Indonesia Extends Counter-Drug Trafficking Cooperation to South America

National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo.

National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo.


“I have just carried out a working visit as Chair of the Indonesian Delegation to several countries in South America in order to anticipate the entry of cocaine and other trafficked narcotics into Indonesia…”


According to the excerpted article from centrist Indonesian-language website tvonenews.com, Indonesia’s National Narcotics Agency (BNN) is now cooperating with South American countries to prevent the entry of cocaine and other narcotics into Indonesia.  In the article, BNN head Petrus Golose discusses his recent working visit to South America.  Although he notes that narcotics trafficking in South America has not yet directly affected Indonesia, it is necessary to address because Indonesia has seen an increase in domestic drug use and could become a destination country for illicit South American drugs.

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s website, kemlu.co.id, discusses the BNN delegation’s visit to Panama in particular.  Indonesia is concerned about Panama’s role as a drug trafficking hub, albeit not a producer.  Indonesia intends to share best practices with Panama in terms of law enforcement strategies to counter drug trafficking.  A memorandum of understanding between the two countries was signed, marking the first time Panama has ever cooperated with an Asian country to combat drug trafficking.

Indonesian-language media outlet databoks.com reports that there had been a surge in narcotics arrests in Indonesia, peaking in 2018, and decreasing since then.  According to the data, North Sumatra is the most affected region.  Marijuana is the most seized drug followed by methamphetamine and ecstasy.  Given that cocaine dominates narcotics trafficking from South America, these facts indicate that Indonesian counter-narcotics initiatives with South American countries is a longer-term preventative measure.


Source:

“BNN Jalin Kerja Sama dengan Negara-Negara di Amerika Selatan Cegah Masuknya Kokain dan Peredaran Narkotika Lain (BNN Cooperates with Countries in South America to Prevent the Entry of Cocaine and Other Narcotics from Circulating),” tvonenews.com (considered neutral Indonesian language media source), 9 June 2022. https://www.tvonenews.com/berita/nasional/45935-bnn-jalin-kerja-sama-dengan-negara-negara-di-amerika-selatan-cegah-masuknya-kokain-dan-peredaran-narkotika-lain

Head of the National Narcotics Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BNN RI) Petrus Reinhard Golose said that his team was cooperating with a number of countries in South America to prevent the entry of cocaine and other trafficked narcotics into Indonesia. Golose explained that the cooperation that BNN has established with countries in South America targets areas around the Andes Mountains. The head of the NNA confirmed that although the circulation of cocaine took place in the Americas, it was possible for Indonesia to become one of the destination countries for the circulation.

Source: “Panama – Indonesia untuk Pertama Kalinya akan Melakukan Kerja Sama Penanggulangan Narkoba (Panama – Indonesia for the First Time to Conduct Drug Countermeasures Cooperation), kemlu.go.id (website of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 25 May 2022. https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/3631/berita/panama-indonesia-untuk-pertama-kalinya-akan-melakukan-kerja-sama-penanggulangan-narkoba

With the support of the Indonesian Embassy in Panama City, the Head of the National Narcotics Agency and his team held a meeting with ministerial-level officials…. Panama itself is not a drug-producing country, but is a hub area for drug dealers in Latin America who come from surrounding drug-producing countries…. In this case, Panama and Indonesia can share experiences both in handling and tackling the use and distribution of drugs, as well as proper law enforcement techniques for dealing with drug issues.

Source: “Jumlah Tersangka Narkoba Menurun dalam 3 Tahun Terakhir (Number of Drug Suspects Decreased in the Last 3 Years),” databoks.katadata.co.ide (web-based Indonesian language media outlet), 29 May 2022. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/05/26/jumlah-tersangka-narkoba-menurun-dalam-3-tahun-terakhir

According to a report by the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), the number of suspects in narcotics and illegal drugs or narcotics cases in Indonesia has decreased over the past three years. However, if one looks at the trend, since 2009 the number of narcotics suspects has tended to increase, with a record high of 1,545 people in 2018.


Image Information:

Image: National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo
Source: Kampung Jawa, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Logo_BNN.svg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo

“For a little more than two years, Togo had been preparing for the expansion of Sahelian terrorist groups on its territory.”


On 11 May, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) attacked a Togolese military checkpoint.  The attack, which claimed eight Togolese soldiers, was JNIM’s first known attack in Togo and may indicate further attacks to come.  The excerpted article from the political affairs-oriented French-language journaldelafrique.com notes that the attack reflects JNIM’s longtime plans to expand into Togo.  It also claims that Togo’s military preparations to secure its borders with Burkina Faso made the Togolese soldiers a target for JNIM.  The article cites previous JNIM attacks in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin as examples of JNIM’s intention to strike Togo.

The journaldelafrique.com article also suggests that military pressure from Mali is pressing JNIM in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, forcing JNIM to move southward.  The article notes that JNIM reconnaissance teams had previously been arrested in northern Togo but were released due to a legal loophole.  The article concludes that the attack in Togo had ample warnings.  However, the article does not blame the army but instead focuses its disdain on Togo’s intelligence apparatus, who it claims should have noticed the 60 JNIM fighters entering Togolese territory and alerted the military that JNIM or other terrorist groups had infiltrated the country.


Source:

“GSIM claims responsibility for the Kpékpakandi terrorist attack,” togobreakingnews.info (French language news website), 7 June 2022. https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gsim-revendique-lattaque-terroriste/

The terrorist attack on May 11 against the checkpoint of Kpekpakandi (Togo-Burkina border) is the work of the Group of Support for Islam and Muslims. The toll of this murderous operation was 8 dead and 13 wounded on the side of the defense and security forces of Togo…. This attack is also the first deadly one that Togo has experienced since the terrorist threat has raged in the West African sub-region.

Source: “Is Togo up to this new terrorist challenge?” journaldelafrique.com (political affairs oriented French-language news source), 12 May 2022. https://lejournaldelafrique.com/le-togo-est-il-a-la-hauteur-de-ce-nouveau-terroriste//

An attack caused the deaths of eight Togolese soldiers. The attack took place in Kpinkankandi, where the Togolese army is conducting its Kondjouaré operation, which aims to secure the borders with Burkina Faso.

For a little more than two years, Togo had been preparing for the expansion of Sahelian terrorist groups on its territory…. The latter [JNIM] have seen their influence in the “Tri-Border” area dwindle under the offensive of the Malian army in recent months…. Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire had suffered several attacks targeting soldiers on the borders with Burkina Faso. More recently, Benin also had to deal with three deadly attacks at the end of 2021.

In Togo, the security authorities had to expect a terrorist attack. It remained to be seen when it would take place. Several members of armed group reconnaissance cells had previously been apprehended in northern Togo, and then were released after interrogation due to a legal loophole…. But the response seems to have been slow on the part of the intelligence services which will, it seems, have great difficulty in curbing the terrorist threat in the short term.

Somalia: Behind Al-Shabaab’s Success in Recruiting Children

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.


“Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.”


Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia’s newly elected president, is facing many problems in his country, including a drought that threatens millions with famine, political divisions hampering unity, and a rise in attacks by al-Shabaab despite years of combatting the terrorist group.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the pan-African independent news platform African Arguments explains, much of al-Shabaab’s strength owes to its ability to recruit children.  The group uses boys as logistics operatives, combatants, and suicide bombers, while girls are used as cleaners, cooks, and “wives” of the fighters.  The group uses both boys and girls as spies, with their young age helping to lessen suspicion of their activities.

According to the article, al-Shabaab finds it easy to recruit youth due to a variety of factors.  Work in a country with a devastatingly high unemployment rate such as Somalia is a huge draw. Power, marriage, and for those seeking one, a religious education, albeit quite radical, are other reasons for joining al-Shabaab.  There is also widespread discontent with the government, which people perceive as being deeply corrupt.  Abuse at the hands of security forces drives young people to the terrorist organization.  Additionally, impoverished parents who receive money from the organization sometimes force their young children to join the group. 

There have been programs to persuade young recruits to leave al-Shabaab as well as dissuade those who have not yet joined from doing so.  However, as the article notes, these attempts usually have little impact because they focus on the evils of al-Shabaab as opposed to the actual needs of the children.  Meanwhile, Western powers, the African Union, and the Somali military are finding it quite difficult to eliminate al-Shabaab because even when they eliminate large numbers of its fighters, new ones soon appear.  Until the factors that draw young people into the terrorist group are significantly mitigated, the pipeline of recruits ready to take up arms will very likely remain quite full.


