Author Archives: Michael Rubin

Iran Struggles to Supply Its Electric Grid

Posted on by

The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.

“There will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors.”

While Iran boasts the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia, it is increasingly difficult for it to provide enough supply to its electrical generating stations to power its electric grid. The problem is especially severe in the winter as consumption increases. Iran’s failure to provide electricity has ramifications for domestic stability and could affect the larger regional operational environment.[i]

The excerpted notice, first posted on the Iranian Ministry of Electricity’s website, noted that there will be forthcoming power disruptions, partially due to the decision not to use mazut. This heavy, low-quality fuel oil is a byproduct of refining but degrades electrical generating plants and causes heavy air pollution. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s decision to shutter mazut-burning plants suggests regime fear of popular backlash to air pollution trumps the discord of suffering power cuts.[ii] He is right to worry; Iran has experienced nationwide protests over poor stewardship of the environment.[iii]

While Iranian analysts place responsibility for the energy shortfall on growing consumption, especially during the cold winter months, such an explanation may be too straightforward and exculpatory toward the regime: Iran’s population growth rate is only 0.8 percent. More likely is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which dominates the power industry, is diverting resources for its own aims and agendas. It is unclear if the pending energy cuts will spare the IRGC’s manufacturing base, but, if so, it will likely spark popular antagonism against the elite military force and its domination of Iran’s industrial sector.

Because Iran’s refinery network is decrepit, Iran cannot adequately refine gasoline domestically. This forces the regime to export gas for refining and then reimport it for use in power generation and to inject into oil fields to enable further oil extraction. This creates a lose-lose situation for the Iranian leadership: either it reverts to burning highly polluting substances and risks public protest, or it suffers more frequent power shortfalls and risks public unrest and industrial shortfalls. The danger of either scenario for those outside Iran is similar: When Iran faces domestic unrest, it often lashes out militarily to distract its own public around the nationalist flag.

Sources:

 “اطلاعیه شماره ۱ شرکت توانیر درباره برنامه قطع برق”(Announcement No. 1 of Tavanir Company about the power cut program),” Donya-e-Eqtesad.com (nominally independent center-right financial newspaper), 9 November 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/4121436-فوری-اطلاعیه-شماره-شرکت-توانیر-درباره-برنامه-قطع-برق  

“We would like to inform our dear compatriots that due to the onset of the cold season and the increase in gas consumption in the domestic sector and the restriction of the supply of gas fuel to power plants, and in accordance with the decisions taken not to consume mazut in some power plants, there will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors. Respected subscribers can be informed about the time schedule for imposing electricity restrictions from the relevant electricity distribution companies on the My Electricity System website.”

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian blackouts, see: Michael Rubin, “Blackouts in Bushehr Province Risk Unrest,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/387127/download/

[ii] For previous discussion of Iranian air pollution, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Pollution Problems Peak,” OE Watch, September 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-39-51-99/2021_2D00_09_2D00_01-Iran_1920_s-Pollution-Problems-Peak-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=465e6ac6175646f29c3498916f3fcd2f

[iii] For discussion of Iran’s arrests of environmental activists, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Environmentalists Arrested as Spies,” OE Watch, April 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-28-50-74/2018_2D00_04_2D00_01-Iranian-Environmentalists-Arrested-as-Spies-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=401ef985fd9b4fb89199f41137332cb3

OE Insight Summary:

IRN’s main electricity company has warned the Iranian public to expect widespread blackouts and other power shortfalls through the winter, perhaps presaging some unrest and also industrial shortfalls.

Image Information:

Image: The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.
Source: https://static.neshanmap.ir/places/images/dca/1043877_3901745–شرکت-توانیر.jpeg
Attribution: Nashan.ir

Iran’s Supreme Leader Hints at His Own Succession

Posted on by

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.

“There will be no pause or interruption in the system….”

On 7 November 2024, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old,[i] appeared before the 88-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical body charged with selecting the new supreme leader, to discuss—obliquely but still more directly than ever before—his own succession. Published on his official website, Khamenei.ir,Khamenei’s speech discussed the possibility of his own “absence” and the need for a rapid transition. While his comments were oblique, they nevertheless represented the bluntest discussion of an increasingly sensitive subject. To hint at his own mortality and the looming succession risks not only transforming Khamenei himself into a lame duck but can also be destabilizing as regime officials begin to maneuver for the post-Khamenei scramble.

Whenever it occurs, the leadership transition in Iran will have an important impact on the operational environment, because, constitutionally, the supreme leader is also the commander-in-chief with authority to hire and fire military commanders in both the Revolutionary Guard and the regular Iranian Army. The speed of succession could also affect both domestic and regional stability. Quick acceptance of a new leader lessens the chance of domestic unrest. However, there is the risk a new leader may resort to military action, terrorism, or through proxies, to establish his revolutionary bona fides. One major question is whether Khamenei’s successor will launch a cultural revolution to try to tamp down dissent in a way that could lead to a public backlash and exacerbate unrest.

Beyond nods to his succession, Khamenei’s speech included other notable takeaways. While Khamenei has previously voiced concern about declining revolutionary fervor among Iranian youth, the speech was also the first time that Khamenei raised the possibility that the gains that resulted from the 1979 Islamic Revolution could be reversible.[ii] Khamenei also criticized former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin for allowing the Soviet experiment to descend into dictatorship at the expense of “communist democracy,” but does not appear self-aware that many within Iranian society see him as a dictator and that Iran as a regime has betrayed its promised values: chants of “death to the dictator” during last year’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” are one example of this public sentiment.

Sources:

“بیانات در دیدار اعضای مجلس خبرگان رهبری”(Statements in the Meeting of the Assembly of Experts),” Khamenei.ir (official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 7 November 2024. https://tinyurl.com/48rfb7rj

Within the structure and general framework of the Islamic system, the primary role of the Leader is to ensure that the system’s orientation is directed toward the goals of the Revolution. This is the main responsibility of the Leader. The Revolution took place for a purpose. Of course, all revolutions have goals. They have fundamental goals that lead them to reshape and transform the order of life… [Those opposed to revolution] were able to prevent [previous] revolutions from achieving their goals and reverse their course. For instance, in the great French Revolution, which was one of the most significant revolutions in our contemporary history, barely 15 years had passed since the start of that revolution when the previous authoritarian monarchy and dictatorship were reestablished. All the efforts of the people, the endeavors of renowned French intellectuals, the efforts and struggles of the masses, the casualties, the massacres, the conflicts — all of these were essentially nullified and destroyed in less than 15 years!

A similar but worse case was what happened to the Soviet Revolution, which was also another major revolution. There too within less than a decade, the claims, the rhetoric, the professed justice and so-called “communist democracy” all vanished. A dictator, a ruthless tyrant like Stalin, seized power and that was the end of it. So this is a risk that all revolutions face.

The Quran repeatedly emphasizes and warns about this matter, not just once or twice, but perhaps tens of times. The holy verses of the Quran repeatedly speak about regression and returning to the previous state from which people had been liberated and saved. This warning is directed toward both the believers and the unbelievers.

An element is necessary to prevent this [regression]. In the Islamic system, this element is the position of the Leader. Such a deviation must be prevented by a leader. This is very important. It is very important…! The establishment and creation of the Assembly of Experts signifies the uninterrupted progress of the Islamic system. This means that there will be no pause or interruption in the system. The Assembly of Experts exists to be able to designate a successor. Therefore, this succession will continue with full strength, power, and ability. This readiness and presence of the Assembly of Experts has such a meaning. If the current Leader were to be absent, the Assembly of Experts would immediately take action to select a successor. It is like this.

Notes:

[i] Ali Khamenei’s health struggles are not entirely secret: a 1981 assassination attempt left him partially paralyzed, and the regime photographed him in the hospital five years ago as he received treatment for prostate cancer.

[ii] For discussion of Khamenei’s concern about declining revolutionary fervor, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns of Declining Fervor of New Generation,” OE Watch, 08 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/irans-supreme-leader-warns-of-declining-fervor-of-new-generation/ . See also: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Speaks on Martyrdom” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/399678/download and Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/310925/download

OE Insight Summary:

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 7 November 2024 speech to the Assembly of Experts highlights looming IRN succession and his fears about the Islamic Republic’s staying power.

Image Information:

Image: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.
Source: https://idc0-cdn0.khamenei.ir/ndata/news/58257/C/14030817_0758257.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Russia To Launch Two Satellites for Iran

Posted on by

Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.

“The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry.”

While Iran-Russia military trade often makes headlines, the relationship between the two countries continues to expand in numerous ways:[i] Russian Special Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) train together[ii] while the two governments collude to avoid unilateral sanctions on each other’s industries.[iii] Now, according to the excerpted article published in the IRGC media outlet Tasnim News these bilateral relations extend to Iran’s space program.

Iran’s space program is a source of national pride. Iran has launched numerous domestically built satellites since 2008 and plans to open a spaceport next year.[iv] Iranian Space Agency head Hassan Salarieh has announced between five and seven planned launches by the end of the Iranian year (20 March). The success rate of Iranian satellite launches has been relatively low, however, perhaps between 25 and 50 percent. While the success rate has climbed in recent years, Iran’s turn toward Russia could reflect internal uncertainty about its capabilities or acknowledgment that its Semnan launch facility is not yet ready. There is also a military dimension to Russia-Iran space launch cooperation, as satellite launch vehicles share technology with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two satellites Iran plans to launch also reflect the military-private partnership that predominates in Iran and Iran’s growing space capabilities. There is little firewall between Iranian students at government universities and the IRGC. Indeed, the IRGC mandates the participation of many Iranian students who have studied abroad in military related research. Iranian media describe the Kowsar satellite as a high-resolution satellite that can produce imagery useful for agricultural and environmental mapping and crisis management. Iran’s reporting does not describe military applications, but it does mention IRGC visits to the laboratory.

The Hudhud is a smaller communications satellite that the excerpted article claims can “provide communication services in remote and hard-to-reach areas where access to terrestrial communication networks is limited.” During periods of unrest, the Iranian government often cuts internet service. Should the IRGC compartmentalize access to the space-based internet, it might gain an upper hand over protestors.

Sources:

“۲ ماهواره‌ ایرانی بخش خصوصی برای پرتاب به روسیه ارسال شد”(Two Private Sector Satellites Sent to Russia for Launch),” Tasnim News (news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 12 October 2024. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/07/21/3175967  

Two satellites made by the private sector of our country, named “Kowsar”[Abundance of Benevolence] and “Hudhud” [Hoopoe Bird], were sent to Russia for launch into space on Friday, October 11.

Both the Kowsar satellite that has a precision agriculture and mapping mission and the Hudhud satellite that is an Internet of Things telecommunication satellite, are ready for launch.

The construction of the “Kowsar” sensing satellite began in 2019, and the “Hudhud” satellite, which is the result of the use of advanced technologies used in “Kowsar,” was designed and built in a short time, only one year. It is important to note that these two great achievements have been achieved by a group of young Iranians with an average age of 25 years in an Iranian technology company in the private sector….

The launch of these two satellites indicates the significant progress of Iran’s space industry and has important consequences for the country, including self-sufficiency in space technology, the development of space applications, job creation and technology development, and the promotion of international status.Before sending these satellites to Russia for launch, Dr. Hassan Salarieh, the head of the Iranian Space Organization, witnessed the final stages of the construction and preparation of the satellites in the knowledge-based manufacturing company.

Notes:

[i] For an overview of the history and evolution of Iran-Russia relations, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran-Russia Relations,” OE Watch, July 2016, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[ii] Michael Rubin, “Iran: Revolutionary Guards Take Part in Russian Military Games,” OE Watch, September 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195247?pi296680=1

[iii] For discussion of industrial cooperation to avoid sanctions, see: Michael Rubin, “The Unexpected Ways Iran and Russia Are Building Military Ties,” National Security Journal, 6 October 2024. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-unexpected-ways-iran-and-russia-are-building-military-ties/

[iv] For discussion of Iran’s new spaceport, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Open New Spaceport in 2025,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/oe-watch-issue-07-2024/. For discussion of previous satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140 and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Simorgh Satellite Ready to Launch,” and “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432

OE Insight Summary:

IRN’s turn to RUS to launch two new satellites highlights another facet of the two countries’ growing partnership.

Image Information:

Image: Iranian scientists display the Kowsar and Hudhud satellites prior to their transfer to Russia for launch.
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/07/21/1403072109450377931177524.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Exaggerate Missile Success in Israel Attack

Posted on by

An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel.

“The Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence.”

On 1 October 2024, Iran launched close to 200 missiles at Israel to avenge the deaths of senior Hamas leader Dr. Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. As with the 13 April 2024 missile and drone barrage, Israeli, U.S., and allied air defenses downed the majority of the missiles. Those that struck Israel appear to have caused only marginal damage. However, according to multiple Iranian media outlets, including the excerpted article published by Mehr News Agency, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) suggested a 90 percent success rate. While this number is false—the only confirmed casualty was a Palestinian in Jericho struck by falling debris—the acceptance of such lies within Iranian command circles and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s base can have a profound impact on the operational environment.

Overconfidence, not oil or water, causes most wars in the Middle East. In the Iranian case, the IRGC has long exaggerated the effectiveness of its missiles.[i] While in an open society, the 1 October barrage might have embarrassed or caused the regime to question those who previously exaggerated claims; no such fallout occurred in Iran. The supreme leader’s power base is perhaps 20 percent of the country. These revolutionary youth, from whom the IRGC draws its recruits, implicitly trust Khamenei and exist in a media bubble that the Iranian regime creates.[ii] Not only do they suggest Israel’s air defense and that lent by the United States are little more than psychological operations, but the Iranian media narrative also downplays Israel’s ability to respond. The 19 April 2024 Israeli airstrike on Iranian anti-aircraft batteries in Isfahan demonstrated precision, but most Iranians are unaware of their success because the targets were not easily visible to the Iranian public.

The question now is whether a “zero-defect” dynamic is at play in Iran. If the Iranian or IRGC leadership fails to accurately assess Iran’s military ability, then it becomes more likely that Iranian leaders could order additional strikes not only on Israel but also potentially on U.S. bases in the region. A belief that only a set proportion of missiles equipped with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads need to pass through complements this calculation. Any contributing factor that leads Tehran to believe they can inflict maximum damage if not dramatically win a conflict makes the region more dangerous and mandates a recalibration of deterrence.

Sources:

“۹۰ درصد شلیک‌ها با موفقیت به اهداف اصابت کرد”(Ninety percent of the shots hit their targets successfully),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 1 October 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6243668 

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

The Islamic Ummah of the Great Front of Resistance and the Noble Nation of Islamic Iran:

Following the previous announcement, your children in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in accordance with the promises made by the Islamic Republic officials and military commanders, with the help of other armed forces, during Operation True Promise II or the Messenger of God (Peace Be Upon Him).

They targeted strategic centers inside the occupied territories with missiles made by the youth of Islamic Iran.

This operation hit some air and radar bases, conspiracy centers which launched the assassination plots against the leaders of the Resistance, especially the [Hamas] martyr Dr. Ismail Haniyeh as well as the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and the military commanders of Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance, and the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards.

Despite the fact that the area was protected by the most advanced and high-volume defense systems, 90 percent of the shots successfully hit the targets, and the Zionist regime is terrified of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and operational dominance.

This operation was carried out within the framework of the right of legitimate defense and in accordance with international law, and any stupidity of the enemy will be met with a devastating and regretful response.

Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian claims about the precision of her missiles, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Khamenei Threatens to Use Precision Missiles,” OE Watch, May 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/276811/download

[ii] For previous discussion of how the regime constructs a media bubble, see: Michael Rubin, “Budget Cutbacks Force Iran Broadcasting Closings,” OE Watch, February 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195463

OE Insight Summary:

IRN exaggeration of missile precision and success in recent strikes against ISR could lower the threshold for further IRN aggression across the Middle East.

Image Information:

Image: An Iranian billboard celebrates the April 2024 missile barrage launched against Israel
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1403/01/27/14030127094522670298182710.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News

Iran Exports Important Nanotechnology to Russia

Posted on by

A sampling of nano-tech catalysts.

“Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges.”

As Iran’s oil fields decline due to decades of use and mismanagement, nanotechnology and the production of industrial catalysts become more important in enabling the extraction of the oil essential for the regime’s survival and the funding of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[i] The excerpted article from semi-official Mehr News Agency is remarkable for its blunt assessment of the current state of Iran’s hydrocarbon extraction industry and its assessment that, absent nanotech catalysts, Iran’s oil production could decline precipitously. The Iranian leadership will be hard-pressed to increase, let alone hold production steady, without laying 2,000 new wells, each of which requires more than a half-year to drill. The recognition of this looming shortfall combined with the Iranian regime’s failure to so far plug the gap either suggests decades-long incompetent management at the highest level and/or that the Iranian oil fields are far more past their prime than the Iranian regime publicly acknowledge.

The Iranian leadership appears in control of the decision to produce certain nanocatalysts. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls most of the factories established to produce catalysts reinforces the military’s dominance of Iran’s economy. This highlights the extent to which the command economy controls Iranian development.

The decision to export $20 million in nanocatalysts to Russia is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects the breadth of the military-industrial trade between the two states. Previously, Russia had provided Iran with nuclear technology in support of the Bushehr reactor; now, Iran is returning the favor. Second, Iran and Russia openly collude in efforts to evade sanctions, Iran for terrorism and Russia for its war in Ukraine. Such collusion exposes a loophole when countries respond to adversaries using targeted sanctions. As Iran works increasingly with Russia, North Korea, and perhaps Venezuela, it can conduct sanctioned research or production outside its territory to evade inspectors; likewise, its allies can relocate their own work to Iranian territory to do the same.

Sources:

” صادرات ۲۰ میلیون دلاری نانوکاتالیست‌های ایرانی به روسیه”

(Export of $20 million in Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 2 August 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6182966

The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution approved the National Document for the Development of Science and Nanotechnology in November 2022. The Development Headquarters for Nano- and Micro-technologies has now published the report on the implementation of this plan through the end of Persian year 1402 [19 March 2024] in six chapters. Considering the importance of technology in the country’s economic development and its great role in improving productivity and creating added value, policy programs have long considered the development of technological capabilities.

Governments employ different policies to develop research and technology. These policies can be divided into two categories. The first are functional or diffusional policies that promote innovation capacity and improve scientific and technological capabilities. The second are targeted or mission-oriented policies that support precise research or the development of needed technology or solve specific problems…. 

“Improving the competitiveness of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries using nanotechnology” is one of the special missions of the nano-tech headquarters…. Energy imbalance should be considered one of the major national challenges that is becoming increasingly sensitive and complex due to the increasing growth of energy consumption in the country. Achieving a daily production of 5.8 million barrels of oil by 2029 requires the drilling 2,000 new wells in order to resolve the energy imbalance, which is unattainable given the high cost of investment ($160 billion) and the time-consuming drilling (at least 200 days to drill each well). Therefore, there is no choice but to increase the extraction from operational wells, which requires the use of advanced technologies such as nanotechnology. The sanctions imposed on the country and consequently, the lack of supply of catalysts needed by refineries and petrochemicals from abroad, also caused the prioritization of support of projects that solve the aforementioned challenges….

The export of Iranian nanocatalysts to Russia is estimated at $20 million, experts of a knowledge-based company in three Russian steel and petrochemical complexes are setting up catalyst production units for this country, and the world’s largest petrochemical producer of urea and ammonia is also supposed to enter the production circuit with Iranian catalysts. The world’s only catalyst for ethylene production is an acetylene hydrogenation catalyst. This catalyst was placed at the top of the sanctioned goods, and the purpose of this sanction was to hit value-creating companies in the petrochemical industry. The advantages of producing these catalysts in the country are reducing the purchase price (compared to foreign catalysts), increasing the knowledge of Iranian experts, and increasing the production efficiency of important products such as urea, ammonia, and methanol in the country.

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic wing, see: Michael Rubin, “The IRGC Wins Multi-Billion Dollar Economic Contracts,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/274485

Image Information:

Image: A sampling of nano-tech catalysts
Source: https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2021/05/03/4/166253257.jpg

Iran Increasing Lithium Battery Production

Posted on by

The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.

“We must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”

The Iranian government appears to be doubling down on investment and production of lithium batteries. According to a report published by Young Journalist Club, on 8-9 July, Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran hosted a conference to highlight local developments in the lithium battery field. Press reports suggest the conference was attended by academic and commercial representatives, but also military officers and politicians. In fact, both Iranian politicians and military personnel appear increasingly engaged in Iran’s lithium and battery industry. In March 2024, Reza Shojaei, the deputy head of the Iranian Defense Ministry’s Department of Energy Resources, claimed Iran had the technology to build electric vehicle batteries and said that the Defense Ministry would increase production by 35 percent to preclude the need to import lithium batteries. Defense officials attending the conference told Iranian journalists that they would not only commercialize electric vehicles, but also expand research laboratories and invest in lithium mining.[i]

The significance of the report is not so much a continuing emphasis on the development of electric vehicles, an item the Iranian press began reporting upon in November 2021,[ii] but rather to show the supremacy of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics if not the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the development of new and cutting-edge technology.[iii] University professors and research centers subordinate themselves to the Iranian military. This reality has ramifications as many Iranians seeking degrees in the West focus their studies on science and technology and may come under pressure if they return to Iran to work directly or indirectly for sanctioned entities.

Domestic lithium production and an indigenous lithium industry can also have a profound impact on the operational environment. If the IRGC controls its mining, it would like profit disproportionately from its sale to foreign partners such as China. Advanced military technology also increasingly integrates lithium batteries into drones and both terrestrial and submarine robots. Given Iran’s proliferation of new weaponry to its proxies, an increased battery production capability could enable the Houthis and Hezbollah to upgrade their own weaponry and capabilities in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

Sources:

“توسعه حوزه لیتیوم نیازمند توجه و همکاری‌های چندگانه”(Developing the Lithium Field Will Require Dedication),” Young Journalist Club (an official center established by the political affairs bureau of the official Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting to train journalists), 9 July 2024. https://www.yjc.ir/fa/amp/news/8774326

Yesterday [8 July 2024], the Iran University of Science and Technology hosted the first international conference and the second national conference on lithium batteries, representing a big step in the development of the battery industry. Shojaei Fard, Director of the Automotive Research Institute of Tehran University of Science and Technology and Secretary of the conference, highlighted the dependence of the automobile industry on the field and how initially, we were working on batteries but lithium batteries were also a new thing. “We launched the lithium battery research and innovation center, and from there the project to examine the future of lithium batteries and technology and challenges began. Despite the fact that this conference is so specialized, we had over 180 papers submitted, though we rejected a few. We also have a training workshop today that a Chinese instructor will teach, a four more workshops tomorrow. During the program, we will review top articles. We will also announce the result of a review into which is the industry-leading lithium battery… We will have four parallel meetings over two days so we can review 80 articles.”

Naderi Sharif, the chief of the Energy Resources Development Organization, stated that there are two approaches to the development of battery technology. Some favor and some oppose.

Opponents of the development of lithium battery cell technology cite reasons such as the need for heavy investment, rapid changes in cell technology and diversity in cell products. Proponents of lithium battery development also believe that lithium batteries are a strategic technology and product and that the development of the energy sector depends on this product. Cheap fossil fuel has led to the backwardness of energy supply and production and related technologies. 

Naderi Sharif emphasized,”We shouldn’t just watch the world’s progress in this field, we must make progress to make up for this backwardness.”

Notes:

[i] Iran’s lithium industry has developed significantly over the past two years. In March 2023, Iranian officials announced discovery of 8.5 million tons of lithium deposits inside Iran near the Western city of Hamedan. If true, this would be the second largest lithium find after a 9.2 million ton reserve in the salt flats of Chile. Rumors also swirl in Iran that the Iranian government is both purposely allowing Lake Urmia in the West Azerbaijan province to evaporate in order to extract lithium and that it works with China to do so. The Iranian government has denied both rumors in the Persian press.

[ii] For a Persian language discussion of Iran’s domestic Yuz electric vehicle, see: “یوز در خیابان‌‌های تهران (Yuz on the streets of Tehran)” Fars News Agency, 2 November 2021. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14000811000836

[iii] The same pattern exists with Iran’s satellite program. For a previous discussion of the involvement of universities in Iran’s satellite program, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download

OE Insight Summary:

IRN continues to put lithium battery production on a fast track perhaps foreshadowing development of a new generation of drones and robots as the Revolutionary Guards take the industrial lead.

Image Information:

Image: The Yuz, Iran’s domestically-manufactured electric vehicle, unveiled in November 2021.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1400/08/11/14000811000831_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Fars News Agency

Iran Spaceport To Open in 2025

Posted on by

The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar.

“The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar.”

Summary: Iran has announced that its third satellite launch facility and its second “spaceport” will become operational in Chabahar by February 2025.

The Iranian space industry is both a source of pride and a strategic asset. It is used to launch vehicles to carry satellites into space and has dual-use technology benifits that could also further Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile ambitions.[i] As per the excerpted article below, from BultanNews.com, a conservative Iranian website, Isa Zarepour, Iran’s Minister of Communications, recently announced that its new spaceport is more than half complete and will be ready to launch satellites by February 2025. This announcement reflects both an expansion of Iran’s space program, and potentially its missile program, and the growing strategic importance to the southern strategic port city of Chabahar.[ii]

Iranian authorities take great pride in satellite launches, even though they fail almost as frequently as they succeed.[iii] In 2008, Iran inaugurated its first spaceport, the Imam Khomeini Spaceport, in the northern city of Semnan, upgrading it significantly in 2017.[iv] Iran also launches satellites from the Shahroud Test Center in Dasht-e Kavir. The Ebrahim Raisi government-initiated work on the new spaceport alongside other efforts to develop the Indian Ocean port of Chabahar. The Chabahar spaceport augments Iran’s satellite launching capabilities but does not replace the spaceport in Semnan. Reports about Chabahar excerpted here and reported in conservative websites do not mention Semnan, but Iran’s original spaceport appears to remain operational. The number of satellites that Iran launches annually – six so far in 2024 – do not appear to justify the expense of a third facility, suggesting two other possibilities. First, Iran might seek to utilize its satellite launch industry to support other countries seeking to put satellites into space but suspicious or resistant to work through Western countries, Russia, or China. Second, Iran’s growing military investment in Chabahar facility might suggest the launch facility will contribute to the region’s growing military footprint.

Sources:

“زارع‌پور: پایگاه فضایی چابهار ۵۶ درصد پیشرفت داشته است”(Zarepour: Chabahar Space Base is 56 percent Complete),” BultanNews.com (an Iranian conservative website), 7 June 2024. https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/847281

Yesterday [6 June 2024], during a video conference with Acting President Mohammad Mokhber and several ministers inaugurated three major projects in the fields of oil and gas industry, hydroelectricity, and communications in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

The communications project connected the 1,261st village with a population greater than 20 households, a 20 trillion rial [US$475 million] communication network. In the ceremony, Isa Zarepour, the minister of Communications and Information Technology, said, “The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar, and with the round-the-clock efforts of my colleagues, its first phase will be completed by the ‘decade of dawn’ [the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on 1-11 February 1979].”Stating that 56 percent of the first phase of the project has been completed, Zarepour said, “The first launch from the Chabahar space port will take place this year.”

Notes:

[i] For discussion of the dual use nature of Iran’s satellite launch capability, see: Michael Rubin, “Zuljaneh: Iran’s New Solid-Fuel Rocket,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

[ii] For previous discussions of Chabahar, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Announces Maritime Development Plan,” OE Watch, 01 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/irans-supreme-leader-announces-maritime-development-strategy/ and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular- format/379863

[iii] For discussion of Iranian satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download

[iv] For discussion of the Semnan space port, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Launch Officially Opens Space Port,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download

OE Insight Summary:

IRN has announced that its third satellite launch facility and its second “spaceport” will become operational in Chabahar by February 2025.

Image Information:

Image: The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1402/07/10/14020710092925717284705610.jpg
Attribution: Tasnimnews.com

Iran Seeks To Cultivate Pakistani and Kurdish Support

Posted on by

International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.

“Freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book.”

While Tehran propagating anti-Israeli vitriol is neither new nor remarkable, its choice about where to direct that propaganda does signal those people that the Iranian regime seeks to cultivate as allies. As reported by Dolat.ir, a government information center, the high-profile annual Tehran International Book Fair recently featured an updated collection of Khamenei’s writings and speeches about Israel and the Palestinians, dating to 1979.[i] Iranian press attention on translations of Khamenei’s writing on the Palestinians into both Urdu and Kurdish suggests renewed efforts by Khamenei to influence both Pakistani and Kurdish audiences. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded its so-called “Axis of Resistance” to include not only Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime, but also Iraqi militias and Houthi tribesmen in Yemen. In the early 1980s, the IRGC tried and failed to create a Hezbollah-like movement among Pakistani Shi’ites akin to its organization of Lebanese Shi’ites.

The effort to proselytize and disseminate Khamenei’s views to a Pakistani audience may suggest a renewed effort to cultivate the general Pakistani population. Such outreach would not limit itself to Pakistani Shi’ites but would seek to use Khamenei’s anti-Israel credentials to bolster Iran’s broader foreign policy leadership.[ii] The Iranian emphasis on cultivating Kurds suggests an effort to expand the Iranian regime’s influence among a population that has both been resistant to Khamenei’s worldview and has also cooperated closely with the U.S. military. While Iran maintains an open presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, the United States maintains a more overt presence. Both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria impede the IRGC’s “land bridge” between Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean. Flipping the Kurds may not be imminent in the short-term, but Iran tends to play the long game.

Sources:

“کتاب «فلسطین؛ از منظر حضرت آیت‌الله سید علی خامنه‌ای» خشم نخست وزیر اسراییل را موجب شد” (The book Palestine: from the perspective of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, angered the Prime Minister of Israel.),” Dolat.ir (Government Information Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran), 11 May 2024. https://dolat.ir/detail/448480

The book Palestine is a compilation of descriptions, analyses, and proposed solutions by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on the issue of Palestine. Given the significance and influential position of Imam Khamenei’s perspective on the Palestinian matter, and the unique current circumstances, this book has been translated and made available in various languages such as Arabic, English, Russian, Turkish, and other languages….

Hujjat al-Islam Saeed Solh-Mirzaei, a member of the Assembly of Experts said, “Due to the importance of Palestine for Urdu and Kurdish speakers, this book has been translated into these two languages, and it is hoped that all Muslims and freedom fighters around the world will become familiar with the contents of this book and fulfill their duties towards Palestine. God willing, they will soon pray together in gratitude in the noble Al-Qods.”

Notes:

[i] Filistin az manzar-i Ayatullah Khamini’i (Palestine from the Perspective of His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei), Tehran: Islamic Revolution Publication, 2011.

[ii] For discussion of Iranian efforts to create Afghan and Pakistani militias, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Praises Revolutionary Guards’ Proxy Afghan Brigade,” OE Watch, 03-2023 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-praises-revolutionary-guards-proxy-afghan-brigade/; and Michael Rubin, “Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias,” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/266059/download

Image Information:

Image: International Department of the Islamic Revolution Cultural & Research Institute unveils translations of Ali Khamenei’s book Palestine at the Tehran International Book Fair, May 10, 2024.
Source: https://cdn-english.khamenei.ir/d/2024/05/11/3/40662.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Iran To Cooperate With Russia On Gas Infrastructure and Trade

Posted on by

Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.

“[Mohammad Hosseini] expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.”

Iran has the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and, even under sanctions, remains one of the top ten world producers. Yet Iran’s gas industry lags far behind its oil extraction capabilities due to an antiquated refinery and pipeline network. Iran must import much of the gas that it utilizes both to fuel transportation needs and to inject into oil fields to facilitate extraction. Iran is increasingly looking to Russia, for assistance.

The excerpted report from Iran-focused Dubai-based brokerage PCM Farsi, addresses a meeting between Hossein Ali Mohammad Hosseini, the director of the Corporate Planning of the National Iranian Gas Company, and Russian energy officials. Hosseini’s comments that Russia and Iran might cooperate regarding gas infrastructure modernization reflects the government’s commercial agenda: if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked National Iranian Gas Company can curb losses attributable to waste, then it will not need to spend as much to import refined gasoline.[i] The report also notes the vulnerability of Iran’s gas infrastructure . Iran has blamed Israel, without evidence, for a February 2024 explosion on a major pipeline. In the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, there have been numerous other gas infrastructure explosions across the country according to reports and social media discussions by ordinary Iranians. Many of these incidents go unreported, while the official Iranian media often dismisses the reported incidents as accidents, or the result of illegal tapping of gas lines to steal petrol. To acknowledge openly the need to work with Russia against gas infrastructure sabotage and terrorism suggests that the Iranian gas industry officials do not fully believe the more innocent explanations from their government. Given the importance of hydrocarbons to Iran’s economy, a faltering gas infrastructure and any vulnerability to sabotage, vandalism, or insurgency could disproportionately affect Iran’s economy and potentially its military readiness.

Sources:

“تهران و مسکو همکاری‌های خود را در زمینه فناوری گاز گسترش می‌دهند” (Tehran and Moscow expanding their cooperation in the field of gas technology),” PCM Farsi (Persian language portal of Dubai-based PCM Brokerage), 14 May 2024. https://pcmfa.news/2024/05/14/11977/

Mohammad Hosseini mentioned the desire for Iran to expand relations with Russia in the energy sector, and said his country welcomes the proposal of the Ministry of Energy of Russia to hold a specialized meeting on digitization, monitoring, and data analysis at the Russian Energy Week, as well as at the St. Petersburg Energy Congress. In his remarks, the director of the National Iranian Gas Company stressed the need to share common experiences in area such as reducing the amount of gas loss, and he expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.

Notes:

[i] For discussion of Iran’s efforts for gasoline self-sufficiency, see: Michael Rubin, “Achieving Gasoline Self-Sufficiency in Iran,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download

Image: Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.
Source: Mojtaba Mohammadgholi, Shana Photo, https://media.shana.ir/d/2023/08/20/3/392725.jpg?ts=1692521593000
Attribution: Shana.ir

Iran Highlights Recent Missile Achievements

Posted on by

The Shafagh missile on display. The sign at the bottom reads “Death to Israel” in both Persian and Arabic.

“Iran is among the four countries with hypersonic technology.”

In the wake of simulated test fires and direct strikes on Israel, the semi-official Iranian news outlet Mehr News Agency highlighted the previous year’s missile developments. The Mehr News Agency article states some of Iran’s missiles are short-range, deployable on helicopters, and designed for use both on land and at sea. This reflects Iran’s growing military capability in the Persian Gulf and over the rough terrain of the Makran Coast, once a relatively lawless backwater whose strategic importance has grown as Iran seeks to develop a greater footprint in the northern Indian Ocean. The article suggests that Iran is focused on the development of smart weapons capable of identifying new targets while en route rather than simply being point-and-shoot. Such claims likely reflect actual progress, as the Iranian military has succeeded in developing all-weather GPS guided drones. The article also describes the Khorramshahr-4 missile in greater detail than others in its arsenal, a possible indication that Iranian reports regarding the Khorramshahr-4’s ongoing development may be accurate. Given its touted range and the explosive power of its warhead, deployment of the Khorramshahr-4 in large numbers could significantly change the operational environment across the region. The Persian Gulf, northern Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean, are within range and could be targeted although it is unclear if it would be successful against Israeli missile defense. The article reflects Iran’s aspirations to build the weapons necessary to alter the region’s decades-long status quo.

OE Insight Summary:

IRN continues to diversify its missile arsenal and extend their range and capabilities. Even if IRN claims about hypersonic capability are false, the IRN missile threat now extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

Sources:

” دستاورد موشکی در سال ۱۴۰۲ ۸”(Eight Missile Achievements in Year 2023-24),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 21 March 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6057908

In Persian year 1402 [20 March 2023 – 19 March 2024], developments in the missile field experienced a glorious period. In this year, we revealed several strategic and precision missiles, such as the hypersonic “Fatah,” the “Paveh,” and the ballistic Khorramshahr-4.

Below we briefly examine the capabilities of some of the most important indigenous missiles unveiled during the Persian year:

  • Shafagh Missile: On 4 January 2024, Maj. Gen. Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, presided over a ceremony unveiling the upgraded Shafaq missile. The Shafaq missile is accurate up to a range of 12 miles.[i]
  • Qadr-29: On the same day, the Qadr-29 missile system with a range of 100 miles, equipped with four-kilogram warheads, was also unveiled. It is used in suicide and reconnaissance operations. This missile system can also be installed on all types of [Bell] 206 helicopters….
  • Haider Cruise Missile: The commander-in-chief of the army also unveiled the Haider long-range cruise missile. This missile system can also be installed on most helicopters equipped with heat-seeking warhead with a range of 120 miles…. Thus system is able to target all land and sea targets in difficult mountainous terrain, sea coasts, and sandy and desert areas with minimum time and with maximum surprise….
  • Talaiyeh and Nasir Cruise Missiles. The Talaiyeh missile system was added to the regular navy this past year. This missile has a range of more than 600 miles and is smart, with the ability to autonomous detect and adjust to new targets during its flight…. The Nasir Maritime Cruise Missile was deployed to the third maritime zone this year. It is a smart missile with a range of 60 miles, and it has very high destructive capability….
  • Paveh Cruise Missile. On 22 September 2023, the long-range Paveh ground cruise missile was unveiled during an armed forces’ parade near the Holy Shrine of Imam Khomeini.
  • Hypersonic Fattah Missile. On 6 June 2023, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Aerospace Force was unveiled at its headquarters in the presence of President Ebrahim Raisi, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander-in-Chief Maj.-Gen. Hossein Salami and Revolutionary Guard Aerospace Force Commander General Amir Ali Hajizadeh. With the unveiling of this missile, Iran became one of the four countries with this technology…. Hajizadeh stated at the ceremony of the unveiling of the hypersonic Fattah missile, stated, “The missile that was unveiled today is a missile that is unique in the world, so that with the launch of this missile Iran is among the four countries with hypersonic technology….”
  • Khorramshahr-4 Long-Range Strategic Missile. The Khorramshahr-4 long-range strategic missile was another missile unveiled in 2023-24. On 25 May 2023, on the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr [during the Iran-Iraq War], the Khomrramshahr-4 long-range strategic missile was unveiled in the presence of Minister of Defense Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani. The Khorramshahr missile is one of the most advanced missiles designed by experts of the Aerospace Organization of the Ministry of Defense. It has a range of 1,200 miles and is equipped with a severe blast type combat head weighing 3,300 pounds. The rocket is equipped with one of the most advanced liquid fuel engines to create tactical capabilities and is designed in such a way that the engine is placed in a fuel tank, which reduces the length of the rocket to about 40 feet
  • Fattah-2 Hypersonic Missile. On 19 November 2023, His Excellency Ayatollah Khamenei, the commander-in-chief, visited Ashura University of Aerospace Sciences and Technologies for an hour and a half to see the latest achievements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In this exhibition, which included missile, drone, defense and space products, young scientists from the Aerospace Force displayed their achievements under the slogan, “From Idea to All-Iranian Product.”  … [Here,] the Fattah-2 hypersonic cruise missile, classified as a hypersonic glide vehicle was unveiled.

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Shafagh, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Installs New Precision Missiles On Army Helicopters,” OE Watch, 05 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/iran-installs-new-precision-missiles-on-army-helicopters/

Image Information:

Image: The Shafagh missile on display. The sign at the bottom reads “Death to Israel” in both Persian and Arabic.
Source: https://media.mehrnews.com/d/2024/02/03/3/4842101.jpg?ts=1706943630686
Attribution: Mehr News Agency