Tag Archives: Venezuela

Cracks Appear in Maduro Regime

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Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.

“Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.”

Recently, the Maduro regime has shown signs of schisms within the ruling Chavista Party,[i] now known as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The arrest and prosecution of regime insider, former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, is a watershed moment for elites in Maduro’s inner circle. According to the first excerpted article from the centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Maduro accused El Aissami of being behind the assassination attempt, as well as corruption, pilfering roughly $21 billion from the state-owned oil company while serving as oil minister.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from the Spanish outlet El País, El Aissami, in addition to the assassination accusation, fell for endangering the PSUV’s electoral prospects with his large-scale theft of public resources. . The outlet notes how the arrests of El Aissami and his associates sent a chill through many circles of regime elites. They come in the context of Venezuela’s July presidential election, in which Maduro faces stiff competition from an organized opposition that continues to lead Maduro in the polls. The fact that dozens have been arrested alongside El Aissami indicates a growing crisis of trust within Chavismo’s elite ranks.[iii] Further, the money that El Aissami stole to grease his corruption networks has restricted the Maduro regime from greater social spending during the campaign, contributing to his flagging prospects of winning the election.

Sources:

Source: “Traicionado por su propio círculo? Así fue cómo un ministro cercano a Nicolás Maduro casi implosiona al chavismo (Betrayed by his own circle? This is how a minister close to Nicolás Maduro almost imploded Chavismo),” El Tiempo (a Colombian daily generally considered politically centrist), 30 April 2024. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/los-conspiradores-estaban-con-maduro-como-un-ministro-casi-implosiona-al-chavismo-3338641

Less than a month ago, El Aissami was seen handcuffed, quite skinny, and with an emaciated appearance…even if it were true that El Aissami had been conspiring against Maduro, his imprisonment could be more related to the accusation than to the ‘loss’ of 21 billion dollars from PDVSA, a plot that leaves more than 60 detainees, all allies of the former minister…With the drone attack story, Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.

Source:  “Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently a close politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish outlet with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The tectonic plates of Chavismo have received a strong shock this Tuesday. The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust…The definitive fall of El Aissami—a powerful and feared operator of Chavismo, around whom important layers of current national capital had been organized—seems to close the chapter of an expensive fraud on the nation, orchestrated under the shadow of international sanctions, in a time in which…the country’s oil production and the economy, were completely bankrupt, in the midst of a massive emigration of people. This may be the most radical and merciless purge carried out by Chavismo since it came to power…El Aissami is not taken to prison for ideological differences, but for having endangered the revolution and abusing its authority.

Notes:

[i] Chavismo is the movement of those who follow Huge Chavez, which today is encapsulated in the party formally called PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, in English). Chavistas are followers of Chavismo.

[ii] To understand more about the unfathomable scale of this theft from PDVSA, and the use of crypto currency and middlemen, see: Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela’s PDVSA with $21.2 billion in Unpaid Bills,” Reuters, 21 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middlemen-have-left-venezuelas-pdvsa-with-212-billion-unpaid-bills-2023-03-21/

[iii] For more information on the opposition’s success in pressuring Maduro despite the long electoral odds, see: Ryan C. Berg, “This Could Be the Last Shot to Restore Democracy in Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 April 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-be-last-shot-restore-democracy-venezuela

Image Information:

Image: Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/globovision/6336412991/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Venezuela’s Maduro Targets Previous Allies Under Anti-Corruption Campaign

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El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.

“The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust.”

The Maduro government in Venezuela has launched an anti-corruption probe into politically motivated transnational criminal elements within its regime.[i] According to the first excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, top targets of the probe include Tareck El Aissami, a former vice president and oil minister, as well as his business partners Samark Lopez, former finance minister Simon Zerpa, and others yet to be identified. El Aissami and his associates stand accused of stealing billions via a cryptocurrency payment scheme at the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Maduro blames El Aissami and his associates for Venezuela’s moribund economy.

Meanwhile, according to the second excerpted article from the Spanish-language outlet CNN en Español, Maduro organized the extraterritorial assassination of a dissident member of the Venezuelan armed forces, Ronald Ojeda, who was living in Chile. The CNN story quotes the prosecutor in the case, who rules out any other cause of death. Given that Maduro faces a difficult scenario this year, discarding erstwhile allies now considered disloyal, such as El Aissami, appears to be crucial for him to consolidate and maintain his regime’s hold on power in an election year. Formerly, El Aissami was considered one of Maduro’s top allies.[ii] However, as the extraterritorial assassination of Ronald Ojeda shows, the Maduro regime’s criminal links remain strong and capable of operating transnationally within Latin America in service of his regime’s consolidation.

OE Insight Summary:

VEN regime of Nicolas Maduro has undertaken a highly questionable anticorruption campaign that seeks to eliminate challengers to the regime and blame those arrested for its economic woes.

