Author Archives: Dodge Billingsley

Russia Conducts Its Largest Naval Exercise in More Than 30 Years

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Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.

“The maneuvers… involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.”

Russia conducted its largest naval exercise in more than 30 years, likely to dispel the notion of its failures against Ukraine in the Black Sea.[i] According to the excerpted article by Russian flagship news outlet Ria Novosti, the exercise, known as Ocean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise, took place across the globe, with maneuvers in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic Seas.[ii]

The Novosti article claims Ocean-2024 maneuvers involved more than 400 vessels and more than 90,000 personnel. Four Chinese naval vessels also participated in Ocean-2024, part of the Pacific Fleet maneuvers. Scenarios included fighter interception of hostile aircraft intent on bombing the surface fleet. In the case highlighted, the attack aircraft was an IL-38 anti-submarine maritime patrol aircraft—no match for the MiG-31BMs sent to intercept. The tactics practiced were tried-and-true naval drills, reflecting long-standing naval threats that still exist but do not consider the ongoing evolution in naval warfare, including drone and counter-drone scenarios, the types of naval warfare that have proved devastating to Russia’s Navy in the Black Sea. While prudent to train in general naval combat operations, Moscow’s failure to reset the exercise to reflect the current and future threat environment begs the question if Ocean-2024 was more a public relations operation, especially in the wake of the U.S.-led RIMPAC naval exercise earlier in the year.  Russia’s Ocean-2024 is likely serves as a morale booster for its Navy at a time when it has not been able to restore any operational capability in the Black Sea.

Sources:

“МиГ-31БМ перехватили условного противника на учениях “Океан-2024” (MiG-31BM intercepted a mock enemy during the Ocean-2024 exercises),” Ria Novosti (mainstream Russian media outlet), 15 September 2024. https://ria.ru/20240915/istrebiteli-1972773873.html

MOSCOW, 15 Sep – RIA Novosti. A pair of MiG-31BM interceptors intercepted a mock enemy over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan as part of the Ocean-2024 exercises, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

“A pair of high-altitude MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, while performing a flight mission to provide fighter-air cover for the Pacific Fleet’s naval strike group over the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan, intercepted a mock enemy as part of the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercise,” the statement said.

It is noted that as part of the exercise, the role of an airspace violator was played by an Il-38 aircraft, which attempted to approach a detachment of naval ships to launch a bomb strike on it. And the crews of the MiG-31BM interceptor fighters, having received coordinates from the radio engineering units, took off from one of the airfields, reached the designated area and independently classified the target, after which they launched long-range tactical air-to-air missiles at it.

“After completing the task, the crews of the fighters practiced elements of air combat with mock enemy fighters performing cover missions “enemy” bombers,” the ministry added.

Russian Navy formations and units began the Okean-2024 strategic command and staff exercises on Tuesday, which will last until September 16. The exercises are being held in a bilateral format under the general leadership of the Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev.

The maneuvers, which will take place in the waters of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic Seas, involve more than 400 warships, submarines and auxiliary fleet support vessels, more than 120 aircraft and helicopters of the naval aviation of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces, about 7,000 units of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as more than 90 thousand personnel.

“Ocean” is the code name for naval exercises conducted by the General Command of the USSR Navy in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1983 and 1985. The “Ocean” exercises (maneuvers) were the largest operational and combat training events of the USSR Navy in the post-war period and the largest in world history for their time.

Notes:

[i] For a western perspective on Ocean-2024, see: “Ocean-2024 – Russian Navy Flexes Its Muscles, China Assists,” Naval News (Europe based naval focused news service), 13 September 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

[ii] Notably, no maneuvers took place in the Black Sea, once a naval strongpoint for Russia built upon its Black Sea Fleet, but now under constant threat from Ukrainian naval drones. Ukrainian surface drones have wreaked enough havoc and forced Moscow to redeploy and scatter its Black Sea Fleet to various ports on the eastern Black Sea.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Buyan-M corvette Uglich of the Caspian Flotilla firing countermeasures during maneuvers part of Ocean-2024. Note the letter “Z” in reference to forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. The Caspian is essentially a Russian lake, the only other significant naval power in the Caspian is Iran and most of Iran’s naval forces are deployed and focused on the contentious Middle East.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, published by Naval News, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/ocean-2024-russian-navy-flexes-its-muscles-china-assists/

Chinese Marines Participate in Brazil’s Military Exercise for the First Time

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“The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.”

The participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa, a multinational military exercise hosted by Brazil’s Navy, caps off a diplomatically busy summer between China and Brazil.[i] However, Chinese media coverage of the military exercise was muted. The excerpted article in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on a single statement from the Chinese Defense Ministry, which noted the exercise would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges.” The SCMP article noted the focus of the exercise was joint landing and anti-landing combat drills—the same type of exercises the U.S. is engaging in across the nations of the South China Sea, to include the Philippines. The SCMP article did acknowledge that the Chinese military participation in Brazil was unusual given that Chinese military exercises are overwhelmingly focused on the South China Sea.

The exercise received different coverage in the Brazilian press. According to the excerpted article in Brazilian flagship news outlet Globo, the annual exercise featured 3,000 military personnel from Brazil, 63 U.S. Marines, and 32 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marines. Eight additional countries sent military observers.[ii] The U.S. had participated in the same exercise in previous years, but it was the first time for PLA personnel. While Brazil heralded the trilateral military exercise as significant for bringing the United States and China together, U.S. defense officials confirmed that U.S. troops participating in the exercise did not train nor participate alongside the contingent of PLA Marines participating in the exercise.[iii] No further explanations were publicized.

While minimal in scope, the participation of Chinese PLA Marines in Operation Formosa is but one of a host of other diplomatic collaborations between China and Brazil. This includes Brazil’s July pronouncement that it would like to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative; the joint commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil in August; and Brazil and Chinese participation at the recent BRICS summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in September.[iv] Seen in conjunction with these other events and pronouncements, the participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa adds to the body of evidence of a deepening China-Brazil relationship.

Sources:

Yuanyue Dang,“In rare shift, China will send marine corps to Brazil for joint military exercise,” South China Morning Post, 6 September 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3277473/rare-shift-china-will-send-marine-corps-brazil-joint-military-exercise?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.

A detachment of the PLA Marine Corps will travel to take part in Exercise Formosa 2024 at the invitation of the Brazilian military, the Chinese defence ministry said on Thursday.

The exercises, with a focus on joint landing and anti-landing combat drills, would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges”, the ministry said in a statement on its website.

In recent years, China has hosted military medicine forums, senior military officer seminars and defence forums for Latin American countries, but it is not common for the Chinese military to travel to the region to take part in operations.

This year has seen an improvement in relations between China and Brazil.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced in July that his administration planned to join the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s flagship infrastructure and investment project.

Also in July, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun met visiting Brazilian army commander Tomás Ribeiro Paiva in Beijing.

Dong said during the meeting that the two militaries should “strengthen exchanges and learn from each other” to “jointly improve capabilities and take military relations to a new level”.

Source: Filipe Vidon, “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil; veja fotos (Navy unites US and Chinese troops for the first time in a military operation in Brazil; see photos),” Globo, 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml?fbclid=IwY2xjawFOo7tleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeVMuBtcSg4CrxXj-qkWNDCN23gW46nn_DjRQtSe3RH3p3C5Vzl6nPBQTg_aem_Q98CjbLroQQSbos97saIrg

63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously.

The Brazilian Navy has achieved a feat: uniting US and Chinese troops on the same side of the “battle”. This is not a preparation for an imminent war, but rather Operation Formosa 2024, an annual military training operation that began on the 4th and will run until September 17, in Goiás.

“Foreign military personnel, together with Brazilian troops, conduct workshops to exchange experiences, known as Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE). During this exchange, various military subjects are addressed, promoting greater integration between Brazil and friendly nations,” the Navy told Globo.

As columnist Ancelmo Gois anticipated, the rivalry between the two countries is not only international, but also 63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously. The Armed Forces will act together, simulating an amphibious operation, considered the most complex of military operations. All weapons used will use live ammunition. The training also aims to promote integration between the Brazilian Navy, Army and Air Force. The objective of the exercise is to prepare Brazilian military personnel to act together in live-fire activities, in controlling airspace and in executing the maneuver during the so-called “Operation of Replacement by Overtaking”. In this phase of the training, responsibilities are transferred between the Armed Forces, which take turns in controlling the actions to achieve the proposed mission. Armored vehicles from the Marine Corps (CFN), such as the JLTV, the ASTROS system, the Piranha, the Amphibious Tracked Car (CLAnf), the UNIMOG truck, in addition to the AF-1 Skyhawk fighter and Navy helicopters. The FAB’s KC-390 Millenium, A-29 Super Tucano and R-99 aircraft, as well as the Army’s ASTROS, Guarani and M60 Combat Car, will also be on display in the operation.

“The holding of major military exercises, such as the Specific Joint Training for Combined Weapons Employment, is essential for optimizing the operations of the Brazilian Armed Forces, promoting efficient integration between the Navy, Army and Air Force. These exercises are designed to improve the coordination and execution of joint operations, addressing crucial aspects such as: fire support, airspace control, command and control, maneuver and logistics,” says the Navy.

Notes:

[i] Operation Formosa has nothing to do with the island of Formosa, otherwise known as Taiwan. Brazil named the annual operation “Formosa” in the 1990s, reflecting its proximity to the Brazilian city of Formosa in the state of Goiás, near the capitol of Brasilia.

[ii] Eight countries sent military observers to Operation Formosa 2024; Argentina, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Congo, Mexico and Nigeria. See: “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil (Navy joins US and Chinese troops for the first time in military operation in Brazil),” Globo (mainstream Brazilian news service), 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml

[iii] For additional information on the U.S. position regarding Chinese PLA Marines participating in Operation Formosa, and statement by Pentagon official noting that “U.S. Marines were only at Formosa to train with their Brazilian partners,” see: “Chinese troops to join Brazil’s military drills with US forces,” Reuters, 10 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-joins-brazilian-military-exercises-alongside-us-troops-2024-09-10/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb

[iv] For reporting on the meeting commemorating 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, see: “Chinese vice president attends reception for 50th anniversary of China-Brazil diplomatic ties,” XinhuaNet (English language Chinese Media), 14 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240914/2a6daa8898ef41d29115085d83858256/c.html; for additional reading on the recent Meeting of BRICS High-Ranking Officials Responsible For Security Matters/National Security Advisors in St Petersburg Russia, see: “China welcomes more Global South partners to join BRICS—senior Chinese official,” XinhuaNet, 12 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240912/4f0d08a4cd98443694fa4fc8a4ddfcf0/c.html

China’s Southern Theater Command Strained by Growing Operational Requirements

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Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.

“With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.”

Multiple press reports emanating from Southeast Asia suggest China’s Southern Theater Command is being stretched to its operational limits.[i] According to the excerpted article from India media aggregator First Post, instability on the China-Myanmar border due to the on-going internal conflict in Myanmar between government and insurgent forces, and continued tension in the South China Sea, could push the command to the brink of its operational capabilities. The First Post article was published on the heels of China’s announcement that it would conduct three days of live fire drills and patrols on the border with Myanmar beginning on 27 August and ending 29 August. The military exercises took place across a small portion of China’s roughly 1,240-mile-long border with Myanmar and are the latest military operations by the PLA on the Myanmar border. According to the First Post article, the military exercises were conducted to “maintain the safety and stability of the border areas.”  According to the second excerpted article from Singapore-based Central News Asia (CNA), China justified the frontier training exercises and patrols in the wake of recent battles between Myanmar’s military and non-government forces spilling over onto Chinese territory and the conflict generally threatening Chinese infrastructure projects on its frontier.

To the east, the PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet and accompanying air assets, operating under the Southern Theater Command, is tasked with carrying out China’s many interests in the South China Sea as China battles a variety of counterclaims on the features of the area.[ii]

The third excerpted article from Xinhau and published on Chinese military-focused news aggregator Chinamilitary.com noted that in addition to border security and continued operations in the South China Sea, the Southern Theater Command is frequently tasked to help with natural disasters such as the participation of 700 PLA Army personal to assist in the response to flooding in central China’s Hunan Province in July. None of the excerpted articles suggest the operational tempo of the Southern Theater Command would threaten the viability of the command itself, nor that China would be unable to reinforce the command from the other four theater commands if necessary. Still, the articles highlight a myriad of flashpoints within the jurisdiction of the Southern Theater Command that show no sign of abating as natural disasters, the conflict in Myanmar, and challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are sure to continue.

Sources:

“Myanmar crisis to South China Sea tensions: Is PLA’s Southern Theatre Command stretched?”, First Post (India-based news service covering the region), 26 August 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/world/myanmar-instability-to-south-china-sea-tensions-is-plas-southern-theatre-command-stretched-13808289.html – goog_rewarded

With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command is facing an unprecedented strain as it prepares for a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border. This drill, set to commence on Tuesday, is a critical test of the command’s capabilities as it grapples with the increasing instability in Myanmar, which poses a significant threat to China’s border security and strategic interests.

The Yunnan provincial government announced that the drill would take place in several key locations including Ruili city near the townships of Huyi and Wanting, Zhenkang county near Mengdui township and the autonomous county of Gengma Dai and Wa near Mengding town. These areas are close to the nearly 2,000-kilometre border that Yunnan shares with Myanmar making them particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

The Southern Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army is unique in that it must manage operations across multiple domains simultaneously. This includes land-based operations along the Myanmar border, maritime security in the South China Sea and air operations that support both naval and land operations.

The PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet, operating under the Southern Theatre Command, is tasked with a wide array of missions from routine patrols to potential conflict scenarios with foreign navies. The fleet must also be prepared to enforce China’s maritime claims often involving standoffs with vessels from other nations including the United States. The PLA Air Force units under the Southern Theatre Command are similarly stretched. They must conduct regular reconnaissance missions enforce airspace control over contested areas and provide rapid response capabilities in case of escalation…

This includes protecting Chinese investments in Myanmar, ensuring the security of critical infrastructure projects and supporting China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

China’s investments in Myanmar, particularly those related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are of strategic importance. The Southern Theatre Command is tasked with ensuring the security of these projects, which include pipelines, roads and ports that are critical to China’s access to the Indian Ocean. Protecting these assets from potential threats, whether from internal conflict in Myanmar or external interference, adds another layer of responsibility to the command’s already heavy workload.

“China’s military to conduct armed patrols, live-fire exercises near Myanmar border,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based media service), 26 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/chinas-military-conduct-armed-patrols-live-fire-exercises-near-myanmar-border-4567376

China’s military said on Monday (26 Aug) it had organised army units and joint air-ground police patrols near its border with Myanmar to maintain security and stability as fighting between Myanmar’s ruling junta and rebel forces escalates.

The patrols will focus on areas around Ruili, Zhenkang and other frontline sections in China, the military said in a statement.

Major fighting has occurred in northern Kachin and Shan states in Myanmar, with artillery shells injuring people and damaging property on the Chinese side, and also threatening infrastructure projects in China.

The Southern Theatre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is organising army units to test troops’ ability to “quickly move, block and control, and strike together, and maintain security and stability in the border areas”, the military said.

A unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also scheduled to organise live-fire exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border from Aug 27-29, according to a separate statement from China’s military.

Exercises will be held in areas located south of Ruili, and in other areas around Zhenkang county and Gengma Dai and Va autonomous county in west Yunnan province, the military said.

China said the conflict was having a negative effect on stability and social order on the China-Myanmar border.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also said recently that China would continue “its commitment to restore peace and stability in Myanmar”.

“Over 700 officers, soldiers of PLA Southern Theater Command head for flood-hit region,” 7 July. Chinamilitary.com (Chinese military-focused news aggregator) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/SouthernTheaterCommand/News_209144/16322315.html

More than 700 officers and soldiers from the airforce of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command departed for Yueyang, central China’s Hunan Province, on Sunday to undertake flood relief and rescue operations.

Carrying 46 vehicles, they are scheduled to arrive at designated areas before midnight on Sunday, with the tasks of inspecting dikes, reinforcing embankments and assisting in the restoration of local production and daily life.Heavy and prolonged rainfall has resulted in flooding in various regions of China, notably causing a breach in the dike of Dongting Lake, the country’s second-largest freshwater lake, located in a county administered by the city of Yueyang.

Notes:

[i] China’s Theater Commands can be likened to the U.S. Combatant Commands but rather than a global focus, their areas of responsibility (AOR) are officially within China itself and the international borders respective to the individual command. China’s Southern Theater Command’s AOR borders Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam (Mainland Southeast Asia) and the South China Sea, and as such the Southern Theater Command has responsibility for this long frontier. It is also anticipated that the Southern Theater Command would support the Eastern Theater Command in any major amphibious operation against Taiwan.

[ii] The Southern Military Command’s air assets also engage in air interdiction missions. See: PLA Southern Theater Command drives away Philippine aircraft illegally intruding into China’s Huangyan Dao, China Military Online, 10 August 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16330462.html

OE Watch Insight:

The high operational mission tempo on CHN’s Southern Theater Command has observers assessing that the command is being stretched to its operational limits.

Image Information:

Image: Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theater_command_(China) – /media/File:Map_of_Theatres_of_PLA_en.svg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China’s South China Sea Strategy Complemented by Civilian Infrastructure

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Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.

“China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.”

Building civilian infrastructure and populating the newly built islands of the South China Sea is part of a cycle of building, populating, and defending that population and infrastructure that China is growing throughout the disputed islands.  A recent article in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) focused on a strategic but otherwise mundane-seeming event—the opening of Xinyi Hardware Store on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.[i] According to the SCMP article, the opening of the hardware store reflects the growing number of civilians and civilian enterprises China is moving to its newly created territories in the South China Sea. The article notes that the hardware store serves both Chinese military and civilians in Shansha City, which was established in 2012 to be the administrative center of Chinese efforts to control the islands and features of the South China Sea. Shansha City is also focal point of Chinese naval and coast guard assets in the region. Today Shansha City boasts a population of more than 2,300 civilians, an undisclosed number of military personnel, a civil-military airport, a 5,000-ton wharf, a post office, banks, schools, library, parks, hospitals, and power plant—all the trappings of a modern city.[ii]

The move has also encouraged other nations with claims in the South China Sea to follow suit. Vietnam is building up its presence in the Paracel Islands and has increased its efforts to solidify its position on Barque Canada Reef, a narrow, 18-mile atoll on the southern end of the Spratlys. Vietnam has doubled the size of the Barque Canada Reef to 492 acres since November 2023.[iii] Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to populate the islands within their control do not change the operational environment – they create the operational environment – and should be recognized as tactics used to gain legitimacy for claims to control parts of the South China Sea.

Sources:

“South China Sea: Beijing opens hardware store on disputed Woody Island,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based English language media outlet), 3 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3273082/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hardware-store-disputed-woody-island

China has opened a hardware store on a disputed South China Sea island, according to the local government, as Beijing ramps up efforts to expand civilian facilities and cement claims in the strategically important waterway.

Covering an area of about 100 square metres (1,076 square feet), the Xinyi Hardware Store is located on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, a contested archipelago known in Chinese as the Xisha Islands and in Vietnamese as the Hoang Sa Islands.

The store, situated next to the cargo terminal of the Sansha Yongxing Airport, opened for business on Thursday, according to the government of Sansha city, which oversees the Paracels as well as the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands – another disputed archipelago known as the Nansha Islands in Chinese.

Located about 300km (186 miles) from the southern Chinese island province of Hainan, Woody Island – known as Yongxing Island in China – is the largest outcrop among the 30 or so islands that make up the Paracels. The archipelago is controlled by Beijing but also claimed by Taipei and Hanoi.To assert its claims to the resource-rich waters, Beijing in 2012 announced the establishment of Sansha city on Woody Island to administer the disputed South China Sea islands and features.

Notes:

[i] Like most of the features of the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands are jointly claimed. The Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and China each claims jurisdiction and hold on to shoals and islands under their respective control. All nations with a claim are building out infrastructure to cement control over territory held.

[ii] The opening of the hardware store on Shansha city is the most recent in a number of media publicized opennings. In April 2023 China opened the Kuanzhai Xiangzi hotpot restaurant in Shansha City on Woody Island. See: “South China Sea: Beijing opens hotpot restaurant on Woody Island in disputed Paracels chain,” South China Morning Post, 30 April 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218912/south-china-sea-beijing-opens-hotpot-restaurant-woody-island-disputed-paracels-chain?module=inline&pgtype=article

[iii] For a recent U.S. media perspective on Vietnam’s herculean effort to dredge the sea floor, fill in land, fortify barriers and erect new structures on Barque Canada Reef, see: “Vietnam accelerates island building to challenge China’s maritime claims,” The Washington Post, 9 August 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/vietnam-south-china-sea-islands-growth/

OE Insight Summary:

CHN practices its own version of nation-building as it expands its territories by moving civilians and civilian infrastructure onto disputed islands in the South China Sea.

Image Information:

Image: Nautical chart of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, with Woody Island highlighted in yellow.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands – /media/File:Asia_-_South_China_Sea_-_Mui_Da_Nang_to_Shen-Ch’uan_Chiang_including_Hai-Nan_Tao_and_Paracel_Islands_(Paracel_Islands_cropped).jpg
Attribution: Public Domain, yellow highlight by author

China Creating Undersea Cable Network in Response to United States Isolation Efforts

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Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive.

Summary: China will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the United States seeks to isolate China from the current global network.

A battle has recently been playing out between China and the United States in a bid to secure information, particularly in regard to the role of undersea cable networks. According to the excerpted article from the Japan-based Nikkei Asia news agency, Beijing is working around U.S. efforts to isolate China from the global undersea cable network, which carries 95% of the world’s data.[i] According to the article, China is striking deals and building its own network of cables with regional neighbors, recognizing the U.S. is using its political power to pressure the mostly U.S.-based data companies that develop the undersea cable network, to exclude China from access to future undersea cables. A Chinese executive interviewed by Nikkei Asia asserted that “we don’t care about the U.S. blacklisting” and claimed that the United States’ undersea network is its “tool to keep its [U.S.] hegemony.” He concluded that the undersea cable race is really a diplomatic one, noting that China only needs other governments’ consent to link with China. As per the article, there are least three major China-led projects under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong to multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Part of China’s ability to develop its own undersea cable network in the region is that they do not require any new or emerging technology. China currently has all the necessary fiber optic technology necessary to lay its own cables and maintain its own network. That ability is one reason the U.S. sees the global undersea cable network as vulnerable to both sabotage[ii] and eavesdropping by China. Last February, Taiwan suspected Chinese vessels of cutting two undersea cables linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands.[iii] In response, in October, Taiwan announced it was working to back up its communications network to protect itself in the event of a cross-strait conflict.[iv] It is likely that as tensions continue in the region  two independent networks of undersea cables will emerge and require the necessary security attention by each side to ensure against compromise.

Sources:

Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li, Tsubasa Suruga and Shunsuke Tabeta, “China’s undersea cable drive defies U.S. sanctions,” Nikkei Asia (Japanese global and regional business news source), 26 June 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/China-s-undersea-cable-drive-defies-U.S.-sanctions?utm_campaign=IC_editor_in_chief_picks_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=2&pub_date=20240628153000&seq_num=9&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Stretching 1.4 million kilometers – long enough to wrap around the Earth more than thirty times – the world’s undersea cable network is the backbone of global communications. These cables lie hundreds or even thousands of meters below the waves, carry over 95% of the world’s data and cost billions of dollars each to install. Using companies like FiberHome, China is determined to break America’s grip on the industry.

The U.S. and a handful of its allies have dominated the undersea cable market for decades, and Washington is pushing hard for “clean” communications networks free of Chinese involvement, citing national security risks. But the quiet rise of companies like FiberHome underscores how hard it is for the U.S. to contain China’s progress in an industry that it has become proficient in.

Unlike cutting-edge semiconductors, where U.S. export controls on production tools have set China’s chip industry back by years, experts agree with Wu’s assessment: China has no need for foreign technology in fiber-optic cables. Instead, success in this industry has come to rely more on state-level diplomatic ties, with politics largely determining who has access to crucial markets and who does not.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive. “The subsea cable industry is like a membership club, we all need other governments’ consent to link with their countries. … This is a diplomatic race.”

Arguably the most important market is in China’s own backyard. The Asia-Pacific region is the global leader in subsea cable investment, recording more projected spending from 2024 to 2026 than anywhere else in the world, according to data from Washington-based research company TeleGeography. At least three major China-led projects are under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong with multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

Notes:

[i] For more information, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Limiting China to Undersea Data Cable Network Threatens To Be a Flashpoint,” OE Watch, 06-2024. (URL when available)

[ii] U.S. officials have warned about potential national-security risks from SBSS, a Chinese undersea cable maintenance company that helps repair broken internet lines, see: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

[iii] The Matsu Islands, officially Lienchiang County, are an archipelago of 36 islands and islets in the East China Sea governed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), situated alongside the southeastern coast of mainland China. In early 2023, an undersea cable linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands was cut effectively disrupting internet connectivity to the Matsu Islands’ 14,000 residents. A Chinese freighter and fishing vessel were suspected of cutting the cable but Taiwan made no formal protest. See: Joe Brock, “U.S. and China wage war beneath the waves – over internet cables,” Reuters, 24 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/

[iv] See, Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan ramps up backup satellite network plans in island defence strategy.” South China Morning Post, 7 October 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237034/taiwan-ramps-backup-satellite-network-plans-island-defence-strategy

OE Watch Insight:

CHN will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the USA seeks to isolate CHN from the current global network. 

Image Information:

Image: Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsu_Islands – /media/File:Nationalist_China_-_administrative_divisons._LOC_2007633622.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

China Assures and Warns Japan Regarding Taiwan

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Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed [by Japan].”

Summary: China issued both an assurance and a warning to Japan after Tokyo released a plan to evacuate its southern island chains should conflict erupt between China and Taiwan.

In June, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MoD) issued a statement that sought to temper Japanese concerns that any action by Beijing might take to reclaim Taiwan would affect Japanese territory. The statement issued on 27 June and reported across multiple media channels including the official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission, Jiefangjun Bao, came in the aftermath of a report that Japan had issued a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures should China invade Taiwan. The Chinese MoD spokesperson pointed out that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan” and the Taiwan question had nothing to do with Japan, and thus, “China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency.’” The spokesman noted that Japan, which had inflicted countless atrocities against China in the past, “should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds.” The statement also reiterated China’s view of the operational environment in the region, emphasizing that Taiwan is the core of Beijing’s core interests[i] and noting that 1.4 billion Chinese would take action should any person or entity seek to restrict Beijing from its efforts to bring Taiwan under Beijing rule. Collectively, these statements underscore the fact that while China does not seek conflict with Japan, it also insists that Japan not impede any would-be efforts to seize Taiwan. As one of the United States’ most important allies in the Asia-Pacific, the delicate brinkmanship between China and Japan serves as a useful barometer of regional sentiment.

Sources:

“Taiwan Question has nothing to do with Japan: Defense Spokesman,” Chinese Ministry of National Defense as reported by Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission), 27 June 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/VOICES/MinistryofNationalDefense_209794/16319219.html

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests. It bears on the political foundation of China-Japan bilateral relations and is the red line that must not be crossed, ” said Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, at a regular press conference on Thursday.

According to reports, the Japanese government has released a draft plan to evacuate residents of Okinawa prefecture and Sakishima islands to Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures. Some analysts believe that Japan’s evacuation plan aims to cope with the so-called “Taiwan contingency”. Not long ago, Chinese Ambassador to Japan said that if Japan ties itself onto the chariot of splitting China, its people will be led into a fire pit.

When being asked to make a comment, the spokesperson first pointed out that Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and the Taiwan question has nothing to do with Japan.

“China opposes the Japanese side’s playing up regional tensions under the excuse of the so-called ‘Taiwan contingency’,” stressed the spokesperson, adding that the biggest threat to cross-Strait peace is the separatist activities for “Taiwan independence” and the connivance and support for such moves from external forces.

“Japan, as a country that had colonized Taiwan for a long time and committed countless atrocities against Chinese people, in particular should have reflected on its history of aggression and be prudent about its words and deeds,” said the spokesperson.

The spokesperson urged the Japanese side to earnestly abide by the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan and the commitments it has made and stop using the Taiwan question to provoke confrontation.

“More than 1.4 billion Chinese people will take resolute and strong actions against any individual or force that attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs or hinder China’s reunification,” stressed the spokesperson.

Notes:

[i] In June 2023 Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, reiterated the same phrase in person to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken while Blinken was on an official visit to the region, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction To Western Presence In Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

OE Watch Insight: 

CHN issued both an assurance and a warning to JPN after JPN released a plan to evacuate its southern island chains should conflict erupt between CNH and TWN.

Image Information:

Image: Map illustrates the close proximity between Taiwan and the Japanese Sakishima Islands and Okinawa Islands.
Source: T.Kambayashi, https://wikitravel.org/shared/File:Japan_Okinawa_map.png
Attribution: CC BY SA 3.0

Georgian Parliament Discusses Impacts of “Russia Law”

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Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.

“The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence.”

Georgia has been rocked by waves of protests and counter-protests triggered by the re-introduction of a “foreign agents law,” the so-called “Russia law” in parliament by the Georgian Dream party. The legislation, similar to a law passed in Russia and currently in debate in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia,[i] requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding and influence, thus leading to its name of the “foreign agents law.” According to the excerpted article and interview published in Austrian-based IGlobenews, Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,[ii] addressed the history behind the controversial bill as well as how it will impact Georgia’s aspirations to be accepted into the EU. The article notes that “Georgian Dream still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude,” at least for the time being. “They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia.” Akhvlediani notes however, that the governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration and that “the victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.” The foreign agents law will certainly impact the operational environment in Georgia. The United States has been involved in Georgia for decades to include military training partnerships and weapons transfers. While it isn’t yet clear what the impact will be, the foreign agents law will likely have a restraining effect on the military and security cooperation between Georgia and the United States and its western partners.

Sources:

Diana Mautner Markhof, “Exclusive iGlobenews Interview with Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,” IGlobenews (Austria-based non-profit news platform created by graduates of Diplomatische Akademie Wien), 8 May 2024. https://www.iglobenews.org/interview-with-armaz-akhvlediani/

The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence. Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani …supports the protests, is strongly anti-Russian and believes the EU/US will fill any void once Russia pulls its considerable influence from Georgia.

Opponents of the bill, believe it will be used to crack down on those not in line with the governing party’s pro-Russian stance. This law, say its critics, will be a roadblock on Georgia’s road to EU membership.

Georgian Dream [political party] still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude. They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia. The Georgia government gathered its own supporters in the tens of thousands to counter-protest in front of Georgia’s parliament in Tbilisi on 29 April. Georgia has learned the lessons of Ukraine’s color revolution and will likely not back down nor relinquish the streets to the opposition.

Armaz Akhvlediani: Achieving candidate member status is the result of a long-term, tireless struggle for the democratic and European values of the Georgian people. The ruling party, led by oligarch Ivanishvili, then and now fiercely opposes this process, flagrantly violating the country’s constitution, which recognizes the European integration of Georgia as a priority. The governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration. Through violence and moral terror, the party led by Ivanishvili aims solely to maintain power. However, most Georgian citizens strongly oppose this and strive to protect Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice. The victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.

Armaz Akhvlediani: The revival of the Putinist law on agents of foreign influence makes joining the European Union virtually impossible. This law, previously withdrawn by the ruling party under public pressure and promises not to revisit the issue, resurfaces, posing a threat to critical NGOs and media outlets akin to Putin’s methods. Despite widespread protests by hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens and daily calls from Western partners urging the “Georgian Dream” to abandon this initiative, Ivanishvili’s party obstinately persists in obstructing the country’s path toward European integration and democratization.

Notes:

[i] Abkhazia is a de-facto independent state having broken free from Georgia by war in the Fall of 1993. It maintains its own government and armed forces while hosting Russian troops. Russia and only four other nations recognize Abkhazia’s independence. Foreign funded NGOs have been very important to Abkhazia such as The HALO Trust, a Europe based de-mining organization that has spent decades in Abkhazia clearing mines left over from the Georgia-Abkhazia War 1992-1993.

[ii] Armaz Akhvlediani is currently serving his third term in Georgia’s Parliament. He is member of Georgia’s Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security and of its Ethics Council. He is the Founder and Director of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies.

Image Information:

Image: Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.
Source: Vakhtang Maisaia
Attribution: By author’s permission

Potential Flashpoint Stemming From Undersea Data Cable Network Access Restrictions

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Underwater fiber optic cable on the ocean floor

China has arisen as an economic superpower rivaling the U.S. and now consumes large amounts of data… [however] China’s presence in subsea cable networks is fading rapidly.”

The United States is working with global technology companies, and regional neighbors, to actively exclude China from future undersea cable networks that will connect the region to the rest of the world according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei news agency. Subsea cables form the backbone of the exchange of global information, carrying 99% of the world’s data traffic—including information considered important to national security. While the Nikkei article doesn’t delve into the geopolitical concerns between the United States and China, the move to restrict the flow of data available to China via these undersea cables, should be seen as a mechanism to isolate China. China, which was once expected to be the future hub for subsea networks that form vital arteries of international communication, is on schedule to receive only three cables laid after this year. All three to Hong Kong, which was relatively more independent when the contracts to lay those undersea cables were struck. By comparison, in the next few years an additional 11 cables are scheduled to be laid in the region: four cables to Japan and seven to Singapore. According to a researcher interviewed for the article, the moves to isolate China from the conduit that carries global information is manifestation of a “subsea cold war” going on between the United States and its partners and China.[i] The U.S. process to isolate China began in 2020 when the Trump administration, “adopted The Clean Network initiative[ii] to freeze Chinese businesses out of telecom infrastructure projects.” This initiative has continued under the Biden administration, citing the “need to ensure data security.”[iii] The article notes that with the decrease in this important data conduit, the share of data centers in China will stay stagnant or begin to recede as well, while increasing in other Asian countries such as Japan, Philippines, and Southeast Asia. This hi-tech form of economic blockade will be a risk to China as its technology prowess begins to lag behind its regional competitors. These second and third order of effects make the subsea cable issue another potential flashpoint between U.S. – China relations, which given the numerous flashpoints between the two super powers, could result in additional tension and possible military action.[iv]

Sources:

Kentaro Takeda, “More subsea cables bypass China as Sino-U.S. tensions grow,” Nikkei, 11 May 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/More-subsea-cables-bypass-China-as-Sino-U.S.-tensions-grow?utm_campaign=IC_asia_daily_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20240513123000&seq_num=3&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Growing geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China have begun to affect the flow of global data due to an expected sharp fall in new undersea cables linking China with the rest of the world…

China is expected to see only three cables laid after this year — fewer than half the number planned for Singapore. The lack of undersea projects is also expected to weigh on the construction of data centers in the country.

Subsea cables form the backbone of the internet, carrying 99% of the world’s data traffic. Roughly 140,000 kilometers of such cables will be completed this year, three times more than five years ago… The increase reflects growing demand for data traffic prompted by the spread of video streaming and cloud services.

On April 10, Google announced a $1 billion project to build two submarine cables to connect Japan, Guam and Hawaii…The leaders said in a joint statement that they welcomed the investment “to improve digital communications infrastructure between the United States, Japan and Pacific Island Nations.”

Behind this seemingly coordinated public-private initiative was “the subsea cold war” between the U.S. and China, said TeleGeography’s research director, Alan Mauldin.

China has arisen as an economic superpower rivaling the U.S. and now consumes large amounts of data. Fifteen 1,000-km-plus submarine cables, all put into use since 1994, link China and the rest of the world….

The tide began to change around 2020, when the U.S., led by then-President Donald Trump, adopted the Clean Network initiative to freeze Chinese businesses out of telecom infrastructure projects. The U.S. has since kept this tough stance against Beijing, citing the need to ensure data security…

China’s presence in subsea cable networks is fading rapidly. Three international cables to connect Hong Kong are due for completion in 2025, but no undersea projects are scheduled for the country thereafter. There are plans to lay four cables to Japan and seven to Singapore after 2024. In addition, nine cables will be laid to Guam, midway between the U.S. mainland and Southeast Asia.Subsea cables and call centers are two pillars of digital infrastructure that move large amounts of data. Their presence could determine the power and influence of host countries and the businesses operating within them.

Notes:

[i] See: “US-China tech war’s new battleground: undersea internet cables,” South China Morning Post,” 14 December 2019. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3042058/us-china-tech-wars-new-battleground-undersea-internet-cables

[ii] For more information on The Clean Network, see U.S. Department of State summary. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/

[iii] In 2021 Google and Facebook announced they had halted efforts to lay undersea cable connecting California and Hong Kong due to U.S.-China tension. See: “Google, Facebook unveil new Asia undersea data cable plan linking Singapore, Japan, others,” South China Morning Post, 16 August 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3145253/google-facebook-unveil-new-asia-undersea-data-cable-plan?campaign=3145253&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

[iv] The gradual restricting of subsea cables to China is occurring at the same time that the U.S. officials are warning that existing subsea cables could be sabotaged or tampered with by Chinese maintenance vessels contracted to maintain existing subsea cables. See: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

Image Information:
Image: Underwater fiber optic cable on the ocean floor
Source: https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/article/protecting-submarine-cables-enhanced-connectivity-subsea/155612/
Attribution: CC by 4.0

Sanctions Drive Russia’s Shift to Domestic Weapons Production

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Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.

“The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors… but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences [necessity] for local production.”

Despite Western efforts to dismantle or limit its defense industry, Russia continues to find ways to produce the weapons it needs to fight its war in Ukraine.[i] As discussed in the excerpted article from the Azeri based Caliber news outlet, on 16 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video unveiling an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan [R1] self-propelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL), supported by a new BAZ-69092 [R2] three axle chassis, at work in Ukraine.[ii] According to the Caliber article, the modifications are a reflection of not only the need to modernize Russia’s rocket and artillery systems, but also “align with Russian strategic [necessity] for local production.” The article notes that Russia has lost at least 83 BM-27 systems in Ukraine since it invaded in Feb 2022. Replacement of these and other systems is critical to Russia’s war effort. The article points out the original Uragan chassis were built in other parts of the former Soviet empire, including Ukraine.[iii] The new BAZ-96092 is a multi-platform chassis wholly built in Russia. Russia continues to rearm its military despite sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine.

OE Watch Insight:

Updated RUS Uragan MRLS appears on UKR battlefield demonstrating RUS ability to replenish its military systems despite western sanctions and restrictions intended to hold back military industrial establishment.

Sources:

“Russian Army deploys new version of BM-27 Uragan MLRS Rocket Launcher in Ukraine,” Caliber (Azeri based news source with good regional coverage from neighboring perspective), 18 April 2024. https://caliber.az/en/post/234544/

On April 16, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing a night-time operation involving the BM-27 Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near the Belgorod region. Notably, the video unveiled an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan launcher mounted on a new platform, identified as the BAZ-69092 three-axle chassis, marking a significant departure from its traditional ZIL-135LM 8×8 truck chassis.

The transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis is part of an ongoing modernization effort within the Russian Army to upgrade existing military equipment and improve its artillery capabilities. This strategy includes plans to replace the aging BM-27 Uragan MLRS with the more advanced Tornado-S [R1] system….

…

The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Army lost at least 83 units in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2023, the Russian Army had only 150 of these vehicles in service, indicating a critical need for the modernization and replacement of this valuable system. Secondly, Russian engineers could face difficulties in modernizing older vehicles such as the ZIL-135LM, whose production ceased in 1995. Thirdly, these difficulties need to be compared with the advantages offered by new platforms for improving combat efficiency. The adoption of the newer BAZ-69092 6×6 chassis offers several advantages, including its capacity to accommodate weapons systems weighing up to 13 tons, but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences for local production.

…It is interesting to note that the BAZ-69092 chassis was specifically developed to standardize and facilitate the use of various military and special vehicles within the Russian army. This initiative began in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which affected the supply of special chassis as key manufacturers were outside Russia (for instance MKZT in Belarus and KrAZ in Ukraine). The Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ) was tasked with developing the BAZ-69092 under the project code “Voshchina-1” to substitute for foreign-made chassis. The model is part of a family of vehicles designed for diverse functions, including combat and support roles, tailored to meet specific requirements of the military.

Notes:

[i] For recent media reporting on Russia’s resurgent domestic arms industry, see: “Russia ramps up weapons production, using mass quantity to outgun Ukraine,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/russia-weapons-production-ukraine-war/; Russia has also received Chinese and Iranian weapons assistance. For recent news coverage regarding Chinese assistance, see: “China Has Helped Russia Boost Arms Production, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b and “US intelligence finding shows China surging equipment sales to Russia to help war effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press, 19 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec

[ii] Fielding of the new and improved Russian BM-27 had been anticipated for months. See: Російські БМ-27 “Ураган” отримали нове шасі БАЗ-69092 (Russia Modernizes BM-27 Uragan Rocket Launchers with BAZ-69092 Chassis Upgrade),” Militarnyi (Ukraine media outlet focused on the military and defense industry), 22 December 2023. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosijski-bm-27-uragan-otrymaly-nove-shasi-baz-69092/

[iii] The above sourced Caliber article noted that Ukraine is also “modernizing its BM-27 MLRS, fitting the Uragan launcher on a Tatra Т815-7Т3RC1 chassis, resulting in the creation of the Bureviy system. Revealed in 2020 and developed by the Shepetiv Repair Plant, the Bureviy successfully completed fire tests in November 2020. Ukraine also developed the Bastion-03, which combines a KrAZ-6322 chassis with a 9K57 Uragan MLRS launcher. This latter project is part of a Ukrainian initiative to standardize rocket artillery chassis using the KrAZ platform, following the earlier Bastion-01 and Bastion-02 models.”

Image Information:

Image: Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, https://t.me/mod_russia/37664
Attribution: Public Domain

China Employs AI Enabled Water Cannon To Enforce South China Sea Territorial Claims

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Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.

“The Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology… Beijing increasingly sees the weapons as vital to bolstering its hold over the disputed waters while also lowering the odds of armed clashes.”

China has managed to avoid open conflict while continually advancing its claims in the South China Sea in part because China employs a variety of non-lethal weapons and tactics. In the following excerpted article published by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, the author notes that water cannons have been a critical non-lethal weapon regularly used by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard against the navies and personnel of other countries in the area, especially in its territorial disputes with the Philippines.[i] The article describes a recent case when a Chinese ship fired a traditional water cannon into a Philippine ship shattering the cockpit windscreen, injuring several personnel, and forcing the Philippine ship to cede. However, according to the article, current water cannon technology is less effective in rough seas. The article claims that a new artificial intelligence (AI) water cannon has been developed by a Chinese firm that could have an outsized influence on China’s ability to maintain its maritime territorial claims. The newly developed AI water cannon is “equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters allowing it to stay on target under a variety of conditions,” enabling China to continually target adversaries “with an error of only two meters in rough conditions.” The development of a more accurate AI driven water cannon should be considered part of China’s full spectrum warfare. Non-lethal in nature, it would allow China to take offensive action while minimizing the threat of a traditionally lethally armed confrontation. This places the onus on China’s competitors to come up with their own non-lethal weapons and counter-tactics, respond with violent action that could plunge the South China Sea into armed conflict, or ultimately cede the territory.

OE Watch Insight:

The development of an AI-driven water cannon seems to indicate CHN’s commitment to use non-lethal weapons to advance its territorial claims in the South China Sea while avoiding armed conflict.

Sources:

Stephen Chen, “’Subdue the enemy without fighting’: How China’s powerful water cannon will change the game in South China Sea,” SCMP. 13 April 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3258772/subdue-enemy-without-fighting-how-chinas-powerful-water-cannon-will-change-game-south-china-sea?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cm&utm_campaign=enlz-today_international&utm_content=20240413&tpcc=enlz-today_international&UUID=200d3857-7b09-402a-bc24-cdd797d79a18&next_article_id=3258875&article_id_list=3258772,3258875,3258822,3258887,3258877,3258884,3258908,3258904&tc=4

The world’s first “smart” water cannon, controlled by artificial intelligence (AI), has been developed by researchers in central China – and it could take the non-lethal weapon to new heights..

The water cannon is also equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters.

Conditions at sea create complex environmental wind and fluid patterns and mechanical transmission errors, so it can be challenging to lock onto and hit a precise spot on a ship in the distance, such as a smokestack, with a water jet on a swaying coastguard vessel.

…

China has been vigorously developing its maritime forces in recent decades, including electromagnetic catapult aircraft carriers, hypersonic anti-ship missiles, ultra-high-power electronic warfare systems and other cutting-edge equipment.

They are formidable weapons, aimed squarely at the US military, but they are too much for territorial disputes against smaller Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea.

The vast disparity in military strength renders China’s hi-tech arsenal impractical against these neighbours. For instance, the Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology, developing a range of increasingly automated and powerful products.

The technology has also been aided from an unlikely quarter – China’s infrastructure projects. With large-scale land reclamation and other infrastructure projects under way, China has some of the world’s most powerful dredging vessels that suck seabed sediment to redistribute it to designated areas. The water pump technology involved in that process is perfectly suited to driving high-performance water cannons…

Zhang Yuqiang, a researcher with the People’s Armed Police Maritime Police Academy Command Department, said that shipboard non-lethal weapons including water cannons “will play an increasingly important role in future maritime conflicts”.

“In recent years, competition and struggles around marine interests and power have become increasingly fierce, and maritime disputes have become a common challenge faced by most maritime countries in the world,”

Because all sides are “fighting for every inch of land and refusing to cede an inch”, the team said, using traditional lethal weapons in small-scale skirmishes could cause them escalate into large-scale armed conflicts. It is a situation that neither China nor other countries around the South China Sea wish to see.Other major maritime countries are now stepping up research and deployment of other types of non-lethal weapons, including blinding lasers and microwaves that can cause skin-burning sensations, they said.

Notes:

[i] South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are also equipped with, and have used, water cannons in naval disputes with competitor nations over maritime territories or fisheries, while the Philippines is lacking in comparison.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.
Source: https://www.jamesokeefe.org/2023/12/naval-politics-by-other-means/
Attribution: CCA 4.0 INT