Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Russian Airborne Receiving Modernized SVD “Sniper Rifle”

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“Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.” 

The standard-issue infantry Kalashnikov family of weapons are not particularly accurate and have a modest effective range of 300 meters.  Their purpose is to conduct suppressive automatic fire to keep the enemy pinned down. The rifle squad and platoon needed a specialty weapon to engage the enemy from 300 to 800 meters.  The answer was the SVD Dragunov semiautomatic longer-range rifle.  While titled a sniper rifle, it is really a rugged expert marksman’s rifle that routinely engages targets to 800 meters.  Designed in 1963 and combat tested initially in South Vietnam, the SVD is older than most currently serving in the Russian military.  According to a recent article in the pro-government newspaper Izvestia, the Dragunov has now been upgraded and airborne and reconnaissance troops are first in line for the upgrade.  This is not the top-of-the-line professional Russian sniper rifle but seems ideal for rough-and-tumble field soldiering.

Source:

Roman Kretsul and Aleksei Ramm, “Точнее, и не смажешь: войсковую разведку перевооружат на новые винтовки (More Precision, No Lubrication. Tactical Reconnaissance Upgrades to New Rifles. Specialized Sniper Subunits to Get the SVDM),” Izvestia (pro-government newspaper), 7 November 2021.

https://iz.ru/1245135/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/tochnee-i-ne-smazhesh-voiskovuiu-razvedku-perevooruzhat-na-novye-vintovki

Reconnaissance and special-purpose subunits are going to acquire some accuracy.  They will fully rearm with the SVDM sniper rifle, which outperforms the classic Dragunov.  The new weapon not only has outstanding accuracy but can also be used with a number of accessories — various sights, a silencer, and additional equipment can be attached to it.  According to experts, this greatly increases reconnaissance troops’ opportunities to eliminate targets at long range.”

The Defense Ministry has decided to upgrade tactical reconnaissance and special-purpose units with the SVDM sniper rifle…  The move should enhance these troops’ battlefield capabilities. The first consignments have already arrived in the Southern Military District.  The Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD) has served the forces well for half a century and in its class has become a brand, like Kalashnikov for assault rifles. Even a less than expert soldier is sure to hit targets with it at ranges of up to 800 meters.  The Dragunov combines greater firepower and range than an assault rifle with exceptional reliability and relative simplicity of use.  Back in Soviet times the role of sniper armed with an SVD was inserted into the standard complement of a motorized infantry squad.  This gave Soviet infantry a substantial increase in firepower compared to foreign armies.

Russian engineers have been working in recent decades on various options for modernizing this tried and true weapon. The latest modification is the SVDM.  Made of advanced materials, it has improved ergonomics and greater accuracy.

The gun mounts Picatinny rails on which accessories to suit the mission at hand, such as optical or night sights or a silencer may be mounted in minutes.  The SVDM has backup iron sights and a fixed point for a folding bipod.  Many older models of the gun required some disassembly in order to mount the accessories, which is a lengthy process.

“In the army a sniper is actually a low-altitude precision weapon,” military expert Vladislav Shurygin stated.  “The Dragunov sniper rifle means you can deliver accurate fire over medium distances.  In battle it is used to take out important targets.  The sniper usually accompanies the commander and is tasked by him.  A modernization for the Dragunov is further confirmation that this gun was created with future upgrades in mind, and it still has great potential today.”

Albert Bakov, general director of TsNIItochmash [Central Scientific Research Institute for Precision Machine Engineering] told Izvestiya in an interview in 2019 that the Dragunov was so perfectly designed from the outset that in the category of army rifles for shooting at ranges between 500 and 800 meters “it cannot be made any better” — only individual elements can be improved.  You can paddle with it, you can throw it around — and it works fine over ranges of 500 to 800 meters.” The company is now working on larger-caliber rifles.

The Kalashnikov concern is currently upgrading the Chuvakin sniper rifle (SVCh), which should hit individual targets at ranges of up to a kilometer with the first shot. It is designed to take two types of cartridge — the powerful Russian 7.62×54 mm flanged and the NATO 7.62×51 mm rifle cartridge. When it will acquire its final shape and enter serial production is unknown.

Until the Chuvakin is inducted into service, the Dragunov will remain the best sniper rifle option for the regular troops.  There are longer-range and more powerful rifles in existence but they are far more expensive and technically complex, and are intended not for use in battle but for particular types of missions.  These weapons are supplied in limited numbers to special-purpose subunits in the army and the security and law enforcement agencies.

The military has already begun to rearm its marksmen:  Airborne Troops reconnaissance subunits have received the brand-new AK-12 assault rifle.  Outwardly it resembles the classic Kalashnikov, but this is a fundamental redesign.  It has acquired the ability to fire in fixed bursts of two rounds per trigger pull, it has a longer-lasting barrel, additional detachable accessories, and easier switching between shooting modes.  New thermal imagers, silencers, and collimator sights are in production for it, enabling accurate fire at silhouette targets from ranges of up to 500 meters.The new weapons and kit now arriving at the Airborne Troops are radically extending their capabilities.  Izvestiya already reported that the blue berets’ reconnaissance subunits have received the new Arbalet-2 parachute, with which they can jump from altitudes of up to 4,000 meters, or higher if they have oxygen tanks.  The parachute’s special canopy means that it can be steered while in flight, which means that troopers can travel dozens of kilometers while descending, to penetrate behind enemy lines undetected.

Russia Develops and Implements Counter-UAV Tactics and Technologies

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Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.

Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.

Ratt Anti-UAV System (exterior view).

Ratt Anti-UAV System (interior view).

“Many Russian electronic warfare manufacturers are now developing portable counter-UAV devices, mindful of the requirement for small military teams to be protected against the drone threat from the air. Most of them, like the Pishchal, are in the form of a firearm, which is convenient and what troops are used to.”

There is a consensus in Russian circles of military thought that the ability to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be decisive in future conflicts.  The excerpted articles from Russian Armed Forces monthly journal Armeyskiy Sbornik and pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discuss Russia’s development of counter-UAV technologies.  Armeyskiy Sbornik describes the theory underpinning Russia’s tactics for countering UAVs.  Russia intends to use both kinetic fires, such as the guns and missiles of air defense systems, and electronic warfare (EW), such as jamming, to counter UAVs.  The article also mentions some of the unique technologies that Russia has developed to further this effort, such as the Pischal counter-UAV gun.  According to military and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, during the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, EW caused approximately 15 UAVs to land, or fly-off course.  The article posits that these EW means and conventional air defense systems could defeat Ukraine’s Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs.  The article from Izvestiya explains how Russia’s theory of kinetic air defense in conjunction with effective EW is not just theory, and Russia is already implementing it in training.

Source:

Colonel M. Mitrofanov, Lieutenant Colonel D. Vasyukov, and Major V. Anisimov, “Практические Рекомендации Защита Элементов Системы Связи От Беспилотных Летательных Аппаратов (Practical Recommendations for Protecting Elements of a Communication System Against Drones),” Armeyskiy Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Armed Forces military and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer), September 2021. https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/343042/

Drones are becoming an increasingly common element of modern military operations and are now accessible not only to regular but also to irregular armed forces and also to terrorist organizations…Experience of countering drones during local conflicts across the world has shown that when they are airborne their data transmission channels are visible to signals intelligence and vulnerable to electronic jamming. The data transmission channels include:

— the operator’s control channel to the drone

— the drone’s channel for transmitting data to its control station

— the satellite navigation channel

Countering drones does not necessarily mean their physical destruction. Electronic jamming can be used to disable a drone’s data transmission channel, also the channel for controlling it. Apart from disabling the control and data channels, you also need to disable the channel that receives the satellite navigation signals. Satellite data is used not only to plot the drone’s route but also by weapons for target acquisition…Russian electronic warfare developers are actively working on ways of countering drones. For example, at the Dubai Airshow in 2019 the Rosoboronexport corporation displayed the design of a layered defense system that included Russia’s latest counterdrone technologies, such as the Repellent-1, Sapsan Bekas, Kupol, Rubezh Avtomatika, Luch, and Pishchal…

Particular attention is also being paid to portable devices for fighting drones. For example, the Luch and Pishchal systems, which can emit electromagnetic signals to disable drones 6 and 2 km away respectively, were displayed for the first time at the Dubai Air Show in 2019. The Pishchal weighs just 3.5 kg and is one of the lightest counter-UAV devices of its class on the market today, so it can form part of a soldier’s personal kit (figure 8).

Many Russian electronic warfare manufacturers are now developing portable counter-UAV devices, mindful of the requirement for small military teams to be protected against the drone threat from the air. Most of them, like the Pishchal, are in the form of a firearm, which is convenient and what troops are used to. They comprise modules for detecting a drone’s radio signals and creating the jamming to disable the control and navigation channels. Among these devices is the “Personal Drone Countermeasures Complex” made by the Special Technology Center company (reference 8), which can disable drone control channels from at least 2 km away and radio navigation channels from at least 10 km. Or the Rex 1 and Rex 2 portable counter-UAV systems made by the company Zala Group Unmanned Systems (reference 9), which also work against drone control and navigation channels. And these are by no means all the developments of our defense sector when it comes to fighting drones.

So, at the present time, we know of the following ways of countering drones.

1. Destroy them using air defense or other fire assets.

2. Destroy their control stations.

3. Capture them (with nets or by intercepting their control channels).

4. Use electro-optical countermeasures (advanced directed-output laser weapons).

5. Electronically jam their control channels, reconnaissance data transmission channels, or their geopositioning systems.

6. Distort the navigation coordinates in the vicinity of a protected site.

7. Conceal protected sites.

8. Create dummy protected sites (deception).

Source: Oleg Falichev, “«Байрактаров»: У России есть все необходимое для приземления турецких беспилотников (Snares for Bayraktar: Russia Has All Necessary Equipment to Force Turkish Drones to Land),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Russian weekly focusing on the military and defense industry), 1 November 2021. https://vpk-news.ru/articles/64483

The situation in eastern Ukraine has escalated once again. The Ukrainian Armed Forces subunits occupied the village of Staromarivka in the so-called gray zone, where 180 residents ended up hostages; about 40 of them own Russian passports. Trains with tanks and artillery arrive at the closest railway station. One of them had been spotted near Slovyansk, the second one — near Svyate. Positions of Donetsk militia are bombed by Turkish-made Bayraktar UAVs. The situation is again on the verge of a full-scale war…So what should Russia do? It cannot be ruled out that Russia might hold new large-scale military exercises next to the borders with Ukraine to rehearse action against external threats, as was observed at the beginning of this year when, according to Western data, a Russian army numbering about 100,000-120,000 personnel was deployed in the vicinity of the Ukrainian border.

[T]he best option is to create a full-fledged air defense grouping in this area, capable of covering villages and militia without crossing the demarcation line…However, Russia also has other weapons that work without firing…Based on the experience of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, about 15 UAVs were forced to land or were thrown off course with the aid of electronic warfare equipment…The Pantsir-S1 and Pantsir-SM antiaircraft missile and gun systems are also excellent countermeasures against drones. The range of the latter has been increased to 40 kilometers thanks to the upgraded multifunctional aiming station. The range at which it detects and selects targets is substantially greater, and so is its resistance to jamming. However, this weapon, as they say, may be used in case of emergency. The main thing right now is to establish and secure a resilient system for radar surveillance and monitoring…

Source: Alexey Ramm and Bogdan Stepovoy, “На новый маневр: войска отработали борьбу с беспилотниками в горах: Какую тактику отражения атак дронов опробовали на учениях в Крыму и на Кавказе (To New Maneuver:  The Troops Worked Out Combating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Mountains: They Worked Out Which Tactic To Repel Drone Attacks at Exercises in the Crimea and in the Caucasus),” Izvestiya (large-circulation pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 3 November 2021. https://iz.ru/1244533/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi/na-novyi-manevr-voiska-otrabotali-borbu-s-bespilotnikami-v-gorakh

The Ministry of Defense has concluded a series of exercises in the Caucasus and in the Crimea, at which they worked out and studied Russian air defense capabilities to combat unmanned aerial vehicles in mountain conditions. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh showed that drones are becoming especially dangerous during combat on mountain terrain: it is difficult to detect and shoot them down due to the terrain’s relief. They managed to repel a supposed mass attack of unmanned aerial vehicles through the joint operations of the air defense (PVO) and electronic warfare (EW) forces. In the experts’ words, only the cohesive work of all subunits, which are participating in the engagement, can yield success in the mountains…

The Military Department previously reported that a composite detachment for combating UAVs of Southern Military District 49th Combined-Arms Army’s Mountain Motorized Rifle Formation repelled the attacks of the notional enemy’s drones at Kobu-Bashi Range in Karachay-Cherkesia. It consisted of EW and tactical reconnaissance subunits and crews of Tunguska-M1 [SA-19 GRISON] air defense missile-gun systems and Strela-10 [SA-13 GOLPHER] missile systems.  During the course of the exercises, the PVO subunits managed to destroy all targets, and the EW complexes confirmed their high effectiveness, having used Zhitel jamming stations to jam the drones’ command and control and navigation channels. More than 500 servicemen participated in the maneuvers…

Even simple UAVs gain many advantages in the mountains, which the defending side needs to mitigate, Military Expert Viktor Murakhovskiy pointed out in a conversation with Izvestiya.

“A drone is not visible for radars and optical systems behind mountain slopes,” he explained. “As a result, the UAVs obtain good chances to conduct a surprise attack and the defending side’s response time is reduced.  The Syrian experience has demonstrated that the composite detachments make a good showing on that terrain, which PVO and EW weapons and even snipers with heavy caliber rifles can reach. It is also very important to organize monitoring of the air situation in the mountains…

The Russian Army is prepared to confront the new threat. The PVO system is being improved constantly and new equipment is arriving in the troops. The Military Department has already reported that a new air defense command and control system was employed at the “Zapad-2021” Strategic Exercises. It consisted of all reconnaissance assets and also of air defense systems and complexes, which were involved in the maneuvers. The exercises demonstrated that the new equipment permits the creation of an impenetrable defensive dome over significant territory…

Image Information:

Image: Pischal Counter-UAV Gun.
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-SCHRNzn/0/6a9634f0/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-090-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Image: Ratt Anti-UAV System (exterior view).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-N8H53ht/0/f9763ab1/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-084-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Image: Ratt Anti-UAV System (interior view).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2020-Static-part-3/i-dMRnVvJ/0/5487d70d/X4/Army2020-Static-Part3-085-X4.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Developments in Russia’s BARS Reserve System

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General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.

Reservists in training.

Reservists in training.

“The military organization is making every effort to eliminate the possible consequences of a hybrid war against the Russian Federation and at the same time lacks human resources. One of the measures preventing attempts to disorganize the rear in a possible military conflict with geopolitical opponents of Russia is the creation of territorial defense troops.”

The accompanying excerpted articles from Vologda Oblastprovincial newspaper Krasnaya Sever and Leningrad Oblast-basedonline news site 47 News discuss the operation of Russia’s new reserve system known as the Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) in some sources, and as the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) in others.  According to Krasnaya Sever, reservists participating in this program will perform up to eight 3-day training assemblies and a 30-day exercise annually.  The article goes on to explain how the BARS will select, train, and compensate reservists.  The article from 47 News is notable as it mentions that BARS is not unique to the Southern Military District, as first reported, but can now be found in at least one other military district.  This suggests that that BARS may, or has already, become a national program, and not just an experiment in the Southern Military District.

The accompanying excerpted articles from Krasnodar regional newspaper Golos Pravdy and Russianmilitary and defense industry weekly Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer discuss personnel issues with BARS.  Golos Pravdy notes that the Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon has only been able to fill 15 of its 424 reserve billets.  Valeriy Poludnitsin of the local military commissariat sums up the BARS recruiting effort as: “Unfortunately and despite all our efforts, the numbers wishing to sign up are small.”  Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer suggests developing a special program for university students and another for personnel working in private military companies as potential ways of increasing participation in BARS.

Source:

Olga Burchevskaya: “А ты записался резервистом?! (Did You Sign Up to Be a Reservist?!),” Krasnaya Sever (provincial newspaper of Vologda Oblast), 27 October 2021.  https://www.krassever.ru/article/a-ty-zapisalsya-rezervistom

…It was earlier, in Soviet times, that everyone in succession was called up into the “partisans”: reserve officers and men traveled to military reservist active-duty training at least once in their lives.  Everything changed in the new millennium: now a limited number of citizens are trained in case of enemy attacks according to the principle of “better less, but better.”

The Russian Federation Presidential Edict establishing a human mobilization reserve came out in 2015.  Initially a number of regions tried it out by assembling small subunits.  This year it also came the turn of our Oblast: in August military commissariats were assigned the mission of manning an expanded battalion of reservists (around 500 persons).  Then in September around 100 men signed a contract and set off for three-day training in Karelia…

Not just anybody will be taken as a reservist, they caution in the oblast military commissariat.  According to the statute, this must be a person who has performed conscripted or contract service in the Army and who has a specific military specialty (tanker, motorized rifleman, specialist in servicing equipment and arms).  The age for privates, NCOs, and warrant officers is up to 42 (greater for officers).  Health also is assessed: those registered in health centers (drug rehabilitation, tuberculosis, psychoneurological) will not be accepted in the mobilization reserve, as well as persons with disabilities.  In addition, citizens will be refused have a criminal record.

“The important thing is the desire of the person himself to become a reservist, we rely on him above all.  Then there is screening and selection: a special board confirms the candidate.  After that he signs a contract to be in the reserve: the minimum term of the first one is three years, and after that it can be even less,” KS was told by Lieutenant Colonel Daniil Bugayev, of the Second Department of the Vologodskaya Oblast Commissariat.  “There are eight training sessions with a reservist annually (each for three training days a month), as well as reservist active-duty training (30 days once a year).  That said, an agrarian, for example, will not be called up for training during the harvest; he will be invited when it will be more convenient for him, in the off-season, let’s say, and river transport workers are not put in action during navigation [season].”

A military uniform, three meals a day “like home” (prepared by civilian cooks), and medical services (what if there is a sudden toothache?) — all this is free at state expense.  Average wages and jobs are kept for reservists, plus they are authorized payments along the Defense Ministry line.  Even if they are not called up for three-day training sessions, privates and NCOs will receive from R1,800 to R3,200 under the contract.  They will be paid from R3,000 to R5,200 for attending such training sessions, and from R18,000 to R31,000 (officers up to R45,000) for month-long reservist active-duty training.  Pay and allowances depend on a reservist’s rank and position (plus the area coefficient for Karelia).

Source: “БАРС соберёт на Северо-Западе несколько тысяч резервистов — их готовят для войск территориальной обороны (BARS [Special Army Combat Reserve] Will Assemble Several Thousand Reservists in the Northwest — They Are Being Trained for the Territorial Defense Troops),” 47 News(online news site focusing on the Leningrad Oblast), 17 November 2021. https://47news.ru/articles/203180/

The second intake of the second phase of reservist active-duty training of subunits of the Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) begins on 22 November in regions where Western Military District troops are stationed.

The Western Military District Press Service informed 47news that plans are to draw several thousand reservists to reservist active-duty training as part of separate subunits formed on the basis of Western Military District military units.

Based on results of reservist active-duty training, citizens who have taken the full combined-arms training course will enter subunits of the territorial defense troops.

During reservist active-duty training, reservists will go through training and improvement of qualification for providing security and defense of strategically important facilities as well as for employing modern arms and military equipment…

Source: “В Красноармейском районе мобилзировано всего 3.5% запасников

(Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon Mobilizes Just 3.5 Percent of Reservists),” Golos Pravdy (newspaper of the Krasnodar region), 16 November 2021. https://golos-pravda.ru/news/obshhestvo/76981-v-krasnoarmejskom-rajone-mobilzirovano-vsego-3-5-zapasnikov/

Reservists are being mobilized in line with Edict of the President of the Russian Federation Number 370 of 17 July 2015 “On the creation of a mobilization personnel reserve of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.”  The rayon military commissariat reports that according to the plan for this year, 33 officers and 391 private soldiers and NCOs from our rayon should be sent to undergo reservist military training. But to date only 15 people have signed a contract to serve in the reserve.

The acting chief of the mobilization resources planning, assignment, training, and registration section, Valeriy Poludnitsin, said that the commissariat has been campaigning hard among the 1,500 reservists who are liable for military service.  “Unfortunately and despite all our efforts, the numbers wishing to sign up are small,” he commented.  In his view this is due to fear of losing one’s job although the contract makes it possible to maintain it during military drills and assemblies, during which the Defense Ministry reimburses the reservist’s average wage to the employer…And along with everything else, when reservists are called up to assemblies and drills their employers are reimbursed their salary costs. Unemployed individuals receive the minimum wage and also the cost of travel and expenses from home to the military commissariat and back. If necessary, the cost of renting accommodation is paid…

 Contracts to serve in the mobilization reserve are signed with warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers up to the age of 42. With junior officers up to 47 years of age, and also with senior officers apart from colonels up to 52 years, and with colonels up to 57 years, for a minimum period of three years.

Source: Grigoriy Nokonorov and Igor Rodionov, “Служба возле дома: Из кого формировать подразделения территориальной обороны (Service Close to Home: Who to Form Subunits of Territorial Defense Troops?),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Russian weekly newspaper focusing on the military and defense industry), 26 October 2021.   https://vpk-news.ru/articles/64394

…The military organization is making every effort to eliminate the possible consequences of a hybrid war against the Russian Federation and at the same time lacks human resources. One of the measures preventing attempts to disorganize the rear in a possible military conflict with geopolitical opponents of Russia is the creation of territorial defense troops…

Time has shown that deployment of territorial defense troops (and such events reflect difficulties of the future mobilization) is fraught with significant problems that have to be addressed.  The first one is changes in the forms of ownership in the country — increase in the share of the private sector, which entails the reluctance of owners to release employees to participate in annual musters, envisaged for reservists…The second problem is related to the demographic situation in the regions where it is planned to assemble forces and means of territorial defense, which mainly involve reservists. Not all regions are able to form the same number of units of territorial defense due to circumstances…The third problem is to increase the efficiency of the acquisition and harmonization of such units. It can be solved through the creation of military commissariats (or units that form the basis of territorial defense troops) in staffs, of a permanent organization core (unit commander and his deputies) directly involved in the selection of personnel, conscription, and coordination of reservists…

In the context of a difficult demographic situation in Russia, the main problem of manning the reserve service is about personnel. How to make the transition from patriotic education at the level of sports, exhibition volunteering, and participation in flash mobs to the practical formation of a youth’s readiness to show their patriotic qualities in more serious situations? It seems reasonable to address male students from higher education institutions who have reached the age of majority.  Currently, more than 4 million people are receiving higher education in the country in 213 nonstate (400,000 students) and 497 state universities (3.6 million people). Students at state universities, both in terms of their number and age, are the most active and controlled force that can either be directed into a destructive direction or involved in the fulfillment of defense tasks…Considering that half of the students in public universities are women and another third of the remaining men are exempt from military service, the remaining number of students who have expressed a desire to serve in the reserve can be considered a resource for recruitment into territorial defense troops. By amending the existing legislation, a mechanism can be envisaged to allow for compulsory service during the first three years of studies through annual mandatory musters, and then conclude a contract for service in the reserve, including in the territorial defense forces…In order to spark interest in service (including in the reserve) among students of draft age, it is possible to envisage mechanisms to reduce tuition fees (for those who study on a paid basis)…

Numerous private security companies, whose employees usually have appropriate health clearance and the right to carry weapons, may also be considered a potential reserve for manning territorial defense troops by allowing their employees to serve in the reserve…It is also possible to envisage the possibility of manning territorial defense troops with reservists from Cossack organizations and with members of military-patriotic clubs that satisfy the set requirements… The country is facing a lack of volunteers and reservists. Taking into account the evolving military-political situation and historical traditions, the country needs volunteers who, if necessary, can defend themselves and the country with weapons in their hands.

Image Information:

Image: General Dvornikov inspecting BARS servicemen.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2mvuschv
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Reservists in training.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://function.mil.ru/images/upload/2019/rezerv_550.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

A Turkish Perspective on the Geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

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“The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments…”

“We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.” 

While critical reporting of the conflict in Ukraine is updated hourly, the accompanying passage from independent Turkish-language news and analysis site Perspektif takes a step back and puts the crisis into the greater context of global geopolitics and great power competition, including analysis of the possible long-term repercussions of the crisis.

The authors highlight the timing of the crisis, which is significant in two ways.  First, the crisis erupted in the immediate aftermath of several developments that they claim had already “rattled” the Euro-Atlantic security community.  In particular, the “defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS),” which they note reflects the “U.S.’s focus on prioritizing the Far East in recent years”; and “the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan.”  They suggest the crisis erupted at a time when Euro-Atlantic relations were not at their peak.  Timing is also important because the crisis is taking place when both the European Union (EU) and NATO are forming their future strategies.  As the authors point out, the EU is in the process of finalizing its five-year Strategic Compass document, while NATO is preparing to ratify its new Strategic Concept for the next 10 years at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  The authors note that the crisis will “leave deep marks” in these documents, which will inform these two organizations’ future strategies. 

The authors also point out that NATO will likely come to the aid of Ukraine, even militarily; while also warning that Ukraine contains certain unique “sensitivities” and should not be the stage for the next proxy war among great powers.  Here they are likely alluding to the fact that Russia views eastern Ukraine as an extension of itself, making this an  existential issue for Russia unlike the southern Caucasus or Syria.  Finally, they point out that European countries have so far shown solidarity against Russia; however, they have differing levels of threat perceptions from Russia.  In particular, “the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad” does not perceive Russia as high a threat compared to East/Southeast Europe and the Baltic countries, which does not bode well for a long-term European unified front against Russia.

Source:

Mithat Çelikpala and Fatih Ceylan, “Dinyeper’de Kabaran Sular Ukrayna ve Rusya’yı Nereye Sürükler? (Where will the Rising Waters in the Dnieper [River] Lead Ukraine and Russia?),” Perspektif Online (independent Turkish-language news and analysis site), 10 December 2021. https://www.perspektif.online/dinyeperde-kabaran-sular-ukrayna-ve-rusyayi-nereye-surukler/

The Ukraine crisis, re-ignited as of November 2021, is taking place within the big picture in ways that can be summarized below:

1. In light of the U.S.’s recently adopted global strategy; the U.S. is in an open wrist fight with China in the Far East.  Throughout 2021, the U.S. did not refrain from maintaining a military presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South/East China Seas to deter China; even though Biden had expressed that they do not intend to start a “Cold War” with China.  The contention between the U.S.-China is among the top challenges on the international agenda.

2. The competition between these two countries is starting to expand into a greater geographic area, from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, from the Balkans to East/Southeast Europe, to include the greater Black Sea basin, within the framework of China’s BRI project.

3. Due to the Ukraine crisis, relations between the U.S./West/NATO and Russia have entered a period of spiraling tension.  The situation has triggered an increased U.S. military build-up in the region and created circumstances that directly impact Black Sea security.  Tension in the region will ebb and flow until a sustainable middle ground (modus vivendi) regarding Ukraine can be achieved within the strategic contention between great powers.

4. The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments and resulted in both sides pulling their swords while also trying to establish dialogue.

5. Ukraine is not a member of NATO; it is a partner.  Therefore, when Ukraine is attacked, NATO’s article 5 does not apply.  On the other hand, it can be predicted that, in such a scenario, NATO and its members will provide all kinds of support, including military support, to Ukraine.  However, it should be remembered that Ukraine has sensitivities that make it impossible for it to be the stage of a proxy war.

6. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, European countries have so far shown solidarity; but this does not mean that there is total agreement among them regarding the threat they perceive from Russia.  In this context, for example, the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad’s threat perception from Russia is different than that of East/Southeast Europe-Baltic countries.  This is the main obstacle to [European countries] having a united stance.

7. The Ukraine crisis, which has been ignited in two separate time periods within the year, has erupted at a critical time.  The European Union is at the late stages of preparing its five-year Strategic Compass document.  NATO’s Strategic Concept for the next 10 years will be accepted at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  If the crisis with Russia deepens at a time when these two important documents are being prepared, there is no doubt that its repercussions will leave deep marks in their future strategies. 

8.  In reality, Russia has lost Western Ukraine, but directly/indirectly gained control of the Crimea peninsula and the Donbass region. It will continue its efforts to legitimize the control it has established in these regions.  It would be realistic to say the problems related to each of these areas are “frozen” and call them “hot disputes” which are difficult to solve; and to establish positions based on this view.  However, this does not mean the recognition of illegitimate/illegal Russian domination in these areas.  We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.  The shadow of the geopolitical/geostrategic competition that impacts the entire world and that has become inflamed this year is poised to create new challenges and disputes from Ukraine to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via the Aegean.

Image Information:

Image: Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Suvorov#/media/File:Suvorov_Alex_V.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

New Russian Film About Syrian Operations Promotes Kremlin Narrative

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“The motion picture ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, reformat it in the spirit of patriotism.”

The Russian military has entered its seventh year of combat operations in Syria.  The Kremlin-supported media has portrayed their country’s military involvement in an overall positive light.  According to their narrative, Russian forces have helped to decimate the terrorist threat in Syria, bringing large portions of the country back under Syrian government control.  Their participation, however, has not been cost-free.  While exact numbers are classified, more than 100 Russian security forces personnel have been killed in Syria since 2015, with an equal or greater number of injured. 

One of the most dramatic and painful losses occurred in November 2015, when a Russian Su-24M bomber was shot down by a Turkish fighter after an alleged border violation.  The Russian film industry, with financial help from the Ministry of Defense (MoD), recently released a movie “Небо” (Sky) to commemorate this event.  As the two accompanying excerpts describe, this film illustrates how the Russian media can transform a misfortune into a triumph and further strengthen the Kremlin’s narrative.

The first excerpt from the mostly independent Nezavisimoye Voennoye points out that “the film is based on real events that took place in Syria, when, during a combat mission on 24 November 2015, a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish fighter.”  It reminds readers that the aircraft’s “navigator (Murakhtin) was rescued, while the pilot, Peshkov was shot by terrorists in the air.”  The article quotes the commander of the Airborne Forces, who asserts that “the film ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, and reformat it toward the spirit of patriotism.”  The second excerpt from the popular Russian media site Vokrug TV provides some additional background.  Not surprisingly, “the main villain in the film is an invisible puppeteer from the United States who controls the actions of terrorists….”  This site also highly praises this new movie, asserting that “all this is filmed so spectacularly that even the last skeptic will stir up something like patriotism in his soul.”

Source:

Daria Lyubovik, “Небо летчик Олег Пешков: Вышел первый российский фильм о войне в Сирии (Sky of the pilot Oleg Peshkov: The first Russian film about the war in Syria was released),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (mostly independent), 25 November 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2021-11-25/1_1167_sky.html

The film company “Triix Media” together with the Ministry of Defense and with the participation of the channel “Russia 1” presented a film about the feat of the Russian pilot Oleg Peshkov, who died during the anti-terrorist operation in Syria. This is the first art picture, by the decision of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, included in the list of mandatory viewing in the Armed Forces.

The film is based on real events that took place in Syria, when, during a combat mission on 24 November 2015, a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish fighter. The crew – Oleg Peshkov and Konstantin Murakhtin – managed to eject. Navigator Murakhtin was rescued, and Peshkov was shot by terrorists in the air. 

…After the premiere of the film “Sky”, “NVO” asked to share his impressions of the Hero of the Russian Federation, the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Andrei Serdyukov.

– In the Soviet Union, films about the Great Patriotic War were an incentive to educate the younger generation. Does the Ministry of Defense plan to further promote the theme of glorification of people who are responsible for the security of the state?

– “I agree that in our youth there was a lot of glorification in cinema, serious films were shot, the heroes of which became an example for the younger generation. We were brought up on catch phrases from our favorite films. The motion picture ‘Sky’ can be considered one of the reference points for modern Russian cinema, allowing, figuratively speaking, to translate the arrows of Russian cinema, reorient, reformat it in the spirit of patriotism. I am sure that in the future, with the support of our leadership, many new patriotic films will be released.”

Source: Leonid Kiskarkin, “Небо: военная драма о современном Маресьеве (Sky: a military drama about modern Maresyev).” Vokrug TV (popular Russian media site), 17 November 2021. https://www.vokrug.tv/article/show/16370996521/

The film describes the feat of Russian pilots, whose plane was shot down by the Turks on the border with Syria. …On November 24, 2015, a Russian Su-24M bomber with tail number 83 took off from the Khmeimim military base to carry out a combat mission: launching a missile strike against terrorists. Near the Syrian-Turkish border in the Yayladagi region of Hatay province, a Turkish fighter jet shot down a plane of the Russian military space forces. The crew of two was ejected from the burning bomber. One of the pilots was shot in the air by opponents of the Assad regime, another was able to land safely in an area controlled by terrorists and was rescued during a special operation by the Russian military. This story formed the basis of the military drama “Sky,” filmed with the support of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation….

…The main villain in the film is an invisible puppeteer from the United States who controls the actions of terrorists…

…The film culminates in the same ill-fated flight during which our bomber fell victim to a dastardly Turkish Air Force strike…. All this is filmed so spectacularly that even the last skeptic will stir up something like patriotism in his soul.

Russian Theorists Contemplating Preemptive Wars

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Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.

Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.

“If earlier, belligerents tried to preempt the enemy both before and during military (combat) actions, now it is advisable to transfer the main efforts in this matter to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.”

The confidence of the Kremlin leadership to employ, or threaten to employ, military force is increasing as Russia continues to modernize its armed forces.  This growing assurance may have reached the point where Russian military experts are now advocating preemptive military actions to defend the country’s interests.  The accompanying excerpt comes from an article in Voennaya Mysl’, the flagship journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense.  The authors argue that given the rapid nature of modern conflict and the increasing threats of potential adversaries, “it is now advisable to transfer the main military efforts to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.”

The authors begin by describing how great Russian military leaders in the past understood the importance of striking the enemy first.  Citing General A. Suvorov, they assert that “money is costly, human life is even more valuable, but time is the most precious thing!”  Perhaps hinting at Russia’s demographic challenges, they point out that “the superiority gained from a surprise attack makes it possible to more than compensate for a smaller number of his troops.”  The authors go on to suggest that Russia’s growing arsenal of “high-precision long-range sea and air-based weapons” now gives the military the ability to conduct a preemptive strike against the enemies of Russia.

Framing time as a spatial concept, the authors liken this preemptive thinking as an element of a “further development of theory and practice of ‘deep operation.’” Quoting another Russian military theorist, they assert that “in a war, the victory is won by the side that strikes earlier… which is necessary in order to break the enemy’s moral and material resistance and force him to submit to our will.”  The authors conclude by stressing the importance of domestic propaganda when striking first, whereby the military’s “preemption of a potential enemy in action,” will gain the “support and develop the defense consciousness of the Russian people.”

Source:

Major General V.V. Kruglov, Colonel A.S. Shubin, “О возрастающем значении упреждения противника в действиях (On the growing importance of anticipating the enemy in actions),” Voennaya Mysl’ (flagship journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), December 2021. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Nomera  (pp. 27-34).

…All social and military processes are accelerated to such an extent that there is a significant increase in the likelihood of missing any fundamental changes in military affairs that could threaten the security of the state. …In this regard, military science is faced with the urgent task of studying the problem of rational use of the time factor in military affairs.

…Military history shows that one of the first generals who most deeply understood the importance of time in battle was A.V. Suvorov…. Suvorov expressed this circumstance in immortal words: “Money is expensive, human life is even more valuable, and time is the most precious thing!”

The superiority gained from the surprise of the attack made it possible to more than compensate for the small number of his troops.

…More than 100 years ago, the Russian military theorist émigré A. Zalf approached this problem in the following way: “In a war, the victory is won by the side that strikes earlier… in order to break the enemy’s moral and material resistance and force him to submit to our will.”

…The emergence of new means of warfare, in particular high-precision long-range sea and air-based weapons (cruise missile “Caliber”, hypersonic missile systems “Dagger”, “Zircon”, gives rise to such new forms of military action as a strategic strike and a missile air-naval strike.

… in fact, is a consequence of the further development of theory and practice “Deep operation”.

…The arsenal of the RF Armed Forces should contain types of weapons, forms and methods of action that are unexpected for the enemy, guaranteeing the destruction of the aggressor in any conditions of the situation. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that at present the use of the time factor has acquired a qualitatively new feature that generates the following pattern. If earlier, belligerents tried to preempt the enemy both before and during military (combat) actions, now it is advisable to transfer the main efforts in this matter to the beginning (and even before the beginning) of the armed struggle.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall the words of the patriot of Russia A. Shcherbatov, addressed to its citizens many years ago: “Under modern conditions of international struggle, victory remains with the fighting force behind which there is a nationwide determination to win at any cost and at whatever cost. victims. It is easy to create such a mood in the Russian people, since the state principle always prevailed over personal interest….”  In connection with the permanent aggravation of the military-political situation in the world, when an armed conflict or war may break out at any moment and one must be ready for them, military scientists and military command and control bodies at all levels should intensify efforts to find and implement the latest effective forms and methods of military (combat) actions, including those involving preemption of a potential enemy in action, and thereby support and develop the defense consciousness of the Russian people.

Image Information:

Image: Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Suvorov#/media/File:Suvorov_Alex_V.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

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2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

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The following summary first offers several ways that Russian theorists have defined a robot, starting in 1991. Second, the analysis compares Russian and U.S. approaches to employing robotics (from a Russian perspective) as well as tasks and principles of their use. Third, some of the uses of robotics in Russia are detailed, focusing on descriptions in military periodicals—in urban environments, in conjunction with engineer support, in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, with artillery, and their use in Syria. Fourth, legal and organizational issues of contention are examined that affect robotic use worldwide and regarding Russia. Fifth, the numerous problem areas are covered that Russia has encountered in its development of robotic capabilities, followed by a few conclusions. There are two appendixes. Appendix One lists some robotic employment principles and Appendix Two offers some photos of robots under development in Russia along with their operating parameters (and several not shown in the photographs).

“Russian Electronic, Information, Navigation, And Reconnaissance-Strike And -Fire Operations: Definitions And Use” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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Russia has been investigating a host of strike and fire concepts for at least a few decades, with one of the first reconnaissance-strike discussions documented in 1984. The quotation above indicates that reconnaissance-strike is not the only strike means under consideration in Russia, and that the number has increased over the years. In terms of terminology and context, Russia’s strike and fire forms are different from those of other nations. The forms under discussion in Russia are radio-electronic-strikes (REU) and radio-electronic-fire strikes (REOU), information-strike and – fire operations (IUO for strike operations, no abbreviation offered for -fire operations), remotely controlled cyber operations (RCW, which appear to be part of information-strikes), navigation strikes, and reconnaissance-strike1 F2 and -fire complexes (RUK and ROK, respectively).

“The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries Of 2010-2017: What Did They Teach Us About Russia’s New Way Of War?” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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From 2010 to 2017 Russian Colonel (reserves) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov wrote 13 interesting articles in the journal Military Thought (nine of them are summarized below) that had a major impact on how Western analysts understood Russian military affairs and way of war. Though the authors have not written publicly since 2017, their impact continues to be felt as the West grapples with how to confront Russian activities across all domains. Asymmetric and indirect actions, the initial period of war, deterrence, military art, forecasting, strategy, new generation warfare, and other topics were discussed, ending with an article in 2017 discussing war in the 21st century. Numerous aspects of these themes remain under discussion in Russia.

“A Survey of Russia Security Topics for 2020 and Just Beyond” by BG (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (2020-10-15)

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Although US security concerns have recently focused to a large degree on China, it is Russia that is the unpredictable wildcard. The country has stumbled in more ways than one during the past several months. In March 2020, it overplayed its hand in a game of oil supply-price brinksmanship with Saudi Arabia. The ruble is under inflation pressure. And the Kremlin’s initial fumbling of the coronavirus outbreak only added to its impact. In late May, Russian state press reported that Moscow could face a 7.5 percent drop in GDP following the pandemic.1 One of the most telling signs of pressure on the Kremlin was the decision—no doubt a reluctant one—to postpone the grand 75th anniversary events linked to VE-Day on 9 May and reschedule a more modest celebration for 24 June. During this tumultuous period, a Levada poll saw a slide in President Vladimir Putin’s popularity to 59 percent, a six-year low.