Sources:

“Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently an intimate politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust. El Aissami was in legal limbo since a mega corruption scheme was uncovered that affected PDVSA, the state oil company that he managed as minister. There is talk of embezzlement in the realm of 21 billion dollars.

“Caso Ronald Ojeda: fiscal de Chile dice que el crimen se ‘organizó y se solicitó’ desde Venezuela (Ronald Ojeda case: Chilean prosecutor says the crime was ‘organized and requested’ from Venezuela),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language version of the Atlanta-based outlet), 12 April 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/04/12/caso-ronald-ojeda-chile-venezuela-orix/

Héctor Barros, prosecutor in charge of the case investigating the murder of former Venezuelan military officer Ronald Ojeda in Chile, stated in an interview with Chilevisión broadcast…that, according to the investigations, the crime ‘was organized and requested from Venezuela.’ Asked by the Chilevisión journalist about the possibility that the motive for the crime was political, Barros said that he has ‘no precedents that point us in the other direction.’

Notes:

[i] For more information on the criminal nature of the Maduro regime, see: Moises Rendon and Mia Kazman, “Maduro’s Mafia State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduros-mafia-state

[ii] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has an excellent profile of El Aissami and his importance to the Maduro regime: “Former Venezuelan Oil Minister and Vice President Arrested for Corruption,” OCCRP, 11 April 2024. https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/18646-former-venezuelan-oil-minister-and-vice-president-arrested-for-corruption

Image Information:

Image: El Aissami campaigns for governor of the state of Aragua. President Maduro recently had him arrested under the auspices of a national anti-corruption campaign.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/tareckpsuv/8139341461/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED.

Venezuela Seeks To Rectify Deteriorating Relations With Iran

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Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.

“Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts.”

Once considered to be one of the Maduro regime’s staunchest allies, the Venezuela-Iran relationship has entered a rocky period.[i] Beyond military cooperation, Iran has long provided critical support to the Maduro regime in the areas of sanctions evasion and diluents for crude oil refining. According to the first excerpted article from the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, the bilateral relationship began to deteriorate when the West partially lifted oil sanctions on Venezuela following pledges for freer and fairer presidential elections this year. The article reports that the Maduro regime shifted production and export to Western markets, falling woefully behind in its scheduled oil deliveries to Iran. The article also details that part of an earlier three-year agreement aimed at sanctions evasion saw Iran offload much of Venezuela’s sanctioned crude.[ii] The second excerpted article, from the business-focused Venezuelan news outlet Banca y Negocios, cites people familiar with the deal that helped boost Venezuela’s crude exports and mitigate fuel shortages while under previous sanctions. Under the deal, Iran also committed to renovating several of Venezuela’s large oil refineries. The Maduro regime’s decision to abandon the terms of its agreement with Iran has irked Iranian officials, according to the reporting by Banca y Negocios. At the same time, it speculates that the Maduro regime is motivated to return to the Iran deal as it anticipates the return of Western sanctions, having failed to comply with its prior commitments toward freer and fairer presidential elections. Returning to this agreement with Iran will be critical for the Maduro regime to survive the possible reimposition of Western sanctions on its oil sector.

Sources:

“Venezuela se apresura a mejorar su relación con Irán mientras se avecinan sanciones de EEUU (Venezuela rushes to improve its relationship with Iran as US sanctions loom),” El Nacional (Venezuelan daily focused on the politics of the Maduro regime), 13 March 2024. https://www.elnacional.com/economia/venezuela-se-apresura-a-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-mientras-se-avecinan-sanciones-de-ee-uu/  

Iran and Venezuela are trying to rebuild an oil alliance that began to crumble last year after Venezuela fell behind in oil trades…A review of PDVSA data and shipping documents shows that Venezuela fell behind on payments to Iran, a shortfall that worsened when the United States began issuing licenses in late 2022. Those authorizations led the state firm to reallocate shipments…to save the partnership, Venezuela is rushing to meet the terms of a three-year alliance that has involved hundreds of millions of dollars in oil trades and contracts. Nicolás Maduro’s government is trying to settle outstanding debt by accelerating deliveries of heavy crude oil and fuel shipments to Iran.

“Venezuela busca mejorar su relación con Irán tras presentar retrasos en el intercambio petrolero (Venezuela seeks to improve its relationship with Iran after presenting delays in the oil exchange),” Banca y Negocios (a Venezuelan digital portal focused on financial and economic reporting), 12 March 2024. https://www.bancaynegocios.com/venezuela-busca-mejorar-su-relacion-con-iran-tras-presentar-retrasos-en-el-intercambio-petrolero/    Six people familiar with the matter stated that the agreement between both nations helped boost crude oil exports and alleviate the fuel problem that Venezuela suffered…the possible reimposition of sanctions by the United States would make the alliance between Venezuela and Iran essential to keeping the Venezuelan oil sector afloat…Venezuela is rushing to comply with the agreement and pay off the debt, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in oil exchanges and contracts, by accelerating the delivery of heavy hydrocarbons and fuel to the nation located in the Middle East.

