Category Archives: Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Terrorism and Transnational Crime.

Niger Claims France and Other West African States Planning Military Intervention

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The new military junta of Niger has demanded the departure of French troops stationed in the country. It has also accused Paris of colluding with other West African states to launch a military intervention into the country (Niger in green).

“With each coup d’état, the process is the same: discussions take place with the juntas in power, the French are asked to pack up and Paris generally complies after a deaf dialogue.”

Soon after seizing power, the military junta of GEN Tchiani in Niger made it clear that it wanted the French military out of the country. As anti-French protests proliferated in the capital, Niamey,[i] the junta quickly annulled former security cooperation agreements with France. The playbook was familiar, as the first accompanying article from Le Journal de l’Afrique articulates: “With each [West African] coup d’état, the process is the same: discussions take place with the juntas in power, the French are asked to pack up, and Paris generally complies after a deaf dialogue.” However, given a general reluctance for obeisance to the junta, France did not move its approximately 1500 troops immediately but stated that it would do so “once certain conditions are met.” Accordingly, French troops appear to have remained on bases in Niger or repositioned to Chad or Benin.

Tchiani’s junta has accused France of planning a military intervention in collusion with Niger’s neighbors as a result of this delay, combined with the repositioning of these French troops in other countries.[ii] According to the second article from the pan-African news aggregator AllAfrica.com, the Nigerien junta has claimed that France is repositioning troops in Senegal, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire for a military intervention in Niger. Acting on this fear, as per the third article from TogoBreakingNews, the Nigerien junta broke off military relations with Benin, accusing it of harboring “military personnel, mercenaries, and material of war,” under the auspices of “an aggression sought by France, with members of ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], against Niger.” This follows a broader pattern of the vilification of France by francophone governments around the continent.[iii] Paris has rejected the claims of collusion. The most recent discord between Niger and France is the latest in an increasingly predictable pattern. France’s status in West Africa is arguably the worst it has been in years as francophone West African militaries conduct putsches, consolidate power, accuse France of malfeasance then demand its departure, and often, subsequently invite in Russia and the Wagner Group.

Sources:

Ben Eddine, “Les troupes françaises, sans base militaire fixe? (French troops, without a permanent base?),” Le Journal de l’Afrique (pan-African news aggregator), 8 September 2023. https://lejournaldelafrique.com/les-troupes-francaises-sans-base-militaire-fixe/

It has become a habit for the French ministries of the Armed Forces and of Defence. With each coup d’état, the process is the same: discussions take place with the juntas in power, the French are asked to pack up and Paris generally complies after a deaf dialogue. After Mali, Niger. It’s been over a month since Niamey and Paris clash over military presence in Niger. The military agreements linking the two countries have been denounced by the junta in power in Niger. 

Because Paris would be in the process of redeploying part of its 1 soldiers stationed there in another African country. France may have taken the time to contest Niger’s demands, so it finally gave in. While French soldiers no longer dare leave their respective bases and French aircraft have not taken off for several weeks, France affirms that it will withdraw “certain military elements” as soon as security conditions are met.

Bamba Mousa, “Niger: Situation de crise – La France dément préparer une intervention militaire (Niger: crisis situation – France denies preparing a military intervention),” AllAfrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 11 September 2023. https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202309110572.html

Tensions between Paris and Niamey gave rise to a new skirmish last weekend. While continuing to refuse a rapid withdrawal of its troops from Niger, France denied the accusations made on Saturday September 9 by the junta, which accuses it of “deploying its forces in several countries of the Economic Community of African States of the West as part of preparations for an aggression against Niger, which it is considering in collaboration with this community organization.”

After the coup d’état of July 26, ECOWAS brandished the threat of military intervention as a last resort in the event of failure of negotiations, in order to restore constitutional order, to release the overthrown president Mohamed Bazoum and to restore its functions. A decision supported by France, which has around 1,500 soldiers in Niger. In a statement a few days ago, Niamey accused France to position troops and military equipment in Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal, in preparation for an attack on Niger.

Didier Assogba, “Niger: Le Bénin accusé d’abriter des mercenaires (Niger: Benin accused of harboring mercenaries),” TogoBreakingnews.info, 13 September 2023. https://togobreakingnews.info/niger-le-benin-accuse-dabriter-mercenaires/

The military in power announced the denunciation of the military agreement of July 11, 2022 with Benin.For the new Nigerien authorities, this decision is justified by the authorization granted by the Beninese government for the stationing in the country of “soldiers, mercenaries and war materials” in the perspective of “an aggression desired by France, in collaboration with certain ECOWAS countries against Niger.”

Notes:

[i] For more information on the anti-French sentiments in the African security sphere, see: Jason Warner, “Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow of Nigerien Government,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/anti-french-sentiment-undergirds-overthrow-of-nigerien-government/;  Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa,” OE Watch 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Matthew Kirwin, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Jason Warner, “Fake News in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News,’ French Counterterrorism, and the Logics of User-Generated Media,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/886306

[ii] The ECOWAS bloc have considered their own military intervention into Niger because of the undemocratic transfer of power in Niger. For more on perspectives of the potential ECOWAS intervention, see: Jason Warner, “West African States Split on Potential Intervention in Niger,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/

[iii] For examples of claims of French malfeasance by governments in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali in Accusing France of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/; Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171;

Image Information:

Image: The new military junta of Niger has demanded the departure of French troops stationed in the country. It has also accused Paris of colluding with other West African states to launch a military intervention into the country (Niger in green).
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Niger_France_Locator.svg
Attribution: Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

As Sahelian Jihadists Expand South, Côte d’Ivoire Stands as Model of Success

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While much of the rest of the Sahel has become engulfed in jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire, highlighted here, has had surprising success at avoiding the same violence.

“The goal is to reverse perceptions among border communities that the state has abandoned them. Doing so will reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents.”

For the past several years, a primary concern in the Sahelian region of West Africa has been the ability of groups associated with the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda to push southward as they march to the littoral of the Bight of Benin.[i] While Mali and Burkina Faso continue to be the epicenters of jihadist activity, even historically immune countries like Togo, Benin, and Ghana have seen their northern regions, which border Mali and Burkina Faso, experience violence from these groups.[ii] However, as the accompanying article from the pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies articulates, Cote d’Ivoire, which would reasonably experience similar threats, seems to have figured out how to protect itself from this southern push. According to the authors, the country’s success is due to its commitment to strategies of security and development. On the security side, the article notes that its “military and security interventions played a notable role in achieving the prevailing calm.” These included several standard practices: the creation of a nationwide counterterrorism strategy; the addition of new weapons and armored vehicles; and the creation of a new counterterrorism center. Yet from the authors’ perspectives, the real success story has been Côte d’Ivoire’s citizen-centric development efforts, targeting populations living in its rural north, who are most susceptible to violence and radicalization. To discourage their joining the insurgents, the government’s social program seeks to “improve civilians’ living conditions” to “reverse the perception among border communities that the state has abandoned them” so as to “reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents.” The development program has focused on improving infrastructure, health, youth employment, and social safety allowances. A recent report by the global think tank International Crisis Group draws similar conclusions,[iii] further underscoring the broader perception of Côte d’Ivoire’s efficacy on this front. As the United States and partner countries seek to stem the tide of jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire’s approach might bear attention as a model that could be replicated elsewhere in the region.

Sources:

William Assanvo, “Has Côte d’Ivoire found the solution to violent extremism?,” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African security studies think tank), 25 July 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-cote-divoire-found-the-solution-to-violent-extremism

No significant terror attacks have been reported in northern Côte d’Ivoire over the past two years, suggesting that its approach to addressing the problem has been effective. With many other states in West Africa still facing a growing threat, what is the country doing right?

Côte d’Ivoire’s border area with Burkina Faso was under substantial pressure from violent extremist groups between 2020 and 2021. Almost 20 attacks and incidents attributed to these groups were recorded in that period. These included attacks against positions and convoys of the defence and security forces, incursions into Ivorian territory, propaganda sermons, threats and intimidation of civilians.

In response, the government focused first on military and security operations, and then supplemented these with a social programme…

Following the Grand-Bassam attack, efforts to strengthen the security apparatus continued, including developing a national counter-terrorism strategy in 2018.

From 2019, the growing presence of extremists in Burkina Faso’s forests along the border with Côte d’Ivoire led to increased vigilance and a stronger military presence in the north. In May 2020, a joint military operation was conducted with Burkina Faso.

This saw the creation in July 2020 of an operational zone in the north, the set-up of military camps in some border localities, and significant investments in increasing the defence and security forces’ functional capacity. This included human resources, air assets, armoured transport vehicles and surveillance equipment.

A counter-terrorism intelligence centre, Centre de renseignement opérationnel antiterroriste, was created in August 2021 to improve intelligence gathering. Better regional cooperation between countries, particularly within the framework of the Accra Initiative in which Côte d’Ivoire participates, was another important part of the response.

The military and security interventions played a notable role in achieving the prevailing calm. Land, air and intelligence operations have contributed to reducing armed groups’ ability to carry out incursions, move around, and operate within Ivorian territory. And reinforcing the presence of soldiers along the border has reassured civilians. It is also possible that the lull is due to the extremists withdrawing across the border to continue their violence there or adopt a low profile.

While this period of calm prevailed, the social component of the Ivorian response to the terror threat was started. It is being implemented under the framework of the government’s second social programme (PS Gouv 2), which runs from 2022 to 2024. The programme’s first strategic axis includes addressing the fragility in the northern border areas.

The programme was announced in November 2021 and officially launched in January 2022. It aims to improve civilians’ living conditions by enhancing infrastructure and access to basic social services. The goal is to reverse perceptions among border communities that the state has abandoned them. Doing so will reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents. The programme focuses on education, health, access to electricity and drinking water, road maintenance, professional integration and youth employment, and providing social safety allowances.The Ivorian approach of combining a military, security and social response isn’t in itself innovative or fundamentally different from that used by neighbouring countries facing terrorism. Notable examples are in central Mali, the Burkina Faso region of the Sahel, and northern Togo. The difference in Côte d’Ivoire could lie in its implementation of these strategies.

Notes:

[i] For more on the push of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants towards the West African coast, see: Jason Warner, “UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/; Jason Warner, “Coastal West African States Brace for Wave of Terrorism From the Sahel,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428040

[ii] West African states have taken various approaches to dealing with jihadist insurgents, especially on the topic of negotiations. For more, see: Jason Warner, “Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants,” OE Watch 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/sahelian-countries-divided-on-negotiating-with-al-qaeda-islamic-state-militants/ 

[iii] The International Crisis Group report largely agrees that the dual security and development approach of Côte d’Ivoire has been important, but also notes that the country’s broader focus on economic development; the northern region’s importance as a base of power for the ruling party; religious tolerance; and an ethnically and regionally balanced military also played their own roles. To read the International Crisis Group study on the topic, see: International Crisis Group, “Keeping Jihadists Out of Northern Cote d’Ivoire,” International Crisis Group, 23 August 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/b192-keeping-jihadists-out-northern-cote-divoire

Image Information:

Image: While much of the rest of the Sahel has become engulfed in jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire, highlighted here, has had surprising success at avoiding the same violence.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b2/Cote_d_Ivoire_in_Africa_%28-mini_map_-rivers%29.svg
Attribution: TUBS, CC BY-SA 3.0

Presidential Candidate Assassination Shows New Depths of Ecuador’s Insecurity

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Ecuadorian Presidential Candidate Fernando Villavicencio.

“He [Fernando Villavicencio] structured his campaign around the fight against mafias and drug trafficking. Days ago, the candidate said that he had been threatened with death by ‘one of the bosses of the Sinaloa Cartel.’”

Over the past three years, Ecuador has experienced a tremendous spike in violence led by the activities of transnational drug trafficking organizations often operating in collaboration with local gangs,[i] which has resulted in skyrocketing homicide rates. [ii] Underscoring the extent of the violence, one of the leading candidates in Ecuador’s snap presidential elections, Fernando Villavicencio, was assassinated in early August after a campaign rally in Quito. Villavicencio polled in the top tier of candidates poised to make the runoff round, with a message focused on anti-corruption efforts. Villavicencio was a journalist who rose to prominence uncovering and denouncing corruption in the Rafael Correa government, as well as links between organized crime and members of Correa’s party. According to the excerpted article from the Spanish daily El País, in addition to denouncing corruption, Villavicencio had spoken on the campaign trail about a comprehensive security plan for the country, including cracking down on organized crime and building maximum security prisons. Days before his assassination, Villavicencio alleged he had been threatened by a member of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel with an interest in Ecuador. The allegation furthered speculation about the role of Mexico’s top criminal organizations, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, in Ecuador’s downward spiral of criminality. Infobae, an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage, states the Ecuadorian investigation has been unable to link Mexican cartels to the crime. Instead, the outlet reports that the investigative unit has uncovered firmer connections between those it suspects are responsible and the local gang Los Lobos and the Puerto Rican transnational crime group the Latin Kings. The development signals the difficulty of confirming the nexus between the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels and local Ecuadorian gangs. It also indicates that high-level politicians may be a new target for Ecuador’s criminal violence.

Sources:

“¿Quién era Fernando Villavicencio, el candidato presidencial asesinado en Ecuador?(Who was Fernando Villavicencio, the presidential candidate assassinated in Ecuador?),” El País (Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 10 August 2023. https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-10/quien-era-fernando-villavicencio-el-candidato-presidencial-asesinado-en-ecuador.html 

Among Villavicencio’s proposals were building ‘a very high security prison’ to lock up the most dangerous criminals, militarizing ports to control drug trafficking, and creating an anti-mafia unit that would pursue drug traffickers with foreign support…He structured his campaign around the fight against mafias and drug trafficking. Days ago, the candidate said that he had been threatened with death by ‘one of the bosses of the Sinaloa Cartel.’

“Asesinato de Fernando Villavicencio: investigan los vínculos del sicario con bandas criminales ecuatorianas (Murder of Fernando Villavicencio: investigating the hitman’s links with Ecuadorian criminal gangs),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 20 September 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/09/20/asesinato-de-fernando-villavicencio-investigan-los-vinculos-del-sicario-con-bandas-criminales-ecuatorianas/After the investigations carried out on the gunman’s mobile phone, the hitman’s links with organized crime groups in the country are being investigated…According to the report, the hitman recruited the first six detainees in the case, all of whom are Colombians from Cali…Others suspected of involvement have been linked to Los Lobos gang and the Latin Kings.

Notes:

[i] For more information on Ecuador’s security challenges and the government’s attempt to stem homicides, see: Ryan C. Berg, “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400849

[ii] For more information on the genesis of Ecuador’s violent crime and its impact on local politics, see: Will Freeman, “A Surge in Crime and Violence Has Ecuador Reeling,” World Politics Review, June 14, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/blog/surge-crime-and-violence-has-ecuador-reeling

Image Information:

Image: Ecuadorian Presidential Candidate Fernando Villavicencio.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alternativ_crop_of_Fernando_Villavicencio.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow of Nigerien Government

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices.”

France, and the West more generally, appear to have lost one of their last, and most consistent, West African counterterrorism allies with the ouster of Nigerien President Mohammad Bazoum on 26 July by Abdourahamane Tiani, the former leader of Niger’s presidential guard. Like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, all of which have been taken over by military juntas over the past several years,[i] Niger’s new military government has thus far painted France, and its lackluster counterterrorism and development efforts, as to blame for Niger’s woes.

As per the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.fr, the military junta spokesman, COL Amadou Abdramane, has claimed France was orchestrating a concerted effort to undermine the new leadership by releasing 16 terrorists and violating Nigerien airspace. According to junta statements, “Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices,” and “we are witnessing a real plan of destabilization of our country, orchestrated by French forces.” France has denied the claims. These sentiments echo previous assertions by senior officials in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, all claiming that France was funding or supporting terrorists.[ii] [iii]

These more specific claims are in line with a broader ethos of anti-French sentiment that marked the overthrow in Niger. In the immediate aftermath of the takeover, thousands of protestors attacked the French Embassy in Niamey. As in Mali and Burkina Faso, protestors displayed signs depicting anti-French (“France kills in Niger”) and pro-Russian (“Down with France, vive Russia!”) sentiments. Translating this French antipathy into policy, on 4 August, the junta declared that it had formally annulled its security cooperation activities with France that were foundational to fighting Islamist insurgencies tied to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Simultaneously, it ceased the dissemination of French-funded broadcasters France 24 and RFI, following similar moves by Burkina Faso and Mali. Unless former president Bazoum is reinstalled, the takeover in Niger portends a loss of not only French but U.S. influence, especially in the counterterrorism space. If Mali and Burkina Faso provide any guide, it is reasonable to expect Niger’s new government to pursue a similarly populist, anti-French, pro-Russian—and likely pro-Wagner[iv]—path in coordination with other African military regimes.

Source:

“Niger: la junte accuse la France d’avoir “libéré des terroristes (Niger: junta accuses France of having liberated terrorists),” Africanews.fr (pan-African news aggregator), 8 August 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/08/09/niger-la-junte-accuse-la-france-davoir-libere-des-terroristes/

Niger’s new military rulers on Wednesday accused France, the country’s traditional ally, of having “unilaterally freed captured terrorists,” a term used for jihadists, and of breaching a ban on the country’s air space.

They claimed that France released a number of jihadists, who then gathered to plan an attack on “military positions in the tri-border area,” a hotspot region where the frontiers of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali converge.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behaviour of the French forces and their accomplices,” according to the statement issued by the new regime, called the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP).

The statement reported that a unit of the armed forces had come under attack on Wednesday, although it did not directly link this with France’s alleged release of the jihadists.

A position held by the National Guard in a locality called Bourkou Bourkou, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from a gold mine at Samira in western Niger, came under attack at 6:30 am (0530 GMT), it said.

“At present, the toll is not yet known.”

The statement called on the security forces to “raise their alert level across the country” and on the public “to remain mobilised and vigilant.”

The regime also accused France of having allowed a “military plane” to take off Wednesday from neighbouring Chad, which then crossed into Niger, defying a ban imposed on Sunday.

The aircraft “deliberately cut off all contact with air traffic control on entering our air space,” from 6:39-11:15 am (0539-1015 GMT), it said in a statement read on national TV.

France has around 1,500 troops in Niger, supporting the country in its fight against jihadists who swept in from Mali in 2015.

But relations broke down after French ally President Mohamed Bazoum was toppled by members of his guard on July 26.

The regime’s accusations come on the eve of a summit by the West African regional bloc ECOWAS on how to tackle the Niger crisis.ECOWAS — the Economic Community of West African States — had given the coup leaders until Sunday to reinstate Bazoum or face the risk of military intervention.

Notes:

[i] For more on the relationship between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/

[ii] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171; Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali in Accusing France of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/

[iii] For more information on the anti-French sentiments in the security sphere in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iv] For more on how post-coup African states have begun to cooperate with the Wagner Group, see: Jason Warner, “Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russian Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg
Attribution: CC By 2.0

Cameroon Requests Nigeria and Chad Prevent Boko Haram Border Attacks

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Military vehicles of the BIR in Far Northern Cameroon 2019

“Officials in northern Cameroon have called on neighboring Chad and Nigeria to deploy additional troops to their border to counter attacks by the Islamist group.”

On 1 June, the French-language Cameroonian publication actucameroun.com reported on Cameroon’s call for its neighbors, Chad and Nigeria, to bolster troop deployments to their mutual border with Cameroon to stop attacks from Boko Haram. This came after Cameroon’s Far North region governor claimed hundreds of Boko Haram members infiltrated the Cameroonian border. According to the article, Cameroonian President Paul Biya responded to the escalating Boko Haram attacks along Cameroon’s Lake Chad shoreline by ordering an emergency meeting of military and government officials in the country’s north to develop strategies to prevent further Boko Haram incursions.

The article claims that Boko Haram attacks in northern Cameroon are increasing. The group abducted six civilians in Amchidé and shot and wounded another civilian. The attack resembled those of the late Abubakar Shekau’s faction, which is notorious for harassing civilians even more than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-affiliated faction.[i] History suggests attacks around Lake Chad will escalate without sufficient regional coordination to counter both factions.[ii][iii] The second excerpted article in Nigeria’s premiumtimes.ng reported on 18 August a promise from Public Information Officer of the Multinational Joint Task Force. This force includes Nigerian, Cameroonian, Chadian, and Nigerien troops and is based in N’djamena, Chad. The officer asserted that the force’s resolve to combat Boko Haram would be enduring.

Sources:

“Des responsables du nord du Cameroun auraient demandé à leur gouvernement et au Nigeria et au Tchad de déployer des troupes supplémentaires à leur frontière (Officials in northern Cameroon reportedly asked their government and Nigeria and Chad to deploy additional troops to their border),” actucameroun.com (French-language publication covering Cameroonian affairs from a neutral perspective), 1 June 2023. https://actucameroun.com/2023/06/01/des-responsables-du-nord-du-cameroun-auraient-demande-a-leur-gouvernement-et-au-nigeria-et-au-tchad-de-deployer-des-troupes-supplementaires-a-leur-frontiere/?_unique_id=64785f3f48c1b

As Boko Haram attacks intensify, we have learned that officials in northern Cameroon have called on neighboring Chad and Nigeria to deploy additional troops to their border to counter attacks by the Islamist group. The governor of the Far North region of Cameroon, which shares a border with Chad and Nigeria, revealed that hundreds of heavily armed radical Islamists infiltrated the dangerous Lake Chad Basin region and attacked, looted, and spread fear. 

President Paul Biya ordered officials and troops in Cameroon’s Far North region to hold an emergency crisis meeting and to ensure that the armed Islamist extremists infiltrating the troubled Lake Chad region are thwarted. 

In context of this security threat, we learn that the leaders of northern Cameroon do not intend to remain only at their border but have asked the neighboring countries, Nigeria and Chad, to also deploy men at their border in order to capture the terrorists.

