Tag Archives: Russia

Russian Public Approval of Military Likely To Decline over Use of Conscripts in Ukraine

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“…the official representative of the RF Ministry of Defense, Igor Konashenkov, admitted that conscripts participated in the special operation….”

Alongside Russia’s improvement in combat readiness over the past decade, we have seen a significant improvement in Russian public attitudes toward the military.  As reported earlier, (see: “Russian Patriotism and Values,” OE Watch, August 2020) polls suggest that Russians regard their military as one of the most trusted institutions, with the majority claiming that some form of military service should be mandatory for young Russian men.  However, as the accompanying excerpt from the moderate source Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggests, the ongoing conflict with Ukraine may change public attitudes toward the military.

The article reports that the official representative of Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD), Igor Konashenkov, admitted on 9 March that conscripts participated in the “special operation” in Ukraine.  As the article points out, this admission took on added poignancy since the day prior,  President Putin had congratulated women on International Women’s Day and asserted that only contract soldiers were participating in the operation.  As the article suggests, the Russian MoD only revealed this information after “the Ukrainian media distributed several videos showing young people who said they were captured Russian servicemen and not contract soldiers.”  The article stresses that Putin had earlier instructed the MoD “to categorically exclude the involvement of conscripts for any tasks on the territory of Ukraine.”  The article asserts that “the perpetrators of misinforming the president are planned to be identified and punished.”  If such deception continues, public attitudes toward the military will likely decline.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Минобороны России признало участие срочников в спецоперации (The Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged the participation of conscripts in the special operation),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (moderate source), 9 March 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-03-09/2_8386_president.html

…Meanwhile, the official representative of the RF Ministry of Defense, Igor Konashenkov, admitted that conscripts participated in the special operation. Earlier, the Ukrainian media distributed several videos showing young people who say they are captured Russian servicemen and not contract soldiers. Russian officials denied this information until March 9, and President Vladimir Putin, congratulating women on International Women’s Day [8 March], confidently said that only contract soldiers were participating in the operation. “I would like to emphasize that soldiers who are serving in military service do not and will not participate in hostilities. There will be no additional call-up of reservists from the reserve,” the head of the Russian Federation said.

The position has now been corrected. “Unfortunately, several facts of the presence of conscripts in parts of the Russian armed forces involved in a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine were discovered,” Konashenkov said. – Almost all such servicemen have already been withdrawn to the territory of Russia. At the same time, a sabotage group of the national battalion attacked one of the units performing the tasks of logistical support. A number of servicemen, including conscripts, were captured.” According to Konashenkov, measures are now being taken to prevent conscripts from being sent to combat areas and to release captured soldiers.Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov said that Putin was informed that his instruction “to categorically exclude the involvement of conscripts for any tasks on the territory of Ukraine” was carried out. Now the perpetrators of misinforming the president are planned to be identified and punished….

Iran Repositions Its Proxies in Syria as Russia Turns Focus to Ukraine

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Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.

Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.

“…Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…”

Local media reports indicate that Iran is “repositioning” in Syria, perhaps seeking to take advantage of the Russian military’s focus on Ukraine.  A late February report by Syria-focused Turkish think tank Jusoor Center for Studies speculates that Russia’s focus on Ukraine may detract from its involvement in Syria, “and Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors.”   The report mentions several signs of Iran’s repositioning in Syria, including increased activities and weapons transfers by Iran-backed militias in regime-controlled areas of the Syrian desert and the Middle Euphrates River Valley, near the border with Iraq.  Tensions were rising between Russian and Iranian proxies in Deir Ezzor Province during the build up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the accompanying excerpt from the Syrian opposition media source Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.  Russian airstrikes on ISIS positions in the desert have declined substantially since the start of the war in Ukraine, even as the group has ramped up its attacks in the Syrian desert, according to a report from the pro-Syrian opposition Lebanese news website al-Modon.  The Quds Brigade, Russia’s key ally in anti-ISIS efforts in the Syrian desert, withdrew precipitously to Damascus.  Meanwhile, local media reports claim several Iraqi militias have returned to Iraq and Iranian proxies in the Fatemiyoun Brigade have redeployed in the area.  The logic behind these movements remains murky, but the accompanying excerpt from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat speculates that they relate to strengthening supply lines and transit corridors between Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria.

Source:

“6 مؤشرات على إعادة تموضع إيران في سورية

(Six indicators that Iran is repositioning in Syria),” Jusoor Center for Studies (Turkey-based think tank focused on Syria), 4 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8tnvv4

Since the beginning of 2022, Iran has begun to undertake a series of political, military, economic and security activities in coordination with the Syrian regime, which indicates its repositioning in Syria…

… the continuation of conflict in Ukraine may lead to a decline in Russia’s interest in Syria.  Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…

Source:

“تصاعد ملحوظ في الحرب الباردة بين الجانبين الروسي والإيراني في محاولة لكسب ود أهالي القرى السبع شرقي الفرات

(Notable Escalation in the Cold War between Russia and Iran in an attempt to gain allegiance from the ‘Seven Villages’ east of the Euphrates),” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (Syrian opposition media source), https://tinyurl.com/2p85pm2x, 16 February 2022.

Recently, the competition between Russia and Iran has escalated in the countryside of Deir Ezzor governorate, specifically in the so-called “seven villages” under the influence of the Iranians and the regime east of the Euphrates, and the corresponding areas on the western bank of the river…

Source:

“إيران تتمدد في سوريا..إثر تراجع النشاط الروسي

(Iran expands in Syria… following decline in Russian activities),” al-Modon (pro-Syrian Lebanese news website), 12 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8v8v9y


Russian military activities throughout the Syrian territory have declined as the Russian attack on Ukraine enters its third week. At the same time, Iranian militias are sending military reinforcements to the city of Palmyra and its surroundings.

…“the Russian aerial bombardment on the Syrian desert is half of what it was before the war on Ukraine”…


On Friday, the Palestinian “Quds Brigade” militia withdrew from the city of Palmyra, located in the eastern countryside of Homs. Militia members left the city heading towards the governorate of Damascus. The motives for this withdrawal remain unknown and it is unclear whether they will return later. According to the sources of the Syrian Observatory, the Quds Brigade’s withdrawal came without prior warning or coordination with the regime’s security services located in Palmyra and its surroundings.

Source:

“مئات من ميليشيات إيران يغادرون سوريا إلى العراق 

(Hundreds of Iranian miliitas leave Syria for Iraq),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 7 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mrdd5r2m

Syrian activists reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard began withdrawing a large number of militia members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghani) and Iraqi (Shiite) militias from military sites in the areas of Palmyra and Sukhna, east of Homs, into Iraqi territory, through unauthorized crossings. Other fighters from the (Afghan Fatemiyoun) Brigade were deployed to new camps east of Palmyra. The sites in Homs countryside and a number of military vehicles and equipment were handed over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The development was described by activists in the region as “remarkable,” at a time when (ISIS) launched repeated attacks against regime forces and Iranian militias in the Homs desert and Deir Ezzor, incurring losses in life and equipment.

Image Information:

Image:  Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021. 
Source: Spc. Isaiah J Scott, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6705061/sdf-conducts-patrol-syria
Attribution: Public Domain

Invasion of Ukraine Spotlights Russia’s Information, Intelligence Operations in Latin America

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A GLONASS or GPS personal device for satellite positioning.

A GLONASS or GPS personal device for satellite positioning.

“All installation work was carried out by Russian personnel and their access is restricted.  A concrete wall topped with barbed wire blocks the way… there is no known anti-drug operation in which it has participated.”

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine brought new focus on Latin America, where Russia maintains influence, especially through the authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.  Russia’s economic footprint may be relatively small compared to China’s, but it operates robust propaganda networks with wide dissemination in the region.  Russia has also demonstrated an ability to interfere in the region’s elections, including in Colombia’s upcoming presidential election.  The excerpted article from center-left Colombian daily El Espectador reports that social media experts have noted an uptick in Russian bots shaping the political narrative in Colombia and pushing domestic debate to the political fringes.  Meanwhile, in Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua, scrutiny remains focused on Russia’s highly capable intelligence-gathering satellites.  The excerpted article from Argentine center-left news website Infobae reports that Russia installed these satellites under the guise of assisting Nicaragua in its counternarcotics operations.  However, the site reports that Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) has not participated in any known counternarcotics operations in its over five years of existence.  Russia’s position in Nicaragua complements its four stations in Brazil, three in Antarctica, and one in South Africa.  The country’s position in Latin America, bolstered by digital information operations and military hardware in countries such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, is extremely important as it contemplates potential measures against the United States for its punishing sanctions campaign.

Source:

“Estación satelital o espionaje?: cómo es la más misteriosa base rusa en América Latina (Satellite station or espionage?: what is the most mysterious Russian base in Latin America),” Infobae (Argentine news outlet generally considered center-left politically), 17 March 2022.  https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2022/03/17/estacion-satelital-o-espionaje-como-es-la-mas-misteriosa-base-rusa-en-america-latina/

From 2013 to date, Russia has installed nine ground satellite stations outside its borders, known as GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System, for its acronym in Russian).  The last one was installed in Nicaragua five years ago, and it is receiving attention when the world takes stock of the resources that Russia has in the face of a possible global war…  All installation work was carried out by Russian personnel and their access is restricted.  A concrete wall topped with barbed wire blocks the way…there is no known anti-drug operation in which it has participated.

Source:  “La influencia rusa en América Latina, ¿un riesgo para Colombia? (Russian influence in Latin America—a risk for Colombia?),” El Espectador (Colombian daily generally considered center-left politically), 1 March 2022.  https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/la-influencia-rusa-en-america-latina-un-riesgo-para-colombia/

There is a lot of talk about disinformation that comes from abroad.  Yes, that is a real threat.  Not so much because of the penetration of vote counting systems in democratic countries, but because of the manipulation of the media, because of disinformation propaganda, because of the use of algorithms to send messages that confuse the voter and that create alarmist opinions.

Image Information:

Image caption:  A GLONASS or GPS personal device for satellite positioning.
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GLONASS_or_GPS_personal_device_NPI-2.jpg
Attribution:  Wikimedia

Azerbaijan and Russia Seek Improved Relations

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Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

“The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.”

Azerbaijan has had a strained relationship with Russia for a number of years, but as the accompanying excerpted article from Azerbaijani semi-independent news agency Trend reports, President Aliyev and President Putin signed an agreement on 22 February 2022 to improve relations.  Several points of the agreement are worth noting, particularly since Aliyev and Putin signed it two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The article includes the text of the agreement, which has over 40 areas of cooperation.  The first and second points state that both sides will respect each other’s internal and foreign affairs, and refrain from interfering in them.  Point number nine states that both governments will continue to make efforts to implement the agreements they signed with Armenia as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.  Since then, Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine as the two sides have had a good bilateral relationship.  Still, Azerbaijan has so far held a neutral position on the war.

Points 12 through 16 pertain to increasing security cooperation in various capacities, particularly numbers 14 and 15, which deal with working together to develop new weapons and equipment.  While it is unknown how much this security cooperation will develop, Russia will likely continue to provide Armenia with new weapons and equipment.  This could be a continuation of previous policy where Russia provided both Armenia and Azerbaijan with equipment as part of an effort to maintain influence with each during their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lastly, point number 25 states that both sides “will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.”  The government of Azerbaijan has reportedly suspended flights of its national airline to Russia due to insurance issues, but it has so far not carried out any economic sanctions against Russia as part of its neutral position on the conflict.  Considering the history of Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Russia, it is difficult to determine how much this relationship will develop, but the agreement marks a step closer to better relations at a time when the Russian government faces sanctions and poor relations with a number of countries around the world.

Source:

“Обнародован текст Декларации о союзническом взаимодействии между Россией и Азербайджаном (The published text of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan),” Trend (semi-independent news agency in Azerbaijan), 22 February 2022.

https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3559098.html

…As Trend reports on Tuesday with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, the Declaration says: “President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, having comprehensively considered the state and prospects for the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations…Noting the importance of building a multipolar world based on international law and the central role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, declare the following:

1. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan build their relations on the basis of allied interaction, mutual respect for independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders of the two countries, as well as adherence to the principles of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of force.

2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan pursue an independent foreign policy aimed at protecting their national interests.

…

9. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to contribute in every possible way to efforts to implement the provisions of the statements of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation dated November 9/10, 2020, January 11, 2021 and November 26, 2021, which served as the basis for strengthening stability and security, unblocking all economic and transport ties in the region and for normalizing relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.

…

12. The Parties shall develop bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries.

13. The parties will deepen interaction between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat training activities, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.

14. The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of having modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.

15. The Parties will intensify efforts to create service centers for maintenance, repair, modernization of weapons and military equipment, as well as to organize joint production of various types of military products.

16. In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military assistance on the basis of the UN Charter, separate international treaties and taking into account the existing international legal obligations of each of the Parties.

…

25. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Aliyev_joint_statements_(2022-02-22)_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Russian Railroad Troops’ Trains Will Be Robotized

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“In addition to the current armored trains in the railroad troops (there are two railroad battalions in the separate railroad brigade in the Southern Military District), we have restored the “Amur” armored trains for special missions in zones of military conflict and restored the “Baikal” military escort trains with their cranes and supply of construction material.”

Railroads are the major means of material transport in Russia.  The Russian Railroad Troops are an established branch of the Russian ground forces.  Before the Second Chechen War, the railroad troops built a rail line into Dagestan that proved valuable to the successful Russian effort against Chechnya.  Railroad Troops build rail lines, rail bridges, switching yards, and tunnels.  They also operate armored trains that mount artillery, air defense systems, and other armaments.  The pro-government newspaper Izvestia sent two of its premier military reporters to interview the Chief of the Railroad Troops.  In addition to providing background on the railroad troops and their mission, he discussed new technical plans and training developed to incorporate robotics into the railroad troops.  In particular, he notes that military scholars are conducting research and development in the uses of robotic systems to support railroad troops.  Although not stated explicitly, the accompanying excerpts of the interview imply that Russian trains manned by Railroad Troops may play a role in the Ukraine invasion delivering essential combat equipment to the area of conflict.

Source:

Roman Kretsul and Alexi Ramm, “Роботизированные Системы Скоро Наудт Применение в Железнодорожных Войскак (Robotic systems will soon be adapted by Railroad Troops), Izvestia (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 11 February 2022. https://iz.ru/1289710/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/robotizirovannye-sistemy-skoro-naidut-primenenie-v-zheleznodorozhnykh-voiskakh

The railroad troops are overshadowed by other structures in the Ministry of Defense.  However, the importance of their work is not underestimated.  For example, in 2015, railroad troops built a bypass line around Ukraine.  General-Lieutenant Oleg Kosenkov, Chief of the Railroad Troops Directorate in the Ministry of Defense sat for an Izvestia interview that covered their experience in the construction of the Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM) railroad and discussed the new technical plans and training developed to incorporate robotics. 

The public knows little about the specific details of the railroad troops.  What are they for and what missions do they do?

Railroad troops are special troops designated for the restoration, blocking, mine removal, technical oversight and construction of railroad lines.  They improve their stability and capacity, construct feeder lines for railroad bridges and junctures, operate and install floating railroad bridges and support the Armed forces of our country.

In recent years, the Army has undergone serious reforms.  Did these have an impact on the railroad troops? 

Under the direction of the Minister of Defense, Army General Sergei Shoigu, we reorganized the structure of the railroad troops on a different vector-from a massive, one might say overdone structure to a smaller, more manageable and optimized structure.  We formed 13 support centers for mobilization deployment.  Their primary mission is to accumulate, maintain and upgrade weapons, military and specialized technology and material items; support mobilization support bases; and to provide administrative points for the receipt of mobilization resources which conduct priority measures.  During this period, we formed four bases for construction material. 

In 2015, we undertook more signification measures for organizing construction.  As a result, the separate railroad brigade (the primary railroad troop organization) gained the status of a formation consisting of separate military regiments.  The railroad troops then consisted of 10 formations with 58 ready separate military regiments.  At the end of 2015, the Ministry of Defense formed the scientific-technical committee for the railroad troops.  Later, the railroad troop’s scientific-technical testing center formed. 

In 2015, the railroad troops built the Zhyravka-Millerovo stretch in southwest Russia.  What experience did they receive from this construction?

The president gave the mission to the Ministry of Defense to build the railroad bypass around Ukraine.  They built a dual-track electrified railroad section for the South-East and Northern Caucasus railroad using troops from the Southern, Western and Central Military Districts.  The project involved some 1,700 personnel and 700 trucks, engineering and specialized equipment.  In a short period, the railroad troops carried out a major project to build a permanent new railroad line….

Last year the railroad troops worked on the reconstruction of the Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM).  Did this present difficulties or was it routine and orderly?

In April 2021, the railroad troops began laying a section of double track from Ulak to the Fevralsk Station on the Far Eastern railroad and set about reconstructing their assigned section of the BAM.  It turns out this was one of the most difficult sections.  

At this time, five railroad troops’ formations with their component of specialized military units and subunits are working to complete this project.  They are quartered in small garrisons of contemporary modular housing in accordance with the established norms for food and housing.  During the course of four seasons, we studied the influence of climate during the construction process.  And you may believe that, having studied the experience of the earlier construction of the magistral, the forces have already finished a significant portion of the work.  You may say that slowly we are beginning to master the harsh taiga….

We always hear how the Navy, Aviation, and the Aerospace Forces receive the newest military technology.  Are the railroad troops also receiving new, breakthrough technology?

…Over the past several years, the railroad troops units have received technology for transporting swimming railroad bridges, for measuring ballast for railroad beds and independent movement.  In the future, they plan to have new track and railroad tie layers and also improvements in wheeled technology for rail.  Further, military scholars are conducting research and development in the uses of robotic systems to support railroad troops.  I believe that they will soon be ours for use.

Are there any plans for the railroad troops to build new sections of track, bridges and tunnels?

Yes, we are working with the Russian Federation Ministry of Transport and the government-owned Joint Stock Company “Russian Railroads”.  We are cooperating on using the railroad troops for new construction and reconstruction.  Currently we are working on a section of track as part of the third stage of developing a rail line from the BAM to the Eastern Military Training area.

Will your forces receive new specialized trains or locomotives?  Are you looking into developing a modern analog to the armored train or something similar?In addition to the current armored trains in the railroad troops (there are two railroad battalions in the separate railroad brigade in the Southern Military District), we have restored the “Amur” armored train for special missions in zones of military conflict and restored the “Baikal” military escort train.  Both can carry cranes and supplies of construction material.  There is no analog to these specialized mobile trains.  Running these trains on railroads provides technical reconnaissance, mine clearing and removal of damaged railroad debris, transportation for personnel and accompanying military echelons.  These trains are always in the “hot” (ready -not damped) mode ready to act under any circumstance.  Within an hour they must be ready to leave the station on the start of a long journey to a designated place.

Russia Fields the “Zemledeliye” Engineering System for Remote Mining

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Engineering System for Remote Mining (ISDM).

Engineering System for Remote Mining (ISDM).

“The installation of minefields with the help of the “Zemledeliye” ISDM [Engineering System for Remote Mining] has a number of advantages. In particular, the speed of laying minefields has been increased, especially in hard-to-reach areas. And the ability of mines to deactivate or self-destruct at a given time ensures safe and quick clearance after the cessation of hostilities.”

“In maneuver war, they [Engineering Systems for Remote Mining] are very effective,” the expert explained. “They bind the enemy, by covering flanks and performing many other missions. On the southern axis, on the one hand, there is a high terrorist threat: Central Asia is nearby, and these systems will become an effective defense system. But if a situation arises related to the same Ukraine, then Zemledeliye can also be used against modern armies equipped with high-tech weapons…”

-Russian military expert Vladislav Shurygin

Russian Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs)—such as the 120mm BM-21 Grad, 220mm BM-27 Uragan, and 300mm BM-30 Smerch—have rockets that can deploy scatterable mines considerable distances.  Although Russian MLRSs can all employ these types of rockets, in practice they are typically only deployed by the BM-27 Uragan, whose 9M59 rocket can deploy 9 PTM-3 antitank mines, and BM-30 Smerch, whose 9M55K4 rocket can deploy 25 PTM-3 antitank mines.  The BM-21 Grad, the only MLRS type at brigade/division level, is capable of firing the 9M22K2/9M28K scatterable mine rocket, but rarely does so because the 9M22K2/9M28K munition is only capable of deploying three PTM-3 antitank mines.  Creating just a 1km minefield requires a minimum of 90 9M22K2/9M28K munitions.  If the intent were to deter or slow a tank battalion, an entire battalion of BM-21s, 18 launchers, would be required.

The accompanying excerpted articles from Russian newspaper Izvestia and Russian defense-related weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer discuss Russia’s recent fielding of the “Zemledeliye” Engineering System for Remote Mining (ISDM).  The Zemledeliye ISDM is a dedicated system for deploying scatterable mines at a distance of up to 15km.  The system consists of a launch vehicle with two pods of 25 rockets each, a transport-loading vehicle, and transport-launch containers with rockets equipped with various types of mines.  The Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer article notes that the Zemledeliye ISDM will greatly increase the speed of mine laying, and that these mines have the capability to deactivate or self-destruct.  According to the Izvestiya article, the military developed new tactics at the recent Zapad-2021 strategic exercises to take full advantage of Zemledeliye’s capabilities.  These tactics consist of using the Zemledeliye in conjunction with a TOS-1A Solntsepek thermobaric rocket launcher to create a ‘fire field.’  Izvestiya also explains that the military is only fielding these systems in engineer brigades and engineer regiments.

Source:

Oleg Falichev, “«Земледелие» в полосе наступления: Инженерные войска ЦВО впервые получат новую уникальную систему дистанционного минирования (‘Zemledeliye’ in the offensive zone: Engineering Troops of the Central Military District will receive a new unique remote mining system for the first time),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (weekly newspaper focusing on military and defense industry issues), 8 February 2022.  https://vpk-news.ru/articles/65708

Of course, the engineering troops of the Central Military District do not forget about solving the main tasks of combat training. It is especially gratifying to note in this regard that the process of re-equipment with new equipment is actively underway. In particular, today the units are receiving the ISDM [Engineering System for Remote Mining] “Zemledeliye” remote mining system. For the first time, she will come to a separate engineering brigade of the Central Military District, stationed in Bashkiria.

…The installation of minefields with the help of the “Zemledeliye” ISDM has a number of advantages. In particular, the speed of laying minefields has been increased, especially in hard-to-reach areas. And the ability of mines to deactivate or self-destruct at a given time ensures safe and quick clearance after the cessation of hostilities.The engineering system includes a combat vehicle on a KamAZ cross-country chassis, a transport-loading vehicle and transport-launch containers with engineering ammunition equipped with mines of various types. All this is a serious factor in breaking through the fortified defenses of the enemy, making passages in minefields…

Source: Roman Krestul and Bogdan Stepova, “Курс «Земледелия»: юг России усилят «реактивными» минными полями: Боевые системы способны в кратчайшие сроки остановить продвижение любого противника (Course ‘Zemledeliye’: The south of Russia will be strengthened by ‘reactive’ minefields),” Izvestiya (large circulation Russian newspaper), 15 February 2022. https://iz.ru/1291330/roman-kretcul-bogdan-stepovoi/kurs-zemledeliia-iug-rossii-usiliat-reaktivnymi-minnymi-poliami

…All engineering units of the Southern MD will soon be equipped with Zemledeliye remote mining systems. This decision was made in the Ministry of Defense, sources in the military department told Izvestiya…The interlocutors of Izvestiya reported that in the future, Zemledeliye should be received by the engineer regiments of the 8th, 49th and 58th combined arms armies, which are part of the Southern MD. Separate batteries equipped with these systems will be formed in them.

Izvestiya has already written that in 2022 the Zemledeliye systems will also be received by the troops of the Central MD. The head of the engineer troops of the Central MD, Colonel Andrey Gandzyuk, said in January of this year that the ISDM would be received by a separate engineering brigade stationed in Bashkiriya by the end of this year.

The appearance of Zemledeliye in the Southern MD is more than relevant, because these systems will be used where ground operations are highly likely, military expert Vladislav Shurygin told Izvestiya.  “In maneuver war, they are very effective,” the expert explained. “They bind the enemy, by covering flanks and performing many other missions. On the southern axis, on the one hand, there is a high terrorist threat: Central Asia is nearby, and these systems will become an effective defense system. But if a situation arises related to the same Ukraine, then Zemledeliye can also be used against modern armies equipped with high-tech weapons…

Zemledeliye was adopted by the Russian army quite recently. Tests of this engineering system were successfully completed as part of the Kavkaz-2020 exercise. Zemledeliye was involved in the run-through of the final episode at the Kapustin Yar training ground in the presence of President Vladimir Putin and top military leaders. The minefield set up by fighting vehicles delayed the advance of the mock enemy’s reserves and limited their maneuverability.

Now the tactics of using ISDM on the battlefield are being worked out. At the Zapad-2021 exercise, the joint use of Zemledeliye and mobile groups of heavy flamethrower [thermobaric] systems TOS-1A Solntsepek was tested. In particular, such an element of influencing the enemy as a “fire field” was tested.  The Zemledeliye set up a minefield, and while the enemy was bogged down on it, the heavy flamethrowers struck them with thermobaric rockets. Then all the mines were remotely detonated. The result was a zone of total destruction, where all living things dying from fragments, or the high temperature and sudden drop of pressure.

Image Information:

Image: Engineering System for Remote Mining (ISDM)
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/Dress-rehearsal-of-2020-Moscow-Victory-Day-Parade/i-2SVLP7k/A
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Russia’s BARS Reserve System Takes Shape

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General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

Reservists in training.

Reservists in training.

BARS servicemen in training.

BARS servicemen in training.

BARS training site.

BARS training site.

“As part of a three-day training session with BARS [National Army Combat Reserve] Southern Military District units, about 30 thousand reserve servicemen were trained in four months of 2021.”

“Formation of the MLR [human mobilization reserve] will continue for the next three years. It is planned to spend 7.3 billion rubles [$95.6 million] from the budget under the article “Mobilization and Civilian Environment Training” in 2021, with over 16 billion rubles [$209.6 million] being spent for these purposes each year from 2022-2024.”

The accompanying excerpted articles discuss Russia’s latest effort to form a functional operational reserve system.  Unlike past efforts, which Russia poorly resourced and quickly abandoned, the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) system appears to have sufficient resources and is now taking shape (see “Developments in Russia’s BARS Reserve System, OE Watch, #1, 2022)  The official Russian Federation Ministry of Defense website describes how the military is implementing BARS in the Southern Military District and trained 30,000 personnel in 2021.  The excerpted article from Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta notes that Russia is making large investments in BARS and plans to spend roughly $209.6 million on its human mobilization reserve from 2022 to 2024.  The article also mentions that the Southern Military District’s total reserve end strength is envisaged to eventually be 38,000 personnel, a number sufficient to man an Army Corps.  A regional website called Artemovskiy Yegorshinskiye Vesti discusses the motivations of a soldier from the Sverdlovsk region for joining BARS, which include competitive pay and boredom from COVID restrictions.  The Artemovskiy Yegorshinskiye Vesti piece is important because it confirms that BARS is being implemented in additional military districts, in this case the Central Military District.

Source:

“В новом году в ЮВО продолжится подготовка резервистов на базе более 20 учебных объектов (In the New Year, the Southern Military District will continue training reservists at more than 20 educational facilities),” Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (official website of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense), 9 January 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3epupdzs

In the Southern Military District, on the basis of field camps, the practice of conducting training sessions for the territorial defense units of the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] will continue.  “At 9 training grounds of the district, 23 training and material bases have been deployed, 240 officers and sergeants have been selected to conduct training sessions with reservists,” General of the Army A. Dvornikov specified.

In addition, at the direction of General of the Army A. Dvornikov, the command of the territorial defense units of the Southern Military District will be involved in tactical exercises at various levels during the winter training period.  “To involve the command staff of the reserve military units in bilateral regimental and battalion tactical exercises using the command-staff method,”… For training in the field, the training and material base of the reserve military units has been equipped and weapons and military equipment have been prepared for use…As part of a three-day training session with BARS Southern Military District units, about 30 thousand reserve servicemen were trained in four months of 2021.

Source: “В России начали создавать новую мобилизационную систему: Вооруженные силы РФ укрепляют резервистами (New Mobilization System Began to Be Created in Russia: Russian Federation Armed Forces Are Being Strengthened with Reservists),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russian newspaper), 24 December 2021. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2021-12-24/11_8335_army5.html

The state seriously concerned itself with creating a reserve in case of a big war and technogenic disasters…  This is happening in post-perestroika Russia for the first time. It is planned that the army combat reserve for each district will consist of several tens of thousands of persons…

The presidential edict on establishing a mobilization reserve was not published fully anywhere in open sources, because the activation and organization of activities of mobilization resources are classified subjects. Experts declared unanimously, though, that this is a very expensive project for Russia. There was no information in the unclassified part of the document as to how many people it was proposed to involve, in what time periods to develop the reserve, and how much money to spend on it. State Duma deputies presumed that in conducting an experiment of activating a human mobilization reserve (MLR) [мобилизационного людского резерва (МЛР)], as a minimum it can be a matter of a brigade numbering around 5,000 reservists, and its upkeep will cost the budget approximately 1.5 billion rubles per year [$19.7 million]…

But the activation of reservist units and formations already had begun in the Armed Forces in August 2021. Colonel Konstantin Zapatotskiy, chief of Southern Military District Organization-Mobilization Directorate, announced that with conclusion of the first contract, a lump-sum payment will be made to the reservist: up to 66,000 rubles [$865] for an officer and up to 39,000 rubles [$511] for a private or sergeant…

In August 2021 the Southern Military District Organization-Mobilization Directorate had been assigned the task of bringing the numerical strength of reservists to 38,000. It will be possible to activate an entire army corps from them, and this considering the fact that three combined-arms armies are already deployed in the district. It is not known precisely how many managed to be recruited in reality, but it was reported that training sessions and exercises already were being held with reservists in the fall. Formation of the MLR will continue for the next three years. It is planned to spend 7.3 billion rubles [$95.6 million] from the budget under the article “Mobilization and Civilian Environment Training” in 2021, with over 16 billion rubles [$209.6 million] being spent for these purposes each year from 2022-2024.

Source: Aleksey Moskvitin, “‘Партизаны’ вновь в строю. Резервист рассказывает о военных сборах (‘Partisans’ in Formation Again; A Reservist Describes Training Camp),” Artemovskiy Yegorshinskiye Vesti (regional website covering the Sverdlovsk Oblast), 10 January 2022.  https://vestart.ru/grand/6137-partizany-vnov-v-stroyu-rezervist-rasskazyvaet-o-voennykh-sborakh.html

One of the first in Artemovskiy to sign a contract to serve in the Russian Federation Armed Forces mobilization reserve has attended three weeks of training camp at the Yelan’ garrison. Here, he shares his impressions.  Not many in Artemovskiy are keen to serve as army reservists, but perhaps they should be. You get a decent uplift to your main salary, and a distraction from the day job. This is the story of 23-year-old reservist Vladislav Skutin, who signed a three-year contract with the Defense Ministry.

“What made you decide to do this?”—we asked him.  “I probably wanted a break from the pandemic and QR codes. You can’t go out anywhere so I decided to give it a go,” is how Skutin, a service desk worker at Yandex Taxi, began the conversation. “I was bored of the same stuff day in day out, I saw a notice about the military reserve, and decided to try it out. I passed the examination at the military commissariat in mid-September, and I was accepted into the reserve.”

Vladislav served his time as a conscripted soldier in Podmoskov’ye, in the town of Kashira. He spent a year in an HQ working as a radio and telephone operator, without getting to experience all the hardships and deprivations of army life. And he wanted to see what he had missed.

“I went to the camp in Yelan’ as a signaler, in the rank of corporal,” the “reservist” said. “For me the most unforgettable thing was living in November frosts in 50-bed army tents with iron stoves, bunks, and washbasins. Conscripts from the Yelan’ garrison brought us firewood and warm water.”…“We were given the same uniform as National Guardsmen, but without the insignia. So we looked different from regular soldiers,” he recalls. “Within the unit and outside it, we were called ‘partisans.'”  Vlad observed that “most reservists sign the contract and go to the training camps for the money.” “But I went for a change of circumstances and new experiences.”  For three weeks of training, our interviewee received about 20,000 rubles [$267] into his account plus monthly reservist payments of several thousand rubles, and the average wage for his main job. Enough to live on…

Image Information:

Image: General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2mvuschv 
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Reservists in training
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://function.mil.ru/images/upload/2019/rezerv_550.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: BARS servicemen in training
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2mvuschv
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: BARS training site
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://function.mil.ru/images/upload/2019/UVO1_29.08.21_550.JPG
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Some Latin American Countries Responsive to Russian Entreaties To Remain Silent on Ukraine War

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

“Russia said in December that escalating tensions over Ukraine could lead to a repeat of the Cuban missile crisis, when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war.”

Many countries in Latin America opted to say little about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine because of their reticence to ruffle their relationships with Russia.  This relative silence is the result of persistent Russian attempts to cultivate influence with anti-Western Latin American leaders in the United States’ backyard as a way to counterbalance Western actions in what the Kremlin considers its sphere of influence.  Center-left Argentine news outlet Infobae reports that Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov visited the region and met with Russia’s most important allies in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.  Borisov promised closer relations and greater “strategic depth” to Russia’s security cooperation.  In turn, the regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba have parroted Russian talking points about NATO and sanctions.  Further, Brazil’s president Jair Bolsonaro and Argentina’s president Alberto Fernández both visited Putin in Moscow shortly before the war, according to Spain’s politically left-leaning main daily El País.  Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov recently stated that Russia had the ability to deploy forces and equipment to Latin America through its security and cooperation agreements.  Russia’s pattern of outreach to Latin America is not new since its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: similar diplomatic and military visits presaged Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 (then President Dmitri Medvedev) and its invasion of Crimea in 2014 (Putin himself).

Source:

“Rusia continúa estrechando lazos con las dictaduras latinoamericanas (Russia continues to strengthen ties with Latin American dictatorships),” Infobae (Argentine news outlet generally seen as center-left politically), 19 February 2022.  https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2022/02/19/rusia-continua-estrechando-lazos-con-las-dictaduras-latinoamericanas-el-viceprimer-ministro-de-putin-visito-cuba/ 

Borisov arrived on the island after visiting Nicaragua and Venezuela, Russia’s key allies in Latin America, and said Russia would also deepen bilateral ties with the two countries…Russia said in December that escalating tensions over Ukraine could lead to a repeat of the Cuban missile crisis, when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war…Cuban dictator Miguel Díaz-Canel discussed coordinating a ‘strategic partnership’ with Putin in January, as tensions began to rise in Ukraine.

Source: “Ucrania, una guerra incómoda para Brasil y Argentina (Ukraine, an uncomfortable war for Brazil and Argentina),” El País (Spain’s main daily generally considered politically-left), 1 March 2022.  https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-03-02/ucrania-una-guerra-incomoda-para-brasil-y-argentina.html 

Bolsonaro’s Brazil and Fernández’s Argentina have been trying to remain neutral since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24.  Only eight days had passed after the Brazilian president was received in Moscow by Vladimir Putin and twenty since a similar visit by the Argentine.  Both Latin American presidents then highlighted the good relations they maintain with the Kremlin.  But the war has turned everything upside down.  The diplomatic tension leaves little room for the grays, and both Bolsonaro and Fernández, located at the ideological poles, face domestic problems due to their international positioning.

Image Information:

Image caption:  Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.
Source:  Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_%26_Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_in_Tehran,_24_November_2015.jpg
Attribution:  CC BY 4.0

Turkey Tries To Mitigate Economic Impact of Sanctions on Russia

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Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

“Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”                                                                                                                                                -Turkish President Erdoğan

The sanctions on Russia will cost the Turkish economy at least $30-35 billion, according to Turkish economists quoted in the pro-government newspaper Yenicag.com.  There will be a significant hit to Turkey’s tourism industry, an increase in energy prices and agricultural products, as well as further decline in the Turkish lira.  In an effort to mitigate this impact, Turkey appears to be trying to position itself as a safe haven from Russian sanctions.

As the accompanying passage from pro-government newspaper Hürriyet reports, in early March, Turkish President Erdoğan suggested to Putin, “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”  Pro-government outlets interpreted Erdoğan’s offer as a “historic hand [being extended] to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated.”  Others criticized this as ridiculous, claiming that the world would not accept Turkey’s effort to turn the Russian sanctions into an advantage while it endures the costs.  Regardless of the reactions to the idea, business leaders said Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, as the passage from pro-government Daily Sabah reports. 

Economically, Russia is an important trading partner to Turkey, with over 3000 Turkish companies operating in Russia and a trading volume of over $32.5 billion annually.  Russia provides 34% of Turkey’s natural gas, is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, and sends the greatest number of tourists to Turkey.  Russia and its banks’ exclusion from the international payment system will create challenges in Russia making its payments to Turkish contractors in Russia and to Turkish travel agents that organize tours for Russian tourists to visit Turkey. 

Politically, Turkey is a neighboring country to both Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea and has good relations with both, including a developing partnership with Ukraine, whereby Turkey sells it armed drones.  As such, Turkey has been trying to play a balancing act between Ukraine and Russia regarding Russia’s invasion.  On the one hand, Turkey acted with its NATO allies and strongly condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, openly calls Russia’s invasion a “war,” and voted to condemn Russia in the United Nations.  President Erdoğan said that Turkey would continue to sell armed drones to Ukraine.  On the other hand, Turkey abstained from a vote to suspend Russia’s membership rights within the European Council, and announced it was not planning to impose sanctions on Russia.

Source:

“Atilla Yeşilada Türk ekonomisine düşen bombayı duyurdu (Atilla Yeşilada explains the bomb that is about to explode on the Turkish economy),” Yenicag.com.tr (pro-government newspaper), 25 February 2022. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/atilla-yesilada-rusyaukrayna-savasi-sonrasi-turk-ekonomisine-dusen-bombayi-acikladi-514360h.htm         

Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association Chief Economist Gizem Öztok Altınsaç says that the geopolitical tension can have an initial cost to Turkey of about $30-35 billion.

Source: Abdülkadir Selvi, “Erdoğan, Putin’e ne önerdi? (What did Erdoğan suggest to Putin?),” Hurriyet.com (pro-government newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abdulkadir-selvi/erdogan-putine-ne-onerdi-42017962

At the AK Party Central Executive Council, President Erdoğan made important statements about the meeting he had with Putin.  He said he suggested to Putin, that “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.” 

…With this suggestion, Erdoğan is extending a historic hand to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated. At the same time, he is taking steps to turn the crisis into an opportunity for Turkey.  Would Russia, who is being isolated in the world, consider the Turkey and China option?  Why not? 

Source: “Uslu: İnsanlar ayçiçek yağı ile güçlü lider arasında tercih yapabilir (Uslu: People can decide between sunflower oil and a strong leader),” Karar.com.tr (independent Turkish newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.karar.com/karar-tv/bikarar-ver-bugun-karar-tvde-12-1655020

Political communications expert İbrahim Uslu [said about Erdoğan’s offer to Putin]: “This is unbelievable, even if you convince Putin, once the world feels that you are intensely piercing their sanctions, they will sanction us…  As the world imposes sanctions and endures significant economic costs, they will not look favorably upon Turkey’s attempt to turn this into an opportunity, attempt to feed the entire Russian market by itself and comfortably make money from this.  Such suggestions can seem appealing trade-wise, but they should be reconsidered in light of political international relations and the alliances that Turkey belongs to.” 

Source: “Turkish businesses expect progress on using rubles in trade with Russia,” Daily Sabah (pro-government newspaper), 11 March 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkish-businesses-expect-progress-on-using-rubles-in-trade-with-russia

Since the currency dispute with shipping companies is causing problems in the delivery of goods passing through customs, Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) head Şekib Avdagiç said Friday.

Avdagiç stated that the companies working with Russia see the withdrawal of Western countries from Moscow as a new opportunity and emphasized that it is important to enable the use of the national currency of Russia.

Image Information:

Image: Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.
Source: Kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Erdo%C4%9Fan_and_Putin.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

U.S. CAATSA Sanctions Hurt Turkey’s Defense Agreements with Third Parties

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Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.

Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.

“The US’s military embargo against Turkey has resulted in the loss of an important contract.  Pakistan decided against the ATAK helicopters it was waiting to buy from TUSAŞ [Turkish Aerospace Industries]…”

In April 2021, the U.S. government started imposing the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on Turkey because of Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia, making Turkey the first NATO member to be subject to these sanctions.  The accompanying article from the pro-government Trhaber.com examines the first example of a Turkish defense contract with a third country, in this case Pakistan, falling through due to the CAATSA sanctions.  The excerpt reports that Pakistan has cancelled a $1.5 billion contract to buy 30 of the type T-129 ATAK combat helicopters from Turkish Aerospace Industries.  As the passage reports, American Honeywell made the helicopters’ turboshaft engine, so permission was needed from the United States for an export license, which could not be granted becaue of the CAATSA sanctions.  The passage also notes Pakistan has now turned to China to buy their Z-10ME combat helicopters.

In addition to the defense deals with third parties falling through, like this example with Pakistan, the CAATSA sanctions also have other, less quantifiable negative impacts on the Turkish defense industry.  As the second excerpt from an interview with a Turkish defense expert featured on Medyaskopetv.com via YouTube points out, the Turkish defense industry has effectively become “contaminated” or “blacklisted.”  He predicts that any Western country, or any “non-Western country wanting to have good relations with the U.S.” will have major reservations about doing business with the Turkish defense industry.  He notes this is not a technical issue, but a diplomatic one.

Source:

“ABD taş koydu, Pakistan ATAK helikopterinden vazgeçti! 1,5 milyar dolarlık anlaşma iptal (The USA prevented it, Pakistan [changed its mind] on the ATAK helicopter! The $1.5-billion-dollar deal is cancelled),” Trhaber.com (Turkish pro-government news site), 5 January 2022. https://www.trhaber.com/savunma/abd-tas-koydu-pakistan-atak-helikopterinden-vazgecti-15-milyar-dolarlik-h27804.html

The US’s military embargo against Turkey has resulted in the loss of an important contract.  Pakistan decided against the ATAK helicopters it was waiting to buy from TUSAŞ [Turkish Aerospace Industries] for three years.  The 1.5 billion dollar contract, which was the biggest export deal [in a single contract] for the Turkish defense industry, foresaw the sale of 30 combat helicopters to Pakistan. 

But the T129 ATAK helicopters’ LHTEC CTW800-4A turboshaft engine is made by the American company Honeywell, so permission was needed from the US for an export license.  Despite Ankara’s communication efforts, no official response was received from Washington.  The attitude of the White House and Congress resulted in Turkey losing this 1.5 billion dollar contract. 

The T-129 ATAK helicopters had been tested by the Pakistani Army multiple times in difficult terrains, and had successfully proven that it was the most effective combat helicopter in its class.  The ATAK helicopter had garnered great admiration from Pakistani pilots, but are unable to reach [those pilots] due to the U.S. preventing the process. 

…The sad development for the Turkish defense industry, was announced by Pakistani military spokesperson Babar Iftikar in a press briefing.  Iftikhar said, in response to a question, that they have decided against the T-129 ATAK purchase from Turkey due to the delays, and have instead started talks with China to buy their Z-10ME combat helicopter.  The U.S.’s blockage of Turkey enabled China to export more products.

Source: Işın Eliçin with Mevlütoğlu, “Trump yönetiminden Ankara’ya S-400 yaptırımları – Konuk: Arda Mevlütoğlu (S-400 sanctions to Ankara by the Trump Administration – Guest: Arda Mevlütoğlu),” Medyaskopetv.com via YouTube (reputable, independent Turkish media platform), 15 December 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPzR50sc6Fs

In a way, the Turkish Defense Industry Directorate (SSB) has been contaminated / blacklisted.  In this case, other Western countries or companies, or any non-Western country that has or wants to have good relations with the U.S. and their institutions, may have reservations regarding doing business with Turkeys Defense Industry Directorate… This is not a directly technical issue, it’s more of a diplomatic issue.

Image Information:

Image: Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.
Source: wiltshirespostter, via Wikimedia Common
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BG12-1001  (14662033896).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0