Author Archives: Dodge Billingsley

Russia Offers Financial Incentives To Meet Troop Recruiting Targets

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Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.

“Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.”

In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the “mobilization” of an additional 180,000 new service members. However, the meaning of “mobilization” appears to be a question of semantics: Russian media has reported that there is no talk in Moscow of a partial mobilization similar to the one conducted in the autumn of 2022, which led to tens of thousands of Russians fleeing the country. According to the first excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin Russian news source Izvestia, the press secretary for the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, stated in November that “there is no talk of mobilization,” instead claiming that Russians are actively signing contracts for service in Ukraine.

Russia is mobilizing troops, not by traditional forced means, but financial inducements are now a key component of Russia’s recruitment tactics. According to the second excerpted article from the Russian news agency Interfax, a new debt law is the most recent incentive passed to encourage participation in the military. The new law allows up to 10 million rubles ($96,000) of outstanding debt facing collection, previously incurred by a recruit and/or his or her spouse, to be written off if a recruit joins the force.[i] Further, according to the third excerpted article from the Russian news tabloid Ragnum News Agency, on 25 November, Russia extended a one-time 400,000 ruble ($3,800) payment to those who sign a contract with the Russian Guard (Rosgvardiya) “for participation in the special military operation” in Ukraine.

The combination of financial incentives, which amounts to a windfall for many Russians, dead or alive, may well help the Russian armed forces continue to meet its recruiting goals, extending the war in Ukraine.[ii]

Sources:

“Песков сообщил об отсутствии планов по проведению мобилизации в России (Peskov reported no plans to conduct mobilization in Russia),” Izvestia (pro-Kremlin Russian news source), 23 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1795673/2024-11-23/peskov-soobshchil-ob-otsutstvii-planov-po-provedeniiu-mobilizatcii-v-rossii

Russia is not planning to conduct mobilization. This was announced on November 23 by the press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov.

The official representative of the Kremlin added that at present, Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.

“There are a lot of these people — hundreds of people sign contracts every day and go to a special military operation,” Peskov noted.

Assembly point: Putin announced the completion of mobilization within two weeks

At the same time, the president emphasized that the conscription process needs to be improved.

Earlier, on October 27, when the agency asked whether there were enough volunteers and whether mobilization might be required, Peskov also answered that there was no talk of mobilization in Russia.

Before that, in May, Peskov stated that there was no need for mobilization in Russia, commenting on an article in the Financial Times (FT) that the country was actively recruiting volunteer contract soldiers.

“Правительство доработало программу списания кредитов военнослужащих (The government has finalized the program for writing off military personnel’s loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 15 November 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/992965

The government proposes to write off overdue loans of up to 10 million rubles for which judicial collection has already begun for mobilized personnel, conscripts (except for cadets) and military contract soldiers during military service to perform the tasks of the Air Defense Forces, from December 1, 2024, follows from the amendments submitted to the State Duma.

We are talking about writing off obligations under loan agreements that were concluded before December 1, 2024 and for which a court order on debt collection has already entered into legal force or enforcement proceedings have been initiated. Up to 10 million rubles can be written off for a certain category of citizens – these are conscripts for military service upon mobilization; conscripted military personnel (except for cadets of military schools or universities); other citizens who are not undergoing military service, but who concluded a contract for military service for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation no earlier than December 1, 2024. The write-off also applies to spouses of this category of citizens.

“The obligations of a citizen called up for military service upon mobilization into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a serviceman who has served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by conscription (except for a serviceman holding a military position as a cadet in a military professional educational organization, a military educational organization of higher education under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), another citizen who is not serving in the military, who concluded no earlier than December 1, 2024, a contract for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation, and (or) his (her) spouse, arising from a loan agreement, if before December 1, 2024 a judicial act on the collection of debt on these obligations entered into legal force and (or) in order to fulfill such obligations, a writ of execution was issued to a bank or other credit organization and (or) enforcement proceedings were initiated based on the applications of the said organizations (the writ of execution was presented for execution), shall be terminated in parts, not exceeding in total 10 million rubles, from the date of conclusion of the said contract,” the text of the amendment says.

“Путин распространил на Росгвардию разовую выплату в 400 тыс. Рублей (Putin Extends One-Time Payment of 400,000 Rubles to the Russian Guard),” Regnum News Agency (Russian tabloid), 25 November 2024. https://regnum.ru/news/3931489?utm_source=iz&utm_campaign=vidjet&utm_medium=8&utm_content=3931489

The Russian Guard has been extended a one-time payment of ₽400,000 upon signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense.

Russian President Vladimir Putin extended the provision on a one-time payment of 400,000 rubles to the Russian Guard upon signing a contract for participation in a special military operation. The corresponding decree was published on November 25.

“This decree shall enter into force on the date of its signing and shall apply to legal relations that arose from August 1, 2024,” the document says.

Putin introduced a payment of 400 thousand rubles for participants in the special operation who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense for a period of one year or more in August. Foreign citizens who decided to go to the combat zone also received the right to it.

The press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov explained that the payment is aimed at supporting the fighters of the special operation. He emphasized that this does not mean a change in the goals of the SVO.

Notes:

[i] In April 2024, the Russian government clarified its position vis-a-vie Russian banks regarding debt and interest reduction for those serving in Ukraine. As per when the article was written, the price tag for the debt forgiveness would be in the neighborhood of 11 billion rubles, half of which will be paid by the banks. The other half would be paid for by the government, adding an additional 5-6 billion rubles to defense expenditures. See: “Принят закон о компенсации банкам 50% потерь от списания процентов по кредитам военных (A law has been adopted to compensate banks for 50% of losses from writing off interest on military loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 2 April 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/953642

[ii] For reporting on the positive economic impact of financial payment to family members of deceased service members, see: Georgi Kantchev and Matthew Luxmoore, “The ‘Deathonomics’ Powering Russia’s War Machine,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 November 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-military-death-pay-6cfe936e?mod=world_lead_pos3

Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.
Source: Russian Office of the President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61584
Attribution: Public Domain

Damage to Undersea Cables in Baltic Hint at China – Russia Collusion

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The Baltic Fulmar was sold to a Chinese shipowner in 2023 and renamed the NewNew Polar Bear. The NewNew Polar Bear is suspected of severing undersea cables in the Baltics.

“Investigators suspect that a Chinese vessel is the perpetrator of the incident. The incident was sharply reacted to by German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who said that it ‘is not an accidental accident, but a deliberate sabotage.”

On 19 November, the Danish Navy detained the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Pang 3 under the suspicion that it had damaged undersea cables connecting Finland and Germany and cables connection Sweden and Lithuania. As per the first excerpted article in the Polish defense publication Defense24, the Yi Pang 3 had sailed from the Russian port of Ust-Lugu before passing through the Baltic Sea. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius called the incident deliberate sabotage but did not delineate a responsible party. According to the second excerpted article from the Indian publication The Week, Russia may be the culprit, given that the Yi Pang 3 was captained by a Russian. Additional western sources point to Russia as well.[i] However, the incident is the second involving a Chinese-flagged ship damaging undersea cables in the Baltic.[ii] It also comes on the heels of Western efforts to isolate China from the undersea cable network in the Indo-Pacific and suspicion of Chinese hacking into existing undersea cables in the region.[iii] Two months prior, in September 2024, Chinese officials excoriated the U.S. and its allies’ efforts to control the global undersea cable network.[iv]

It is highly probable that both Russia and China are complicit in the acts of sabotage against critical Western infrastructure. Both China and Russia have a shared interest in degrading Western capabilities: China’s confrontations with the West regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea and Russia’s confrontations with the West over control of Ukraine. Both China and Russia have recently engaged in hybrid or non-lethal forms of warfare, leading multiple Western leaders to suspect and accuse them of sabotage.

Sources:

“Danish Navy Stopped Chinese Ship Suspected of Damaging Undersea Cables,” Defense24 (Polish based security focused news outlet), 20 November 2024. https://defence24.com/armed-forces/danish-navy-stopped-a-chinese-ship-suspected-of-damaging-undersea-cables?utm_source=archives.internationalintrigue.io&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=tense-moments-at-this-year-s-g20&_bhlid=0108ca30f9c9a3a247f66f2e0da3ce1af250d1cd

The detention took place in the area of Danish territorial waters, in the Danish Straits at the exit of the Great Belt. The detention of the vessel was carried out by the Danish Navy patrol vessel P525. After a few hours, another vessel HDMS Soeloeven, which is specialised for underwater work, reached both vessels. The detention of the vessel occurred on the evening of 19 November.

There is no information on whether there was an inspection of the vessel by the Danish MW’s boarding group. The Chinese vessel was sailing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga.

There is no official announcement from the Danish authorities as yet either, but the Chinese bulk carrier is suspected of damaging telecommunications cables lying on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. The vessel was said to have sailed over the damaged cables between Finland and Germany, the so- called C-Lion1, and between cables connecting Sweden and Lithuania.

Investigators suspect that a Chinese vessel is the perpetrator of the incident. The incident was sharply reacted to by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, who said that it “is not an accidental accident, but a deliberate sabotage.”

This is not the first time that a Chinese naval vessel has been responsible for damaging strategic infrastructure in the Baltic. In October 2023, the Balticconenctor gas pipeline connecting Estonia and Finland was unsealed. The gas pipeline was damaged by an anchor dropped from the deck of the Chinese container ship NewNew Polar Bear. The vessel was suspected of being the perpetrator of that incident from the outset, but it was not decided to detain it and it escaped from the Baltic Sea without consequences.

Source: “Not Russia? Chinese cargo vessel “Yi Peng 3” likely behind the sabotage of undersea cables in Baltic,” The Week (India based news service), 21 November 2024. https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2024/11/21/not-russia-chinese-cargo-yi-peng-3-likely-behind-the-sabotage-of-undersea-cables-in-baltic.html

A Chinese cargo vessel ‘Yi Peng 3’ is said to be “of interest” in connection with the alleged sabotage of two undersea communication cables in the Baltic Sea. The ship is said to have passed two cables on Sunday and Monday around the same time they were found to be severed, said reports.

Though there is no official confirmation in this regard, the Danish Navy is said to have detained the Chinese-registered cargo ship, allegedly helmed by a Russian captain. The detention allegedly took place inside the Danish territorial waters by the Danish Navy patrol vessel P525. Soon another vessel HDMS Soeloeven, which specialises in underwater work, joined the P525.

However, it is not clear whether the Danish Navy officials boarded the Chinese vessel which was said to be sailing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga.

Besides Denmark, Sweden too is taking an active interest in the ship. Sweden’s National Operative Department said it is “part of the sphere of interest, but there may be more.”

As per the data by Vesselfinder tracking data, Yi Peng 3’s last port visit was on November 15 in Ust-Luga in western Russia, close to the border with Estonia.

It stopped overnight on Tuesday to Wednesday in the Kattegat strait between Denmark and Sweden. The ship was then said to be moving along a strange route and stopped overnight on Tuesday to Wednesday in the Kattegat strait between Denmark and Sweden.

The ship was travelling 78 km at an average speed of 10.4 km/h and the transponder, which relays the data of the ship, at the time was inactive. Though the vessel’s AIS data shows that it circled just off Bornholm for about an hour, this is attributed to strong winds at that time and in that region.

However, Russian maritime pilot Alexander Stechentsev, who boarded the ship to guide it out of port, told The Guardian that there “was nothing unusual about the vessel.” He added that he took the ship to a receiving buoy located 11 miles offshore before disembarking.This isn’t the first that a Chinese vessel is destroying an underwater asset in the Baltic Sea. In 2022, the Chinese container vessel, the ‘NewNew Polar Bear’ had damaged a gas pipeline after its anchor dragged it across the seabed. China acknowledged the incident but claimed that the vessel accidentally damaged the pipeline due to stormy conditions that were prevailing at the time.

Notes:

[i] The view that Russia is behind the sabotage is also supported by at least one article in the U.S press. See: “Chinese-Registered Ship Is Held in Baltic Sea Sabotage Investigation,” The Wall Street Journal, 20 November 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/chinese-registered-ship-is-held-in-baltic-sea-sabotage-investigation-27929472

[ii] In October 2023 the Chinese flagged NewNew Polar Bear cut an undersea pipeline and communications cable in the Baltic. That ship was also piloted by a Russian crew and escaped the area without being detained.  China eventually said the NewNew Polar Bear had indeed damaged the critical undersea infrastructure but noted it was an accident. For an Australian perspective see: Cynthia Mehboob, “Commentary: Beijing’s Baltic confession exposes undersea vulnerability,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based news service), 15 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/china-ship-pipeline-accident-sabotage-damage-undersea-cable-europe-asia-4545766

[iii] For background information on the recent undersea cable dispute with China, see: Dodge Billingsley, “China Creating Undersea Cable Network In Response To United States Isolation Efforts, OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-creating-undersea-cable-network-in-response-to-united-states-isolation-efforts/; and Dodge Billingsley, “Potential Flashpoint Stemming From Undersea Cable Network Access Restrictions,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/potential-flashpoint-stemming-from-undersea-data-cable-network-access-restrictions/

[iv] “US politicization of undersea cables opposed,” Global Times (English language newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily), 24 September 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1320312.shtml

Image Information:

Image: The Baltic Fulmar was sold to a Chinese shipowner in 2023 and renamed the NewNew Polar Bear. The NewNew Polar Bear is suspected of severing undersea cables in the Baltics.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newnew_Polar_Bear – /media/File:Baltic_Fulmar_(ship,_2005)_IMO_9313204,_Maasmond,_Port_of_Rotterdam_pic4.JPG
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia Accused of Interference in Moldovan and Georgian Elections

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Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.

“Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the ‘victim of a Russian special operation.’”

Election interference allegations against Russia have disrupted Moldova and Georgia’s progress towards EU integration. According to the excerpted article from independent but partially U.S.-funded FRE/RL’s Georgian Service, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili declared that “as the only remaining independent institution,” she would not recognize the election results. According to Zurabishvili, Georgia was the “victim of a Russian special operation.” However, according to the excerpted article from the Russian daily Izvestia, the pro-Moscow Georgian Dream party,[i] won approximately 90 of the 150 seats in Georgian parliamentary elections, giving it “the opportunity to once again form a one-party government.” The Izvestia article confirms that the election was marred by tensions, intimidation, and physical violence but implies that Western observers present in Georgia, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “recognized the elections as legitimate.” Multiple opposition parties, which had hoped to build a pro-Western coalition government, secured only 37 percent of the vote as a bloc and have vowed to challenge the election results.

Meanwhile, Moldova also held an election for president and a referendum on EU integration in October. According to the excerpted article from RFE/RL’s Moldova Service, the election was also marred by Russian election interference, including a vote-buying scheme orchestrated by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.[ii] Shor is a convicted criminal and fugitive in Moldova and is thought to be residing in Russia. Pro-EU Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who failed to secure enough votes to win reelection outright and will now have to face a pro-Moscow candidate in a runoff election, accused “foreign forces” of the outcome.[iii] In response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on Sandu to “‘produce proof’ to back up her accusations.”

If substantiated, election interference in both Georgia and Moldova is a clear indication of Russia’s ability to influence areas using what has loosely been referred to as hybrid operations, non-lethal operations, or influence operations, all of which fall short of actual armed conflict, but which are very difficult to counter.

Sources:

“Georgian President Won’t Recognize Vote Results, Calls For Protests, Alleges Russian Interference,” RFE/RL’s Georgian Service (independent but partially U.S. funded news service), 27 October 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/33175194.html?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=pn-msg&utm_campaign=2024-10-27-Crisis-In-Georg

Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the “victim of a Russian special operation.”

Zurabishvili did not present any evidence to back up her claim in a brief statement to the media in Tbilisi on October 27.

“As the only remaining independent institution in this state, I want to say that I do not recognize this election. It cannot be recognized. It would be the same as recognizing Russia’s entry here — Georgian subordination to Russia,” she said.

“I didn’t come to Georgia for [Russian domination]. Our ancestors did not live for this. We will not tolerate this. It cannot be taken away from Georgia — its European future,” she added.

She called for street protests starting on October 28 at 7 p.m. in the South Caucasus nation, which has seen mass demonstrations in recent months against the ruling Georgian Dream party, which critics accuse of being pro-Russian and of having eroded democratic norms.

She blasted what she called a “Russian special operation — one of the new forms of hybrid warfare carried out on our people, our country.”

The Georgian Dream party celebrated an apparent win in the vote, but the pro-Western opposition cried foul and election monitors said that “critical violations took place,” including voter intimidation and physical violence.

Western observers also demanded an investigation into alleged irregularities.

The vote was seen as a crucial test of the EU-candidate country’s democratic credentials, and one that Brussels had said could determine Georgia’s chances of joining the bloc.

The OSCE also decried recorded instances of vote buying, double voting, physical violence, and intimidation.

Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White, the head of the European Parliament monitoring delegation, said Georgian Dream used hostile rhetoric and “promoted Russian disinformation” and conspiracy theories ahead of the election in an attempt to “undermine and manipulate the vote.”

“During our observation, we noted cases of vote buying and double voting before and during elections, especially in rural areas,” said Romanian lawmaker Iulian Bulai, head of the delegation sent by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), speaking at a joint news conference held in Tbilisi by heads of election-observation missions.

“Давняя «Мечта»: готова ли Грузия к смене внешнеполитического курса после выборов (Long-standing “Dream”: Is Georgia Ready to Change Its Foreign Policy Course After the Elections),” Izvestia (long running Russian daily newspaper, sanctioned by the EU in May 2024 for spreading propaganda), 27 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1781219/elizaveta-borisenko/davniaia-mechta-gotova-li-gruziia-k-smene-vneshnepoliticheskogo-kursa-posle-vyborov

The Georgian Dream, which has ruled the country since 2012, managed to win a convincing victory. According to the Central Election Commission, it gained almost 54% of the votes in the parliamentary elections held on October 26, almost the same as in the previous elections in 2020. This gives it the opportunity to claim about 90 of the 150 seats in parliament and once again form a one-party government.

Nevertheless, the defeated united opposition actively tried to destabilize the situation. They planned to form a coalition government, but gained only half as many votes as the Georgian Dream, about 37%. Of the 18 registered political forces, in addition to the Dream, only four overcame the five percent barrier [to be represented in parliament].

OSCE observers recognized the elections as legitimate, but warned that “they will observe how the new government will adhere to the European path.” Later, the recognition of the elections as legitimate was confirmed by the Georgian Prime Minister, who called the OSCE’s conclusions quite logical.

It is not entirely clear how the relationship between the Georgian Dream and President Salome Zurabishvili, who openly supports the opposition, will develop. The head of state is exclusively in favor of the country’s European integration, and the government and parliament are in favor of balanced relations with both the West and the Russian Federation…

The question of how Georgia’s relations with Western countries will develop after the victory of the Georgian Dream also remains open. It is worth noting that the dialogue between Tbilisi and the West sharply worsened in the spring, when the authorities initiated the adoption of the law “On the transparency of foreign influence”, which provides for assigning the status of a foreign agent to an NPO or media outlet if a “foreign force” receives more than 20% of its income from abroad during a calendar year… In addition, at the instigation of the “Dream”, a law banning LGBT propaganda was adopted in Georgia. Then, at the stage of opening negotiations on joining the union, the EU announced the suspension of the country’s integration.

…If the West decides to push Georgia away, the political vector may change. So far, there is no clear political line on tearing the republic away from the West, says Vadim Mukhanov.

As for relations with Russia, they are unlikely to change significantly. After the elections, Irakli Kobakhidze said that Georgia does not plan to restore diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation due to the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Tbilisi considers its territories. It is worth noting that on the eve of the elections, the Georgian Dream promised to “apologize” to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“Moldovan Police Accuse Pro-Russian Oligarch Of $39M Vote-Buying Scheme.” RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service (partially U.S. State Department funded but independent regional news service), 25 October 2024.

https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-police-accuse-shor-russia-oligarch-39m-vote-buying/33172951.html

Moldovan police have accused convicted fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor of transferring $39 million into the bank accounts of thousands of Moldovans over the past two months allegedly to buy votes for the pro-Russian camp in a referendum and the first round of presidential elections last week.

Investigators said on October 25 that they uncovered about 1 million bank transfers, which reached the personal accounts of Moldovan citizens in September and October through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank (PSB), Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernauteanu told a news conference in Chisinau.

He added that some 500 people had already been fined for “passive electoral corruption,” without clarifying what that means. No direct evidence of vote buying has been released, but under Moldovan law, it is illegal to accept large sums of money from abroad for political purposes.

Despite expectations of a landslide “yes,” the October 20 referendum on Moldova’s integration into the European Union only passed by a razor-thin margin of less than 1 percentage point…

The referendum was held simultaneously with a presidential vote, won by incumbent Sandu with some 42.5 percent of the vote — less than the 50 percent plus one vote needed to avoid a runoff.

She will face pro-Moscow ex-Prosecutor-General Alexandr Stoianoglo in a crucial runoff on November 3.

On October 21, Sandu indicated that the stronger-than-expected showing of the pro-Moscow camp in both elections was due to what she said was an “unprecedented” assault from “criminal groups,” which she said tried to buy off as many as 300,000 votes with tens of millions of euros in an attempt to “undermine the democratic process.”

Russia has denied any interference, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling on Sandu to “produce proof” to back up her accusations.

The police investigation found that, in September, PSB bank, which has been under international sanctions for its support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, sent $15 million followed by a further $24 million this month. Cernauteanu said investigators had established the identities of some 138,000 Moldovan citizens in whose bank accounts the money ended up. The real number of those allegedly bribed by Shor, however, “is even higher” than the 300,000 mentioned by Sandu, because transfers made to one account were then shared between more people, he said.

Notes:

[i] Georgian Dream party, founded in 2012, won the general election the same year as part of a coalition. It proceeded to win the 2016 and 2020 general elections as an independent party as well. Upon establishment, Georgian Dream was largely considered favorable to EU integration. However, it is now considered to be pro-Moscow by Georgian opposition parties and the current Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, based on its support of a number of controversial laws and the dissemination of anti-Western narratives. Georgian Dream leadership dispute this vilification claiming that their current platform seeks to look to both Russia and the West equally.

[ii] Shor, who also holds Russian and Israeli citizenship, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison by a Moldovan court in April 2023 over a $1 billion bank fraud. He is believed to be in Russia.

[iii] See: “Еврореферендум и выборы сделали Санду политическим трупом, считает эксперт (The Euroreferendum and elections have turned Sandu into a political corpse, says expert),” Ria Novosti (Russian daily), 23 October 2024. https://ria.ru/20241023/sandu-1979672826.html

Image Information:

Image: Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.
Source: Jelger Groeneveld, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_in_Tbilisi_against_arrest_of_journalists_(26_Sept_2021).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-2.0

Taiwan’s Plan To Deter China With Submarines Faces Scrutiny

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Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.

“The threat the submarines are intended to guard against was highlighted anew this week, as Beijing on Monday held a day of large-scale military drills surrounding Taiwan.”

Last year Taiwan unveiled its first attack submarine, the Hai Kun. Taiwan’s ruling party and defense officials have pitched the Hai Kun as a critical deterrent to China’s ever-expanding naval capability. However, according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei Asia, plans to build seven more submarines based on the Hai Kun prototype from 2025 to 2038 are facing stiff opposition in Taiwan from political rivals and analysts asking questions about the cost of and viability of the submarines themselves.[i]

According to the article, there are calls within Taiwan and from the United States to urgently “develop asymmetric weapons in large quantities and learn how to use them effectively.” Some experts doubt whether the submarines are an appropriate response to counter China’s far more extensive firepower. According to the Nikkei Asia article, Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, stated that Taiwan’s new submarines are not up to par to operate in “this threat environment” and that to launch them from Taiwan makes no sense. But not all agree. Head of Taiwan’s National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, Adm. Huang Shu-kuang,[ii] had previously claimed that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack, or a blockade.” The article does note that Taiwan is serious about acquiring large numbers of relatively inexpensive sea drones, taking a page out of Ukraine’s playbook, which “deployed mobile coastal defense cruise missiles and ‘kamikaze’ sea drones, which acted as smart mines.”However, another Taiwanese defense analyst noted that the submarine program could be valuable in creating “a defense economy in Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s success in thwarting a potential Chinese invasion may depend on Taipei’s ability to correctly determine whether submarines or drones, or a combination of both, will give it the best chance of winning a war with China.

Sources:

“Taiwan submarine program faces mounting questions over tactical merits,” Nikkei Asia (Japan based news service that specifically covers the Indo-Pacific region), 15 October 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-submarine-program-faces-mounting-questions-over-tactical-merits

Taiwan faces fresh questions over its most ambitious defense program — a government plan to build seven more submarines — as opposition parties push back and some experts call for complementary reforms.

President Lai Ching-te and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, have pushed the submarine program as a means to deter an aggressive Communist China, which claims Taiwan as its own. Political divisions over the subs reflect broader disagreements over Taiwan’s security and defense reforms that could have global consequences as Beijing ratchets up coercive measures while refusing to rule out an invasion….

Some experts doubt whether the submarines fit into this strategy for countering China’s far more extensive firepower. Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at a recent Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club briefing… questioned the wisdom of the submarine endeavor if it comes at the expense of smaller weapons such as sea drones. “The technology in Taiwan’s new submarine isn’t up to par to operate in this threat environment. Basing submarines here in the heart of the contested area is not smart. Submarines are going to be very useful if they’re coming from a thousand miles away but Taiwan doesn’t have an overseas base, so it begs the question,” he said. “Sending out large numbers of expendable sea drones would make a lot more sense…”

The defense ministry has indeed announced plans to acquire defense drones. Experts say Taiwan could consider establishing a vast drone operation based on lessons from the Ukraine war…

Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, then-head of the National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, told Nikkei Asia last year that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack or a blockade.”

But one diplomat involved in Taiwan affairs argued that Lai’s administration may need to reconsider its submarine-centric approach… “The problem is that Taiwan’s government has now framed this as their most important reform against Chinese threats.”

Others disagree, seeing broad benefits. Su Tzu-yun, a defense expert at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research think tank, emphasized the importance of submarines not only in fending off China’s blockade attempts, but also in driving Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry and strategic development.

“A submarine can create a counter or balance force to stop or reduce a blockade or quarantine operation by the PLA,” Su said during another TFCC briefing. “But there are additional benefits to the project. … Building a fleet can create a defense economy. Taiwan can build submarines with a permanent shipyard and it can create an economic motor.”

Notes:

[i] “Taiwan earmarks billions to build 7 more Submarines in bid to deter possible PLA attacks.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based media outlet), 24 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3275605/taiwan-earmarks-billions-build-7-more-submarines-bid-deter-possible-pla-attacks?share=cnt17jZj5x2IHbTcgP1CgdsGujXmS1xu8Cd5o4Kyc5t3kKRdk3KmSsGYcdjokCp9+rof+rs4CNVI9dikc5HG%2FWDLPW2KQ9cqIjDI0iJnb80InWHGNkf8Z1txcJ9f33PsihBnLZXWcX%2F4gdgwywk6Pw==&utm_campaign=social_share

[ii] Admiral Huang Shu-kuang had offered his resignation in April 2024 due to, in his words, “unfounded accusations and slander targeting the IDS program.” His resignation was refused, and he currently heads up the submarine program. See: “Retired Navy Admiral to Stay on Sub Program,” Taipei Times (Taiwan English language news service), 16 May 2024.https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/05/16/2003817950

Image Information:

Image: Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/09.28_總統主持「潛艦國造原型艦命名暨下水典禮」_-_Flickr_id_53219332200.jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-2.0

Russia Conducts Its Largest Naval Exercise in More Than 30 Years

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Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.

“The maneuvers… involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.”

Russia conducted its largest naval exercise in more than 30 years, likely to dispel the notion of its failures against Ukraine in the Black Sea.[i] According to the excerpted article by Russian flagship news outlet Ria Novosti, the exercise, known as Ocean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise, took place across the globe, with maneuvers in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic Seas.[ii]

The Novosti article claims Ocean-2024 maneuvers involved more than 400 vessels and more than 90,000 personnel. Four Chinese naval vessels also participated in Ocean-2024, part of the Pacific Fleet maneuvers. Scenarios included fighter interception of hostile aircraft intent on bombing the surface fleet. In the case highlighted, the attack aircraft was an IL-38 anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft—no match for the MiG-31BMs sent to intercept. The tactics practiced were tried-and-true naval drills, reflecting long-standing naval threats that still exist but do not consider the ongoing evolution in naval warfare, including drone and counter-drone scenarios, the types of naval warfare that have proved devastating to Russia’s Navy in the Black Sea. While prudent to train in general naval combat operations, Moscow’s failure to reset the exercise to reflect the current and future threat environment begs the question if Ocean-2024 was more a public relations operation, especially in the wake of the U.S.-led RIMPAC naval exercise earlier in the year.  Russia’s Ocean-2024 is likely serves as a morale booster for its Navy at a time when it has not been able to restore any operational capability in the Black Sea.

Sources:

“МиГ-31БМ перехватили условного противника на учениях “Океан-2024” (MiG-31BM intercepted a mock enemy during the Ocean-2024 exercises),” Ria Novosti (mainstream Russian media outlet), 15 September 2024. https://ria.ru/20240915/istrebiteli-1972773873.html

MOSCOW, 15 Sep – RIA Novosti. A pair of MiG-31BM interceptors intercepted a mock enemy over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan as part of the Ocean-2024 exercises, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

“A pair of high-altitude MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, while performing a flight mission to provide fighter-air cover for the Pacific Fleet’s naval strike group over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan, intercepted a mock enemy as part of the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise,” the statement said.

It is noted that as part of the exercise, the role of an airspace violator was played by an Il-38 aircraft, which attempted to approach a detachment of naval ships to launch a bomb strike on it. And the crews of the MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, having received coordinates from the radio engineering units, took off from one of the airfields, reached the designated area and independently classified the target, after which they launched long-range tactical air-to-air missiles at it.

“After completing the task, the crews of the fighters practiced elements of air combat with mock enemy fighters performing cover missions “enemy” bombers,” the ministry added.

Russian Navy formations and units began the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercises on Tuesday, which will last until September 16. The exercises are being held in a bilateral format under the general leadership of the Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev.

The maneuvers, which will take place in the waters of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic Seas, involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.

“Ocean” is the code name for naval exercises conducted by the General Command of the USSR Navy in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1983 and 1985. The “Ocean” exercises (maneuvers) were the largest operational and combat training events of the USSR Navy in the post-war period and the largest in world history for their time.

Notes:

[i] For a western perspective on Ocean-2024, see: “Ocean-2024 – Russian Navy Flexes Its Muscles, China Assists,” Naval News (Europe based naval focused news service), 13 September 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

[ii] Notably, no maneuvers took place in the Black Sea, once a naval strongpoint for Russia built upon its Black Sea Fleet, but now under constant threat from Ukrainian naval drones. Ukrainian surface drones have wreaked enough havoc and forced Moscow to redeploy and scatter its Black Sea Fleet to various ports on the eastern Black Sea.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, published by Naval News, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

Chinese Marines Participate in Brazil’s Military Exercise for the First Time

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“The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.”

The participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa, a multinational military exercise hosted by Brazil’s Navy, caps off a diplomatically busy summer between China and Brazil.[i] However, Chinese media coverage of the military exercise was muted. The excerpted article in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on a single statement from the Chinese Defense Ministry, which noted the exercise would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges.” The SCMP article noted the focus of the exercise was joint landing and anti-landing combat drills—the same type of exercises the U.S. is engaging in across the nations of the South China Sea, to include the Philippines. The SCMP article did acknowledge that the Chinese military participation in Brazil was unusual given that Chinese military exercises are overwhelmingly focused on the South China Sea.

The exercise received different coverage in the Brazilian press. According to the excerpted article in Brazilian flagship news outlet Globo, the annual exercise featured 3,000 military personnel from Brazil, 63 U.S. Marines, and 32 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marines. Eight additional countries sent military observers.[ii] The U.S. had participated in the same exercise in previous years, but it was the first time for PLA personnel. While Brazil heralded the trilateral military exercise as significant for bringing the United States and China together, U.S. defense officials confirmed that U.S. troops participating in the exercise did not train nor participate alongside the contingent of PLA Marines participating in the exercise.[iii] No further explanations were publicized.

While minimal in scope, the participation of Chinese PLA Marines in Operation Formosa is but one of a host of other diplomatic collaborations between China and Brazil. This includes Brazil’s July pronouncement that it would like to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative; the joint commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil in August; and Brazil and Chinese participation at the recent BRICS summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in September.[iv] Seen in conjunction with these other events and pronouncements, the participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa adds to the body of evidence of a deepening China-Brazil relationship.

Sources:

Yuanyue Dang,“In rare shift, China will send marine corps to Brazil for joint military exercise,” South China Morning Post, 6 September 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3277473/rare-shift-china-will-send-marine-corps-brazil-joint-military-exercise?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.

A detachment of the PLA Marine Corps will travel to take part in Exercise Formosa 2024 at the invitation of the Brazilian military, the Chinese defence ministry said on Thursday.

The exercises, with a focus on joint landing and anti-landing combat drills, would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges”, the ministry said in a statement on its website.

In recent years, China has hosted military medicine forums, senior military officer seminars and defence forums for Latin American countries, but it is not common for the Chinese military to travel to the region to take part in operations.

This year has seen an improvement in relations between China and Brazil.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced in July that his administration planned to join the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s flagship infrastructure and investment project.

Also in July, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun met visiting Brazilian army commander Tomás Ribeiro Paiva in Beijing.

Dong said during the meeting that the two militaries should “strengthen exchanges and learn from each other” to “jointly improve capabilities and take military relations to a new level”.

Source: Filipe Vidon, “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil; veja fotos (Navy unites US and Chinese troops for the first time in a military operation in Brazil; see photos),” Globo, 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml?fbclid=IwY2xjawFOo7tleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeVMuBtcSg4CrxXj-qkWNDCN23gW46nn_DjRQtSe3RH3p3C5Vzl6nPBQTg_aem_Q98CjbLroQQSbos97saIrg

63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously.

The Brazilian Navy has achieved a feat: uniting US and Chinese troops on the same side of the “battle”. This is not a preparation for an imminent war, but rather Operation Formosa 2024, an annual military training operation that began on the 4th and will run until September 17, in Goiás.

“Foreign military personnel, together with Brazilian troops, conduct workshops to exchange experiences, known as Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE). During this exchange, various military subjects are addressed, promoting greater integration between Brazil and friendly nations,” the Navy told Globo.

As columnist Ancelmo Gois anticipated, the rivalry between the two countries is not only international, but also 63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously. The Armed Forces will act together, simulating an amphibious operation, considered the most complex of military operations. All weapons used will use live ammunition. The training also aims to promote integration between the Brazilian Navy, Army and Air Force. The objective of the exercise is to prepare Brazilian military personnel to act together in live-fire activities, in controlling airspace and in executing the maneuver during the so-called “Operation of Replacement by Overtaking”. In this phase of the training, responsibilities are transferred between the Armed Forces, which take turns in controlling the actions to achieve the proposed mission. Armored vehicles from the Marine Corps (CFN), such as the JLTV, the ASTROS system, the Piranha, the Amphibious Tracked Car (CLAnf), the UNIMOG truck, in addition to the AF-1 Skyhawk fighter and Navy helicopters. The FAB’s KC-390 Millenium, A-29 Super Tucano and R-99 aircraft, as well as the Army’s ASTROS, Guarani and M60 Combat Car, will also be on display in the operation.

“The holding of major military exercises, such as the Specific Joint Training for Combined Weapons Employment, is essential for optimizing the operations of the Brazilian Armed Forces, promoting efficient integration between the Navy, Army and Air Force. These exercises are designed to improve the coordination and execution of joint operations, addressing crucial aspects such as: fire support, airspace control, command and control, maneuver and logistics,” says the Navy.

Notes:

[i] Operation Formosa has nothing to do with the island of Formosa, otherwise known as Taiwan. Brazil named the annual operation “Formosa” in the 1990s, reflecting its proximity to the Brazilian city of Formosa in the state of Goiás, near the capitol of Brasilia.

[ii] Eight countries sent military observers to Operation Formosa 2024; Argentina, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Congo, Mexico and Nigeria. See: “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil (Navy joins US and Chinese troops for the first time in military operation in Brazil),” Globo (mainstream Brazilian news service), 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml

[iii] For additional information on the U.S. position regarding Chinese PLA Marines participating in Operation Formosa, and statement by Pentagon official noting that “U.S. Marines were only at Formosa to train with their Brazilian partners,” see: “Chinese troops to join Brazil’s military drills with US forces,” Reuters, 10 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-joins-brazilian-military-exercises-alongside-us-troops-2024-09-10/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb

[iv] For reporting on the meeting commemorating 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, see: “Chinese vice president attends reception for 50th anniversary of China-Brazil diplomatic ties,” XinhuaNet (English language Chinese Media), 14 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240914/2a6daa8898ef41d29115085d83858256/c.html; for additional reading on the recent Meeting of BRICS High-Ranking Officials Responsible For Security Matters/National Security Advisors in St Petersburg Russia, see: “China welcomes more Global South partners to join BRICS—senior Chinese official,” XinhuaNet, 12 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240912/4f0d08a4cd98443694fa4fc8a4ddfcf0/c.html

China’s Southern Theater Command Strained by Growing Operational Requirements

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Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.

“With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.”

Multiple press reports emanating from Southeast Asia suggest China’s Southern Theater Command is being stretched to its operational limits.[i] According to the excerpted article from India media aggregator First Post, instability on the China-Myanmar border due to the on-going internal conflict in Myanmar between government and insurgent forces, and continued tension in the South China Sea, could push the command to the brink of its operational capabilities. The First Post article was published on the heels of China’s announcement that it would conduct three days of live fire drills and patrols on the border with Myanmar beginning on 27 August and ending 29 August. The military exercises took place across a small portion of China’s roughly 1,240-mile-long border with Myanmar and are the latest military operations by the PLA on the Myanmar border. According to the First Post article, the military exercises were conducted to “maintain the safety and stability of the border areas.”  According to the second excerpted article from Singapore-based Central News Asia (CNA), China justified the frontier training exercises and patrols in the wake of recent battles between Myanmar’s military and non-government forces spilling over onto Chinese territory and the conflict generally threatening Chinese infrastructure projects on its frontier.

To the east, the PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet and accompanying air assets, operating under the Southern Theater Command, is tasked with carrying out China’s many interests in the South China Sea as China battles a variety of counterclaims on the features of the area.[ii]

The third excerpted article from Xinhau and published on Chinese military-focused news aggregator Chinamilitary.com noted that in addition to border security and continued operations in the South China Sea, the Southern Theater Command is frequently tasked to help with natural disasters such as the participation of 700 PLA Army personal to assist in the response to flooding in central China’s Hunan Province in July. None of the excerpted articles suggest the operational tempo of the Southern Theater Command would threaten the viability of the command itself, nor that China would be unable to reinforce the command from the other four theater commands if necessary. Still, the articles highlight a myriad of flashpoints within the jurisdiction of the Southern Theater Command that show no sign of abating as natural disasters, the conflict in Myanmar, and challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are sure to continue.

Sources:

“Myanmar crisis to South China Sea tensions: Is PLA’s Southern Theatre Command stretched?”, First Post (India-based news service covering the region), 26 August 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/world/myanmar-instability-to-south-china-sea-tensions-is-plas-southern-theatre-command-stretched-13808289.html – goog_rewarded

With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command is facing an unprecedented strain as it prepares for a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border. This drill, set to commence on Tuesday, is a critical test of the command’s capabilities as it grapples with the increasing instability in Myanmar, which poses a significant threat to China’s border security and strategic interests.

The Yunnan provincial government announced that the drill would take place in several key locations including Ruili city near the townships of Huyi and Wanting, Zhenkang county near Mengdui township and the autonomous county of Gengma Dai and Wa near Mengding town. These areas are close to the nearly 2,000-kilometre border that Yunnan shares with Myanmar making them particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

The Southern Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army is unique in that it must manage operations across multiple domains simultaneously. This includes land-based operations along the Myanmar border, maritime security in the South China Sea and air operations that support both naval and land operations.

The PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet, operating under the Southern Theatre Command, is tasked with a wide array of missions from routine patrols to potential conflict scenarios with foreign navies. The fleet must also be prepared to enforce China’s maritime claims often involving standoffs with vessels from other nations including the United States. The PLA Air Force units under the Southern Theatre Command are similarly stretched. They must conduct regular reconnaissance missions enforce airspace control over contested areas and provide rapid response capabilities in case of escalation…

This includes protecting Chinese investments in Myanmar, ensuring the security of critical infrastructure projects and supporting China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

China’s investments in Myanmar, particularly those related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are of strategic importance. The Southern Theatre Command is tasked with ensuring the security of these projects, which include pipelines, roads and ports that are critical to China’s access to the Indian Ocean. Protecting these assets from potential threats, whether from internal conflict in Myanmar or external interference, adds another layer of responsibility to the command’s already heavy workload.

“China’s military to conduct armed patrols, live-fire exercises near Myanmar border,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based media service), 26 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/chinas-military-conduct-armed-patrols-live-fire-exercises-near-myanmar-border-4567376

China’s military said on Monday (26 Aug) it had organised army units and joint air-ground police patrols near its border with Myanmar to maintain security and stability as fighting between Myanmar’s ruling junta and rebel forces escalates.

The patrols will focus on areas around Ruili, Zhenkang and other frontline sections in China, the military said in a statement.

Major fighting has occurred in northern Kachin and Shan states in Myanmar, with artillery shells injuring people and damaging property on the Chinese side, and also threatening infrastructure projects in China.

The Southern Theatre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is organising army units to test troops’ ability to “quickly move, block and control, and strike together, and maintain security and stability in the border areas”, the military said.

A unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also scheduled to organise live-fire exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border from Aug 27-29, according to a separate statement from China’s military.

Exercises will be held in areas located south of Ruili, and in other areas around Zhenkang county and Gengma Dai and Va autonomous county in west Yunnan province, the military said.

China said the conflict was having a negative effect on stability and social order on the China-Myanmar border.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also said recently that China would continue “its commitment to restore peace and stability in Myanmar”.

“Over 700 officers, soldiers of PLA Southern Theater Command head for flood-hit region,” 7 July. Chinamilitary.com (Chinese military-focused news aggregator) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/SouthernTheaterCommand/News_209144/16322315.html

More than 700 officers and soldiers from the airforce of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command departed for Yueyang, central China’s Hunan Province, on Sunday to undertake flood relief and rescue operations.

Carrying 46 vehicles, they are scheduled to arrive at designated areas before midnight on Sunday, with the tasks of inspecting dikes, reinforcing embankments and assisting in the restoration of local production and daily life.Heavy and prolonged rainfall has resulted in flooding in various regions of China, notably causing a breach in the dike of Dongting Lake, the country’s second-largest freshwater lake, located in a county administered by the city of Yueyang.

Notes:

[i] China’s Theater Commands can be likened to the U.S. Combatant Commands but rather than a global focus, their areas of responsibility (AOR) are officially within China itself and the international borders respective to the individual command. China’s Southern Theater Command’s AOR borders Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam (Mainland Southeast Asia) and the South China Sea, and as such the Southern Theater Command has responsibility for this long frontier. It is also anticipated that the Southern Theater Command would support the Eastern Theater Command in any major amphibious operation against Taiwan.

[ii] The Southern Military Command’s air assets also engage in air interdiction missions. See: PLA Southern Theater Command drives away Philippine aircraft illegally intruding into China’s Huangyan Dao, China Military Online, 10 August 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16330462.html

Image Information:

Image: Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theater_command_(China) – /media/File:Map_of_Theatres_of_PLA_en.svg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China’s South China Sea Strategy Complemented by Civilian Infrastructure

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Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.

“China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.”

Building civilian infrastructure and populating the newly built islands of the South China Sea is part of a cycle of building, populating, and defending that population and infrastructure that China is growing throughout the disputed islands.  A recent article in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) focused on a strategic but otherwise mundane-seeming event—the opening of Xinyi Hardware Store on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.[i] According to the SCMP article, the opening of the hardware store reflects the growing number of civilians and civilian enterprises China is moving to its newly created territories in the South China Sea. The article notes that the hardware store serves both Chinese military and civilians in Shansha City, which was established in 2012 to be the administrative center of Chinese efforts to control the islands and features of the South China Sea. Shansha City is also focal point of Chinese naval and coast guard assets in the region. Today Shansha City boasts a population of more than 2,300 civilians, an undisclosed number of military personnel, a civil-military airport, a 5,000-ton wharf, a post office, banks, schools, library, parks, hospitals, and power plant—all the trappings of a modern city.[ii]

The move has also encouraged other nations with claims in the South China Sea to follow suit. Vietnam is building up its presence in the Paracel Islands and has increased its efforts to solidify its position on Barque Canada Reef, a narrow, 18-mile atoll on the southern end of the Spratlys. Vietnam has doubled the size of the Barque Canada Reef to 492 acres since November 2023.[iii] Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to populate the islands within their control do not change the operational environment – they create the operational environment – and should be recognized as tactics used to gain legitimacy for claims to control parts of the South China Sea.

Sources:

“South China Sea: Beijing opens hardware store on disputed Woody Island,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based English language media outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3273082/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hardware-store-disputed-woody-island

China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.

Covering an area of about 100 square metres (1,076 square feet), the Xinyi Hardware Store is located on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, a contested archipelago known in Chinese as the Xisha Islands and in Vietnamese as the Hoang Sa Islands.

The store, situated next to the cargo terminal of the Sansha Yongxing Airport, opened for business on Thursday, according to the government of Sansha city, which oversees the Paracels as well as the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands – another disputed archipelago known as the Nansha Islands in Chinese.

Located about 300km (186 miles) from the southern Chinese island province of Hainan, Woody Island – known as Yongxing Island in China – is the largest outcrop among the 30 or so islands that make up the Paracels. The archipelago is controlled by Beijing but also claimed by Taipei and Hanoi.To assert its claims to the resource-rich waters, Beijing in 2012 announced the establishment of Sansha city on Woody Island to administer the disputed South China Sea islands and features.

Notes:

[i] Like most of the features of the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands are jointly claimed. The Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and China each claims jurisdiction and hold on to shoals and islands under their respective control. All nations with a claim are building out infrastructure to cement control over territory held.

[ii] The opening of the hardware store on Shansha city is the most recent in a number of media publicized opennings. In April 2023 China opened the Kuanzhai Xiangzi hotpot restaurant in Shansha City on Woody Island. See: “South China Sea: Beijing opens hotpot restaurant on Woody Island in disputed Paracels chain,” South China Morning Post, 30 April 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218912/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hotpot-restaurant-woody-island-disputed-paracels-chain?module=inline&pgtype=article

[iii] For a recent U.S. media perspective on Vietnam’s herculean effort to dredge the sea floor, fill in land, fortify barriers and erect new structures on Barque Canada Reef, see: “Vietnam accelerates island building to challenge China’s maritime claims,” The Washington Post, 9 August 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/vietnam-south-china-sea-islands-growth/

Image Information:

Image: Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands – /media/File:Asia_-_South_China_Sea_-_Mui_Da_Nang_to_Shen-Ch’uan_Chiang_including_Hai-Nan_Tao_and_Paracel_Islands_(Paracel_Islands_cropped).jpg
Attribution: Public Domain, yellow highlight by author

China Creating Undersea Cable Network in Response to United States Isolation Efforts

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Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive.

Summary: China will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the United States seeks to isolate China from the current global network.

