Monthly Archives: February 2022

Service Rifles and Fighter Jets: Pakistan’s Defense Acquisition Priorities

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A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets…”

In late 2015 Pakistan announced it would conduct trials to find a new infantry rifle as the country’s army sought to phase out the Heckler & Koch G3.  After a few years of testing, the government did not select a rifle from bids of several well-known companies and instead looked to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for a potential replacement (See: “A New Domestically Produced Service Rifle in Pakistan?” OE Watch, December 2019).  While Pakistan’s Army has yet to acquire a new service rifle, the accompanying excerpted articles report on a possible replacement for the G3 and other defense acquisition priorities.

The article from Pakistani defense focused news website Quwa.org reports on the POF’s introduction of the BW20 and BW21.  The article notes that the POF is “pitching the BW20” as the next-generation rifle and that the cost of it could be lower due to “existing production infrastructure” for the G3.  It also notes that BW20 “has some commonality with the G3,” though it is considered a new rifle and not an upgrade.  The article also mentions that Pakistan’s Army “did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption” and that one reason for not selecting a new rifle was that “the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design.”  While the cost of the BW20 and BW21 might be lower than purchasing a foreign rifle, it could still be some time until it is in a position to become the standard service rifle in Pakistan’s Army.

The article from independent Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn reports on the country’s recent acquisition of J-10 multirole fighters from China.  The article mentions the new fighters, but only in reference to them appearing as part of a fly over during Pakistan Day ceremonies on 23 March 2021.  Pakistan did not make a widely publicized announcement of the acquisition of a reported two dozen J-10s, which are estimated to cost $28 million each.  Dawn quoted the country’s Interior Minister as saying that the J-10s are an answer to India’s 2021 purchase of Rafale jets from France.

Source:

“Pakistan Reveals New Rifles – POF BW20 and POF BW21,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 19 December 2021. https://quwa.org/2021/12/19/pakistan-reveals-new-rifles-pof-bw20-and-pof-bw21-2/

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) took the shrouds off its new in-house, original rifle projects – the BW20 and BW21. The POF BW20 and BW21 are chambered for 7.62×51 mm rounds.

…It seems that POF is pitching the BW20 for the PA’s next-generation rifle requirements…the BW20 is a new rifle design that delivers cost savings by re-leveraging POF’s existing production infrastructure, which is geared for the HK G3.

Though the BW20 has some commonality with the G3 (around 30%), the BW20 is not an upgrade of the HK G3. It is a new rifle…

In 2015, the Pakistan Army issued a tender for a new-generation assault rifle. It had tested many designs from all over the world, including the FN SCAR, Beretta ARX-200, CZ BREN, AK-103 and others. In the end, however, the Army did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption…

Ultimately, it seems that POF was given the greenlight to design an original rifle. Part of the reason seems to stem from a sense that none of the foreign designs substantially improved upon the G3 in terms of its accuracy and durability. This is not to say the other rifles were not good, but the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design…

Source: Aamir Yasin, “Every party seeks patronage of establishment, says minister,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper from Pakistan), 30 December 2021.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1666604

Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed on Wednesday said every party and politician wanted to be patronised by the establishment, terming the debate on the return of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif useless…

“It does not matter whether he comes or not; it will not make any difference to the government,” he said, adding it was strange that people who spent most of their lives in this country eventually left it instead of loving it…The minister reiterated his offer of a one-way ticket to Pakistan for Nawaz Sharif.

Talking about the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of opposition parties, the minister said he wanted the alliance to move the date of its protest from March 23 to the 30th as it coincided with Pakistan Day celebrations.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets,” Mr Ahmed said…

Image Information:

Image: A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengdu_J-10#/media/File:J-10B_with_PL-10_and_PL-12.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Iran and Syria Discuss Transportation Cooperation

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“It [is] important as well for Iran to overcome these sanctions.”

Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Syria has been Iran’s most trustworthy if not only Arab ally.  During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Syria was the only Arab country to side with Iran.  Iran returned the favor during the Syrian civil war, dispatching the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in what the Iranian press described as train-and-assist missions, but which included combat resulting in IRGC casualties.  The IRGC also activated Lebanese Hezbollah units to fight on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Now that the Assad regime has largely regained control over Syria, Iran and Syria increasingly discuss how they might cooperate both in rebuilding Syria and post-conflict trade (See: “Iran and Syria Seek to Jumpstart Economic Ties,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  The excerpted selection from Iran’s official news outlet, Islamic Republic News Agency, reports from Syria on a meeting between the heads of Iranian companies soliciting business in Syria and the Syrian Transport Minister Zuhair Khazim.  The air link between Syria and Iran is not new.  IRGC owned airlines have long shuttled men and material between airports in Tehran or the nearby city of Karaj and both Damascus and Beirut.  However, the frankness with which Khazim and the Iranian businessmen discussed reviving the land route suggests confidence that Iraq will no longer pose an impediment to overland trade between Iran and Syria.  Also relevant is the open acknowledgment that both countries seek to bypass sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries.

Source:

“Iran va Suriya dar baraye Tawse’ah-e Hamkariha dar hawzeh-e hamal va Naqel Goftegu Kardand (Iran and Syria Discussed Transportation Cooperation),” Islamic Republic News Agency (Iran’s official news outlet), 23 December 2021.  https://www.irna.ir/news/84588042

…In a meeting with representatives of a number of Iranian companies, [Syrian] Minister of Transport Zuhair Khazim referred to the unilateral Western sanctions affecting the Syrian people, and called for the development of cooperation in the field of transportation between Syria and Iran. He considered it important as well for Iran to overcome these sanctions.

The meeting, held in Damascus, called on the Syrian Minister of Transport to define the framework for cooperation for both air and land sectors between Iran and Syria in accordance with the legal provisions and to have the relevant committees in each sector review them. According to Syrian media reports, the Iranian delegation also considered the possibility of establishing joint airlines and supporting road maintenance projects and investing in the construction of new roads and bridges in Syria…. At the end of March 2011, Syria became embroiled in a crisis backed by some of its neighboring Western-oriented Arab countries and the Zionist regime. The presence of more than 360,000 terrorists from 120 countries in various cities in Syria caused the widespread destruction of many important cities during the nearly nine years of war in this country.

Algeria Obtains Chinese Integrated EW Reconnaissance/Jamming System

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.

“…The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems…”

Algeria’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities have been bolstered by recent acquisitions, including the Russian Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza ELINT system and the Chinese DWL002 passive detection radar.  The latest acquisition is an integrated EW system from China.  A handful of Twitter users focused on Algerian military affairs first noticed the delivery.  They identified it as a CHL-906, based on visual similarities to a model exhibited last November at EDEX 2021, Egypt’s recently established annual arms show.  The Algeria-focused military blog MenaDefense quickly picked up news of the delivery, and several Arabic-language media outlets subsequently reported it.  The CHL-906 is manufactured by the China Electronics Corporation (CEC) and sold for export by the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) and ELINC China (ELINC), a CEC subsidiary.  The ELINC website describes it as an integrated EW system that provides comprehensive “reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems.”  The chassis-mounted CHL-906 has a purported 600 km detection radius and a 300 km jamming radius.  The latest Algerian acquisition is almost certainly in part a reaction to its neighbor, Morocco, recently bolstering its UAV arsenal.

Source:

@kmldial70. “#Algeria probably received a package of very modern #Chinese EW systems recently,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/kmldial70/status/1477238084823658496

Source: @Aln54Dz “Electronic warfare department acquires the system CHL-906 ELINC

#AlgerianArmy,” Twitter (social media network), 1 January 2022. https://twitter.com/Aln54Dz/status/1477404225168683014)

Source: “Un nouveau système de guerre électronique pour l’Algérie (A new electronic warfare system for Algeria),” MenaDefense (Algeria-focused military blog), 1 January 2022. https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/un-nouveau-systeme-de-guerre-electronique-pour-lalgerie/

This is the Integrated Electronic Warfare system from the Chinese company ELINC and CEIC… which is used to:

  • Detect enemy radio and radar emissions over a distance of 600 km
  • Determine the position, identify and classify enemy emissions over these distances
  • Protect radars and anti-aircraft systems from anti-radiation missiles by “covering” radar frequencies
  • Block communications over a distance of 300 km
  • Prohibit the enemy (air, sea, land) from using GNSS satellite positioning systems (GPS, Baidu, Galileo, Glonass) over a distance of 300 km
  • Jam frequencies from 0.5 to 40 GHz
  • Detect stealth aircraft and ships
  • Detect remotely piloted drones and sever their data link to the ground
  • Detect AEW aircraft over a distance of 500 km
  • “Fry” certain radio-electric equipment thanks to the directed emission power of 500 Kw

Source:  “Integrated EW System,” ELINC Company Website (China Electronics Corporation Subsidiary), undated. https://www.elinc.com.cn/business/defense/IntegratedElectronicWarfare/

The integrated electronic countermeasure system can carry out reconnaissance, interference and warning on the enemy’s electronic information systems such as early warning detection, communication transmission, multi-dimensional reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, and guided fire control. Combat operations such as ground-to-air defense, air interdiction, border control, anti-terrorism and stability maintenance, seize and maintain the battlefield system information rights.

Image Information:

Image:  The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) arrives in Algiers, Algeria, March 5, 2019.
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Ford Williams, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5149959/190305-n-ji086-036
Attribution: Public Domain

China Strengthening Position in Central America with Recognition by Nicaragua

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Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

“The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.”

At the end of 2021, Nicaragua’s dictator Daniel Ortega announced that his country would recognize China after severing over 30 years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (See “Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  One of the country’s oldest dailies, Confidencial, states that the diplomatic switch should be viewed through the lens of China’s escalating attempts to curtail Taiwan’s diplomatic relations; increasing Chinese interest in Central America; and an ideological alliance with Ortega, who also runs a single-party regime.  The move gives China momentum in terms of developing deeper relations in the region.  Panama and El Salvador have ruptured relations with Taiwan, and the election of Xiomara Castro in Honduras could see a similar maneuver in the coming months.  If Castro follows through on her campaign pledge to drop Taiwan, Guatemala and Belize would remain the only two countries in Central America to recognize Taiwan, potentially tipping the geopolitical balance decisively in favor of China.

Nicaragua now counts China, Russia, and Iran among its closest allies.  Another Confidencial article speculates that Ortega seeks to buffer against international isolation by recognizing China, something his existing relationships with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others cannot provide.  The outlet reports that Ortega will seek financing and export markets in China, especially in the face of international financial pressure and sanctions. 

Source:

“Ortega se adelanta a Ley Renacer y suspensión del CAFTA al alinearse con China (Ortega anticipates the Renacer Law and suspension of CAFTA by aligning himself with China),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 18 December 2021.  https://www.confidencial.com.ni/economia/ortega-se-adelanta-a-ley-renacer-y-suspension-del-cafta-al-alinearse-con-china/

In addition to challenging the United States, Ortega is also looking for options in the face of the… Renacer Law… excluding Nicaragua from the free trade agreement (CAFTA), and that Europe does the same with the Association Agreement, which would make Nicaraguan exports to both markets much more expensive.

Source:  “La “afinidad” de Ortega con China es que el gigante asiático tiene “un régimen de un solo partido” (Ortega’s “affinity” with China is that the Asian giant has “a one-party regime”),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 16 December 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/editorial/muerte-en-la-frontera-editorial-el-tiempo-643053 

The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.

Image Information:

Image:  Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidentialoffice/31429913323
Attribution:  Flickr

Beyond the Glitzy Projects: China’s Far-Reaching Impact on Kenya

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China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

“By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building [a] strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.”

In Kenya, China’s influence can be clearly seen in the high-profile Mombassa-Nairobi Railway, the Lamu deep seaport, and the towering Global Trade Centre.  However, beyond these massive projects built by Chinese companies, often with Chinese money and labor, there are numerous other means, including much smaller projects, through which China is making its mark in Kenya.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the Kenyan news agency Capital News explains, that mark is enormous, with China, and particularly Chinese technology, revolutionizing the country’s infrastructure and helping to supercharge its manufacturing base.  Chinese influence on Kenya includes charitable actions, such as delivering substantial amounts of medical supplies critical to helping Kenya deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, all the while garnering appreciation from the Kenyan population.  Chinese online education platforms also filled the gap created when 2,000 Kenyan students found themselves cut off from their university as the disease spread.

The influence of Chinese companies is vast: they have donated food, established industrial parks, held educational workshops, and are transferring technology to Kenyan factories.  However, as the article notes, perhaps the most important impact China has had on Kenya is the growing attitude among young Kenyans that through hard work and knowledge, the country can accomplish projects of all sizes important to national development.  This outlook is in large part a result of Kenyans witnessing, and learning from, successful Chinese businesspeople living and working in Kenya.