“MNJTF Eliminates Boko Haram Fighters in Cameroon Axis,” 18 August 2023, premumtimes.ng (Abuja-based publication noted for investigative journalism that is critical of the government) https://prnigeria.com/2023/08/18/mnjtf-eliminates-boko/

On August 17, 2023, the troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Sector 1 in Cameroon successfully intercepted remnants of the Boko Haram terrorists who were scavenging for logistics in Hile Halifa on the fringes of Lake Chad, Far North Cameroon. This successful effort signifies another major setback for the terrorist group, which continues to threaten peace and stability in the regionThe MNJTF Sector 1 continues to strengthen its resolve in dismantling Boko Haram and restoring stability in the affected areas.

Notes:

[i] Perhaps no one spoke in more detail about Shekau’s harming civilians than his own rival subcommanders. They accused him of, among other brutalities, killing displaced persons who had no other way of finding food or shelter but to seek the support of “Christian” aid organizations and the government in refugee shelters and camps. However, Shekau considered this to be “apostasy.” In addition, Shekau ordered the killing of anyone who opposed him or even disagreed with him, which earned him—and Boko Haram more generally—a notorious reputation among the civilians of northeastern Nigeria. This caused the group to lose support to the consternation of Shekau’s less radical subcommanders. See Nur, Mamman, ‘Exposé: An Open Letter to Abubakar Shekau’, in Abdulbasit Kassim, and Michael Nwankpa (eds), The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2018.

[ii] For more on regional cooperation to counter Boko Haram, see; Jacob Zenn, “Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch, 05-2023.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/multinational-joint-task-force-lauds-counterterrorism-success-against-boko-haram/    

[iii] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is the entity through which Lake Chad states, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, have intended to boost their “capacity by better sharing plans and intelligence, committing troops for longer operations and improving troops’ human rights compliance.” However, these states have resisted fully integrating their forces into the MNJTF, which may have contributed to the MNJTF’s lack of capacity to eliminate or significantly reduce Boko Haram attacks or border incursions around Lake Chad. See International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?,” Report  #291, July 7, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

Image Information:

Image: Military vehicles of the BIR in Far Northern Cameroon 2019
Source: Moki Edwin Kindzeka (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Military_vehicles_of_the_BIR_in_Far_Northern_Cameroon_2019.jpg
Attribution: (CC x 2.0)

UN Assesses Core of Islamic State Stagnating, While Some Global Affiliates Thrive

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Flag of the Islamic State.

“Despite significant attrition of the Da’esh leadership and a reduction in activity in the core conflict zone, the risk of resurgence remain[s].”

The United Nations Monitoring Team has released a new report on the status of the Islamic State (IS) around the world. The report details member states’ efforts to combat the group’s core presence as well as the activities of IS affiliate branches around the world.

The report notes that despite the international cooperation against the Islamic State, its core group, based in Iraq and Syria, still has an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 fighters. The report notes IS attacks have slowed from the previous reporting period (the second half of 2022), though the group maintains a low-level insurgency, particularly taking advantage of the security vacuums along the Kurdistan border in Iraq. The report also underscores that IS core’s reserves of $25 to $50 million have dwindled significantly, though it continues to raise funds, most commonly via kidnapping for ransom. Notably, the report relays that continued counterterror pressure from states around the world has led IS to adopt an increasingly decentralized model of governance extending to IS’s global provinces. While no evidence exists to demonstrate these provinces are being commanded and controlled by IS central, “reporting shows that financial, propaganda and other connections remain.” The satellite provinces of the Islamic State remain a concern. The report assesses the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) to be “the most serious terrorist threat in Afghanistan and the wider region.” With fighters and their family members estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 individuals, the report notes that IS-K has adopted increasingly sophisticated tactics aimed at demonstrating the Taliban’s inability to ensure security.[i] The IS continued to demonstrate its staying power in Africa,[ii] the world region most beset by jihadist terror.[iii] In the Sahel,[iv] the report notes that the IS-Sahel province, “had become increasingly autonomous and had played a significant role in the escalation of violence in the region,” though curiously, the report makes no mention of the largest IS branch in Africa, the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP). The report notes that an estimated 300 to 500 fighters still exist in southern Libya, and that UN member states have grown concerned about the presence of a strengthening IS presence in Sudan considering the country’s recent political turmoil.

Source:

United Nations Security Council, “Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat,” United Nations Security Council, 31 July 2023. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F568&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

During the first half of 2023, the threat posed to international peace and security by Da’esh and its affiliates remained mostly high in conflict zones and low in non-conflict areas. However, the overall situation is dynamic, with notable subregional variation in activity. Leadership attrition, as well as counter-terrorism efforts by Member States in certain regions, continue to have an impact on Da’esh activities. Multilateral cooperation has remained essential to effectively responding to the threat, including through an integrated and balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy…

Despite significant attrition of the Da’esh leadership and a reduction in activity in the core conflict zone, the risk of resurgence remained. The group has adapted its strategy, embedding itself with local populations, and has exercised caution in choosing battles that are likely to result in limited losses, while rebuilding and recruiting from camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic and from vulnerable communities, including in neighbouring countries…

The trend of counter-terrorist pressure prompting Da’esh to adopt less hierarchical and more networked, decentralized structures has continued, with operational autonomy in the affiliated groups. Member States have little evidence that the core leadership is exercising command and control of regional affiliates, although reporting shows that financial, propaganda and other connections remain…The group’s media apparatus leverages the operations of Da’esh affiliates in conflict zones in its propaganda efforts, reaching a wide audience, with the aim of radicalizing potential recruits, gaining support and inspiring attacks beyond conflict zones. While its previously well-developed external operations capability remained diminished and largely constrained, the ambition to reconstitute is clear. The situation in Afghanistan has become more complex, with increasing Member State concerns about the ability of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) (QDe.161) to project a threat both in the region and further afield…

Notes:

[i] For more on the UN’s critiques of the Taliban, see: Jason Warner, “Taliban Responds to UN Reports Claiming Taliban Rule Aids Terrorist Expansion,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/taliban-responds-to-un-reports-claiming-taliban-rule-aids-terrorist-expansion/

[ii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch,03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iii] For more on Africa as the new epicenter of global terrorism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/african-leaders-and-un-see-terrorism-in-the-sahel-as-dire/

[iv] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch, JNIM, Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch,05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch,04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Islamic State. 
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants

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Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda

“Niger’s approach [to addressing jihadists threats]… starkly contrasts with the regional trend.”

The countries of the Sahel are undertaking divergent paths when it comes to the question of negotiating with terror groups as the African region cements itself as the new epicenter of global jihadist terrorism.[i] Most countries in the Sahel, and wider West Africa, have shown a reluctance to negotiate with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ)[ii] or the Islamic State (IS),[iii] as well as with secular separatist insurgencies. Burkina Faso’s prime minister, Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela, was emphatic that his country, which has seen one of the most significant spikes of jihadist violence of any in the world, would “never negotiate” with the militants in his country, according to the pan-African news aggregator allafrica.com,. He articulated, “The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield.” Burkina Faso looks to rely heavily on its armed self-defense force, The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, or VDP (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie). The VDP is an auxiliary unit working alongside the armed forces of Burkina Faso, which has been criticized for providing civilians arms and authority for violence with as little as two weeks of training.[iv] Burkina Faso is also presumed to be receiving some assistance from the Wagner Group to facilitate this kinetic response, which it has officially denied.[v] Niger has taken a different approach, combining negotiations with AQ and IS elements with kinetic counterterror efforts. Niger’s counterterrorism strategy is seen as being much more effective than the zero-tolerance negotiation policy of other Sahelian states, according to a second article from the centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies.. Niger’s approach is modeled after the successes of two other regional states, Algeria and Mauritania, to their own insurgencies, and it derived from its own successful history of addressing Tuareg rebellions that plagued the country for years. The military-first approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has shown its limits over the past decade. The authors of the second article give advise: “Niger’s neighbors in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations.”

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: Prime Minister Rules Out Any Deal With Jihadists, Boosts Civil Militias,” Allafrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 31 May 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202305310419.html  

Burkina Faso’s prime minister on Tuesday ruled out any negotiations with jihadist insurgents that have taken control of swathes of the West African country since 2015. 

“We will never negotiate, either over Burkina Faso’s territorial integrity or its sovereignty,” Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela told parliament, adding that the government aimed to double the number of volunteers for the VDP civil defence militia to 100,000. 

“The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield,” de Tambela told the Transitional Legislative Assembly. 

Hassane Koné and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Is Niger’s counter-terrorism approach an exception in the Sahel?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 5 April 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-nigers-counter-terrorism-approach-an-exception-in-the-sahel  

In early 2022, Nigerien authorities recognised the need for dialogue with jihadist leaders in Tillabéri. This was inspired after several Nigeriens defected from their extremist groups, and violence in the Diffa region decreased after a disarmament and reintegration process launched in 2016…. 

The use of dialogue in Tillabéri shows strong political will on the part of the government, which is keen to disincentivise engagement with extremist groups, and stabilise the region. Niger’s approach, which combines dialogue and military action, starkly contrasts with the regional trend. Neighbouring countries have reinforced their military tactics through diversifying strategic alliance and employing armed civilians…  

By including dialogue in its counter-terrorism efforts, Niger is experimenting with an approach similar to those in Algeria and Mauritania, underpin their decade-long protection against jihadist violence. 

Niger’s neighbours in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations. A coordinated regional approach would also exert pressure on terrorist groups and ultimately deprive them of human resources.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Sahel’s role as the new center of global jihadism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[ii] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

[iii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “”UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iv] For more on the VDP and critiques of it, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

[v] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda  
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa

“[African critics] no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.”

Unprecedented waves of anti-French sentiment have swept over many francophone African countries over the past four years. These manifest in large-scale civil society protests in Mali and Burkina Faso, the targeting of French counterterror convoys throughout the Sahel, and accusations from both Mali and the Central African Republic that France is actively funding terrorists. [i]

The reasons why anti-French sentiment has become so pervasive are detailed in the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com. . The article is based on the findings of an upcoming report from noted French think tank, the Institute for International Relations (IFRI). The report suggests there are three issues: African critiques of the French military and counterterrorism presence, a lack of development, and disdain over the CFA (Communauté financière d’Afrique) currency. The report also notes that France is consistently scapegoated by African political and military leaders for their own failures: “It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” The pervasiveness of simple untruths maligning French military and counterterror presence in the Sahel—what some researchers have called “Afrancaux News”[ii]—is similarly driving the pervasiveness of the anti-French sentiment. The IFRI report notes that African critics “no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.” While Russian disinformation campaigns vilifying France and promoting Russia exacerbate the sentiment, the report’s authors recognize that France itself does bear some responsibility for its declining reputation on the continent, with French leaders long believing that anti-French sentiment was merely tied to episodic crises and was not part of longstanding grievances tied to the colonial legacy of France in Africa. Understanding African public opinion remains imperative as many countries in francophone Africa—Mali, Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic most prominently—move even further away from France and toward Russia.[iii]

Sources:

“Pourquoi le sentiment anti-français imprègne l’Afrique francophone? (Why is anti-French sentiment so pervasive in Africa?) Africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator),” 15 June 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/06/14/pourquoi-le-sentiment-anti-francais-impregne-lafrique-francophone/ 

Anti-French rhetoric in French-speaking Africa has spread beyond the educated urban elite, and the phenomenon could “take root for a long time,” says Alain Antil, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), in an interview. 