Source:

Liban Osiye and Liban A. Hussien, “To counter al-Shabaab, Somalia’s new govt must do something for the kids,”African Arguments (pan-African independent news platform), 24 May 2022. https://africanarguments.org/2022/05/to-counter-al-shabaab-somalias-new-govt-must-do-something-for-the-kids/

Tackling this war crime head on will be critical to saving thousands of children from myriad forms of abuse and, in some instances, death. But it will also be essential to combating the al-Shabaab threat as a whole. In almost all the groups’ acts of terrorism, young people are involved in some capacity.

Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.

Unless President Mohamud’s administration honestly examines the reasons that many young people and their families see joining al-Shabaab as an attractive or necessary option, the Islamist militants will keep winning the radicalisation war. To truly tackle child recruitment, his new government will have to recognise that al-Shabaab’s greatest tools in turning Somalia’s future generations against its present leadership are issues such as endemic poverty, social exclusion, lack of basic public services, endemic corruption, paralysed politics, and poor governance. An effective military strategy is also essential to combatting al-Shabaab – insecurity allows militants to use brute force, torture and abductions to recruit many child soldiers – but not sufficient.

Most of al-Shabaab’s child recruits are from areas the group holds or has a significant presence in. But it is notable that its level of recruitment in big cities like the capital Mogadishu is reportedly increasing.

And it has been found to use girls as cooks, cleaners, and “wives” as well as to spy or move weaponry.


Image Information:

Image: Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/7306922512/in/album-72157629979805598/
Attribution: Public Domain

Murder of Paraguayan Prosecutor in Colombia Suggests Transnational Criminal Cooperation

Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.

Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.


“The prosecutor was leading one of the largest anti-mafia operations in the history of Paraguay, a key country in the region’s drug trafficking network.”


Paraguayan prosecutor Marcelo Pecci was recently murdered on the Island of Barú while on honeymoon with his wife.  The young prosecutor, who specialized in organized crime, had a reputation for pursuing cases related to transnational criminal organizations and money laundering.  His brutal murder, far from Paraguay, shocked the nation and hinted at a highly organized and motivated set of criminal organizations operating in conjunction.  Five suspects, one Venezuelan and four Colombians, have been arrested and prosecuted for the crime, according to reporting in Spain’s top newspaper El País.  The BBC’s Spanish-language news service BBC Español further reports that the hit was likely organized by the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Brazil’s largest and most sophisticated criminal organization.  The PCC uses Paraguay’s relatively ungoverned tri-border area as a hub for smuggling and money laundering.  Pecci was conducting one of the largest investigations into criminal organizations in Paraguay’s history.  The cross-continent operation displays a remarkable level of criminal coordination and sophistication.  It also shows the extent to which Paraguay risks becoming a state held hostage by criminal interests operating in its much larger neighbor.  Finally, Pecci’s assassination highlights the persistent inability of Latin America’s governments to protect prosecutors, police, and politicians pursuing anti-corruption agendas.


Source:

“Capturan a los presuntos asesinos del fiscal Marcelo Pecci (The capture of alleged murderers of prosecutor Marcelo Pecci),” El País (Spain’s top newspaper with comprehensive coverage of Latin America), 3 June 2022.  https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2022-06-03/capturan-a-los-presuntos-asesinos-del-fiscal-marcelo-pecci.html

Pecci was a specialized prosecutor against organized crime in Paraguay and was in charge of several of the most important drug trafficking and money laundering cases in that country…Without committing to a hypothesis, the director of the Colombian Police, General Jorge Vargas, said that ‘two of the main investigations carried out by prosecutor Pecci in Latin America were against the Primeiro Comanda da Capital—the most powerful group of organized crime in Brazil and South America—and the structure known as Point 50, in the south of the continent.’ 

Source:  “Marcelo Pecci: las nuevas evidencias sobre el asesinato del fiscal paraguayo (Marcelo Pecci: the new evidence on the murder of the Paraguayan prosecutor),” BBC Español (the Spanish-language version of the popular British outlet), 8 June 2022.  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-61741012  

Pecci was enjoying his honeymoon with his wife in the tourist town of Barú, near Cartagena, when he dismounted a jet ski and a gunman shot him.  The prosecutor was leading one of the largest anti-mafia operations in the history of Paraguay, a key country in the region’s drug trafficking network.


Image Information:

Image:  Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.
Source:  Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File :A_group_of_police_officers_at_2004_Brazilian_Grand_Prix.JPG
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 2.5

A Complex Link Between Coups and Jihadism in West Africa

Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.


“Analysts say that while there is no mutually beneficial relationship between jihadist groups and coup plotters, there is a linkage between the increase of jihadism and the protracted insecurity across the region.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the non-profit scholarly publication The Conversation: Africa examines the possible connections between coups and the presence of Islamic terrorists in African states.  There have been three coups in West Africa’s Sahel Region in since 2021:  Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso, as well as a fourth failed attempt in Guinea-Bissau.  The author found the link between coups and jihad to be complex, with jihadism not necessarily a direct precursor.

The author notes jihadism and coups are precipitated by similar factors such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, ignorance, political instability, and the inability of governments to meet these challenges.  These conditions serve as excellent recruiting tools for jihadist groups looking to increase their ranks with jobless, angry youth.  These conditions also encourage soldiers, sometimes with a disgruntled populace backing them, to overthrow a corrupt government that is unable to provide for its citizens.  Finally, the military is more likely to attempt a coup when the government appears unable to defeat terrorist organizations.  This was the case in Burkina Faso, where the military overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, after feeling their forces were not being adequately supplied to defeat the jihadists and becoming disenchanted as the number of casualties within their ranks grew. Coup leaders often adopt a very militaristic approach to defeating jihadists. Instead of attacking the root causes of discontent, such as high unemployment and lack of essential services, they implement forceful measures that tend to drive the poor into the arms of jihadist recruiters.  As such, their harsh measures lead to more jihadist recruits, leading to harsher crackdown measures, and so on.  Ultimately, the outcome of the coup-jihadism relationship becomes increased instability.  Meanwhile, the African Union and Western nations, see their efforts at democratization and counterterrorism in the Sahel undermined.


Source:

Folahanmi Aina, “Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship,” The Conversation: Africa (non-profit scholarly publication), 17 February 2022. https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988

Most of these groups are affiliated with global jihadist groups such Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This has led to repeated tensions in relations between the state and society, which the jihadist groups have exploited in intensifying their recruitment drive.

On the other hand, the activities of these jihadist groups have also mounted additional pressure on the fragile democratic systems across the region.

This encourages state capture by the military, who see themselves as “guardians of the state” and the “last hope” of the common citizen.

The continued emergence of coups is likely to be capitalised upon by jihadists as reflecting efforts which are finally yielding desired results – the forced displacement of democratic systems of government. The jihadists could use this as a tactic to get more fighters to join them.The military juntas now in power must urgently seek to establish mutuality with the societies they now rule. It’s a tall order, given that they don’t prioritise the relationship between state and society. Doing so would require giving voice to the concerns and grievances of citizens they rule over.


Image Information:

Image: Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.
Source: Kassim Traoré /VOA/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comit%C3%A9_national_pour_le_salut_du_Peuple_-_2020_Malian_coup_d%27Etat_2.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

The Philippines Gaining Upper Hand Against Abu Sayyaf

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.


“The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed…”


The Philippines government may be weakening Abu Sayyaf across the region.  According to Philippine daily sunstar.com, there was concern that Abu Sayyaf would seek to disrupt the elections after Philippine forces killed the group’s leader in Basilan only weeks earlier.  The military’s strategy to protect the elections from Abu Sayyaf involved closing off access points to the group’s main area of operations in Basilan and ordering troops to avoid political partisanship.  In addition, the army boosted its coordination with the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to secure the elections.  Ultimately, the army deployed 69,000 soldiers to protect the elections, which were held successfully on 9 May.

A separate article in the Philippines’ largest English-language newspaper, Manila Bulletin, pointed to the surrender of an Abu Sayyaf bomb-maker as evidence that Abu Sayyaf’s ranks were being further depleted through the Philippines’ rehabilitation program for former Abu Sayyaf members.  The program, which allows local governments to work with surrendered repentant militants to reintegrate them into society, has seen some success since the Philippines stepped it up in recent years. Elsewhere, according to a recent Indonesian-language article in Hong Kong-based suara.com, a number of hostages escaped Abu Sayyaf in Indonesia in April.  Collectively, the articles imply that Abu Sayyaf’s military capabilities and negative impact appears to be waning in the face of determined government effort.


