Russian Combat Capabilities for 2020: Three Developments to Track (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Russia’s military prowess has increased significantly ever since the appointments of Sergey Shoygu as Minister of Defense in 2012 and Valery Gerasimov’s assignment as Chief of the General Staff in 2013. They have diligently worked to fulfill President Vladimir Putin’s May 2012 edict that called for modernizing the Armed Forces by 2020 with a focus on electronic warfare and air-space defense capabilities, among others. The modernization effort offers three areas for Western analysts to track closely in the coming year: how it is being implemented – and lessons learned — during the fighting in Syria, Russian developments in space, and Russian plans to disorganize a foe’s command and control system with electronic warfare. These areas appear to support the development of a new theory of warfare in Russia that, according to Shoygu and Gerasimov, relies on a combination of classical and asymmetric concepts.


Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Technology has dramatically increased the speed at which decisions must be made, expanded the spectrum of military thought (from the strategic to the planetary), and focused more attention on innovative thinking and risk-taking.  This report, Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements, considers technology’s impact on military thought while also considering the latter’s historical legacy passed from the Soviet to the Russian period. Two issues are thus at play in the report, traditional ones and those associated with information-age advances. Initially, the report examines several concepts from the Soviet era still in vogue today, such as the forms and methods of warfare, forecasting, and the initial period of war, among others. The past remains important for the present and continues to affect the way Russia analyzes its situational context. Next, how these basic concepts are applied to information-age advances are examined. For example, there are Russian-authored articles on the forms and methods (traditional thought) of network-centric conditions, aerospace defense, and cyber issues (information-age thought), among others.  Forecasting must assess the impact on the nature of war from weapons based on new physical principles. The speed of cyber operations indicates that forces must be prepared now for the initial period of war (IPW). Planning tomorrow for a surprise attack is more than a day late, as the cyber IPW may result in the conflict’s end before it starts.  The report is of interest for its focus on purely Russian military thought. It attempts to avoid mirror-imaging Western concepts (hybrid, grey zone, etc.) onto Russian military thinking. It represents the first focused study on the topic of military thought since the edited 1981 book Soviet Military Thinking. The report in no way replaces that volume but rather supplements it.


Kremlin Kontrol: Russia’s Political-Military Reality (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Authoritarian regimes are, by their very nature, insecure. They tend to view Western democracies as an existential threat to their way of rule and they fear the development of any type of opposition or protests in the streets. In Russia’s case, the latter fear of protests leading to a “color revolution” often appears as important as the ISIS threat to its southern border. Lacking political legitimacy, they rely on two factors to sustain their leadership, patriotism and control. This study discusses the latter issue from both a civilian and military point of view. Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB operative, is all about control. In his excellent book The Invention of Russia, Arkady Ostrovsky recounted one conversation about Putin: “Anything you control is safe. Anything you don’t control by definition represents a threat—that is their mental framework, and a KGB officer is always a KGB officer.”

This work is divided into two parts. Part One looks at the system of control that Putin has either continued or developed anew in his twelve years as president. Part Two is focused on several military aspects of control. These include not only command and control issues but also the methodical manner in which Russian military analysts establish control parameters over their environment.


Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Timothy L. Thomas)

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This book is divided into three parts. Part one addresses President Vladimir Putin’s personality, Russian methods of developing strategy, and the Russian thought process for evaluating military affairs (forecasting, correlation of forces, forms, and methods of thought). Part two addresses the nature of future war, focusing on future war’s new weapons and organizations (to include aerospace, robotics, electronic warfare equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles, among other pieces of equipment) and the DARPA-like organizations that have been created to increase Russia’s focus on science and technology developments. Part three address geopolitics, in particular the Russian militarization of the Arctic and the rationale behind their operations in Ukraine. All three parts help analysts in their attempts to uncover the vector (s) in which Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. The nation’s theorists have absorbed lessons learned from the contemporary conflicts of others and placed increased focus on the development of new technologies to protect their national interests and attain specific strategic goals.


China’s Military Strategy: Basic Conceptsand Examples of its Use (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Chinese retired Lieutenant General Li Jijun noted in 2006 that, from the vantage point of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), “Therefore, in war direction, understanding the adversary’s ideological culture and strategic thinking method is as important as finding out the adversary’s military deployment.” This book seeks to address the concept of China’s military strategy in order to help US analysts better understand PLA motives and intent. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not an enemy, it has developed into a powerful competitor worthy of closer examination. If we (the US) are to follow the advice of PLA analysts, and do what they are doing, then we should be using peacetime to contemplate how their strategic thought is developed and implemented. Keeping a finger on the pulse of the PLA’s thought process as it proceeds with confidence (and some degree of arrogance) into the second decade of the 21st century will allow the US to assess the probable direction (or uncover purposeful misdirection) inherent in PLA strategy. Accordingly, any required adjustments to US military strategy can be formulated.  The analysis merely suggests a way of considering or thinking about PLA strategy and not necessarily the way. The discussion and conclusions are almost solely based on the use of translated Chinese documents and, as such, attempt to offer a purely Chinese perspective on the content, goals, and implementation of strategy.


Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker (Timothy L. Thomas)

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China’s cyber policy has become partly visible to foreign nations through observation, tracking, and inference. The policy appears to have three vectors. The first vector is in the public opinion or “soft power” arena, where China professes to be led by a policy of active defense and cooperation with other nations over cyber issues. The second and most prominent vector is China’s exhibited capability to conduct strong and stealthy intelligence and reconnaissance activities against nation’s worldwide, using the guise of anonymity to hide these efforts. The third vector is the offensive character of China’s cyber strategy. It contains the theoretical backing for preemptive cyber operations against other nations in times of crisis. These three aspects—peace activist, espionage activist, and attack planner—dominate China’s cyber policy. Some are always hidden from view while others are demonstrated daily. Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon is divided into sections that coincide with these vectors.


Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Recasting the Red Star describes Russia’s modernization effort in a comprehensive fashion. The Defense Ministry’s military reform effort and the operational environment implied in Russia’s national security strategy (2009) and military doctrine (2010) are described. The Soviet culture of military thought is examined to include a short history of Tsarist and Soviet military traditions. These chapters serve as a reference point for the traditions behind Russia’s modernization effort. Next the author examines technological developments, such as Russia’s concept of high-technology deception, information war, reconnaissance- and information-strike systems (a C4ISR equivalent), and resulting future war construct. Finally, the book closely examines the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008. These chapters question why Russia and Georgia went to war, how information warfare figured into the conflict, and, most important of all, “who set the bear trap.”


The Dragon’s Quantum Leap: Transforming from a Mechanized to an Informatized Force (Timothy L. Thomas)

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Chinese observations of warfare in the information age have resulted in a widespread transformation and metamorphosis of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a mechanized to an informatized force. This transformation has affected nearly every aspect of China’s military from strategy to logistics to educational development.The Dragon’s Quantum Leap intends to peel back the transformation process and uncover the impact of new modes of thought on several key segments of military development (culture, stratagems, crisis management, deception, and reconnaissance among other elements) that digital-age thought is affecting. It expands the scope but not the basic theoretical theme of the author’s two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. They were Dragon Bytes, which covered Chinese IW activities from 1999-2003; and Decoding the Virtual Dragon, which covered Chinese IW activities from 2003-2006. The Dragon’s Quantum Leap updates these concepts and activities to mid-2009 and completes the author’s trilogy on the topic. As with the author’s previous works, this book primarily uses original Chinese source material.


Decoding the Virtual Dragon: Critical Evolutions in the Science and Philosophy of China’s Information Operations and Military Strategy (Timothy L. Thomas)

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This book expands upon Dragon Bytes, the author’s earlier work on Chinese information warfare (IW) activities from 1999-2003. Decoding the Virtual Dragon explains how Chinese IW concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. There are few intermediate filters. In some cases direct translations of key Chinese terms are offered. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition. The book thus serves as a source for the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrates how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.


Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations (Timothy L. Thomas)

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This book explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide. Four issues are examined: the contrast between the concept of “cyber operations” used by civilians, including criminals and terrorists, and the concept of “information operations” used by armed forces; the differences in information operations (IO) theory among the US, Russian, and Chinese militaries; the manner in which militaries use information operations in peace and in war; and the impact of cyber and information processes on the mind, the military machine, and their interface.