In recent years, criticism of France’s policies has been accompanied by violent demonstrations against French companies such as Total and against diplomatic representations in Chad, Mali, and, more recently, Burkina Faso. 

The depth of the phenomenon is “nothing like what we saw in previous decades,” points out Antil, who heads Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Centre and who on Wednesday, with his colleague Thierry Vircoulon, is publishing a study devoted to “Themes, actors, and functions of anti-French discourse in French-speaking Africa”. 

We are a long way from the days ”when highly articulate criticism (…) was confined to leading circles of intellectuals and sometimes, during serious political crises, spilled out onto the streets,” he says. 

It is striking to note that critics no longer even try to demonstrate untruths: ”We no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. We just say so,” he observes. 

For the researcher, the intensification of anti-French sentiment can be explained by ”disappointing economic and political trajectories” in countries where the population had once pinned their hopes on economic progress and democracy. 

Faced with the failure of their own policies, the leaders of these countries resort to ”scapegoating techniques”: “France is ultimately responsible for the non-development of these countries and the corruption of their elites,” explains Antil. ”It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” 

At the same time, this anti-French rhetoric has been able to flourish because French leaders have been slow to react. 

Until very recently, the French authorities ”were in a kind of denial,” seeing it simply as a correlation with crises, ”outbreaks of hives” or manipulation by the Russians, explains the researcher. 

The study does show ”a link between this Russian propaganda war and certain segments of African social networks.” 

It is undeniable that social networks have massively circulated false information, such as videos or photos showing French soldiers ”supposedly” stealing gold or ”consorting with jihadists,” stresses Alain Antil. 

But the expert warns against the temptation to explain everything in terms of Russian propaganda. 

“Obviously, the Russians are playing their part, having an impact and funding anti-French campaigns,” he says.  

However, he warns that it would be a mistake to think that ”explaining to Africans that they are being manipulated by the Russians will put an end to it.” 

Far from abating, this rhetoric will take root ”for a long time in the politics and public opinion of these countries,” he adds, citing three factors fuelling anti-French sentiment: the military presence, the development aid policy, and the currency. 

While the number of French troops has fallen drastically from 30,000 in the early 1960s to around 6,100 today, ”interventionism has not diminished,” notes the researcher.

Notes:

[i] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

[ii] For more information on the anti-French counterterror sentiment, see: Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iii] For more on African states’ growing alliances with Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Top Ugandan General Adds to List of Growing Pro-Russian African Military Personnel” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/top-ugandan-general-adds-to-growing-list-of-pro-russian-african-military-personnel/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429302

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa  
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Taliban Responds to UN Reports Claiming Taliban Rule Aids Terrorist Expansion

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The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) decries a UN report “biased and far from reality”

“A range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of manoeuvre under the Taliban de facto authorities. They are making good use of this, and the threat of terrorism is rising in both Afghanistan and the region.”

The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team for the Taliban released a report in June 2023 critically assessing the status of the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan since the group took over the country in August 2021. For its part, the Taliban released an equally scathing rebuke of the UN’s report. The Monitoring Team report, which draws from reporting by UN member states, underscores the link between the Taliban’s rule and the greater latitude of movement that certain terror groups have in the region. Most notably, it articulates that “the link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic,” and that there “are indications that Al-Qaida is rebuilding operational capability [and] that the TTP is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban.” The report does note that not all terrorist groups enjoy equal latitude: the Taliban has attacked members of the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K), though not to a degree that the operations of the latter have declined in a meaningful way. To the contrary, the report suggests that IS-K’s numbers have grown substantially, now estimated to be between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters, a number that members of the U.S. intelligence community have claimed is significantly higher than their estimates.[i] IS-K has taken advantage of the lack of Taliban control to consolidate its power in more remote locations. As the UN report notes, “Attacks against high-profile Taliban figures raised [IS-K] morale, prevented defections, and boosted recruitment, including from within the Taliban’s ranks.”

Representatives of the Taliban government responded, calling the UN’s report “biased and far from reality” and “full of prejudice.” The Taliban press release notes that contrary to what the UN report claims, the Taliban government does not allow its territory to be used to threaten neighboring countries, the region, or the world writ large. From the perspective of the Taliban, “the publication of such reports…does not help Afghanistan…rather, it increases worry among the people… [and casts] doubts on [sic] the impartiality and independence of the United Nations.” The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has widened the window of growth for Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups. The same threat actors that have consumed it for nearly two decades—the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State—still remain pernicious challenges even as the United States has shifted to focus most acutely on near-peer competition with China and Russia. [ii]

Sources:

“Letter dated 23 May 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 1 June 2023, United Nations Security Council Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports

The Taliban, in power as the de facto authorities in Afghanistan under Hibatullah Akhundzada, have reverted to the exclusionary, Pashtun-centred, autocratic policies of the Taliban administration of the late 1990s. 

The link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic. A range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of manoeuvre under the Taliban de facto authorities. They are making good use of this, and the threat of terrorism is rising in both Afghanistan and the region. While they have sought to reduce the profile of these groups and have conducted operations against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-K), in general, the Taliban have not delivered on the counter-terrorism provisions under the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the United States of America and the Taliban. 

