Boko Haram Train Attack Raises Frustration with Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy

81 Division NA - Camp Zairo, 2017.

81 Division NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.


“We failed to learn from our Boko Haram experiences, thus validating the dictum that those who fail to learn from their experiences are doomed to repeat them.”


The Nigerian government has been unable to curb Boko Haram attacks.  The excerpted article from Nigeria based vanguardngr.com expresses frustration over the government’s incompetence following an attack on a train in Kaduna State in late April.  According to the article, this is only the latest of many failures in Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy dating back to the notorious Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping of 2014.  The train attack is particularly notable because it occurred outside of Boko Haram’s main area of operations in northeastern Nigeria and came just two years after another Boko Haram faction loyal to al-Qaeda shot and almost downed a military helicopter in 2020.Vangaurdngr.com has previously been critical of the federal government led by northerner Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari, suggesting that the dire economic situation in Nigeria and lack of a government mandate over certain rural areas in Kaduna have facilitated Boko Haram’s spread in the country.  The article asserts the government is mismanaging the security situation in the country and failing to learn from previous mistakes in countering Boko Haram.  Unless the negative security trend lines are reversed, the article indicates the Buhari administration will have a legacy of empty promises.  Ultimately, the article demands the government prioritize defending communities against Boko Haram and warns that unless this is done, the group will continue to expand its operations and conduct devastating attacks like this one that erode the government’s legitimacy.


Source:

“Failure to learn from our Boko Haram experience,” vanguardngr.com (Nigerian media outlet), 19 April 2022. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/04/failure-to-learn-from-our-boko-haram-experience/

The train attack was obviously staged to embarrass and blackmail the Federal Government. They downed a military jet and attacked the Kaduna Airport twice. The steady massacres and attacks of defenceless communities in Southern Kaduna as well as Plateau and Benue states by herdsmen terrorists have gone largely ignored by the Buhari government. The parlous economic situation and near anarchy due to the failure of the Federal Government to protect innocent and defenceless people have continued to put a question mark on the positive legacy this regime has recorded. We failed to learn from our Boko Haram experiences, thus validating the dictum that those who fail to learn from their experiences are doomed to repeat them. We hope the next regime will review the actions of major actors of this administration in mismanaging our security.


Image Information:

Image: 81 Division NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.
Source: Hussaina Muhammad (VOA)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:81_Division_NA_-_Camp_Zairo,_2017.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Separatist Conflict Imminent in Northern Mali

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be implemented.”  


On 10 March, the Arabic-language website imangahdien.com, which covers northern Mali, published the excerpted interview with the spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).  The CMA includes Tuareg and Arab militant and political movements that seek autonomy for northern Mali.  In 2015, the CMA concluded a peace agreement with the Malian government, known as the Algiers Accords.  CMA spokesperson Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud suggests that the CMA may take up arms again against the Malian state and renounce the Algiers Accords.  The CMA views that a return to war is likely because the current Malian military rulers are unwilling to grant autonomy in parts of northern Mali to the CMA.   The CMA’s views regarding the lack of implementation of the Algiers Accords are consistent with the findings of the International Crisis Group, which argued in 2020 that the decentralization and regionalization guaranteed by the Accords had indeed not been fully implemented and that the Malian government focused almost exclusively on the jihadist threat.

Mouloud notes that the CMA welcomed the coup that brought the Malian military to power last year and ousted the democratically elected President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta.  According to Mouloud, Keïta did not implement the Algiers Accords.  However, the CMA believes that the military leaders have also not implemented them, despite their promises to do so.  Further, the CMA resents the military rulers because they allowed Russian forces, including from the Wagner Group, on Malian soil despite Russia’s record of human rights abuses in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere.  Moreover, the CMA claims that Russia will not be able to compensate for the withdrawal of French troops from Mali because the security and counter-terrorism demands of the country are too severe for either foreign power to resolve.  Rather, the CMA believes its own military forces should be granted increased authority to provide security in northern Mali.


Source:

“المتحدث باسم CMA: العودة إلى الكفاح المسلح ليست مستبعدة في ظل تنصل مالي من اتفاقية السلام (CMA Spokesperson: A return to armed struggle is not excluded because of Mali’s rejection of the peace agreement),” imangahdien.com (Arab language news website), 10 March 2022. https://imangahdien.com/en/2022/03/10/porte-parole-de-la-cma-un-retour-a-la-lutte-armee-nest-pas-exclu-a-la-lumiere-de-la-repudiation-par-le-mali-de-laccord-de-paix/

The spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements, which signed the peace agreement with the Malian government, stated that a return to armed struggle cannot be discounted because of the Malian government’s disavowal of the agreement concluded between the two parties.

Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud: In fact, we welcomed with anticipation the departure of the regime of former President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta, who had no will to implement the agreement concluded between the Malian government and the Azawad movements, signed six years ago, all of which was scheduled to be implemented within two years of its signing…. The precedent that has been procrastinating and manipulating the Azawadi issue.

Our position on the Russian presence is very clear and specific. From the first day, we issued a statement rejecting the Russian presence on the territory of Mali, and we said that this presence would represent a danger to the region, and that Wagner’s history is linked to crimes and massacres in Syria, Libya and Central Africa…. Of course, they will not be able to fill the vacuum of the French and European forces, and in fact, the security vacuum in Mali can only be filled by the re-arranged national army, to include the national forces of the Azawad movement.

Source: “Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm,” The International Crisis Group (international research organization), 24 June 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire

The agreement seeks to restore peace in Mali principally through a process of decentralisation or regionalisation, reconstituting a national army from the members of the former armed groups that were signatories, and boosting the economy (particularly in the north), based on dialogue, justice and national reconciliation…. So far, the measures have been temporary or too limited to make any real impact on the ground.


Image Information:

Image: Islamist fighters in northern Mali.
Source: Idrissa Fall
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Islamist_fighters_in_northern_Mali.PNG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Al Shabaab Takes Advantage of Somalia’s Disjointed Election Process To Ramp Up Attacks

A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.

A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.


“Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.”


As the accompanying excerpted article from Somali independent news outlet Shabelle Media Network explains, al Shabaab is involved in two aspects of the country’s dragged out elections.  First, it is delaying the voting process by targeting politicians and the means to conduct an election.  As the article notes, the election was originally scheduled for July 2021.  At that time, 329 seats in parliament were to be filled.  Second, it is taking advantage of the confusion caused by the delay to launch additional terrorist attacks, including two bombings in the city of Beledweyne, which claimed at least 48 lives.  Among the dead is Amina Mohamed Abdi, a young lawmaker who had been a strong critic of the government.  She is the fifth parliamentary candidate killed in two months.

Political disputes between President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, as well as  disagreements between the central and provincial governments, have had a significant role in knocking the election process off kilter.  All of this has played into the hands of al Shabaab, which has found the disarray an opportune time to strike at targets that compound the government’s inability to keep a firm election date.  Additionally, al Shabaab’s attacks have created concern among the civilian populace about their safety, likely suppressing the actual number who will go to the polls.  On the same day as the Beledweyne bombings, two al Shabaab militants breached Mogadishu’s heavily fortified airport, which was the designated location for the presidential elections.  It is also the location of the UN, AMISOM, and several Western embassies.  Western powers have been pushing Somalia to conduct elections, hoping they might help unify the divided nation and strengthen its ability to combat al Shabaab.  Al Shabaab’s recent attacks are a strong reminder that despite repeated pronouncements of the terrorist organization being weakened, it is still a potent force capable of frustrating both the Somali government and Western powers.


Source:

“Al-Shabaab Increases Attacks as Elections Drag in Somalia,” Shabelle Media Network (independent news outlet), 26 March 2022. https://shabellemedia.com/al-shabaab-increases-attacks-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/

 Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.

 Among the dead was a firebrand woman member of parliament, Amina Mohamed, who was on the campaign trail when she was targeted and killed by a suicide bomber.