A battle has recently been playing out between China and the United States in a bid to secure information, particularly in regard to the role of undersea cable networks. According to the excerpted article from the Japan-based Nikkei Asia news agency, Beijing is working around U.S. efforts to isolate China from the global undersea cable network, which carries 95% of the world’s data.[i] According to the article, China is striking deals and building its own network of cables with regional neighbors, recognizing the U.S. is using its political power to pressure the mostly U.S.-based data companies that develop the undersea cable network, to exclude China from access to future undersea cables. A Chinese executive interviewed by Nikkei Asia asserted that “we don’t care about the U.S. blacklisting” and claimed that the United States’ undersea network is its “tool to keep its [U.S.] hegemony.” He concluded that the undersea cable race is really a diplomatic one, noting that China only needs other governments’ consent to link with China. As per the article, there are least three major China-led projects under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong to multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Part of China’s ability to develop its own undersea cable network in the region is that they do not require any new or emerging technology. China currently has all the necessary fiber optic technology necessary to lay its own cables and maintain its own network. That ability is one reason the U.S. sees the global undersea cable network as vulnerable to both sabotage[ii] and eavesdropping by China. Last February, Taiwan suspected Chinese vessels of cutting two undersea cables linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands.[iii] In response, in October, Taiwan announced it was working to back up its communications network to protect itself in the event of a cross-strait conflict.[iv] It is likely that as tensions continue in the region  two independent networks of undersea cables will emerge and require the necessary security attention by each side to ensure against compromise.

Sources:

Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li, Tsubasa Suruga and Shunsuke Tabeta, “China’s undersea cable drive defies U.S. sanctions,” Nikkei Asia (Japanese global and regional business news source), 26 June 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/China-s-undersea-cable-drive-defies-U.S.-sanctions?utm_campaign=IC_editor_in_chief_picks_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=2&pub_date=20240628153000&seq_num=9&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Stretching 1.4 million kilometers – long enough to wrap around the Earth more than thirty times – the world’s undersea cable network is the backbone of global communications. These cables lie hundreds or even thousands of meters below the waves, carry over 95% of the world’s data and cost billions of dollars each to install. Using companies like FiberHome, China is determined to break America’s grip on the industry.

The U.S. and a handful of its allies have dominated the undersea cable market for decades, and Washington is pushing hard for “clean” communications networks free of Chinese involvement, citing national security risks. But the quiet rise of companies like FiberHome underscores how hard it is for the U.S. to contain China’s progress in an industry that it has become proficient in.

Unlike cutting-edge semiconductors, where U.S. export controls on production tools have set China’s chip industry back by years, experts agree with Wu’s assessment: China has no need for foreign technology in fiber-optic cables. Instead, success in this industry has come to rely more on state-level diplomatic ties, with politics largely determining who has access to crucial markets and who does not.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive. “The subsea cable industry is like a membership club, we all need other governments’ consent to link with their countries. … This is a diplomatic race.”

Arguably the most important market is in China’s own backyard. The Asia-Pacific region is the global leader in subsea cable investment, recording more projected spending from 2024 to 2026 than anywhere else in the world, according to data from Washington-based research company TeleGeography. At least three major China-led projects are under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong with multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

Notes:

[i] For more information, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Limiting China to Undersea Data Cable Network Threatens To Be a Flashpoint,” OE Watch, 06-2024. (URL when available)

[ii] U.S. officials have warned about potential national-security risks from SBSS, a Chinese undersea cable maintenance company that helps repair broken internet lines, see: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

[iii] The Matsu Islands, officially Lienchiang County, are an archipelago of 36 islands and islets in the East China Sea governed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), situated alongside the southeastern coast of mainland China. In early 2023, an undersea cable linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands was cut effectively disrupting internet connectivity to the Matsu Islands’ 14,000 residents. A Chinese freighter and fishing vessel were suspected of cutting the cable but Taiwan made no formal protest. See: Joe Brock, “U.S. and China wage war beneath the waves – over internet cables,” Reuters, 24 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/

[iv] See, Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan ramps up backup satellite network plans in island defence strategy.” South China Morning Post, 7 October 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237034/taiwan-ramps-backup-satellite-network-plans-island-defence-strategy

Image Information:

Image: Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsu_Islands – /media/File:Nationalist_China_-_administrative_divisons._LOC_2007633622.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

China Assures and Warns Japan Regarding Taiwan

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Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed [by Japan].”

Summary: China issued both an assurance and a warning to Japan after Tokyo released a plan to evacuate its southern island chains should conflict erupt between China and Taiwan.

In June, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MoD) issued a statement that sought to temper Japanese concerns that any action by Beijing might take to reclaim Taiwan would affect Japanese territory. The statement issued on 27 June and reported across multiple media channels including the official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission, Jiefangjun Bao, came in the aftermath of a report that Japan had issued a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures should China invade Taiwan. The Chinese MoD spokesperson pointed out that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan” and the Taiwan question had nothing to do with Japan, and thus, “China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency.’” The spokesman noted that Japan, which had inflicted countless atrocities against China in the past, “should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds.” The statement also reiterated China’s view of the operational environment in the region, emphasizing that Taiwan is the core of Beijing’s core interests[i] and noting that 1.4 billion Chinese would take action should any person or entity seek to restrict Beijing from its efforts to bring Taiwan under Beijing rule. Collectively, these statements underscore the fact that while China does not seek conflict with Japan, it also insists that Japan not impede any would-be efforts to seize Taiwan. As one of the United States’ most important allies in the Asia-Pacific, the delicate brinkmanship between China and Japan serves as a useful barometer of regional sentiment.

Sources:

“Taiwan Question has nothing to do with Japan: Defense Spokesman,” Chinese Ministry of National Defense as reported by Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission), 27 June 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/VOICES/MinistryofNationalDefense_209794/16319219.html

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed, ” said Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, at a regular press conference on Thursday.

According to reports, the Japanese government has released a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures. Some analysts believe that Japan’s evacuation plan aims to cope with the so-called “Taiwan contingency”. Not long ago, Chinese Ambassador to Japan said that if Japan ties itself onto the chariot of splitting China, its people will be led into a fire pit.

When being asked to make a comment, the spokesperson first pointed out that Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and the Taiwan question has nothing to do with Japan.

“China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency’,” stressed the spokesperson, adding that the biggest threat to cross-Strait peace is the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence” and the connivance and support for such moves from external forces.

“Japan, as a country that had colonized Taiwan for a long time and committed countless atrocities against Chinese people, in particular should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds,” said the spokesperson.

The spokesperson urged the Japanese side to earnestly abide by the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan and the commitments it has made and stop using the Taiwan question to provoke confrontation.

“More than 1.4 billion Chinese people will take resolute and strong actions against any individual or force that attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs or hinder China’s reunification,” stressed the spokesperson.

Notes:

[i] In June 2023 Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, reiterated the same phrase in person to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken while Blinken was on an official visit to the region, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction To Western Presence In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

Image Information:

Image: Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.
Source: T.Kambayashi, https://wikitravel.org/shared/File:Japan_Okinawa_map.png
Attribution: CC BY SA 3.0