Notes:

[i] For more historical background on the importance of the bilateral relationship, see: Moises Rendón and Claudia Fernandez, “The Fabulous Five: How Foreign Actors Prop Up the Maduro Regime in Venezuela,” CSIS Policy Brief, 19 October 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela

[ii] For more information on the deal signed between Iran and Venezuela, see: Deisy Buitrago and Vivian Sequera, “Iran, Venezuela Eye Trade Increase, Sign Petrochemical Deal,” Reuters, 12 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-caracas-kicking-off-regional-tour-2023-06-12/

Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s former Foreign Minister, Jorge Arreaza, visits Iran.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Venezuela%E2%80%99s_Top_Diplomat_Visits_Iran-9.jpg  
Attribution: CC-BY-4.0.

Venezuela’s Maduro Regime Threatens Annexation of Guyanese Territory

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Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.

“The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory.”

In December 2023, the Maduro regime of Venezuela oversaw a referendum about a long-disputed region called the Essequibo, which represents more than two-thirds of neighboring Guyana’s territory.[i] The Essequibo region—roughly the size of the state of Florida—has been administered by Guyana for more than 100 years, according to an arbitral award in Paris in 1899. The Maduro regime announced that 95 percent of Venezuelans who voted approved all five questions on the referendum.  This included an explicit rejection of the recent jurisdiction granted to the International Court of Justice upon referral of the case by the UN’s Secretary General, as well as a commitment by the Venezuelan state to recover the territory by all means necessary “within the law.”[ii] Accordingly, the first excerpted article from Chilean news outlet La Nación reported that Maduro announced the creation of a new Venezuelan state called Guayana Esequiba, constituted by the territory of Essequibo. Maduro followed the announcement by encouraging state-owned enterprises to exploit the natural resources of the Essequibo area, as well as a small mobilization of troops and equipment near the border.[iii] According to La Nación, this has given rise to the possibility of inter-state conflict, a rare worry in Latin America.  However, many countries in the region, as well as Venezuela’s political opposition, have interpreted Maduro’s threats to annex the Essequibo as a domestic ploy aimed at distraction. In the excerpted article from Argentina’s Urgente24, Venezuelan opposition leaders claimed that the referendum was a nationalistic distraction. The outlet says that Maduro is looking for a change in narrative after the recent successes of the country’s opposition, including the election of María Corina Machado, as the unified opposition candidate to face Maduro. Distraction or not, Maduro’s actions have engendered an environment that is rife with possibilities for miscalculation as both sides stake out maximalist positions.[iv]

Sources:

“Maduro propone ley que busca anexar esequibo a Venezuela: Pide explotar recursos naturales (Maduro proposes a law that seeks to annex Essequibo to Venezuela: He asks to exploit natural resources),” La Nación (a Chilean daily with over one hundred years reporting on the region), 6 December 2023. https://www.lanacion.cl/maduro-propone-ley-que-busca-anexar-esequibo-a-venezuela-pide-explotar-recursos-naturales/

The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, ordered the immediate exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the territory of Essequibo, an area in dispute with Guyana, just one day after the ‘yes’ victory was announced in the referendum that claimed sovereignty over the territory. Through a government act broadcast on radio and television, the president ordered that they immediately proceed ‘to grant operating licenses for the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the entire area of our Guayana Esequiba.’

“Referéndum y nueva ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distrae (Referendum and new ‘Guyana Esequiba:’ Maduro distracts),” Urgente24 (an Argentine outlet with both opinion and news) 6 December 2023. https://urgente24.com/mundo/referendum-y-nueva-guyana-esequiba-maduro-distrae-n564799

For her part, the Venezuelan presidential candidate María Corina Machado, who won the opposition primaries and who could dethrone Maduro if there is no fraud, spoke about it…and described it as a distraction from the success of the opposition primaries. ‘It is a way to distract attention from the monumental success that the primaries were and create cohesion in the different sectors of the ruling party around an element that awakens patriotic sentiment but that had a very low participation rate.’

Notes:

[i] For more information and background on the manufactured crisis and Venezuela’s claims, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “The Entirely Manufactured and Dangerous Crisis over the Essequibo,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/entirely-manufactured-and-dangerous-crisis-over-essequibo

[ii] For more information on the referendum questions and the dispute itself, see: Julia Symmes Cobb, “Explainer: What is the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana?,” Reuters, 6 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/what-is-border-dispute-between-venezuela-guyana-2023-12-06/

[iii] For more information on troop and equipment deployments to the border with Guyana, bolstered with satellite imagery analysis, see: Christopher Hernandez-Roy et al., “Miscalculation and Escalation over the Essequibo: New Insights Into the Risks of Venezuela’s Compellence Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 9, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/miscalculation-and-escalation-over-essequibo-new-insights-risks-venezuelas-compellence.

[iv] In response to the possibility of conflict, Brazil brought both parties to the table on the island nation of St. Vincent, negotiating the Argyle Declaration, which commits both sides to a peaceful resolution of the border dispute. However, the Maduro regime abrogates agreements frequently. For more information on the Argyle Declaration, see: “The Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace between Guyana and Venezuela,” Government of Barbados, 14 December 2023. https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-joint-declaration-of-argyle-for-dialogue-and-peace-between-guyana-and-venezuela/.

Image Information:

Image:  Maduro pushed the December 3rd referendum, partially as a distraction from his abysmal poll numbers.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/125816678@N05/39329361431 
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Drug Trafficking a Prime Source of Financing for Venezuela’s Maduro Regime

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The Venezuelan armed forces have become critical to the Maduro regime’s ability to move drugs around the world.

“Venezuela is currently an important bridge in global drug trafficking exports, from where between 250 and 350 metric tons per year leave, which has a street value of between 6 and 8 billion dollars.”

The Maduro regime in Venezuela has long maintained links to organized crime groups and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).[i] However, a recent hack of documents from the Colombian Prosecutor’s Office has revealed the depths of the Maduro regime’s involvement with DTOs. According to the Argentine daily Infobae, the documents allege that Venezuelan Armed Forces are crucial to trafficking drugs through Venezuela. The outlet reports that they cooperate with Colombian guerrillas and are directly involved in the process of moving drugs, as opposed to passively permitting their passage and receiving bribes, as was the case in the past. The second excerpted article from Infobae states that the alleged center of these operations is Catatumbo, a borderland region between Colombia and Venezuela rich in coca production estimated to be 330 tons per year. The article paints a complex picture of rival criminal organizations from Mexico and Venezuela also occupying the same territory. The Maduro regime’s spiral into criminality will likely have meaningful impacts on the operational environment.[ii]Venezuelan Armed Forces’ increased role in Latin America’s drug trafficking operations will have spillover effects for most neighboring countries. At the same time, such activities are likely to deepen the Maduro regime’s staying power.

Sources:

“Un informe reveló cómo el régimen de Maduro hizo del narcotráfico su principal fuente de financiamiento (A report revealed how the Maduro regime made drug trafficking its main source of financing),” Infobae (Argentine daily with excellent regional coverage), 7 November 2023. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2023/11/07/un-informe-revelo-como-el-regimen-de-maduro-hizo-del-narcotrafico-su-principal-fuente-de-financiamiento/

Leaked documents from the Colombian Prosecutor’s Office, analyzed and verified through additional interviews and other independent reports, reveal that Venezuelan military personnel, in association with Colombian guerrillas, are directly involved in drug trafficking operations…The epicenter of this network is the mountainous region of Catatumbo, on the border with Venezuela, an area that has a high concentration of coca leaf plantations…More than 330 tons transited through the state of Zulia from the Catatumbo region last year alone, an alarming figure given that experts say that Catatumbo supplies only about 60% of the drugs entering Venezuela. The rest is transported by rivers in the plains region and the jungle region in the south of the country.

“Vínculos del Gobierno venezolano con el narcotráfico en la región del Catatumbo en Colombia revelan filtraciones de documentos de la Fiscalía (Links of the Venezuelan Government with drug trafficking in the Catatumbo region in Colombia revealed by leaks of documents from the Prosecutor’s Office),” Infobae (an Argentine daily with excellent coverage), 8 November 2023. https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/11/08/vinculos-del-gobierno-venezolano-con-el-narcotrafico-centran-la-atencion-en-la-region-del-catatumbo-en-colombia/ In the department of Norte de Santander, there is also the presence of the Mexican cartels of Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation, along with the Venezuelan gang known as the Tren de Aragua… The investigation also highlighted the change in the roles of participation of the Venezuelan authorities, which have gone from being bribed by the drug cartels to leading illegal operations themselves, which represents an increase in the complexity and severity of the criminal operations.

Notes:

[i] For information on the Maduro regime’s links to criminal groups, see: Moises Rendón, “Maduro’s Mafia State,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 31 October 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduros-mafia-state

[ii] For more information on how the Maduro regime uses criminal groups as an instrument of state power and power projection capability, see: Moises Rendón and Arianna Kohan, “Identifying and Responding to Criminal Threats from Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 22 July 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/identifying-and-responding-criminal-threats-venezuela

Image information:

Image: The Venezuelan armed forces have become critical to the Maduro regime’s ability to move drugs around the world.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ch%C3%A1vez_eyes_-_Venezuelan_armed_forces.png
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC BY 3.0 DEED

Maduro Regime Claims Victory Over Tren de Aragua Criminal Network

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The aftermath of a deadly prison riot in Lara state, Venezuela in 2013.

“Its fugitive leader, “El Niño” Guerrero, benefited from complicity and even negotiated with the government to leave the prison before the security operation began, according to the NGO Venezuelan Prison Observatory.”

The Maduro regime in Venezuela recently conducted a military operation in the Tocorón prison, the power center of the transnational Tren de Aragua criminal network.[i] According to the excerpted article from the Argentine outlet Infobae, the regime uncovered a large stockpile of weapons and munitions at the prison, including anti-tank launchers, artillery rockets, and a cache of rifles and pistols. Additionally, the article reports that prisoners controlled a small town where family members lived, replete with amenities such as a pool, baseball stadium, and zoo. This level of criminal control is common in Venezuela, where the Maduro regime has relied on prison gang leaders, called “pranes,” to maintain a semblance of stability and control, and to reduce violent prison uprisings.[ii] In exchange, groups like the Tren de Aragua possess a high degree of autonomy within prison walls to continue criminal activity. In reasserting state control over the Tocorón prison, the Maduro regime claims to have defeated Tren de Aragua, as reported by Colombia’s center-left daily El Espectador. There are many reasons to doubt this claim notably, Tren de Aragua’s leader, Héctor Guerrero Flórez (alias “Niño Guerrero”), escaped before the raid with forewarning about an impending operation. Despite this, the Maduro regime’s military operation is significant for a few reasons. First, it allows the Maduro regime to claim that it is addressing the complaints of its neighbors in the region, who have openly fretted about the regional growth of the Tren de Aragua criminal network. Second, the operation could pay domestic dividends as the Maduro regime seeks to convince voters that it is tackling the country’s security crisis ahead of the anticipated elections in the latter half of 2024. Lastly, the regime’s recent operation serves as an important testing ground for the strength of its security forces, which it may resort to using to suppress any opposition mobilization in 2024.[iii]

Sources:

“El sorprendente interior del penal de Tocorón, el centro de operaciones del Tren de Aragua en Venezuela (The surprising interior of the Tocorón prison, the operations center of the Tren de Aragua in Venezuela),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 27 September 2023. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2023/09/27/el-sorprendente-interior-del-penal-de-tocoron-el-centro-de-operaciones-del-tren-de-aragua-en-venezuela/

More than 11,000 members of the security forces occupied the prison controlled by this gang that has spread its tentacles to several Latin American countries…There was tranquility, there was a swimming pool, a zoo…Its fugitive leader, “El Niño” Guerrero, benefited from complicity and even negotiated with the government to leave the prison before the security operation began, according to the NGO Venezuelan Prison Observatory.

“Gobierno de Maduro dice que el temido Tren de Aragua fue desmantelado ‘totalmente’ (Maduro’s government says that the feared Tren de Aragua was ‘completely’ dismantled),” El Espectador (Colombia’s center-left daily), 23 September 2023. https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/gobierno-de-maduro-dice-que-el-temido-tren-de-aragua-fue-desmantelado-totalmente/

We have total control of this prison, of this penitentiary center, and, in addition to that, we have completely dismantled the self-proclaimed former Tren de Aragua. We have 88 people detained at this moment, providing information of interest, all members of that group, which was abandoned by those who led it,” said the Minister of the Interior of Venezuela, Remigio Ceballos, when presenting a balance of the operation…Ceballos denied that the government had negotiated with the leaders of this gang dedicated to, among other crimes, kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.

Notes:

[i] For more information on Tren de Aragua, its origin, and its historical evolution from railway construction union to criminal organization, see this excellent and comprehensive profile of the group; “Tren de Aragua,” InSight Crime, 12 May 2020. https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/tren-de-aragua/

[ii] The history of pranes, or leaders of prison gangs in Venezuela, is complex. For a condensed version of this history, see; Marie Metz, “Venezuelan Prisons and the Power of Pranes,” Foreign Policy Association blog, 15 October 2012. https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/10/15/venezuelan-prisons-and-the-power-of-pranes/

[iii] For more information on the idea that the Maduro regime may be testing the security forces in anticipation of the 2024 election season, see; Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer, “The Only Threat of Violence in Venezuela’s Opposition Primaries Comes from the Regime,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 17 October 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/only-threat-violence-venezuelas-opposition-primaries-comes-regime

Image Information:

Image: The aftermath of a deadly prison riot in Lara state, Venezuela in 2013.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/diariocriticove/8422860917
Attribution: CC BY 2.0 DEED

Maduro, With Venezuelan Election Looming, Heads to China for Support

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Former President Hugo Chávez receives a Chinese delegation. No Latin American leader traveled more to Beijing than Hugo Chávez during his presidency.

“China is Venezuela’s largest creditor…The restructuring of this enormous amount of money has been one of the headaches in relations between both countries.”

Upcoming elections and increasing pressure at home drove Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to head to China in September 2023 to reignite relations. In the past, China was Venezuela’s greatest benefactor. During the years of President Hugo Chávez (1998-2013), Venezuela received over $60 billion in loans through a combination of sovereign lending, China’s policy banks, and large development projects.[i] However,  during Nicolás Maduro’s government (2013-present), Venezuela’s economy fell precipitously through a combination of mismanagement and corruption, causing China to withdraw much of its support in 2015 and 2016. Ever since, Maduro has struggled to return to China’s good graces and convince the Chinese Communist Party that he can be a good steward of Venezuela’s economy. While in China, Spanish daily El País reports Maduro had an agenda aimed at finding solutions to Venezuela’s grave economic crisis and rebuilding robust bilateral ties.

Maduro’s efforts were in vain. As one of Mexico’s main daily newspapers La Jornada states, the two partners signed dozens of agreements, but none of them involved the depth of investment Venezuela received during the Chávez years. Maduro’s trip failed to yield the kind of agreement he needed to reset his economy. The agreements reveal that China no longer sees Venezuela as its principal partner in Latin America to challenge the United States geopolitically. To assuage Maduro, China and Venezuela upgraded their bilateral ties to an “all weather relationship.” While this represents an upgrade in the hierarchy of China’s foreign relations, Maduro’s trip revealed the fundamental distrust that persists in Beijing about its ability to support Caracas monetarily and get a return on its investment.[ii] Lack of Chinese financial support and a presidential election likely upcoming in 2024 suggest Maduro will have to rely on greater repression to hold onto power. Additionally, Maduro’s largely empty-handed return from China may be seen by Russia as an opening to deepen their strategic ties to Venezuala, given Moscow’s desire to use Latin America as a counterpoint to U.S. policy in Europe, and specifically, support for Ukraine.[iii]

Sources:

“Nicolás Maduro visita China para tratar de paliar la crisis económica de Venezuela (Nicolás Maduro visits China to try to alleviate the economic crisis in Venezuela),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage of Latin America), 12 September 2023. https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-12/nicolas-maduro-visita-china-para-tratar-de-paliar-la-crisis-economica-de-venezuela.html

Maduro arrived with an eminently economic agenda and the intention of finding solutions to the crisis that is shaking the country… The intention is to strengthen ties that have been diluted in recent years and realign interests in an international theater polarized by the tense relationship between the United States and Beijing… China is Venezuela’s largest creditor, the Latin American country that has the largest debt with Beijing: since 2007, it has received about 60 billion dollars in Chinese state loans… The restructuring of this enormous amount of money has been one of the headaches in relations between both countries and was the driver behind Maduro’s last visit to Beijing in 2018.

“Relación China-Venezuela será elevada a su máximo nivel: Xi Jinping (China-Venezuela relationship will be raised to its highest level: Xi Jinping),” La Jornada (one of Mexico’s daily newspapers), 13 September 2023. https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2023/09/13/mundo/relacion-china-venezuela-sera-elevada-a-su-maximo-nivel-xi-jinping/  Chinese President Xi Jinping announced this Wednesday in a meeting with his counterpart Nicolás Maduro in Beijing the strengthening of relations with Venezuela, which will be raised to their highest level… “All weather relations” are the highest level of Chinese diplomatic relations. Only a handful of countries (Pakistan, Russia, Belarus) have this status.

Notes:

[i] For more information about China’s role in supporting Hugo Chávez’s government, see: Stephen B. Kaplan and Michael A. Penfold, “China-Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics,” Wilson Center for International Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/china-venezuela-economic-relations-hedging-venezuelan-bets-chinese-characteristics

[ii] For additional analysis on the bind China finds itself in with Venezuela—too important to cut relations, yet too untrustworthy to deepen them—see: “The Future of Sino-Venezuelan Relationship: Make or Break?,” Harvard International Review, December 22, 2021. https://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-the-sino-venezuelan-relationship-make-or-break/

[iii] For more information on how Russia views its relations with Latin America as a counterpoint to U.S. policy in Europe, see: Ryan C. Berg, “What Does Russia’s War in Ukraine Mean for Latin America and the Caribbean?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-war-ukraine-mean-latin-america-and-caribbean

Image Information:

Image: Former President Hugo Chávez receives a Chinese delegation. No Latin American leader traveled more to Beijing than Hugo Chávez during his presidency.
Source: https ://www.flickr.com/photos/chavezcandanga/6396096677
Attribution: Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Venezuela’s Dictatorship Strengthens While Opposition Is in Disarray

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Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.

“A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive.”