There are indications that Al-Qaida is rebuilding operational capability, that TTP is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban, that groups of foreign terrorist fighters are projecting threat across Afghanistan’s borders and that the operations of ISIL-K are becoming more sophisticated and lethal (if not more numerous). 

It is too early to judge the impact of the decree by the Taliban in April 2022 banning poppy cultivation. At this point, prices have increased, as has production of the more profitable methamphetamine. Key Taliban individuals remain closely involved in production and trafficking.  The Taliban de facto authorities have had some success in revenue generation and budgetary management, with the caveat that data on expenditures is scant and opaque.  The effectiveness of the sanctions regime appears mixed. There is little evidence that it substantially impacts Hibatullah’s decision-making, but lifting sanctions measures is a constant demand by the Taliban engaging Member States.  Widespread availability and proliferation of weapons and materiel already in Afghanistan undermines the arms embargo.  A number of travel ban exemptions have been sought since the end of the group exemption for the Taliban in August 2022, but information regarding unauthorized travel and late requests is concerning.

Notes:

[i] Jeff Seldin, “UN Report Warns Al-Qaida, Islamic State Growing in Afghanistan,” Voice of America, 15 June 2023. https://www-voanews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.voanews.com/amp/un-report-warns-al-qaida-islamic-state-growing-in-afghanistan/7138133.html

[ii] For more on the state of the global terrorist landscape, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 5-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303; Jason Warner, “Global Reactions Vary After Death of Al-Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri,” OE Watch, 9-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425695

Image Information:

Image: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) decries a UN report “biased and far from reality”
Source: https://www.alemarahenglish.af/the-statement-of-ieas-spokesperson-on-the-recent-report-of-the-united-nations-security-council/
Attribution: Public Domain

Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence

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Map of Mali

Map of Mali.

“More than nine of out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of jihadist insecurity.”

In its annual report gauging public interest on various topics in Mali, the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has revealed deep—and sometimes counterintuitive—insights about how Malians think about the security situation in their country.[i] According to the accompanying news article from pan-African news aggregator AfricaNews.com,which summarized the FES report, one of the key takeaways of the poll is the deep trust that a vast majority of Malians appear to place in Russia’s ability to help the country address violence caused by its various jihadist insurgencies. As the article relays, “More than nine out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of jihadist insecurity,” with 69 percent of respondents “very confident” and 22 percent “rather confident.” Also, four out of five Malians viewed there to be no negative impact from the withdrawal of the French Operation Barkhane, while 48 percent of respondents instead noted that the security situation had improved with the French counterterrorism force’s departure.[ii] Another notable finding relates to Malian perspectives about their own defense and security forces: the most common sentiment expressed (by 58 percent of respondents) was the Malian defense and security forces represented a source of pride for the respondent. The next most common perception was that “I see them as my protectors,” a view offered by 36 percent of respondents. Only 1 percent said that “I have no confidence in defense and security forces,” and no respondent agreed with the sentiment that “I am afraid of the defense and security forces.” Given that Mali and its neighbor Burkina Faso are now the new epicenters of global jihadist terrorism-linked deaths,[iii] and both have engaged the Wagner Group,[iv] the findings of the FES report are perhaps counterintuitive for outside observers. Malians see security improving, their lots in life getting better, and they are generally satisfied with the military regime of Assimi Goïta and the way he is managing military and security affairs. The Wagner Group’s presence appears to be welcomed, and France is not missed. Such perspectives should be taken seriously as the United States and its allies seek to engage Mali and the broader region.

Sources:

“Les Maliens majoritairement confiants dans la Russie, selon un sondage, (A majority of Malians are confident in Russia, according to a poll),” AfricaNews (pan-African news aggregator), 4 May 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/05/04/les-maliens-majoritairement-confiants-dans-la-russie-selon-un-sondage/

More than nine out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of insecurity and jihadism, indicates an opinion poll carried out by the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and published on Wednesday.

Malians are also satisfied in the same proportions with the leader of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta, who took power by force in August 2020, this survey shows.

The junta severed a longstanding alliance with France and turned militarily and politically to Russia from 2021.

The Malian army has received several deliveries of Russian military equipment as well as the reinforcement of hundreds of men, Russian army instructors according to it, mercenaries from the private company Wagner, whose actions are decried, according to France and its western partners.

The survey indicates that 69% of respondents are very confident and 22% rather confident in Russian aid in the fight against insecurity.

The general situation of the country has improved for more than four out of five Malians (82%), a result in clear increase compared to previous years, says the survey.

Nine out of ten Malians say they are satisfied with the management of the so-called transition period pending a return of civilians to power scheduled for March 2024.

Three out of five believe that keeping to the schedule [of the transition of power] is not important, the study notes. The first stage of this calendar, a constitutional referendum scheduled for March 19, has been postponed to an unspecified date.

Notes:

 [i] For a full copy of the FES report, in French, see: “Mali-Mètre 2023 – Enquête d’opinion, Fevrier 2023,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, May 2023. https://mali.fes.de/e/mali-metre-2023

[ii] For an example of the often-contentious relationship between Mali and France, especially regarding counterterrorism, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

[iii] For more on the Sahel as a new epicenter for jihadist terrorism-linked deaths, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, ith the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch,05-2023.; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[iv] For more on how Mali and Burkina Faso have each approached their relationships with the Wagner Group, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Map of Mali
Source: https://southafrica-info.com/africa/africa-from-a-to-z/attachment/map-of-africa-and-mali/
Attribution: Creative Commons 4.0