Yearly Archives: 2024

China Employs AI Enabled Water Cannon To Enforce South China Sea Territorial Claims

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Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.

“The Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology… Beijing increasingly sees the weapons as vital to bolstering its hold over the disputed waters while also lowering the odds of armed clashes.”

China has managed to avoid open conflict while continually advancing its claims in the South China Sea in part because China employs a variety of non-lethal weapons and tactics. In the following excerpted article published by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, the author notes that water cannons have been a critical non-lethal weapon regularly used by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard against the navies and personnel of other countries in the area, especially in its territorial disputes with the Philippines.[i] The article describes a recent case when a Chinese ship fired a traditional water cannon into a Philippine ship shattering the cockpit windscreen, injuring several personnel, and forcing the Philippine ship to cede. However, according to the article, current water cannon technology is less effective in rough seas. The article claims that a new artificial intelligence (AI) water cannon has been developed by a Chinese firm that could have an outsized influence on China’s ability to maintain its maritime territorial claims. The newly developed AI water cannon is “equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters allowing it to stay on target under a variety of conditions,” enabling China to continually target adversaries “with an error of only two meters in rough conditions.” The development of a more accurate AI driven water cannon should be considered part of China’s full spectrum warfare. Non-lethal in nature, it would allow China to take offensive action while minimizing the threat of a traditionally lethally armed confrontation. This places the onus on China’s competitors to come up with their own non-lethal weapons and counter-tactics, respond with violent action that could plunge the South China Sea into armed conflict, or ultimately cede the territory.

OE Watch Insight:

The development of an AI-driven water cannon seems to indicate CHN’s commitment to use non-lethal weapons to advance its territorial claims in the South China Sea while avoiding armed conflict.

Sources:

Stephen Chen, “’Subdue the enemy without fighting’: How China’s powerful water cannon will change the game in South China Sea,” SCMP. 13 April 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3258772/subdue-enemy-without-fighting-how-chinas-powerful-water-cannon-will-change-game-south-china-sea?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cm&utm_campaign=enlz-today_international&utm_content=20240413&tpcc=enlz-today_international&UUID=200d3857-7b09-402a-bc24-cdd797d79a18&next_article_id=3258875&article_id_list=3258772,3258875,3258822,3258887,3258877,3258884,3258908,3258904&tc=4

The world’s first “smart” water cannon, controlled by artificial intelligence (AI), has been developed by researchers in central China – and it could take the non-lethal weapon to new heights..

The water cannon is also equipped with motion sensors that collect the swing state of the ship to alter the ballistic parameters.

Conditions at sea create complex environmental wind and fluid patterns and mechanical transmission errors, so it can be challenging to lock onto and hit a precise spot on a ship in the distance, such as a smokestack, with a water jet on a swaying coastguard vessel.

…

China has been vigorously developing its maritime forces in recent decades, including electromagnetic catapult aircraft carriers, hypersonic anti-ship missiles, ultra-high-power electronic warfare systems and other cutting-edge equipment.

They are formidable weapons, aimed squarely at the US military, but they are too much for territorial disputes against smaller Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea.

The vast disparity in military strength renders China’s hi-tech arsenal impractical against these neighbours. For instance, the Philippines’ entire naval force owns only two frigates capable of launching missiles. Recognizing this imbalance, the Chinese government has ramped up investment in water cannon technology, developing a range of increasingly automated and powerful products.

The technology has also been aided from an unlikely quarter – China’s infrastructure projects. With large-scale land reclamation and other infrastructure projects under way, China has some of the world’s most powerful dredging vessels that suck seabed sediment to redistribute it to designated areas. The water pump technology involved in that process is perfectly suited to driving high-performance water cannons…

Zhang Yuqiang, a researcher with the People’s Armed Police Maritime Police Academy Command Department, said that shipboard non-lethal weapons including water cannons “will play an increasingly important role in future maritime conflicts”.

“In recent years, competition and struggles around marine interests and power have become increasingly fierce, and maritime disputes have become a common challenge faced by most maritime countries in the world,”

Because all sides are “fighting for every inch of land and refusing to cede an inch”, the team said, using traditional lethal weapons in small-scale skirmishes could cause them escalate into large-scale armed conflicts. It is a situation that neither China nor other countries around the South China Sea wish to see.Other major maritime countries are now stepping up research and deployment of other types of non-lethal weapons, including blinding lasers and microwaves that can cause skin-burning sensations, they said.

Notes:

[i] South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are also equipped with, and have used, water cannons in naval disputes with competitor nations over maritime territories or fisheries, while the Philippines is lacking in comparison.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese Coast Guard use water cannons to harass Philippine fishermen.
Source: https://www.jamesokeefe.org/2023/12/naval-politics-by-other-means/
Attribution: CCA 4.0 INT

China Reveals Its Carrier-Based J-15D Electronic Warfare Fighter

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The J-15D, featured in a CCTV-7 Military News episode, displaying two electronic warfare pods on the wing tips and two larger electronic warfare pods on the inside of the wings.

“Chinese aircraft carrier formations have reached a new level of comprehensive combat capabilities, and has entered the era of offensive operations, breaking the monopoly advantage of the U.S. military. This is something we are very happy about.”

The introduction of the J-15D [R1] signals a pivotal moment for Chinese aircraft carrier formations, enabling them to execute strikes against adversaries with sophisticated air defense systems according to the first article published by government-censored Chinese internet and gaming provider NetEase. The Chinese J-15D electronic warfare aircraft made its first public appearance on CCTV in late March 2024.[i] Equipped with electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance capabilities, and the capacity to disrupt enemy radar and missile systems, the J-15D substantially enhances the combat power of Chinese aircraft carriers.[ii] The article highlights three key aspects of the J-15D. First, its strategic value in anti-ship warfare is underscored by its comprehensive suite of electronic warfare, anti-radiation warfare, and air combat capabilities. Second, the J-15D signifies China’s comparable strength to the U.S. in the field of electronic warfare. Third, its ability to provide situational awareness is crucial, particularly in scenarios involving the deployment of hypersonic missiles by Chinese aircraft carrier formations. The J-15D confers an asymmetric advantage with its capacity to target adversaries at long distances and provide targeting guidance for hypersonic missiles. Overall, the J-15D signifies a “a new level in terms of comprehensive combat capabilities” for the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet. The second excerpt, published on highly regulated Chinese internet platform Tencent, suggests that the introduction of the J-15D also marks a significant shift in the combat strategy of China’s aircraft carriers. The excerpt states that in the past, the People’s Liberation Army Navy followed the Soviet Navy’s model, relying on carrier-based fighter jets for air defense while utilizing escort ships for long-range anti-ship attacks. With advancements in the performance of the J-15D, Chinese aircraft carriers are now capable of conducting long-range anti-ship and ground operations coupled with defensive and offensive electronic warfare.[iii] The J-15D, with its offensive capabilities, can engage in long-range sea or ground attacks alongside other carrier-based fighters, leveraging electronic warfare systems to dominate the battle space.[iv] This poses an “unprecedented” threat to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups.

OE Insight Summary:

CHN’s naval aviation strength has significantly increased with the introduction of the J-15D, a carrier-based EW fighter jet. This EW fighter enhances CHN’s ability to assert electronic dominance from its aircraft carriers, providing strategic versatility in maritime operations.

Sources:

Fu Qianshao, “ ‘央视曝光’电战鲨’，歼-15D推动航母编队进入攻势作战时代 (CCTV Reveals ‘Electric War Shark’, the J-15D Propels Aircraft Carrier Formations into an Era of Offensive Operations),” Netease (one of China’s largest internet companies, subject to regulatory oversight and censorship by the national internet regulator, China’s Cyberspace Administration), 02 April 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/IUPAKE5T0535T18G.html

CCTV’s ‘Military Report’ recently aired footage showcasing the J-15D fighter jet as it commenced a naval training program, signaling a significant advancement for China’s aircraft carrier capabilities. Notably, the J-15D fills a crucial gap that its predecessor, the J-16D, couldn’t address, as it lacked compatibility for deployment on aircraft carriers.

The introduction of the J-15D into Chinese naval aviation signifies a pivotal advancement, enabling Chinese aircraft carrier formations to conduct air strikes against adversaries equipped with sophisticated air defense systems. Reflecting on the Gulf War, the US Air Force frequently coordinated air strikes against ground targets with electronic warfare aircraft to neutralize ground defense systems. This underscores the critical role of electronic warfare aircraft in suppressing air defenses, a capability that the J-15D helps address.

Compared with the US EA-18G, is the J15-D superior or inferior? 1. The J-15D offers enhanced strategic value particularly in anti-ship warfare. The J-15 is equipped with electronic warfare capabilities, anti-ship warfare and anti-radiation warfare, and has a relatively complete air combat capability. Compared to the J15-D, the EA-18G has excellent electronic warfare capabilities, limited anti-radiation and air combat capabilities, and almost no anti-ship combat capabilities. 2. The J-15D holds the advantage of possessing more modern electronic warfare technology, benefitting from China’s robust capabilities in the electronic industry. In the competition between China and the US in electronic warfare, China stands equal to the United States in terms of industry strength. 3. The tactical awareness offered by the J15-D holds significant value in scenarios where Chinese aircraft carriers possess hypersonic missiles. The J15-D’s ability to lock onto opponents’ carrier formations at longer distances and provide target indications for hypersonic missiles presents an asymmetric advantage. While the U.S. EA-18G possesses similar capabilities, its missile speed and range are insufficient to pose a threat to Chinese carrier formations.

Overall, the J-15D entry into service signifies that Chinese aircraft carrier formations reached a new level in terms of comprehensive combat capabilities, and entered the era of offensive operations, breaking the monopoly advantage of the US military. This is something we are very happy about. 

Kongtian Daliang, “央视官宣，歼15D ’咆哮鲨’ 喷涂海军灰，中国航母任务出现转变 (CCTV Reveals, J-15D “Roaring Shark” Sprayed Navy Grey, Marks Changes for Chinese Aircraft Missions),” Tencent (China’s largest multinational technology conglomerate, operating within a tightly regulated environment), 26 March 2024. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240326A0442K00

Recent footage from the CCTV Military Channel showcased the J-15D carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The aircraft, painted in navy gray, suggests that it is either nearing or has already entered service. The presence of the J-15D fighter indicates a shift in focus for Chinese aircraft carriers from air defense to offense.

The CCTV footage reveals that the J-15D electronic warfare aircraft is equipped with two electronic warfare pods mounted under its wings, like the PLAAF J-16D [R1] electronic warfare aircraft. The primary function of this electronic warfare equipment is to analyze enemy radar frequencies, identify, jam, position, and target enemy radars. A notable distinction between the J-15D and other J-15 fighters is the absence of the airspeed tube, indicating comprehensive upgrades to the aircraft’s electronic equipment such as radar and sensors, facilitating comprehensive control of electromagnetic signals in combat airspace.

The introduction of the J-15D signifies a significant transformation in China’s aircraft carrier combat missions. Previously, Chinese aircraft carriers faced a distinct disadvantage compared to American super aircraft carriers. Consequently, the Soviet Navy model was adopted, utilizing carrier jets for air defense cover while escort ships launch long-range anti-ship missiles to conduct attacks. With the increasing maturity of the J-15, it is now equipped with air-launched anti-ship missiles, bolstering Chinese aircraft carriers’ offensive air capabilities.

The primary objective of the J-15D is to employ high-power electronic warfare equipment to suppress and disrupt the opponent’s electronic systems, while employing various methods to degrade the opponent’s radar detection capabilities. Alongside other carrier-based fighters, the J-15D can execute long-range sea and ground attacks, utilizing its electronic warfare capabilities to neutralize the opponent’s air defense systems. For US aircraft carrier strike groups, the threat posed by the J-15D is unprecedented. As for Japan’s ‘Izumo’ class light aircraft carriers, they are equipped with the F-35B stealth fighters, which have a generational advantage over the J-15 series. However, the number of F-35B aircraft is limited and may have limited warning aircraft to provide airspace intelligence and early warning. This greatly reduces the situational awareness capability of the F-35B. In addition, the J-15D retains most of the J-15’s air combat capabilities, and electronic warfare aircraft can be regarded as the nemesis of stealth fighter jets. Therefore, Chinese aircraft carriers employing J-15D aircraft are enough to cause Japanese light aircraft carriers to suffer significant losses.

Notes:

[i] To watch the full CCTV-7 video of the J15-D, see CCTV’s C-Bit Series Baidu post, Baidu, 24 March 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=17129917562037813254

[ii] Mu Feng Lun Dao, “电战版歼-15D来袭，央视正式官宣，中国航母舰载机最后拼图全凑齐 (Electronic Warfare Version of J15-D is Coming, CCTV Formally Announces, Completing the Final Piece for China’s Carrier-Borne Aircraft),” Netease, 26 March 2024. https://www.163.com/dy/article/IU70SP910552YXLH.html

[iii] A Taiwanese news channel invites a Chinese military expert to discuss the strengths and advantages of the J-15D fighter plane, CTI News Channel, 02 April. 2024. https://youtu.be/srdhxxwV-CQ?t=304

[iv] A Taiwanese news channel invites a Chinese military expert to discuss the combat application of the J15-D, CTI News Channel, 30 March 2024. https://youtu.be/s6o1H0ffZXU?t=101

Image Information:

Image: The J-15D, featured in a CCTV-7 Military News episode, displaying two electronic warfare pods on the wing tips and two larger electronic warfare pods on the inside of the wings.
Source: https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=17129917562037813254
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

China Rehearsing Possible Taiwan Decapitation Operation

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Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building

“In the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.”

China is expanding its capability to train for a decapitation operation against Taiwan. On 26 March, Joseph Wen, a Taiwanese defense analyst, posted satellite images of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training ground in southwest Inner Mongolia. The images appear to show a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone, a restricted area that houses key government buildings, including the Presidential Office Building in Taipei. The first excerpted article, taken from the popular Taiwan English news source Taiwan News, highlights some of the concerns and speculation resulting from the images. For example, it explains that while this is not the first time the PLA has created a replica of Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, this mockup is different in that it “covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range,” which indicates where China is likely to be focused. Lu Te-yun, a satellite imagery expert, explains that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.” However, some experts, such as a former Kuomintang legislator cited in the article, believe the PLA would be unable to swiftly launch a decapitation strike. Instead, he believes, the exercise is more likely part of psychological and cognitive warfare effort to pressure Taiwan into believing that it must negotiate.[i] As seen in the second excerpted article, taken from an editorial published in Taiwan’s English-language newspaper Taipei Times, the PLA has repeatedly held other military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base,[ii] also located in Inner Mongolia, during which they used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building to simulate a decapitation strike. Published one month after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the article explains that the media had been predicting a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. The author, Yao Chung-yuan, former deputy director of the Taiwan Ministry of National defense strategic planning department goes on to stress the importance of Taiwan preparing for such an event. Today, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict drags on with no victory in sight for Moscow, China could be placing more urgency into honing its own capabilities to prevent a protracted conflict should it one day invade Taiwan.

Sources:

Keoni Everington, “China Creates Taipei Mockup to Train for Invasion,” Taiwan News (popular online English-language news source in Taiwan), 28 March 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5131830

Joseph Wen …posted satellite images of a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone (博愛特區), which is a restricted zone in Taipei’s Zhongzheng District where the Presidential Office Building and other key government buildings are situated. The training ground is located in the Alxa Left Banner administrative division of Alxa League in the southwest of China’s Inner Mongolia.

Wen said in the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.

Lu Te-yun (盧德允), a satellite imagery expert who once served as an inspector for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) told UDN that the proportions of the training grounds need to be measured. However, Lu said that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.”

On the TVBS program “Situation Room” on Wednesday, former Kuomintang (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) said that given Taiwan’s extensive air defenses, it is unlikely that the PLA could swiftly launch a decapitation strike on Taipei. Lin said, “This is psychological and cognitive warfare. China will not relax and will continue to put pressure on Taiwan, telling Taiwan that it can negotiate or fight, simultaneously employing a dual strategy of negotiation and confrontation.”

Yao Chung-yuan, “Prepare for ‘Decapitation’ Attempts,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s English-language daily newspaper), 28 March 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/28/2003775565

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the media predicted a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. An in-depth discussion of the issue seems necessary in Taiwan.

There are many ways of launching a decapitation strike, which seeks to assassinate a national leader. ….

Despite Russia’s failure to kill Zelenskiy, Ukraine must remain extremely vigilant.

“Decapitation” is a military term for the use of ballistic and precision-guided missiles to assassinate a national leader or destroy a presidential office, to demoralize and severely weaken an enemy.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly held military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, during which it used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building in Taipei to simulate a decapitation strike…

The purpose of Russia’s supposed decapitation attempts was to hijack Zelenskiy, not assassinate him, but as tension mounts during a continued war, whether Russia attempts other decapitation methods is a possibility. In Taiwan’s 2020 Han Kuang exercises, the military simulated strikes against PLA and Chinese secret agents targeting the Presidential Office Building and other central government agencies in Taipei’s Boai Special Zone (博愛特區), while training for countermeasures against the CCP’s hijacking of the Taiwanese president. From the situation in the Russia-Ukraine war, the scenario set in the Han Kuang military drill is not impossible.

Notes:

[i] For more on this, see: Cindy Hurst, “Chinese Cognitive Operations Might Impact Taiwan’s Will to Resist,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-cognitive-operations-might-impact-taiwans-will-to-resist/

[ii] Zhurihe is the PLA’s largest military training base. For more information, see: Chen Zhuo, “8 Things to Know About China’s Biggest Army Training Base,” South China Morning Post and reposted to China Military, 13 May 2019. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/Features_209191/9501757.html

Image Information:

Image: Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building
Source: CEphoto, Uwe Aranas, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taipei_Taiwan_Presidential-Office-Building-01a.jpg
Attribution:

The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Gaza War’s Impact On The Middle East Strategic Landscape (Lucas Winter)(June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Three de facto strategic coalitions dominate the contemporary Middle East geopolitical landscape: the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Turkish-led “Political Islam Coalition,” and the U.S.-led “Arab Normalization” Coalition, anchored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hamas fits uneasily between the Axis of Resistance and Political Islam Coalitions, receiving tepid support from both but fully trusted by neither. The Arab Normalization Coalition does not support Hamas.
  • Members of the three de facto strategic coalitions responded differently to Hamas’ 7 October attacks and their aftermath: “Axis of Resistance” members contributed calculated, largely symbolic military support; the Political Islam Coalition supported Hamas in media and diplomacy; and the Arab Normalization Coalition sought to maintain a neutral distance from the war in Gaza.
  • Prior to 7 October, the Middle East was in the midst of a new era of regional détente, in which members of the different de facto strategic coalitions were re-engaging and de escalating their conflicts. The War in Gaza shifted the regional strategic calculus in ways that are not yet clear. Three scenarios are presented for how these changes may occur, and how China and Russia may seek to benefit from them. The first scenario involves increased Turkish-Iranian policy convergence, the second a deepening of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and the third a “grand bargain” that includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is more likely to benefit from the first two scenarios, while China is likely to benefit most from the third.

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

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A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.

“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”

Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.

Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Armenia Distances Itself From Instruments Of Russian Security

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An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.

“The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia.”

Armenia has been critical of both Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) over their responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some Armenian officials have even called for the country to leave the CSTO and limit cooperation with Russia, though Armenia has continued to engage with both since the end of the 2020 war because of a lack of other options.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel, reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 22 February 2024 that Armenia had ended its participation in the CSTO, though he did not go as far as to say that Armenia is leaving the organization. The article notes that the decision is based on the CSTO’s responses to the 2020 war and the numerous clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since then. The article also relays that Armenia has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh for not favorably dealing with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the breakaway region and not preventing Azerbaijan’s operation in September 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region. The article ends with a statement from Pashinyan, who claims that the CSTO is a threat to the national security of Armenia. Based on this statement, it is possible that Armenia will leave the CSTO, but the country will still be home to a Russian military base and Russian border guards in its territory for the foreseeable future.[ii] In a seemingly related development, the second excerpted article, from the Armenian news website News.am, reports that Armenia has notified Moscow that Russian border guards will need to be removed from the Zvartnots International Airport. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyancommented that Armenian border guards are capable of taking over duties at the airport. The article clarifies that Armenia is not asking the Russian border guards to leave their positions on the border with Turkey or Iran, but only to leave the airport. While this development has yet to play out, it is one step Armenia has taken to rely less on Russia.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 29 February 2024. https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia increased and what steps Armenia took in its attempts to look for an alternative to the CSTO…

During the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. Moscow responded by saying that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated and the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and after that it sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh… conflict zone.

At a meeting with Putin on December 27, 2022, the Armenian prime minister again recalled the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. “The Lachin corridor has been blocked for almost 20 days. This is the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. And I want to remind you that according to the trilateral statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Lachin corridor should be under the control of Russian peacekeepers,” said Pashinyan…

On September 21, 2023, the day after the end of hostilities in Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sharply criticized Russian peacekeepers. “The Russian peacekeeping contingent was supposed to guarantee the safety of the civilian population…We bear our share of responsibility. But I don’t think that we should turn a blind eye to the failures that the Russian peacekeeping force had contingent,” he said…“Due to the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, over 100 thousand Armenians left their homes and native places in Nagorno-Karabakh in a week,” Pashinyan said…

On February 22, 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, in an interview with France 24 TV channel, stated that the CSTO reaction did not correspond to reality in relation to the Republic of Armenia, in particular in 2021 and 2022. “And, obviously, this could not go unnoticed by Armenia. Today, in practice, we have actually frozen our participation in this agreement in this organization,” said the Prime Minister of Armenia…

On February 28, 2024, answering questions from deputies in the Armenian parliament, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia…”

“Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” News.am (Armenian news website), 7 March 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explained how Yerevan informed Moscow about the matter of the Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport of the Armenian capital city of Yerevan.

At Thursday’s press conference, the FM confirmed the statement by the secretary of the Council of Armenia regarding the aforementioned matter, and stated that the Russian side was informed about the initiative to remove the Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport…

“Now we believe that Armenia is institutionally capable of independently implementing border guard service at the [Yerevan] airport, about which we have informed the Russian side. I believe that this will be enough for the Russian side and the matter will be over,” Mirzoyan noted, adding that it is about the entire package of jurisdiction at the airport…To the question about the presence of Russian border guards in other places in Armenia, for example on the Turkish border, the minister responded that the matter is only about Zvartnots airport. “Therefore, we are talking only about the airport,” added the Armenian FM.

Notes:

[i] Russia and the CSTO have had separate responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the ceasefire agreement, but the peacekeepers are not affiliated with the CSTO. The CSTO declined to intervene in the 2020 war or the clashes on the grounds that the organization stated Armenia itself was not attacked in any of the instances and thus, does not necessitate a collective defense response from the organization.

[ii] Russia’s 102nd Military Base is located near the city of Gymuri, Armenia with an estimated 3,000 soldiers garrisoned there, while Russian border guards provide security on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran as well as operating at the Zvartnots International Airport outside of the capital Yerevan.

Image Information:

Image: An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_-_2023_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0

India’s Plan To Counter China and Sustain Maritime Sphere of Influence

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The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China.

“Modi government’s strategy [is] to use [Indian] island territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region.”

As China seeks to gain more prominence in the Indian Ocean, India is pushing back with a number of its own efforts to sustain its sphere of influence. According to the excerpted article from the Indian nationalist publication Hindustan Times, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently announced the inauguration of naval bases, which will be on islands in the Indian territory of the Lakshadweep archipelago, near the states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The article describes the bases as a “game-changer” and notes how they are part of a broader strategy of the Modi administration to project power into the Indo-Pacific. Specifically, according to the article, India seeks to counter the Chinese Navy and make it “think twice” about hostile actions towards India.

India considers China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean as an attempt to encircle and contain India, including with Chinese naval bases in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, [i] and Pakistan and a port in Myanmar, which can be converted to a base in the future. China can use naval bases to monitor India’s Navy and naval training exercises and, in the event of war, strike Indian ships capable of firing nuclear weapons, which would limit India’s nuclear deterrent.[ii] China claims that India is exaggerating the threat from China and is interfering in the sovereignty of India’s neighbors in the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by pressuring them to disallow even Chinese “scientific research vessels”[iii] to dock at their ports.[iv] However, India disregards China’s claims. Rather, to meet the threat India perceives from China, the least India can do is to increase own naval bases to match, if not necessarily even exceed, the Chinese port and base presence in the Indian Ocean. India considers the Indian Ocean its own sphere of influence and is, therefore, building up its naval infrastructure to meet its security needs.

Sources:

“India to build naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands,” Hindustan Times (Delhi-based weekly covering issues in India and around the world from nationalist angles),14 January 2024. hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-build-naval-bases-in-agatti-and-minicoy-islands-101707884042309.html

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep, India has decided to firmly extend its naval footprint by establishing naval bases in Agatti and Minicoy Islands along with air bases in order to secure the vital sea lanes of communication.

This decision dovetails into Modi government’s strategy to use its islands territories to project power in the Indo-Pacific in support of maritime security of the region. The geographical location of Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands and the Andamans and Nicobar Islands is such that India can safeguard the maritime trade routes while countering the challenge of rapidly expanding Chinese Navy and their supplicants in the Indian Ocean…. Such level of force projection has never been seen in the past and will make the adversary [China] and its supplicants think twice before playing mischief in the Indian Ocean region.

Notes:

[i] An overlooked reason why China has gained increasing influence in Sri Lanka is that India’s domestic Tamil population has exerted pressure on India’s government to pressure the Sri Lankan government on treating Tamil civilians better during the civil war and in Sri Lanka. Although India did not directly intervene, it “warned” Sri Lanka about its human rights conduct, while the U.S suspended aid to Sri Lanka for its human rights violations. China, in contrast, took advantage of the situation to offer crucial aid, armaments, and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan government without any criticism of its human rights record. See A. Jathindra, “Revisiting Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Balance under the Shadow of the Space Dragon,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/28/2003270082/-1/-1/1/JATHINDRA_COMMENTARY.PDF

[ii] See, for example, Firstpost.com, “’String of Pearls’: How China-made Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar threatens India’s nuclear attack submarine base,” 8 January 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/world/string-of-pearls-how-china-made-kyaukphyu-port-in-myanmar-threatens-indias-nuclear-attack-submarine-base-13588512.html.

[iii] The Washington D.C-based think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), from 2020 to 2024, 64 Chinese “oceanographic missions” using “research vessels” were observed from satellite imagery, and 80% of them “demonstrated suspect behavior or possessed organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda.” Indis would, therefore, rightly be suspicious of their activities in the Indian Ocean. See “China’s Research Vessels Carry Out Covert Missions for PLA,” The Maritime Executive, 14 January 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-china-s-research-vessels-carry-out-covert-missions-for-pla

[iv] See, for example, “印度海军潜艇到访斯里兰卡，印媒炒作“击败中国 (Indian navy submarine visits Sri Lanka, and Indian media exaggerates defeating China),” guancha.cn (privately owned Chinese-language website with nationalist tendencies), 5 February 2024. https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2024_02_05_724626.shtml

Image: The Indian Navy has been deployed in in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden, but the former is increasingly seeing competition with China
Source: Government of India https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indian_Navy_QRT_deployed_in_North,_Central_Arabian_Sea_and_Gulf_of_Aden.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Hamas and Houthis Target Youth as New “Islamic Resistance” Movement Emerges

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Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.

“Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses.”

Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom have seen their popularity grow since 7 October, are capitalizing on conflict in Gaza to recruit new generations of young men into their culture of “Islamic Resistance.”[i] According to the first accompanying excerpt from an op-ed published recently in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed, Hamas’s prior youth training efforts have been critical to its ability to withstand the Israeli campaign. The author mentions the “Futawwa” (youth) training program, which allowed Hamas to spread its “resistance” ideology across Gaza throughout the 2010s.[ii] The second and third accompanying excerpts, from the prominent Saudi dailies al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Watan, respectively, illustrate how both Hamas and the Houthis have used their growing popularity since 7 October to launch recruitment campaigns, especially targeting the youth. Youth indoctrination is critical for both groups, and both have put substantial efforts into it over the past decade.[iii] The Houthi Movement and Hamas in Gaza share much in common. They are both mobilized movements with Islamic ideological underpinnings that act as de facto governments in their respective regions despite not formally being recognized as such by the international community. The key difference between them is doctrinal—the former are adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam while the latter is a Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movement. For both groups, though, “the culture of resistance” is a critical component that arguably supersedes sectarian differences. Perhaps to a greater degree than previously, a focus on sectarian differences seems secondary and increasingly irrelevant in the current context. Instead, Hamas and the Houthis—alongside Shia-majority Lebanese Hezbollah and the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq”—may coalesce into a transnational, cross-sectarian “Islamic Resistance” movement that should be thought of as distinct from the 2010s, Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”[iv] Both on the Sunni and the Shia side, the new generation of fighters coming of age in the shadow of conflict in Gaza will presumably be less interested in sectarian differences or other intra-Islam disputes than in the fight against Israel.

Sources:

“How and why has Gaza held out?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily) https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/كيف-صمدت-غزّة-ولماذا

What is the secret of this resilience? … After the attempted coup against the Hamas government and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip fell under a tight siege, and the local “Gaza Authority” found itself under a unique state of “independence.” It was able to make whatever decisions it wanted regarding its society, especially in the fields of education and curriculum making… Specifically, the Hamas Authority introduced the “Futawwa” program into the curricula of its schools, aiming to train students specifically in weapons use and field skills.

“Hamas seeks to exploit the Gaza war in the Lebanese camps,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (prominent Saudi daily), 4 December 2023. https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4708376-%C2%AB%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86

On Monday, the Lebanese branch of the Hamas movement announced the establishment of the “Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood.” This is an organization with military dimensions, as the statement suggested…

In a statement, the movement called on “young and heroic men” to join the “vanguard of the resistance.” The movement’s sources explained that “this project is linked to Lebanon and does not aim exclusively to gather more fighters, but rather to include more individuals in Hamas who are active in more than one sector.” A statement issued by the movement linked the establishment of these vanguards to “affirming the role of the Palestinian people, wherever they are, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means,” and to “complementing what Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved, and benefiting from scientific and artistic energies and capabilities.”

“Houthis recruit children through seminars on war in Gaza,” al-Watan (prominent Saudi daily), 18 November 2023. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/1137388

A Yemeni source in Sanaa said that the most rejoicing over what is happening in Gaza is among the Houthi militias, who rose up directly to restore their dilapidated ranks and support their disintegrating fronts… The source stated that Houthi vehicles carrying slogans of supporting Gaza roam the villages with forms to register children and youth into these training courses, a method that does not differ from previous methods of recruitment. However, the Houthis have developed new tricks to entice children and youth to enroll in these malicious courses. This includes sending young graduates to the streets to talk about their participation in previous courses, graduating them without any assignments, and giving them monthly salarie

Notes:

[i] Several opinion polls confirm these groups’ rising popularity, including:

“Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 13 December 2023. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

“How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views,” Arab Barometer, 14 December 2023. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/how-the-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza-is-changing-arab-views/; 

“New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 December 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war;  “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” Doha Institute, 10 January 2024. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-press-release-en.pdf

[ii] Much has been written on the program over the past decade. See for instance: “Gaza teens graduate from Hamas military school,” Ynet News, 24 January 2013. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4336807,00.html

and “Training Fighters of Future Across Gaza,” New York Times, 14 January 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/world/middleeast/training-fighters-of-future-across-gaza.html

[iii] For more on Hamas youth recruitment, see: “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” CTC Sentinel, October/November 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/; For the Houthis, see: “Yemen: Houthis Recruit More Child Soldiers Since October 7,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7

[iv] The idea of an “Islamic Resistance” axis is not new. However, it bears distinguishing the emergent post-7 October Islamic Resistance from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The latter coalesced in the early 2010s, during the fight against ISIS and in support of the Syrian regime, and at a time when Hamas was estranged from Iran and its proxies. As such, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a primarily Shia organization focused on countering Sunni extremism in Syria and Iraq (or, for the Houthis, fighting against Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies). Israel remained part of the discourse, but it was not the axis’s primary focus.

Image Information:

Image: Hamas supporters in Gaza, including families and children, attending the 25th anniversary of the movement’s founding, December 2012.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1391/09/18/13910918213433966_PhotoL.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Names New Leader

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Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.

“Despite its decline in the Arabian Peninsula, [AQAP] remains the most effective terrorist group in Yemen, with the intent to launch attacks in the region and beyond.”

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) named a successor after the recent loss of its leader. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi state-owned international news outlet Al Arabiya, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, aka “Abu al-Laith,” a Yemeni national, has been named the new leader of AQAP. The organization’s official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a broadcast recording that the group’s former leader had been killed, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.”[i] The new AQAP leader, Al-Awlaki, reportedly had direct ties to former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and was repatriated to Yemen by Bin Laden. Al-Awlaki is reported to also have originated from the same tribe as former al-Qaeda spiritual leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. There is a $6 million reward from the U.S. State Department for information about the new AQAP leader, who has “publicly called for attacks on the U.S. and its allies.” The U.S. has designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2010.[ii]

The second excerpted article from the Jeddah-based Saudi daily newspaper Okaz, provides some perspective on the current status of AQAP, as well as the potential effect of Al-Awlaki as the group’s new leader. The article notes that the al-Qaeda affiliate has struggled for a multitude of reasons, including the loss of several key leaders, financial challenges, and internal disputes that have led to structural issues. The article also states that Al-Awlaki could be a unifier for AQAP due to his extensive background in the terrorist network, experience in the al-Qaeda leadership council, and previous position as Emir in the Shabwa Province. While there has been a shift in the West to focus on great power competition with China and Russia, and persistent challenges from Iran, the ongoing threat from international terrorist organizations cannot be discounted, especially with new leaders who have openly called for attacks against the United States.[iii]

Sources:

“سعد العولقي.. من هو زعيم “القاعدة” الجديد في اليمن؟  (Saad Al-Awlaki… Who is the New Leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen),” Al Arabiya (Saudi state-owned news outlet), 11 March 2024. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2024/03/11/بعد-الاعلان-عن-مقتل-زعيم-تنظيم-القاعدة-من-هو-خليفته؟

Al-Qaeda in Yemen confirmed the killing of its leader, Khaled Batarfi, without going into details, announcing that his new successor is Saad Al-Awlaki. The SITE Center, which monitors terrorist media, stated that the organization’s legal official, Ibrahim al-Qusi, confirmed in a recording broadcast yesterday, Sunday, the killing of Batarfi, the organization’s leader since February 2020, declaring that “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki is the new leader of the organization in the Arabian Peninsula.” , which the United States classifies as a terrorist…

Saad bin Atef Al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu Al-Laith,”… is of Yemeni nationality, and media reports indicate that he is one of those who was repatriated from Afghanistan to Yemen by the former leader of Al-Qaeda, who was killed by America in 2011, Osama bin Laden. Thus, Al-Awlaki becomes the fifth leader to publicly lead Al-Qaeda in Yemen, after working for years as the extremist organization’s second-in-command in the country.

Saad Al-Awlaki was born in the town of Al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in the Upper Egypt District in Shabwa Governorate (south). He comes from the large Al-Awalqi tribe, the same tribe from which the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda, Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was killed by an American drone in 2011, descends.

Mohamed Hefney, “خبير مصري لـ عكاظ: الخلافات تفكك تنظيم القاعدة الإرهابي في اليمن (An Egyptian expert to Okaz: Disagreements are Disintegrating the Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization in Yemen),” Okaz (Saudi based newspaper), 13 March 2024. https://www.okaz.com.sa/news/politics/2157390

Fears are escalating within Al-Qaeda, after the killing of its fourth leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, nicknamed “Abu al-Miqdad al-Kindi,” and the appointment of his successor, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, nicknamed “Abu al-Layth,” who the US administration classified in 2021 as a global terrorist, and offered a reward of $6. Millions of dollars in exchange for providing information about him.

Dr. Nabil Naeem, believes that Al-Awlaki is known for his extreme hostility toward America, and like all of his predecessors, he called for the necessity of launching attacks on the United States of America, which prompted the American administration to allocate a large financial reward to anyone who provides information about him. He stressed that Al-Qaeda in general, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has become weak and fragile and is witnessing a major liquidation of its leaders, whether in Yemen or other countries in the region. It is not the organization that existed 20 years ago. The new leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen faces grave challenges and priorities, including how to preserve his life and the lives of his followers from the expected physical liquidation. The Yemeni organization also faces challenges at the financial and structural levels, as the financial level is very weak. Structural level: There is a state of splits and divisions within the organization left behind by the former leader of the organization, which indicates that his death was under the direction of those close to him. Therefore, we do not rule out that the new leadership will seek to bring the terrorist organization together.Al-Awlaki is considered one of the founding leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he served as a member of the leadership council of Al-Qaeda. He was born in the 1980s. He joined the organization in 2010, and assumed the position of Emir of Shabwa Province until 2014, then he was appointed a member of the organization’s Shura Council, which is responsible for Managing operations, and he was called the second man in Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Notes:

[i] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was initially created in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni branches merged forces. The group is currently assessed to be one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates. The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder on AQAP, see: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2015. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap

[ii] For a complete list of designated terrorist organizations by the United States Government see: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed 12 March 2024. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[iii] The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community further notes that, “Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates on the African continent and Yemen will sustain the global network as the group maintains its strategic intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” The entirety of the most recent unclassified annual threat assessment issued by the United States Intelligence Community can be located here: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 5 February 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Image Information:

Image: Sana’a, capitol of Yemen at Night.
Source: https://openverse.org/image/c4b13d0f-5ffa-44fc-9a82-518d08dbfbc0?q=yemen Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0