Source:

“Troops told to ready for poll worst-case scenario,” sunstar.com (Philippine daily), 20 April 2022. https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/1926909/zamboanga/local-news/troops-told-to-ready-for-poll-worst-case-scenario

Lieutenant General Alfredo Rosario Jr., commander of the Western Mindanao Command (Westmincom), has ordered the troops in Basilan province to prepare for the worst-case scenario on election day. “The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed,” Rosario said. On March 25, Radzmil Jannatul alias Abu Khubayb, the leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan province, was killed in a clash with government troops in Sitio Center, Baiwas village, Sumisip, Basilan.

“Let us also sustain our good coordination with our partners from the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to ensure an honest, orderly, and peaceful elections,” Rosario added. He reminded the JTF-Basilan troops to remain non-partisan at all times.

Source: “Sayyaf bomber surrenders in Zamboanga,” mb.com.ph (Philippines largest English language newspaper), 23 March 2022. https://mb.com.ph/2022/03/23/sayyaf-bomber-surrenders-in-zamboanga/

A suspected Abu Sayyaf member linked to several bombing and kidnapping incidents in Zamboanga and Basilan surrendered to authorities on Tuesday. Mursidin Husin, 39, a resident of Sitio Buahayan, Dita, Zamboanga City, surrendered to the police at PNP Camp General Eduardo Batalla, RT Lim Boulevard. Husin also turned over his .38 caliber revolver with ammunition. Husin, a follower of Jamiul Nasalun, an Abu Sayyaf sub-leader based in Zamboanga City, was allegedly involved in the 2013 bombing of a passenger bus in Zamboanga City and two other explosions in a Sangali cafeteria and in Basilan.

Source: “Kisah WNI 427 Hari jadi Tahanan Abu Sayyaf: Jarang Makan dan Takut Kena Bom (Story of Indonesian Citizen 427 Anniversary of Abu Sayyaf Prisoner: Rarely Eat and Fear of Bombs), suara.com (Hong Kong based Indonesian language bi-monthly newspaper), 5 April 2022. https://www.suara.com/news/2021/04/05/132923/kisah-wni-427-hari-jadi-tahanan-abu-sayyaf-jarang-makan-dan-takut-kena-bom

Arizal Caste Miran, one of the four victims of the Abu Sayyaf group hostage-takers in the Philippines, is now able to reunite with his family. Before returning to his family’s arms, Arizal and three other people were desperate to escape. They heard from a member of the Abu Sayyaf group that the hostages would be transferred to Tawi Island. While on their way in the morning, the ship they were traveling on capsized because from the waves. Instantly the four Indonesian citizens went to save themselves.


Image Information:

Image: 2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.
Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2021-12-03_T4_Delivery_005.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Degrading Environmental Conditions in Iraq Providing Cover for Terrorism

U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).

U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).


“…the number of dusty days increased from 243 days to 272 days per year over the past two decades, and is expected to reach 300 dusty days per year in 2050.”


Over a three-week span in April and May, the Iraqi news agency Shafaq News reported at least three separate attacks in which ISIS fighters took advantage of dust storms to attack Iraqi positions.  The attacks themselves are not novel, as ISIS and other rebel groups have used dust storms and sandstorms to conceal their movements during attacks in both Syria and Iraq for years.  Nor were the attacks particularly impactful, relegated to brief reports in local media.  The frequency and breadth of this year’s dust storms, however, have drawn substantial media attention.  As detailed in the accompanying excerpt from the influential Qatari outlet al-Jazeera, the number of annual “dusty days” is expected to reach 300 by the year 2050, up from 243 at the start of the millennium and 272 at present.  A major reason for this is Iraq’s accumulating environmental problems, which include ongoing drought, expanding desertification, extreme summer heat, and decreased water flows in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  Iraq’s dysfunctional political parties are unlikely to muster sustainable responses to these challenges, allowing the spiraling cycle to continue.  Those frustrated at the negative social impacts caused by environmental degradation are likely to channel this against authorities, giving ISIS and other insurgent groups an opening to continue recruiting among the increasingly disaffected population.


Sources:

“بالتزامن مع عاصفة ترابية.. داعش يهاجم الجيش في الموصل والحشد يدخل الإنذار

(ISIS attacks the army in Mosul during dust storm, as PMF goes on alert),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 6 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yck9dbmy

On Wednesday, ISIS militants attacked Iraqi army units in the city of Mosul, the center of Nineveh Governorate. A statement of the 44th Brigade in the Popular Mobilization (Ansar al-Marja’iya) stated that… “a very dense dust storm hit the city of Mosul at the time of the attack by ISIS.”

Source:

“جرحى بهجوم لداعش في الانبار مستغلا عاصفة ترابية تضرب المحافظة

(Injuries in ISIS attack in Anbar taking advantage of dust storm in the province),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 19 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8wz9xa

Imad Al-Dulaimi, the mayor of Al-Rutba district, western Iraq, revealed on Tuesday that six soldiers and civilians were wounded by ISIS militants who took advantage of a dust storm that hit the area.

Source:

“مسؤول حكومي: هجوم “البو طراز” خارج حدود ديالى وداعش استغل العاصفة

(Government official: Albu Tiraz attack outside of Diyala’s borders, as ISIS takes advantage of storm),” Shafaq News (Iraqi news agency), 2 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yndch5bj

Eyewitnesses in the village of Albu Tiraz revealed that ISIS militants took advantage of the dust storm and lack of vision to carry out the attack, as visibility did not exceed 10 meters.

Source:

“العواصف الترابية تضرب مدن وقرى العراق طوال السنة.. تعرف على الأسباب

(Reasons why dust storms hit Iraqi cities and villages throughout the year),” al-Jazeera (influential Qatari news outlet), 19 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/p793253f

…according to the statistics recorded by the General Meteorological Authority, the number of dusty days increased from 243 days to 272 days per year over the past two decades, and is expected to reach 300 dusty days per year in 2050. About 70% of agricultural land in Iraq is degraded or threatened with deterioration, as a result of climate change and the loss of vegetation cover, which is the main factor for soil stabilization…


Image Information:

Image:  U.S. Soldiers walk from the dining facility during a sandstorm at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Iraq, July 4 (2009).
Source: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/186799/sandstorm
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Sees Threat from Morocco as Western Sahara Conflict Threatens To Reignite

Morocco from space.

Morocco from space.


“…Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders…”


The long-frozen dispute over the Western Sahara, in which Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory and Algeria supports the Polisario Front’s independence aspirations, continues to thaw amid sporadic military activity.  The latest incident occurred in early April, when a Moroccan UAV purportedly struck a convoy near the border between Mauritania and the Western Sahara. There are conflicting reports of what happened.  The Algerian government, through its foreign affairs ministry, called it “a targeted assassination” carried out by Morocco outside of its internationally recognized borders.  The Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadid cites a source that claimed a Moroccan drone had fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks that had delivered their commercial cargo in Mauritania and were returning to the Algerian city of Tindouf.  The Moroccan government did not comment on the matter, but according to the Facebook page of the quasi-official Moroccan military chat forum FAR Maroc, Moroccan authorities had conveyed to the UN that 10 trucks transporting weapons and ammunition were struck within territory that the Polisario Front controls.  It added that Polisario had prevented UN forces from accessing the site for 72 hours, during which the group altered the scene to make it appear as if the missiles struck a civilian convoy. The Algerian military’s main articulated concern vis-à-vis Morocco are not UAVs, but rather the broader threat of “new generation warfare.”  In a speech immediately following the incident described above, Saïd Chengriha, Chief of Staff of the Algerian military, emphasized the importance of maintaining national cohesion amid external attempts to sow discord through misinformation and influence campaigns.  Chengriha has stated on more than one occasion that the key battle for Algeria’s youth is a battle of conscience, “in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people.” 


Sources:

Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter account, @Algeria_MFA, 12 April 2022. https://twitter.com/Algeria_MFA/status/1513918713086492676

Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders against innocent civilians from three countries of the region.

Source:

“قصف جديد لشاحنات جزائرية في الصحراء قرب الحدود الموريتانية

(New attack on Algerian trucks in the Sahara near the Mauritanian border),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 10 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/ydf7uemn

Local sources told al-Araby al-Jadid that Moroccan drones fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks, which caused their destruction and the injury of more than two people. They added that the two trucks had unloaded their cargo in Mauritania and were on their way back to the city of Tindouf, in southern Algeria.

Source: FAR Maroc (quasi-official Moroccan military news forum), Facebook page (Arabic), 21 April 2022. https://www.facebook.com/1529080437316937/posts/3255921981299432

Regarding the Bir Lahlu operation on April 10, the [UN] mission confirmed that Morocco had informed that it targeted, in a specific operation, about 10 trucks and vehicles loaded with ammunition and weapons targeting the security of Morocco. However, the Polisario prevented members of the mission from inspecting the site for 72 hours, after which they found only two trucks and a vehicle. It also monitored the presence of another operation near the location of the two trucks, confirming that Polisario had manipulated the scene to prove its allegation that Morocco had targeted civilians.

Source: “Les nouveaux défis exigent la consolidation du front interne,” Algeria Press Service (Algerian oficial news agency), 8 May 2022. https://www.aps.dz/algerie/139409-les-nouveaux-defis-exigent-la-consolidation-du-front-interne-et-une-confiance-totale-dans-les-institutions-de-l-etat

According to El Djeich, “the various challenges which Algeria is currently facing, and which it will have to take up in the future, have led the High Command of the People’s National Army (ANP)… to carry out a vast program of modernization and capacity-renewal of the ANP battle corps and its implementation on the ground, in order to achieve a high level of competence at all levels and therefore operational availability”

… “The real battle that our young people must win today is essentially a battle of conscience, Lieutenant General Saïd Chengriha has said on numerous occasions,” per the Editorial. “It is a battle in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people…”


Image Information:

Image:  Morocco from space
Source: NASA, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/751371/morocco-image-day]  
Attribution: Public Domain

Mexican Cartels Buying Land on Colombia-Venezuela Border

A coca plantation of the kind found on the Colombia-Venezuela border.


“The first thing the cartels ask is if the farm has a landing strip because that gives the property a very high price.”


Mexican criminal organizations have ambitions to transform much of South America’s drug trade through a robust physical presence in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.  Previously, emissaries of Mexican criminal organizations had arrived at the Colombia-Venezuela border in an attempt to mediate disputes between local drug gangs (see “Colombian Military Continues to Forcefully Dismantle FARC Dissident Structures,” OE Watch, #4, 2022).  However, according to one of Argentina’s leading news sites, Infobae, the presence of Mexican cartels extends well beyond mediation.  Under the guise of oil exploration, Infobae reports how Mexican criminal organizations are driving a real estate frenzy on the Colombia-Venezuela border.  Farmland with a landing strip is especially valued, since it gives drug flights the ability to land and take off near production and storage facilities.  Large farms with landing strips are common because the roads are blocked during the rainy season and prevent farmers from getting their harvest to market.  Another Infobae report indicates that Mexican cartels in the borderland have started to transform Colombia’s drug production as well.  Specifically, Mexican cartels have introduced coca plants that yield greater harvests while requiring fewer hectares under cultivation.  Mexican cartels that used to work with local criminal organizations are becoming more globally minded in an effort to cut out middlemen and other major players.


Source:

“Alarma por el crecimiento de la compra y venta de ganado del narcotráfico y la guerrilla en Venezuela con participación de militares y políticos (Alarm over the growth of the purchase and sale of property from drug trafficking in Venezuela with the participation of the military and politicians),” Infobae (one of Argentina’s leading news sites), 28 April 2022.  https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2022/04/28/alarma-por-el-crecimiento-de-la-compra-y-venta-de-ganado-del-narcotrafico-y-la-guerrilla-en-venezuela-con-participacion-de-militares-y-politicos/

There is a boom in the acquisition of properties by…Mexicans in the states of Apure, Guárico, Anzoátegui and Bolívar, with money of unknown origin…The first thing the cartels ask is if the farm has a landing strip because that gives the property a very high price.  The presence of Mexicans…has the excuse that they are interested in oil exploitation…For years, farmers have had airplanes mainly because in the rainy season, the roads are obstructed…Now, there are landing strips everywhere and aircraft landing and taking off at any time.

Source:  “Cómo el Cártel de Sinaloa y el CJNG han innovado la producción de cocaína en Colombia (How the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG have innovated cocaine production in Colombia),” Infobae (one of Argentina’s leading news sites), 11 May 2022.   https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/05/11/como-el-cartel-de-sinaloa-y-el-cjng-han-innovado-la-produccion-de-cocaina-en-colombia/ 

As if they were administrators of legal companies, the Mexican drug traffickers participate directly in the cultivation of the coca leaf with the introduction of adapted seeds…Lieutenants sent to the South American country not only supervise the planting, but also coordinate the shipment that guarantees the quality of the drug exported via Central America and its passage through Mexico to the streets of the United States, where the product increases its value exponentially…Despite the limited planting area, they have also implemented strategies to increase the crop yields of plantations.


Image Information:

Image caption:  A coca plantation of the kind found on the Colombia-Venezuela border.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/ciat/4387014624
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 2.0

National Armed Strike in Colombia Demonstrates Strength of Gulf Clan

The Colombian Police capture high-level figures in the Gulf Clan.

The Colombian Police capture high-level figures in the Gulf Clan.


“The illegal armed group carried out an armed strike between May 5 and May 9, 2022.  It is estimated that 24 homicides occurred, in addition to the incineration of nearly 200 vehicles to block roads.”


In November 2021, Colombian security forces arrested Dairo Antonio Úsuga, otherwise known as “Otoniel,” the leader of the Gulf Clan and the most wanted drug trafficker in the country.  Colombian President Iván Duque declared at the time that this was “the most important blow of this century against drug trafficking in Colombia” (see: “Colombia Celebrates the Arrest of Major Drug Trafficker ‘Otoniel’,” OE Watch, December 2021).  However, in early May, the Gulf Clan shut down wide swathes of northern Colombia, declaring an “armed strike,” according to Colombia’s leading weekly magazine Semana.  The strike, which lasted four days, was a direct response to the Colombian government’s decision to extradite Otoniel.  The government was slow to react, but eventually sent several thousand troops and police to intervene and lift the strike.  According to Colombia’s left-leaning daily El Espectador, the strike resulted in 24 homicides and hundreds of burned cars used to block highways.  It also exacerbated Colombia’s supply chain challenges.  Finally, the strike demonstrated the enduring power of cartels in Colombia and had an immediate ripple effect on Colombia’s presidential election.  Leftist presidential candidate, Gustavo Petro, blamed the security policies of past presidents, while the leading right-wing candidate, Fico Gutierrez, affirmed his support for the policy of extradition and a close security partnership with the United States.  Petro won the election, ushering a new era of what will likely be more limited cooperation with a formerly reliable U.S. partner in the region.


Source:

“Clan del Golfo: qué hubo detrás del paro armado? (Clan del Golfo: what was behind the armed strike?),” El Espectador (one of Colombia’s left-leaning daily newspapers), 12 May 2022.  https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/clan-del-golfo-que-hubo-detras-del-paro-armado/ 

The illegal armed group carried out an armed strike between May 5 and May 9, 2022.  It is estimated that 24 homicides occurred, in addition to the incineration of nearly 200 vehicles to block roads.  El Espectador spoke with several leaders of the affected areas and the general picture they gave us was that, despite the military deployment, the absence of the state was felt for five days.  Business was closed, people could not leave their homes, children could not go to school, threats to leaders were constant and they could not travel on the country’s highways.

Source:  “Terror en Antioquia: Clan del Golfo ha quemado 10 vehículos en medio de su ‘paro armado’ (Terror in Antioquia: Clan del Golfo has burned 10 vehicles in the midst of its ‘armed strike’),” Semana (Colombia’s leading weekly magazine), 5 May 2022.  https://www.semana.com/nacion/medellin/articulo/terror-en-antioquia-clan-del-golfo-ha-quemado-10-vehiculos-en-medio-de-su-paro-armado/202221/ 

Cargo and food transport vehicles have been incinerated, but there are also buses for the mobilization of people and even taxis.  Around 3,000 cargo operations have been stopped…In a pamphlet released by Gulf Clan, they assure that the ‘armed strike’ will be carried out for five days, during which time social, economic, educational and cultural activities will be entirely suspended.


Image Information:

Image caption:  The Colombian Police capture high-level figures in the Gulf Clan.
Source :  https://www.flickr.com/photos/policiacolombia/8616989338/in/photostream/
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 2.0