 “If the election is being delayed then they must have got time, so that at least they can easily target the elders, who select the candidates,” Abdisamad said. “They can easily kill candidates vying for the seats. They can easily interrupt the entire election process, so that they see failed outcome at the end of the day.”

 Safiina said security has been tightened at all polling stations and is provided by national police as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Safiina said anyone who wants to undermine the election by acts of terrorism or disruption will fail.


Image Information:

Image: A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://flickr.com/photos/61765479@N08/27519432255
Attribution: Public Domain

Mexican Criminal Organizations Consolidate Their Positions in South America

Violence breaks out in Ecuador during protests over the spiraling security situation.

Violence breaks out in Ecuador during protests over the spiraling security situation.


“Mexican drug traffickers, especially from the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels, are sending emissaries that arrive at the border through Venezuelan territory and that, in a few cases, pass through Colombian airports in Bogotá and Medellín.”


Historically, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela had various homegrown criminal organizations all working with Mexican cartels.  More recently, however, it appears that Mexican groups are moving to cut out middlemen and become major players further afield of their traditional regions of operation and influence.  A series of recent events signal this shift in northern parts of South America. Ecuador suffered a series of deadly prison riots throughout 2021 and into 2022.  These gruesome acts heralded the arrival of Mexico’s powerful criminal organizations, jockeying for position in the country’s drug trade, as well as territory for the export of narcotics via the Pacific Ocean.  The excerpted article from one of Medellín’s leading newspapers, El Colombiano, reports that emissaries of Mexican criminal organizations have been on the Colombia-Venezuela border trying to mediate disputes between local drug gangs.  Purportedly, Mexican cartels would like to tamp down the violence and restore the steady supply of illicit drugs that existed prior to the Venezuelan government’s operations in the border regions.  The article goes on to say that representatives, mostly from the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels, arrive through Venezuelan territory, while others pass through Colombia.  The article from Colombian weekly magazine Semana reports that Colombian authorities arrested a top lieutenant of Mexican trafficker Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán in Cali.


Source:

“Emisarios de narcos extranjeros aterrizan en frontera con Venezuela para mediar en la guerra (Emissaries of foreign drug traffickers land on the border with Venezuela to mediate in the war),” El Colombiano (one of Medellín’s leading newspapers), 11 April 2022.  https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/narcos-mexicanos-llegan-a-colombia-para-frenar-guerra-criminal-en-frontera-con-venezuela-cocaina-y-armas-CH17239658

…It is in this context that Mexican drug traffickers, especially from the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels, are sending emissaries that arrive at the border through Venezuelan territory and, in a few cases, pass through Colombian airports in Bogotá and Medellín… The message they are sending is there is money for everyone and they do not have to kill each other.

Source:  “Cabecilla del cartel de Sinaloa y mano derecha del Chapo Guzmán fue capturado en Cali (Leader of the Sinaloa cartel and right-hand man of Chapo Guzmán was captured in Cali),” Semana (Colombia’s leading weekly magazine), 8 April 2022.  https://www.semana.com/nacion/cali/articulo/cabecilla-del-cartel-de-sinaloa-y-mano-derecha-del-chapo-guzman-fue-capturado-en-cali/202248/

In a condominium in the exclusive residential neighborhood Ciudad Jardín, in southern Cali, the authorities captured a Mexican citizen who arrived in Colombia as an emissary of the Mexican drug trafficker, alias Mayo Zambada, successor in the Sinaloa Cartel of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera… The whereabouts of the emissary was known thanks to the monitoring carried out by the authorities, with infiltrated agents.


Image Information:

Image:  Violence breaks out in Ecuador during protests over the spiraling security situation
Source:  Romina Icaza via Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/asambleanacional/5018365312
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 2.0.

Colombian Navy Discovers Clandestine Narcosub Shipyard

A narcosub of the type found in a clandestine shipyard in Colombia.

A narcosub of the type found in a clandestine shipyard in Colombia.


“Navy men located two semi-submersibles that were ready to be loaded with eight tons of cocaine… During the year 2021 and so far in 2022, 43 semi-submersible naval devices have been seized.”


Colombia’s criminal organizations have always proven capable of evading detection through innovation.  According to Colombian weekly magazine Semana, the country’s navy discovered a clandestine shipyard meant for building “narco-subs” for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group.  The shipyard was found in Nariño, a department on the southern border with Ecuador.  According to the article, the shipyard contained two half-built, 82-foot semi-submersibles with a full range of modern equipment.  Colombian authorities have seized more than 40 semi-submersibles since the beginning of 2021.  

Right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal says that traffickers have employed semi-submersibles with increasing frequency in the Pacific Ocean.  Colombian groups have recently started using this maritime route to move their products to Mexican criminal organizations rather than the land route.  Each narcosub can carry about four tons of cocaine.

Other semi-submersible submarines have been making trans-Atlantic and Pacific crossings in recent years.  Although there are no known instances of drug traffickers accomplishing this feat, it suggests that it is plausible that criminal organizations can ship their own product, even across the Atlantic, rather than hiding it in shipping containers or having to pay off corrupt customs officials.  Such a development would remove several points of vulnerability from the drug trafficking supply chain, making detection and interdiction more difficult in the vast oceans.


Source:

“Encuentran dos semisumergibles en selvas de Nariño, listos para cargar de cocaína (An encounter of two semi-submersibles in the jungles of Nariño, ready to load cocaine),” Semana (Colombia’s most famous weekly magazine), 16 March 2022.  https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/encuentran-dos-semisumergibles-en-selvas-de-narino-listos-para-cargar-de-cocaina/202239/  

Navy men located two semi-submersibles that were ready to be loaded with eight tons of cocaine…Semi-submersibles are used by drug traffickers to ship tons of cocaine undetected…During the year 2021 and ..in 2022, 43 semi-submersible naval devices were seized.

Source:  “CJNG. Salsa Club, el antro de los narcos mexicanos en Colombia (CJNG. Salsa Club, the den of Mexican drug traffickers in Colombia),” El Universal (a major Mexican daily that tends to lean right), 12 April 2022.  https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/cjng-salsa-club-el-antro-de-los-narcos-mexicanos-en-colombia 

The celebration was used by Colombian and U.S. agents to infiltrate and find out the details of the Mexican-Colombian criminal alliance to traffic cocaine in semi-submersibles through a maritime corridor of the Pacific Ocean that leaves the coast of San Juan de la Costa en route to…Mexico and the US.  The corridor covers the Pacific coasts of Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico, and in the 21st century it became a vital drug trafficking route from South to North America.


Image Information:

Image: A narcosub of the type found in a clandestine shipyard in Colombia.
Source: Peru Ministry of Defense via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Peru_Narco-submarine.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Nigerian Governor Assures Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram

7 Div NA - Camp Zairo, 2017.

7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.”  


Babaguna Zulum, the governor of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, is assuring Nigerians that a multi-pronged counterterrorism approach is leading to success against Boko Haram.  According to the excerpted 18 February article from Nigerian current events-focused Vanguard News, Zulum met with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and reported that 30,000 Boko Haram members had surrendered voluntarily to the Borno authorities.  He further underscored that defections from Boko Haram substantiate that dialogue with the insurgents, including guarantees of assistance for insurgents who lay down their arms, must accompany the army’s use of force.

Zulum noted that the heavy presence of Nigerian troops in southern Borno coincided with the defections and called for a similar deployment in northern Borno.  This indicates that military pressure on the insurgents led to demoralization and caused some of the insurgents to surrender.  Further, Zulum advised that once the government cleared insurgents from local areas, then it should immediately return displaced people to their homes with military protection.

Zulum distinguished between those Boko Haram members who the government captured and those who surrendered, with only the latter granted a chance for rehabilitation.  Given the success of such efforts, Zulum urged the Nigerian government to provide increased funding to repatriation, resettlement, and reconciliation programs.  More broadly, Zulum claims that Boko Haram will not be defeated completely on the battlefield and, therefore, the government must seek some form of political settlement through negotiations.


Source:

“Boko Haram insurgency’ll end by 2023 — Zulum,” vanguardngr.com (Nigerian news source), 18 February 2022. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/02/boko-haram-insurgencyll-end-by-2023-zulum//

The governor further said that the Borno state government does not offer any incentive to the fighters to come out of the forests; rather, they have done so voluntarily.

Zulum disclosed that he discussed the continuing surrender of the insurgents and the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with the president even as he said that the security situation in Borno state has improved considerably, hoping that things will continue in that direction. He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.

“… I’m pleased to inform you that there was a very heavy military deployment into the southern Borno. And I hope such a deployment will also take place in northern Borno, with a view to clearing the ISWAP insurgents in the Lake Chad.”

Source: “More than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered,” premiumtimesng.com (Nigerian news source), 21 September 2021. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/486107-more-than-8000-boko-haram-terrorists-have-surrendered-goc.html

The Acting General Officer Commanding (GOC), 7 Division, Abdulwahab Eyitayo, says more than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have so far surrendered to troops.… He said the surrender by the repentant terrorists was a welcome development, adding that the overwhelming fire power of the troops was responsible.


Image Information:

Image: 7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017
Source: Hussaina Muhammad, VOA
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:7_Div_NA_-_Camp_Zairo,_2017.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Somalia: How Al Shabaab’s Arsenal Grows

Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.

Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.


“The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for [al Shabaab] but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency.”


The Somali government and AMISOM have been unable to defeat al Shabaab in large part due to the terrorist group’s ability to procure weapons.  According to the accompanying excerpted report from a Somali organization that studies security issues, the Hiraal Institute, al Shabaab annually spends approximately $24 million acquiring weapons through several sources.  These sources include arms directly purchased by the group, including from corrupt government officials; those bought from dealers who frequently sell lethal wares from Yemen; and various small arms obtained in Somali black markets. Al Shabaab spends an additional $1.8 million per year on its in-house explosives and weapons manufacturing activities, with much of that money used to obtain chemical precursors to explosives.

Though al Shabaab is sometimes depicted as having internal divisions and problems, acquisition of these weapons as described by the report hardly appears haphazard.  Instead, consultative bodies and so-called ministries play a large role in properly arming the terrorist organization’s members.  Most important for regular arms procurement is the organization’s defense ministry, which receives a substantial monthly allotment of funds. 

Al Shabaab’s security committee, which draws from both the military command and executive leadership, makes the decisions for acquiring large amounts of equipment in preparation for an increased operational tempo, or for purchasing very expensive individual items.  Al Shabaab’s finance ministry is responsible for acquiring the funds necessary for these weapons purchases mainly through illicit taxation.  The report notes that the farmers, merchants, and others who are barely eking out a living are being extorted so that the terrorists can purchase more weapons which can be used to extort and hurt these people further.  Though the finance ministry’s methods can be quite brutal, they are also quite profitable, enabling continued weapons proliferation in a country already awash in arms from decades of inter-clan warfare.   The ready availability of so many weapons, especially in the hands of al Shabaab, has made the pursuit of peace, security, and stability by the Somali National Army and AMISOM, and the Western powers backing such efforts, extremely difficult.


Source:

“Al Shabaab’s Arsenal; From Taxes to Terror,” Hiraal Institute (Somali organization that studies security issues), February 2022. https://hiraalinstitute.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Al-Shabaabs-Arsenal-From-Taxes-to-Terror-Web.pdf

The situation in Somalia is increasingly one of stalemate, with little prospect of either the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with AMISOM and international support, or al Shabaab (AS) delivering a decisive military victory. However, AS remains adaptive and in control of large parts of Somalia, in particular in the south, with partial control over other areas. It is clear that AS has access to several sources to acquire weapons. The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for AS but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency. In October 2021, the Hiraal Institute undertook a four-month project to research the scope, scale, system, and use of AS resources to obtain lethal materiel, both in Somalia and from outside.

