Beyond the Glitzy Projects: China’s Far-Reaching Impact on Kenya

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.


“By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building [a] strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.”


In Kenya, China’s influence can be clearly seen in the high-profile Mombassa-Nairobi Railway, the Lamu deep seaport, and the towering Global Trade Centre.  However, beyond these massive projects built by Chinese companies, often with Chinese money and labor, there are numerous other means, including much smaller projects, through which China is making its mark in Kenya.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the Kenyan news agency Capital News explains, that mark is enormous, with China, and particularly Chinese technology, revolutionizing the country’s infrastructure and helping to supercharge its manufacturing base.  Chinese influence on Kenya includes charitable actions, such as delivering substantial amounts of medical supplies critical to helping Kenya deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, all the while garnering appreciation from the Kenyan population.  Chinese online education platforms also filled the gap created when 2,000 Kenyan students found themselves cut off from their university as the disease spread.

The influence of Chinese companies is vast: they have donated food, established industrial parks, held educational workshops, and are transferring technology to Kenyan factories.  However, as the article notes, perhaps the most important impact China has had on Kenya is the growing attitude among young Kenyans that through hard work and knowledge, the country can accomplish projects of all sizes important to national development.  This outlook is in large part a result of Kenyans witnessing, and learning from, successful Chinese businesspeople living and working in Kenya.

The article does not mention any of the pushback against China often discussed in other publications, such as that concerning an unsustainable debt load, poor quality of some Chinese goods, and Chinese workers doing jobs that Kenyans could fill.  However, despite this editorial omission, the article does bring to light the influence China has in Kenya beyond the “glitzy” projects, which tends to be underreported and as a result possibly underappreciated.  China’s influence in Kenya is far larger than just the high-profile projects would indicate, and as the article describes, that influence is building strong relationships, including diplomatic, between the two countries.  It behooves other countries wanting to deal with Kenya to take note of how China has grown that relationship through the breadth and depth of its business activities.


Source:

Adhere Cavince, “How Chinese firms have changed the face of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi,” Capital News (a Kenyan news agency), 22 December 2021. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/how-chinese-firms-have-changed-the-face-of-kenyas-capital-nairobi/

The 8th Ministerial of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation held in Senegal last month resolved to support private sector partnerships between China and African countries. Given the strong record of Kenya to attract and sustain high caliber international businesses, more Chinese firms should consider investing in the country and further promote economic integration of the two countries. By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.

There is increasing confidence that Kenyans too, can follow the footsteps of their Chinese counterparts and improve their socio-economic standing. As more Kenyans get a chance to interact with Chinese firms, more learning points emerge. Nairobi is for instance home to young and skilled professional in rail and road construction, capable of providing their services beyond Kenya.

In the course of implementing big-ticket infrastructure projects across the country, Chinese enterprises have also engaged in building community roads, setting up water pans and upgrading learning institutions through donation and renovation of classrooms and provision of learning materials. During the floods and landslides witnessed in West Pokot in 2019, for example, Chinese firms donated food and non-food items in a show of solidarity with the affected households.

Yet, beyond these glitzy projects, the firms have equally been engaging in small acts of charity that have equally left inedible marks in the lives of individuals and households across the country.


Image Information:

Image: China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.
Source: Macabe5387/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nairobi_Terminus.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Mozambique: Foreign Mercenaries Not Enough To Beat Terrorism

Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.

Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.


“The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.”


Mozambique’s northernmost province, Cabo Delgado, has been under attack by Islamist insurgents since 2017.  Initially the government declined offers of outside help by other nations, instead depending on its own military, which was poorly equipped and not well trained in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency tactics.  As the excerpted article from the South African think tank Institute for Security Studies notes, Mozambique turned to Russia for help after two years of disastrous results. In September 2019, Russian military contractor Wagner Group arrived in Cabo Delgado.

The terms of the agreement with Wagner Group were never made public.  However, the Russian mercenaries were only in Cabo Delgado for about two months.  Apparently they wanted to bomb various locations where terrorists were purportedly located.  This strategy was at odds with what their Mozambican counterparts had planned.  Also, during their short time in Mozambique, a number of the Russians were killed, reportedly including some who were beheaded during botched missions.  The abrupt departure of Wagner Group personnel has been attributed to their failures and possibly confusion sown by the discord between the Wagner Group and Mozambican military. Mozambique next turned to the South Africa-based Dyck Advisory Group (DAG).  In April 2020 DAG arrived in civilian helicopters converted into gunships.  While helpful, it was unable to stem extremist attacks.  One year later DAG was gone and replaced by trainers and advisers from a South Africa-Dubai consortium. However, as the article explains, it was not until Mozambique finally agreed to let foreign troops, beginning with a relatively large contingent from Rwanda, assist in the fight, that real progress was made against the insurgents, including dislodging them from their bases. While it is not clear why Wagner Group and DAG were not more effective, it appears that that unlike the mercenaries, trained militaries from other nations made swift and significant gains against the Islamists.


Source:

Borges Nhamirre, “Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado?” Institute for Security Studies (a South African think tank) 5 November 2021. https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado

The failed intervention in Mozambique by the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, took place amid serious disagreements between the company and the Mozambican military.

Faced with the inability of government forces to stop the insurgency, even with private military support, liberation struggle veterans in Maconde-dominant districts of Cabo Delgado formed local militias to fight the insurgents. The contribution of the militias has not yet been studied in depth, but it seems that they were useful in blocking the insurgents’ advance towards districts such as Mueda and Muidumbe.

Rwanda’s quick achievements were due to better combat experience, but also better equipment, which allowed them great superiority over the insurgents. While the insurgents’ bases had already been identified by the Mozambican military, they did not have the capability to dislodge the insurgents. The attempts that had been carried out in the past had resulted in failures and in some cases, tragedies.

Despite progress in combating violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, there is still a long way to go. After more than a decade of the radicalisation of local populations and a multi-year armed insurgency, three months of foreign intervention is just the start of the process towards building peace and stability in Cabo Delgado.


Image Information:

Image: Unlike the Russian mercenaries, Rwandan soldiers, such as the ones depicted here during a training exercise, made significant progress against terrorists in Mozambique.
Source: Sgt. Heather Doppke/SETAF/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/48640726723/
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

COVID-19 Diverting Resources from Terrorism Fight in the Sahel

Diversion of funds to fight COVID-19 has left the Burkinabe military with fewer resources to combat terrorism.

Diversion of funds to fight COVID-19 has left the Burkinabe military with fewer resources to combat terrorism.


“The Sahel is reeling under escalating Islamist attacks. Is Africa’s fight against the coronavirus eating up resources urgently needed to combat insurgency?”


The COVID-19 pandemic may have weakened security in the Sahel, according to the excerpted article from German international media outlet Deutsche Welle.  With so many resources devoted by Sahelian nations to combating the pandemic, fewer resources have been available to combat terrorist groups.  Those resources are more than just financial; they include soldiers who regional governments have pressed into public health services.  It is uncertain if the terrorist groups are aware of, or have been able to take advantage of the current crisis but, according to the article, armed terrorist attacks have increased in Mali and Burkina Faso.

The situation has become so bad in Mali that there is concern the government might fall to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda–linked militant group whose territory has been steadily expanding.  In Burkina Faso, Nadiagou became the first village in the country to fall to armed Islamists.  A man who escaped the attack said the two police officers guarding the village fled because they could not do anything, a sentiment echoed on a larger scale by a retired Senegalese general who explained that the limited capacities of national militaries in the region are allowing terrorist groups to claim additional territory.  Additional factors, such as the flow of weapons from Libya and interethnic tensions, also fuel the growth of terrorist groups.  African heads of state, at the recent Dakar Forum for Peace and Security, discussed the need for foreign aid to fight COVID in the Sahel and free funds to build up militaries to combat the growing presence of Islamist terrorist groups.  


Source:

Philipp Sandner, “Has the COVID pandemic amplified insecurity in the Sahel?” Deutsche Welle (German international media organization), 8 December 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/has-the-covid-pandemic-amplified-insecurity-in-the-sahel/a-60058754

The Sahel is reeling under escalating Islamist attacks. Is Africa’s fight against the coronavirus eating up resources urgently needed to combat insurgency?

African economies were massively hit by the pandemic, he told DW in Dakar where he was attending the forum, adding that “this economic impact also had consequences on the capacities of African countries to design counter-terrorism strategies.

African heads of state meeting earlier this week at the Dakar Forum for Peace and Security called for easier access to international funding and stronger strategic support to combat Islamist groups.

“They were two [police officers] against many. Even if they had tanks, they couldn’t have done anything,” he said describing how easy it was for the armed group to captured Nadiagou, the first village in Burkina Faso to fall into the hands of Islamists.


Image Information:

Image: Diversion of funds to fight COVID-19 has left the Burkinabe military with fewer resources to combat terrorism.
Source: Staff Sgt. Candace Mundt/AFRICOM?Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/26442708444/in/photolist-GhDMYh-GL3WpA-GhDMX5-GL3WoU-GnXmmQ-GnXmkh-GL3WpW-GL3WqC-GnXmn1-GnXmmu-GL3Wpq-23AcdJG-GhDMXA-8D3wYX-CP9EA4-GG6bze-8D3wVx-8D3wWx-CP9bDc-8D3wX4-26817Lk-CP9bCv-88YSaH-23jUwH1-CP9bCa-CP9bCF-88YRWR-7PymMU-8DEsaq-7PykYy-8uNPNs-hS2vPx-8uKMLK-7PygwA-7PunfD-7Puid2-7Pyg4f-8938Rj-7Pyhrd-hS2vGD-8937H1-hS2vLB-hS2vBi-8uNPLJ-88YTs6-hS2vGZ-89368d-8DEqJQ-8uKLGt-Svwee6
Attribution: CC BY 2.0