Iran Considers Rapprochement With Pakistan

 Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi meets with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, 20 September 2022.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi meets with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, 20 September 2022.


“He expressed hope that Islamic countries will…form a united and coherent front.”


While certain pillars of Iranian foreign policy, such as rejection of Israel’s right to exist and opposition to the United States remain immutable, over the past two decades, Iran has undertaken diplomatic rapprochement on several fronts. Relations between Iran and Russia, for example, are at their closest in 50 years.[i] The March 2023 announcement that Iran and Saudi Arabia would resume diplomatic ties breaks down an important barrier between Iran and the Arab world. As the accompanying article from the Iranian Fars News Agency relays, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s call for greater strategic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan reflects Iran’s continued efforts for rapprochement with traditional rivals.

Raisi’s outreach to Pakistan comes on the heels of exacerbated tensions between Iran and Pakistan over Afghanistan: Iran backed many Shiite Hazara groups and western Afghanistan’s ethnic Persians, while Pakistan supported Sunni and Pashtun warlords culminating in its embrace of the Taliban. In the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, however, Iran sought a new approach. It cooperated with Pakistan to operate border markets on both sides of the Iran-Afghanistan and Iran-Pakistan frontiers. Iran also decided to engage the Taliban diplomatically rather than stonewall them or fight them by proxy.[ii]

Iran’s effort to build better relations with Pakistan also takes place amidst rumors of U.S. efforts to broker a rapprochement between Israel and Pakistan. The Iranian government would look at any such development as a security threat, much as it considers Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel a threat to its security. Any Iran-Pakistan rapprochement would also directly augment China’s position. Pakistan’s indebtedness to China as a result of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has increased Beijing’s influence in Islamabad. China’s efforts to broker Iran-Saudi rapprochement demonstrate Tehran’s growing openness to China as well. While Raisi might pitch animosity toward Israel as the basis for growing ties, a position that would have populist appeal among Pakistanis, commonalities regarding China may be as important.


Source:

“Raisi dar Goftegu ba Nakohost Vazir-e Pakistan: Keshavarha-ye Islami ba Tashkil Junbeh-e Vahid Mana’ Tadavem Aghdamat-e Dadamenshaneh Siyonistha Shavand  (Raisi, in a Conversation with the Prime Minister of Pakistan: Islamic Countries Should Form a United Front to Prevent the Continuation of the Abusive Actions of the Zionists),” Fars News Agency (news agency closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 13 April 2023. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14020124000742

In a telephone call with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Ayatollah Sayyid Ibrahim Raisi expressed deep concern over recent developments in Palestine. He condemned the Zionist regime’s crimes, especially the indignity that the Al-Aqsa Mosque suffered, and expressed hope that Islamic countries will prevent the continuation of the Zionists’ brutal actions by forming a united and coherent front.

Later in the telephone conversation, the president pointed to the longstanding and friendly relations between the two countries, and expressed hope that these relations, especially in the field of economic and energy, will expand even further. He said that the policy of strengthening relations with neighbors and developing relations with Islamic countries is one of the priorities of the 13th [Raisi] government….… Shehbaz Sharif also emphasized his country’s interest in strengthening Tehran-Islamabad relations, pointing to Iran’s privileged position in the region and the importance of expanding Islamabad’s relations with Tehran. He stressed his government’s readiness not only to review economic cooperation projects, but also Pakistan’s willingness to implement them.


Notes:

[i] Michael Rubin, “Iran-Russia Relations” OE Watch, July 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[ii] Michael Rubin, “An Afghan Perspective: New Phase in Afghanistan-Iran Relations” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/340009 and Michael Rubin, “Iran Talking to the Taliban,” OE Watch, June 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/336632


Image Information:

Image: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi meets with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, 20 September 2022.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1401/06/29/14010629000909_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Fars News Agency

Iran Seeks To Reestablish Embassy and Consulate in Saudi Arabia Before Hajj

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana'ani speaks to the Islamic Republic News Agency in a November 2022 file photo.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani speaks to the Islamic Republic News Agency in a November 2022 file photo.


“Efforts will be made to reopen and activate our country’s diplomatic representations before the annual Hajj.”


On 10 March 2023, regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia announced a deal to restore diplomatic relations for the first time in more than seven years. On 6 April 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, met in Beijing to discuss the technicalities of resuming ties. According to the excerpted article from the Iran-based Hamshahri newspaper, these diplomatic efforts are taking place in earnest to normalize relations before the Hajj, which begins 26 June 2023.[i] Iran-Saudi ties have long been fraught. While ethnic tension between the two Middle East regional powers predates Iran’s Islamic Revolution, sectarian and ideological differences in the post-1979 period created significantly more hostility.[ii] Both countries accuse the other of supporting terrorist groups targeting the other.[iii] So, while the restoration of diplomatic relations may appear straightforward, Iran’s track record breeds suspicion, especially regarding the Hajj. In 1986, the head of the predecessor to the Quds Force, sought to infiltrate saboteurs into Mecca under cover of the Hajj to unleash a bombing campaign. The following year, clashes erupted between Iranian demonstrators and Saudi security forces, leading to the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims. Despite Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s willingness to reconcile with Iran, Saudi security forces and intelligence will tread carefully, especially regarding the size of the mission and the freedoms Iranian diplomats might enjoy inside the Kingdom. During the 1986 incident, hardline ideologues within Iran’s security services ignored the Iranian government’s desire to break out of its isolation. Almost four decades later, it remains to be seen if the same dynamics are at play, especially as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps do not fall under the authority of either President Ebrahim Raisi or Foreign Minister Abdollahian.


Source:

“Talash baraye Rahandazi Saferat-e Iran dar Arabistan qabl az Ayam-e Hajj (The Struggle to Set Up an Iranian Embassy in Saudi Arabia before the Hajj),” Hamshahri (mass circulation general newspaper), 12 April 2023. https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/753453

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani said that an Iranian technical delegation arrived in Riyadh on Wednesday [April 12] at noon in a new step toward the implementation of the agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume formal relations and diplomatic activities of political and consular representations of the two countries. Saudi officials welcomed the delegation.

The spokesman added that the Iranian delegation divided into two working groups to take the necessary measures to set up the embassy and consulate general in Riyadh and Jeddah respectively and also to discuss reestablishment of a permanent representation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the [Jeddah-based] Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also added that the Saudi technical delegation, which arrived in Iran on Saturday [April 8, 2022], will leave for Mashhad tomorrow [April 13, 2022].“Efforts will be made to reopen and activate our country’s diplomatic representations before the annual Hajj,” the spokesman added.


Notes:

[i] Within the United States, much of the ensuing coverage and commentary focuses on China’s role as diplomatic broker, but Iranian discussion largely focuses on the technicalities and timeframe for resuming its diplomatic missions in the Kingdom.

[ii] Saudi Arabia was among Iraq’s most generous financial backers during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. After clashes at the Hajj in 1987, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran, a freeze that lasted close to four years. During the 1990s, there was a brief rapprochement, but tensions renewed after the 2003 U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein as Iranian-backed militias grew more powerful in Iraq at the expense of the country’s Sunni Arabs. In 2012, protests that Saudi authorities accused Iran of instigating wracked Saudi Arabia’s Shiite-dominated Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia responded with brute force, killing dozens and arrested Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia’s top Shiite scholar, who Saudi Arabia later executed. For more on the dynamics at the time, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Demands Release of Nigerian Shi’ite Cleric” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195361/download

[iii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Prosecution of Arab Separatist Highlights Supposed Saudi Ties” OE Watch, 3-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/407738/download


Image Information:

Image: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani speaks to the Islamic Republic News Agency in a November 2022 file photo.
Source: https://media.hamshahrionline.ir/d/2022/11/08/4/4752193.jpg?ts=1667935844000
Attribution: Islamic Republic News Agency

Iran Installs New Precision Missiles on Army Helicopters

A Shafagh missile mounted on an Iranian Bell-114 helicopter.

A Shafagh missile mounted on an Iranian Bell-114 helicopter.


“The missile… is capable of destroying multiple ground targets in all weather conditions.”


Almost five years to the day after the Iranian Army unveiled a prototype short-ranged, “Shafagh” air-to-ground missile, Iranian Army Ground Force Commander Brig Gen. Kioumars Heydari announced that the Army has now equipped its aviation wing with a new generation Shafagh. In the accompanying article from Mashregh News,a source close to Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus, Heydari described the short-range missile as utilitarian, capable of mounting on manned and unmanned fixed-wing aircraft as well as helicopters, and able to find targets in all weather and times of day. The description of the Shafagh offered in the Iranian press suggests the missile is the Iranian equivalent of an AGM-114 Hellfire, though Iranian officials claim a slightly larger warhead and greater range. Even if Iranian figures exaggerate their claims regarding the Shafagh’s capabilities, an increased precision to drone-launched missiles could complicate regional operations for the United States, its Arab allies, and Israel.[i]

While Iran has recently modernized its helicopter fleet, Heydari’s emphasis on helicopter operations is curious, given both the vulnerability of helicopters to longer-range missiles and the lack of obvious use in the regional environment.[ii] If the Iranian military wanted to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf, for example, utilizing anti-ship missiles or drones would prove far less risky. Iran’s preference for proxy warfare to maintain plausible deniability and to avoid direct confrontation with superior military powers makes the use of helicopters to support operations unlikely. Heydari’s unveiling of the Shafagh, therefore, may have more to do with Iran’s ambitions to be a military export power. Iranian commanders say that Iran’s indigenous military industry “stands among the world’s top states” regarding both drones and high-precision missiles. While Iran now reportedly exports drones to Russia among other states, a proliferation of Hellfire-like missiles to regional proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen—all of which already utilize Iranian drones—might augment the lethality of these groups. So too would the export of helicopters to Iran’s regional allies like Syria or Yemen’s Houthi-led government. Given the frequency of drone and missile strikes across the region, any increase in precision will reduce the diplomatic space to refrain from military retaliation in response to attacks perpetrated by proxies or militias. After all, it is more politically feasible to wave off retaliation for a strike that misses rather than one that strikes key infrastructure or kills multiple soldiers or officials.


Source:

“Nasib-e Nasal-e Jadid Mushakha-ye ‘Shafagh’ Ruye Balgaradaha-ye Havaniruz- Artesh (Installation of a New Generation of Shafagh Missiles on Army Helicopters),” Mashregh News (news source close to Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus), 9 April 2023. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1360280

The new generation of “Shafagh” [Twilight] missiles that have special operational capabilities, compared to previous models were installed on Army Aviation’s Cobra and [Bell-] 214 helicopters. The missile, which is 1.9 meters long and weighs about 50 kilograms, is capable of destroying multiple ground targets in all weather conditions, and is also useful for night operations. The new model also has a range of 20 kilometers, a significant increase compared to previous generations. The new Shafagh missiles can be installed on all types of helicopters, drones, and fighters. They have laser guidance, travel at a speed of 750 meters per second [1678 mph] and can destroy both moving and stationary targets within a radius of 15-20 kilometers. They are precise to a margin of 0.20 meters.

The two-stage missile, using a 13-kilogram warhead, has significant penetration power and can destroy all types of armored systems. It can destroy, for example, tanks, personnel carriers, concrete trenches, floats, and other defense infrastructure.

The prototype Shafaghs are actually based upon the Shahab-e Saqeb defense missile that uses an infrared imaging seeker. This technology has the ability to track armored and floating targets from all angles, has a relatively high resistance to jamming and deception, and has much better sensitivity in detecting targets.One of the advantages of this missile, which is similar to a Hellfire missile, is the ease of deployment and the need not to have to stabilize the helicopter in front of a target. Rather, the Shafagh is in the category of ‘shoot-and-forget’ missiles.


Notes:

[i] This is not the first time Iran has claimed enhanced missile precision. See: Michael Rubin, “Iran Claims Enhanced Missile Precision” OE Watch, May 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195361/download

[ii] Michael Rubin, “Iran: Reconstruction and Overhaul of Helicopters” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download


Image Information:

Image: A Shafagh missile mounted on an Iranian Bell-114 helicopter.
Source: https://cdn.mashreghnews.ir/d/2022/04/09/4/3446518.jpg
Attribution: Mashregh News

Iran’s Increased Defense Budget Leading to More Arms Exports

Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi.

Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi.


“This year, the [Defense Industries] Organization has grown by 200 percent.”


Iran has steadily increased its defense budget following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the lifting of many United Nations sanctions.[i] According to the excerpted article from the Ministry of Defense’s Holy Defense News Agency, that windfall has now come to Iran’s Defense Industry Organization (DIO), the state-owned conglomerate meant to bolster the Iran’s indigenous military technology development and manufacturing base. In the excerpted article, Deputy Defense Minister Seyyed Mahdi Farahi, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general who previously headed Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and served as DIO managing director, reported that the DIO budget tripled from the previous year. DIO exports have reportedly more than doubled, suggesting that Iran has recouped some of the investment it made to develop the same weapons it deploys itself. Iran’s exports of drones to Russia likely comprises a large portion of these export revenues.[ii]

Iranian arms exports might also be bolstering IRGC coffers given that Farahi may funnel the proceeds of Iranian weapon sales to the IRGC. IRGC-run businesses seldom if ever return their profits to the central treasury, and the IRGC’s official budget allocation accounts for perhaps only a quarter of its actual funding. Farahi’s celebration of DIO may also reflect renewed investment in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs given that such public spotlight often coincides with an organization’s growing centrality to Iranian strategy. The DIO would be the paramount organization coordinating domestic manufacture of military hardware for these programs as Iran is loath to rely on external manufacturing for such high-profile hardware because of Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions. Both the European Union and the U.S. Treasury Department have sanctioned Farahi for his role in proliferating weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, work which often saw Farahi travel to and negotiate with North Korea.[iii]


Source:

“Rashad 200 dar sadi sazman-e sanaya’-e defah nesbat beh sal gerefteh (Two Hundred Percent Growth in Defense Industry Organizations Over Past Year),” Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s Defense Ministry), 13 March 2023. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/578644

Explaining the favorable performance of the Defense Industries Organization in 2022-23, General Farahi said. “This year the Organization has grown by 200 percent over the previous year and has seen a 2.5 times growth in exports.”

The deputy minister of defense and support of the armed forces continued: “The organization also produced 57 new products from its research this year and after production, delivered these to the armed forces and even exported some of these products, which is very gratifying for the country’s defense industry….

Farahi said that behind these successes was the employment of some great intellects. “Maintaining and attracting efficient, committed and expert human resources is the beating heart of the organization and is one of the most important issues that should be considered by the managers of armed forces industries in order to advance the supreme goals of the organization.”


Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Iranian defense budget, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Budget Increases for Missiles, Qods Force,” OE Watch, 08-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/201732/download and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Military Budget Increased 145%,” OE Watch, 06-2017, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/197269/download

[ii] Iran-Russia conversations regarding drone exports predate the current Ukraine war. See: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Russia Desperate for our UAV Technology,” OE Watch, 11-2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195245/download

[iii] For discussion of U.S. sanctions against Farahi, see: “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran,” U.S. Department of Treasury, 17 January 2016. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0322


Image Information:

Image: Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi
Source: https://image.alkawthartv.ir/imagema//original/2021/12/31/637765384943630275.jpg
Attribution: Al-Kawthar Television

Iran Unveils Updated Yasin Training Jet With Possible Close Combat Applications

The Yasin training jet, 11 March 2023.

The Yasin training jet, 11 March 2023.


“The Yasin will be able to be used… for close air support.”


In 2019 the Iranian military unveiled its new Yasin Training Jet [GRLCUT(1] to great fanfare. In March 2023, Iran announced the final prototype and Yasin production line, according to the excerpted article from the semi-official, pro-government Iranian Students’ News Agency. The latest variation of the training aircraft is said to include many upgrades, including new ejection seats, avionics, engine, and landing gear. An Iran-produced airborne weather radar has also been fitted into the Yasin. According to the article, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, pilot training was put “on the agenda” of the Armed Forces, but Iran has continued to suffer from an aging fleet and untrained pilots.[i] The article suggests that pilot training is paramount in the development of the Yasin,[ii] but there is also speculation that Iran may fit the aircraft with weaponry, allowing it to become a low-cost, easy-to-operate, multi-role fighter with a focus on close air support. If Iran can produce the Yasin at scale, not only would it be a valuable training platform, but it could also be deployed to many of the conflict zones in which Iran has previously relied on drones for air support—namely Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The introduction of the Yasin, or any Iranian manned aircraft, into any of these conflicts would risk escalating these proxy wars further.


Source:

“Ravanma-ye az Namuneh Ma’yar Tawlid-e Jet-e Amuzesh-e ‘Yasin’ (Unveiling of the Training Jet Prototype ‘Yasin’),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (semi-official student-run news agency that promotes the Iranian government’s line), 11 March 2023. https://www.isna.ir/news/1401122013717

The Yasin’s training jet production prototype was unveiled in the presence of the Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, while the mass production line of this training jet was also inaugurated…. Pilot training is one of the most advanced and complex training regimens that any country can do. The Islamic Republic of Iran has succeeded in applying world-class education in the fields of science and technology, and training pilots is no exception.

After the end of the [Iran-Iraq] war, the necessity for pilot training was put on the agenda of the Armed Forces. From that time, with the input of veterans and professors, faculties for training pilots were created….

So, how does the Islamic Republic of Iran train pilots and what is the role of Yassin training jet?

The training of the fighter aircraft pilot is fundamentally different from the civilian pilot. For military pilots, training is done in three stages: First, basic training for learning flight basics. Second, training for flight skills, regulations and maneuver. And, third, advanced training for tactical flight ability with advanced fighters. An important feature of advanced training jets is that pilots from operational bases continue to exploit them, and pilots become familiar with air combat and ground combat tactics and techniques, and learn the use of various weapons. All of these advantages and features have been the reason for…the Ministry of Defense to design and build this aircraft.

Does the aircraft also have combat capability?

Since combat training is in many cases carried out with real weapons and in simulated battle environments, it is natural that Yasin jet has the capability to conduct combat missions as well. In the development plan, it will be able to be used as a light combat aircraft and for close air support.


Notes:

[i] For background on efforts within Iran to re-equip its air force, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran-China Air Force Cooperation on Horizon?” OE Watch, December 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195975/download See also: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract,” OE Watch, August 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/421643/download

[ii] While a potentially positive step for the Iranian Air Force, the Yasin is not the bridge trainer required for Iran’s recent purchase of the Su-35 multi-role fighters from Russia. The Su-35 is far too complex and would necessitate a more advanced trainer. It is more likely that Russian pilots will train Iranian pilots to fly the Su-35.


Image Information:

Image: The Yasin training jet, 11 March 2023.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/03/11/3/62547091.jpg?ts=1678512083735
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade

Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017.

Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017.


“If it were not for their sacrifices, today the Islamic State would have advanced to Bangladesh.”


Against the backdrop of the fight against the Islamic State that erupted in 2014, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force established a number of ethnic-based movements to fight in Syria.[i] The Quds Force deployed the Afghan Shia militia Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatimid Banner) to Syria primarily to defend the Damascus shrine of Zaynab, the daughter of Imam Ali and the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad.[ii] In the excerpted article from IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency, General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, Deputy Commander of the Quds Force, speaks about the legacy of the Liwa Fatemiyoun upon the death of one of its commanders. He describes the Fatemiyoun, an Afghan proxy of the IRGC, as a core component of the Iranian strategy to foil the Islamic State. While this may be an exaggeration in terms of actual fighting, the IRGC used the crisis to form the Fatemiyoun and other ethnic militias to further the IRGC’s aim to export revolution.  That the Quds Force did not disband the Liwa Fatemiyoun after the defeat of the Islamic State inside Syria suggests that the IRGC seeks to preserve the group to utilize beyond its initial purpose. Fallahzadeh’s discussion that absent the Afghan brigade, the Islamic State might have reached Bangladesh, suggests that Iran might be ready for a renewed push into South Asia. Shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the IRGC sponsored not only Lebanese Hezbollah but sought to create a corollary movement among Pakistani Shia. While infiltration of the Lebanese diaspora helped the Quds Force project power not only in the Middle East, but also Africa and Latin America, it traditionally fell short in South Asia. Forty years later, the Quds Force might see the Liwa Fatemiyoun as a viable substitute for its failed Pakistan efforts to extend its influence as far to the east as it does to the west.[iii]


Source:

“Sardar Falahzadeh: Agar Aysargariha-ye Fatamayun Nabud, Emruz Da’esh ta Bangladesh Pishruye Kardeh Bud (General Falahzadeh: If It Were Not for the Sacrifices of the Fatamayun, the Islamic State Would Have Advanced to Bangladesh),” Fars News Agency (a news agency closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 13 February 2023. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14011124000424

General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, met in Yazd with the family of the late Sayyid Qasem Hosseini, a warrior defending the shrine from the [Liwa] Fatemiyoun Division. In this meeting, General Fallahzadeh commemorated upon the memory of the martyrs defending the shrine and said, “the Islamic State was not a normal organization, but a vicious pedigree that was both determined and motivated by its false belief, and, in a single sentence, it can be said that the Islamic State was the army of false belief.

The deputy commander of the Quds Force added, “Usually mercenary armies try to avoid suffering casualties, but the Islamic State, with their firm but vicious conviction, martyred our warriors with suicide operations and perished in the process. In Syria, all blasphemy was against all Islam, and it was the alliance between Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iran that stopped the Islamic State because [our] correct belief was greater and stronger.”

… He described the Islamic State as a product of the American Zionist plan and continued, “The defenders of the shrine and Fatemiyoun warriors, led by the Supreme Leader and the commander of the hearts of Haj Qassem Aziz [Qassem Soleimani], defeated this plan and secured a victory for the Islamic Front.”Referring to Fatemiyoun’s role in defending the Shrine of [Al-Sayyida] Zaynab [in Damascus], the deputy commander of the Quds Force said, “These beloved ones played an essential role in defending Islam, Shi’ism and humanity and, if it were not for their sacrifices, today the Islamic State would have advanced to Bangladesh.”


Notes:

[i] For more background on Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

[ii] Liwa Fatemiyoun was formed in 2014, although it is possible that former Afghan National Army soldiers are now serving in the ranks of Liwa Fatemiyoun, as thousands have fled Afghanistan and now reside in Iran.

[iii] For an earlier discussion of Iran’s concept of strategic boundaries extending to its west, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Influence Extends to the Mediterranean,” OE Watch, September 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/242569/download


Image Information:

Image: Mothers of Fatamayoun Militiamen Hold Photos of Sons Killed in Action, 2017
Source: https://images.khabaronline.ir//images/2016/5/16-5-14-135413950108_0633065.jpg
Attribution: Khabar Online

Iran Profiles the Female Police Seeking To Quell the Women’s Protests

Members of the Women’s Police Special Unit pose in front of their motorcycles, February 2023.

Members of the Women’s Police Special Unit pose in front of their motorcycles, February 2023.


“Some people were paid to attack.”


In September 2022, the death while in police custody of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested for alleged improper dress, sparked an unprecedented wave of protests and unrest across Iran, as Iranians rallied under the slogan “Women, life, freedom.”[i] In addition to brutal crackdowns that have killed hundreds and landed tens of thousands in prison, the Iranian government has engaged its state-run media to present an alternative narrative to its populace to argue that women support the Islamic Republic. The excerpted feature by a correspondent from Fars News, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, profiles a female police officer, but its awkward praise for her intellectual and athletic excellence and her choice to become a police officer unintentionally highlights the regime’s condescension that chafes at Iranian women. The Iranian regime is aware that it has an ideological problem: many young Iranians are not committed to Revolutionary Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s Shi’ite revolutionary values.[ii]Fars News’ decision to spotlight the women’s elite police unit coincides with a broader effort to counter this ideological erosion and renew revolutionary values among Iran’s youth. It also seeks to amplify the idea that the police cracking down on the protestors are the true patriots by juxtaposing the anonymous subject with allegations that outside powers sponsored or manipulated those protesting on behalf of Amini and Iranian women. The emphasis in the Fars News profile on the special police unit members’ proficiency in both English and French is curious. It might seek to imply to the Iranian audience that the protests are not indigenous, but rather foreign agents spark and control the riots. At the same time, the mention of language proficiency may also reflect an understanding inside regime circles that they must engage foreign journalists and diplomats in their own languages. While women have long played a role in specialized units of the paramilitary Basij, their traditional focus on enforcing dress and sexual segregation in public spaces has rubbed many Iranians the wrong way. Notably the article acknowledges the popular anger directed to the security forces, but it is not clear if information operations like this or even a new squad will improve Iranian women’s perceptions of their government and its security forces.


Source:

Maryam Arab Ansari, “Ba Polis-e Zan-e Nukhbeh ‘Yagan Vizheh’: az Tobaher dar Rishteh-haye Razmi Taslet beh Inglis va Faransavi (With the Women’s Police Elite ‘Special Unit’: From Mastering Martial Arts to Speaking English and French),” Fars News Agency (news agency closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 12 February 2023. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14011122000164

She is a police officer, a woman, a member of the Special Operations Group, and has full proficiency in English and French. In 2021, she graduated with a straight A average, and ranked 300th in English [nationwide], entered the Amin Police University [in Tehran], where she had both general and specialized training. She also passed combat training including [basic] self-defense, judo, weapons training, rappelling, ninja crafts, shooting, arrest and detention. Every day, she periodically reviews her exercises, specialized and combat training because physical fitness is an integral part of sports and specialized training for special force officers, although her specialty is judo.

She is single. I ask during the riots and with your presence in the streets, didn’t your mother worry that God forbid something would happen to you?

With calmness, she says, “There were no troubling issues, and we have learned not to worry our families….I ask about the days of turmoil, the unrest and how some people were paid to attack people in the streets and squares of the city and…The only answer she gives use is that insults and slander have no effect on our resolve, and our sole purpose and focus is to ensure the order and security of the people, and we are not going to react whether we hear insults or disrespect.


Notes:

[i] For background on the death of Mahsa Amini and the ensuing protests, see: Maggie McGrath, “Mahsa Amini: The Spark That Ignited A Women-Led Revolution,” Forbes, 6 December 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2022/12/06/mahsa-amini-the-spark-that-ignited-a-women-led-revolution/?sh=6a9f7aeb5c3d

[ii] For a previous discussion on revolutionary fervor among a younger generation, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Speaks on Martyrdom,” OE Watch, December 2021, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/399678/download; Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor,” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/354648


Image Information:

Image: Members of the Women’s Police Special Unit pose in front of their motorcycles, February 2023
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1401/10/24/14011024000759_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Farsnews.ir

Iran Fires Indigenous Torpedoes From Submarines for First Time

An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.

An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.


“Torpedoes fired from Fateh and Ghadir-class submarines also destroyed their targets.”


Every year, the Iranian military hosts the Zulfiqar joint military exercises to demonstrate air, naval, and ground components from both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and regular army, often acting in concert.[i] As detailed in the accompanying article from the pro-regime Iranian Students’ New Agency, the most recent exercises occurred in late December 2022. They spanned the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and northern Indian Ocean, and featured demonstrations of Iran’s indigenous Mi’ad (vow) torpedoes launched from Kilo-class Tareq attack submarines against naval targets and Valfajr torpedoes launched from Qadir submarines.[ii] The exercises also included Iranian Army Sikorsky SH helicopters launching Mark-46 torpedoes. While it is not possible yet to assess whether the capabilities of Iran’s indigenous torpedoes match the promise of regime officials, the emphasis on torpedo development and multiple launch platforms underscores the danger that increased Iranian capabilities may pose to shipping in the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean. The Persian Gulf is both narrow and shallow. After the U.S. defeat of the Iranian navy and air force in 1988’s Operation Praying Mantis, IRGC tactics shifted.[iii] Rather than risk direct confrontation with large ships or jet fighters, the IRGC-Navy embraced small speed boats as a low-cost, low-risk way to harass warships and commercial traffic. The development of torpedoes may mark a further shift in strategy that could make IRGC speedboat operations obsolete.


Source:

“Shalik-e Azhdarha-ye Mi’ad va Valfajr az Zirdarya-yehaye Niru-ye Artesh (Firing of Iranian Mi’ad and Valfajr Torpedoes from Navy Submarines),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (a semi-official student-run news agency that promotes the Iranian government’s line). 1 January 2023, https://www.isna.ir/news/1401101106235

During the operational phase of the army’s Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercise, the Iranian torpedo Mi’ad fired from a Tareq [Attack] submarine for the first time and destroyed its target… Iranian Valfajr-2 torpedoes fired from Fateh and Ghadir-class submarines also destroyed their targets in the Oman Sea and northern Indian Ocean. A SH helicopter also hit its target at sea by launching the Mark-46 torpedo. These types of torpedoes are designed and manufactured by young navy specialists in collaboration with the country’s scientific centers and defense industries…. Valfajr intelligent torpedoes combine anti-deception capability, high speed and an explosive warhead with great destructive capacity, and are able to strike with surprise and completely destroy and sink large sea targets and vessels within seconds. They also boast short preparation time that increase tactical power, speed of action and rapid response compared to similar torpedoes.


Notes:

[i] Zulfiqar is a Persian rendition of the Arabic Du-l-Faqir, Imam Ali bin Abi Talib’s legendary split tip sword. Shi’ite Muslims consider the Imam Ali (600-661) to be the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad.

[ii] For more on the Valfajr torpedo, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Submarine-to-Surface Missile Launch System Entered Mass Production,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380351

[iii] Operation Praying Mantis was a 1988 operation by the U.S. military to retaliate against Iran’s mining of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. For greater background, see: Lee Allen Zatarain, America’s First Clash with Iran: The Tanker War, 1987–88. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2008.


Image Information:

Image: An Iranian Navy helicopter drops a Mark-46 torpedo on 31 December 2022 during Zulfiqar 1401 joint exercises.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/01/01/3/62473566.jpg?ts=1672563255357
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Iranian General Reiterates Goal To Expel United States From Region

Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020.

Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020.


“This goal [to expel American forces] will be pursued until the result is achieved.”


In the early morning hours of 3 January 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed both Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force chief Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy chief of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (al-hashd al-shaabi) on the outskirts of Baghdad International Airport.[i] Five days later, the IRGC retaliated with Operation Martyr Soleimani, consisting of about a dozen missiles fired at Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Iraq’s western al-Anbar Governorate and Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan.[ii] Both are Iraqi facilities where U.S. forces  are present. While no American personnel were killed, more than 100 U.S. military personnel were injured in the strike. As the accompanying article describes, over three years later, Soleimani’s death continues to resonate in Iran, with major Iranian military figures calling for the expulsion of the United States from the region.

The excerpted statement from Mohammad Bagheri, an IRGC general who has, since June 2016, served as Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, expresses outrage at the death of Soleimani. As he writes in the below, Operation Martyr Soleimani was “the beginning of the work…of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the axis of resistance to fulfill the efforts of Martyr Haj Qasem to expel American terrorist forces from the region.”Bagheri’s likening of the Iranian retaliation against supposed U.S. planners at Ayn al-Assad Air Base to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor suggests, at least in the IRGC’s mindset, that Iran is at war with the United States. Also notable is that the reformist news outlet Shargh Daily published this piece, as it underscores how, even across Iran’s divided political spectrum, Soleimani’s death remains resonant. 


Source:

“Payam Sarlashkar Bagheri beh Monasabat-e Shahid Soleimani ‘Amaliyat-e (General Bagheri’s Message on the Anniversary of the Martyr Soleimani Operation),” Shargh Daily (website of one of Iran’s more popular reformist newspapers), 7 January 2023. https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-سیاست-6/866489-پیام-سرلشکر-باقری-به-مناسبت-عملیات-شهید-سلیمانی

On the morning of 3 January 2020, the terrorist U.S. government killed Lt.-Gen. Haj Qasem Soleimani, the national hero and the Muslim world, and a group of commanders and comrades of the resistance front at Baghdad Airport with a drone strike. This act of terrorism left the Iranian nation, Islamic nations and other nations of the world perplexed as to how a government had been able to target with a drone strike an official guest of the Iraqi government contrary to all legal, political and international rules!

It was obvious that under such circumstances and the martyrdom of the master of the martyrs, the first demand not only of the Iranian people but also the rightful nations was to confront the U.S. terrorist act, but also the rightful nations. The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, realizing this demand prepared to bomb and destroy the U.S. base of ‘Ayn al-Assad on Iraqi soil, which was known as one of the bases where the United States plotting the assassination of General Soleimani. Therefore, on the morning of 8 January 2020, the IRGC’s aerospace force fired 13 ballistic missiles to inflict a hard slap against the terror planning and execution center in the first countermeasure and an action that was unprecedented in the past 70 years and it was able to destroy America’s hegemony in the region and the world. Of course, this operation was the beginning of the work and the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the axis of resistance to fulfill the efforts of Martyr Haj Qasem to expel American terrorist forces from the region. This goal will be pursued until the result is achieved.


Notes:

[i] For a brief overview of both Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, see: Nectar Gan, “Who was Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian commander killed by a US airstrike?” CNN.com, 3 July 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/03/asia/soleimani-profile-intl-hnk/index.html

[ii] For an American account of the Iranian attack on Ayn al-Assad Air Base, see: David Martin and Mary Walsh, “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, 8 August 2021. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iranian-attack-al-asad-air-base-60-minutes-2021-08-08/  


Image Information:

Image: Iran launch missiles targeting U.S. forces on Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, to avenge the death of General Qassem Soleimani, 8 January 2020
Source: https://nournews.ir/Media/photo/20/01/20011101000958_org.jpg
Attribution: NourNews.ir

Iran Moves Sea-Borne Drone Fleet Closer to Reality

Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.

Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.


“Today, the economic highway of the country in the Persian Gulf is safe.”


Iran increasingly uses its navy and its drone fleet to project power, and new reporting suggests that Iran has continued to make strides to integrate the two capabilities[i] In the excerpted article from the official outlet of the Iranian Ministry of Defense Holy Defense News Agency, Admiral Shahram Irani, who took command of the regular Iranian Navy in 2021, announced in November 2022 that the Iranian Navy would soon station drones and helicopters onboard its ships. This declaration, which partially repeats an announcement from July 2022 about launching drones from carriers, for the first time was accompanied by photographs of drone launches from both submarines and surface vessels, suggesting that the Iranian Navy has taken the capability to a new level.[ii] While Iranian officials often exaggerate Iran’s military capabilities, the Iranian Navy now appears to have attached a “drone section” to the Navy and made the skill set to launch, maintain, and operate drones more standard among naval personnel. Admiral Irani’s announcement that there would be a “massive” drone exercise in the Indian Ocean in coming months underscores that the ambition to activate a naval drone fleet is moving quickly from the realm of rhetoric to reality.

Such new investment in the Iranian navy continues an effort, now more than a decade old, to make the Navy the vanguard of Iran’s projection of power. Its operational range has expanded, with port calls in recent years ranging from Syria to South Africa, Sri Lanka, and as far as China.[iii] Yet, promises by Irani to expand the Iranian Navy’s operational range to the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca exaggerate both the navy’s capabilities and Iran’s diplomatic room to maneuver. While Iran’s mention of separate Indian Ocean, Atlantic, and Pacific commands within the Iranian Navy are likely theoretical, they reflect a growing Iranian ambition to become a blue water navy and operate beyond Iran’s traditional areas of operation.


Source:

“Alhaq Balgardha-ye Hajumi va Pehpadha-ye Jadid ba Navegan-e Niru-ye Daryaye Artesh dar Ayendeh Nazdik” [“Addition of New Attack Helicopters and Drones to the Navy Fleet in the Near Future”], Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s ministry of Defense), 22 November 2022, https://defapress.ir/fa/news/557328

Admiral Shahram Irani added, “Soon we will have naval attack helicopters that will help is to escort our ships and also a drone section, and soon we will be equipped with modern drones. The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s carrier will cover a radius of at least 2,000 kilometers [1,242 miles] and carry unmanned aerial vehicle systems.” The command of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army’s Navy continued, “The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s drone carrier also has the capability to fly hundreds of drones in its waters and manage various missions with them.” He added, “Today, the economic highway of the country in the Persian Gulf is safe, and our fleets have strong activity in this area.” The Iranian admiral continued, “All ships of the Islamic Republic of Iran are under the escort of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy’s combat carriers, and our combat carriers are conducting missions in three areas: The Indian Ocean command, Atlantic Command and Pacific Command.”


Notes:

[i] For background on Iranian drone developments and strategies, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, August 2020. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/A-short-history-of-the-Iranian-drone-program.pdf?x91208

[ii] For analysis of the July 2022 announcement, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Reportedly Using New Carrier, Submarines To Expand Reach of Drones,” OE Watch, Issue 9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425542. For Persian-language reporting on Iran’s quest to build an aircraft carrier, see: “Sakht-e Nav-e Havapaymabar dar Niru-ye Darya-ye Iran (Construction of an aircraft carrier in the Iranian Navy),” Asr-e Iran, 29 September 2011. https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/183171

[iii] For more on the expansion of the Iranian Navy, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Navy Expands Operational Range,” OE Watch, January 2013.


Image Information:

Images: Drone launches during surface and submarine naval exercises, August 2022.
Source: https://static2.borna.news/thumbnail/rLtkN0hf9M38/zKlnR2CgDMsLPypExSqkWVexFSgSRltNvp3exfX06vug6WJOtspsxLwVvO9faXc9wvplisndFdUHpxCkrVbVYdPDnYY4EW_0/IMG-20220825-WA0005.jpg
Attribution: Borna News