… It needs to be emphasised that all of AS’s actions within the security field – including arms procurement, capability acquisition, and distribution – are enabled by the extensive finance operations that the group undertakes, notably its illicit taxation collection and revenue gathering. In essence, the money that AS gathers illegally from those it forces to pay tax in Somalia funds the ability of the group to purchase weapons, arms, and ammunition that it then uses in its operations and attacks in the country.

Within Somalia, AS operates a hierarchical financial administrative structure. A central Finance Maktab headquarters oversees a financial centre under which provincial financial centres (one per AS designated province) operate. Funds are moved through regular AS financial channels, utilising a number of methods and in a corresponding variety of forms – cash, bank accounts and mobile money transfer, and hawala – to channel funds to where they are intended.

While Somalia and Yemen are largely excluded from the international banking system, the use of banks for transfers of illicit payments within Somalia is commonplace; again, reporting states that transactions are made via accounts in the name of friendly legitimate businesses or individuals.

Image Information:

Image: Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab
Source: Omar Abdisalan/AMISOM/flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/49590723103
Attribution: Public Domain

Colombian Military Continues To Forcefully Dismantle FARC Dissident Structures

A protest against the FARC and its activities.

A protest against the FARC and its activities.


“According to the National Army, these offensive operations are carried out within the framework of security provided by the Armed Forces in the midst of the 2022 Democracy Plan, in which they seek to counteract ‘the terrorist actions of the criminal armed groups in this region of the country.”


In 2016, the Colombian government signed a groundbreaking peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  The agreement was intended to put an end to over 50 years of conflict.  Colombia’s military, however, continues to fight dissident members of the FARC who rejected the agreement and did not lay down their arms.  Aided by the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela, FARC remnants remain a deadly and powerful force in Colombia, especially in rural and border regions as they push to expand their control of lucrative drug trafficking routes.  According to the excerpted article from the politically centrist Columbian daily El Tiempo, in recent months, Colombia’s military has clashed with members of FARC dissident groups as it increases the pace of special military operations.  The outlet reports that in one such operation in Arauca, the military killed 23 dissidents, including a top leader.  The excerpted article from Colombia’s most famous weekly magazine, Semana, tells the story of similar captures of important FARC dissidents in Tumaco state.  FARC dissidents are not only reconstituting themselves with the safe haven provided by Venezuela, but also competing internally between various dissident factions for territorial control.  Currently, the FARC is under heavy scrutiny in Colombia as the country is in the midst of a heated presidential campaign where security is, as always, an important topic.


Source:

“Mueren 23 disidentes en operación de ejército, entre ellos ‘Arturo’ (23 dissidents die in army operation, among them ‘Arturo’),” El Tiempo (one of Colombia’s oldest dailies generally described as politically-centrist), 25 February 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/arauca-23-disidentes-murieron-tras-operacion-militar-653989  

The newspaper established that for 20 days intelligence from the National Police had been monitoring the structure of ‘Arturo,’ who crossed the border from Venezuela with at least 35 of his men…It was established that after the intelligence group located the camp, a bombing operation was planned by the Colombian Air Force, and the Army Special Forces immediately entered and fought with part of the guerrilla.  Then the Judicial Police entered and managed to recover 23 bodies, including Arturo’s.

Source:  “Capturan a seis presuntos disidentes de las Farc en Tumaco (Six presumed dissidents of the Farc are captured in Tumaco),” Semana (Colombia’s most famous weekly magazine), 12 March 2022.  https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/capturan-a-seis-presuntos-disidentes-de-las-farc-en-tumaco/202208/    

According to the National Army, these offensive operations are carried out within the framework of security provided by the Armed Forces in the midst of the 2022 Democracy Plan, in which they seek to counteract ‘the terrorist actions of the criminal armed groups in this region of the country’…the Ombudsman’s Office warned at the end of February of a rearrangement of criminal dynamics…that seek to control this strategic corridor and the access roads to the city of Bogotá through the use of violence.


Image Information:

Image caption:  A protest against the FARC and its activities.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/kozumel/2245170100
Attribution:  CC BY-ND 2.0

Uganda and Rwanda Target Militants in Congo

Ugandan soldiers on parade.

Ugandan soldiers on parade.


“In order to fight them more effectively, our two countries [Uganda and DRC] have recently agreed to pool their efforts in order to carry out joint operations against this common enemy.”


The first accompanying excerpt from the Rwanda-centric media outlet taarifa.rw discusses the continued counterterrorism collaboration of Rwanda’s neighbors, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  The cooperation is meant to combat militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the insurgent Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), based in the DRC.  According to the article, the two countries’ forces have opened a second axis for launching an offensive against the ADF.  The article notes that originally Uganda entered the DRC with the DRC government’s permission because the ADF conducted two bombings in Kampala, but Uganda has increased coordination with the DRC to more effectively combat the ADF.

The second accompanying excerpt from the Ugandan publication pulse.ug also emphasizes a retaliatory objective for Uganda’s latest troop deployment to the DRC.  Besides the ADF’s bombings in Kampala, the group also began attacking markets located near Uganda’s northern border with the DRC.  After the ADF stole food and medicine and retreated, numerous displaced people crossed into Uganda, which created an additional humanitarian crisis for Uganda.  Further, the article notes the Ugandan army suspected that ADF members were operating in Uganda by disguising themselves as refugees.  This incentivized Uganda to enter the DRC to push the ADF back from the border.

As the final excerpt from the pro-government Rwandan daily newtimes.co.rw notes, there is a growing perception that the conflict in the DRC is now a regional affair.  According to the article, Rwandan President Paul Kagame is calling for collective regional military action to combat the ADF and the Rwandan government is opening lines of communication with Uganda to resolve their border issues as another means to address the ADF’s regional threat.  In addition, the article mentions Rwanda’s increasing collaboration with Burundi to target other militia groups besides the ADF, and with Mozambique to combat ISIS-loyal militants in that country.  This suggests that Rwanda is increasingly acquiring regional military influence.


Source:

“Uganda Sends More Troops To DRC,” taarifa.rw (Rwanda-centric media outlet), 3 February 2022. https://taarifa.rw/uganda-sends-more-troops-to-drc/

Uganda’s government says it has sent an extra number of troops into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo to bolster its fight against the Allied Democratic Forces rebels. Last year in November, thousands of [Ugandan] troops crossed into DRC on invitation by President Félix Tshisekedi to “fight against armed groups, in particular the Ugandan rebels of the ADF”. Uganda gladly accepted the invitation and responded by conducting aerial and artillery bombardment of ADF bases deep in the jungles of DRC.

The attacks in October and November [2021] prompted the Ugandan military to deploy in eastern DRC in late November to take on the Islamist fighters.

Source: “Thousands of refugees flee into Uganda after an ADF attack,” pulse.ug (Ugandan publication covering Ugandan affairs for a global readership), 7 February 2022. https://www.pulse.ug/news/thousands-of-refugees-flee-into-uganda-after-an-adf-attack/522ex8c

Uganda’s Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, Esther Anyakun, said that the ADF reportedly broke into pharmacies and shops as residents fled at their approach. The rebels allegedly made off with food and medicine. The refugees that crossed into Uganda were registered by Uganda Red Cross with the help of the Office of the Prime Minister and The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR. Only days before this fresh influx of refugees, residents in Bundibugyo and Ntoroko districts were advised not to accommodate refugees fleeing battle in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These refugees, Ugandan authorities said, would have to be reported to the Refugees’ Reception Center and be registered.

Source: “Security problems in DR Congo affect the whole region,” newtimes.co.rw (pro-government Rwandan daily), 8 February 2022. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/security-problems-dr-congo-affect-whole-region-kagame

President Paul Kagame has called for collective efforts by regional leaders towards the end of security challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo, mainly associated to armed militia groups based in the country. He said that Rwanda was ready to play her part in resolving the security challenges stemming from the neighbouring country. The head of state also weighed in on Rwanda’s ties with neighboring countries, which he said were on a promising trajectory.


Image Information:

Image: Ugandan soldiers on parade.
Photographer: Master Sergeant Carlotta Holley
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ugandan_soldiers_on_parade.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mozambique Struggles with Post-Conflict Recovery in War Torn Cabo Delgado

Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.

Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.


“With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that Medicines Sans Frontiers teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area…”


On 4 February, the international affairs focused Brazilian publication portalrbn.com published the excerpted article on northern Mozambique’s transition from active military conflict to post-conflict reconstruction.  According to the article, many civilians in Cabo Delgado remain displaced and lack medical care, while attacks by militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria persist.  For example, the militants carried out 20 attacks in the last two weeks of January, torching 2,800 homes and forcing 14,000 people to flee their villages.  The article indicates the military has retaken almost all the territory that the militants captured in 2021 but have not been able to prevent continued attacks on civilians.

Based on interviews with Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) personnel in the area, the article suggests that in addition to providing security, the military needs to find ways to provide medical care and protection against cyclones to aid displaced people.  If the military fails to do so, MSF warns the humanitarian crisis will spiral out of control, which will then affect the broader post-conflict recovery. 

In fact, further military support to Mozambique is expected in coming months. A 3 February article from South Africa-based news24.com noted that South African president Cyril Ramaphosa promised to continue South Africa’s deployment of 1,500 troops to Mozambique and allow for new investment to assist Mozambique’s post-conflict recovery.  According to the article, this will be essential to restoring normalcy to Cabo Delgado and allow for the reconstruction of northern Mozambique and the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis.  The article notes that Tanzania and Rwanda are also deploying forces to secure northern Mozambqiue and revitalize its economy, signaling a regional effort in ending the insurgency.


Source:

“Ataques e violência em Cabo Delgado deslocam milhares de pessoas no início da temporada de ciclones (Attacks and violence in Cabo Delgado displace thousands of people at the start of cyclone season),” portalrbn.com (Portuguese language international affairs focused Brazilian publication), 4 February 2022. https://portalrbn.com.br/mocambique-ataques-e-violencia-em-cabo-delgado-deslocam-milhares-de-pessoas-no-inicio-da-temporada-de-ciclones/

A significant part of Cabo Delgado’s population is now extremely vulnerable to displacement and the lack of access to medical care. Local authorities have reported more than 20 attacks on four villages in the last two weeks with 2,800 homes damaged or destroyed by fire. This is the biggest wave of displacement in recent months. “Violent attacks and continued insecurity in several districts of central Cabo Delgado have led thousands of people to leave their homes with only what they could carry, just as the cyclone and rain season is starting,” says Raphael Veicht, chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency unit.

With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that MSF teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area so they can provide people with the necessary care. It is absolutely crucial that medicines and medical supplies can be imported quickly without bureaucratic delays.

Source: “’We are fighting to bring peace’: Ramaphosa visits insurgency-hit Mozambique,” news24.com (South Africa based on-line news), 3 February 2022. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-are-fighting-to-bring-peace-ramaphosa-visits-insurgency-hit-mozambique-20220203

President Cyril Ramaphosa visited northern Mozambique, supporting the government’s latest effort to reassure neighbours and investors that an Islamist uprising is under control. Over the last week, Mozambique has tried to reassure neighbours and investors that their efforts are worthwhile. Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan visited last Friday and TotalEnergies boss Patrick Pouyanne met Nyusi in Maputo on Monday. Rwandan forces last week also allowed journalists a rare visit, to see how life is slowly returning to some of the hardest-hit areas.


Image Information:

Image: Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pra%C3%A7a_dos_Her%C3%B3is_na_cidade_de_Pemba,_Cabo_Delgado,_Mozambique,_VOA.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0