credited with great Arctic ambitions, but for now, mainly focused on securing hydrocarbon supplies from Siberia.  China has its own projects under construction. Barges for two additional floating nuclear power plants for the north coast of Siberia and a nuclear-powered icebreaker are currently under construction at a yard in China.

The Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk opens the opportunity for joint efforts to combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing. The deal was signed by top leaders with FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard.

“This testifies that Russia actively wants to invite China into the kind of tasks we have thought Russia would safeguard,” Andreas Østhagen states, finding this a significant shift in policy. “We have thought that Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations,” He notes that the future of China-Russian Arctic cooperation is difficult to predict, but he makes one comparison: “This reminds me a bit of when my mother-in-law wants to stay with us for a couple of weeks “until she finds something else.”

For Russia, the exercise showcasing FSB Border Guards’ maritime capabilities for the Chinese visitors wasn’t aimed at fishery inspections in the Barents Sea. This was hard-core security, as previously instilled by strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s special Rosgvardia forces in the Arctic, including at the nuclear icebreaker base in Murmansk.

The exercise scenario was FSB fighting terrorists that had attacked Rosatomflot’s nuclear transport ship “Rosita” in Kola Bay. “All the inputs worked out during the practical maritime exercise confirmed the readiness of interdepartmental structures to solve problems in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” said acting director of Atomflot Leonid Irlitsa.

Rosatomflot oversees Russia’s Northern Sea Route Directorate. The state-owned company is currently boosting the number of nuclear icebreakers and support infrastructure, key to President Putin’s great Arctic ambitions.  For neighboring Norway, FSB Coast Guards’ new cooperation with China could pose a challenge.“Although I think we are far away from seeing Chinese Coast Guard or naval vessels performing tasks in the Barents Sea, for Norway that would entail a new security challenge and make cooperation with the Russian Coast Guard (FSB) even more difficult,” says Andreas Østhagen. Norwegian-Russian Coast Guard cooperation in the Barents Sea is one of very few areas of contact that has not been officially called off by Oslo after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

Russian Defense Ministry Approves Five-Year Plan To Expand and Modernize Arctic Air Bases

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In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).

“Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya.  The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers.”

Russia is expanding its ability to maintain and launch military aircraft within its Arctic territories, possibly due to increased NATO naval exercises in the North Sea over the past three years. According to the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian military is modernizing both Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemla and Nagurskoye air base on Franz Josef Land. As the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates, Russia’s long-range bombers are a dual threat as they also serve as cruise missile launchers. Russian cruise missiles have significant range, and recent attacks on Ukrainian targets launched from military aircraft in the Caspian Sea are a poignant indication of the strategic value Russia stands to gain from these expanded and modernized Arctic bases.

Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Further expansion for Novaya Zemlya air base aims to serve long-range bombers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/further-expansion-novaya-zemlya-airport-aims-serve-long-range-bombers

Rogachevo airfield is already upgraded to serve MiG-31 and Su-33 fighter jets.  Such aircraft have since 2020 served the Arctic airport on a rotational basis from their airports on the Kola Peninsula. The new plans include special buildings for basing aircraft equipment and new houses for the military servicemen and their families.

Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya. The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers, according to the plans reported by Izvestia. Today’s runway is 2,400 meters, likely too short for Russia’s long-range bombers like the Tu-95 [RG1] and Tu-160 [RG2] .At the Nagurskoye base on Franz Josef Land, work is underway to extend the runway to nearly 3,600 meters. The Russian Air Force has over the last years significantly stepped up its presence in the Arctic.

Image Information:

Image: In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:InterceptionOfMissile2018-11.jpg
Attribution: CCA x 4.0 International

Facing European Sanctions, Russian Redirects Grain and Coal to Asian Customers

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“As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour.”

