Author Archives: Karen Kaya

A Turkish Perspective on Great Power Competition in 2022 and Beyond

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Map showing the US, Russia, China.

Map showing the US, Russia, China.

“In the new international environment… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time… In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount.” 

The accompanying passages from the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research, a reputable and independent Turkish think tank, provide a foreign and balanced perspective on how great power competition may evolve in 2022 and beyond.  The passages also include astute observations about the current strategic competition among what they call “the prominent players”—the United States, Russia, and China.

First, the authors note that each of these actors is trying to expand its partnership network.  For the United States, this includes the G7, NATO, the U.S.-EU Summits, the Democracy Summit, and the security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the United States (AUKUS).  They note that the United States and its partnerships revolve around common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law.  In contrast, they note China is focused on expanding its partnership network by providing economic opportunities to certain countries, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative.  Meanwhile Russia is trying to “transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself.”  The Ukraine crisis is a case in point.  Second, they note the world is becoming polarized between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes.  In this context, they warn that democracy is regressing in some Western democracies and claim it is critical to reverse this trend. 

Third, they note that the United States is trying to protect its technological superiority over the others.  On this point, they suggest that even though China is investing more and allocating more resources to gain superiority, “the return on this investment…will not turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.”  They write that each player is investing in groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and biotechnology to achieve technological superiority and become more resilient, especially in their supply chains.  They note that the use of these technologies and the hybrid warfare they enable is eroding the distinction between peacetime and conflict. 

Finally, they claim that the deciding factor for the future of the international system will be whether, or to what extent, competing countries can cooperate on global challenges such as climate change or pandemics; as well as on contentious issues that are zero-sum games.

Source:

Sinan Ülgen and Tacan Ildem, “2022’ye Bakış (A Look at 2022),” EDAM.org.tr [Turkish] Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research (a reputable, independent Turkish think tank based in Istanbul), January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

…Today’s international environment is witnessing a systemic and strategic competition. The USA, China and to some extent Russia are the prominent players in this strategic competition. …Each of these players is trying to expand their partnerships to gain superiority over the other. For the USA, this means keeping its partnership network (such as the G7, NATO, USA-EU Summits, Democracy Summit and finally AUKUS) strong, which brings together the countries that share common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. For China, this means developing its partnership network by providing economic opportunities, especially [via] the Belt and Road Initiative.  Russia… is trying to transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself… The Ukraine crisis should be read in this context.

…

In the new international environment where strategic competition is felt more… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time.  Global polarization is taking place between groups of democratic countries and authoritarian systems.  In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount. 

Meanwhile… emerging and groundbreaking technologies create game-changing challenges and opportunities in an increasingly complex security environment where strategic competition is increasing.  In fact, we are witnessing that the USA, together with its allies and global partners, focusing more on protecting its technological superiority against its rivals.  Although China invests more and allocates more resources to gain superiority in technology against its competitors, the return on this investment, at least for the moment, is not in a size that will turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.  … Competing countries are trying to gain technological superiority and strengthen their resistance and resilience capacities, especially in the supply chain… In this context, access to emerging and groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and bio technologies is a priority.

By making use of these technologies… hybrid warfare methods are increasingly being used to achieve strategic goals without the need to resort to conventional power by using tactics in military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, information and other fields… This makes the distinction between peacetime and conflict, where the use of kinetic force used to be decisive, less clear. Increasing social resilience and resilience against hybrid activities is gaining importance. Cyber ​​attacks and disinformation campaigns are a threat and test for every society. As such, the protection of critical infrastructure emerges as a vital issue.

What will be decisive for the future of the international system is to what extent competing countries can develop cooperation in other fields, as well as the contentious areas that are seen as a zero-sum game in this strategic competitive environment. For example, will the USA and China, which seem to be facing an increasingly fierce competition in technology, be able to set common goals in the fight against climate change? Likewise, will it be possible to include China in the negotiation of international agreements … in the field of arms control and disarmament? …

Image Information:

Image: Map showing the US, Russia, China.
Source: Keith via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Second_Cold_War_locator.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

A Turkish Perspective on the Geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

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“The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments…”

“We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.” 

While critical reporting of the conflict in Ukraine is updated hourly, the accompanying passage from independent Turkish-language news and analysis site Perspektif takes a step back and puts the crisis into the greater context of global geopolitics and great power competition, including analysis of the possible long-term repercussions of the crisis.

The authors highlight the timing of the crisis, which is significant in two ways.  First, the crisis erupted in the immediate aftermath of several developments that they claim had already “rattled” the Euro-Atlantic security community.  In particular, the “defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS),” which they note reflects the “U.S.’s focus on prioritizing the Far East in recent years”; and “the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan.”  They suggest the crisis erupted at a time when Euro-Atlantic relations were not at their peak.  Timing is also important because the crisis is taking place when both the European Union (EU) and NATO are forming their future strategies.  As the authors point out, the EU is in the process of finalizing its five-year Strategic Compass document, while NATO is preparing to ratify its new Strategic Concept for the next 10 years at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  The authors note that the crisis will “leave deep marks” in these documents, which will inform these two organizations’ future strategies. 

The authors also point out that NATO will likely come to the aid of Ukraine, even militarily; while also warning that Ukraine contains certain unique “sensitivities” and should not be the stage for the next proxy war among great powers.  Here they are likely alluding to the fact that Russia views eastern Ukraine as an extension of itself, making this an  existential issue for Russia unlike the southern Caucasus or Syria.  Finally, they point out that European countries have so far shown solidarity against Russia; however, they have differing levels of threat perceptions from Russia.  In particular, “the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad” does not perceive Russia as high a threat compared to East/Southeast Europe and the Baltic countries, which does not bode well for a long-term European unified front against Russia.

Source:

Mithat Çelikpala and Fatih Ceylan, “Dinyeper’de Kabaran Sular Ukrayna ve Rusya’yı Nereye Sürükler? (Where will the Rising Waters in the Dnieper [River] Lead Ukraine and Russia?),” Perspektif Online (independent Turkish-language news and analysis site), 10 December 2021. https://www.perspektif.online/dinyeperde-kabaran-sular-ukrayna-ve-rusyayi-nereye-surukler/

The Ukraine crisis, re-ignited as of November 2021, is taking place within the big picture in ways that can be summarized below:

1. In light of the U.S.’s recently adopted global strategy; the U.S. is in an open wrist fight with China in the Far East.  Throughout 2021, the U.S. did not refrain from maintaining a military presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South/East China Seas to deter China; even though Biden had expressed that they do not intend to start a “Cold War” with China.  The contention between the U.S.-China is among the top challenges on the international agenda.

2. The competition between these two countries is starting to expand into a greater geographic area, from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, from the Balkans to East/Southeast Europe, to include the greater Black Sea basin, within the framework of China’s BRI project.

3. Due to the Ukraine crisis, relations between the U.S./West/NATO and Russia have entered a period of spiraling tension.  The situation has triggered an increased U.S. military build-up in the region and created circumstances that directly impact Black Sea security.  Tension in the region will ebb and flow until a sustainable middle ground (modus vivendi) regarding Ukraine can be achieved within the strategic contention between great powers.

4. The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments and resulted in both sides pulling their swords while also trying to establish dialogue.

5. Ukraine is not a member of NATO; it is a partner.  Therefore, when Ukraine is attacked, NATO’s article 5 does not apply.  On the other hand, it can be predicted that, in such a scenario, NATO and its members will provide all kinds of support, including military support, to Ukraine.  However, it should be remembered that Ukraine has sensitivities that make it impossible for it to be the stage of a proxy war.

6. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, European countries have so far shown solidarity; but this does not mean that there is total agreement among them regarding the threat they perceive from Russia.  In this context, for example, the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad’s threat perception from Russia is different than that of East/Southeast Europe-Baltic countries.  This is the main obstacle to [European countries] having a united stance.

7. The Ukraine crisis, which has been ignited in two separate time periods within the year, has erupted at a critical time.  The European Union is at the late stages of preparing its five-year Strategic Compass document.  NATO’s Strategic Concept for the next 10 years will be accepted at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  If the crisis with Russia deepens at a time when these two important documents are being prepared, there is no doubt that its repercussions will leave deep marks in their future strategies. 

8.  In reality, Russia has lost Western Ukraine, but directly/indirectly gained control of the Crimea peninsula and the Donbass region. It will continue its efforts to legitimize the control it has established in these regions.  It would be realistic to say the problems related to each of these areas are “frozen” and call them “hot disputes” which are difficult to solve; and to establish positions based on this view.  However, this does not mean the recognition of illegitimate/illegal Russian domination in these areas.  We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.  The shadow of the geopolitical/geostrategic competition that impacts the entire world and that has become inflamed this year is poised to create new challenges and disputes from Ukraine to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via the Aegean.

Image Information:

Image: Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Suvorov#/media/File:Suvorov_Alex_V.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain