China and Taiwan Explain Key Differences Between Cross-Strait Relations and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

“We have seen that some people emphasize the principle of sovereignty on the Ukraine issue, but continue to undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan question. This is a naked double standard.”

-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi


Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked widespread concern that China could similarly invade Taiwan, although not everyone agrees with this analogy.  The accompanying passages from Chinese and Taiwanese sources consider the key differences between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China-Taiwan relations.

Two days before Russian forces invaded Ukraine, China’s Central News Agency released an article in which a high-level Taiwan national security official describes Taiwan as strategically located within the first island chain in East Asia, providing an important line of defense to keep communist forces “from crossing the first island chain and threatening the U.S. mainland.”  The article also argues that unlike Ukraine, which shares a common border with Russia, the Taiwan Strait offers a natural barrier between China and Taiwan, making it harder for communist forces to attack across the sea.  Finally, the article argues that Taiwan is critical to the development of automobiles, smart phones, wind power, and military equipment, which makes it more important than Ukraine to the international supply chain.  The article also states that China sought to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), arguing that “triggering boycott or sanctions by the CPTPP member states, which are mostly in the Indo-Pacific region, will not be something that China wants to see.”  The CPTPP is a free trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Four days after the invasion began, Taiwan’s only English-language newspaper, Taipei Times, published an article describing further differences between the Ukraine and Taiwan issues.  First, Taiwan “has the advantage of being a mountainous smattering of islands that have been building up defenses for decades.”  Next, the article opines that sanctions against China would likely have “a far more acute sting” due to the country’s economy heavy integration with the rest of the world.  Finally, like the first article, the author talks about the importance of Taiwan to the global supply chain.  According to this article, “The world relies on Taiwan for semiconductors, meaning that a Chinese invasion would at best disrupt supply and at worst rewrite the technological and geopolitical world order.”  In comparing the two leaders, the article describes Russian President Vladimir Putin as a tyrant in charge, who fears his time is running out, and Chinese President Xi Jinping as more calculating and prudent and who believes he only has to wait.  Despite these arguments, the second article warns, “no one can predict the calculations happening in the halls of power, and as the Ukraine crisis has shown, anything is possible.”  The article ends on a note for the people of Taiwan to be prepared. 

Chinese sources, such as the third article, published by China’s official English-language news outlet, China Daily, explain that the situation in Ukraine involves a dispute between two sovereign countries, whereas the question of Taiwan is a domestic matter.  However, the article also warns that while Beijing will try to unify Taiwan with the mainland peacefully, the central government will never exclude taking military action as an option.


Source:

Wen Kui-hsiang, “國安高層:台海與俄烏情勢三大不同 嚴防中國認知戰 (High-Level National Security Official: Three Major Differences Between Taiwan Strait Situation and the Russia-Ukraine Situation; Guarding Against China’s Cognitive Warfare),” Taipei Chung-yang T’ung-hsun-she (The Republic of China’s central news agency), 22 February 2022. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202202220333.aspx

 First, in terms of geostrategy, Taiwan is in the first island chain in East Asia, which is extremely important for the United States to containing the expansion of China’s communist forces and for maintaining the military, commercial and shipping security of the Indo-Pacific region. It is an important defense line to prevent the communist forces from crossing the first island chain and threatening the U.S. mainland.

 Second, the geographical environment is very different, and the U.S. commitment to cross-Strait security is clear and firm. The senior national security officials said that unlike Ukraine, which is close to Russia, the natural barrier formed by the Taiwan Strait makes it far more difficult for the Communist forces to cross the sea and attack Taiwan than it is for Russia to invade Ukraine. Moreover, the United States is more interested in the Indo-Pacific region, having U.S. military deployed there, whereas the Russia-Ukraine conflict has a limited impact on U.S. military deployment.

 Third, the importance to the international supply chain is very different. Taiwan holds a key position in the international supply chain for post-pandemic recovery. According to a senior national security official, Taiwan’s economic strength and high-tech industries…are crucial to the development of global industries, such as automobiles, smartphones, wind power generation, and armaments. Even China cannot escape Taiwan’s industrial impact.

 …China is also seeking to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership). At this time, unilaterally triggering disputes, boycotts, or sanctions by the CPTPP member states, which are mostly located in the Indo-Pacific region, is not be something that China wants to see.

 Source: “Taiwan is Different from Ukraine,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s only English-language newspaper and which aims to give Taiwan’s perspective to the international community), 28 February 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/01/2003773950

 First and most evident, Ukraine shares a long land border with its bellicose neighbor, while Taiwan has the advantage of being a mountainous smattering of islands that have been building up defenses for decades. Ukraine was caught off-guard when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and has been playing catch-up ever since. Most experts are confident that invading Taiwan would be immensely lengthy and costly for China, with no guarantee of success — especially with US involvement.

Sanctions against China would also likely have a far more acute sting, given its massive economy’s integration with the rest of the world. Beijing will certainly be watching closely to see how far countries are willing to go in sanctioning Russia, and adjust its risk calculation accordingly.

Perhaps most importantly, Taiwan is of critical economic interest to the countries poised to take action in its defense. The world relies on Taiwan for semiconductors, meaning that a Chinese invasion would at best disrupt supply and at worst rewrite the technological and geopolitical world order.

As unfathomable as it might seem to ignore these immense risks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown the world that when a tyrant is in charge, the war room is always open. Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is not the same as Putin, and neither are their countries.

 Source: “Tsai Ing-wen’s Empathy For Ukraine Ridiculous,” China Daily (China’s official English-language news), 24 February 2022. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202202/24/WS62177fafa310cdd39bc88c12.html

What is happening between Ukraine and Russia is a dispute between two sovereign countries. The question of Taiwan is an internal affair of China…

The mainland will try whatever it can to seek the peaceful reunification of the island, which it believes is in the interest of the Chinese people across the Strait. But military action is always an option the central government will never exclude.

Chinese Brigade Makes Improvements to Command Information System

“The battlefield situation changes constantly.  …The difference between victory or defeat can occur within a millisecond.”


A brigade in China’s 71st Group Army reportedly has upgraded and perfected its command information system, improving speed and accuracy in firepower response time.  The accompanying article, published in the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army, Jiefangjun Bao, explains that the command-and-control software originally issued to the brigade was limited and inadequate.  There were delays in coordination between detachments, which affected the firepower response time.  According to the article, to improve the overall function of the command information system, leaders within the brigade assembled a team of key personnel with technical specialties.  Experts from factories and scientific communities also participated.  The new upgraded command information system allows real-time data sharing and precise air defense and targeting.  If the report is accurate, the effort demonstrates the effectiveness of President Xi Jinping’s push to foster an environment of independent innovation at all levels.  There is no mention in the article about whether the PLA will distribute the improved system to other brigades.  However, according to a brigade commander mentioned in the article, they will continue to strengthen the development of information systems, explore and innovate combat methods and training methods, and further strengthen the troops’ expert capabilities in winning modern wars.


Source:

Liu Renhao and Gao Junfeng, “数据共享提升体系作战能力第七十一集团军某旅升级完善指挥信息系统 (Brigade in 71st Group Army Upgrades, Perfects Command Information System, Data Sharing Boots ‘Systems of Systems’ Operations Capability,” Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA), 14 February 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-02/14/content_309298.htm

…By upgrading and improving the command information system, this brigade shortened the firepower response time, effectively enhancing the unit’s combat power.

Previously, a command and control software was provided to the brigade. However, after several combat-realistic drills, troops found that, due to the limited capabilities of the command information system, delays appeared during information transmission, easily leading to situations where coordination between detachments was lacking and delays occurred with respect to firepower response.

“The battlefield situation changes constantly. In the blink of an eye, and the difference between victory or defeat can occur within a millisecond.”

“Real-time data sharing provides technical support for ‘system of systems’ operations and joint operations.” The brigade’s commander explained that in the next step, they will continue to strengthen the development of information systems, explore and innovate combat methods and training methods, and further temper the troops’ expert capabilities in winning modern wars.

China Deepens Information Security Cooperation with Central Asian Neighbors

Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.


“… in the future, information security cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation organization should proceed from a strategic and long-term perspective, improve its position, strengthen its capabilities, expand its horizons, and promote the development of regional and global network governance in a more benign and orderly direction.”


2021 marked the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  The SCO, a multilateral association of China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with four additional observer states, was created to ensure security and maintain stability across Eurasia.

While its focus was initially on traditional counterterror military and police operations, there has been a steady expansion of emphasis on cyber and information security cooperation.  The excerpted article published on the website of the China Institute of International Studies, CIIS.org, provides an outline of the development of this cooperation and China’s future plans.  Written before the outbreak of political violence in Kazakhstan in January 2022, the article provides a snapshot of how China regards its international cooperation efforts in security spheres, and more generally, influence on its neighbors.  SCO members have signed joint documents on information security likening the potential disruptive capabilities of information technologies to weapons of mass destruction.  As such, they emphasize the need to better grasp these technologies to adequately address what the SCO refers to as the “three forces”—terrorists, separatists, and extremists. 

The full article also highlights the role of cyber exercises in China’s engagement with the SCO over the past decade.  Were it not for the pandemic, the fourth iteration of biennial cyberterrorism exercises would have been held in Xiamen, Fujian Province in December.  The first exercise was held in 2015, with subsequent exercises in 2017 and 2019.  These exercises involved capture the flag, cyber forensic investigations and collaborative intelligence collection exercises, identifying terror organizations’ methods of recruiting members, identifying affiliated individuals, and carrying out coordinated arrests.

Taken together, China appears to be equipping its neighbors with the tools to carry out both traditional counterterrorism operations using modern technologies, and improving their ability to counter dissent or any threat to social stability.  The 2018 SCO Qingdao Summit announced the desire to expand SCO far beyond its original size and remit.  As repeated in official readouts at the time, the meeting “marked a new start as the SCO began to transform from an organization of mainly landlocked Central Asian countries to one of regional cooperation between coastal and hinterland countries.”  Cybersecurity and information cooperation—especially with an emphasis on public security, counterterrorism and internal control—will continue to be a springboard for deepening and expanding the impact of the organization.  As Central Asian countries react to the fallout from recent political upheaval in Kazakhstan, China is likely to double down on the promotion of these tools.


Source:

Deng Hao [邓浩], Li Tianyi [李天毅], “上合组织信息安全合作:进展、挑战与未来路径(SCO Information Security Cooperation: Progress, Challenges, and Future Path),” CIIS.org (Website of the China Institute of International Studies, a directly-affiliated research institute or think tank for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 24 September 2021.

https://www.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/sspl/202109/t20210924_8175.html

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211217134841/https://www.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/sspl/202109/t20210924_8175.html

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter referred to as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”). Security cooperation has always been the top priority of the SCO cooperation and is the biggest highlight of the SCO’s two decades of development. In the past 20 years, Central Asia, the core area of ​​the SCO, has not been rendered chaotic (lit. “Middle Easternized” [被中东化]) and has always maintained a stable overall situation. The effective security cooperation of the SCO has contributed greatly to this. Over the past 20 years, the economy of the SCO has generally improved. The economic aggregates and per capita GDP growth of its member countries have both been higher than the world average. The security provided by the SCO has contributed a lot. Information security cooperation is the “rising star” of the SCO’s security cooperation and a new force for the SCO’s security cooperation. It plays an increasingly important role in maintaining regional security and stability. The SCO is standing at a new starting point in the history of the third decade, and maintaining information security faces new challenges and pressures. In the future, the SCO information security cooperation should further strengthen the sense of a community of shared future, continuously enhance the ability to respond to information security threats, increase international cooperation, and strive to build a peaceful, safe, fair and open information space.

The SCO information security cooperation started in 2005. Over the past 16 years, the SCO’s information security cooperation has continued to expand from consensus to action and has made positive progress, showing great potential and good prospects…

In the Declaration of the Fifth Astana Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005, the heads of member states proposed for the first time the prevention of information terrorism. This is the first time that the SCO has raised the issue of information security in an official cooperation document. This opened the prelude to the SCO’s information security cooperation. The SCO’s security cooperation has begun to expand from the traditional field to cyberspace.

On June 15, 2006, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the SCO, the heads of the SCO member states held the sixth summit, which further clarified the need to maintain information security and jointly deal with the military, political, criminal, and terrorism they are facing… It was also at this summit that the heads of member states signed the first special document on information security cooperation-the “Statement of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on International Information Security.” The statement expressed concern about the use of information and communication technology to damage personal, social, and national security, and believed that information security threats would bring serious political, socio-economic consequences to countries and regions and the world, and trigger the instability of societies in various countries, which may cause It is a worldwide disaster equivalent to the use of weapons of mass destruction…

On September 13, 2013, the SCO held the 13th Bishkek Summit of Heads of State. The declaration adopted at the meeting clearly stated that it is necessary to build a peaceful, safe, fair and open information space based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and advocate the formulation of a unified information space national code of conduct. This is a new understanding of member states on national information security cooperation. The Dushanbe Declaration of the 14th SCO Heads of State Summit in 2014 further stated that member states support the right of all countries to manage the Internet on an equal basis and support and guarantee their respective sovereign rights to Internet security. This has further improved the SCO’s position on international information security issues.

On June 9, 2017, the heads of state of the member states signed the “Statement of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Joint Fighting against International Terrorism” at the 15th SCO Summit in Astana. They believed that comprehensive measures should be taken to combat terrorism, particularly the spread of ideology and extremism, through the prevention of the use of the Internet and other propaganda to incite terrorism and extremism, and conduct recruitment activities.

On October 11, 2020, at the 20th Moscow Summit, the heads of the member states signed the “Statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State Council on Ensuring Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security” and the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization… The Statement on Combating the Spread of Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism… calling on the international community to work closely in the information field to jointly build a community with a shared future in cyberspace…

In order to effectively carry out information security cooperation, the SCO has gradually established and continuously improved corresponding cooperation mechanisms and systems in the course of practice, which has provided the necessary means and legal guarantees for the SCO’s information security cooperation.

In terms of mechanism construction, regional anti-terrorist agencies are the primary support of the SCO’s information security cooperation. This institution is one of the two permanent institutions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Since its establishment in 2004, it has been committed to promoting coordination and cooperation among member states in combating the “three forces” (terrorists, separatists, and extremists)…

At the 20th SCO Moscow Summit in 2020, President Xi Jinping emphasized..in the future, cooperation within the SCO should proceed from a strategic and long-term perspective, improve its position, strengthen its capabilities, expand its horizons, and promote the development of regional and global network governance in a more benign and orderly direction.


Image Information:

Image: Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.
Source: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation_(logo).svg
Attribution: Fair Use

China-Russia Pledges of Deeper Cooperation Show Tangible Results

Chinese and Russian Flags.

Chinese and Russian Flags.


“…We continue to expand local currency settlements and establish mechanisms to counteract the negative effects of unilateral sanctions. The Agreement between the Russian Government and the Chinese Government on Settlement and Payment signed in 2019 became an important milestone in this work.”


“The two sides reiterated that they firmly support each other’s core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose external interference in the internal affairs of the two countries.”


Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in early February, and Russia and China took the opportunity to cement their increasingly close relationship further.  The accompanying excerpts from Putin’s public letter and a joint statement, both published by Chinese state media outlet Xinhua, give some sense of the future direction of this relationship.  Central to both the letter and the joint statement is the expressed desire to expand cooperation across a wide range of areas, including space exploration, development of the Arctic, transportation, science, and technological development.

The two countries have successively upgraded relations from a constructive partnership (1994), to strategic partnership of coordination for the 21st century (1996), to a comprehensive strategic coordinated partnership (2011), to a new-era Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic coordinated Partnership (2019) (See “China Upgrades Relations with Russia,” OE Watch, July 2019).  These titles have been accompanied by real improvements in the two countries’ levels of cooperation.  In particular, Putin’s letter highlighting the importance of joint efforts to improve each side’s ability to use local currencies in payments has helped Russia mitigate the effects of international sanctions.

Cooperation in the energy sector has further benefited both sides as China looks to transition its energy grid to use more natural gas as a cleaner and more efficient alternative to coal while Russia is diversifying and expanding its sales of oil and gas.  The two sides have steadily opened new transportation links to improve cross-border trade, including a bridge connecting Heihe and Blagoveschensk along the Amur River, which forms part of China’s northeast border with Russia (See “New Bridge to Connect Russia’s Far East with China’s Northeast,” OE Watch, February 2020).  In Putin’s letter, these links and improving trade have taken on additional importance as both countries look to expand trade after the negative effects of the global pandemic.

The joint statement expands upon the pledges of economic cooperation mentioned in Putin’s letter, promising increasing connectivity across Eurasia and cooperation in developing the Arctic.  The statement also systematically touches upon issues of concern to each side, ranging from core interests such as the “One China” Principle and the status of Taiwan, to the historical account of Russia’s role in World War Two.  It devotes significant time to defending their respective interpretations of democracy and positioning Russia and China as defenders of the post-World War Two international system and global security.  While both sides likely harbor some doubts about the long-term value of cooperation due to the massive inequalities in the size of their respective economies and populations, improving trade and scientific cooperation as well as backing each other diplomatically could pay significant dividends in expanding both countries’ national power in the near term.


Source:

“普京通过新华社发表署名文章《俄罗斯和中国:着眼于未来的战略伙伴》(Putin published a signed article through Xinhua News Agency ‘Russia and China: Strategic Partners for the Future’),” Xinhua (PRC State News agency), 3 February 2022.

http://www.news.cn/2022-02/03/c_1128325398.htm

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20220203015000/http://www.news.cn/2022-02/03/c_1128325398.htm

….We continue to expand local currency settlements and establish mechanisms to counteract the negative effects of unilateral sanctions. The Agreement between the Russian Government and the Chinese Government on Settlement and Payment signed in 2019 became an important milestone in this work.

A mutually beneficial energy alliance is being formed between our two countries. In addition to the long-term delivery of oil and gas to China, we also plan to implement a series of large-scale joint projects. One of the projects is the construction of four new generating units at China’s nuclear power plant from last year, with the participation of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation. All of this greatly enhances the energy security of China and the entire Asian region.

We believe that the two countries have extensive opportunities to develop partnerships in the information and communications industry, medicine, and space exploration, including the application of national navigation systems and the implementation of the International Lunar Research Station project. The “Year of Science and Technology Innovation” held  2020-2021 and hosted by both countries has injected a huge impetus into strengthening bilateral relations.

Accelerating the socio-economic development of Siberia and the Far East is one of Russia’s strategic tasks. These regions are the regions closest to China. We plan to actively develop local cooperation, attract Chinese investment and technology, and expand global transportation and trade routes. For example, modernization and upgrading of the Baikal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railways have already begun. Its capacity will be doubled and a half by 2024 by increasing the volume of transit freight and shortening transit times. In addition, the port infrastructure in the Russian Far East has also been developed. All of these will further enhance the complementarity of the Russian and Chinese economies.… We have the same position on international trade issues. We advocate maintaining an open, transparent and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system based on the rules of the World Trade Organization, and agree to restart the global supply chain. As early as March 2020, Russia proposed an initiative to build a “green corridor” for trade without any sanctions, political and administrative barriers. The implementation of this initiative will help overcome the economic impact of the pandemic….

Source: “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于新时代国际关系和全球可持续发展的联合声明 (Joint Statement of People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on International Relations in the New Era and Global Sustainable Development),” Xinhua (PRC State News agency), 4 February 2022. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-02/04/content_5672025.htm

… The two sides will actively promote the cooperation between the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” and the Eurasian Economic Union, and deepen the practical cooperation between China and the Eurasian Economic Union in various fields. Improve the level of connectivity in the Asia-Pacific and Eurasian regions. The two sides are willing to continue to promote the parallel and coordinated development of the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” and the “Greater Eurasian Partnership”, promote the development of regional organizations and the process of bilateral and multilateral economic integration, and benefit the people of all countries in the Eurasian continent.

The two sides agreed to further deepen pragmatic cooperation in Arctic sustainable development…

The two sides expressed deep concern over the severe challenges facing the international security situation, and believed that the people of all countries share a common destiny, and no country can and should not achieve its own security by breaking away from world security and at the expense of the security of other countries. The international community should actively participate in global security governance to achieve common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.

The two sides reiterated that they firmly support each other’s core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose external interference in the internal affairs of the two countries.

The Russian side reiterated that it abides by the one-China principle, recognizes that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and opposes any form of “Taiwanese independence.”

China and Russia oppose external forces undermining the security and stability of the two countries’ common surrounding areas, oppose external forces interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, and oppose “color revolutions”, and will strengthen cooperation in the areas mentioned above.

The two sides believe that individual countries, military-political alliances or alliances seek direct or indirect unilateral military superiority, harm the security of other countries through unfair competition and other means, intensify geopolitical competition, exaggerate rivalry and confrontation, seriously undermine the international security order, and undermine global strategic stability. . The two sides oppose the continued expansion of NATO, and call on NATO to abandon the ideology of the Cold War, respect the sovereignty, security, interests, and diversity of civilizations, history and culture of other countries, and view the peaceful development of other countries in an objective and fair manner. The two sides oppose the establishment of a closed alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region and the creation of confronting camps, and are highly vigilant of the negative impact of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” promoted by the United States on the peace and stability of the region. China and Russia have always been committed to building a security system in the Asia-Pacific region that is equal, open, inclusive, and not targeting third countries, and maintains peace, stability, and prosperity.


Image Information:

Image: Chinese and Russian Flags.
Attribution: Image by Author. Permission to use image granted by author

Chinese AI Researchers Claim Success in Teaching Drones To Win Dogfights

“A main focus of the Chinese military AI program is to develop new algorithms that can get high performance out of a slow computer.”


The accompanying excerpt from the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) references a report published in the Chinese peer-review journal, Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica Sinica, that researchers have developed an artificial intelligence (AI) system capable of teaching Chinese combat drones how “to win dogfights thousands of times faster than comparable American technology.”  According to the researchers, the ability to learn at a higher speed could help drones to identify a human pilot’s “cheating maneuvers” and outperform them in complex, large-scale air combat.  They put the system to the test by simulating combat between a drone and a test fighter.  The researchers claim that after conducting 800,000 simulations, the drone was able to win most of its encounters.  They compared the results to a “similar dogfight competition conducted in the United States in 2020,” which they say took more than 4 billion rounds of training to achieve the same result.  The test took place in Jianyang, Sichuan Province, at the Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, the largest research and testing institute of aerodynamics in China. The SCMP article notes the growing role of drones in defense, explaining that most military drones are designed for surveillance, early warning, communications, or attack.  They normally cannot handle the sophisticated, fast-paced action needed in a dogfight, which requires more calculation and swifter movement since their computer chips are slower and possess more conservative technology.  The AI program’s focus is to develop new algorithms that increase performance rate.


Source:

Stephen Chen, “Chinese AI Team Claims Big Win in Battle to Teach Dogfights to Drones,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong’s most prominent online English-language daily), 30 January 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3165330/chinese-ai-team-claims-big-win-battle-teach-dogfights-drones.

Researchers in southwest China say they developed an artificial intelligence system that can teach Chinese combat drones to win dogfights thousands of times faster than comparable American technology.

The (US) Heron system defeated the pilots in all five dogfights, taking more than 4 billion rounds of “training” to achieve the result.

The researchers in Sichuan said their system took just 800,000 simulations to win most of its encounters.

Huang said that their new AI system was selective, choosing only the best data for the next round.

Most military drones have been designed for surveillance, early warning, communications or to attack ground targets. These systems cannot handle fast-paced, sophisticated actions such as dogfights because an enormous amount of calculation must be done quickly, according to some military researchers.A main focus of the Chinese military AI program is to develop new algorithms that can get high performance out of a slow computer.

China Issues Fifth Mobilization Order To Kick Off Annual Military Training

“Chairman Xi Jinping issued a mobilization order to the entire armed forces to begin training in the new year, clearly requiring that “[troops] comprehensively advance the transformation and upgrade of military training, resulting in elite forces capable of fighting and winning.”


The accompanying article published by the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) official newspaper Jiefangjun Bao is a possible indication of a heightened level of urgency and war preparedness in China.  The article discusses a training competition that the 82nd Group Army held in early 2022, with higher requirements and more rigorous standards.  This marks the fifth year in a row that President Xi Jinping, Chairman of the CMC, has issued a mobilization order to kick off military training.  These exercises have become more refined and high tech, adding cutting-edge technologies such as big data, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and artificial intelligence on the frontline of training.  They have introduced advanced simulators, including bio-simulation and virtual reality technologies, which simulate various types of combat injuries, creating a more realistic combat scenario. 

According to Jiefangjun Bao, participants broke 16 training records during the competition.  The article attributes some of the records to new processes, technologies, and equipment, such as new command-and-control equipment that has been in service for just over a year.  A system of rewards and punishment, meant to increase the soldiers’ level of confidence and motivation, is also in place.  While the article focuses on the specific exercise of only one group army, it describes the training activities as “a microcosm of troops from the entire armed forces obeying Chairman Xi’s orders and focusing on military training.”


Source:

Geng Tao and Zhou Yuan, “第82集团军某旅群众性练兵比武拉开新年度训练序幕——奖牌之争折射训练之变 (Mass Training and Competition Held by 82nd Group Army Brigade Kicks off the New Year of Training),” Jiefangjun Bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily. The official newspaper of the Central Military Commission), 20 January 2022. https://www.81.cn/sydbt/2022-01/20/content_10124683.htm

At the beginning of the new year, Chairman Xi issued a mobilization order to the entire armed forces to begin training in the new year, clearly requiring that “[troops] comprehensively advance the transformation and upgrade of military training, resulting in elite forces capable of fighting and winning.” This was the fifth year in a row that Chairman Xi has issued a mobilization order to kick off training, sounding a contemporary bugle call for troop training and war preparedness, and undoubtedly advancing the military training of our armed forces toward a new stage of all-round transformation and overall improvement. The gratifying scene that took place on the competition ground of a certain brigade of the 82nd Group Army was a microcosm of troops from the entire armed forces obeying Chairman Xi’s orders and focusing on military training. At a new starting point in the new year, units throughout the armed forces must use higher requirements and more rigorous standards to continue to set in motion a wave of enthusiasm for combat-realistic military training, and greet the opening of the 19th Party Congress with high spirits and first-rate training results.

On the competition ground, while operating a new command and control equipment that had been in service for only a little over a year, Staff Sergeant Xie Kun was the first to complete the subject [of competition] and set a new record. Faced with multiple obstacles, heavy equipment transport vehicle driver Zhao Pengcheng drove the vehicle with speed and broke the training record that had been maintained at the brigade for many years…  At the beginning of the new year, a certain brigade of the 82nd Group Army held a mass training and skills competition, unfurling the curtain on the new year’s training. One after another, officers and soldiers broke 16 training records of the brigade.

… The combat-realistic level of the units’ training has been constantly rising. Many gratifying changes were taking place on the training ground.

… Last year, the brigade introduced bio-simulation and virtual reality technologies to simulate various types of combat injuries, making battlefield rescue training more closely adhere to actual combat.

… the brigade took the initiative to apply cutting-edge technologies such as big data, UAVs, and artificial intelligence on the frontlines of training. It upgraded and rebuilt eight new-type training fields, set up terminals for military vocational education and study, and established multiple types of high-tech training facilities that adhere closely to [the requirements of] actual combat. Multiple training courses on dangerous and difficult subjects can be carried out in all weather conditions and in high efficiency.

… This brigade focused on training and combat readiness to establish a reward and punishment mechanism. More than 90 percent of the meritorious service indicators were used for military training, allowing training elites to be commended and to receive rewards. This [mechanism] motivated officers and soldiers to actively exert efforts to fight and win on the battlefield. Since its establishment, the brigade has participated in various types of military skills competitions organized by the higher-ups and won 38 first place awards.

PLA Experimenting with Formations To Optimize Combat Effectiveness

PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.

PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.


“Precise deployment of forces is an important part of winning future ‘informationized’ wars. Only by continuously improving the accuracy of the allocation of forces and use of firepower can we better unlock the full combat effectiveness of the troops, achieve functional integration and complement each other’s advantages.”


A brigade in northeastern China appears to be experimenting with new combat formations.  In the accompanying excerpt from the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newspaper PLA Daily, the unnamed brigade, which is under the 78th Group Army based in northeastern China, reallocated units down to the squad level to better suit mission requirements and terrain.  Units under the 78th Group Army appear to have long been at the forefront of the PLA’s experimentation with, and transition to, combined arms battalions (See “New Type” PLA Units Emphasize Mobility, Joint Operations,” OE Watch, October 2018).  In this exercise, the brigade testing the new formation was representing the blue team, or “enemy” force.  This gave the red PLA force the chance to test itself against an unusual and more effective fighting force while experimenting with new ways of allocating forces.  The “mixing and matching” method proved successful in both defensive and offensive scenarios during the exercise.

In the article, the blue team brigade leader notes that allocation of forces will be essential to prevail in “informationized” warfare characterized by high tempos and deep integration of sensors, communications, and precision fires.  Modularity and organizational flexibility will be essential to bringing the maximum amount of combat power to bear while allowing quick responses to new threats.  Currently, the PLA is quickly adopting new command systems and testing new formations and equipment to improve its proficiency in combined arms operations.  (See “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021).  While new equipment is arguably equally important, finding new ways to use existing or new formations, and adopting a mindset that would allow such innovation, may prove key in future conflicts.


Source:

Zhang Guangxuan [张光轩], “第78集团军某旅 ‘按需混编’ 精准释放战斗效能(Brigade under the 78th Group Army ‘Mixes’ Units Correctly to Release Full Combat Efficiency),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the PLA), 11 February 2022. 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2022-02/11/content_4904656.htm

On the eve of the Spring Festival, a brigade of the 78th Group Army and a related unit conducted a realistic confrontation exercise. Acting as the opposing force, the brigade used an “on-demand mixing” method to organize its troops and firepower for combat operations instead of the static, pre-allocated method used before, which allowed the unit to optimize combat formations and improve the effectiveness of combat command.

“Precise deployment of forces is an important part of winning future ‘informationized’ wars. Only by continuously improving the accuracy of the allocation of forces and use of firepower can we better unlock the full combat effectiveness of the troops, achieve functional integration and complement each other’s advantages.” According to the brigade’s leader, in this exercise, the opposing force broke up existing units and instead reallocated each squad to a new ad hoc mixed unit to better suit the mission requirements and terrain. Each combat unit has a designated commander and deputy. Compared with the previous grouping method, this “on-demand mixing” mode enables more precise use of force and firepower and more efficient and efficient combat command.

At the exercise area, Zhang Peng, the commander of the opposing force, organized the force into 18 operational units after leading the battalion, company, and platoon commanders to conduct repeated surveys of the defensive positions before the battle. After the battle started, Zhang Peng directly ordered each operational unit to enter the fight in response to the attacking forces. Their reaction speed and the efficiency of the deployment of troops and firepower were significantly improved.

“The opponent’s reaction is too fast!” admitted the commander of the attacking team at the end of the exercise. “The main reason for the failure of our attack is that the opposing team was able to respond quickly, and the coordination of forces and fires is more effective.” In the following iteration of the exercise, the opposing force switched from defense to attack and again ‘mixed’ forces to suit the terrain and mission. The result of the new tactics was clear—another decisive win. 


Image Information:

Image: PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/PLA-TACSHOOTER2021.png
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Xi Urges Accelerated Development of Cutting-Edge Weaponry, Military Modernization

GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).

GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).


“Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests…”


Speaking in October at the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) annual all-service equipment conference, which sets priorities for military modernization, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech describing China’s major efforts to catch up with other military powers, particularly since 2012.  In the accompanying excerpted article from the PLA’s official news outlet China Military Online, Xi describes China’s weapons development as having shifted from importation and imitation to indigenous development and greater self-reliance.  While Xi acknowledges continuing gaps, the Chinese military has tried to improve management of weapons and equipment development programs.  In 2016, China significantly restructured its top-level organizations guiding equipment development for the PLA, replacing the General Armaments Department with an Equipment Development Department (EDD) directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military body.

In a related development, the CMC and each of China’s Joint Theater Commands appear to have also established a Military Requirements Bureau under their Joint Staff departments.  The bureaus are intended to help their respective organizations more quickly address changing requirements, whether related to training or necessary equipment.  At the same time other organizations with oversight of long-term planning, particularly the Science and Technology Commission were also upgraded.  Engagement with non-traditional parts of the defense industry and expanding cooperation with scientists and institutions outside of the industry have also been prioritized to improve the PLA’s access to cutting-edge research.  Taken together, these efforts will enable the PLA to better coordinate efforts between services while also responding to technological change more swiftly.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had set several important milestones for military modernization, many of which are looming.  In the speech, Xi referred to the PLA’s centennial goal, which entails accelerating mechanization and integration of informationized and intelligent (smart) systems by 2027.  There is no guarantee that China will meet these deadlines.  For example, the goal of completing mechanization of the PLA by 2020 appears to have been revised.  Even more ambitious milestones lie ahead: the CCP wants the PLA to achieve world-class status as a military by mid-century.  Efforts set since 2012 to make the PLA a potent, modernized force, and to improve the underlying processes that drive modernization, are paying off.


Source:

“加快推进武器装备现代化——认真学习贯彻习主席在全军装备工作会议上重要指示(Accelerate the modernization of weapons and equipment——Conscientiously study and implement Chairman Xi’s important instructions at the military equipment work conference),” China Military Online (official news outlet for the People’s Liberation Army), 27 October 2021.

http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211031030653/http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

The PLA held an equipment work conference for all military services in Beijing. President Xi extended sincere greetings and important instructions to the delegates and all comrades working on the front lines of weapons and equipment and spoke highly of the leapfrog development and historic achievements of the Chinese military’s weapons and equipment development during the course of the “13th Five-Year Plan” (2016–2020), clarifying the fundamental, directional, and overall major issues of weaponry and equipment construction. This has important practical significance and far-reaching guiding significance for accelerating the implementation of the “14th Five-Year” plan (covering 2021-2025) and creating a new chapter in weaponry and equipment development.

Without adequate equipment, we cannot begin to discuss the art of war. Weapons and equipment are an important symbol of military modernization, an important foundation of the preparation for military struggle preparations, an important support for national security and national rejuvenation, and an important weight in international strategic competition. Only by possessing advanced weapons and equipment and truly improving our defensive capabilities can we offer a real deterrent. Building a People’s Army with advanced weapons and equipment is the goal of [the Chinese Communist Party]. In the course of its long-term development, our military has successively gone through the development stages of importation, imitation, and indigenous research and development. It has successively produced a large number of advanced weapons and equipment and high-precision technology as represented by the “Two Bombs and One Satellite” [China’s successful Manhattan Project-like effort to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs in the 1960s and launch an artificial satellite in 1970].

Promoting the leapfrog development of our military’s equipment construction and providing material and technical support for enhancing the country’s strategic capabilities, especially military strength, are the great mission placed on the PLA by the Party and the expectation of the PLA’s officers and enlisted. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests, or with the requirements for winning an informatized war, and compared with the world’s strongest military powers. At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution, industrial revolution, and military revolution are evolving rapidly. The degree of informatization of modern warfare continues to increase, and the characteristics of intelligence are increasingly emerging. This provides a rare opportunity for advancing the modernization of weaponry and equipment and also creates tougher demands. In the face of changing times, wars, opponents, and technological changes, we can only be determined and strengthen our sense of urgency. Only by working hard, focusing more proactively on tomorrow’s war to accelerate the development of weapons and equipment, and stepping up the construction of a modern management system for weapons and equipment can we fully create a new situation in weapons and equipment construction and make positive contributions to the realization of the goal of the army’s centennial struggle.


Image Information:

Image: GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Zhang_Youxia_%282017-12-07%29_02.jpg
Attribution: Zhang Youxia (2017-12-07) 02.jpg, CC BY 4.0

China Strengthening Position in Central America with Recognition by Nicaragua

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.


“The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.”


At the end of 2021, Nicaragua’s dictator Daniel Ortega announced that his country would recognize China after severing over 30 years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (See “Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  One of the country’s oldest dailies, Confidencial, states that the diplomatic switch should be viewed through the lens of China’s escalating attempts to curtail Taiwan’s diplomatic relations; increasing Chinese interest in Central America; and an ideological alliance with Ortega, who also runs a single-party regime.  The move gives China momentum in terms of developing deeper relations in the region.  Panama and El Salvador have ruptured relations with Taiwan, and the election of Xiomara Castro in Honduras could see a similar maneuver in the coming months.  If Castro follows through on her campaign pledge to drop Taiwan, Guatemala and Belize would remain the only two countries in Central America to recognize Taiwan, potentially tipping the geopolitical balance decisively in favor of China.

Nicaragua now counts China, Russia, and Iran among its closest allies.  Another Confidencial article speculates that Ortega seeks to buffer against international isolation by recognizing China, something his existing relationships with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others cannot provide.  The outlet reports that Ortega will seek financing and export markets in China, especially in the face of international financial pressure and sanctions. 


Source:

“Ortega se adelanta a Ley Renacer y suspensión del CAFTA al alinearse con China (Ortega anticipates the Renacer Law and suspension of CAFTA by aligning himself with China),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 18 December 2021.  https://www.confidencial.com.ni/economia/ortega-se-adelanta-a-ley-renacer-y-suspension-del-cafta-al-alinearse-con-china/

In addition to challenging the United States, Ortega is also looking for options in the face of the… Renacer Law… excluding Nicaragua from the free trade agreement (CAFTA), and that Europe does the same with the Association Agreement, which would make Nicaraguan exports to both markets much more expensive.

Source:  “La “afinidad” de Ortega con China es que el gigante asiático tiene “un régimen de un solo partido” (Ortega’s “affinity” with China is that the Asian giant has “a one-party regime”),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 16 December 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/editorial/muerte-en-la-frontera-editorial-el-tiempo-643053 

The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.


Image Information:

Image:  Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidentialoffice/31429913323
Attribution:  Flickr

Beyond the Glitzy Projects: China’s Far-Reaching Impact on Kenya

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.


“By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building [a] strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.”


In Kenya, China’s influence can be clearly seen in the high-profile Mombassa-Nairobi Railway, the Lamu deep seaport, and the towering Global Trade Centre.  However, beyond these massive projects built by Chinese companies, often with Chinese money and labor, there are numerous other means, including much smaller projects, through which China is making its mark in Kenya.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the Kenyan news agency Capital News explains, that mark is enormous, with China, and particularly Chinese technology, revolutionizing the country’s infrastructure and helping to supercharge its manufacturing base.  Chinese influence on Kenya includes charitable actions, such as delivering substantial amounts of medical supplies critical to helping Kenya deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, all the while garnering appreciation from the Kenyan population.  Chinese online education platforms also filled the gap created when 2,000 Kenyan students found themselves cut off from their university as the disease spread.

The influence of Chinese companies is vast: they have donated food, established industrial parks, held educational workshops, and are transferring technology to Kenyan factories.  However, as the article notes, perhaps the most important impact China has had on Kenya is the growing attitude among young Kenyans that through hard work and knowledge, the country can accomplish projects of all sizes important to national development.  This outlook is in large part a result of Kenyans witnessing, and learning from, successful Chinese businesspeople living and working in Kenya.

The article does not mention any of the pushback against China often discussed in other publications, such as that concerning an unsustainable debt load, poor quality of some Chinese goods, and Chinese workers doing jobs that Kenyans could fill.  However, despite this editorial omission, the article does bring to light the influence China has in Kenya beyond the “glitzy” projects, which tends to be underreported and as a result possibly underappreciated.  China’s influence in Kenya is far larger than just the high-profile projects would indicate, and as the article describes, that influence is building strong relationships, including diplomatic, between the two countries.  It behooves other countries wanting to deal with Kenya to take note of how China has grown that relationship through the breadth and depth of its business activities.


Source:

Adhere Cavince, “How Chinese firms have changed the face of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi,” Capital News (a Kenyan news agency), 22 December 2021. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/how-chinese-firms-have-changed-the-face-of-kenyas-capital-nairobi/

The 8th Ministerial of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation held in Senegal last month resolved to support private sector partnerships between China and African countries. Given the strong record of Kenya to attract and sustain high caliber international businesses, more Chinese firms should consider investing in the country and further promote economic integration of the two countries. By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.

There is increasing confidence that Kenyans too, can follow the footsteps of their Chinese counterparts and improve their socio-economic standing. As more Kenyans get a chance to interact with Chinese firms, more learning points emerge. Nairobi is for instance home to young and skilled professional in rail and road construction, capable of providing their services beyond Kenya.

In the course of implementing big-ticket infrastructure projects across the country, Chinese enterprises have also engaged in building community roads, setting up water pans and upgrading learning institutions through donation and renovation of classrooms and provision of learning materials. During the floods and landslides witnessed in West Pokot in 2019, for example, Chinese firms donated food and non-food items in a show of solidarity with the affected households.

Yet, beyond these glitzy projects, the firms have equally been engaging in small acts of charity that have equally left inedible marks in the lives of individuals and households across the country.


Image Information:

Image: China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.
Source: Macabe5387/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nairobi_Terminus.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0