In the face of sanctions and economic isolation from Europe, Russia’s longtime export hub in Murmansk has become, at least for now, an unnecessary and out-of-the-way detour for Russian commodities being shipped abroad, especially to Asia. According to the excerpted article in the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is increasing its exports to Asia on the northbound Siberian rivers to the Northern Sea Route. Grain barges have successfully shipped north on the Lena River to the Northern Sea Route to China at substantial savings over rail. Coal will now move by rail from the Siberian coal fields to the river port of Krasnoyarsk and by barge on the north flowing Yenesei River to the Arctic Circle port region and then be loaded onto bulk carriers for China and India. Exploiting these additional routes will be more cost effective, quicker, and sanction-free, while providing Russia access to friendly markets and much needed export revenue.

Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Asia-bound coal finds Siberian shortcut route, avoiding Murmansk,”

The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 3 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/04/asia-bound-coal-finds-siberia-shortcut-route-avoiding-murmansk

As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour. The first test batch with 30,000 tons of coal from Kuzbass will be shipped via the Yenisei River and Northern Sea Route when ice is gone and the waterways open for navigation later this year.

“It is planned to organize an experimental shipping in 2023 […] from Kuzbass with transshipment in Krasnoyarsk and Lesosibirsk. In Ust-Port region, the coal will be reloaded to ships and sent to China,” stated head of the Yenisey inland waterways, Leonid Fedorov.

The coal will be sent by rail to Lososibirsk and Krasnoyarsk where it will be loaded on barges and shipped north the Yenisey River to Ust-Port inside the Arctic Circle. A larger bulk carrier will take over the cargo and sail to the outlet of the river and further east along the Northern Sea Route towards Asia. About half of all Russian coal comes from the Kuzbass region southeast of Krasnoyarsk.Over the last decade, export via Murmansk has increased from about 9,5 million tons in 2010 to 16,2 million tons in 2019. After Putin’s full-scale military attack on Ukraine last year, the European Union decided to ban Russian coal, and export from the ice-free port on the coast to the Barents Sea is now shipped via the Suez channel to Asia, for the most part to India and China. If increasing to large volume, export via the Yenisey River and the Northern Sea Route will be substantially shorter than the route via Murmansk.

Russia Effectively Leaves Arctic Council

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“On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects.”

The Arctic Council, founded in 1996, lists its members as Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The position of Arctic Council president rotates between member states, and though the Council currently has a Russian president, other members of the Council have refused to meet in his presence in response to the war in Ukraine. Underscoring the schism, the Council also recently met without its current president presiding and accepted a Canadian counterclaim to Arctic territory that is also claimed by Russia.[i] As the excerpted article from independent Norwegian news source High North News indicates, Russia has effectively pulled out of the Arctic Council as a result of the Council’s actions and will now pursue its interests in the Arctic through bilateral relations and self-reliance. Russia’s decision increases the chance of further political conflict in the Arctic that could lead to a physical confrontation between Russia and Arctic Council member states.

Source:

Malte Humpert, “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing Cooperation Within Arctic Council,” High North News (independent newspaper published by the High North Center at Nord University, Bodo, Norway). 23 February 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-and-removing-cooperation-within-arctic

On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects. The hopes for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic continue to cool. Days after a U.S. diplomat stated that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic was now virtually impossible, the Kremlin published amendments to its Arctic policy. President Putin signed the decree on 21 February. The updated document places greater emphasis on Russian national interests in the region and removes specific mentions for cooperation within the Arctic Council.

While the original policy, published in March 2020, called for the “strengthening of good neighborly relations with the Arctic states” in the fields of economic, scientific, cultural and cross-border cooperation the amended version removes the above section and instead calls for the “development of relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis, “taking into account the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.”

The amended text also removes mentions of “the framework of multilateral regional cooperation formats, including the Arctic Council, the coastal Arctic “five” and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.” 

In the original policy the section on international cooperation, placed significant emphasis on work within “multilateral regional cooperation formats” for the purpose of building up economic, scientific and technological, as well as cultural cooperation. It did not make any mention of prioritizing Russian national interests. In contrast, the wording of the revised document now places the country’s national interests in the Arctic ahead of work towards economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation. Just last week, U.S. military leaders emphasized that the Arctic was now Russia’s number one priorityThe updated version also places a greater emphasis on Russian self-reliance in the region. It calls for ensuring “import independence of the shipbuilding complex,” clearly a response to western sanctions which have affected Russia’s ability to order and purchase ice-capable gas and oil tankers at foreign shipyards.The amended version of the policy calls for the” development and modernization of shipbuilding and ship repair facilities for the construction and maintenance of ships navigating in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. “In terms of energy supply for population centers and industrial facilities along the NSR the policy now calls for the use of domestically built “low-power nuclear power plants.” The first such facility, the floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov was towed through the Baltics and up the Norwegian coastline in 2018 to the Arctic town of Pevek to supply electrical power and residential heat.

Notes:

[i] For more additional information about the Canadian claim on the Lomonosov Ridge see: Les Grau, “Canada Makes Additional Claims to Arctic Territory Claimed by Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.

Russia Cutting Back on Nuclear Icebreaker Production

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“An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.”

As reported in the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia will only build one of the three nuclear icebreakers it had previously planned but will compensate by increasing conventional icebreaker production. Although the cutback in production could be a response to the latest rounds of EU sanctions against Russia, the decision may have already been in process. In the past, Russia has cut back on expensive projects only to introduce improved projects later. The change in direction may indicate Russia believes it already has enough atomic-powered icebreakers in an era of thinning polar icecaps.

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Moscow lowers ambitions in nuclear icebreaker program, will not build fleet of new super-powerful vessels after all,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 March 2023.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/03/moscow-lowers-ambitions-nuclear-icebreaker-program-will-not-build-fleet-new-super-powerful

Only two days after the EU imposed sanctions against Russia’s state nuclear icebreaker operator, the country announces that it will not build a fleet of Lider-class vessels. An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.

The lead ship carries the name “Rossiya” and is currently under construction at the Zvezda yard in the Russian Far East. It is due to be ready for sailing in 2027. The Lider (project 20510) will be equipped with two RITM-400 type nuclear reactors and have a total capacity of 120 MW, twice the power of the currently most powerful icebreakers. It will be able to crush through ice thicker than four meters.

The vessel is very complicated to build, and it comes at an extraordinarily high price. The Russian government in January 2020 allocated 127 billion rubles (€1,85 billion) for the construction of the lead ship. The reduction of the number of Liders is compensated by the construction of more LK-60 icebreakers[GRLCUT(1] . While the original strategy document from 2020 includes the construction of “no less than five” icebreakers of the 22220 class, the updated documents reads “no less than seven” vessels of the kind.

Russia already has three ships of the class in operation: the Arktika, Sibir and Ural. By year 2035, also the Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka and Primorie will be completed. The Arctic Strategy also outlines the construction of 30 rescue and support ships, as well as three hydrographic survey ships and two piloting ships by 2030.

The updated document comes only two days after the European Commission adopted its 10th package of sanctions against Russia, a part of which is aimed at nuclear icebreaker operator Atomflot. According to the Commission, the sanctions against Atomflot will reduce Russia’s ability to take use of the Northern Sea Route to exploit its vast Arctic oil and gas reserves.

“With oil and gas exports shifting from Europe to Asia as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and subsequent Westerns sanctions, Russia’s icebreaker fleet is key to the country’s Arctic hydrocarbon strategy. In order to escort oil and gas tankers on the much longer and more challenging voyage from the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas to Asia, rather than the much shorter and less ice infested route to Europe, Russia relies on Atomflot’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers,” an explanation from the Commission reads.Vladimir Putin has since 2018 had the development of the Northern Sea Route as one of his key priorities and federal agencies have been commissioned to reach 80 million tons of goods per year on the route by 2024. The lion’s share of the projected goods traffic is oil, liquified natural gas and coal.

Russian Battalion Tactical Group Mission Training in the Arctic

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(Click image to download magazine.)

28 A COLD, SOGGY, BOGGY SLOG: GROUND FORCES IN HIGHER LATITUDE
COMBAT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau

34 RUSSIAN BATTALION TACTICAL GROUP MISSION TRAINING IN THE
ARCTIC
By Dr. Lester W. Grau & Dr. Charles K. Bartles

40 POLAR NIGHTS, WHITE NIGHTS, AND NORMAL DAYS AND NIGHTS:
ARCTIC GROUND TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau

Russian Arctic Seaports Expand Activity Despite War in Ukraine

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“The most important issue on today’s agenda is the fulfillment of President Putin’s instructions to increase shipping volumes on the Northern Sea Route to 80 million tons by the year 2024.”

According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer,despite fighting in Ukraine and sanctions by the West, Russia continues to strongly push the expansion of the Northern Sea Route’s capacity. Most notably, the accompanying article notes that Russia seeks to expand from a shipment of 34 million tons of goods in 2022 to a projected 80 million tons by 2024. It also notes that Russia has set a target of implementing the construction of 41 new cargo vessels by 2030. In the past, President Putin has set increased shipping goals for the Northern Sea Route and, officially, they have been met. Yet, given the significantly ambitious increase from 34 million metric tons to 80 million metric tons, we do not know what goods are being shipped and who the customers are. Today, much of the Northern Sea Route shipping goes east to the Russian Far East and China; it also remains the case that many non-European countries are ready to expand trade with Russia regardless of its invasion of Ukraine. In terms of what will get shipped, given Russia’s natural resources and the never-ending need for sources of energy, much of this cargo will be liquified natural gas (LNG), coal, oil, timber, and processed metals. Grain shipments by barge up the Lena River to the Arctic Ocean and on to China have already been accomplished at a cheaper rate than rail. Still, it may be the case that the new proposed capacities might exceed demand. Annual increases of two to four million metric tons are achievable, but an increase to of the likes projected here would be unprecedented. If accomplished, though, any increase in shipping capacity could help Russia offset export losses due to ongoing sanctions.

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Moscow assures it will not lower ambitions in Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 13 February 2023.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/02/moscow-assures-it-will-not-lower-ambitions-arctic

“The most important issue on today’s agenda is the fulfillment of President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s instructions to increase shipping volumes on the Northern Sea Route to 80 million tons by the year 2024,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister YuriTruter said as he on the 11th of February opened a meeting in the State Commission on Arctic Development.

In the room were representatives of key federal ministries, regional governments, and state companies. Western sanctions have caused certain difficulties in reaching the president’s objectives, the high-ranking government official admitted. But investment projects in the Arctic are still proceeding according to plans, he assured the group.

In 2022, a total of 34 million tons of goods was shipped on the route. “It is a good result,” Trutnev underlined, and explained that the original plan for the year was only 32 million tons.

Despite the war against Ukraine and the severe economic hardships facing the country, the Northern Sea Route remains a top priority for the Russian government.

The cabinet headed by Premier Mikhail Mishustin continues to aim for an unprecedented boost in Arctic shipping, and the ambitions outlined in the federal” Plan on the development of the Northern Sea Route” as adopted in August 2022 remains intact.

The document says shipping on the route is to increase to 80 million tons in 2024 and later to 150 million tons in 2030 and 220 million tons in 2035.

In order to reach the target, a total of 41 new cargo vessels must be built by 2030, the leader of the Arctic Commission argued in last week’s meeting. Trutnev also underlined that the goods capacity of seaports along the Northern Sea Route will increase to 36 million tons in 2023 and to 83 million tons in 2024.

Behind the port development stands nuclear power company Rosatom, that in 2022 completed the construction of the Utrenneye terminal in the Gulf of Ob. In 2024, Rosneft’s Sever Bay terminal will stand ready on the coast of the Kara Sea, and the same year — the nearby new coal terminal of the Severnaya Zvezda.

But there are looming financial troubles in the horizon. “I do not exclude that we will have to find new solutions to financing the operations, so that there appears no deficit of funds in any phases of development,” Trutnev told his commission colleagues.And despite the dramatic increase in federal deficit, the government official underlined that the state is ready to offer support. “If one of the companies will not have financing, that does not mean that it will be abandoned, [but] we must help,” Trutnev said.

Canada Makes Additional Claims to Arctic Territory Claimed by Russia

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“The addition is to Canada’s 2019 partial submission that claimed approximately 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean seabed and subsoil.  ‘This addendum to that partial submission regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the Arctic Ocean covers an additional area of continental shelf extending beyond the limits provided for in that partial submission, encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau…”

Canada recently filed a claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau, including the Lomonosov Ridge. This most recent claim follows a previous Canadian claim made in 2019 that included up to 1.2 million square kilometers of ocean seabed and part of the Lomonosov Ridge. According to independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, Canada’s claims to Arctic territory involving the Lomonosov Ridge run counter to Russia’s earlier claim over much of that area. Canada’s claim also comes at a time when Russia’s relations with the West are severely strained. Normally the Arctic Council, comprised of states with a presence in the Arctic, would meet to help solve competing claims. However, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic Council first ceased operating but is now meeting without Russia and the Russian president of the Arctic Council. It is unlikely that the overlapping claims in the Arctic will be solved diplomatically in the near term since the Arctic Council is dysfunctional and tensions between Russia and West, in this case Canada, are worsening.

Source:

Eil’is Quinn, “Canada extends continental shelf claim, increasing overlaps with Russia in Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 December 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2022/12/canada-extends-continental-shelf-claim-increasing-overlaps-russia-arctic

The addition is to Canada’s 2019 partial submission that claimed approximately 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean seabed and subsoil. “This addendum to that partial submission regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the Arctic Ocean covers an additional area of continental shelf extending beyond the limits provided for in that partial submission, encompassing the full length of the Central Arctic Plateau,” the government said in the Dec.19 document filed with the U.N.’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives coastal states a 200 nautical mile continental shelf claim that allows countries the right to exploit resources in the seabed and subsoil of their respective areas. The activities could be anything from deep seabed mining and fishing to oil and gas exploration.

Canada has been working on gathering data to support its claims in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans since 2003. But UNCLOS allows continental shelves to be extended if a state has scientific data to prove that particular underwater geological or geographical features are actually extensions of their continental shelves.

The Lomonosov Ridge is a kind of underwater mountain chain that extends across the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean and is something that Canada, Russia and Denmark all claim is an extension of their respective continental shelves.

Canada’s new filing comes at a time of high tension between Russia and the West.  In March, the seven western states on the Arctic Council paused their participation in the body’s work in protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying the war undermined many of the founding principals of the forum, which include sovereignty and territorial integrity based on international law. In June, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States said they’d resume limited council work in areas that did not include Russia.

Global Affairs Canada was not able to immediately reply to a request for comment on Thursday concerning Canada’s new Arctic claims and its interactions with Russia during the process. But in the addendum document, Canada says it had regular consultations with Russia, as it did with Denmark and the United States, countries with which Ottawa also has overlapping claims.

“During the preparation of this submission, regular consultations between Canada and the Russian Federation revealed overlaps in their respective continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean,” the addendum said.

“Through an exchange of letters, Canada and the Russian Federation reached an understanding that: When one State makes a submission to the Commission that includes the Arctic Ocean, the other State will promptly transmit a diplomatic note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” 

In 2021, Russia filed a claim with the U.N.’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that goes up to Canada’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. It takes the commission several years to study the scientific merits of claims filed. Afterwards, countries use the commission’s recommendations to negotiate final boundaries between themselves.  Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2013.