The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.


“…as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find a more comfortable space for itself against Russia.”


Turkey’s recent purchase of S-400 systems from Russia has led to questions about Turkey’s “western-ness” and trustworthiness as a NATO ally.  Traditionally a pro-Western country, Turkey’s increasing shift towards Russia despite their complex relationship is one of the biggest geopolitical shifts since the Cold War.  As such, the evolution of Turkish-Russian relations will have implications for the United States, NATO, and great power competition.  The accompanying articles from Turkish sources provide an outlook on Turkish-Russian relations, discussing both issues of contention and cooperation.

The articles, one from pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet and another from the Istanbul-based independent think tank Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), note that the points of friction between Turkey and Russia are the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh; developments in Libya; tensions in Syria’s Idlib Province; and changes in eastern Ukraine.  The Syrian conflict has the potential to impact Turkish-Russian relations the most because, as the Hürriyet article highlights, Russia continues to strike Turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces around Idlib and Turkey’s areas of operation.  The tensions between Russia and Turkey will likely increase once the Russia-backed Syrian regime launches an operation on Idlib.  Both articles note the Ukrainian conflict will be another high-level point of friction between Turkey and Russia because of Turkey’s drone sale to Ukraine.  However, according to the EDAM publication, despite these frictions, Turkey and Russia cooperate in the energy sector, including Russia supplying natural gas to, and building a nuclear power plant in, Turkey.  Russia also maintains strong trade relations with Turkey, investing in its tourism and defense industry.  The Hürriyet article also refers to President Erdoğan’s statement from September 2021 that Turkey will deepen its defense cooperation with Russia and is considering purchasing other weapons systems in addition to the recently purchased S-400s.

The EDAM article states that the foundation of Turkish-Russian relations is built on a personal dialogue between their presidents rather than on an institutional foundation, and Presidents Erdoğan and Putin have managed to de-escalate tensions so far when they rise.  However, considering the points of friction, Turkish-Russian relations remain fragile.  Finally, the Hürriyet article notes Turkish-Russian relations are asymmetrical and the scale will further tilt in Russia’s favor if Turkey continues to drift away from its Western allies.  Therefore, the article suggests that Turkey should ensure its relations with its Western allies remain strong to counterbalance Russia.


Source:

Sedat Ergin,“2021’den 2022’ye Türk Dış Politikası (5)-Rusya ile çatışarak işbirliği modeli ilerlemeye devam ediyor (Turkish Foreign Policy from 2021 to 2022 (5)- Adversarial Cooperation model with Russia continues),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish newspaper),04 January 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/2021den-2022ye-turk-dis-politikasi-5-rusya-ile-catisarak-isbirligi-modeli-ilerlemeye-devam-ediyor-41974354

The Russians see no harm in continuing their air operations in a region where TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] units are present. We can guess that with these attacks, Russia wants to maintain a certain pressure on Turkey, which prevented the regime’s army from entering Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria…

The previous day also witnessed the first telephone conversation of the New Year between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Brief statements with largely similar content were made from both sides. In the Kremlin’s statement, there was an indirect reference to the Ukraine-linked NATO-Russia tension. Apart from this, it was stated that the topics of the Caucasus, Libya, and Syria were on the agenda in both of statements. Intention and determination to further the cooperation between the two countries were also emphasized as an important common theme in the texts.

Meanwhile, the importance of 2021 was that it was a year…[of] cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations that would extend to the coming years… President Erdoğan went to Sochi at the end of September and during the meeting he held with Putin, he proposed to his counterpart the construction of two new nuclear power plants in Turkey, in addition to Akkuyu… Putin also offered to cooperate with Turkey on launching rockets into space by establishing platforms at sea and on land.

A more critical development was that Erdoğan also suggested to Putin “deepening cooperation” in the defense industry during this meeting. In this context, the President announced that they discussed the further development of the S-400 project, and listed aircraft engines, warplanes, warship, and submarine construction as new potential areas of cooperation.

In this respect, Erdoğan is also trying to intimidate the USA and European countries by stating that the weapon systems that Turkey cannot obtain or have difficulty in obtaining from the West can very well be obtained from Russia. Although the second chapter of the S-400 project has not been signed, it remains on the table…

President Erdoğan keeps cooperation with Russia as a bargaining card in his hand against the West…

… Erdoğan followed a delicate balance between the USA and Russia throughout 2021… In any case, the continuation of cracks, conflicts, and tensions within the Western alliance, as well as the realization of new potential arms sales to Turkey, will be developments that will please the Kremlin.

This asymmetry will be widened further [in Russia’s favor] as Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorate… It should not be forgotten that as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find itself in a more comfortable space against Russia. The decline in Turkey’s foreign relations with the west will also weaken Turkey’s hand against Russia.

Source: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Üstün,“2022’de Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri: İşbirliği-Rekabet İkileminin Devamı Beklenirken… (Turkey-Russia Relations in 2022: Expecting the Continuation of Cooperation-Competition Dilemma…),” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (Istanbul-based an independent think tank), 13 January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

Although relations with Russia have been handled on the axis of cooperation, especially in the energy and defense sectors in recent years, it is not a relationship model free from crises and problems… Because Turkey’s relations with Russia are based on bilateral relations between leaders rather than on institutional foundations, it has a relationship model that is difficult to be called sustainable…

​​The ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, the possible developments in Libya, the tensions in and around Idlib, Ukraine and Belarus are noticeable issues that have the potential to affect relations.

Of course, it should not be ignored that as much as their problems [need a resolution], there are areas where Turkey and Russia are trying to develop cooperation. After the Blue Stream, the Turkish Stream project is a step taken to strengthen the energy ties between Russia and Turkey. Energy takes first place in Turkey’s imports from Russia.

