Author Archives: Christopher Betts

Drone Warfare Is Becoming a Common Tactic in Mali

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A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.

“The use of drones by the CSP rebels, if it were to increase, could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels.”

Recent reporting indicates that both the Malian military and Tuareg separatist groups are utilizing drone warfare.[i] According to the first excerpted article from the Africa-focused UK-based news publication Qiraat Africa,rebel forces reported 21 civilian deaths, including 11 children, following Malian military air strikes on the village of Tinzaouatine.[ii] The strike was part of intensified fighting following the recent defeat of Malian Army and Africa Corps mercenaries by rebel fighters who allied with militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) is a coalition of Malian separatist groups fighting against government forces in northern Mali and is the latest evolution of the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg people, who inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya, have been fighting with the Malian government for autonomy on and off since the 1990s. While these separatist groups have been geographically close to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also based in northern Mali, their motivation has consistently been about independence as opposed to an Islamic caliphate. According to the rebels, the airstrikes allegedly targeted a pharmacy and groups of gathered people in the village. The Malian Armed Forces confirmed the attack but stated that the strikes were precise and specifically targeted terrorists. These strikes and associated civilian casualties are likely to continue as fighting persists, and government forces cannot conduct a persistent ground campaign in the Kidal region of the country.

Seemingly in retaliation for the Tinzaouatine attack, the rebels conducted a drone strike against a Malian Army camp. According to the second excerpted article from French news radio RFI, rebel forces struck a Malian Army camp approximately 60 miles from Timbuktu, though no casualties were reported. The strike marked an evolution in the conflict, with both sides now utilizing drone warfare. Although the rebel forces indicated they did not acquire the drones through Ukraine or JNIM, there are few open-source details on the type or quantity of drones they use. The leadership of the rebel faction did acknowledge that they have had access to the drones for ten months to train with and manufacture grenades. While still an effective tool, rebel forces are likely not using as technologically advanced drones as the Malian Army, who, alongside their Africa Corps counterparts, have been using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones with significant effect.[ii]

Drone warfare in Mali and possibly other non-state actors could signal a fundamental shift in the conduct of battles and the power balance in the region. The only other time rebel forces utilized drones was in July 2024, when they defeated Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces. Though the CSP currently denies drone use in conjunction with terrorist organizations like JNIM, their successful use in the region has the potential to also expand the usage by jihadist groups. Drone warfare on both sides will also likely impact civilian casualties and cause problems for the Malian armed forces, similar to what the Russian military is currently facing in Ukraine.

Sources:

“Au moins 21 civils tués par un drone dans le nord du Mali, selon un groupe dirigé par des Touaregs (At least 21 civilians killed by drone strike in northern Mali, Tuareg-leg group says),” Qiraata Africa (independent UK-based magazine focused on sub-Saharan Africa), 26 August 2024.
https://qiraatafrican.com/fr/12604/au-moins-21-civils-tues-par-un-drone-dans-le-nord-du-mali-selon-un-groupe-dirige-par-des-touaregs/

Airstrikes on a village in northern Mali near the Algerian border killed 21 civilians on Sunday, including 11 children, a spokesman for a coalition of predominantly Tuareg pro-independence groups said. The attack on the village of Tinzaouatine marks the highest number of civilians killed by drones since the breakdown of a peace deal between the country’s ruling military junta and pro-independence armed groups in northern Mali last year.

The Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups fighting for the independence of northern Mali, which they call Azawad. Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy, followed by additional strikes targeting people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “The provisional toll of these criminal strikes stands at 21 civilians killed, including 11 children and the head of the pharmacy, dozens of injured and enormous material damage,” said the statement signed by Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the rebel coalition present in the village.

In a statement broadcast on national television, the Malian armed forces confirmed these strikes. “The army general staff confirms the airstrikes in the Tinzaouatine sector on the morning of August 25, 2024. These precision strikes targeted terrorists,” the press release states. The strikes come weeks after the Malian army and mercenaries from the Russia-based Wagner Group were defeated by Tuareg rebels and fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a group linked to al-Qaeda.

Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy; then others targeted people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “Both Malian forces and Russian mercenaries lack a strong ground presence in the Kidal region, so using air assets, including drones, is the only way for them to engage armed groups in the region,” said Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan think tank. “Therefore, airstrikes, including on civilians, are likely to increase as revenge for the recent major setback suffered by Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali”

Source: “Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones (Mali: CSP rebels now fight with drones),” RFI (French-based radio station and part of the France Medias Monde group), 12 September 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240912-mali-les-rebelles-du-csp-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-avec-des-drones

In Mali, the rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) are now fighting with drones. They used them on September 11, 2024, against a Malian army camp about a hundred kilometers from Timbuktu. No casualties were reported. But it was on this occasion that the rebels revealed that they had drones and that it was the second time they had used them. A new addition to their arsenal could change the shape of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the rebels in the North.

The rebels claim to have used it [drones] for the first time at the end of July in Tinzaouatène, during their only but important victory against the Malian soldiers and the Wagner group, who had lost several dozen men and were forced to turn back. Where do these drones come from? How many do the rebels have? What model exactly? No details have been released. CSP spokesman Mohamed el Maouloud Ramadane says only that they were “purchased,” and assures that they were not supplied by Ukraine – nor by the al-Qaeda-linked Jnim (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The jihadists, who are also fighting the Malian army in northern Mali , use drones to film their propaganda videos. To date, JNIM has not claimed responsibility for any drone attacks.

According to several CSP fighters contacted by RFI, the rebels have had these drones for about ten months now. “We had to train people and make the grenades; it’s dangerous, and it takes time,” explains one of them. Regarding their use in Tinzaouatène at the end of July, the rebels assure that it was ” decisive “, particularly ” against the armored vehicles”. At the time, the CSP rebels had not communicated on the unprecedented use of these drones. Nor had the Malian army, which had exceptionally acknowledged ” a significant number of losses in human and material life ” (press release of July 29).

The Fama (Malian Armed Forces) and their Wagner auxiliaries themselves use armed drones. The first Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, acquired by the Malian army, were received in December 2022. Other deliveries followed, always relayed on state media to illustrate the army’s “rise in power”. These drones actually proved decisive during the capture of Kidal, a rebel stronghold, last November. The strikes forced the CSP men to withdraw, without even attempting ground combat. If the use of drones by the CSP rebels were to increase, it could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels. It could help to rebalance the forces because, until now, the Malian army and Wagner dominate the terrain. Since the use of armed drones requires particularly reliable intelligence and careful targeting, it could also increase the risk for civilians, whom the CSP rebels have made it their mission to protect.

Notes:

[i] The linked article by Le Monde goes in-depth on the Tuareg rebellion that has been going on in Mali since the 1990s. For more information, see: Philippe Baqué, “For the Tuaregs, unite or disappear (Mali’s Tuaregs: ‘For us, this war is existential’),” Le Monde, April 2024. https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/13mali

[ii] The Bayraktar TB2 is described as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of a 27-hour maximum flight time and a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. For additional information see: “Bayraktar TB2,” Bayraktar, n.d. https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/

Image Information:

Image: A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg

Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

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Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.

Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”

Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/

OE Insight Summary:

Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in RUS’s war on UKR have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse UKR of supporting terrorist organizations.

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain

Burkina Faso Reels From Continued Terrorist Attacks

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Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.

“Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – have been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced.”

Summary: Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Even with exceptional monetary investment in military equipment by Burkina Faso, the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) continues to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against government targets. According to the first excerpted article from French language news agency specializing in African economics, Agence Ecofin, a speech by the Minister of the Economy, Aboubakar Nacanabo, revealed Burkina Faso had spent more than $1 billion to acquire military equipment in the fight against terrorism.[i] While this amount might not be notable for many nations, these purchases totaled 30% of the entire state budget in 2023 and contributed to the government’s 6.7% budget deficit. To help with funding, Burkina Faso implemented a voluntary Patriotic Support Fund and, later, compulsory taxes on telecommunications systems and land to assist with funding defense purchases. Minister Nacanabo indicated that the government planned a similar financial allocation for defense equipment purchases in 2024, totaling 29.49% of the state budget.

Despite its considerable spending, Burkina Faso continues to struggle with organized and frequent terrorist attacks by armed jihadist groups such as JNIM. JNIM, originally based in Mali, has spread through many parts of Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo, and Cote d’Ivoire.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from French-language public service news channel TV5 Monde, JNIM conducted a deadly attack on 11 June 2024, at the military installation in Mansila, near the border with Niger. The attack targeted homes and businesses in the town as well as the local military detachment. The government is yet to release an official report on the number of killed or wounded. The 11 June attack is just one in a long history of terrorist attacks affecting the country, with the article noting that over 20,000 have been killed by jihadist groups and over 2,000,000 have been displaced in Burkina Faso alone.

Nearly one third of the Burkinabe state budget is being spent on defense equipment purchases, and the ongoing armed conflict throughout the country raises questions about the efficacy of these purchases. Much of the military equipment purchased by the new regime is likely originating from Russia, as Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries have moved away from Western aid.[iii] Though the country’s deteriorating security situation is currently a regional issue, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism strategy and effective combat operations against groups like JNIM have broader U.S. policy implications. Transnational terrorist organizations have had a resurgence in conducting international attacks, which brings to the forefront the importance of stopping the spread of JNIM and the Islamic State from expanding to other neighboring African nations.

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: 1 milliard $ investis dans du matériel militaire en 2023 (Burkina Faso: $1 billion invested in military equipment in 2023),” Agence Ecofin (French language Geneve-based news agency), 7 June 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0706-119330-lien-burkina-faso-1-milliard-investis-dans-des-materiels-militaires-en-2023

Burkina Faso has been facing a security and humanitarian crisis for many years due to terrorist attacks, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending. Burkina Faso spent around $1 billion (more than 600 billion CFA francs), or 30% of the state budget, for the acquisition of military equipment in 2023. This information was revealed by Aboubakar Nacanabo (photo), minister of the Economy, during the program “Tribune of Accountability” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

According to the minister, this investment aims to strengthen the operational capabilities of the national armed forces in the fight against terrorism. Burkina Faso has, in fact, been facing a security and humanitarian crisis due to terrorist attacks for many years, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending, according to the government. However, Minister Nacanabo reassured the public by affirming that after these acquisitions, the government will gradually increase spending in other sectors. A move that could underline the administration’s commitment to ensuring balanced national development, despite pressing security challenges.

Note that Captain Ibrahim Traoré, president of the transition, has placed the fight against terrorism and the reconquest of the territory at the heart of his priorities; what is considered “essential” before the organization of national elections. As a result, several reforms have been put in place to respond more effectively to the crisis, notably the creation of the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP) in January 2023. Initially funded by voluntary contributions, the government introduced compulsory contributions on certain products and services to support the Fund. For the 2024 budget year, the Burkinabe government plans to allocate 29.49% of its budget to security-related expenses.

“Burkina Faso: quel bilan dans l’attaque djihadiste meurtrière à Mansila (Burkina Faso: what results in the deadly jihadist attack in Mansila),” TV5 Monde (Multi-nationally funded French language news outlet), 15 June 2024.  https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burkina-faso-quel-bilan-dans-lattaque-djihadiste-meurtriere-mansila-2726176

The town of Mansila located in the northeast of Burkina Faso near Niger, was the target of a deadly jihadist attack on June 11, according to local and security sources. The authorities have not communicated on the attack claimed by the GSIM, affiliated with Al Qaeda.

A deadly jihadist attack, the exact toll of which is unknown, targeted the town of Mansila on Tuesday, in the north-east of Burkina Faso, near Niger, we learned on Sunday from local and security sources. On June 11, “ill-intentioned individuals stormed the detachment (military, editor’s note), our homes, our businesses and all other representations of the country”, indicates the association of pupils and students of Mansila, in a published press release on Facebook.

“At present, while we have not finished mourning our dead, many of our fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters are missing,” continues this association, which calls on the authorities to “restore peace.”  A security source confirmed the attack to AFP. “It is difficult to give a precise assessment, but there were losses in Mansila. Many elements are missing,” said this source.

The military detachments deployed in the various localities of Burkina generally comprise around 150 elements. No official report has been released, and the authorities have not communicated about this attack, which was claimed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Friday, the head of the military regime in power in Burkina Faso appeared on national television news, donating blood in the capital Ouagadougou, after two days of uncertainty following the fall of a shell in the courtyard of public television located near the presidency.

On Sunday, the presidency of Faso posted a message wishing a happy Eid to the country’s Muslims, accompanied by a photo of Captain Traoré praying. Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – has been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced. The authorities regularly claim to obtain victories over the jihadists, but the attacks continue, and part of the territory remains beyond the control of the army

Notes:

[i] Aboubakar Nacanabo’s speech took place in June 2024 during the “Tribune de la redevabilité (Tribune of Accountability)” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

[ii] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a foreign terrorist profile on JNIM, located here: “Jama’at Nursrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Counter Terrorism Guide, Updated October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[iii] The M-DIME Research Project details Russia’s total Military DIME influence in Burkina Faso, including arms transfers. Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham, “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/

OE Insight Summary:

Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, JNIM has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Image Information:

Image: Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burkinabe_soldiers_respond_to_an_ambush_during_training_at_Exercise_Flintlock_2019_near_Po,_Burkina_Faso,_Feb._26,_2019.jpg Attribution: Public Domain

Mali Launches Successful Counterterrorism Operations

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Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.”

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) recently publicized a series of successful counter-terrorism operations against armed extremist groups throughout the country. According to the first excerpted article from Arabic-language Moroccan electronic newspaper Tamaghrabit, FAMA announced that it had successfully eliminated Abu Hudhayfah, a former Polisario Front separatist and one of the leaders of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Prior to his time with the ISGS, Hudhayfah was allegedly trained by the Algerian Army and his joint affiliation has signaled a connection between separatist and terrorist organizations in the region. Hudhayfah was also suspected to have assisted with attacks on U.S. and Nigerian forces in Niger in 2017. Mali and the greater Sahel region have faced a significant and sustained threat from armed extremist groups for multifaceted reasons ranging from weak governmental leadership, less international counterterrorism support, and instability in neighboring nations.[i] Although Hudhayfah will undoubtedly be replaced, the FAMA’s successful operation against ISGC is a needed disruption and morale boost for local forces.

Following FAMA’s successful operation against Hudhayfah, the Malian military claimed several other successful counterterrorism operations throughout the Diafarabé area, Ségou region. According to the second excerpted article from Burkina Faso’s French-language independent newspaper, 24heures, the General Staff of the Armed Forces announced air strikes and ground operations that targeted training camps and logistical bases near Nouh Bozo, a village in the center of the country located along the bank of the Niger River. Before kinetic operations, FAMA used information derived from “specialized services” to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance on each target. It was believed that the unnamed terrorist organizations operating the camps intended to “transform the area into sanctuaries to prepare their dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” In addition to the destruction of training camps and logistical storage areas, FAMA claimed to have destroyed fuel shipments destined for terrorist organizations throughout the country. The security situation in the Sahel continues to be plagued with instability and terrorism. External players like Russia continue to garner influence in the region. With U.S. troops withdrawing from neighboring Niger, the forces to counter a growing terrorist threat in the Sahel are even more sparse. Mali’s ability to independently conduct kinetic operations against high-value targets may indicate a renewed focus on securing their nation, which could have a positive impact across the region.

Sources:

“الجيش المالي يعلن القضاء على الانفصالي “أبو حذيفة” ويؤكد علاقة البوليساريو بالإرهاب (The Malian army announces the elimination of the separatist “Abu Hudhayfah” and confirms the Polisario’s relationship with terrorism),” Tamaghribit (Moroccan newspaper), 1 May 2024. https://www.tamaghrabit.com/?p=19302

The Malian army announced the elimination of the former Polisario Front separatist and leader of ISIS in the Sahara region, called “Abu Hudhayfah” and nicknamed “Hugo,” in a qualitative operation in northern Mali.

It is noteworthy that “Abu Hudhayfah” had previously received intensive training in the Tindouf camps under the supervision of Algerian army officers… before he was sent to northern Mali to join what calls itself the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. He will then be succeeded by Adnan Abu Al-Walid Sahrawi, who was in turn a leader in the Polisario terrorist organization, before leading ISIS.

The liquidation of the so-called “Abu Hudhayfah” confirms Morocco’s view that the terrorist phenomenon and the separatist phenomenon are linked, and that terrorism is a form of secession… given that terrorist organizations seek to establish political entities on the outskirts of countries where the security focus is less… and thus create “zones of savagery.” “It is managed to reach what is called in the organizational literature the “empowerment stage.”

Source:  “Des regroupements de terroristes identifiés et traités avec succès (Groups of terrorists identified and successfully treated),”24heures (Burkina Faso newspaper), 9 May 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/mali-des-regroupements-de-terroristes-identifies-et-traites-avec-succes-communique/

The harvest seems good for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). From May 6 to 8, they began a “hunt” against armed terrorist groups in several parts of the country. Several terrorists have been “neutralized” according to a press release from the General Staff of the Armed Forces dated May 8. A “major local terrorist leader” was also reportedly killed.

“Based on information obtained by specialized services, the FAMA has been carrying out an active surveillance and reconnaissance campaign for several days in the Diafarabé area, Ségou region,” indicates the General Staff of the Armed Forces. This requires, he says, careful work and patience. These operations led to the location and identification of several fallback bases located in forest areas. According to the Malian Army, armed terrorist groups plan to transform this area into sanctuaries. To prepare their “dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” Air strikes followed by ground action targeted training camps and logistical bases around Nouh Bozo, on the right bank of the Niger River, on May 6 and 7, 2024.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.The Malian Forces are thus on the hunt for armed terrorist groups who sow terror and desolation both within the Defense and Security Forces and among civilians. In this context, several air and land operations are carried out in several parts of the national territory. This Sahel country also intends, in its drive to fight terrorism, to cut off the sources of fuel supply for armed groups.

Notes:

[i] Mali has faced multiple radical Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), and the Islamic State’s Islamic State in Greater Sahara affiliate branches, which have been responsible for numerous deadly attacks throughout the country and have even been able to control territory. The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker published a detailed background and analysis on violent extremism in the Sahel to provide contextual information on the issued faced in Mali and neighboring nations. See: “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, Updated 14 February 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

Image Information:

Image: Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Assimi_Goita,_August_2021.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Turkey Conducts Counterterrorism Operations Against the Islamic State

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Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.

“Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the [terrorist] cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000.”

Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State (IS) and other groups as the government attempts to restrict Tajik nationals access after a string of international attacks. Turkey is actively attempting to disrupt the remaining cells of the IS in the country after several deadly terrorist attacks linked to the group have occurred throughout the globe. Over a week period in January 2024, IS conducted bombings in Kerman, Iran, conducted a shooting at the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul, Turkey, and finally, the group killed over 130 people during an attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi-owned international newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, in April 2024, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Division personnel arrested 48 IS members in Istanbul. Thirty of those arrested were said to be connected to the Santa Maria Catholic church attack. 18 additional members were arrested in Ankara, many of whom are Tajik. The article also notes that at least two of the perpetrators of the Crocus attack in Moscow spent time in Istanbul immediately before the attack. IS fighters traveling through Turkey or using the country as a temporary place to stay is not a new phenomenon, as thousands of fighters and recruits have passed through Turkish borders since 2013. IS fighters and supporters have consistently used Turkey as a hub, despite counter-terrorism efforts. Many IS-affiliated individuals will cross the border from Syria, and Ankara’s primary countermeasure has been deportation to the country of origin with over 9,000 deported to date.[i] According to the second excerpted article from the Turkish-based news outlet TürkRus, Tajik nationals now face deportation and rescinded visa exemptions as a result of the Tajik connection to the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, the Santa Maria Catholic church attack, and a planned attack in Istanbul. Tajiks in Turkey were given a deadline of 20 April 2024 to leave or be under the threat of being forcibly expelled. Although Tajikistan is a small former Soviet republic just north of Afghanistan, approximately half of IS fighters are recruited there. A combination of poverty, lack of religious freedom, and an oppressive dictatorial regime give citizens few options, which IS has capitalized on. Through primarily online recruitment methods, IS appears to have been able to appeal to many Tajik’s grievances with Russia and the West. As for Turkey, the effects of its most recent countermeasures for Tajik nationals are yet to be seen.

OE Insight Summary:

TUR’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State and other groups as the government attempts to restrict access to Tajik nationals after a string of international attacks.

Sources:

Saeed Abdul Razik, “طاجيكستان دون تأشيرة تركيا توقف العشرات من «داعش» وتلغي دخول مواطني (Turkey arrests dozens of ISIS members and cancels visa-free entry of Tajik citizens),” Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi news site), 6 April 2024. https://aawsat.com/شؤون-إقليمية/4952726-تركيا-توقف-العشرات-من-داعش-وتلغي-دخول-مواطني-طاجيكستان-دون-تأشيرة

Counter-terrorism forces in Turkey arrested 48 members of the terrorist organization ISIS, including 30 members linked to the perpetrator of the attack on the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul on January 28. 18 members of the terrorist organization were also arrested in the Turkish capital, Ankara.

Last February, a Turkish court decided to imprison 25 defendants and conditionally release 9 others who were involved in the armed attack on the Santa Maria Church in the Sariyer district of Istanbul, which was carried out by two ISIS members: the Tajikist Amerjon Khalikov and the Russian David Tandev, who were charged. They were charged with: “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “premeditated murder.” They were among 60 Russian and Tajik suspects who were arrested in connection with the attack, and 26 of them were referred to deportation centers outside the country.

The Turkish security forces arrested 147 ISIS members as part of the investigations, and 17 members of what is known as the “Khorasan Province” affiliated with ISIS were arrested after their identities were identified by Turkish intelligence and the Anti-Terrorism Division in the Istanbul Security Directorate. Confirming their connection to the armed attack on the church and planning to establish an entity to train and deploy ISIS militants in Middle Eastern countries. ISIS, which Turkey has classified as a terrorist organization since 2013 and which was responsible for or attributed to the killing of more than 300 people in attacks in Turkey between 2015 and 2017.

Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands of them, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000, and preventing the entry of more than 5,000 into the country.

“Turkey 20 Nisan’dan itibaren Tacikistanlıları deport edecek (Turkey will deport Tajikistan citizens as of April 20),” TurkRus (Turkish news site), April 7, 2024. https://www.turkrus.com/3167873-turkiye-20-nisandan-itibaren-tacikistanlilari-deport-edecek-xh.aspx

After the terrorist attack in Moscow, it was revealed that the terrorists were Tajik nationals. Turkey also recently announced that it has lifted visa liberalization for Tajikistan. Turkey announced that it had lifted visa liberalization with Tajikistan. Speaking to Sputnik, Turkish diplomatic sources stated that Turkish officials informed the Tajikistan authorities that Tajik nationals who did not leave the country as of April 20 would be deported from the country.

It is noteworthy that the decision was taken after it was announced that some of the defendants, who were Tajik citizens, who were announced to have carried out the terrorist attack in Crocus City in Moscow, had traveled to and from Turkey before this action, and after many news about this issue appeared in the Russian press.It was noted that Tajikistan is considering the issue of imposing a visa requirement for Turkish citizens in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

Notes:

[i] The International Crisis Group provides a detailed analysis of the overall challenge Türkiye faces with ISIS-linked foreigners in Türkiye. For more information, see:

“An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-Linked Foreigners in Turkiye,” International Crisis Group, 28 February 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/267-enduring-challenge-isis-linked-foreigners

Image: Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_Army_vehicles_in_south-eastern_Turkey.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

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Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.