Venezuela’s long struggle against the Maduro dictatorship began 2023 with yet another setback. In 2019, the opposition established an interim government structure to push for a democratic transition in Venezuela, replete with an interim president (Juan Guaidó) who was recognized by nearly 60 countries. That experiment was recently terminated when three of the country’s four main opposition parties voted to dissolve the interim government structure, a move that had been rumored for several months.[i] Since voting to dissolve its own constitutional arrangement, the opposition to Maduro’s regime has fractured.[ii] According to an article from Peruvian media conglomerate Redacción RPP, three of the opposition parties voted to dissolve the structure because it had failed to achieve its objective of a democratic transition away from Maduro’s dictatorship. The article also notes that opacity in the financing and management of international assets had made some opposition legislators uneasy about extending the arrangement. The second excerpted article from Spanish daily La Voz de Galicia reports that the Maduro regime has transitioned to a more offensive posture after several years of being on the back foot, rattled by the opposition’s interim government structure that had been recognized by dozens of countries. Maduro is looking to reassert himself diplomatically and shore up key allies. The Maduro regime’s survival and strengthening serves as a conduit for Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in South America and the Caribbean because of their support for Maduro during the regime’s darkest days.[iii] Close security relationships with other authoritarian states mean that Venezuela will continue to represent a hemispheric security threat and an important staging ground for countries like Russia and Iran.

Sources: 

“Venezuela: El ‘Gobierno interino’ de Juan Guaidó se extinguió sin claridad en sus cuentas (Venezuela: The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó was extinguished without clarity in its accounts),” Redacción RPP (the largest radio and television broadcasting company in Peru), 10 January 2023. https://rpp.pe/mundo/actualidad/venezuela-el-gobierno-interino-de-juan-guaido-se-extinguio-sin-claridad-en-sus-cuentas-noticia-1459150?ref=rpp

The ‘interim government’ of Juan Guaidó, eliminated… by the majority of the former deputies who supported him in 2019, leaves a shadow in Venezuela due to poor accountability. No one knows how much money he managed or what this sort of parallel power that had the support of foreign powers spent it on… in the next 45 days, Guaidó is obliged to account for the period given to him by the former anti-Chavista deputies who abolished the interim government, considering that the structure did not achieve its objectives, not to mention that they do not know the status of the resources managed under this arrangement.

“Maduro pasa a la ofensiva tras la disolución del Gobierno interino de Guaidó (Maduro goes on the offensive after the dissolution of the interim government of Guaidó),” La Voz de Galicia (a Spanish daily newspaper with good coverage of Latin America), 2 January 2023. https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/internacional/2023/01/03/maduro-pasa-ofensiva-tras-disolucion-gobierno-interino-guaido/0003_202301G3P18993.htm 

A few hours after the fragmented Venezuelan opposition put an end to the figure of the interim government of Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, launched a diplomatic and political offensive… Maduro also stated in the interview that he awaits the release of the country’s resources frozen in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Notes:

[i] For more information on some of the international legal implications of this decision to dissolve Venezuela’s interim government, see: Ryan C. Berg and Alexandra Winkler, “The Interim Government of Venezuela was Dissolved by its Own Promoters,” CSIS Commentary, 12 January 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/interim-government-venezuela-was-dissolved-its-own-promoters

[ii] For information on infighting in the opposition and its impact on the Venezuelan opposition’s standing among voters, see: Luis González Morales, “Knives Out: Venezuelan Opposition Edition,” Caracas Chronicles, 29 December 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/12/29/knives-out-venezuelan-opposition-edition/

[iii] For more information about Venezuela’s deep security relationship with Russia, in particular, see: Vladimir Rouvinski, “Russia’s Continued Engagement with Venezuela in 2019 and Beyond,” Wilson Center, February 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-continuing-engagement-venezuela-2019-and-beyond-update

Image Information:

Image: Then Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaidó with Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro during a trip to Washington, D.C.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/oasoea/49499293397
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Colombia’s New Government Quickly Reestablishes Relations With Maduro’s Venezuela

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The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.

The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.

The first and most important step in this new phase of bilateral relations is to restore diplomacy between the two countries.

Mere weeks after taking office in August 2022, Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, has reestablished relations with Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela. This is noteworthy as relations between the two countries ruptured in 2019, when Columbia’s then-president Iván Duque recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, thus prompting Maduro to end formal diplomatic ties. Under president Duque, Colombia was a staunch opponent of Maduro, seeking to isolate him on the international stage, while itself seeking to play a lead role in Latin America.

Presidents Petro and Maduro celebrated the resumption of relations with the exchange of ambassadors, CNN en Español reports. The article notes that the exchange of ambassadors, the reopening of their shared border, the resumption of trade, and eventually, a meeting between Petro and Maduro, signals a changing strategic environment in Latin America toward Venezuela’s dictatorship.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the region’s appetite for isolating Venezuela and demanding domestic changes. In an interview with Colombia’s leading weekly magazine Semana, Colombia’s new ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti, announced Colombia’s intention to buy Venezuelan oil and gas, previously sanctioned to press Maduro over links to organized crime and gross human rights abuses.  Ambassador Benedetti also spoke of a proposal to establish special economic zones along the Colombia-Venezuela border, which immediately generated concern about the potential for drug trafficking organizations and Colombian guerrillas using these zones to launder money. Collectively these moves give the Maduro regime more space to maneuver.

Sources:

Source: “Colombia y Venezuela restablecen relaciones bilaterales con la llegada de embajadores a Bogotá y Caracas (Colombia and Venezuela reestablish bilateral relations with the arrival of ambassadors to Bogotá and Caracas),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language version of the popular American outlet), 29 August 2022.

https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/08/29/armando-benedetti-embajador-de-colombia-en-venezuela-llega-a-caracas-orix/

Benedetti told journalists in Caracas that the first and most important step in this new phase of bilateral relations is to restore diplomacy between the two countries.  That includes both the diplomatic issue and trade relations, one of the priorities of the two governments.  “We are going to reestablish relations with Venezuela, we are going to reestablish trade from which more than 8 million Colombians live, we are going to look for an economic zone, tax exemptions and legislation that allows the Colombian government to invest in works that have an impact on the development of the region,” said Benedetti…Upon his arrival in Caracas, Benedetti told reporters that “there are several ideas” to restore trade relations…among them, creating a special economic zone on both sides.  “And in my country legislation would have to be passed so that it can invest in hospitals, in bridges, in works, infrastructure, that really have an impact on development.”

Source: “‘Es necesario que Colombia le compre gas a Venezuela:’ Armando Benedetti (‘It is necessary for Colombia to buy gas from Venezuela:’ Armando Benedetti),” Semana (Colombia’s leading weekly magazine), 9 September 2022. https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/es-necesario-que-colombia-le-compre-gas-a-venezuela-armando-benedetti/202247/

The purchase of gas from Colombia to Venezuela “is necessary because our country will run out of gas in the next seven years.  They already have the gas pipeline that comes out of the Gulf of Maracaibo itself.  They already have the exploitation, a gas pipeline, it would only be necessary to look for about 30, 40 kilometers so that they can begin to commercialize from Colombia.”

Image Information:

Image: The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/cidh/49534798383
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Venezuela Plays Host to China, Russia, and Iran in International Military Games

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Venezuelan tanks during a military parade.

Venezuelan tanks during a military parade.

 “This week, Venezuela will become the first country in the Americas to host military competitions organized by Russia, known as the Army Games.” 

For the first time, the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela played host to Russia’s International Army Games.  The event, held in the city of Barquisimeto in Lara state, was a kind of “Olympics” of war games, according to an article in U.S. government-operated Spanish- language Voz de América.  While the Venezuelan armed forces have participated six times in Russia’s International Army Games, the list of participating countries coupled with the location in the Western Hemisphere presents a direct challenge to the United States, according to the article.  Furthermore, an article in left-leaning Argentine daily Clarín notes that the International Army Games began just one day after annual military exercises sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command.  The newspaper highlights Russia’s traditional role as a security provider to Venezuela, as well as its desire to show strength in the Western Hemisphere.  The International Army Games demonstrate Venezuela’s continuing desire to be considered a serious power and U.S. adversary in the Western Hemisphere.  They also demonstrate Russia’s enduring interest in projecting power in Latin America and the Caribbean and to blunt diplomatic isolation on the world stage.  Lastly, these military exercises are likely to further the interoperability of participating militaries with principal adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran.  

Source:

“Olimpíadas de la Guerra’ en Venezuela pueden  generar ‘celo y vigilancia’ en la region (War Olympics’ in Venezuela can generate ‘zeal and vigilance’ in the region),” Voz de América (the Spanish-language version of the state-owned media outlet), 9 August 2022.  https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/olimpiadas-guerra-venezuela-celo-vigilancia-region/6694410.html   

This week, Venezuela will become the first country in the Americas to host military competitions organized by Russia, known as the Army Games… The Russian Ministry of Defense… has organized these military sports annually since August 2015.  They usually last a couple of weeks and spokesmen close to the Kremlin refer them as the “Olympics of War”…The Army Games 2022 are being held in a context of worldwide condemnation of the Vladimir Putin government for its armed attack on Ukraine. 

Source: “Rusia, China e Irán lanzan sus ‘juegos de guerra’ para desafiar a Estados Unidos en Venezuela (Russia, China and Iran launch their ‘war games’ to challenge the United States in Venezuela),” Clarín (left leaning daily in Argentina), 10 August 2022. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/rusia-china-iran-lanzan-juegos-guerra-desafiar-unidos-venezuela_0_HyifirkIYK.html  

The war and hunger games come together in Venezuela.  Live and direct military competitions with Russia, China, and Iran will be held from August 13 to 27 to challenge the United States in the city of Barquisimeto, Lara state, in the northwest of the country, while the streets have been heating up with the protests of the teachers affected by “starvation wages”…Vladimir Putin, whose armed invasion of Ukraine is in its sixth month, aims to demonstrate Russia’s military strength in the Latin America and Caribbean area.  

Image Information:

Image caption:  Venezuelan tanks during a military parade 
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BTR-80A[RG1] _VEN.jpg 
Attribution: CCA-SA 2.0