FMSO

Open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

Iran Seeks To Reestablish Embassy and Consulate in Saudi Arabia Before Hajj

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Michael Rubin

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani speaks to the Islamic Republic News Agency in a November 2022 file photo.

“Efforts will be made to reopen and activate our country’s diplomatic representations before the annual Hajj.”

On 10 March 2023, regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia announced a deal to restore diplomatic relations for the first time in more than seven years. On 6 April 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, met in Beijing to discuss the technicalities of resuming ties. According to the excerpted article from the Iran-based Hamshahri newspaper, these diplomatic efforts are taking place in earnest to normalize relations before the Hajj, which begins 26 June 2023.[i] Iran-Saudi ties have long been fraught. While ethnic tension between the two Middle East regional powers predates Iran’s Islamic Revolution, sectarian and ideological differences in the post-1979 period created significantly more hostility.[ii] Both countries accuse the other of supporting terrorist groups targeting the other.[iii] So, while the restoration of diplomatic relations may appear straightforward, Iran’s track record breeds suspicion, especially regarding the Hajj. In 1986, the head of the predecessor to the Quds Force, sought to infiltrate saboteurs into Mecca under cover of the Hajj to unleash a bombing campaign. The following year, clashes erupted between Iranian demonstrators and Saudi security forces, leading to the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims. Despite Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s willingness to reconcile with Iran, Saudi security forces and intelligence will tread carefully, especially regarding the size of the mission and the freedoms Iranian diplomats might enjoy inside the Kingdom. During the 1986 incident, hardline ideologues within Iran’s security services ignored the Iranian government’s desire to break out of its isolation. Almost four decades later, it remains to be seen if the same dynamics are at play, especially as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps do not fall under the authority of either President Ebrahim Raisi or Foreign Minister Abdollahian.

Source:

“Talash baraye Rahandazi Saferat-e Iran dar Arabistan qabl az Ayam-e Hajj (The Struggle to Set Up an Iranian Embassy in Saudi Arabia before the Hajj),” Hamshahri (mass circulation general newspaper), 12 April 2023. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/753453

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani said that an Iranian technical delegation arrived in Riyadh on Wednesday [April 12] at noon in a new step toward the implementation of the agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume formal relations and diplomatic activities of political and consular representations of the two countries. Saudi officials welcomed the delegation.

The spokesman added that the Iranian delegation divided into two working groups to take the necessary measures to set up the embassy and consulate general in Riyadh and Jeddah respectively and also to discuss reestablishment of a permanent representation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the [Jeddah-based] Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also added that the Saudi technical delegation, which arrived in Iran on Saturday [April 8, 2022], will leave for Mashhad tomorrow [April 13, 2022].“Efforts will be made to reopen and activate our country’s diplomatic representations before the annual Hajj,” the spokesman added.

Notes:

[i] Within the United States, much of the ensuing coverage and commentary focuses on China’s role as diplomatic broker, but Iranian discussion largely focuses on the technicalities and timeframe for resuming its diplomatic missions in the Kingdom.

[ii] Saudi Arabia was among Iraq’s most generous financial backers during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. After clashes at the Hajj in 1987, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran, a freeze that lasted close to four years. During the 1990s, there was a brief rapprochement, but tensions renewed after the 2003 U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein as Iranian-backed militias grew more powerful in Iraq at the expense of the country’s Sunni Arabs. In 2012, protests that Saudi authorities accused Iran of instigating wracked Saudi Arabia’s Shiite-dominated Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia responded with brute force, killing dozens and arrested Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia’s top Shiite scholar, who Saudi Arabia later executed. For more on the dynamics at the time, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Demands Release of Nigerian Shi’ite Cleric” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195361/download

[iii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Prosecution of Arab Separatist Highlights Supposed Saudi Ties” OE Watch, 3-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/407738/download

Image Information:

Image: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani speaks to the Islamic Republic News Agency in a November 2022 file photo.
Source: https://media.hamshahrionline.ir/d/2022/11/08/4/4752193.jpg?ts=1667935844000
Attribution: Islamic Republic News Agency

Iran Installs New Precision Missiles on Army Helicopters

Posted on May 1, 2023 by Michael Rubin

A Shafagh missile mounted on an Iranian Bell-114 helicopter.

“The missile… is capable of destroying multiple ground targets in all weather conditions.”

Almost five years to the day after the Iranian Army unveiled a prototype short-ranged, “Shafagh” air-to-ground missile, Iranian Army Ground Force Commander Brig Gen. Kioumars Heydari announced that the Army has now equipped its aviation wing with a new generation Shafagh. In the accompanying article from Mashregh News,a source close to Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus, Heydari described the short-range missile as utilitarian, capable of mounting on manned and unmanned fixed-wing aircraft as well as helicopters, and able to find targets in all weather and times of day. The description of the Shafagh offered in the Iranian press suggests the missile is the Iranian equivalent of an AGM-114 Hellfire, though Iranian officials claim a slightly larger warhead and greater range. Even if Iranian figures exaggerate their claims regarding the Shafagh’s capabilities, an increased precision to drone-launched missiles could complicate regional operations for the United States, its Arab allies, and Israel.[i]

While Iran has recently modernized its helicopter fleet, Heydari’s emphasis on helicopter operations is curious, given both the vulnerability of helicopters to longer-range missiles and the lack of obvious use in the regional environment.[ii] If the Iranian military wanted to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf, for example, utilizing anti-ship missiles or drones would prove far less risky. Iran’s preference for proxy warfare to maintain plausible deniability and to avoid direct confrontation with superior military powers makes the use of helicopters to support operations unlikely. Heydari’s unveiling of the Shafagh, therefore, may have more to do with Iran’s ambitions to be a military export power. Iranian commanders say that Iran’s indigenous military industry “stands among the world’s top states” regarding both drones and high-precision missiles. While Iran now reportedly exports drones to Russia among other states, a proliferation of Hellfire-like missiles to regional proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen—all of which already utilize Iranian drones—might augment the lethality of these groups. So too would the export of helicopters to Iran’s regional allies like Syria or Yemen’s Houthi-led government. Given the frequency of drone and missile strikes across the region, any increase in precision will reduce the diplomatic space to refrain from military retaliation in response to attacks perpetrated by proxies or militias. After all, it is more politically feasible to wave off retaliation for a strike that misses rather than one that strikes key infrastructure or kills multiple soldiers or officials.

Source:

“Nasib-e Nasal-e Jadid Mushakha-ye ‘Shafagh’ Ruye Balgaradaha-ye Havaniruz- Artesh (Installation of a New Generation of Shafagh Missiles on Army Helicopters),” Mashregh News (news source close to Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus), 9 April 2023. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1360280

The new generation of “Shafagh” [Twilight] missiles that have special operational capabilities, compared to previous models were installed on Army Aviation’s Cobra and [Bell-] 214 helicopters. The missile, which is 1.9 meters long and weighs about 50 kilograms, is capable of destroying multiple ground targets in all weather conditions, and is also useful for night operations. The new model also has a range of 20 kilometers, a significant increase compared to previous generations. The new Shafagh missiles can be installed on all types of helicopters, drones, and fighters. They have laser guidance, travel at a speed of 750 meters per second [1678 mph] and can destroy both moving and stationary targets within a radius of 15-20 kilometers. They are precise to a margin of 0.20 meters.

The two-stage missile, using a 13-kilogram warhead, has significant penetration power and can destroy all types of armored systems. It can destroy, for example, tanks, personnel carriers, concrete trenches, floats, and other defense infrastructure.

The prototype Shafaghs are actually based upon the Shahab-e Saqeb defense missile that uses an infrared imaging seeker. This technology has the ability to track armored and floating targets from all angles, has a relatively high resistance to jamming and deception, and has much better sensitivity in detecting targets.One of the advantages of this missile, which is similar to a Hellfire missile, is the ease of deployment and the need not to have to stabilize the helicopter in front of a target. Rather, the Shafagh is in the category of ‘shoot-and-forget’ missiles.

Notes:

[i] This is not the first time Iran has claimed enhanced missile precision. See: Michael Rubin, “Iran Claims Enhanced Missile Precision” OE Watch, May 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195361/download

[ii] Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

Image Information:

Image: A Shafagh missile mounted on an Iranian Bell-114 helicopter.
Source: https://cdn.mashreghnews.ir/d/2022/04/09/4/3446518.jpg
Attribution: Mashregh News

Iran’s Flawed Statistics and Growing Drug Addiction

Posted on September 1, 2022 by Michael Rubin

Iranian police display Afghan opium seized inside Iran.

“This means a human capital disaster in the country.”

Iran has dealt with a long history of drug addiction. For centuries, Iranians openly cultivated opium and used it both medicinally and recreationally. In the first decade of the 20^th century, Iran participated in a number of international opium conferences to try to reduce and regulate the opium trade. Because addiction was so great, however, it sought to slowly devolve access rather than end it precipitously. In the years immediately prior to the revolution, clerics pointed to the prevalence of opium addiction to societal corruption under the shah and promised a new, cleaner order.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the clerical leadership took Draconian measures to end drug addiction. Imprisonment and public execution of addicts and traffickers became commonplace. It did not work. Opium cultivation exploded in Afghanistan against the backdrop of the Soviet invasion, civil war, and state failure. Iran became both a transit and consumer country as Afghan drug smugglers struck deals with corrupt Iranian clerics and security officials. Ultimately, the Ministry of Health formed a counternarcotics headquarters and the high-level Expediency Council established the Independent Committee against Drugs and Narcotics to combat addiction.

In the excerpted interview from prominent reformist newspaper Aftab-e Yazd, Ali Hashemi, the former chairman of the Independent Committee, discusses the latest statistics on addiction and abuse. His assessment is that the Islamic Republic’s ninth government, which correlates to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term, corrupted statistics. In the article, Hashemi shows that, contrary to the Ahmadinejad-era claims, the rate of addiction has increased steadily. Unstated but underlying his interview is technocratic disdain for the denial of reality inside the Islamic Republic under hardline administrations. While he references the lack of current statistics, he omits mention that the current Iranian administration of Ebrahim Raisi is rooted, like Ahmadinejad’s, more in the camp of hardliners. Regardless, Iranian government efforts to stamp out addiction have clearly failed. Hashemi expresses special concern that the recent increase in drug addiction is among the young. This has profound implications both for society and the military. It both suggests that many young Iranians have given up hope for their future, suggests problems with both crime and health loom, and can affect military readiness (see “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards To Expand Drug Treatment Center,” OE Watch, Issue 8, 2022).

Sources:

“Faz-e Jadid Markaz-e Daman-e Shahid Ziadian bezudi Ahdas Mishavad (The Old Wound of Addiction in Iran and the 800 Million Rial Cost Per Addict Each Year),” Aftab-e Yazd (prominent reformist newspaper published in Yasd), 31 July 2022. https://aftabyazdonline.ir/4913-زخم-کهنه-اعتیاد-در-ایران-و-خسارت–۸۰۰-میلیونی-هر-معتاد-به-کشور-در-سال.html

[Former chairman of the Expediency Council’s Independent Committee against Drugs and Narcotics] Ali Hashemi, while examining the status of addiction in the country and Iran’s performance in the field of countering narcotics and reducing the rate of addiction, says, “In the strategic study of addiction status in the country… there are two basic indicators based on the prevalence rate of addiction and the incidence rate of addiction, according to which we can comment on the performance of the country, the current situation and future approaches in the field of addiction.”

In this regard, he provides statistical indicators of the state of addiction in the country and adds, “In the year 1987-88, there were two million drug users in the country. In 2004-2005, an addiction study was carried out in coordination with the cooperation of the Headquarters of the Fight against Narcotics and the Ministry of Health. This study placed the number of users at 3.76 million.

The Drug Control Headquarters of the ninth government [2012-2016] placed the prevalence of addiction in the country at 800,000 drug users, but because the statistics were not correct, they had to correct these statistics and, two years later, the Drug Control Headquarters announced there were 1.2 million consumers in the country. This too was wrong and based on manipulated statistics but, in 2015, the then-Secretary General of the Headquarters was forced to announce the statistics so that the total number of consumers was 4.4 million.

The former secretary general of the country’s drug control headquarters, citing the existing statistics on the incidence of addiction, continues, “Currently, the official statistics are that 4.4 million Iranians use drugs, among whom 2.8 million are addicts and the others occasional recreational users. Of course, we don’t have the statistics from 2015 to the present, however. Still, the statistics show that in just one decade, from 2005 to 2015, the number of drug used increased by 630,000 people.

Hashemi notes, “Unfortunately, so far, scientific research has not been conducted in a comprehensive way at the national level but, what is known, is that according to official statistics, from 2005 to 2015, the number of consumers has increased from 3.76 million to 4.40 million people, which means that the number of new people came from the “young” stratum. This means a human capital disaster in the country….

Hashemi continues, “If we want to consider only this one indicator [arrests], it shows the depth of its tragedy, i.e. in the last 43 years, of the approximately 19 million people arrested, 65 percent of them were directly and indirectly (including repeat offenders) related to drug offenses.”

Image Information:

Image: Iranian police display Afghan opium seized inside Iran
Source: Islamic Republic News Agency (Government)
https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2019/06/25/4/156425841.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran Unveils Stealth Speedboats

Posted on September 1, 2022 by Michael Rubin

The IRGC displays speedboats it alleges have stealth capability.

“Our Navy is a complete strategic force.”

The excerpted article from Serat News, an outlet associated with the state-run, hardline Kayhan newspaper, reports on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-N)’s unveiling of new, supposed stealth speedboats at the Malik Ashtar festival held just outside Iran’s main Persian Gulf port Bandar Abbas. The IRGC often names exhibitions, exercises, units, and festivals after either religious figures or religious artifacts as part of an effort to imbue the Guards with a religious patina.

That the IRGC-N would mass produce speedboats is consistent with long-held tactics and strategy. The chief lesson the IRGC learned in the wake of their clash with the U.S. Navy during Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 is that they could not confront the U.S. Navy directly given the superiority of American ships. They then turned to small speedboats to harass slower, larger shipping. Speedboats are cheaper and quicker to manufacture than large ships. Should the IRGC-N load these speedboats with explosives and conduct suicide strikes against larger ships, they hope they can do enough damage both to cripple a ship and to cause enough casualties to get the American domestic audience to question the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region. The drawback of the IRGC-N speedboats is their range. They might be able to operate throughout the relatively narrow and shallow Persian Gulf, but they are of little value in the northern Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea. This, alongside the IRGC’s financial interest in the security of Iran’s offshore gas and oil infrastructure, explains why the IRGC-N claims the entirety of the Persian Gulf as its area of operation while the regular Iranian Navy operates outside the Gulf. In practice, this makes the Persian Gulf more harrowing for international shipping. Commercial shipping, Arab militaries, and the U.S. Navy report more professional communications and de-confliction with the regular Iranian Navy than with the IRGC-N.

Source:

“Qayeqha-ye Tondaru Sepah Radar Gariz Shod (IRGC Stealth Speedboats Evaded Radar),” Serat News (media outlet associated with the state-run hardline Kayhan newspaper), 25 July 2022. https://www.seratnews.com/fa/news/593277

Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy [IRGC-N], said on the sidelines of the Malik Ashtar Festival that based on the orders of the Supreme Leader…we have been witnessing the festival for 12 years. He stated that additions have been made to this [IRGC-N] force: Over the past three years, we have had eight additions. Generally, these were of domestic equipment provided to our warriors and by God’s grace, we will witness such happy events again in the future.

Tangsiri remarked that it was one of the honors of the Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be able to use domestic knowledge and products developed by Iranian scientists. He continued: “We have everything from tanks to amphibious tanks to fixed-wing aircraft and drones….” Tangsiri stated, “We in the Navy are proud that our equipment is made by knowledge-based companies. Some of the drones and quadcoptors that we use are actually from our knowledge-based companies, and we have put the order of the Supreme Leader, who said to use our knowledge-based companies, intro practice. And we are proud that the Navy has done this for years.

The commander of the IRGC-N also spoke about the new radar-evading speedboats: We have made the hulls of our boats radar evasive and we are trying to use domestically made hulls. Emphasizing that the extent and quality of our presence in the region has caused the enemy to flee from the Persian Gulf, he said, “We have always told the countries of the region that we can establish security ourselves and, by the grace of God, with the departure of the Americans, more security has been established in this sensitive and strategic region.”

Image Information:

Image: The IRGC displays speedboats it alleges have stealth capability
Source: Tasnim News https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1400/09/20/14000920165842669242530410.jpeg
Attribution: CC SA 4.0

Iran Reportedly Using New Carrier, Submarines To Expand Reach of Drones

Posted on September 1, 2022 by Michael Rubin

Drones onboard Iran’s first “drone carrier” assigned to Iran’s southern fleet, July 2022.

“Combat UAVs were flown from the Iran-made Fateh submarine[RG1] .”

Iran was among the first countries in the Middle East to recognize the military utility of drones. Whereas Turkey developed its indigenous drones only a decade ago, Iran began building drones in 1985 to fly over and surveil Iraqi trenches during the Iran-Iraq War. Over subsequent decades, the stable of Iranian drones proliferated with different models available to the regular Iranian military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and domestic law enforcement agencies. While drones allowed Iran to project force within range of its land borders, unless the Iranian military was to outsource drone operation to its proxies—as it has in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—it was unable to utilize them farther afield. The problem with outsourcing drone operations, however, is that it gives control to militias that are not always in sync with Iranian aims and objectives.

The excerpted article from the Iranian Students News Agency, a semi-official agency supposedly run by students, but which projects the government’s official line, discusses July exercises in the northern Indian Ocean in which the Iranian Navy unveiled a “drone carrier” capable of launching numerous drones with surveillance, general attack, and kamikaze capabilities. It is unclear from the reporting if the drone carrier will be able to recover the drones it launches. Such a capability enables the Iranian military to strike with drones over the open ocean where, previously, Iran’s capabilities were limited. A greater concern for those seeking to counter Iranian aggression would be the article’s claim that Iran also launched drones from both its domestic-made submarine and its Russian-built Kilo-class import. While the range and underwater endurance of Iranian submarines are limited compared to U.S. nuclear submarines or the German-built diesel submarines, which Israel uses, submarine-launched Iranian drones would enhance Iran’s special operations by enabling the Iranian military to evade radar when conducting offensive drone operations throughout the region.

Source:

“Ravanmaye az Avalin Navdasteh Pehpadbar Niruye Daryayi (Unveiling of the Navy’s First Drone Carrier),” Iranian Student News Agency (semi-official student led news agency projecting the government line), 15 July 2022. https://www.isna.ir/news/1401042416384

The army’s first strategic navy drone fleet was unveiled with the presence of Army Commander-in-Chief Amir Maj. Gen. Mousavi in the Navy’s Southern Fleet. According to the Iranian Student News Agency quoting the public affairs department of the Army, the regular Navy unveiled its first drone carrier fleet in the presence of both the commander-in-chief of the Army and the Navy. It consisted both of surface and sub-surface units carrying all types of combat, surveillance, and suicide drones in the southern fleet of the regular Iranian Navy.

In the unveiling ceremony for this flotilla, a variety of advanced and cutting-edge drones produced by the Army and the Ministry of Defense including the Pelican, Homa[RG1] , Arash, Chamrosh, Zhubin, Ababil-4, and Bavar-5 drones flew over the waters of the Indian Ocean.

According to this report, in addition to the flight of vertical and sea-based UAVs from the deck of surface units, for the first time, combat UAVs were flown from the Iran-made Fateh submarine and Kilo-class Tareq[RG2] submarine….

Major General Seyyed Abdul Rahim Mousavi, commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, expressed his satisfaction with the successful deployment of combat drones… He added, “As seen, surveillance drones have actually increased the intelligence capability of our vessels by hundreds of kilometers beyond the country’s borders, and combat and kamikaze drones are considered the Islamic Republic of Iran’s long hand in international waters and the open sea. Both deter threats and, if necessary and the enemy makes a mistake, they will ensure the enemy will face a regrettable response.

Image Information:

Image: Drones onboard Iran’s first “drone carrier” assigned to Iran’s southern fleet, July 2022
Source: Iranian Students News Agency (Government)
https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2022/07/15/3/62319318.jpg?ts=1657874350773
Attribution: Public Domain