Tag Archives: Houthis

Hamas and Houthis Target Youth as New “Islamic Resistance” Movement Emerges

Posted on by

Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.

“Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses.”

Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom have seen their popularity grow since 7 October, are capitalizing on conflict in Gaza to recruit new generations of young men into their culture of “Islamic Resistance.”[i] According to the first accompanying excerpt from an op-ed published recently in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, Hamas’s prior youth training efforts have been critical to its ability to withstand the Israeli campaign. The author mentions the “Futawwa” (youth) training program, which allowed Hamas to spread its “resistance” ideology across Gaza throughout the 2010s.[ii] The second and third accompanying excerpts, from the prominent Saudi dailies al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Watan, respectively, illustrate how both Hamas and the Houthis have used their growing popularity since 7 October to launch recruitment campaigns, especially targeting the youth. Youth indoctrination is critical for both groups, and both have put substantial efforts into it over the past decade.[iii] The Houthi Movement and Hamas in Gaza share much in common. They are both mobilized movements with Islamic ideological underpinnings that act as de facto governments in their respective regions despite not formally being recognized as such by the international community. The key difference between them is doctrinal—the former are adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam while the latter is a Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement. For both groups, though, “the culture of resistance” is a critical component that arguably supersedes sectarian differences. Perhaps to a greater degree than previously, a focus on sectarian differences seems secondary and increasingly irrelevant in the current context. Instead, Hamas and the Houthis—alongside Shia-majority Lebanese Hezbollah and the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq”—may coalesce into a transnational, cross-sectarian “Islamic Resistance” movement that should be thought of as distinct from the 2010s, Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”[iv] Both on the Sunni and the Shia side, the new generation of fighters coming of age in the shadow of conflict in Gaza will presumably be less interested in sectarian differences or other intra-Islam disputes than in the fight against Israel.

Sources:

“How and why has Gaza held out?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily) https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/كيف-صمدت-غزّة-ولماذا

What is the secret of this resilience? … After the attempted coup against the Hamas government and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip fell under a tight siege, and the local “Gaza Authority” found itself under a unique state of “independence.” It was able to make whatever decisions it wanted regarding its society, especially in the fields of education and curriculum making… Specifically, the Hamas Authority introduced the “Futawwa” program into the curricula of its schools, aiming to train students specifically in weapons use and field skills.

“Hamas seeks to exploit the Gaza war in the Lebanese camps,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (prominent Saudi daily), 4 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4708376-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

On Monday, the Lebanese branch of the Hamas movement announced the establishment of the “Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood.” This is an organization with military dimensions, as the statement suggested…

In a statement, the movement called on “young and heroic men” to join the “vanguard of the resistance.” The movement’s sources explained that “this project is linked to Lebanon and does not aim exclusively to gather more fighters, but rather to include more individuals in Hamas who are active in more than one sector.” A statement issued by the movement linked the establishment of these vanguards to “affirming the role of the Palestinian people, wherever they are, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means,” and to “complementing what Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved, and benefiting from scientific and artistic energies and capabilities.”

“Houthis recruit children through seminars on war in Gaza,” al-Watan (prominent Saudi daily), 18 November 2023. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/1137388

A Yemeni source in Sanaa said that the most rejoicing over what is happening in Gaza is among the Houthi militias, who rose up directly to restore their dilapidated ranks and support their disintegrating fronts… The source stated that Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses, a method that does not differ from previous methods of recruitment. However, the Houthis have developed new tricks to entice children and youth to enroll in these malicious courses. This includes sending young graduates to the streets to talk about their participation in previous courses, graduating them without any assignments, and giving them monthly salarie

Notes:

[i] Several opinion polls confirm these groups’ rising popularity, including:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/; 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war;  “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Much has been written on the program over the past decade. See for instance: “Gaza teens graduate from Hamas military school,” Ynet News, 24 January 2013. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4336807,00.html

and “Training Fighters of Future Across Gaza,” New York Times, 14 January 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/training-fighters-of-future-across-gaza.html

[iii] For more on Hamas youth recruitment, see: “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” CTC Sentinel, October/November 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/; For the Houthis, see: “Yemen: Houthis Recruit More Child Soldiers Since October 7,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7

[iv] The idea of an “Islamic Resistance” axis is not new. However, it bears distinguishing the emergent post-7 October Islamic Resistance from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The latter coalesced in the early 2010s, during the fight against ISIS and in support of the Syrian regime, and at a time when Hamas was estranged from Iran and its proxies. As such, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a primarily Shia organization focused on countering Sunni extremism in Syria and Iraq (or, for the Houthis, fighting against Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies). Israel remained part of the discourse, but it was not the axis’s primary focus.

Image Information:

Image: Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1391/09/18/13910918213433966_PhotoL.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran Navy Upgrades Bell-212 Helicopters

Posted on by

Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.

“This new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire.”

Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 [R1] helicopters with both SONAR and air to ground missiles, copies of the U.S. made Hellfire missiles. While it appears to exaggerate its mastery of SONAR, its reverse engineering of the Hellfire appears real.

As the Iranian Navy expands its footprint, it relies increasingly on helicopters to project power.[i] The excerpted article from the news portal Khabar Online, describes a Defense Ministry exhibition of new products held at the Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company. Headlining the exhibit was an upgraded Bell-212 helicopter, modified to conduct anti-submarine operations and to carry Ghaem-114 missiles, an Iranian copy of the U.S.-made AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missile.

SONAR is important to Iran. Even though the Persian Gulf is both narrow and shallow with an average depth of 100 feet and a maximum depth of just 295 feet, Iranian defense officials worry that enemy submarines can approach their shores and ships without detection. Should war erupt between Israel and Iran, for example, submarine-launched missiles would be a major component of any Israeli attack on Iran. Detecting submarines and developing anti-submarine warfare is increasingly important to the Iranian Navy as it operates farther from its shores. The distance between the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas and the Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic waterway between Yemen and Djibouti where Iran currently operates, for example, is nearly 1,700 nautical miles. This is outside the defensive layers of speedboats and shore-based missiles the Iranian Navy rely upon closer to its shores.  It is unclear, however, if the Iranian announcement of its helicopter-borne SONAR system is real. While Iranian press photos showing the helicopter at the Tehran exhibit are new, photographs accompanying Iranian media coverage depicting a Bell-212 deploying SONAR at sea are two years old and depict a U.S. Navy helicopter. As such, Iranian Navy helicopter-equipped SONAR is more likely in development.

The Ghaem-114 missile likely represents a truer capability, albeit one that is not new. In July 2021, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces unveiled a helicopter-launched Ghaem-114 Hellfire copy that it billed as an anti-tank missile with a range of six miles. In April 2023, the regular Iranian Army unveiled the “Shafagh” missile that it also likened to the U.S. manufactured Hellfire.[ii] The current announcement likely reflects the standardization of the Ghaem-114 across Iranian services. Iran also claims that its Ghaem-114 has both thermal and laser guidance with a 50-kilogram warhead. Iranian production of a Hellfire knock-off could have substantive tactical ramifications across the region. While Hamas and the Houthis do not have helicopters, the Iranian military could use lifting or non-enforcement of sanctions to provide these groups helicopters that could fire Ghaem-114s. The Houthis could equip drones with Ghaem-114s, while both Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, both of which operate helicopters, could immediately introduce the Ghaem-114 to the Israeli frontier and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sources:

“تجهیز این بالگرد ارتش به سونار و موشک قائم ۱۱۴ “(Equipping this [Bell-212] Helicopter with Sonar and Ghaem-114 missiles),” KhabarOnline.ir (general news website affiliated with reformist political factions), 4 March 2024. https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1880466

Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company hosted an exhibition of Iran Ministry of Defense achievement. During this exhibition, the Ministry of Defense displayed some achievements in helicopters, including upgrading Iranian Navy [Bell-] 212 helicopters.

One of these achievements was upgrading the Iranian Navy’s [Bell-] 212 helicopters to equip them with sonar to detect submarines and deal with surface vessels…. Sonar technology enables the identification of ships and submarines through the emission of underwater soundwaves and determines their direction and distance. Submarines, surface ships, helicopters and maritime and anti-submarine patrol aircraft use sonar to discover their targets underwater.

Iran has SH-3 specialized anti-submarine helicopters in its air fleet that it purchased before the [1979 Islamic] Revolution and they can both detect all types of submarines and launch Mark 46 torpedoes. In addition, the [Bell-] 212 helicopters have been equipped with Ghaem-114 missiles to neutralize surface vessels and an electro-optical system to detect and targets vessels night and day….

In January 2020, during the delivery of overhauled helicopters to the armed forces, the Aerospace Force of the Army of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps displayed [Bell-] 214 helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles, similar to Hellfires.  Although no detailed information about this missile was published, this new missile was nicknamed the Iranian Hellfire and many observers saw the development of this missile in the context of the design of new air-to-ground missiles….Equipping Navy helicopters with Ghaem-114 missiles increases the ability of this force to support amphibious operations seeking to capture the enemy coast and to counter small and fast enemy vessels or to deal with piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Notes:

[i] Iran has no aircraft carriers, but it designs its frigates to accommodate helicopters as a means both to project power onto land from sea and to defend Iranian ships. For discussion of upgrading and rehabilitating Iranian helicopters, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters,” OE Watch, 03 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382672

[ii] For discussion of Shafagh missile unveiling see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Installs New Precision Missiles On Army Helicopters,” OE Watch, 05 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-installs-new-precision-missiles-on-army-helicopters/

Image Information:

Image: Iran Helicopter Support and Renovation Company display of upgraded Bell-212, in Tehran in March 2024. Iran’s Navy has announced that it will equip its Bell-212 helicopters with both SONAR and knockoffs of Hellfire missiles.
Source: https://media.khabaronline.ir/d/2024/03/04/4/6000265.jpg?ts=1709559703000
Attribution: KhabarOnline.ir

Iran Warns United States Against Attacking Ships in Red Sea

Posted on by

“The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot.

“Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.”

Iran has warned the United States against targeting cargo ships that the United States and others believe to be Iranian support ships feeding intelligence to Houthi rebels in Yemen. “Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks,” the Iranian Army declared in an English-language video recently posted on its Telegram channel Aja Media, clips of which are included in the first excerpted post. The Behshad is a cargo vessel widely believed by Western intelligence officials to be a spy ship operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is said to be passing electronic intelligence to Yemen’s Houthi rebels—armed with drones and ballistic missiles—to spot and target ships passing in the Red Sea region in reaction to the ongoing Gaza war.[i]

In the video, the narrator describes Behshad and other cargo ships like it—including the Saviz and Behzad—as “floating armories” stationed in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to prevent the hijacking of Iranian ships by pirates—a problem that began in the 1980s. According to the video, 93 squadrons have been dispatched to the region and thwarted 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships. To maintain the ship’s innocence and its respect for international law, the video goes as far as to cite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, claiming the ships are storage and support centers offshore.[ii] Very little information is available on the Behshad and other cargo ships in Iranian state media coverage. However, as per the second excerpted article, in April 2021, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the Saviz had been the target of a limpet mine attack allegedly by Israel because it was believed to be “Iran’s naval base” for the Houthi rebels.[iii] The third excerpted article published by the Iranian daily newspaper Hamshari reported that the United States and UK media coverage of the cargo ships in recent weeks were adopting “more hostile positions” because the media wanted to provoke the United States into a war with Iran.

Sources:

“رسانه ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران ‘آجامدیا’ (Media of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army ‘Aja Media’),” “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video post, 4 February 2024. https://t.me/aja_media/3797

Since the late 1980s, with the rise of piracy in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea leading to the hijacking of several Iranian ships by pirates, the Iranian military, like many other countries, decided to deploy squadrons to this area in order to protect its commercial vessels and ensure the security of its shipping crew and commercial cargo. To date, ninety-three squadrons of the Iranian navy have been dispatched to this region and have prevented 183 piracy attempts against Iranian ships before the pirates could reach them… Those engaging in terrorist activities against Behshad or similar vessels jeopardize international maritime routes, security, and assume global responsibility for potential future international risks.

“گزارش تسنیم| مأموریت کشتی ساویز در دریای سرخ چه بود؟ (Tasnim Report: What was the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea?),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated news source), 7 April 2021. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1400/01/18/2480574/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AE-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF

This ship was the Iranian ship Saviz that was in the region for a long time already, and while some sources reported that it might have been hit by a missile or torpedo, a Tasnim reporter informed that likely this scenario is because of the explosion of magnetic and sticky mines on the body of the ship. After the publication of this news, there were different discussion s about the Saviz ship’s mission in the Red Sea, and some incorrectly—or on purpose—considered it to be Iran’s naval base to support the resistance of Yemen.

“واکنش سخنگوی وزارت دفاع آمریکا به کلیپ رسانه ارتش ایران در خصوص شناور بهشاد (The reaction of the U.S. Defense Department spokesperson to the media clip of the Iranian Army regarding the Behshad float),” Akharin Khabar (News aggregator with Telegram account), 12 February 2024. https://akharinkhabar.ir/story/9941219

The Pentagon spokesperson regarding the Behshad vessel: We have heard things about the mission of this vessel, but it is Iran’s right to have a vessel in the Red Sea and conduct operations. We are not looking for a naval confrontation with Iran.

A journalist told him during a press conference: Iran has issued a warning and told America that you are not allowed to target this ship. Iran has announced that it is an anti-piracy ship.

“ایران درباره کشتی بهشاد و ساویز به آمریکا هشدار داد؟ (Iran warned America about Behshad and Saviz ships?),” Hamshahri (Iran daily newspaper), 4 February 2024. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/830282/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

Some American and British media continue to create a media space to provoke the United States to attack Iran… Iran issued a warning to the United States on Sunday about the potential targeting of two ships in the Middle East long suspected of serving as operations bases for Iranian commandos… It seems that Iran’s statement about the Behshad and Saviz shows Tehran’s growing concern that the American attacks in the past days in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that targeted militias supported by the Islamic Republic.

Notes:

[i] Keir Simmons, Mo Abbas, Dan De Luce, and Matthew Mulligan, “Iran goes public with stark warning over suspected spy ship as U.S. refuses to rule out more strikes,” NBC News, 6 February 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-goes-public-stark-warning-suspected-spy-ship-us-strikes-rcna137150

[ii] The vessels were sanctioned by the previous U.S. Administration in 2018. See: “Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related Designations Updates,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, 8 June 2020. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200608

[iii] According to Western media reports, the attack was apparently by Israel in retaliation for Iranian strikes on a Liberian-flagged ship owned by an Israeli shipping billionaire. See: Oren Liebermann, “U.S. watching as Iran quietly replaces Red Sea spy ship damaged in April attack” CNN, 6 August 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/politics/us-monitor-iran-spy-ships/index.html

Image Information:

Image: “The Story of the Behshad’s Mission for Maritime Security,” Telegram video screenshot
Source: https://t.me/aja_media/3797
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks Not Only Motivated by Gaza

Posted on by

Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

“The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder…”

While recent naval attacks by Yemen’s Ansarallah group—better known as the Houthis—have been justified as being in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, Ansarallah’s build-up of capabilities to engage in an anti-access naval campaign was motivated by domestic concerns that predate Israel’s operations against Hamas in Gaza. Beginning on 19 October, Ansarallah began targeting primarily commercial vessels in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The majority of these weapons were shot down by ships from the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group.[i] These attacks were concurrent with other attacks carried out by Iranian allies, all presented as in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza and as part of a coordinated anti-Israel response by members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—Hezbollah in Lebanon, “Islamic Resistance” militias in Iraq, and Ansarallah in Yemen. According to the accompanying excerpt from the official Yemeni daily 26 September, Ansarallah leaders have justified their buildup of anti-ship capabilities as motivated by their adversaries “exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder” and their attempts to “expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun [also known as Perim Island].” From Ansarallah’s perspective, its domestic adversaries—both the Saudi-backed Internationally Recognized Government and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council—have used the early 2022 UN-brokered truce in Yemen to tighten control over resources and strategic locations on Yemen’s coastline with foreign assistance and complicity.[ii] In August 2023, a few months before hostilities broke out in Gaza, Ansarallah officials threatened to sink two oil tankers seeking to transport Yemeni oil for export from ports in the Gulf Aden under the control of Ansarallah’s domestic opponents. Ansarallah’s position vis-à-vis Red Sea shipping prior to 7 October, per the article, was “to encourage international navigation through the [Bab El Mandab] Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.” Thus, while Ansarallah’s attacks on shipping vessels transiting Bab El Mandab are—at least rhetorically—linked to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, they should also be understood as a deliberate effort by the group to assert control over the entirety of Yemen’s territorial waters and internationalize the struggle for control of Yemen’s resources and strategic locations.

Sources:

“قدرات اليمن في حماية البحار والمياه الوطنية  Yemeni capabilities for protecting national seas and waterways,” 26 September (official Yemeni daily), 25 September 2023. https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/64705-2023-09-25-05-09-57

”We were in a raging war with two ships coming to the port of Aden to plunder Yemeni gas, and they retreated four times, most recently yesterday. We informed the companies that owned the ships ‘Sinmar Jane’ and ‘Bolivar’ that we would strike them if they entered to loot gas from the port of Aden, and they are ready to do so. A few days earlier, President Al-Mashat vowed to ‘target the military bases of the Saudi-Emirati coalition forces on the Yemeni islands.’ At that time, he concurred with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces and Coastal Defense, Brigadier General Mansour Ahmed Al-Saadi, ‘on the level of qualitative armament that the naval forces now possess, which enables them to confront the enemy with all merit and ability, and allows them to meet the challenges…”


The Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, had previously confirmed that maritime security of Yemeni territorial waters would be a priority in the next stage…

The preparation of the naval force comes in light of the enemy mercenaries’ relinquishing of national sovereignty, and their exposing the country’s sovereign oil, gas and fishery resources to unprecedented plunder. Alongside this organized plunder are the occupation’s efforts to expand and control the most important strategic ports and islands, such as Socotra and Mayun. It was necessary for the Yemeni armed forces to carry out their duty to protect the territorial waters and the sovereign wealth of oil, gas and fisheries from the dangers coming from the coalition of aggressors and their mercenaries from inside and outside the country, and to prepare themselves as a deterrent weapon for all these ambitions. Regarding freedom of international navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the position of the Republic of Yemen is specific and clear, which is to encourage international navigation through the Strait provided that it does not harm the sovereignty, unity, security or independence of the Republic.

Notes:

[i] For details on Ansarallah’s naval arsenal, see: “A Maritime Menace: The Houthi Navy,” Oryx Blog, 2 January 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/01/a-maritime-menace-houthi-navy.html; “Houthis Showcase Large Arsenal Of Missiles, Drones At Sana’a Military Parade,” MEMRI, 21 September 2023. https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-showcase-large-arsenal-missiles-drones-military-parade; “Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/under-fire-bab-al-mandab-houthi-military-capabilities-and-us-response-options;“Houthi anti-ship missile systems: getting better all the time,” IISS, 4 January 2024. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/ For details on Ansarallah’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, see: “We Might Have Just Seen the World’s First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Attack,” Popular Mechanics, 1 December 2023. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a45964460/first-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-attack-houthi-rebels/

[ii] For more on control over Socotra, see: Lucas Winter, “Regional Friction Over Yemen’s Socotra Island,” OE Watch, June 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-27-93-72/2018_2D00_06_2D00_01-Regional-Friction-Over-Yemen_1920_s-Socotra-Island-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true; For more on control over Yemen’s Arabian Sea ports, see: Lucas Winter, “Saudis Seek Pathway to the Arabian Sea,” OE Watch, October 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-26-69-08/2018_2D00_10_2D00_01-Saudis-Seek-Pathway-to-the-Arabian-Sea-_2800_Winter_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true

Image Information:

Image:  Yemen map showing major population centers as well as parts of neighboring countries and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/yemen/map
Attribution: Public Domain