The article does not mention any of the pushback against China often discussed in other publications, such as that concerning an unsustainable debt load, poor quality of some Chinese goods, and Chinese workers doing jobs that Kenyans could fill.  However, despite this editorial omission, the article does bring to light the influence China has in Kenya beyond the “glitzy” projects, which tends to be underreported and as a result possibly underappreciated.  China’s influence in Kenya is far larger than just the high-profile projects would indicate, and as the article describes, that influence is building strong relationships, including diplomatic, between the two countries.  It behooves other countries wanting to deal with Kenya to take note of how China has grown that relationship through the breadth and depth of its business activities.

Source:

Adhere Cavince, “How Chinese firms have changed the face of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi,” Capital News (a Kenyan news agency), 22 December 2021. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/how-chinese-firms-have-changed-the-face-of-kenyas-capital-nairobi/

The 8th Ministerial of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation held in Senegal last month resolved to support private sector partnerships between China and African countries. Given the strong record of Kenya to attract and sustain high caliber international businesses, more Chinese firms should consider investing in the country and further promote economic integration of the two countries. By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.

There is increasing confidence that Kenyans too, can follow the footsteps of their Chinese counterparts and improve their socio-economic standing. As more Kenyans get a chance to interact with Chinese firms, more learning points emerge. Nairobi is for instance home to young and skilled professional in rail and road construction, capable of providing their services beyond Kenya.

In the course of implementing big-ticket infrastructure projects across the country, Chinese enterprises have also engaged in building community roads, setting up water pans and upgrading learning institutions through donation and renovation of classrooms and provision of learning materials. During the floods and landslides witnessed in West Pokot in 2019, for example, Chinese firms donated food and non-food items in a show of solidarity with the affected households.

Yet, beyond these glitzy projects, the firms have equally been engaging in small acts of charity that have equally left inedible marks in the lives of individuals and households across the country.

Image Information:

Image: China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.
Source: Macabe5387/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nairobi_Terminus.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion

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“…the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.”

Amid tensions across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan media has been reporting about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of cognitive warfare to reunite the two Chinas.  One such article was published in the Military Affairs Forum of Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (The Youth Daily), a government-sponsored daily that reports on military, government, and general news.  According to the accompanying excerpts, the CCP is using non-military, gray zone tactics to change people’s perception of China.  The CCP uses both traditional media and various forms of internet media to carry out its war of public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. As an example, the article describes how the CCP will tell the “Chinese story” in an effort to “expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts.”  It transmits false information to various foreign media outlets or “infiltrate social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish [China’s] own image and perception both domestically and abroad.”  According to the article, behind the war of influence is the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which is in charge of propaganda; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department, which focuses on external propaganda and control domestic public opinion; and the Ministry of State Security, which combines both civilian hackers, who launch cyber-attacks, with false information produced on content farms.

The second article, published in Taiwan’s English-language publication Taipei Times explains, “the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its ‘united front’ strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its target, including Taiwan.”  To accomplish this, it resorts to both hard and soft power (i.e. culture, education, sports exchanges, media organizations, and economic means) “to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.”  While none of this is particularly new, this recent spotlight in Taiwanese media shows that the cognitive warfare strategy that China uses to win without fighting is persistent, far-reaching, and controlled by the CCP (as opposed to spontaneous, independent media).

Source:

Shu Hsiao-huang, “反制認知作戰 抵禦灰色地帶威脅 (Countering Cognitive Warfare and Resisting Gray Zone Threats),” Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (Youth Daily News: Published by the government of the People’s Republic of China), 9 December 2021. https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1467725&type=forum

Cognitive warfare is the use of information or various communication platforms to change the mindset of an opponent in order to change his or her behavior. The Chinese Communist Party has been waging a united war against Taiwan for many years, carrying out “The Three Warfares” of public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare.  It uses old wine in new bottles, along with both traditional print and electronic media, as well as Internet media (platforms) and other means to carry out its war of influence.

The United Front Department is in charge of propaganda.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department focus on external propaganda and control internal public opinion, and the Ministry of State Security combines cyber-attacks, carried out by civilian hackers, with fake information produced on content farms to carry the war of influence.

…(The CCP) shares the “China story” to expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts. The modus operandi includes spreading falsehoods and spreading them rapidly across platforms; it uses foreign media or infiltrates social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish its own image and perception both domestically and abroad.

Source: Change Yan-ting and Paul Chiou, “Resolutions to Engage with China,” Taipei Times (Taiwan based English-language publication), 11 January 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/01/12/2003771189

As we embark upon a new year, tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to heighten by the day.

However, the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.

The regime consistently uses soft and sharp power, such as culture, education and sports exchanges, as well as media organizations and economic means, to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization Demonstrates Its “Peacekeeping” Capabilities

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CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…”

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance of select post-Soviet states, made history on 6 January 2022, when the organization’s leadership agreed to a request from the government of Kazakhstan to deploy peacekeepers to support Kazakh security forces after a few days of civil unrest across the country.  This marked the first time the CSTO sent units from its Collective Operational Reaction Force and demonstrated how the organization can respond to an incident on short notice.

According to the excerpted article in semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, the CSTO Security Council agreed to Kazakhstan’s request for peacekeepers based on Article 4 of the organization’s treaty.  The article notes that this section of the treaty provides for a collective response in the event of a threat to the “security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” of a member state.  It also points out “the authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, but did not say by who.”  The article mentions how previous requests to the CSTO for military support, in 2010 by Kyrgyzstan and in 2021 by Armenia, were not granted.  The CSTO did not respond to Kyrgyzstan with military support in 2010 because its articles at the time did not allow a response to an internal security issue.  After the 2010 unrest, CSTO member states changed the articles to allow the collective forces to be used to respond to an internal security threat of a member state.  The lack of a response to Armenia in 2021 is notable as it involved clashes with Azerbaijan, an external threat to Armenian security, but the CSTO had not previously provided the Armenian government support for its conflict with Azerbaijan and stated the 2021 clashes were a border incident, which essentially did not require an actionable response.

The article from Central Asia-focusedindependent news website Fergana Agency reports on the units deployed and breaks down contributions from member states.  The majority of these came from Russia, including companies of the 31st Airborne Brigade, 98th Airborne Division, and the 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade.  A company of the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade from Belarus, soldiers of the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade from Kyrgyzstan, as well as special forces units from Armenia and Tajikistan also deployed.  The units in this peacekeeping force closely match the units that conduct annual joint military exercises of the CSTO’s collective forces.  The article also notes that the peacekeeping force tasks included protecting key infrastructure and airfields and that “the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies.”  This included Russian forces at Almaty’s international airport.  While the CSTO peacekeeping forces reportedly began withdrawing on 13 January, the deployment demonstrated the capabilities of the CSTO to respond to an incident involving a member state.

Source:

Kiril Krivosheev, Yelena Chernenko, Yuri Barsukov, and Arshaluis Mgdesyan, “ОДКБ спешит на помощь (The CSTO is hurrying to help),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 6 January 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156017

…Around midnight (on 5 January), President Tokayev held a meeting of the Security Council, at which he announced a “counter-terrorist operation.” “The groups are, in fact, international, which have taken part in serious training abroad and their attack on Kazakhstan should be regarded as an act of aggression,” President Tokayev explained. “In this regard, today, I turned to the CSTO heads of state to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.”…

A confirming response to this request was sent overnight. The statement was, ironically, made by a politician who himself unsuccessfully sent a similar request not long ago, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who is the current head of the CSTO Collective Security Council…

the Council made a decision in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty…It involves collective assistance, including military, if “one of the participating states is subjected to aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty).”…The authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, by did not say by who…

It is unknown how long the peacekeeping mission will last…It should be noted that the CSTO collective forces are being used for the first time. In 2010, authorities in Kyrgyzstan asked for a deployment of the organization’s forces (against the backdrop of interethnic conflict in the south) as well as in 2021, when authorities of Armenia requested it (against the backdrop of an armed confrontation with Azerbaijan). However, these requests were not granted…

Source: Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 7 January 2022.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/

On the night of 6-7 January, the first units of the Russian Airborne Forces arrived in Almaty and took control of the airport of the largest city in Kazakhstan…The total number of the peacekeeping force in Kazakhstan should stand around 2500. This includes a company from Belarus (around 150-200), 200 from Tajikistan, 150 from Kyrgyzstan and another 100 from Armenia. The remainder are from the Russian Army.

All of the Russian units in Kazakhstan have previously been involved with military operations in the post-Soviet period.

The 31st Airborne Brigade, which is permanently garrisoned in Ulyanovsk, took part in the Second Chechen campaign and the war in South Ossetia in 2008…Since 2013, the 31st has been part of the Rapid Reaction Forces.

The 98th Airborne Division is located in Ivanovo. This unit has experience in participating in peacekeeping missions – in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, in Georgia-Abhazia in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999…The 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces is one of the most elite units in the Russian Army…

A peacekeeping company from the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade deployed from Belarus…Kyrgyzstan sent 150 soldiers from the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade to Kazakhstan…It is still unknown which units Tajikistan and Armenia deployed, but, according to local media, they are special forces…

As stated by the ministries of the CSTO governments, which agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan, the military personnel will carry out task to protect key infrastructure and airfields. The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…

Image Information:

Image: CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_collective_peacekeeping_forces_in_Kazakhstan_2022-JAN-11,_Kyrgyzstan_soldier_in_Almaty_Power_Station-2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Chinese Army Division Independently Improves Integrated Reconnaissance System

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“After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.”

According to a recent article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website, a Chinese division has fielded a new type of integrated reconnaissance system.  The new system is supposed to enable more rapid reconnaissance and strike capability against enemy targets.  The article explains that China had developed past reconnaissance equipment in piecemeal fashion over extended periods, often making systems incompatible and therefore inefficient at reconnoitering and strike.  Hoping to improve efficiency, the unidentified army division set up a team of experts who spent nearly half a year tackling key problems, as well as researching, developing, and testing equipment interconnections.  Their efforts reportedly streamlined levels of command and improved the interconnection and communication between the different reconnaissance systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.  While this article does not indicate whether or not this sort of localized innovation is a common practice in the PLA, it is at least a demonstration of alignment with President Xi Jinping’s general directive for more innovation in PLA.

Source:

Zhang Jin and Hu Wenbo, “陆军某师紧盯战斗力建设难点问题推进科研攻关自主革新挖掘侦察装备潜能 (Army Division Focuses on Difficult Issues in Building Combat Power, Promotes Key Scientific Research, Independently Innovates and Explores Potential of Reconnaissance Equipment),” Chinese Ministry of Defense website, 17 December 2021. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2021-12/17/content_4901281.htm.

Officers and soldiers utilized a new type of independently developed, integrated reconnaissance system to achieve rapid reconnaissance and rapid strikes against “enemy” targets.

According to information provided, due to the incompatibility of reconnaissance equipment distributed at different times in the past, the efficiency of reconnoitering and striking targets was not high. With respect to this issue, the division set up a team that sought to collect expertise and tackle key problems. Under the guidance of relevant experts, the team repeatedly tested the interconnection sequences of equipment, streamlined levels of command, researched and built new types of connecting cables and interfaces for the equipment, and achieved interconnection and communication among various kinds of reconnaissance equipment, including reconnaissance UAVs, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.

… After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.

The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations

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Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

“…as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find a more comfortable space for itself against Russia.”

Turkey’s recent purchase of S-400 systems from Russia has led to questions about Turkey’s “western-ness” and trustworthiness as a NATO ally.  Traditionally a pro-Western country, Turkey’s increasing shift towards Russia despite their complex relationship is one of the biggest geopolitical shifts since the Cold War.  As such, the evolution of Turkish-Russian relations will have implications for the United States, NATO, and great power competition.  The accompanying articles from Turkish sources provide an outlook on Turkish-Russian relations, discussing both issues of contention and cooperation.

The articles, one from pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet and another from the Istanbul-based independent think tank Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), note that the points of friction between Turkey and Russia are the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh; developments in Libya; tensions in Syria’s Idlib Province; and changes in eastern Ukraine.  The Syrian conflict has the potential to impact Turkish-Russian relations the most because, as the Hürriyet article highlights, Russia continues to strike Turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces around Idlib and Turkey’s areas of operation.  The tensions between Russia and Turkey will likely increase once the Russia-backed Syrian regime launches an operation on Idlib.  Both articles note the Ukrainian conflict will be another high-level point of friction between Turkey and Russia because of Turkey’s drone sale to Ukraine.  However, according to the EDAM publication, despite these frictions, Turkey and Russia cooperate in the energy sector, including Russia supplying natural gas to, and building a nuclear power plant in, Turkey.  Russia also maintains strong trade relations with Turkey, investing in its tourism and defense industry.  The Hürriyet article also refers to President Erdoğan’s statement from September 2021 that Turkey will deepen its defense cooperation with Russia and is considering purchasing other weapons systems in addition to the recently purchased S-400s.

The EDAM article states that the foundation of Turkish-Russian relations is built on a personal dialogue between their presidents rather than on an institutional foundation, and Presidents Erdoğan and Putin have managed to de-escalate tensions so far when they rise.  However, considering the points of friction, Turkish-Russian relations remain fragile.  Finally, the Hürriyet article notes Turkish-Russian relations are asymmetrical and the scale will further tilt in Russia’s favor if Turkey continues to drift away from its Western allies.  Therefore, the article suggests that Turkey should ensure its relations with its Western allies remain strong to counterbalance Russia.

Source:

Sedat Ergin,“2021’den 2022’ye Türk Dış Politikası (5)-Rusya ile çatışarak işbirliği modeli ilerlemeye devam ediyor (Turkish Foreign Policy from 2021 to 2022 (5)- Adversarial Cooperation model with Russia continues),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish newspaper),04 January 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/2021den-2022ye-turk-dis-politikasi-5-rusya-ile-catisarak-isbirligi-modeli-ilerlemeye-devam-ediyor-41974354

The Russians see no harm in continuing their air operations in a region where TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] units are present. We can guess that with these attacks, Russia wants to maintain a certain pressure on Turkey, which prevented the regime’s army from entering Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria…

The previous day also witnessed the first telephone conversation of the New Year between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Brief statements with largely similar content were made from both sides. In the Kremlin’s statement, there was an indirect reference to the Ukraine-linked NATO-Russia tension. Apart from this, it was stated that the topics of the Caucasus, Libya, and Syria were on the agenda in both of statements. Intention and determination to further the cooperation between the two countries were also emphasized as an important common theme in the texts.

…

Meanwhile, the importance of 2021 was that it was a year…[of] cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations that would extend to the coming years… President Erdoğan went to Sochi at the end of September and during the meeting he held with Putin, he proposed to his counterpart the construction of two new nuclear power plants in Turkey, in addition to Akkuyu… Putin also offered to cooperate with Turkey on launching rockets into space by establishing platforms at sea and on land.

A more critical development was that Erdoğan also suggested to Putin “deepening cooperation” in the defense industry during this meeting. In this context, the President announced that they discussed the further development of the S-400 project, and listed aircraft engines, warplanes, warship, and submarine construction as new potential areas of cooperation.

In this respect, Erdoğan is also trying to intimidate the USA and European countries by stating that the weapon systems that Turkey cannot obtain or have difficulty in obtaining from the West can very well be obtained from Russia. Although the second chapter of the S-400 project has not been signed, it remains on the table…

President Erdoğan keeps cooperation with Russia as a bargaining card in his hand against the West…

… Erdoğan followed a delicate balance between the USA and Russia throughout 2021… In any case, the continuation of cracks, conflicts, and tensions within the Western alliance, as well as the realization of new potential arms sales to Turkey, will be developments that will please the Kremlin.

This asymmetry will be widened further [in Russia’s favor] as Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorate… It should not be forgotten that as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find itself in a more comfortable space against Russia. The decline in Turkey’s foreign relations with the west will also weaken Turkey’s hand against Russia.

Source: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Üstün,“2022’de Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri: İşbirliği-Rekabet İkileminin Devamı Beklenirken… (Turkey-Russia Relations in 2022: Expecting the Continuation of Cooperation-Competition Dilemma…),” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (Istanbul-based an independent think tank), 13 January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

Although relations with Russia have been handled on the axis of cooperation, especially in the energy and defense sectors in recent years, it is not a relationship model free from crises and problems… Because Turkey’s relations with Russia are based on bilateral relations between leaders rather than on institutional foundations, it has a relationship model that is difficult to be called sustainable…

​​The ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, the possible developments in Libya, the tensions in and around Idlib, Ukraine and Belarus are noticeable issues that have the potential to affect relations.

…

Of course, it should not be ignored that as much as their problems [need a resolution], there are areas where Turkey and Russia are trying to develop cooperation. After the Blue Stream, the Turkish Stream project is a step taken to strengthen the energy ties between Russia and Turkey. Energy takes first place in Turkey’s imports from Russia.

…

Considering the problems experienced in its relations with the West, both the EU and the USA, it is expected that Turkey’s relations with Russia will continue to be economically important. However, every step taken towards Russia has risks to further wear down Turkey’s relations with its Western allies… the issues that occupied the agenda in 2021 also occupy the agenda in 2022, and that it is more important to benefit economically and geopolitically for Russia in the framework of possible tensions, than to provide a permanent peace environment in the region…

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Source: Russian Presidential Executive Office, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62936, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_(2020-03-05)_04.jpg, Files from Kremlin.ru | CC-BY-4.0 | Russia photographs taken on 2020-03-05

A Turkish Perspective on Great Power Competition in 2022 and Beyond

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Map showing the US, Russia, China.

Map showing the US, Russia, China.

“In the new international environment… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time… In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount.” 

The accompanying passages from the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research, a reputable and independent Turkish think tank, provide a foreign and balanced perspective on how great power competition may evolve in 2022 and beyond.  The passages also include astute observations about the current strategic competition among what they call “the prominent players”—the United States, Russia, and China.

First, the authors note that each of these actors is trying to expand its partnership network.  For the United States, this includes the G7, NATO, the U.S.-EU Summits, the Democracy Summit, and the security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the United States (AUKUS).  They note that the United States and its partnerships revolve around common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law.  In contrast, they note China is focused on expanding its partnership network by providing economic opportunities to certain countries, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative.  Meanwhile Russia is trying to “transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself.”  The Ukraine crisis is a case in point.  Second, they note the world is becoming polarized between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes.  In this context, they warn that democracy is regressing in some Western democracies and claim it is critical to reverse this trend. 

Third, they note that the United States is trying to protect its technological superiority over the others.  On this point, they suggest that even though China is investing more and allocating more resources to gain superiority, “the return on this investment…will not turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.”  They write that each player is investing in groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and biotechnology to achieve technological superiority and become more resilient, especially in their supply chains.  They note that the use of these technologies and the hybrid warfare they enable is eroding the distinction between peacetime and conflict. 

Finally, they claim that the deciding factor for the future of the international system will be whether, or to what extent, competing countries can cooperate on global challenges such as climate change or pandemics; as well as on contentious issues that are zero-sum games.

Source:

Sinan Ülgen and Tacan Ildem, “2022’ye Bakış (A Look at 2022),” EDAM.org.tr [Turkish] Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research (a reputable, independent Turkish think tank based in Istanbul), January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

…Today’s international environment is witnessing a systemic and strategic competition. The USA, China and to some extent Russia are the prominent players in this strategic competition. …Each of these players is trying to expand their partnerships to gain superiority over the other. For the USA, this means keeping its partnership network (such as the G7, NATO, USA-EU Summits, Democracy Summit and finally AUKUS) strong, which brings together the countries that share common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. For China, this means developing its partnership network by providing economic opportunities, especially [via] the Belt and Road Initiative.  Russia… is trying to transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself… The Ukraine crisis should be read in this context.

…

In the new international environment where strategic competition is felt more… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time.  Global polarization is taking place between groups of democratic countries and authoritarian systems.  In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount. 

Meanwhile… emerging and groundbreaking technologies create game-changing challenges and opportunities in an increasingly complex security environment where strategic competition is increasing.  In fact, we are witnessing that the USA, together with its allies and global partners, focusing more on protecting its technological superiority against its rivals.  Although China invests more and allocates more resources to gain superiority in technology against its competitors, the return on this investment, at least for the moment, is not in a size that will turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.  … Competing countries are trying to gain technological superiority and strengthen their resistance and resilience capacities, especially in the supply chain… In this context, access to emerging and groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and bio technologies is a priority.

By making use of these technologies… hybrid warfare methods are increasingly being used to achieve strategic goals without the need to resort to conventional power by using tactics in military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, information and other fields… This makes the distinction between peacetime and conflict, where the use of kinetic force used to be decisive, less clear. Increasing social resilience and resilience against hybrid activities is gaining importance. Cyber ​​attacks and disinformation campaigns are a threat and test for every society. As such, the protection of critical infrastructure emerges as a vital issue.

What will be decisive for the future of the international system is to what extent competing countries can develop cooperation in other fields, as well as the contentious areas that are seen as a zero-sum game in this strategic competitive environment. For example, will the USA and China, which seem to be facing an increasingly fierce competition in technology, be able to set common goals in the fight against climate change? Likewise, will it be possible to include China in the negotiation of international agreements … in the field of arms control and disarmament? …

Image Information:

Image: Map showing the US, Russia, China.
Source: Keith via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Second_Cold_War_locator.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0