Considering the problems experienced in its relations with the West, both the EU and the USA, it is expected that Turkey’s relations with Russia will continue to be economically important. However, every step taken towards Russia has risks to further wear down Turkey’s relations with its Western allies… the issues that occupied the agenda in 2021 also occupy the agenda in 2022, and that it is more important to benefit economically and geopolitically for Russia in the framework of possible tensions, than to provide a permanent peace environment in the region…


Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Source: Russian Presidential Executive Office, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62936, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_(2020-03-05)_04.jpg, Files from Kremlin.ru | CC-BY-4.0 | Russia photographs taken on 2020-03-05

Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing

Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.

Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.


“For years, the Russian government has been focused on occupying Nicaragua as a platform for cyber and electronic operations… This agreement is a delivery of the country’s security to the Russians.”


Nicaragua held presidential elections in early November under highly repressive conditions, with seven major opposition candidates imprisoned and hundreds of political prisoners.  Incumbent President Daniel Ortega ran practically unopposed.  Pre-election polls revealed that majorities of Nicaraguans would have voted for an opposition candidate over Ortega if given the chance.  Facing international isolation, a significant element of Ortega’s survival strategy leans on extra-hemispheric actors, including Russia, for support.  Spanish-language digital military journal Diálogo relays that Nicaragua’s National Assembly recently ratified an agreement to permit Russia a larger role in Nicaragua’s cyberspace.  Russia has promised to help Nicaragua monitor its cyber domain, which includes bringing forth evidence that would fall under the country’s repressive “cybercrimes” legislation, reports the outlet.  Most recently, according to popular U.S. Spanish-language outlet CNN Español, Nicaragua announced official relations with China, dropping diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Facing criticism from much of the international community, the Ortega regime is eager to bolster its hold on power by deepening its partnership with Russia and China.  Further, given that the country’s opposition has used the internet to criticize and to organize itself politically (including in exile abroad), authoritarian great power rivals could ensure Ortega a much greater level of control over the domestic security apparatus.  As Ortega becomes increasingly isolated and desperate, Nicaragua will likely become an important platform for rivals to project power.


Source:

“Nicaragua rompe relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwán y solo reconoce a China

(Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Taiwan and only recognizes China),” CNN Español (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular U.S. outlet), 9 December 2021.  https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2021/12/09/nicaragua-taiwan-china-orix/

The Nicaraguan government decided to break relations with Taiwan and will only recognize China, as announced by Foreign Minister Denis Moncada at a press conference this afternoon…Nicaragua’s announcement leaves just over a dozen countries around the world with official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including Honduras and Guatemala.

Source:  “Rusia interviene en seguridad informática de Nicaragua (Russia intervenes in Nicaraguan IT security),” Diálogo (a Spanish-language digital military journal), 15 October 2021.  https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/rusia-interviene-en-seguridad-informatica-de-nicaragua/#.YWnYwxrMI2y  

For years, the Russian government has been focused on occupying Nicaragua as a platform for cyber and electronic operations…This agreement is a delivery of the country’s security to the Russians…and it will serve to launch, from a closer place in the hemisphere, cyber-attacks or interference in elections.


Image Information:

Image caption:  Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Denis Moncada, speaks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrob.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/mfarussia/49212557647/
Attribution:  Flickr

Russian Airborne Receiving Modernized SVD “Sniper Rifle”

“Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.” 


The standard-issue infantry Kalashnikov family of weapons are not particularly accurate and have a modest effective range of 300 meters.  Their purpose is to conduct suppressive automatic fire to keep the enemy pinned down. The rifle squad and platoon needed a specialty weapon to engage the enemy from 300 to 800 meters.  The answer was the SVD Dragunov semiautomatic longer-range rifle.  While titled a sniper rifle, it is really a rugged expert marksman’s rifle that routinely engages targets to 800 meters.  Designed in 1963 and combat tested initially in South Vietnam, the SVD is older than most currently serving in the Russian military.  According to a recent article in the pro-government newspaper Izvestia, the Dragunov has now been upgraded and airborne and reconnaissance troops are first in line for the upgrade.  This is not the top-of-the-line professional Russian sniper rifle but seems ideal for rough-and-tumble field soldiering.


Source:

Roman Kretsul and Aleksei Ramm, “Точнее, и не смажешь: войсковую разведку перевооружат на новые винтовки (More Precision, No Lubrication. Tactical Reconnaissance Upgrades to New Rifles. Specialized Sniper Subunits to Get the SVDM),” Izvestia (pro-government newspaper), 7 November 2021.

https://iz.ru/1245135/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/tochnee-i-ne-smazhesh-voiskovuiu-razvedku-perevooruzhat-na-novye-vintovki

Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.  According to experts, this greatly increases reconnaissance troops’ opportunities to eliminate targets at long range.”

The Defense Ministry has decided to upgrade tactical reconnaissance and special-purpose units with the SVDM sniper rifle…  The move should enhance these troops’ battlefield capabilities. The first consignments have already arrived in the Southern Military District.  The Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD) has served the forces well for half a century and in its class has become a brand, like Kalashnikov for assault rifles. Even a less than expert soldier is sure to hit targets with it at ranges of up to 800 meters.  The Dragunov combines greater firepower and range than an assault rifle with exceptional reliability and relative simplicity of use.  Back in Soviet times the role of sniper armed with an SVD was inserted into the standard complement of a motorized infantry squad.  This gave Soviet infantry a substantial increase in firepower compared to foreign armies.

Russian engineers have been working in recent decades on various options for modernizing this tried and true weapon. The latest modification is the SVDM.  Made of advanced materials, it has improved ergonomics and greater accuracy.

The gun mounts Picatinny rails on which accessories to suit the mission at hand, such as optical or night sights or a silencer may be mounted in minutes.  The SVDM has backup iron sights and a fixed point for a folding bipod.  Many older models of the gun required some disassembly in order to mount the accessories, which is a lengthy process.

“In the army a sniper is actually a low-altitude precision weapon,” military expert Vladislav Shurygin stated.  “The Dragunov sniper rifle means you can deliver accurate fire over medium distances.  In battle it is used to take out important targets.  The sniper usually accompanies the commander and is tasked by him.  A modernization for the Dragunov is further confirmation that this gun was created with future upgrades in mind, and it still has great potential today.”

Albert Bakov, general director of TsNIItochmash [Central Scientific Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering] told Izvestiya in an interview in 2019 that the Dragunov was so perfectly designed from the outset that in the category of army rifles for shooting at ranges between 500 and 800 meters “it cannot be made any better” — only individual elements can be improved.  You can paddle with it, you can throw it around — and it works fine over ranges of 500 to 800 meters.” The company is now working on larger-caliber rifles.

The Kalashnikov concern is currently upgrading the Chuvakin sniper rifle (SVCh), which should hit individual targets at ranges of up to a kilometer with the first shot. It is designed to take two types of cartridge — the powerful Russian 7.62×54 mm flanged and the NATO 7.62×51 mm rifle cartridge. When it will acquire its final shape and enter serial production is unknown.

Until the Chuvakin is inducted into service, the Dragunov will remain the best sniper rifle option for the regular troops.  There are longer-range and more powerful rifles in existence but they are far more expensive and technically complex, and are intended not for use in battle but for particular types of missions.  These weapons are supplied in limited numbers to special-purpose subunits in the army and the security and law enforcement agencies.

The military has already begun to rearm its marksmen:  Airborne Troops reconnaissance subunits have received the brand-new AK-12 assault rifle.  Outwardly it resembles the classic Kalashnikov, but this is a fundamental redesign.  It has acquired the ability to fire in fixed bursts of two rounds per trigger pull, it has a longer-lasting barrel, additional detachable accessories, and easier switching between shooting modes.  New thermal imagers, silencers, and collimator sights are in production for it, enabling accurate fire at silhouette targets from ranges of up to 500 meters.The new weapons and kit now arriving at the Airborne Troops are radically extending their capabilities.  Izvestiya already reported that the blue berets’ reconnaissance subunits have received the new Arbalet-2 parachute, with which they can jump from altitudes of up to 4,000 meters, or higher if they have oxygen tanks.  The parachute’s special canopy means that it can be steered while in flight, which means that troopers can travel dozens of kilometers while descending, to penetrate behind enemy lines undetected.

Central Asian States Take the Initiative in Security Cooperation

Map of Central Asia.

Map of Central Asia.


“Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this.”


Much of the security cooperation analysis that takes place with Central Asian states often focuses on Russian, Chinese, or U.S. efforts in the region.  While important, this particular scope overlooks how Central Asian states have been increasingly carrying out bilateral security cooperation with each other in recent years.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on recent security cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and provide insight on how governments in the region are cooperating with each other outside of the influence of other partners.

The article from Central Asia-focused independent news website Fergana Agency reports that the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan recently signed a “Declaration of Allied Relations.”  The agreement allows for increased cooperation between the two sides in a number of areas, including defense.  Additionally, both governments confirmed they have the same position on “countering challenges to security and stability in the region” in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. 

The first article from Uzbek news website Kun.uz reports on a recent joint military exercise carried out by Kazakh and Uzbek units.  The exercise involved engaging “with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border” and that Kazakh and Uzbek forces used multiple systems to eliminate the threat.  The exercise marks another example of Central Asian forces conducting bilateral exercises annually for the past several years focused on eliminating a terrorist group.  The majority of Russia-led or China-led joint military exercises in the region involve similar scenarios.

The second article from Kun.uz reports on a November meeting between the defense ministers of both countries.  The article notes that the ministers “discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it,” signing an agreement at the end of the meeting, which included “a number of measures for defense cooperation.”  While there has been no indication of the bilateral security cooperation between Central Asian governments replacing what takes place with Russia or other partners, it demonstrates growing partnerships where Central Asian states take the initiative.


Source:

“Государства-союзники (Government-allies),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 6 December 2021.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124124/

Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Qasym Jomart-Tokyaev signed a Declaration of Allied Relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan on 6 December…Within the framework of the visit, which took place 5-6 December, 22 documents were signed…including a plan of action to bring trade turnover between the two states to $10 billion in the next five years…

Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this…

Among the signed documents are agreements in the customs sphere, in the prevention and elimination of emergency situations, the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes as well as documents on further cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, energy, communications and defense…

Source: “В Термезе завершились совместные узбекско-казахские учения (The joint Uzbek-Kazakh exercise has finished in Termez),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 25 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/25/v-termeze-zavershilis-sovmestnyye-uzbeksko-kazaxskiye-ucheniya

The soldiers of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan carried out the main stage of the joint exercise “Hamkorlik-2021” in Termez this week…

According to the plan of the exercise, the combined units of the two countries engaged with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border with the support of fifty vehicles and three hundred service members.

Fighters, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, artillery, motorized rifle units and unmanned aerial systems were used to eliminate the mock enemy group…

Source: “Главы Минобороны Узбекистана и Казахстана обсудили региональную безопасность (The head of the Ministries of Defense of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan discussed regional security),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 23 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/23/glavy-minoborony-uzbekistana-i-kazaxstana-obsudili-regionalnuyu-bezopasnost

On 22 November, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Lieutenant General Bakhodir Kurbanov, met with a military delegation led by the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan, Lieutenant General Murat Bektanov…the two sides discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it…

Following the meeting, the ministries of defense signed an agreement, which includes a number of measures for defense cooperation…


Image Information:

Image: Map of Central Asia.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Central_Asia.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Develops and Implements Counter-UAV Tactics and Technologies

Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.

Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.

Ratt Anti-UAV System (exterior view).

Ratt Anti-UAV System (interior view).


“Many Russian electronic warfare manufacturers are now developing portable counter-UAV devices, mindful of the requirement for small military teams to be protected against the drone threat from the air. Most of them, like the Pishchal, are in the form of a firearm, which is convenient and what troops are used to.”


There is a consensus in Russian circles of military thought that the ability to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be decisive in future conflicts.  The excerpted articles from Russian Armed Forces monthly journal Armeyskiy Sbornik and pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discuss Russia’s development of counter-UAV technologies.  Armeyskiy Sbornik describes the theory underpinning Russia’s tactics for countering UAVs.  Russia intends to use both kinetic fires, such as the guns and missiles of air defense systems, and electronic warfare (EW), such as jamming, to counter UAVs.  The article also mentions some of the unique technologies that Russia has developed to further this effort, such as the Pischal counter-UAV gun.  According to military and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, during the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, EW caused approximately 15 UAVs to land, or fly-off course.  The article posits that these EW means and conventional air defense systems could defeat Ukraine’s Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs.  The article from Izvestiya explains how Russia’s theory of kinetic air defense in conjunction with effective EW is not just theory, and Russia is already implementing it in training.


Source:

Colonel M. Mitrofanov, Lieutenant Colonel D. Vasyukov, and Major V. Anisimov, “Практические Рекомендации Защита Элементов Системы Связи От Беспилотных Летательных Аппаратов (Practical Recommendations for Protecting Elements of a Communication System Against Drones),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Armed Forces military and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer), September 2021. https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/343042/

Drones are becoming an increasingly common element of modern military operations and are now accessible not only to regular but also to irregular armed forces and also to terrorist organizations…Experience of countering drones during local conflicts across the world has shown that when they are airborne their data transmission channels are visible to signals intelligence and vulnerable to electronic jamming. The data transmission channels include:

— the operator’s control channel to the drone

— the drone’s channel for transmitting data to its control station

— the satellite navigation channel

Countering drones does not necessarily mean their physical destruction. Electronic jamming can be used to disable a drone’s data transmission channel, also the channel for controlling it. Apart from disabling the control and data channels, you also need to disable the channel that receives the satellite navigation signals. Satellite data is used not only to plot the drone’s route but also by weapons for target acquisition…Russian electronic warfare developers are actively working on ways of countering drones. For example, at the Dubai Airshow in 2019 the Rosoboronexport corporation displayed the design of a layered defense system that included Russia’s latest counterdrone technologies, such as the Repellent-1, Sapsan Bekas, Kupol, Rubezh Avtomatika, Luch, and Pishchal…

Particular attention is also being paid to portable devices for fighting drones. For example, the Luch and Pishchal systems, which can emit electromagnetic signals to disable drones 6 and 2 km away respectively, were displayed for the first time at the Dubai Air Show in 2019. The Pishchal weighs just 3.5 kg and is one of the lightest counter-UAV devices of its class on the market today, so it can form part of a soldier’s personal kit (figure 8).

Many Russian electronic warfare manufacturers are now developing portable counter-UAV devices, mindful of the requirement for small military teams to be protected against the drone threat from the air. Most of them, like the Pishchal, are in the form of a firearm, which is convenient and what troops are used to. They comprise modules for detecting a drone’s radio signals and creating the jamming to disable the control and navigation channels. Among these devices is the “Personal Drone Countermeasures Complex” made by the Special Technology Center company (reference 8), which can disable drone control channels from at least 2 km away and radio navigation channels from at least 10 km. Or the Rex 1 and Rex 2 portable counter-UAV systems made by the company Zala Group Unmanned Systems (reference 9), which also work against drone control and navigation channels. And these are by no means all the developments of our defense sector when it comes to fighting drones.

So, at the present time, we know of the following ways of countering drones.

1. Destroy them using air defense or other fire assets.

2. Destroy their control stations.

3. Capture them (with nets or by intercepting their control channels).

4. Use electro-optical countermeasures (advanced directed-output laser weapons).

5. Electronically jam their control channels, reconnaissance data transmission channels, or their geopositioning systems.

6. Distort the navigation coordinates in the vicinity of a protected site.

7. Conceal protected sites.

8. Create dummy protected sites (deception).

Source: Oleg Falichev, “«Байрактаров»: У России есть все необходимое для приземления турецких беспилотников (Snares for Bayraktar: Russia Has All Necessary Equipment to Force Turkish Drones to Land),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Russian weekly focusing on the military and defense industry), 1 November 2021. https://vpk-news.ru/articles/64483

The situation in eastern Ukraine has escalated once again. The Ukrainian Armed Forces subunits occupied the village of Staromarivka in the so-called gray zone, where 180 residents ended up hostages; about 40 of them own Russian passports. Trains with tanks and artillery arrive at the closest railway station. One of them had been spotted near Slovyansk, the second one — near Svyate. Positions of Donetsk militia are bombed by Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs. The situation is again on the verge of a full-scale war…So what should Russia do? It cannot be ruled out that Russia might hold new large-scale military exercises next to the borders with Ukraine to rehearse action against external threats, as was observed at the beginning of this year when, according to Western data, a Russian army numbering about 100,000-120,000 personnel was deployed in the vicinity of the Ukrainian border.

[T]he best option is to create a full-fledged air defense grouping in this area, capable of covering villages and militia without crossing the demarcation line…However, Russia also has other weapons that work without firing…Based on the experience of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, about 15 UAVs were forced to land or were thrown off course with the aid of electronic warfare equipment…The Pantsir-S1 and Pantsir-SM antiaircraft missile and gun systems are also excellent countermeasures against drones. The range of the latter has been increased to 40 kilometers thanks to the upgraded multifunctional aiming station. The range at which it detects and selects targets is substantially greater, and so is its resistance to jamming. However, this weapon, as they say, may be used in case of emergency. The main thing right now is to establish and secure a resilient system for radar surveillance and monitoring…

Source: Alexey Ramm and Bogdan Stepovoy, “На новый маневр: войска отработали борьбу с беспилотниками в горах: Какую тактику отражения атак дронов опробовали на учениях в Крыму и на Кавказе (To New Maneuver:  The Troops Worked Out Combating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Mountains: They Worked Out Which Tactic To Repel Drone Attacks at Exercises in the Crimea and in the Caucasus),” Izvestiya (large-circulation pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 3 November 2021. https://iz.ru/1244533/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi/na-novyi-manevr-voiska-otrabotali-borbu-s-bespilotnikami-v-gorakh

The Ministry of Defense has concluded a series of exercises in the Caucasus and in the Crimea, at which they worked out and studied Russian air defense capabilities to combat unmanned aerial vehicles in mountain conditions. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh showed that drones are becoming especially dangerous during combat on mountain terrain: it is difficult to detect and shoot them down due to the terrain’s relief. They managed to repel a supposed mass attack of unmanned aerial vehicles through the joint operations of the air defense (PVO) and electronic warfare (EW) forces. In the experts’ words, only the cohesive work of all subunits, which are participating in the engagement, can yield success in the mountains…

The Military Department previously reported that a composite detachment for combating UAVs of Southern Military District 49th Combined-Arms Army’s Mountain Motorized Rifle Formation repelled the attacks of the notional enemy’s drones at Kobu-Bashi Range in Karachay-Cherkesia. It consisted of EW and tactical reconnaissance subunits and crews of Tunguska-M1 [SA-19 GRISON] air defense missile-gun systems and Strela-10 [SA-13 GOLPHER] missile systems.  During the course of the exercises, the PVO subunits managed to destroy all targets, and the EW complexes confirmed their high effectiveness, having used Zhitel jamming stations to jam the drones’ command and control and navigation channels. More than 500 servicemen participated in the maneuvers…

Even simple UAVs gain many advantages in the mountains, which the defending side needs to mitigate, Military Expert Viktor Murakhovskiy pointed out in a conversation with Izvestiya.

“A drone is not visible for radars and optical systems behind mountain slopes,” he explained. “As a result, the UAVs obtain good chances to conduct a surprise attack and the defending side’s response time is reduced.  The Syrian experience has demonstrated that the composite detachments make a good showing on that terrain, which PVO and EW weapons and even snipers with heavy caliber rifles can reach. It is also very important to organize monitoring of the air situation in the mountains…

The Russian Army is prepared to confront the new threat. The PVO system is being improved constantly and new equipment is arriving in the troops. The Military Department has already reported that a new air defense command and control system was employed at the “Zapad-2021” Strategic Exercises. It consisted of all reconnaissance assets and also of air defense systems and complexes, which were involved in the maneuvers. The exercises demonstrated that the new equipment permits the creation of an impenetrable defensive dome over significant territory…


Image Information:

Image: Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-SCHRNzn/0/6a9634f0/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-090-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Image: Ratt Anti-UAV System (exterior view).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-N8H53ht/0/f9763ab1/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-084-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Image: Ratt Anti-UAV System (interior view).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-dMRnVvJ/0/5487d70d/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-085-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Developments in Russia’s BARS Reserve System

General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

Reservists in training.

Reservists in training.


The military organization is making every effort to eliminate the possible consequences of a hybrid war against the Russian Federation and at the same time lacks human resources. One of the measures preventing attempts to disorganize the rear in a possible military conflict with geopolitical opponents of Russia is the creation of territorial defense troops.”


The accompanying excerpted articles from Vologda Oblastprovincial newspaper Krasnaya Sever and Leningrad Oblast-basedonline news site 47 News discuss the operation of Russia’s new reserve system known as the Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) in some sources, and as the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) in others.  According to Krasnaya Sever, reservists participating in this program will perform up to eight 3-day training assemblies and a 30-day exercise annually.  The article goes on to explain how the BARS will select, train, and compensate reservists.  The article from 47 News is notable as it mentions that BARS is not unique to the Southern Military District, as first reported, but can now be found in at least one other military district.  This suggests that that BARS may, or has already, become a national program, and not just an experiment in the Southern Military District.

The accompanying excerpted articles from Krasnodar regional newspaper Golos Pravdy and Russianmilitary and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer discuss personnel issues with BARS.  Golos Pravdy notes that the Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon has only been able to fill 15 of its 424 reserve billets.  Valeriy Poludnitsin of the local military commissariat sums up the BARS recruiting effort as: “Unfortunately and despite all our efforts, the numbers wishing to sign up are small.”  Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer suggests developing a special program for university students and another for personnel working in private military companies as potential ways of increasing participation in BARS.


Source:

Olga Burchevskaya: “А ты записался резервистом?! (Did You Sign Up to Be a Reservist?!),” Krasnaya Sever (provincial newspaper of Vologda Oblast), 27 October 2021.  https://www.krassever.ru/article/a-ty-zapisalsya-rezervistom

…It was earlier, in Soviet times, that everyone in succession was called up into the “partisans”: reserve officers and men traveled to military reservist active-duty training at least once in their lives.  Everything changed in the new millennium: now a limited number of citizens are trained in case of enemy attacks according to the principle of “better less, but better.”

The Russian Federation Presidential Edict establishing a human mobilization reserve came out in 2015.  Initially a number of regions tried it out by assembling small subunits.  This year it also came the turn of our Oblast: in August military commissariats were assigned the mission of manning an expanded battalion of reservists (around 500 persons).  Then in September around 100 men signed a contract and set off for three-day training in Karelia…

Not just anybody will be taken as a reservist, they caution in the oblast military commissariat.  According to the statute, this must be a person who has performed conscripted or contract service in the Army and who has a specific military specialty (tanker, motorized rifleman, specialist in servicing equipment and arms).  The age for privates, NCOs, and warrant officers is up to 42 (greater for officers).  Health also is assessed: those registered in health centers (drug rehabilitation, tuberculosis, psychoneurological) will not be accepted in the mobilization reserve, as well as persons with disabilities.  In addition, citizens will be refused have a criminal record.

“The important thing is the desire of the person himself to become a reservist, we rely on him above all.  Then there is screening and selection: a special board confirms the candidate.  After that he signs a contract to be in the reserve: the minimum term of the first one is three years, and after that it can be even less,” KS was told by Lieutenant Colonel Daniil Bugayev, of the Second Department of the Vologodskaya Oblast Commissariat.  “There are eight training sessions with a reservist annually (each for three training days a month), as well as reservist active-duty training (30 days once a year).  That said, an agrarian, for example, will not be called up for training during the harvest; he will be invited when it will be more convenient for him, in the off-season, let’s say, and river transport workers are not put in action during navigation [season].”

A military uniform, three meals a day “like home” (prepared by civilian cooks), and medical services (what if there is a sudden toothache?) — all this is free at state expense.  Average wages and jobs are kept for reservists, plus they are authorized payments along the Defense Ministry line.  Even if they are not called up for three-day training sessions, privates and NCOs will receive from R1,800 to R3,200 under the contract.  They will be paid from R3,000 to R5,200 for attending such training sessions, and from R18,000 to R31,000 (officers up to R45,000) for month-long reservist active-duty training.  Pay and allowances depend on a reservist’s rank and position (plus the area coefficient for Karelia).

Source: “БАРС соберёт на Северо-Западе несколько тысяч резервистов — их готовят для войск территориальной обороны (BARS [Special Army Combat Reserve] Will Assemble Several Thousand Reservists in the Northwest — They Are Being Trained for the Territorial Defense Troops),” 47 News(online news site focusing on the Leningrad Oblast), 17 November 2021. https://47news.ru/articles/203180/

The second intake of the second phase of reservist active-duty training of subunits of the Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) begins on 22 November in regions where Western Military District troops are stationed.

The Western Military District Press Service informed 47news that plans are to draw several thousand reservists to reservist active-duty training as part of separate subunits formed on the basis of Western Military District military units.

Based on results of reservist active-duty training, citizens who have taken the full combined-arms training course will enter subunits of the territorial defense troops.

During reservist active-duty training, reservists will go through training and improvement of qualification for providing security and defense of strategically important facilities as well as for employing modern arms and military equipment…

Source: “В Красноармейском районе мобилзировано всего 3.5% запасников

(Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon Mobilizes Just 3.5 Percent of Reservists),” Golos Pravdy (newspaper of the Krasnodar region), 16 November 2021. https://golos-pravda.ru/news/obshhestvo/76981-v-krasnoarmejskom-rajone-mobilzirovano-vsego-3-5-zapasnikov/

Reservists are being mobilized in line with Edict of the President of the Russian Federation Number 370 of 17 July 2015 “On the creation of a mobilization personnel reserve of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.”  The rayon military commissariat reports that according to the plan for this year, 33 officers and 391 private soldiers and NCOs from our rayon should be sent to undergo reservist military training. But to date only 15 people have signed a contract to serve in the reserve.

The acting chief of the mobilization resources planning, assignment, training, and registration section, Valeriy Poludnitsin, said that the commissariat has been campaigning hard among the 1,500 reservists who are liable for military service.  “Unfortunately and despite all our efforts, the numbers wishing to sign up are small,” he commented.  In his view this is due to fear of losing one’s job although the contract makes it possible to maintain it during military drills and assemblies, during which the Defense Ministry reimburses the reservist’s average wage to the employer…And along with everything else, when reservists are called up to assemblies and drills their employers are reimbursed their salary costs. Unemployed individuals receive the minimum wage and also the cost of travel and expenses from home to the military commissariat and back. If necessary, the cost of renting accommodation is paid…

 Contracts to serve in the mobilization reserve are signed with warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers up to the age of 42. With junior officers up to 47 years of age, and also with senior officers apart from colonels up to 52 years, and with colonels up to 57 years, for a minimum period of three years.

Source: Grigoriy Nokonorov and Igor Rodionov, “Служба возле дома: Из кого формировать подразделения территориальной обороны (Service Close to Home: Who to Form Subunits of Territorial Defense Troops?),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Russian weekly newspaper focusing on the military and defense industry), 26 October 2021.   https://vpk-news.ru/articles/64394

…The military organization is making every effort to eliminate the possible consequences of a hybrid war against the Russian Federation and at the same time lacks human resources. One of the measures preventing attempts to disorganize the rear in a possible military conflict with geopolitical opponents of Russia is the creation of territorial defense troops…

Time has shown that deployment of territorial defense troops (and such events reflect difficulties of the future mobilization) is fraught with significant problems that have to be addressed.  The first one is changes in the forms of ownership in the country — increase in the share of the private sector, which entails the reluctance of owners to release employees to participate in annual musters, envisaged for reservists…The second problem is related to the demographic situation in the regions where it is planned to assemble forces and means of territorial defense, which mainly involve reservists. Not all regions are able to form the same number of units of territorial defense due to circumstances…The third problem is to increase the efficiency of the acquisition and harmonization of such units. It can be solved through the creation of military commissariats (or units that form the basis of territorial defense troops) in staffs, of a permanent organization core (unit commander and his deputies) directly involved in the selection of personnel, conscription, and coordination of reservists…

In the context of a difficult demographic situation in Russia, the main problem of manning the reserve service is about personnel. How to make the transition from patriotic education at the level of sports, exhibition volunteering, and participation in flash mobs to the practical formation of a youth’s readiness to show their patriotic qualities in more serious situations? It seems reasonable to address male students from higher education institutions who have reached the age of majority.  Currently, more than 4 million people are receiving higher education in the country in 213 nonstate (400,000 students) and 497 state universities (3.6 million people). Students at state universities, both in terms of their number and age, are the most active and controlled force that can either be directed into a destructive direction or involved in the fulfillment of defense tasks…Considering that half of the students in public universities are women and another third of the remaining men are exempt from military service, the remaining number of students who have expressed a desire to serve in the reserve can be considered a resource for recruitment into territorial defense troops. By amending the existing legislation, a mechanism can be envisaged to allow for compulsory service during the first three years of studies through annual mandatory musters, and then conclude a contract for service in the reserve, including in the territorial defense forces…In order to spark interest in service (including in the reserve) among students of draft age, it is possible to envisage mechanisms to reduce tuition fees (for those who study on a paid basis)…

Numerous private security companies, whose employees usually have appropriate health clearance and the right to carry weapons, may also be considered a potential reserve for manning territorial defense troops by allowing their employees to serve in the reserve…It is also possible to envisage the possibility of manning territorial defense troops with reservists from Cossack organizations and with members of military-patriotic clubs that satisfy the set requirements… The country is facing a lack of volunteers and reservists. Taking into account the evolving military-political situation and historical traditions, the country needs volunteers who, if necessary, can defend themselves and the country with weapons in their hands.


Image Information:

Image: General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2mvuschv
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Reservists in training.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://function.mil.ru/images/upload/2019/rezerv_550.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

New Russian Film About Syrian Operations Promotes Kremlin Narrative

The motion picture ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, reformat it in the spirit of patriotism.”


The Russian military has entered its seventh year of combat operations in Syria.  The Kremlin-supported media has portrayed their country’s military involvement in an overall positive light.  According to their narrative, Russian forces have helped to decimate the terrorist threat in Syria, bringing large portions of the country back under Syrian government control.  Their participation, however, has not been cost-free.  While exact numbers are classified, more than 100 Russian security forces personnel have been killed in Syria since 2015, with an equal or greater number of injured. 

One of the most dramatic and painful losses occurred in November 2015, when a Russian Su-24M bomber was shot down by a Turkish fighter after an alleged border violation.  The Russian film industry, with financial help from the Ministry of Defense (MoD), recently released a movie “Небо” (Sky) to commemorate this event.  As the two accompanying excerpts describe, this film illustrates how the Russian media can transform a misfortune into a triumph and further strengthen the Kremlin’s narrative.

The first excerpt from the mostly independent Nezavisimoye Voennoye points out that “the film is based on real events that took place in Syria, when, during a combat mission on 24 November 2015, a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish fighter.”  It reminds readers that the aircraft’s “navigator (Murakhtin) was rescued, while the pilot, Peshkov was shot by terrorists in the air.”  The article quotes the commander of the Airborne Forces, who asserts that “the film ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, and reformat it toward the spirit of patriotism.”  The second excerpt from the popular Russian media site Vokrug TV provides some additional background.  Not surprisingly, “the main villain in the film is an invisible puppeteer from the United States who controls the actions of terrorists….”  This site also highly praises this new movie, asserting that “all this is filmed so spectacularly that even the last skeptic will stir up something like patriotism in his soul.”


Source:

Daria Lyubovik, “Небо летчик Олег Пешков: Вышел первый российский фильм о войне в Сирии (Sky of the pilot Oleg Peshkov: The first Russian film about the war in Syria was released),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (mostly independent), 25 November 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2021-11-25/1_1167_sky.html

The film company “Triix Media” together with the Ministry of Defense and with the participation of the channel “Russia 1” presented a film about the feat of the Russian pilot Oleg Peshkov, who died during the anti-terrorist operation in Syria. This is the first art picture, by the decision of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, included in the list of mandatory viewing in the Armed Forces.

The film is based on real events that took place in Syria, when, during a combat mission on 24 November 2015, a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish fighter. The crew – Oleg Peshkov and Konstantin Murakhtin – managed to eject. Navigator Murakhtin was rescued, and Peshkov was shot by terrorists in the air. 

…After the premiere of the film “Sky”, “NVO” asked to share his impressions of the Hero of the Russian Federation, the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Andrei Serdyukov.

– In the Soviet Union, films about the Great Patriotic War were an incentive to educate the younger generation. Does the Ministry of Defense plan to further promote the theme of glorification of people who are responsible for the security of the state?

– “I agree that in our youth there was a lot of glorification in cinema, serious films were shot, the heroes of which became an example for the younger generation. We were brought up on catch phrases from our favorite films. The motion picture ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, reformat it in the spirit of patriotism. I am sure that in the future, with the support of our leadership, many new patriotic films will be released.”

Source: Leonid Kiskarkin, “Небо: военная драма о современном Маресьеве (Sky: a military drama about modern Maresyev).” Vokrug TV (popular Russian media site), 17 November 2021. https://www.vokrug.tv/article/show/16370996521/

The film describes the feat of Russian pilots, whose plane was shot down by the Turks on the border with Syria. …On November 24, 2015, a Russian Su-24M bomber with tail number 83 took off from the Khmeimim military base to carry out a combat mission: launching a missile strike against terrorists. Near the Syrian-Turkish border in the Yayladagi region of Hatay province, a Turkish fighter jet shot down a plane of the Russian military space forces. The crew of two was ejected from the burning bomber. One of the pilots was shot in the air by opponents of the Assad regime, another was able to land safely in an area controlled by terrorists and was rescued during a special operation by the Russian military. This story formed the basis of the military drama “Sky,” filmed with the support of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation….

…The main villain in the film is an invisible puppeteer from the United States who controls the actions of terrorists…

…The film culminates in the same ill-fated flight during which our bomber fell victim to a dastardly Turkish Air Force strike…. All this is filmed so spectacularly that even the last skeptic will stir up something like patriotism in his soul.

Russian Theorists Contemplating Preemptive Wars

Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.

Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.


“If earlier, belligerents tried to preempt the enemy both before and during military (combat) actions, now it is advisable to transfer the main efforts in this matter to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.”


The confidence of the Kremlin leadership to employ, or threaten to employ, military force is increasing as Russia continues to modernize its armed forces.  This growing assurance may have reached the point where Russian military experts are now advocating preemptive military actions to defend the country’s interests.  The accompanying excerpt comes from an article in Voennaya Mysl’, the flagship journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense.  The authors argue that given the rapid nature of modern conflict and the increasing threats of potential adversaries, “it is now advisable to transfer the main military efforts to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.”

The authors begin by describing how great Russian military leaders in the past understood the importance of striking the enemy first.  Citing General A. Suvorov, they assert that “money is costly, human life is even more valuable, but time is the most precious thing!”  Perhaps hinting at Russia’s demographic challenges, they point out that “the superiority gained from a surprise attack makes it possible to more than compensate for a smaller number of his troops.”  The authors go on to suggest that Russia’s growing arsenal of “high-precision long-range sea and air-based weapons” now gives the military the ability to conduct a preemptive strike against the enemies of Russia.

Framing time as a spatial concept, the authors liken this preemptive thinking as an element of a “further development of theory and practice of ‘deep operation.’” Quoting another Russian military theorist, they assert that “in a war, the victory is won by the side that strikes earlier… which is necessary in order to break the enemy’s moral and material resistance and force him to submit to our will.”  The authors conclude by stressing the importance of domestic propaganda when striking first, whereby the military’s “preemption of a potential enemy in action,” will gain the “support and develop the defense consciousness of the Russian people.”


Source:

Major General V.V. Kruglov, Colonel A.S. Shubin, “О возрастающем значении упреждения противника в действиях (On the growing importance of anticipating the enemy in actions),” Voennaya Mysl’ (flagship journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), December 2021. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Nomera  (pp. 27-34).

…All social and military processes are accelerated to such an extent that there is a significant increase in the likelihood of missing any fundamental changes in military affairs that could threaten the security of the state. …In this regard, military science is faced with the urgent task of studying the problem of rational use of the time factor in military affairs.

…Military history shows that one of the first generals who most deeply understood the importance of time in battle was A.V. Suvorov…. Suvorov expressed this circumstance in immortal words: “Money is expensive, human life is even more valuable, and time is the most precious thing!”

The superiority gained from the surprise of the attack made it possible to more than compensate for the small number of his troops.

…More than 100 years ago, the Russian military theorist émigré A. Zalf approached this problem in the following way: “In a war, the victory is won by the side that strikes earlier… in order to break the enemy’s moral and material resistance and force him to submit to our will.”

…The emergence of new means of warfare, in particular high-precision long-range sea and air-based weapons (cruise missile “Caliber”, hypersonic missile systems “Dagger”, “Zircon”, gives rise to such new forms of military action as a strategic strike and a missile air-naval strike.

… in fact, is a consequence of the further development of theory and practice “Deep operation”.

…The arsenal of the RF Armed Forces should contain types of weapons, forms and methods of action that are unexpected for the enemy, guaranteeing the destruction of the aggressor in any conditions of the situation. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that at present the use of the time factor has acquired a qualitatively new feature that generates the following pattern. If earlier, belligerents tried to preempt the enemy both before and during military (combat) actions, now it is advisable to transfer the main efforts in this matter to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall the words of the patriot of Russia A. Shcherbatov, addressed to its citizens many years ago: “Under modern conditions of international struggle, victory remains with the fighting force behind which there is a nationwide determination to win at any cost and at whatever cost. victims. It is easy to create such a mood in the Russian people, since the state principle always prevailed over personal interest….”  In connection with the permanent aggravation of the military-political situation in the world, when an armed conflict or war may break out at any moment and one must be ready for them, military scientists and military command and control bodies at all levels should intensify efforts to find and implement the latest effective forms and methods of military (combat) actions, including those involving preemption of a potential enemy in action, and thereby support and develop the defense consciousness of the Russian people.


Image Information:

Image: Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Suvorov#/media/File:Suvorov_Alex_V.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

“Russia On The Nature Of Future Conflict: Is This An Opening Discussion Of Russia’s New Military Doctrine?” by Timothy Thomas and Harold Orenstein (May 2021)

(Click image to download brief.)


KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Soviet Union stated that military doctrine “contains two closely interlinked and interdependent aspects—a socio-political aspect and a military-technical aspect.”1 The socio-political aspect contains the greatest stability while the military-technical aspect encompasses matters directly pertaining to military organizational development and technical equipment. It helps determine the forms and methods for conducting operations.2

Likewise, the dictionary states that the character/nature of war is composed of socio- political and military-technical components (the 2007 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Eksmo, did not define the term). The socio-political aspect includes economic and socio-political causes, conflicts which led to war’s occurrence, class thrusts and political aims of belligerents, and the degree to which these aims are in conformity with social progress. This character of the socio- political component may change during a war’s course. The military-technical component of war’s character includes conventional and nuclear military hardware, the forms and methods of the conduct of military operations, and the scope, scale, and duration of war.3 While dated, the definitions offer most of the basic elements of these concepts today. Even though the article that follows is about the nature of future conflict, it should be kept in mind that the analysis is also about how Russian military authors may be sizing up their next version of military doctrine.


“The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense” by Les Grau and Charles Bartles (May 2021)

(Click image to download brief.)


KEY TAKEAWAYS

In the practice and application of historical analysis, the Russian General Staff closely examines details of past conflicts – noting what they learned and even unlearned – to keep their military science and training forward-looking. Maneuver defense is one of those lessons. Russia’s strategic defense Russia and the Soviet Union fought successful major wars using strategic defense and withdrawal. Russia defeated Napoleon by initially conducting a strategic defense and multiple withdrawals, followed by decisive counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved superior to that of his enemies and his operations were primarily offensive. Napoleon was often successful in surrounding an enemy army or defeating it in one decisive battle and then occupying its capital city and taking charge of the country.2 Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion by losing battles, yet maintaining and rebuilding its army throughout successive retreats. As the army retreated, the Russians set fire to their own crops and villages, leaving scorched earth behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet Russia still refused to surrender and soon flames consumed Moscow. Napoleon had reached his culminating point, and his supply lines stretched to breaking. Russia was fighting a strategy of “war of attrition,” whereas Napoleon was fighting a strategy of “destruction.”