Tag Archives: Sahel Region

Mali Launches Successful Counterterrorism Operations

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Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.”

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) recently publicized a series of successful counter-terrorism operations against armed extremist groups throughout the country. According to the first excerpted article from Arabic-language Moroccan electronic newspaper Tamaghrabit, FAMA announced that it had successfully eliminated Abu Hudhayfah, a former Polisario Front separatist and one of the leaders of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Prior to his time with the ISGS, Hudhayfah was allegedly trained by the Algerian Army and his joint affiliation has signaled a connection between separatist and terrorist organizations in the region. Hudhayfah was also suspected to have assisted with attacks on U.S. and Nigerian forces in Niger in 2017. Mali and the greater Sahel region have faced a significant and sustained threat from armed extremist groups for multifaceted reasons ranging from weak governmental leadership, less international counterterrorism support, and instability in neighboring nations.[i] Although Hudhayfah will undoubtedly be replaced, the FAMA’s successful operation against ISGC is a needed disruption and morale boost for local forces.

Following FAMA’s successful operation against Hudhayfah, the Malian military claimed several other successful counterterrorism operations throughout the Diafarabé area, Ségou region. According to the second excerpted article from Burkina Faso’s French-language independent newspaper, 24heures, the General Staff of the Armed Forces announced air strikes and ground operations that targeted training camps and logistical bases near Nouh Bozo, a village in the center of the country located along the bank of the Niger River. Before kinetic operations, FAMA used information derived from “specialized services” to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance on each target. It was believed that the unnamed terrorist organizations operating the camps intended to “transform the area into sanctuaries to prepare their dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” In addition to the destruction of training camps and logistical storage areas, FAMA claimed to have destroyed fuel shipments destined for terrorist organizations throughout the country. The security situation in the Sahel continues to be plagued with instability and terrorism. External players like Russia continue to garner influence in the region. With U.S. troops withdrawing from neighboring Niger, the forces to counter a growing terrorist threat in the Sahel are even more sparse. Mali’s ability to independently conduct kinetic operations against high-value targets may indicate a renewed focus on securing their nation, which could have a positive impact across the region.

Sources:

“الجيش المالي يعلن القضاء على الانفصالي “أبو حذيفة” ويؤكد علاقة البوليساريو بالإرهاب (The Malian army announces the elimination of the separatist “Abu Hudhayfah” and confirms the Polisario’s relationship with terrorism),” Tamaghribit (Moroccan newspaper), 1 May 2024. https://www.tamaghrabit.com/?p=19302

The Malian army announced the elimination of the former Polisario Front separatist and leader of ISIS in the Sahara region, called “Abu Hudhayfah” and nicknamed “Hugo,” in a qualitative operation in northern Mali.

It is noteworthy that “Abu Hudhayfah” had previously received intensive training in the Tindouf camps under the supervision of Algerian army officers… before he was sent to northern Mali to join what calls itself the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. He will then be succeeded by Adnan Abu Al-Walid Sahrawi, who was in turn a leader in the Polisario terrorist organization, before leading ISIS.

The liquidation of the so-called “Abu Hudhayfah” confirms Morocco’s view that the terrorist phenomenon and the separatist phenomenon are linked, and that terrorism is a form of secession… given that terrorist organizations seek to establish political entities on the outskirts of countries where the security focus is less… and thus create “zones of savagery.” “It is managed to reach what is called in the organizational literature the “empowerment stage.”

Source:  “Des regroupements de terroristes identifiés et traités avec succès (Groups of terrorists identified and successfully treated),”24heures (Burkina Faso newspaper), 9 May 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/mali-des-regroupements-de-terroristes-identifies-et-traites-avec-succes-communique/

The harvest seems good for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). From May 6 to 8, they began a “hunt” against armed terrorist groups in several parts of the country. Several terrorists have been “neutralized” according to a press release from the General Staff of the Armed Forces dated May 8. A “major local terrorist leader” was also reportedly killed.

“Based on information obtained by specialized services, the FAMA has been carrying out an active surveillance and reconnaissance campaign for several days in the Diafarabé area, Ségou region,” indicates the General Staff of the Armed Forces. This requires, he says, careful work and patience. These operations led to the location and identification of several fallback bases located in forest areas. According to the Malian Army, armed terrorist groups plan to transform this area into sanctuaries. To prepare their “dark actions against the populations and store their logistics there.” Air strikes followed by ground action targeted training camps and logistical bases around Nouh Bozo, on the right bank of the Niger River, on May 6 and 7, 2024.

“The FAMA will relentlessly continue their mission of protecting populations throughout the national territory,” reassures the Army.The Malian Forces are thus on the hunt for armed terrorist groups who sow terror and desolation both within the Defense and Security Forces and among civilians. In this context, several air and land operations are carried out in several parts of the national territory. This Sahel country also intends, in its drive to fight terrorism, to cut off the sources of fuel supply for armed groups.

Notes:

[i] Mali has faced multiple radical Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), and the Islamic State’s Islamic State in Greater Sahara affiliate branches, which have been responsible for numerous deadly attacks throughout the country and have even been able to control territory. The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker published a detailed background and analysis on violent extremism in the Sahel to provide contextual information on the issued faced in Mali and neighboring nations. See: “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, Updated 14 February 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel

Image Information:

Image: Assimi Goita, the current leader of Mali.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Assimi_Goita,_August_2021.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants

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Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda

“Niger’s approach [to addressing jihadists threats]… starkly contrasts with the regional trend.”

The countries of the Sahel are undertaking divergent paths when it comes to the question of negotiating with terror groups as the African region cements itself as the new epicenter of global jihadist terrorism.[i] Most countries in the Sahel, and wider West Africa, have shown a reluctance to negotiate with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ)[ii] or the Islamic State (IS),[iii] as well as with secular separatist insurgencies. Burkina Faso’s prime minister, Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela, was emphatic that his country, which has seen one of the most significant spikes of jihadist violence of any in the world, would “never negotiate” with the militants in his country, according to the pan-African news aggregator allafrica.com,. He articulated, “The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield.” Burkina Faso looks to rely heavily on its armed self-defense force, The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, or VDP (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie). The VDP is an auxiliary unit working alongside the armed forces of Burkina Faso, which has been criticized for providing civilians arms and authority for violence with as little as two weeks of training.[iv] Burkina Faso is also presumed to be receiving some assistance from the Wagner Group to facilitate this kinetic response, which it has officially denied.[v] Niger has taken a different approach, combining negotiations with AQ and IS elements with kinetic counterterror efforts. Niger’s counterterrorism strategy is seen as being much more effective than the zero-tolerance negotiation policy of other Sahelian states, according to a second article from the centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies.. Niger’s approach is modeled after the successes of two other regional states, Algeria and Mauritania, to their own insurgencies, and it derived from its own successful history of addressing Tuareg rebellions that plagued the country for years. The military-first approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has shown its limits over the past decade. The authors of the second article give advise: “Niger’s neighbors in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations.”

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: Prime Minister Rules Out Any Deal With Jihadists, Boosts Civil Militias,” Allafrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 31 May 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202305310419.html  

Burkina Faso’s prime minister on Tuesday ruled out any negotiations with jihadist insurgents that have taken control of swathes of the West African country since 2015. 

“We will never negotiate, either over Burkina Faso’s territorial integrity or its sovereignty,” Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela told parliament, adding that the government aimed to double the number of volunteers for the VDP civil defence militia to 100,000. 

“The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield,” de Tambela told the Transitional Legislative Assembly. 

Hassane Koné and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Is Niger’s counter-terrorism approach an exception in the Sahel?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 5 April 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-nigers-counter-terrorism-approach-an-exception-in-the-sahel  

In early 2022, Nigerien authorities recognised the need for dialogue with jihadist leaders in Tillabéri. This was inspired after several Nigeriens defected from their extremist groups, and violence in the Diffa region decreased after a disarmament and reintegration process launched in 2016…. 

The use of dialogue in Tillabéri shows strong political will on the part of the government, which is keen to disincentivise engagement with extremist groups, and stabilise the region. Niger’s approach, which combines dialogue and military action, starkly contrasts with the regional trend. Neighbouring countries have reinforced their military tactics through diversifying strategic alliance and employing armed civilians…  

By including dialogue in its counter-terrorism efforts, Niger is experimenting with an approach similar to those in Algeria and Mauritania, underpin their decade-long protection against jihadist violence. 

Niger’s neighbours in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations. A coordinated regional approach would also exert pressure on terrorist groups and ultimately deprive them of human resources.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Sahel’s role as the new center of global jihadism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[ii] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

[iii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “”UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iv] For more on the VDP and critiques of it, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

[v] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda  
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

A Complex Link Between Coups and Jihadism in West Africa

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Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

“Analysts say that while there is no mutually beneficial relationship between jihadist groups and coup plotters, there is a linkage between the increase of jihadism and the protracted insecurity across the region.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the non-profit scholarly publication The Conversation: Africa examines the possible connections between coups and the presence of Islamic terrorists in African states.  There have been three coups in West Africa’s Sahel Region in since 2021:  Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso, as well as a fourth failed attempt in Guinea-Bissau.  The author found the link between coups and jihad to be complex, with jihadism not necessarily a direct precursor.

The author notes jihadism and coups are precipitated by similar factors such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, ignorance, political instability, and the inability of governments to meet these challenges.  These conditions serve as excellent recruiting tools for jihadist groups looking to increase their ranks with jobless, angry youth.  These conditions also encourage soldiers, sometimes with a disgruntled populace backing them, to overthrow a corrupt government that is unable to provide for its citizens.  Finally, the military is more likely to attempt a coup when the government appears unable to defeat terrorist organizations.  This was the case in Burkina Faso, where the military overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, after feeling their forces were not being adequately supplied to defeat the jihadists and becoming disenchanted as the number of casualties within their ranks grew. Coup leaders often adopt a very militaristic approach to defeating jihadists. Instead of attacking the root causes of discontent, such as high unemployment and lack of essential services, they implement forceful measures that tend to drive the poor into the arms of jihadist recruiters.  As such, their harsh measures lead to more jihadist recruits, leading to harsher crackdown measures, and so on.  Ultimately, the outcome of the coup-jihadism relationship becomes increased instability.  Meanwhile, the African Union and Western nations, see their efforts at democratization and counterterrorism in the Sahel undermined.

Source:

Folahanmi Aina, “Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship,” The Conversation: Africa (non-profit scholarly publication), 17 February 2022. https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988

Most of these groups are affiliated with global jihadist groups such Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This has led to repeated tensions in relations between the state and society, which the jihadist groups have exploited in intensifying their recruitment drive.

On the other hand, the activities of these jihadist groups have also mounted additional pressure on the fragile democratic systems across the region.

This encourages state capture by the military, who see themselves as “guardians of the state” and the “last hope” of the common citizen.

The continued emergence of coups is likely to be capitalised upon by jihadists as reflecting efforts which are finally yielding desired results – the forced displacement of democratic systems of government. The jihadists could use this as a tactic to get more fighters to join them.The military juntas now in power must urgently seek to establish mutuality with the societies they now rule. It’s a tall order, given that they don’t prioritise the relationship between state and society. Doing so would require giving voice to the concerns and grievances of citizens they rule over.

Image Information:

Image: Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.
Source: Kassim Traoré /VOA/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comit%C3%A9_national_pour_le_salut_du_Peuple_-_2020_Malian_coup_d%27Etat_2.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain