Chinese Seeking To Use AI Disinformation Database for Cognitive Defense

Rumor Crusher.

Rumor Crusher.


“The models built by AI still need further language training. For example, some users’ share [rumors] with irony, sarcasm, or as a metaphor, and machines find it difficult to judge whether they are true expressions of emotion or not. Therefore, we should focus on improving the public’s media literacy so that they are more serious about interacting and sharing content ….”


According to the excerpted article from PLA-owned strategic communications journal Military Correspondent, the PLA is exploring an early warning mechanism for monitoring and combating digital disinformation utilizing the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)’s[i] “AI Rumor Crusher.”[ii] While the article is not a definitive accounting of how the CAC will use artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor and counter digital disinformation, it does provide insight into a methodology employed across China’s information environment to control flows of information. The author, Li Beibei, a researcher at China’s National Defense University’s College of Politics, suggests that an ideal approach for countering disinformation would include a multipronged strategy that includes expansion of China’s legal framework, improvement of data-sharing among social media platforms and the government, and improved media literacy.

Li explains AI Rumor Crusher’s operational methodology as an eight-step iterative process composed of recognition, word separation, comparison with a rumor database, determination of credibility, analysis of rumor and non-rumor features, and finally supervised and reinforcement learning. In the first two steps, AI Rumor Crusher identifies the source of a piece of information and analyzes the disseminator. Next, it analyzes the information against preexisting rumor samples and tracks sources for their credibility (website, publisher, professionals, etc.). Finally, the key arguments are labeled and cross-referenced with authoritative knowledge databases[iii] to verify the veracity of the information. Li argues that AI, when compared to human counterparts, possesses a superior ability to work around the clock, identify and eliminate rumors in a timely way, track disseminators of disinformation, judge the veracity of information, and even determine the disseminator’s motivation for sharing rumors. Li further advocates for a multipronged approach to digital disinformation governance that would include the expansion and strengthening of China’s relevant legal regulations and public media literacy to reinforce social values and ensure both originators and disseminators (witting or unwitting) do not exacerbate the issue.[iv]


Sources:

“利用人工智能技术治理网络谣言探析 (An Exploration of the Uses of Artificial Intelligence in Governing Digital Rumors),” Military Correspondent (PLA-owned strategic communications journal ), 23 February 2023. http://www.81.cn/rmjz_203219/jsjz/2023nd1q_244462/yldzgzyj_244467/16203061.html.

Management of digital rumors has become an urgent issue. We can establish an early warning mechanism for digital rumors based in artificial intelligence technologies. With AI “Rumor Crusher” we can build a data-sharing platform for disinformation to monitor the trajectory of digital rumors and prevent them from spreading in order to effectively combat digital disinformation.

With the promotion of new media interactive platforms, the difficulty of Internet rumor management is gradually increasing, and users’ behavior and speech on the Internet are difficult to be effectively and timely restrained, making rumor suppression a more complicated and difficult task.

The most central factor in the formation and dissemination of digital rumors is the openness and ambiguity of incoming information. People are most likely to generate and spread rumors in the absence of reliable information. … people use their virtual identities to send and receive information over their various accounts without temporal, spatial, or moral constraints … resulting in many online rumors leading to serious consequences. Since August 2020, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)’s Reporting Center has organized more than 10 website platforms such as Weibo, Douyin and Baidu to carry out digital rumor tagging and labeling work. This ensures that digital rumor samples are promptly exposed, thereby minimizing the space for digital rumors to survive. However, despite the active measures relevant government departments have taken to control digital rumors, there is still a long way to go. In particular, the legal punishment for digital rumors should be strengthened so the disseminators of rumors can be punished according to the degree to which the rumor is malign and causes a negative impact.


Notes:

[i] Cyberspace Administration of China’s Reporting Center (网信办举报中心, literally, “Illegal and Harmful Information Reporting Center, 违法和不良信息举报中心). As early as 2004, under the Internet Society of China, the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center was established with the stated goal of standing up for “virtue and right thinking” while opposing pornography, violence, and fraud. See: Sumner Lemon, “Chinese website lets users report illegal content,” Computer World, 15 June 2004. https://www.computerworld.com/article/2565362/chinese-web-site-lets-users-report-illegal-content.html

[ii] “Rumor (谣言)” is both a colloquial and legal term in the PRC. Colloquially, it connotes a similar meaning to the term “rumor” in English. According to the Cyberspace Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室,简称:网信办), internet rumors网络谣言 refers to “false information that intentionally fabricates facts to cause harm to society and others.” This definition partly aligns with Western conceptions of disinformation (often translated as 虚假信息, lit. fake information). For further exploration of the PRC’s unclear use of similar terms in legal matters, see: 谣言型犯罪中“谣言”该如何理解 (How Should “Rumor” be Understood in Rumor Crimes), The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China, 12 February 2022. https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/llyj/202202/t20220212_544221.shtml

[iii] While not explicitly stated, these would likely include both open source, commercial, and classified government databases accessible by government, military, and commercial personnel. Much of the labeling and tagging until recently has been conducted by human regulators working on behalf of social media companies like Alibaba, Baidu, ByteDance, and Tencent.

[iv] Many of these same issues are addressed in China’s preexisting legal infrastructure managing cyberspace including the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures. For more on China’s vision for global cyberspace governance, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/433067


Image Information:

Image: Rumor Crusher.
Source: https://szzx.sust.edu.cn/info/1005/2532.htm
Attribution: Public Domain

Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance

“Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.” 


China identifies the Internet and cyberspace as a critical domain for ensuring national security, economic and social stability, and ultimately, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Recently, Beijing presented its vision for international cooperation in cyberspace via a white paper from the State Council Information Office. The white paper reflects Beijing’s tightening grip on information flows and fundamental freedoms, its growing concerns over Western digital advantages in its operational environment, and its expanding efforts to export digital authoritarianism to the developing world.

For Beijing to realize its global superpower aspirations and compete with the United States as a cyber superpower, it must present a vision for an equitable and inclusive global community. The 2022 white paper lays out Beijing’s vision for such a community through “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and promot[ion of] a multilateral, democratic, and transparent international internet governance system.” The document further highlights Beijing’s achievements in internet development (e.g. expansion of its internet penetration, digital economy, and tech sector) and cyberspace governance (e.g. the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures)[i] while advocating for the rights of all countries to formulate their own national cybersecurity strategies. However, these seemingly liberal themes are trumped Beijing’s emphasis on cyber sovereignty as its core guiding principle in international cyberspace governance.

Cyber sovereignty is the notion that individual countries should maintain the exclusive right to govern their own territory’s cyberspace, superseding any supposed rights for the mutual interest of a future shared community in cyberspace. As such, reliance on the principle of cyber sovereignty serves to justify the CCP’s long-term strategic control over information flows available to Chinese internet users and to facilitate Beijing’s digital security apparatus’ ability to enforce social stability to buttress CCP legitimacy.

Simultaneously, China looks to promote this version of internet governance abroad.  This conception of cyberspace governance diverges from the principles of an “open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet” advocated for by the United States and 61 partner nation signatories of the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet.”[ii] Indeed, Beijing’s white paper presents China’s achievements and vision of shared internet development and cyberspace governance in stark contrast to its vision of Western “cyber hegemonism,” the idea that “certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance.” Despite the liberal rhetoric framing a “community with a shared future in cyberspace,” the more Beijing can affiliate cyber sovereignty with equitable and inclusive participation in cyberspace governance to developing countries, the wider its brand of digital authoritarianism will spread.


Source:

“携手构建网络空间命运共同体 (Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace),” State Council Information Office, 7 November 2022. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1732898/1732898.htm (Chinese) http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2022-11/07/content_78505694.htm (English).

Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.

Certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance, raising the risk of conflict in cyberspace.

Some countries attempt to decouple with others, and create schism and confrontation in cyberspace. The increasingly complex cybersecurity situation calls for more just, reasonable and effective cyberspace governance. Global threats and challenges in cyberspace necessitate strong global responses.

All countries have the right to formulate public policies, laws, and regulations on cyberspace in the context of their national conditions and international experience. No country should seek cyber hegemony; use the internet to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs; engage in, incite, or support cyber activities that endanger other countries’ national security, or infringe on other countries’ key information infrastructure.


Notes:

[i] For more on the PRC’s evolving cyberspace and data governance legislation see: “China’s Evolving Data Governance Regime,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 July 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/Chinas_Evolving_Data_Governance_Regime.pdf

[ii] For more on the Biden administration’s articulation of the United States’ vision for cyberspace governance see: “A Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” The White House, 28 April 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf