Category Archives: China

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to China.

A Chinese Perspective on the Pitfalls of Military Intelligentization

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“The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis.”

Chinese military strategists are increasingly focused on developing practices of military “intelligentization,” the next generation of warfare expected to improve the military’s combat efficiency.[i] Intelligentization, also referred to as intelligent warfare, is the Chinese concept of applying machine speed and processing power of artificial intelligence (AI) to military planning, operational command, and decision support.[ii] The rate of developing intelligent weapons and systems is progressing at such a rapid pace, however, that it comes with potential risks, according to the following article published in the People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper PLA Daily. According to the article, the anti-jamming ability of current intelligent systems is too weak, making intelligent systems more vulnerable. For example, drone command and control relies on communication links that connect the drones to rear personnel. If the communication link is jammed, the operator will lose control of the drone. Therefore, improved anti-jamming capability is necessary to ensure communications links are not disrupted. The article also explains that the reliability of today’s AI technology is questionable. While the AI systems’ level of intelligence is superior to that of a human, there is not yet a reliable test to ensure they will not fail in a complex combat scenario.

The article also warns that using intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis. For example, military operations that rely on intelligent weapons and equipment could surpass the speed of political decision making. This could weaken the decision-maker’s ability to control the situation. The article further warns that the use of intelligent weapons and equipment in large-scale combat could increase tension between countries as well as lead to changing the psychology of combatants, potentially causing them to become more desensitized to killing because of their greater distance from the battlefield and gradually reducing caution in decision-making.

The article notes that countries are increasingly pouring money into AI technology to gain military advantage, and this struggle for predominance could lead to a dangerous arms race. With current AI technology, for example, the algorithms used to distinguish civilians from combatants are not yet reliable, thereby potentially putting the lives of civilians at risk. Based on the article, there is still a long way to go before China has perfected the software to not only drive AI weapons and equipment, but also to test them to ensure they are ready to meet all the demands of the battlefield.

Source:

Luo Zhaocheng, “关注智能化武器装备运用风险 (Pay Attention to Risks in Using Intelligentized Weapons and Equipment),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 5 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/ll/2023-01/05/content_10209877.htm

… Currently, the world’s major countries are vigorously pursuing the development of military intelligentization of weapons and equipment across the different operational domains. While the new technology greatly enhances combat capabilities, it also could pose some great risks.

…the anti-jamming capability of intelligent weapons and equipment is weak. This could cause a loss of operational control over systems. The intelligent weapons and equipment currently used by various countries often require command and control to be conducted by rear area personnel who rely on communications links. As these links are jammed, it will be difficult to return them to operational effectiveness… Iran’s successful capturing of U.S. drones through jamming technology is a typical example…

Artificial intelligence technology in certain fields is shown to far exceed human intelligence. However, its reliability and interpretability are questionable… Presently, countries have conducted repeated simulation tests and even actual combat using intelligent weapons and equipment. However, there is still no reliable testing method to ensure its dependability should it run into a complex battlefield environment.

Wide-scale application of intelligent operations could trigger an arms race, leading to the risk of disposition for unsafe AI systems…

The use of intelligent weapons and equipment can impact the international strategic balance and increase the risk of war breaking out. The use of smart weapons and equipment increases the risk of “firing the first shot.”

The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis…

…Intelligent weapons and equipment put participating personnel further away from the battlefield. Participants’ apathy will grow as distance increases…

Notes:

[i] For other Chinese insights on intelligentization, see Cindy Hurst, “China: ‘New Concepts’ in Unmanned Combat,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376077 and Peter Wood, “A Chinese Perspective on Intelligent Warfare and Future Urban Operations,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376999

[ii] For an example of intelligent warfare, see Cindy Hurst, “The ‘Blade of Victory’: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms,” OE Watch, March 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/358341

New Domain Forces and Combat Capabilities in Chinese Military Thinking

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“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.”

In 2021 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted “Multidomain Precision Warfare” as its core operational concept. While few sources address this topic in much detail, a related concept has remained prominent in Chinese media. In October 2022, in his speech at the 20th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping declared that China must “increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities.[i] New-domain forces with new combat capabilities are also a focus area for Chinese military force development for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). While these concepts are abstract and rarely include more than vague descriptions of what they entail, Chinese media emphasize them as essential to the PLA’s evolution from informatization toward intelligent warfare. The following excerpt from Chinese party-owned media outlet PLA Daily provides some insights into what is meant by these ideas and how they may take shape in coming years.

The excerpt, a commentary, acknowledges that clarity about the “newness” of some of the domains covered in this effort is important. The author provides an overview of the characteristics of these new domain forces and capabilities, which include flexible architectures, dynamic reorganization, and mutation of operational concepts in response to new technologies.

Terms[ii]Characteristics and Examples
New Domain ForcesFlexible architecturesReliant on intelligent systems (integrated command platform, etc.)Dynamic reorganizationMutability in response to technological developmentsCross-domain strikesFocus on achieving strategic paralysis of the enemy
New Combat Capabilities[iii]Uncrewed systems (air, sea, and ground-based)PLA Strategic Support Force[iv]PLA Ground Force long-range rocket artillery (MLRS)[v]

Fundamentally, these concepts demonstrate a recognition that the most effective use of combat capabilities will not be the single-domain clash between similar forces and that the PLA must instead be able to flexibly deploy forces across domains against enemy weaknesses to maximize their effects. Of course, Chinese military thinking does not develop in a vacuum. Multi-domain precision operations appear to have many of the same core assumptions about the future of war as in other countries’ concepts, such as “Multidomain Operations” (MDO).[vi]  However, despite the rhetorical similarities to U.S. concepts, at a more basic level, Chinese warfighting is likely to unfold differently due to core differences resulting from the direction and structure of PLA, which has Chinese Communist Party committees and political officers throughout as an essential part. The PLA’s development of an integrated command platform and other informatized tools, such as those referenced in the article, appear intended to not only make its forces more survivable in modern informatized or intelligentized war but also to be “designed to” the PLA’s structure itself and improve the speed of decision making that its structure might otherwise impede.[vii] While China’s focus on achieving multidomain effects is noteworthy, in the interim much of these concepts may remain aspirational for the PLA, a military that has, for much of its recent history by its own admission, struggled to effectively train to the standard of being able to carry out combined arms operations, much less joint operations.

Source:

Liu Haijiang (刘海江), “新域新质作战力量 ‘新’在哪里 (Explaining the ‘new’ in new-domain forces with new combat capabilities),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of China’s armed forces), 29 November 2022. hxxp://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-11/29/content_328869.htm

With the expansion of the scope of human activities and the development of national interests, where military struggle takes place has moved beyond traditional domains such as land, sea, and air and continues to expand into the deep sea, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains. As required by the times, forces and types of combat power to be fielded in these domains have emerged.

Driven by advanced technology, new domain and new quality combat forces have broken through traditional spaces such as land, sea, air, and space, and the scope of activities has become more three-dimensional and diverse. Deep sea, space, underground, and polar regions have all become new territories where new domains and new quality combat forces compete.

New-domain forces with new combat capabilities involve dynamic reconfiguration and cross-domain integration of combat elements. With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.

Notes:

[i] “New combat capabilities” is the more anodyne translation used in the official version of Xi’s remarks, but the Chinese here means something closer to “enabled by new capabilities.” For consistency, “new combat capabilities” is used throughout.

[ii] This table is partially constructed from other articles in PLA Daily that were either too short or did not have enough details and explanation to warrant translation.

[iii] The delineation between “new combat capabilities” and “New Type Combat Forces” [新型作战力量], another buzzword of PLA modernization, is unclear.

[iv] China’s 2019 Defense White Paper describes the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The PLASSF is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities. China’s National Defense in the New Era [新时代的中国国防] State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室] 24 July 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm

[v] One article in August 2022 described new long-range rockets launched by PLA ground force units belonging to the Eastern Theater Command toward the vicinity of Taiwan in response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit using the same language. “Our ground forces’ development of new combat capabilities continues to advance long-range rocket forces represent a new era of precision firepower” [我陆军新质作战力量建设持续推进 远程火箭炮兵成为新一代火力精兵], PLA Daily, 29 October 2022. http://www.81.cn/xue-xi/2022-08/29/content_10180334.htm

[vi] In his article, Liu Haijiang also highlights the U.S. Army’s fielding of the AI decision-making assistant FIRES Synchronization to Optimize Responses in Multi-Domain Operations (FIRESTORM) as indicative of the future direction of intelligent warfare.

[vii] Peter Wood, “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400756

Image Information:

Image: “Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Author-created

Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance

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“Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.” 

China identifies the Internet and cyberspace as a critical domain for ensuring national security, economic and social stability, and ultimately, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Recently, Beijing presented its vision for international cooperation in cyberspace via a white paper from the State Council Information Office. The white paper reflects Beijing’s tightening grip on information flows and fundamental freedoms, its growing concerns over Western digital advantages in its operational environment, and its expanding efforts to export digital authoritarianism to the developing world.

For Beijing to realize its global superpower aspirations and compete with the United States as a cyber superpower, it must present a vision for an equitable and inclusive global community. The 2022 white paper lays out Beijing’s vision for such a community through “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and promot[ion of] a multilateral, democratic, and transparent international internet governance system.” The document further highlights Beijing’s achievements in internet development (e.g. expansion of its internet penetration, digital economy, and tech sector) and cyberspace governance (e.g. the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures)[i] while advocating for the rights of all countries to formulate their own national cybersecurity strategies. However, these seemingly liberal themes are trumped Beijing’s emphasis on cyber sovereignty as its core guiding principle in international cyberspace governance.

Cyber sovereignty is the notion that individual countries should maintain the exclusive right to govern their own territory’s cyberspace, superseding any supposed rights for the mutual interest of a future shared community in cyberspace. As such, reliance on the principle of cyber sovereignty serves to justify the CCP’s long-term strategic control over information flows available to Chinese internet users and to facilitate Beijing’s digital security apparatus’ ability to enforce social stability to buttress CCP legitimacy.

Simultaneously, China looks to promote this version of internet governance abroad.  This conception of cyberspace governance diverges from the principles of an “open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet” advocated for by the United States and 61 partner nation signatories of the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet.”[ii] Indeed, Beijing’s white paper presents China’s achievements and vision of shared internet development and cyberspace governance in stark contrast to its vision of Western “cyber hegemonism,” the idea that “certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance.” Despite the liberal rhetoric framing a “community with a shared future in cyberspace,” the more Beijing can affiliate cyber sovereignty with equitable and inclusive participation in cyberspace governance to developing countries, the wider its brand of digital authoritarianism will spread.

Source:

“携手构建网络空间命运共同体 (Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace),” State Council Information Office, 7 November 2022. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1732898/1732898.htm (Chinese) http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2022-11/07/content_78505694.htm (English).

Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.

Certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance, raising the risk of conflict in cyberspace.

Some countries attempt to decouple with others, and create schism and confrontation in cyberspace. The increasingly complex cybersecurity situation calls for more just, reasonable and effective cyberspace governance. Global threats and challenges in cyberspace necessitate strong global responses.

All countries have the right to formulate public policies, laws, and regulations on cyberspace in the context of their national conditions and international experience. No country should seek cyber hegemony; use the internet to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs; engage in, incite, or support cyber activities that endanger other countries’ national security, or infringe on other countries’ key information infrastructure.

Notes:

[i] For more on the PRC’s evolving cyberspace and data governance legislation see: “China’s Evolving Data Governance Regime,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 July 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/Chinas_Evolving_Data_Governance_Regime.pdf

[ii] For more on the Biden administration’s articulation of the United States’ vision for cyberspace governance see: “A Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” The White House, 28 April 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf

China Addresses Food Security at Home, Uses “Food Diplomacy” Abroad

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China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

“China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation.”

The combination of COVID-19 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine have demonstrated the vulnerability of the global food supply through prevalence of price shocks leading to increasing hunger. For its part, China is taking threats caused by food insecurity seriously. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, included food security in his 2014 articulation of a “Holistic National Security Concept.”[i] As illustrated in the following excerpts, food security remains a driving force for Chinese policy, including efforts to improve its self-reliance and insulate itself from global food market shocks, while at the same time advancing relations with strategically important trade partners and diversifying its trade partners to reduce impacts from market fluctuations.

In March 2021, China issued its latest five-year plan, which will guide policy through 2025. The excerpted portion of the plan below lays out some of the core elements of China’s domestic initiatives to improve food security. These include efforts to better use mechanization and bring small agricultural plots together for greater efficiency. The plan also called for increasing soil restoration projects to return arable land that had been polluted. In January 2022, the State Council commissioned a national soil survey to systematically study the level of pollution, which previous surveys had found to be significant.[ii] In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi reinforced many of these themes, calling for greater efforts to ensure that China’s target of arable land is protected, existing land is used more efficiently, and better seed technologies are incorporated. 

Xi also sees food security as central to his foreign policy. Xi’s Global Development Initiative,[iii] introduced in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021 as a complement to China’s Belt and Road, makes food security and “food diplomacy” an important plank.[iv] The excerpted article by Zhang Lubiao, Director of China’sMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ Foreign Economic Cooperation Center in People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, lays out some examples of China’s food diplomacy. Zhang cites China’s historical commitment to the export of these technologies and the training of thousands of technical personnel since 1979. Notably, the article highlighted how China had helped several countries, including Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, improve yields and the variety of key staples, leading Nigeria to become a major rice-producing country itself. Going forward, food security—and China’s sprint to reduce its exposure to global markets—are likely to remain a major theme of both its foreign and domestic policies.

Sources:

“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要 (Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035),” Xinhua (PRC State Media), 13 March 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm

We will consolidate the foundation of grain production capacity and ensure the supply of important agricultural products…We will enforce the strictest possible system for protecting farmland, strengthen the protection of the quantity of available farmland and enhance its quality to ensure that the total area of China’s farmland remains above the red line of 120 million hectares [十八亿亩耕地红线] (~296.5 million acres[i]), prevent the use of farmland for non-agricultural and non-grain purposes… Focusing on functional zones for grain production and protected areas for the production of major agricultural products, we will build a ‘national food security industrial belt’, implement high-quality farmland development projects, and build contiguous high-quality farmland of more than 71.67 million hectares.

It is essential to improve the systems to guarantee the supply of major agricultural products and to the production, purchase, storage, marketing, and sale of grain, to ensure absolute security of staples, basic self-sufficiency of grain, and adequate supply of major agricultural products and byproducts products. Efforts will continue to develop grain production, further implement the strategy of sustainable farmland use and innovative application of agricultural technology for national food security, carry out research to overcome the technological bottleneck of superior seed sources, and improve self-reliance and control[ii] of seed types.

Zhang Lubiao, “中国杂交水稻技术助力维护全球粮食安全 (Hybrid Rice Technology is a Hallmark of China’s International Agricultural Cooperation),” People’s Daily (Official Newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee), 13 November 2022. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-11/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20221113_7-03.htm

While simultaneously addressing the problem of domestic self-sufficiency, China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation and working with all parties to enhance global sustainable agricultural production capacity…. China has also trained more than 14,000 hybrid rice professionals from more than 80 developing countries through international training courses.

In order to promote hybrid rice technology, China has sent a large number of agricultural technical experts. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 2021, under the framework of China-FAO South-South Cooperation alone, China has sent nearly 1,100 agricultural experts and technicians to more than 40 countries and regions, accounting for nearly 60% of the total number of dispatched experts.

…

Cooperative hybrid rice projects involving China, Nigeria, Uganda and other countries have also achieved remarkable results. China has helped Nigeria make great progress in the field of rice planting by sending experts, promoting improved crop varieties, and providing technical support, and has become one of the major rice-producing countries in Africa.

Sources Notes:

[i] The original phrase is 1.8 billion “mu,” a Chinese unit of measure. For comparison, in 2021 the U.S. had 895 million acres of farmland. While China is slightly larger than the U.S. in size, much of its land is mountainous, plateaus, or desert areas unsuitable for farming. See: “Farms and Land in Farms 2021 Summary,” USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, February 2022. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/fnlo0222.pdf  

[ii] Here, control is referring to rights including patents. China still relies heavily on seed types that are patented by foreign countries.

Notes:

[i] “Holistic National Security Concept” [总体国家安全观].

[ii] “The State Council Notice on the Third National Soil Survey” [国务院关于开展 第三次全国土壤普查的通知], PRC State Council (Chinese Government), 29 January 2022.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/16/content_5673906.htm

[iii] Global Development Initiative (GDI) [全球发展倡议].

[iv] Food security was mentioned second after poverty alleviation in a list of specific measures in a section discussing development. See: Xi Jinping, “Speech by Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (full text),” [ 习近平在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话（全文）], Xinhua, 22 September 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/22/content_5638597.htm

Image Information:

Image: China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).
Source: US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/rssiws/al/crop_production_maps/China/China_Total_Rice.jpg
Attribution: USG/Public Domain

New Chinese Small Arms at Weapons Expo

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Chinese Small Arms.

Chinese Small Arms.

“Compared to the previous Type-95 series of rifles, the Type-20 series are lightweight and more portable. A major technological breakthrough for the new rifles is improvements in reliability and service life.”

Several examples of China’s new series of small arms were recently shown at the Zhuhai airshow. Formally known as the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, the event is held every two years and includes displays of a wide range of new equipment. While most weapons are meant primarily for export, the expo also showcases equipment that has been adopted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The following excerpt from Chinese state media describes a new series of small arms developed by China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation[i] known as the “Type 20 New Weapon Series.”[ii]

In 2019, China showed troops equipped with a new battle rifle, the Type 191,[iii] during the military parade that was part of celebrations of the 70th founding of the People’s Republic of China. New camouflage uniforms were also shown for the first time.[iv] Since then, Chinese media reporting has shown more units being equipped with the new rifles and wearing the new camouflage. As highlighted by Zhang Lu in the excerpt, the Type 20 weapons feature improvements in their lifespan and reliability. The rifles use M-LOK and Picatinny rail systems to allow easy modification and use of accessories, including grips, lasers, and optics. When the Type 191 was initially introduced, it appeared with an optic using a loop of fiberoptic to provide illumination of the reticle without the need for batteries. Since then, numerous other optics have appeared in use, and images from the expo showed a wide variety of thermal and low-light optics. Other weapons belonging to the Type 20 series have appeared in other Chinese media reporting, including new dedicated marksman rifles, sniper rifles, and the Type 201 5.8mm Squad Machine Gun, a replacement for the Type 95-derived squad support weapon (QBB-95[RG1] ).[v] This new machine gun gives up the bull-pup design and drum magazine of the QBB-95 for a traditional belt-fed design. Other parts of the Type 20 series include a 9mm submachine gun with an extendable stock and holographic sight and a new handgun. While the new weapons will take some time to be fielded across the force, these minor improvements are important to increasing the combat power of Chinese military units and will help make them more effective in a variety of scenarios.

Source:

“‘硬核’的中国制造！20式新枪族 ‘组团’ 亮相 (“Hard core” made in China! The parts of the Type-20 series of weapons have appeared),” China Central Television [央视网] (PRC State Media), 8 November 2022. http://news.jstv.com/a/20221108/1667855745474.shtml

The 14th China Air Show began on 8 November. The new Type 20 series of firearms which was independently developed by China, made a “Group” appearance.

According to Zhang Lu [张路], Assistant to the General Manager of Chongqing Construction Industry [重庆建设工业](a subsidiary of China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation, developer of the weapons), “The Type 20 series have high reliability, and easy adaptability to the needs of global combat environments.”

Compared to the previous Type-95 series of rifles, the Type-20 series are lightweight and more portable. A major technological breakthrough for the new rifles is improvements in reliability and service life. In the past, a gun could only fire 5,000-10,000 rounds. The Type 20 series doubles this service life.

The largest group within the Type 20 series is the new generation of 5.8mm rifles which include standard battle rifles, carbines, and three precision variants.

Compared with the Type-95 series and the Type 20 series various optics can be used making them suitable for different combat requirements. The series also adopts a transparent magazine for rifles to make it clearer how many rounds remain.

Notes:

[i] China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation [中国兵器装备集团有限公司].

[ii] Type 20 New Weapon Series [20式新枪族].

[iii] For greater detail regarding the new rifle see: Peter Wood, “China Introduces New Battle Rifle for the PLA,” OE Watch, December 2019.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/342827

[iv] For more details regarding the camouflage types see: Peter Wood, “PLA Adopts New Digital Camouflage for All Services,” OE Watch, May 2020.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/360519

[v] For background regarding China’s previous squad support weapons see: Peter Wood, “Why the PLA Adopted the Type 95 Light Support Weapon,” OE Watch, May 2020.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/362528

Image Information:

Image: Chinese Small Arms.
Source: Created by Author
Attribution: Image by Peter Wood

China Likely To Boost Nuclear Triad

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“China’s second-strike capability is powerful enough to destroy the globe.”

The following article, published in South China Morning Post (SCMP), anticipates[RG1]  that China is going to upgrade its air-, ground-, and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s recent call for a “strong system of strategic deterrence.” SCMP, Hong Kong’s most prominent online English daily, based its information on interviews with various Chinese defense analysts. Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing, said that deterrence through conventional weapons during the Russia-Ukraine conflict revealed weakness on the battlefield, with both sides locked in endless fights and neither one able to use aircraft and tanks to overwhelm the other.[i] In contrast, according to Song Zhongping, a defense commentator and former instructor for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces, “Russia’s powerful nuclear triad” had “deterred the U.S. and NATO from direct combat with the Russian military.” Therefore, analysts see further boosting China’s nuclear triad as a wise option.

To do so, Zhou Chenming argued that developing the Xian H-20 supersonic stealth bomber will help to further boost China’s nuclear triad. While Chinese authorities over the past years have remained tight-lipped about its capabilities and progress in development, Chinese experts expect it to have good stealth characteristics to provide defense penetration capabilities; a range of about 10,000 km, extendable through aerial refueling; both nuclear and conventional capability; and a fully advanced electronic warfare capability.[ii] According to the SCMP excerpt, the H-20 is expected to double China’s nuclear strike range. Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy, explained that China’s nuclear arsenal has always been smaller than that of the United States and Russia.[iii] Therefore, China “must modernize its capabilities” and increase its nuclear arsenal to become more effective. In contrast, according to Zhou Chenming, because of China’s “no first use” policy, the country does not need to expand its nuclear arsenal because China’s second-strike capability is “powerful enough to destroy the globe.”

Source:

Minnie Chan, “Upgrades for China’s Nuclear Triad as Xi Jinping Pushes for Stronger Strategic Deterrence: Analysts,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong Chinese daily, once considered independent but now suspect of promoting China soft power abroad), 29 October 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3197705/upgrades-chinas-nuclear-triad-xi-jinping-pushes-stronger-strategic-deterrence-analysts

Defence experts say China is expected to upgrade its air, ground and sea-based nuclear delivery systems – or nuclear triad – following President Xi Jinping’s call for a “strong system of strategic deterrence.”

Defence analysts said the Ukraine war and an increasingly uncertain global order had reminded Beijing that conventional weapons were not enough for real “strategic deterrence.”

“Deterrence with conventional weapons revealed their weakness on the battlefield of the Ukraine war, which has seen the Russian military and Ukraine’s NATO-aided forces locked in endless fights, as neither could use aircraft and tanks to overwhelm each other,” said Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing.

China’s strategic deterrence will be significantly upgraded once the H-20 is put into service…

Chinese military magazines and social media suggested the H-20’s maiden flight could happen this year, but Beijing has been reluctant to announce any progress on the bomber.

Zhou Chenming of the Yuan Wang think tank said that Beijing’s best option was to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, rather than expand its nuclear arsenal and trigger an arms race.

“Since Beijing has promised to maintain its ‘no first use’ policy, China doesn’t need to expand its nuclear arsenal, as its nuclear technology is now on a par with the US and Russia, meaning China’s second-strike capability is also powerful enough to destroy the globe,” Zhou said.

Notes:

[i] The “Yuan Wang military science and technology think thank” can also be referred to as “Beijing Yuanwang Military Technology Think Tank” [北京远望军事科技智库] or simply “Yuan Wang Think Tank.” It appears to be an independent Chinese think tank that focuses oncutting-edgee technology and highlights aspects of defense.

[ii] See Zhang Lijun and Li Wei, “中国新一代远程轰炸机拥有五大突出特点 (The Five Outstanding Features of China’s New Generation of Long-range Bombers),” China Youth Daily (newspaper of the Communist Youth League of China), 16 February 2017. http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2017-02/16/nw.D110000zgqnb_20170216_1-12.htm

[iii] China is estimated to have 200 to 300 nuclear warheads.

Taiwan Set To Cooperate with Turkey on Cost-Effective Drone Technology

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Albatross 9733 Display at Gangshan Air Force Base.

Albatross 9733 Display at Gangshan Air Force Base.

“Ukraine has demonstrated [drones’] effectiveness in asymmetric warfare…  It is a lesson that has not been lost on Taiwan.”

Appearing to take note of Ukraine’s success in using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drones, Taiwan is considering the value of small and cost-effective drones to protect its own territory in the face of a Chinese attack.[i] The accompanying passages report on Taiwanese drone producers’ efforts to develop indigenous, cost-effective drones, and a recent agreement between Taiwanese and Turkish drone researchers to cooperate and exchange information on doing so. In contrast to numerous countries that are purchasing the Bayraktar TB-2 drones from Turkey, Taiwan wants to develop indigenous drones of its own, based on the lessons learned from the use of TB-2s in different conflicts.[ii] Perhaps the most notable lesson for Taiwan from the war in Ukraine is the ability to achieve overmatch by deploying large numbers of small, cost-effective drones.[iii]

As the first accompanying article from Taiwan’s national news agency Focus Taiwan reports, Taiwan’s domestic drone producers are working on several small and cheap drones, including the Albatross II, which is effectively a Taiwanese TB-2 with a longer range of 250 km. There is also the Flyingfish drone, which reportedly costs less than $3,000, making it cost effective to deploy in large numbers in urban or naval warfare. The passage quotes the drone’s developer as saying, “When the enemy approaches [Taiwan’s] coastal waters, the Flyingfish drones will prove to be a formidable weapon for asymmetric combat, because they are so easy to use and can be used in great numbers.”

The second excerpted article, from Turkey’s oldest secular newspaper, Cumhuriyet, discusses a recent agreement between Turkish and Taiwanese institutions that conduct research and development on drone technology. It reports that Gebze Technical University, which conducts research on drone technology, and Turkey’s Fly BVLOS Technology, which conducts drone pilot trainings and produces world-class drones, participated in the “Taiwan-Turkey UAV Technology Forum” held in Chiayi, Taiwan in August. Chiayi is home to Taiwan’s new, state-run drone research and development center. The two Turkish institutions signed an agreement with Taiwan Formosa University, which conducts academic research in drone technology, to encourage and strengthen academic-technical exchange and cooperation in the field of UAV technology. 

Sources:

Sean Lin, “Asymmetrical warfare focus has Taiwan drone companies upping the ante,” Focus Taiwan (Taiwan’s national news agency), 10 September 2022. https://focustaiwan.tw/sci-tech/202209100016

Ukraine has demonstrated [drones’] effectiveness in asymmetric warfare as it blunts the advances of more numerous Russian forces, deploying Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones and Switchblade suicide drones donated by the U.S. to attack targets and gain intelligence. It is a lesson that has not been lost on Taiwan, itself threatened by a larger neighbor and committed to a defense strategy centered on asymmetrical warfare.

At the inauguration of a state-run drone research and development (R&D) center in Chiayi County last month, President Tsai Ing-wen pledged to support drone research to strengthen the country’s asymmetric combat capabilities. But it is domestic drone producers, eager to upgrade the first-generation of domestically made drones Taiwan currently possesses, that could offer the quickest shot in the arm to Taiwan’s defenses.

JC Tech President Robert Cheng said his company now has built and tested prototypes of a suicide drone called the Flyingfish… Costing less than US$3,000, the Flyingfish 200 has a much lower price point than cruise missiles or other combat drones, making it cost effective to deploy in large numbers in urban or naval warfare, he said… “When the enemy approaches [Taiwan’s] coastal waters, the Flyingfish drones will prove to be a formidable weapon for asymmetric combat, because they are so easy to use and can be used in great numbers,” Cheng said.

Meanwhile, aviation company GEOSAT, which began developing drones in 2008, has been collaborating with the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) — Taiwan’s state-run weapons developer and manufacturer — on the Albatross II drone… The GEOSAT CEO believed that the Albatross II, which is compatible with locally developed Sky Sword air-to-air missiles and 2.75-inch rockets, could outperform the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which gained fame for sinking the Russian cruiser Moskva in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Su Tzu-yun, an analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said… suicide drones… can be used to great effect when targeting smaller PLA ships during amphibious warfare, and military drones can be used in place of radar stations should the latter be destroyed to keep command centers informed of what is happening on the front lines of combat… Su agreed with Cheng on the power and importance of numbers… The combination of different drones will “allow Taiwan to amass a sizable arsenal of precision strike munitions to counter the PLA’s numerical advantage, greatly leveraging the efficacy of Taiwan’s armed forces in defending the nation,” Su said.

“Türkiye ile Tayvan arasında İHA iş birliği (Drone Cooperation between Turkey and Taiwan),” Cumhuriyet (the oldest secular Turkish daily newspaper), 11 August 2022. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/turkiye-ile-tayvan-arasinda-iha-is-birligi-1968257

Gebze Technical University, which conducts research on drone technology and Fly BVLOS Technology [which conducts UAV pilot trainings and produces world-class UAVs]… participated in the “Taiwan-Turkey UAV Technology Forum” held in Chiayi, Taiwan, [and] signed an agreement with Taiwan Formosa University to encourage and strengthen academic-technical exchange and cooperation in the field of UAV technology.  With the agreement, Fly BVLOS Technology became a partner of UAV Technology Center, headquartered in Taiwan and working in the field of UAV technology.  [The sides] will carry out R&D activities together… especially for products such as motors, chips and batteries. In addition, all stakeholders will share their expertise and experience in the field of UAV technologies.  While Gabze Technical University and Fly BVLOS transfer their experience in UAV production to Taiwan, they will also benefit from the work of Taiwan Formasa University, an important technology manufacturer, and its partner UAV Technology Center.

Fly BVLOS Founder Kamil Demirkapu said: “Turkey… has come to an important place in the world with the breakthroughs it has made in various fields from R&D to production. As everyone knows very well, some of the best UAVs in the world are produced by Turkish engineers. Gabze Technical University, together with the logistics and aviation sectors of the future, will change the entire commercial life. … With this agreement, the experience of Taiwan Formosa University, which has carried out valuable academic studies in the field of UAV technology, will also join these two very strong partners from Turkey. With this cooperation, we aim to contribute both to our country’s R&D and production activities in the field of UAVs and to make Turkey’s expertise and experience more visible in the international community by signing important research and innovations in the sector.”

Notes:

[i] See: Karen Kaya, “Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine,” OE Watch, Issue 6, 2022.

[ii] See: Karen Kaya, “Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment,” Foreign Military Studies Office, September 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/421179

[iii] See: “Turkey and the TB-2: A Rising Drone Superpower with Karen Kaya,” Army Mad Scientist Convergence Podcast, September 2022. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/65-turkey-and-the-tb-2-a-rising-drone/id1495100075?i=1000579565167

Image Information:

Image: Albatross 9733 Display at Gangshan Air Force Base
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NCSIST_Albatross_9733_Display_at_Gangshan_Air_Force_Base_Apron_20170812a.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Taiwan Testing Satellite Program To Overcome Communications Vulnerabilities

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“Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.”

Over the next two years, Taiwan plans to test a satellite program to ensure its command systems continue to operate should the country lose connectivity through its conventional links. As shown in the first article, according to the Singapore-based Straits Times, in September Taiwan Minister of Digital Affairs Audrey Tang announced the launch of a telecommunication network resilience plan. The article explains that international internet traffic currently relies heavily on fiber optic cables lining the ocean floor. There are 15 submarine data cables connecting Taiwan with the rest of the world. Taiwan would be cut off from the Internet should these cables be cut. According to the article, experts warn that Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.

As demonstrated in the second article from Chinese state-owned multi-language news source Xinhua, in President Xi Jinping’s speech kicking off the 20th National Congress in mid-October, Xi asserted that the Taiwan question remains an important matter for the China. He asserted that while China would continue to strive for peaceful reunification, it will not rule out the use of force. Such a message, it appears, could put even more urgency in Taiwan’s plans to improve its communications vulnerabilities.

Sources:

Yip Wai Yee, “Taiwan Plans for Ukraine-Style Back-Up Satellite Internet Network Amid Risk of War,” The Straits Times (Singapore-based daily),22 September 2022. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-plans-for-ukraine-style-back-up-satellite-internet-network-amid-risk-of-war

Over the next two years, (Taiwan) is set to trial a N[ew] T[aiwan]$550 million (US$24.67 million) satellite programme that aims to keep Taiwan’s command systems running if conventional connections get cut, Ms. Tang (Taiwan’s minister of Digital Affairs) said. Several Taiwan companies are now in discussions with international satellite service providers, she added, without providing details.

Currently, international Internet traffic is mostly carried through fibre-optic cables lining the ocean floor. Taiwan is connected to the world via 15 submarine data cables. “The Internet used in Taiwan relies heavily on undersea cables, so if (attackers) cut off all the cables, they would cut off all of the Internet there,” Dr Lennon Chang, a cyber-security researcher at Monash University, told The Straits Times. “It makes sense for the government to have alternative forms of communication ready for emergency situations,” he added.

Already, some analysts say that concerns over Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.

“(CPC Congress) CPC to Unswervingly Advance Cause of National Reunification: Xi,” Xinhua (Chinese state-owned multi-language news source), 16 October 2022. https://english.news.cn/20221016/29113f9cbf3247978534dd1f4aee299e/c.html

Xi Jinping said… the Communist Party of China (CPC) will implement its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification. “Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese,” said Xi at the opening session of the 20th CPC National Congress.

“We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary…

Xi said that the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification…

Taiwan Testing Satellite Program To Overcome Communications Vulnerabilities

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“Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.”

Over the next two years, Taiwan plans to test a satellite program to ensure its command systems continue to operate should the country lose connectivity through its conventional links. As shown in the first article, according to the Singapore-based Straits Times, in September Taiwan Minister of Digital Affairs Audrey Tang announced the launch of a telecommunication network resilience plan. The article explains that international internet traffic currently relies heavily on fiber optic cables lining the ocean floor. There are 15 submarine data cables connecting Taiwan with the rest of the world. Taiwan would be cut off from the Internet should these cables be cut. According to the article, experts warn that Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.

As demonstrated in the second article from Chinese state-owned multi-language news source Xinhua, in President Xi Jinping’s speech kicking off the 20th National Congress in mid-October, Xi asserted that the Taiwan question remains an important matter for the China. He asserted that while China would continue to strive for peaceful reunification, it will not rule out the use of force. Such a message, it appears, could put even more urgency in Taiwan’s plans to improve its communications vulnerabilities.

Sources:

Yip Wai Yee, “Taiwan Plans for Ukraine-Style Back-Up Satellite Internet Network Amid Risk of War,” The Straits Times (Singapore-based daily),22 September 2022. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-plans-for-ukraine-style-back-up-satellite-internet-network-amid-risk-of-war

Over the next two years, (Taiwan) is set to trial a N[ew] T[aiwan]$550 million (US$24.67 million) satellite programme that aims to keep Taiwan’s command systems running if conventional connections get cut, Ms. Tang (Taiwan’s minister of Digital Affairs) said. Several Taiwan companies are now in discussions with international satellite service providers, she added, without providing details.

Currently, international Internet traffic is mostly carried through fibre-optic cables lining the ocean floor. Taiwan is connected to the world via 15 submarine data cables. “The Internet used in Taiwan relies heavily on undersea cables, so if (attackers) cut off all the cables, they would cut off all of the Internet there,” Dr Lennon Chang, a cyber-security researcher at Monash University, told The Straits Times. “It makes sense for the government to have alternative forms of communication ready for emergency situations,” he added.

Already, some analysts say that concerns over Taiwan’s network vulnerabilities are very real.

“(CPC Congress) CPC to Unswervingly Advance Cause of National Reunification: Xi,” Xinhua (Chinese state-owned multi-language news source), 16 October 2022. https://english.news.cn/20221016/29113f9cbf3247978534dd1f4aee299e/c.html

Xi Jinping said… the Communist Party of China (CPC) will implement its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification. “Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese,” said Xi at the opening session of the 20th CPC National Congress.

“We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary…

Xi said that the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification…

Xi Jinping Sets Milestones for Next Five Years of Chinese Military Modernization

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20th CCP Central Military Commission (2022-2027).

20th CCP Central Military Commission (2022-2027).

“We will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities, and promote coordinated development and application of the network information system.”Xi Jinping

Every five years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds a party congress, an event that brings together nearly 2,300 delegates drawn from the CCP’s over 96 million members. The most recent of these was held in mid-October 2022. These congresses are important for several reasons.

First, key positions are filled as politicians age out or are replaced. This includes the membership of the Politburo Standing Committee, which represents the apex of power in China, and the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military decision-making body. Some insights regarding Xi’s plans for the Chinese armed forces can already be drawn from the new composition of the Commission, which saw three generals replaced (Xu Qiliang, Wei Fenghe and Li Zuocheng). The CMC’s new membership still includes at least two combat veterans of the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979-1991), including Vice-Chair General Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli.[i] The former has also been on the CMC since the previous Congress and has long experience in China’s organizations for military equipment development and modernization (the Equipment Development Department and its predecessor, the General Armaments Department). Other figures, such as General Li Shangfu, have extensive experience in units dedicated to space operations, highlighting the strong focus of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the domain. Two others, Admiral Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin, are political officers and play important roles in maintaining the Party’s control over the military.

A second important part of the Congress is a “work report” delivered by the Party General Secretary (Xi Jinping) at the beginning of the Congress. The most recent report, as described by state-run Xinhua News Agency summarizes the Party’s efforts over the past five years and sets out guideposts for the next five years. The language of the most recent report is always a staple of subsequent official pronouncements and state media discussions, and language including that in the excerpted portions below are likely to feature prominently in official media.

One additional note is that Chinese military modernization is frequently linked to important dates, such as the centenary of the founding of the CCP (which passed in 2021), centenary of the founding of the PLA in 2027, and of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, by which time China wishes to “fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.” China likely missed some of its targets for the 2021 milestone, such as “achieve completion of efforts of mechanization… with significantly enhanced informationization and greatly improved strategic capabilities.” Perhaps, as a result, there is a palpable urgency in the language of the report in Xi’s demands to continue radical improvements to the PLA.

In terms of military modernization, three major themes[ii] can be seen in the excerpted text: first, faster development and iteration of high-tech weaponry and ‘new-domain forces’ and unmanned systems; second, enhanced combat preparedness—particularly through realistic, joint, and OPFOR training; and third, a systemic approach to bringing the entirety of China’s capabilities to bear. The first acknowledges that China is in a race with its competitors to build strategic capabilities, which include not just nuclear weapons, but also critical technologies and the ability to operate in new or emerging domains. The second, an emphasis on realistic and joint training, is perhaps one of the most difficult modernization efforts despite the PLA making major headway in recent years. The last of these comes in a rather innocuous-sounding phrase: “We will consolidate and enhance integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities.” This consolidation of national strategies represents the culmination of China’s military-civil fusion strategy, which attempts to achieve efficiencies through resource sharing between civilian and military sectors and, more broadly, to coordinate China’s economic developmental and military modernization efforts so that they are self-reinforcing.

Looking ahead, China is facing strong domestic economic and demographic headwinds—many of which are the true focus of this recently released work report. However, despite these challenges, the language used here demonstrates the continued emphasis on the speedy transformation of the PLA, seen since Xi first took the reins of the CCP in 2012 at the 18th Party Congress. 

Source:

Xi Jinping [习近平], “高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗一一在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告 (Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects – Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China),” Xinhua News Agency, 16 October 2022.https://news.ifeng.com/c/8K9I4qcZtaw

Achieving the goals for the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army in 2027 and more quickly elevating our people’s armed forces to world-class standards are strategic tasks for building a modern socialist country in all respects. To this end, we must apply the thinking on strengthening the military for the new era, implement the military strategy for the new era, and maintain the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces…

We will simultaneously carry out operations, boost combat preparedness, and enhance our military capabilities. We will continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies and work faster to modernize military theory, organizational forms, personnel, and weaponry and equipment. We will enhance the military’s strategic capabilities for defending China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests and see that the people’s armed forces[i] effectively fulfill their missions and tasks in the new era…

We will intensify troop training and enhance combat preparedness across the board to see that our people’s armed forces can fight and win. We will study and gain a good grasp of the characteristics of informatized and intelligent warfare and the laws that govern it, provide new military strategic guidance, and develop strategies and tactics for People’s War.[ii]

We will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities, and promote coordinated development and application of the network information system.

We will improve the command system for joint operations and enhance our systems and capacity for reconnaissance and early warning, joint strikes, battlefield support, and integrated logistics support.

We will intensify military training under combat conditions, laying emphasis on joint training, force-on-force training, and high-tech training…We will speed up the development of modern logistics, implement major projects to develop defense-related science and technology, weaponry, and equipment, and move faster to translate scientific and technological advances into combat capabilities…

We will consolidate and enhance integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. We will better coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production factors between the military and civilian sectors. We will improve the system and layout of science, technology, and industries related to national defense and step-up capacity building in these areas.

Notes:

[i] Liu Zhenli replaced Li Zuocheng, who was awarded for his actions in combat during that war. Based on public descriptions of his career Co-Vice Chair He Weidong also has a long history in operational PLA units, but it is unclear if he served during the conflict.

[ii] Not included in the excerpts below but which are repeatedly highlighted in the full text are mentions of political work—which involves not only loyalty to the CCP but also morale. National pride is a major point of emphasis in the speech. Notably, Xi mentions that there are additional efforts being made to improve the “institutions and mechanisms” of the Chairman’s responsibility system, which refers to Xi’s personal control over Chinese military affairs.

[i] While PLA is often used generally to refer to the Chinese military, according to Chinese law, the Chinese Armed Forces are, “composed of the active and reserve forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force and the Militia.”

[ii] Chinese official publications define “People’s War” as referring to confronting foreign aggression or safeguarding national unity by arming and relying on the people (i.e., a whole of nation approach).

Image Information:

Image: 20th CCP Central Military Commission (2022-2027).
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Peter Wood