“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]

Sources:

“سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.

Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Taliban Challenged by Uptick of Islamic State–Khorasan Province Attacks

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Taliban Humvee in Kabul

“The Taliban government has said that it has defeated the Daesh group and will not allow the terrorist organization to use the territory of Afghanistan to pose any threat to other countries… At the same time, the spokesperson of the US Department of State said that the Taliban should remain committed to the fight against terrorism.”

Despite counterterrorism efforts by the Taliban, the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has been responsible for a series of attacks in Afghanistan since the new year. According to the first excerpted article from Pashto-language public service news Radio Azadi, the Taliban previously stated it had defeated IS-KP; however, recent activity by the group indicates otherwise. Since its inception in 2014, IS-KP has conducted bombing and suicide attacks against both civilian and government targets, mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, resulting in an estimated 309 fatalities in 2021.[i] In January 2024, IS-KP claimed responsibility for detonating an improvised explosive device in Kabul, killing two civilians and wounding 14 more. This was the second IS-KP bombing in Afghanistan in less than a week.[ii] These attacks followed the highly publicized IS-KP–-claimed attack in Kerman, Iran, on 4 January, which killed as many as 84 people and injured scores more. Iran called it the single deadliest attack in the country since 1979.

Recent reporting suggests Afghanistan is once again being used as a terrorist training ground—this time by IS-KP rather than al-Qaeda. According to the second excerpted article from the Saudi news source Independent, two IS-KP suicide bombers were arrested in Pakistan and accused of planning to bomb the leaders of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and National Awami political parties.[iii] The captured bombers admitted to receiving training in the Paktia province in Afghanistan, a remote area that shares a border with Pakistan. The article further notes that counterterrorism talks continue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, intended to decrease tension resulting from disagreements on how to handle Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders currently residing in Afghanistan. Although weakened, IS-KP appears able to continue to stage attacks in Afghanistan and the region at large. The Taliban is situated in a delicate position in the region, with any potential missteps in its counterterrorism strategy leading to an IS-KP resurgence. Internal disputes in the Taliban government have led to some Tajik Taliban members in the northern part of Afghanistan being investigated for links to IS-KP. Additionally, the Taliban does not appear to have any intention to reconcile with communities formerly linked with IS-KP, which could be a source of additional recruits for the organization. Finally, there is an ongoing concern among TTP leadership about members potentially defecting to IS-KP should the group’s jihad in Pakistan end.[iv]

Sources:

 “کابل کې د ۲۰۲۴ کال لومړۍ چاودنه او د ملکیانو مرګ ژوبله (The first explosion of 2024 in Kabul and civilian casualties),” Radio Azadi (Radio Free Europe Affiliate), Accessed 13 January 2024. https://pa.azadiradio.com/a/32763886.html

At least two civilians were killed, and 14 others were injured in the first explosion of 2024 in Afghanistan, which took place in Dasht Barchi, a Shia-populated area west of Kabul. Khaled Zadran, the spokesman of the Taliban government’s Kabul police headquarters, said in a statement late yesterday that a caster-type vehicle was targeted in the blast. He announced the beginning of the investigation regarding this incident, for which no one has accepted responsibility. Before this, the Khorasan province branch of the Islamic State group or Daesh has accepted responsibility for some deadly attacks in the west of Kabul.

In the month of November, there was an explosion in Dasht Barchi that killed at least 7 people, and the responsibility was taken by Daesh, the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State group. According to the report of Agence France-Presse, although the level of insecurity has greatly increased after the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, some armed groups, such as the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State group, or Daesh, are still considered a serious threat. The Daesh group also claimed responsibility for the killing of Dawood Muzamal, the Taliban governor for Balkh, last year. He was killed in a bomb attack in his office.

The Taliban government has said that it has defeated the Daesh group and will not allow the terrorist group to use the territory of Afghanistan to pose any threat to other countries. According to the report of the French news agency, the Acting Minister of Defense of the Taliban, Mohammad Yaqub Mujahid, last week announced a 90 percent decrease in the attacks of the Daesh group during the last year in Kabul. This is while the intelligence of the United States of America has said that the Daesh group in Afghanistan is involved in the bombings of the city of Kerman, Iran, last Wednesday. Two well-informed sources told the Reuters news agency last Friday that the communication information collected by the US proves that this attack, which killed nearly 100 people, was carried out by two attackers from the Khorasan province branch of the Islamic State group or Daesh… Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has denied this report while talking to the media. He said that ISIS has no capacity or presence in Afghanistan to plan any attack in Iran. At the same time, the spokesperson of the US Department of State said that the Taliban should remain committed to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan…

Last Wednesday, January 3rd, explosions took place in Kerman city of Iran during the ceremony of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of IRGC Quds Force. Iran has called it the deadliest attack in the country since 1979. A day after the incident, the Islamic State or Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack on Thursday and said that two of its members planted explosives on their bodies. The group did not say that this was done by the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group or Daesh…

“بازداشت دو مهاجم انتحاری داعش «آموزش‌دیده در افغانستان» در پاکستان (Two ISIS suicide bombers ‘trained in Afghanistan’ were arrested in Pakistan),” Independent Persian (Persian language Saudi Research and Marketing Group Agency media outlet), 13 January 2024. https://www.independentpersian.com/node/382361/

Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Department said on Friday, January 12, that two suicide bombers belonging to the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS), who planned to attack Maulana Fazl-ul-Rehman, the leader of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Party, and Amil Wali Khan, the leader of the National Awami Party of that country, have been arrested. According to the Express Tribune, Najmul Hasnain Liaqat, one of the senior officials of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism department, said in a press conference in Peshawar that the two suicide bombers were arrested in Peshawar and two suicide vests, three hand grenades, and some explosives were recovered from them.

The official of the Anti-Terrorism Department said that the explosives of these suicide attackers have been neutralized, and they have confessed to planning suicide attacks against Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman and Emil Wali Khan in the initial investigations.He said that these two ISIS suicide bombers were trained in Paktia province in Afghanistan and then went to Pakistan. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism department has not provided a document about the suicide training of these two ISIS members in Afghanistan. Taliban officials have not commented on this matter so far. But the Taliban deny training terrorists, including ISIS, in Afghanistan.

The Taliban call their suicide bombers “martyrs”. These forces have been trained in the training centers of the Taliban in such a way that they are ready to kill themselves to achieve the “dream of reaching heaven”. Among these suicide forces, there are a large number of young people who are waiting in line for a suicide attack and blowing themselves up on the way to the Taliban’s targets… Recently, ISIS has launched explosive and suicide attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman traveled to Afghanistan on Sunday, and met with Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Hasan Akhund, the prime minister of the Taliban, Maulvi Abdul Kabir, the political deputy of the prime minister of the Taliban, Amir Khan Motaghi, the foreign minister of the Taliban, Mullah Yaqub, the minister of defense of the Taliban, and other officials. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan has claimed that Mullah Yaqoob told Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman that the Taliban do not distinguish between themselves and Pakistan, and Mullah Yaqoob has expressed hope that the tension between the Taliban and Pakistan will decrease…The tension between the government of Pakistan and the Taliban regime has been formed in connection with how to deal with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The government of Pakistan wants the Taliban to hand over the leaders of the TTP inside the territory of Afghanistan and not to allow this group to use the territory of that country to attack. But on the other hand, Taliban reject the presence of foreign terrorists like TTP in Afghanistan. Senior Taliban officials have repeatedly said that TTP is Pakistan’s internal problem and that country must deal with it. Following the domination of the Taliban over Afghanistan, the number of explosive and terrorist attacks in Pakistan has increased. TTP and its allied groups are responsible for most of these attacks. ISIS is also trying to increase attacks in Pakistan. America has described the presence of Daesh in Afghanistan as a serious threat to the region and the world.

Notes:

[i] For additional information on IS-K’s history, ideology, tactics, and a summarized threat assessment, visit: Catrina Doxsee, and Jared Thompson. “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 September 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp

[ii] See: “داعش مسئولیت دومین انفجار مرگبار در کابل را هم بر عهده گرفت (ISIS also claimed responsibility for the second deadly explosion in Kabul),” Radio Farda, 9 January 2024. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/kabul-isis/32768439.html

[iii] Pakistan’s parliamentary election is scheduled for 8 February 2024. A detailed list of political parties and their political affiliations published by the UK Government can be found here: “Country Policy and Information Note Pakistan: Political Parties and Affiliation,” Home Office UK Government, May 2023. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/645cb936ad8a03000c38b295/PAK_CPIN_Political_parties_and_affiliation.pdf

[iv] The ICCT published a recent analysis on the potential resurgence of IS-KP and the Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts at: Antonio Giustozzi. “The Islamic State in Khorasan between Taliban counter-terrorism and resurgence prospects,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, January 30, 2024. https://www.icct.nl/publication/islamic-state-khorasan-between-taliban-counter-terrorism-and-resurgence-prospects

Image Information:

Image: Taliban Humvee in Kabul
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taliban_Humvee_in_Kabul,_August_2021_(cropped).png
Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan Deporting Approximately 1.7 Million Undocumented Afghanis in Response to Terrorist Attacks

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Flag of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

“Suppose that the Pakistani government succeeds in deporting all Afghan refugees, will terrorism be eradicated? Obviously not.”

Pakistan continues to struggle with a series of terror attacks, leading the government to resort to mass deportations of Afghan refugees to curb the violence. According to the first excerpted article from the Pashto-language version of the German media company Deutsche Welle, terrorists carried out four separate attacks in Pakistan between 3 and 6 November 2023. The attacks, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan provinces, resulted in the deaths of 17 soldiers, five civilians, with another 24 wounded. The article notes that ten militants were killed in response, and “security forces have received Afghan ID cards from six of the militants killed in the Zhob [Balochistan] attack.” Amid rising tensions due to the ongoing acts of terrorism, the regional government of the Balochistan province alleged that both border nations, Iran and Afghanistan, were involved in recent attacks to increase political pressure on Pakistan. No evidence was provided to substantiate these allegations. Pakistan’s proposed solution to counter the ongoing violence inside its borders includes the deportation of approximately 1.7 million undocumented Afghanis, some of whom have lived in Pakistan for up to 40 years, according to the second excerpt from the independent Afghan news outlet Hasht e Subh. As of December 2023, over 400,000 have left Pakistan.[i] A majority of the remaining refugees currently reside in either the Balochistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces that border Afghanistan.[ii] The article notes that Pakistan has not been able to successfully contain the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP)) and has frequently accused the Afghan refugee population of collaborating with the TTP. The article alleges that the Pakistani military has used both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to further its own geopolitical agenda when convenient. Some Afghan refugees allege that the Pakistani government is committing acts of terrorism by expelling them from the land. A mass deportation of a long-standing population may also lead to an increase in grievances by that community and possibly increased support for the TTP and other like-minded groups, resulting in additional terrorist attacks.[iii] The mass expulsion of undocumented refugees has already created a burden on both the Afghan and Pakistani governments from an economic and human rights perspective.

Sources:

“پاکستان: په ۴۸ ساعتونو کې وسله والو ۴ بریدونه کړي دي (Pakistan: Militants have carried out 4 attacks in 48 hours),” Deutsche Welle (German news site), 6 November 2023. https://p.dw.com/p/4YRJH

According to security sources, militants carried out another attack in The Dera Ismail Khan district of Khyber Pakhtounkhwa yesterday, but this is the fourth attack on Pakistani security forces in the past 48 hours. Last night, police raided a police checkpoint in Ismail Khan district with heavy weapons. The exchange between the police and the armed forces lasted about half an hour, but the militants eventually fled. Police say they have cordoned off the area and are searching for suspected attackers. In the past three days, terrorists have carried out major attacks in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtounkhwa, Punjab and Balochistan provinces, killing 17 security forces, five civilians and wounding about 24 others, including police. Police claimed to have killed 10 people in the attack.

In recent days, attacks in different parts of Pakistan have increased. In the wake of the latest incidents, Balochistan’s regional government has claimed that two neighbouring countries are involved in the terrorist attacks because they want to pressure Pakistan. Balochistan’s Acting Information Minister, Jan Achakzai, told a news conference on Sunday that Pakistan was facing attacks “on both sides” but that it could not undermine the government’s will to defeat terrorists. He claimed that security forces had obtained identification cards from six of the militants killed in the attack. John Achakzai accused India of spreading insecurity in the region and that India’s intelligence agency, “Ro” is “involved in terrorist attacks in Pakistan.” Referring to the two terrorist attacks last week, he said: “We have repeatedly mentioned that India is involved in the terrorist attacks in the country, especially in Balochistan.”

“د کډوالو په اېستلو سره په پاکستان کې ترهګري له منځه نه ځي (Terrorism in Pakistan will not disappear by expelling refugees)” Hasht e Subh (independent Afghan news site), 5 November 2023. https://8am.media/ps/terrorism-in-pakistan-will-not-disappear-by-expelling-refugees/

The interim government of Pakistan has started deporting Afghan refugees en masse, which has provoked widespread protests. The interim prime minister of Pakistan has emphasized that all those illegal Afghan refugees who have been living in Pakistan for the past 40 years will be deported. This move has deepened the crisis which is not new for the Afghans and they have been dealing with it for decades. With the rule of the Taliban, the crisis of immigration has not decreased, but has expanded and increased… This has caused citizens to move to neighboring countries. This is not the only result of the arrival of the Taliban. The strengthening of terrorist groups and the development of their activities is also one of the destructive consequences of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan… The government of Pakistan, which is unable to control the TTP and has not given the desired result to the pressure on the Afghan Taliban to suppress this group, has increased the pressure on the Afghan refugees and accuses the Afghan refugees of terrorist attacks… There is no doubt that the Taliban is involved in many terrorist attacks in Pakistan and will continue to be in the future. But it cannot be that all Afghan refugees are considered terrorists or collaborators of terrorists and the solution is to seek their deportation. In reality, Afghan refugees have not only played an important role in the growth and strengthening of terrorism, but are considered the primary victims of the development of terrorist groups’ activities.

The terrorism that the government of Pakistan is using to expel Afghan refugees from their land today is the result of the deadly game that the soldiers of this country have skillfully played for years and the result was full of benefits for them. Thanks to the terrorist industry managed by the Pakistani army, the people of this country have not seen a stable civilian government and the army has control over all affairs. Terrorism is actually a pretense through which the soldiers introduce themselves as the saviors of Pakistan. If they are not there, the country will become food for wolves… It is not yet clear whether the TTP, as well as the Afghan Taliban, have really escaped the control of the Pakistani army or not; But what can’t be doubted is that the main threat to Pakistan is the soldiers, or to put it bluntly, the managers of the terrorist industry, not the Afghan refugees or the Pashtuns of this country. The Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line are the main victims of terrorism trained by the Pakistan Army.In the last few decades, one of the important tasks of the religious seminaries established in Pakistan with the support of the army was the training of the hard-line jihadi generation, who as proxy soldiers of the ESA during the invasion of the Soviet Union and also during the presence of the American forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army overthrew the western-backed government in Afghanistan and established its own proxy regime in the country. But now that the jihad in Afghanistan is over, according to the terrorists, how and where will the thousands of jihadists trained in the religious schools of Pakistan quench their thirst for jihad… Suppose that the Pakistani government succeeds in deporting all Afghan refugees, will terrorism be eradicated? Obviously not. The main supporter of terrorism in Pakistan is the army, which is in control of the entire country, and thus, the main source of terrorism in Pakistan is religious madrassas, which continue to operate whether they are children of Afghan refugees or not. and the army does not care about them. Are only Afghans committing suicide attacks? No. Pakistanis are ahead of Afghans in terrorism and extremism…

Notes:

[i] A supplemental report by the Associated Press detailing recent updates in the deportation of undocumented Afghanis in Pakistan: Sattar, Abdul and Munir Ahmed. “A Pakistani province aims to deport 10,000 Afghans a day,” Associated Press, November 30, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-baluchistan-deport-migrants-afghans-7393238ace4c49acce9d7c77ebd708bf

[ii] For additional information on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, please visit the United Nations Refugee data website: “Registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan” United Nations Operational Data Portal. https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/pak

[iii] To learn more about the potential impact of grievances and their effect on terrorism globally, see:

Murphy, Natalie. “Why Grievances Matter: An Analysis of the Influence Grievances Have on Domestic Terrorism Globally,” Johns Hopkins University, [Thesis] May 2022. https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/0f722198-6850-4d16-8250-5fcad421430b/content

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Tehrik-i-Taliban_Pakistan.png#globalusage
Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan Struggles In The Tri-Border Region After Multiple Terrorist Attacks

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Location of the Mastung district in Balochistan, Pakistan.

“Recently, the insecurity and activities of militants have increased in different parts of Balochistan, and a number of security forces, government employees, and civilians have been killed in attacks and clashes.”

As attention turns to developing terrorism trends in other regions of the world, Pakistan has recently suffered a series of deadly suicide attacks in its Balochistan province. [i]

 According to the first excerpted article from the London-based, Afghan-run independent news outlet Afghanistan International, on 29 September, 59 people were killed, and more than 60 were injured, in a suicide attack during the Milad al-Nabi ceremony in Mastung, Balochistan. Milad al-Nabi is an important Muslim holiday celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad.[ii] The Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) quickly condemned the attack and denied responsibility, claiming they provided information to Pakistan’s intelligence agency before the bombing. While the TTP denied this bombing, the pro-Pashtun group has been responsible for multiple deadly attacks in the province, as well as the greater Balochistan region.[iii] No group has claimed responsibility for this attack, though Pakistan’s Acting Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti claimed India was involved.

The second excerpt from the Pashto language branch of Radio Free Europe, Mashal Radio, describes some of the complex issues that Pakistan’s Balochistan province is facing. In addition to TTP activity, the Islamic State (IS) and Baloch separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have claimed responsibility for multiple recent attacks.[iv] Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department conducted kinetic operations in the area, killing a prominent IS member days before the bombing in Mastung. Hours after the Mastung attack, an additional suicide bombing was conducted in Doaba, a small city in the Hangu district of Pakistan. It is currently unclear whether the attacks are related. Recent attacks in Balochistan province – as well as the greater tri-border region – have created a delicate security situation. The Taliban, IS, and Baloch separatist groups conducting attacks in the same area make it difficult for counterterrorism units to combat them effectively and accurately attribute attacks to the appropriate groups. Although Pakistan has stepped up counterterrorism efforts in its own province, the larger Balochistan region is remote and challenging for each country to police. Terrorist groups can base their operations out of Afghanistan or Iran and conduct attacks in Pakistan, with little ability for Pakistan to conduct follow-up operations inside bordering nations. If these groups gain a permanent foothold in the greater Balochistan region, transnational groups could use the area to coordinate international attacks or further destabilize the relationship between Pakistan and India.

Sources:

“المرصاد: طالبانو د بلوچستان د برید په هکله له پاکستان سره معلومات شریک کړي وو

(Al-Mursad: The Taliban had shared information with Pakistan about the attack in Balochistan),” Afghanistan International (London based Afghan run independent news outlet), 1 October 2023. https://www.afintl.com/pa/202310018517

Al-Mursad, a website close to the Taliban, says that the group had shared the information about the Baluchistan attack and other similar attacks and the names of those involved with Pakistan’s intelligence…. The previous day, 59 people were killed and 60 were injured in a suicide attack on the Milad al-Nabi ceremony in Mastung, Balochistan. Pakistan’s Acting Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti said in Quetta yesterday that India is involved in the Balochistan attacks. But al-Mursad says, reliable evidence shows that Pakistan is carrying out the project of raising and strengthening ISIS as a proxy organization in Afghanistan and the region…. They [Al-Mursad] add in their report that Balochistan is considered a large and lawless area for ISIS in this country. Even before this, Daesh has claimed responsibility for some attacks in Balochistan, the last of which was Hafiz Ahmad, the leader of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, in Swabi last month. ISIS has not yet said anything about the Mustang attack.

Terin, Ayub, Majeed Babar, Shahin Buneri, Daud Khattak, “د مستونګ چاودنه کې لسګونه کسان وژل شوي دي

(Dozens of people were killed in the Mustang explosion),” Mashal Radio, 29 September 2023. https://www.mashaalradio.com/a/eid-miladunnabi-explosion-in-mastung-many-killed/32615419.html

[H]e did not say anything about the nature of the explosion, but the Reuters news agency quoted a police official, Munir Ahmed, as saying that the suicide bomber detonated near the “Madina Mosque” when people were attending the Milad ceremony. Achakzai said the government declared a state of emergency in the hospitals of Quetta after the incident…. A few hours after the explosion in Mastung, a number of people were killed in a suicide attack in Doaba, Hangu district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemned the attacks in Doba and Mastung in a statement on September 20. The statement says that the organization’s Secretary General Hussain Ibrahim Taha condemns “any form of terrorism” and expresses “full support for Pakistan’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.” This is while 11 people, including the spokesman and former senator Hafiz Hamdullah,were injured in a bomb blast in Mastung on September 14. The police had said at that time that Hamdullah’s convoy was going towards the Mustang from Quetta when an explosion occurred at the checkpoint. The Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the Mastung blast…. The Pakistani army has said that four soldiers were killed in a missile attack on a security post in Zhob. The Army Public Relations Office (ESPR) said in a statement that the attack took place on the evening of September 28. It has been claimed in the statement that the missile was sent by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants from Afghanistan, but that group and the Taliban government in Kabul have not yet said anything in response…. Recently, insecurity and activities of militants have increased in different parts of Balochistan and a number of security forces, government employees and civilians have been killed in attacks and clashes. On the 9th of September, six local football players were going from Dera Bugti to Sawai in a car to participate in the championship called “Al Pakistan Chief Minister Gold Cup” when armed men kidnapped them. Before this, a soldier was killed in two attacks on the traffic police and the Levies force in the afternoon of August 16…. On August 13, militants attacked the convoy of Chinese engineers in the port city of Gwadar, after which a clash with the security forces began….

Notes:

[i] Balochistan has been conquered and divided by multiple empires, gaining partial independence in the 18th century, and is now divided amongst three nations, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan—with other ethnic majorities. While not as commonly known as the Pashtun, Kurdish, or Punjabi people, the Baloch are ethnically, linguistically, and historically unique. Years of subjugation and marginalization – along with its remote and sparsely populated geographic location – have contributed to the fragile state of the region, allowing nationalist and radical Islamist groups to further destabilize the province through violence. For more information on the history of the Balochistan region, see: Mickey Kupecz. “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications,” The International Affairs Review, 16 May 2012. https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/8er0x982v5pj129srhre98ex6u8v8n

[ii] For more information on the Mawlid al-Nabi celebration, see: “Birthday of the Prophet: Mawlid al-Nabi,” The Pluralism Project – Harvard University, 2020. https://pluralism.org/birthday-of-the-prophet-mawlid-al-nabi

[iii] For additional background information on Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan, see: “Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html

 [iv] For additional information on the Balochistan Liberation Army, see: “Balochistan Liberation Army,” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, Updated 2019. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/balochistan-liberation-army

Image Information:

Image: Location of the Mastung district in Balochistan, Pakistan.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/39/Pakistan_-_Balochistan_-_Mastung.svg/1172px-Pakistan_-_Balochistan_-_Mastung.svg.png?20211017045741
Attribution: CC-BY-SA-4.0