Yearly Archives: 2023

Malian Special Forces Sustain Collaboration With Russia’s Wagner Group

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Russian security IN Bangui

“The BAFS was the gateway for Wagner’s mercenaries into the center of the country.”

On 29 May, Le Monde, the French-language publication covering international affairs in France and Francophone countries, reported on the Malian Autonomous Special Forces Battalion (BAFS), which is the conduit for Russian Wagner mercenaries to support the Malian army. BAFS became widely known among Mali observers when one of its members, Colonel Assimi Goita, launched a coup in 2020 that brought himself into power. According to the article, BAFS’ importance increased after it participated in the military coup in 2020 and then helped topple the transitional government in 2021.[i] After this second coup, relations with France and other Western countries soured and the new coup leaders welcomed Wagner Group to support BAFS. Wagner now has 1,600 troops in Mali and its current objective is ostensibly to fight alongside the BAFS in counterterrorism operations in central Mali, according to the Le Monde article. However, the article claims summary executions have occurred when BAFS and Wagner Group operate together. Malian leaders claim “only terrorists” are killed in these operations and have vociferously rejected any criticisms of BAFS’ cooperation with Wagner Group, indicating that Wagner will remain in Mali.[ii]

Sources:

“Massacre de Moura au Mali: ce que l’on sait des deux militaires sanctionnés par les Etats-Unis (Massacre of Moura in Mali: what we know about the two soldiers sanctioned by the United States)” lemonde.fr (French daily with a focus on analysis and opinion and with socialist leanings), 29 May 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/05/29/massacre-de-moura-au-mali-ce-que-l-on-sait-des-deux-militaires-sanctionnes-par-les-etats-unis_6175335_3212.html

Mali remains plagued by both security and political instability: the military retook power from civilians after two coups in August 2020 and May 2021.

The BAFS was the gateway for Wagner’s mercenaries into the center of the country. Deployed in Mali to help Bamako fight terrorism, the Russian private security group, which now has nearly 1,600 men on the ground, gained a foothold in the center of the country in early 2022.

It is from this locality that Wagner and the FAMA conduct a large part of their anti-terrorist operations in the center and during which several instances of abuses against civilians have been noted by humanitarian and human rights organizations.

The Malian government maintains that only “terrorist fighters” were killed by the army in Moura and it persists, moreover, in denying the presence of Wagner in the country, despite confirmations of the deployment of the group in Mali emanating from the Russian authorities.

Notes:

[i] Mali’s first military coup occurred in 2020 when a group of soldiers from the Malian army mutinied and arrested President Ibrahim Boubakar Keita and forced him to resign and dissolve the government and National Assembly. Although the mutinying soldiers promised to hold elections and reinstate the constitutional system, no clear path for transition emerged. Subsequently, nine months later, in 2021, Mali’s military arrested the interim civilian president and prime minister whose appointments the previous military coup leaders had overseen, but now the coup leaders claimed that the cabinet formed by the civilian leaders violated the terms of Mali’s transition charter. Although that charter called for new democratic elections to be held in February 2022 to fully restore Mali to civilian rule, the coup leaders have not held those elections and remain in power. This has led to deteriorating relations with the West and has coincided with closer relations with Russia. See Ena Dion, “After Two Coups, Mali Needs Regional Support to Bolster Democracy,” United States Institute of Peace, 9 December 2021. https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/after-two-coups-mali-needs-regional-support-bolster-democracy

[ii] The mutiny by Wagner Group CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023 seems to have little effect on Wagner’s presence in Africa, including in Central African Republic (CAR), where its force is larger than in any other African country. The Russian Ambassador to CAR has claimed there are 1,890 “Russian instructors” in the country, who are reportedly “running” the country alongside the CAR government and have “displaced” the former colonial and post-colonial power, France. See Al-Jazeera, “Russian envoy says 1,890 Russian ‘instructors’ are in CAR,” 3 February 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/3/russian-envoy-says-1890-russian-instructors-in-central-african-republic-ria

Image Information:

Image: RussiansecurityBangui
Source: Corbeau News Centrafrique, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_mercenaries_in_Koundili.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Iran’s Proposed Maritime Security Alliance Draws Mixed Reviews

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North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)

“Iran’s actual and real success in forming [the new naval alliance] is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing.”

In early June 2023, Iran’s navy commander suggested that Tehran was on the verge of establishing a regional naval security alliance that would include India, Pakistan, and several Arab Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia.[i] Reactions in Arabic-language media were mixed. Outlets affiliated with or supportive of China, Iran, and Russia portrayed the announcement as a highly consequential move that would further erode, if not fully negate, U.S. regional influence. However, the announcement was essentially ignored by mainstream Arabic-language Gulf media outlets from the countries purported to form the alliance’s backbone, most notably Saudi Arabia.

The first accompanying source, an excerpt from Russia’s Sputnik Arabic, characterizes the proposed alliance as a one-time “fantasy” that has become an imminent reality made possible by the U.S. failure to provide regional maritime security. The second accompanying source, from a report in China’s CGTN Arabic, argues that the China-brokered Saudi-Iran détente has created favorable conditions for regional security cooperation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.[ii] The third accompanying source, an opinion piece in the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, describes how this new alliance constitutes Iran’s “imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region,” as well as “a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of Israel.” Although not a tacit rejection of the idea, other Gulf media outlets have been less enthusiastic and officials from the Arab states involved have not commented. Prominent Saudi media outlets, such as al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Riyadh, have also kept quiet. By contrast, Saudi media outlets have vocally expressed new alignment with Iran on regional matters, most notably Syrian normalization since Saudi Arabia’s May 2023 détente with Iran. Iran’s inclusion in the Russo-Chinese “Maritime Security Belt” exercises in the Indian Ocean, most recently in March 2023, indicate the possibility of a Russo-Chinese role in encouraging a regional naval coalition that marginalizes the United States’ role. Chinese interest in and encouragement of this Iranian-led security mechanism, if genuine, suggests that Saudi leadership might take the idea more seriously than the lack of media coverage would otherwise suggest.

Sources:

“تحالف بحري بين إيران والخليج… لماذا أصبح من الضروري أن تحافظ دول المنطقة على أمنها بنفسها؟

(Naval alliance between Iran and the Gulf… Why did it become necessary for regional countries to guarantee their own security?),” Sputnik Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 5 June 2023. https://sputnikarabic.ae/20230605/تحالف-بحري-بين-إيران-والخليج-لماذا-أصبح-من-الضروري-أن-تحافظ-دول-المنطقة-على-أمنها-بنفسها-1077771292.html

A few weeks ago, talk of an alliance including Iran and the Gulf countries together was a fantasy, but it has become a reality with the announcement of the imminent formation of a naval alliance that includes the countries of the region… Hassan Ibrahim Al-Nuaimi, an Emirati political analyst, considered that the countries of the region suffered from maritime threats, while foreign countries failed to secure the seas in the region. Thus, it became clear to the Arab Gulf states that these foreign countries only pursue their own agendas, and do not care about the interests of other countries.

“إيران تخطط لتشكيل تحالف بحري وسط تحسين العلاقات في الشرق الأوسط

(Iran plans naval alliance amidst improving relations in Middle East),” CGTN Arabic (Chinese Arabic-language media outlet), 6 June 2023. https://arabic.cgtn.com/news/2023-06-06/1666049661388214273/index.html

Iran’s proposal for a security alliance or coordination mechanism with Gulf countries is completely natural. Iran had the idea, and it is not a new one, but conditions were not adequate in the past…

” تحالف دولي.. إيران في مواجهة هيمنة أميركا على المنطقة

(International alliance… Iran confronting American regional hegemony),” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 12 June 2023. https://www.almayadeen.net/articles/تحالف-دولي-إيران-في-مواجهة-هيمنة-أميركا-على-المنطقة

Iran’s actual and real success in forming it is an imposition of a new deterrence theory and a great challenge to the United States of America and its hegemony in the region, which it is slowly losing… The international naval alliance is a joint security project for Iran and the Gulf states, the realization of which constitutes a practical reality, a fatal blow to the strategic interests of “Israel” in that region…

Notes:

[i] In addition to Pakistan and India, Iran’s proposed alliance is to include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

[ii] The CGTN video report cites Dr. Niu Xinchun, the Director of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/en-us/Institution.html?subtype=Middle%20East&&type=region

Image Information:

Image:  North Arabian Sea (Jan. 19, 2021)
Source: Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jose Madrigal, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6493578/nimitz-transits-arabian-sea  
Attribution: Public Domain

India’s Security Engagement With Egypt and Saudi Arabia Evolving

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi meeting Mohammad bin Salman, Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (2016)

“The military-to-military ties are likely to develop further, with greater efforts toward interoperability and understanding each other’s security concerns…” 

India’s military influence activities continue to increase in key Arab countries Egypt and Saudi Arabia.[i] In May 2023, the commanders of the Indian and Egyptian armies met in Cairo to discuss deepening bilateral military cooperation, as reported in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Twitter account of the Indian Embassy in Cairo. The meeting follows up on earlier high-level engagements discussing defense cooperation, most notably Egyptian President Sisi’s January 2023 visit to India. Their armies conducted a bilateral exercise in Egypt in January, and earlier in May, the Indian and Egyptian air forces also conducted joint training, as mentioned in the second accompanying excerpt from the Egyptian defense ministry website. Egypt is seen as a possible gateway for Indian weapons sales to Africawith rumors of looming weapons sales and possible joint production agreements between the two countries.

The Indian military has also increasingly engaged with their Saudi counterparts. Indian and Saudi naval forces held a training exercise in the Persian Gulf in May, concurrent with a 3-week training program for around 50 Saudi naval personnel in India. India-Saudi military ties “are likely to develop further, with greater efforts toward interoperability and understanding each other’s security concerns,” according to an Indian defense expert cited in the excerpt from the Saudi English-language daily Arab News. The two countries’ heads of state spoke in June on deepening relations in several areas, including defense.[ii] Saudi Arabia remains among the top global arms importers and an attractive potential customer for the Indian weapons industry. Saudi media is enamored of the narrative of multipolarity but rarely considers India as part of the great power competition discussion. India’s strategic importance is evaluated through the lens of its membership in non-Western multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt recently became SCO dialogue partners and have moved toward greater involvement in BRICS institutions.[iii] India’s growing security involvement in the Arab world bears watching even though it remains overshadowed by the specter of growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

Sources:

@indembcairo. Twitter, 15 May 2023. https://twitter.com/indembcairo/status/1658039664345858049 

Indian Army Chief General Manoj Pande proceeded on a three-day visit to Egypt. The visit will provide an opportunity to enhance bilateral #DefenceCooperation and strengthen cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

“The Egyptian And The Indian Air Forces Carry Out A Joint Air Training At An Egyptian Air Base,” Egyptian Ministry of Defense Website, 8 March 2023. https://www.mod.gov.eg/ModWebSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=42648

Within the framework of supporting and strengthening military cooperation relations with friendly and brotherly countries, the Egyptian and Indian Air Forces carried out a joint air exercise at an Egyptian air base. The training included implementation of a number of joint drills, including training on aerial refueling, which contributes to the exchange of training experiences between the elements participating from both sides

“Indian navy chief welcomes Saudi cadets during first joint training,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 2 June 2023. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2314776/saudi-arabia  

Muddassir Quamar, a Middle East expert and associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, said there have also been efforts to develop cooperation in nonconventional defense areas, as well as the defense industry. “The military-to-military ties are likely to develop further, with greater efforts toward interoperability and understanding each other’s security concerns,” he told Arab News.

Notes:

[i] For background see: “India-Egypt Ties: Sharply Rising Graph of Engagement,” Bharatshakti (Indian defense publication), 12 December 2022. https://bharatshakti.in/india-egypt-ties-sharply-rising-graph-of-engagement/ and “How India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Ties Are Deepening, And Will Help The Defence Industry,” ABP News (Indian news network), 28 May 2023. https://news.abplive.com/india-at-2047/how-india-saudi-arabia-strategic-ties-are-deepening-and-will-help-the-defence-industry-1605245

[ii] “PM Modi, Saudi Crown Prince review ties with focus on connectivity and defence,” Hindustan Times (Indian daily), 9 June 2023. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-saudi-crown-prince-review-ties-with-focus-on-connectivity-and-defence-101686249683889.html

[iii] Egypt recently became an official member of the New Development Bank, sometimes referred to as the “BRICS bank,” and Saudi Arabia is reportedly in talks to join. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have also both expressed interest in BRICS membership and are considered potential candidates were the group to expand.

Image Information:

Image:  Prime Minister Narendra Modi meeting Mohammad bin Salman, Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (2016) 
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India, via Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi_meeting_Mohammad_bin_Salman,_Deputy_Crown_Prince_of_Saudi_Arabia.jpg    
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0 

Armenia Questions Continuing Its Membership in Russia-Led Regional Security Body

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Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon

“After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO.” 

Armenia has long considered ending its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to a perceived lack of support from the organization following numerous clashes with its neighbor Azerbaijan, which is not a CSTO member. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on 22 May that Armenia is considering leaving the organization marked the latest in a series of disputes between Armenia and CSTO leadership that could be a turning point for its role in the organization. The accompanying excerpted article from the independent, Caucasus-focused website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a look at the issues Armenia has with the CSTO. The article notes “the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising” since the CSTO refused to intervene in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In the fall of 2021, Pashinyan made a comment that “Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving” the CSTO, but this position has changed since then. The article notes how the organization and Russia responded to recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan. From Armenia’s perspective, clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2022 should have triggered the CSTO’s collective defense clause, but the organization declined to intervene. This damaged Armenia’s already tenuous relations with the CSTO in addition to straining Armenian-Russian relations, as Armenian officials believed Russia has failed to pressure Azerbaijan to stop attacks against their country.[i] The article also notes that Pashinyan refused to sign a CSTO declaration in December 2022, declined to host a previously planned CSTO joint military exercise in Armenia in 2023,[ii] and refused to host CSTO observers. Armenia’s relations with the CSTO have become bad enough that the CSTO Secretary General became concerned that Armenia will withdraw from the organization.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The crux of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website), 23 May 2023. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/386973/

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization has weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia has been rising… 

During the aggravation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. In response, Moscow stated that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated, the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 war, the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and then sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh conflict zone…In the fall of 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, commenting on Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO in connection with Russia’s position on the conflict in Karabakh, stated that Armenia was not going to consider the possibility of leaving this organization. However, two years later, Armenia’s rhetoric on this issue changed.  

In the spring of 2022, Nikol Pashinyan accused the CSTO of not properly responding to the actions of the Azerbaijani military in the Sotk-Khoznavar sector. “The way the CSTO reacted to what happened was a failure for the organization itself. Contrary to existing procedures, the CSTO has not decided to conduct monitoring at the site at the moment, justifying the long-standing fears of the Armenian public that an organization important for the security of Armenia will not do anything at the right time,” said the Armenian Prime Minister… 

According to Pashinyan, during the discussion of security issues in the CSTO, he received clear assurances that the Armenian border was a “red line” for the organization, but “it turned out that red lines exist only in words.” “This is important not only for Armenia, but also for the CSTO, because if you say that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, then there is no CSTO, because the CSTO has a zone of responsibility, which is defined by borders. If there is no border, then there is no area of responsibility; if there is no area of responsibility, then there is no organization,” Pashinyan said. 

On November 23, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan refused to sign the declaration of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the CSTO and the draft decision on assistance to Yerevan. The reason was the lack of a clear political position of the organization on the issue of Azerbaijan’s actions… 

In January 2023, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan considers it inappropriate to hold CSTO exercises in Armenia. “The Armenian Defense Ministry has already informed the CSTO Joint Headquarters in writing that we consider it inappropriate to conduct exercises in Armenia in the current situation…” he said.  

Commenting on the possibility of Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO, Nikol Pashinyan replied that the Armenian side would be guided by the state interests in this decision…“When the CSTO Secretary General arrived in Armenia in 2022, he told me that the CSTO was concerned that Armenia would withdraw from the Organization. I said that this concern is out of place, but there is another concern that the CSTO may withdraw from Armenia. My assessment now is this: the CSTO, willingly or not, is leaving Armenia. And this worries us,” Pashinyan repeated… 

On May 22, 2022, Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at a press conference that the issue of Armenia’s withdrawal from the bloc remains on the agenda… 

He also explained why Armenia refused CSTO observers, being a member of this military bloc. “The CSTO mission does not operate on the territory of Armenia for the simple reason that, in fact, the organization does not indicate its vision of the territory and borders of Armenia. 90 percent of the problems stem from this,” the prime minister said.

Notes:

[i] For more background on the strained relations between Armenia and Russia, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more background on Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO declaration, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 2-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Before the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. From left to right: CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_Summit_2022_01.jpg   
Attribution: CCA 4.0 

Pakistan’s Defense Industry Publishes New Weapon Systems Roadmap

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Official logo of GIDS

“GIDS’ future roadmap ranges from improved variants of existing, mainstay solutions – such as the Fatah-series of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and Burq-series air-to-ground missiles (AGM) – to newly revealed systems, like the “Group 5 UCAV” or “LOMADS” SAM system.”

Pakistan has cooperated with China on the development and production of several weapons systems for use in country’s armed forces, including the Al-Khalid [RG1] main battle tank and the JF-17 [RG2] multirole fighter.[i] Technology transfers of smaller defense items have also provided a boost to Pakistan’s defense industry. The accompanying excerpted article from Pakistan defense-focused Quwa.org reports on a recent announcement by Pakistan’s government-owned Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS) on a roadmap to produce new products for the country’s armed forces. While the roadmap did not include joint production of a new system with China, it still provides a look at production capabilities in Pakistan’s defense industry, which has made sales to other governments in recent years.

The GIDS roadmap includes improved variants of existing systems as well as new systems. GIDS “does not develop or manufacture any of the systems it is promoting and selling,” but rather it is the commercial component of other state-owned defense companies, according to the article. The roadmap includes two high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial systems currently in development, one of which can carry a payload of 450 kg, or roughly 1000 lbs.  These systems could be used in a reconnaissance role for Pakistan and could fulfill several requirements for other buyers. The roadmap also includes a new surface-to-air missile system and an upgraded variant of a multiple rocket-launch system that Pakistan currently uses. The roadmap is described as “relatively ambitious” and states that “it is unclear how far Pakistan has developed each of these systems.” While Pakistan’s defense industry has been technologically limited in certain capacities, the article acknowledges that the companies producing these systems are confident enough to reveal them to potential buyers in the roadmap.[ii] It is unknown when all of the systems in the roadmap will be available for potential sales, but Pakistan’s new systems could offer buyers cheap alternatives to systems already on the market. JF-17s have a lower cost than other multirole aircraft, for example.2  Pakistan sold JF-17s to Nigeria in 2020, marking a boost for the country’s defense industry.

Sources:

“Pakistan’s Defence Industry Lays Out Ambitious Future Roadmap,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 22 May 2023. https://quwa.org/2023/05/22/pakistans-defence-industry-lays-out-ambitious-future-roadmap-2/embed/#?secret=Rt0Vm2ACd8#?secret=M3LkjwsxlO

Global Industrial and Defence Solutions (GIDS), the commercial representative of multiple Pakistani state-owned defence suppliers, released its roadmap for future products… 

GIDS’ future roadmap ranges from improved variants of existing, mainstay solutions – such as the Fatah-series of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and Burq-series air-to-ground missiles (AGM) – to newly revealed systems, like the “Group 5 UCAV” or “LOMADS” SAM system. 

It should be noted that GIDS itself does not develop or manufacture any of the systems it is promoting and selling. Rather, GIDS serves as the commercial wing of a conglomerate of Pakistani state-owned enterprises that specialize in defence, such as NESCOM, for example. Basically, it is these state-owned enterprises that carry out the development and production work of GIDS’ products… 

According to GIDS, there are two HALE UCAVs are under development: the 3,000-kg “Group 5 UCAV” and the 1,650-kg Shahpar III (also designated as “Group 4”). 

The Group 5 UCAV seems to leverage twin turboprop or piston engines. The Group 5’s designers (possibly, if not likely, NESCOM) is aiming to achieve an endurance of over 35 hours and external payload in excess of 450 kg. Though it is called a UCAV, it seems that NESCOM is optimizing the Group 5 for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) role, especially imaging-related missions… 

GIDS also revealed multiple potential systems that may speak to the future of Pakistan’s ground-based air defence (GBAD) environment through new SAMs and radars. 

First, there is a ‘LOMADS’ SAM with a range of up to 100 km and maximum engagement altitude of 20 km. According to GIDS, each of these LOMADS units would comprise of a multi-function radar and six multi-cell launchers carrying four missiles each. GIDS did not reveal the guidance and seeker details of the SAM, but it likely leverages active radar homing (ARH) like the majority of its current-day contemporaries. 

GIDS also revealed an ‘E-SHORADS’ system, which it has also designated as the ‘FAAZ-SL’. The FAAZ-SL will offer a maximum range of 20-25 km and a maximum engagement altitude of 6-8 km. GIDS stated that the SAM will be truck-mounted (seemingly similar in design to the NASAMS)… 

Finally, GIDS has also shown that Pakistan is committed to continue developing upon the systems it already has, such as the Fatah, Azb, Burq, Zumr, and Ribat. 

The Fatah-II is an evolved variant of the Fatah-I, an indigenously developed multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). Whereas the Fatah-I has a range of 140 km, the Fatah-II will improve upon it with a range of equal or more than 250 km, while also continuing to leverage the same GNSS-aided INS guidance suite… 

Overall, GIDS has revealed a relatively ambitious product roadmap…It is unclear how far Pakistan has developed each of these systems. However, given that GIDS has revealed them to the public (and, potentially, to potential overseas buyers) could suggest that the institutes behind each of these are relatively confident about completing these projects…

Notes:

[i] For more information on the China’s efforts in the development of Pakistan’s defense industry, see: Matthew Stein “China Involved in Developing Pakistan’s Main Battle Tank,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more on Pakistan’s sale of the JF-17s, see: Matthew Stein “Pakistan Moving into Sales of JF-17 Fighters,” OE Watch, May 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Official logo of GIDS 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Official_logo_of_GIDS.png   
Attribution: Public domain

Scandal Threatens Stability of Colombia’s First Leftist Government

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Senator Armando Benedetti campaigns for Colombian President Gustavo Petro

“They took her [the nanny] to the Casa de Nariño, that is, to the Presidential Palace, for the polygraphy part.”

A scandal has engulfed the administration of Colombian President Gustavo Petro, threatening his reform agenda.[i] Petro’s campaign allegedly accepted illegal campaign contributions, including narcotics money from the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The scandal emerged when Colombia’s leading weekly magazine, Semana, reported on an incident of cash being stolen from the home of Petro’s chief of staff, Laura Sarabia. Sarabia suspected her nanny of the theft, subjecting her to a coerced polygraph test and illegally wiretapping her phone, according to the outlet. Simultaneously, Semana has a recording in which Armando Benedetti, former senator and, until recently, Colombia’s Ambassador to Venezuela, discusses breaching campaign finance limits with Laura Sarabia and hints at dirty money in the Petro campaign. According to the article in the Argentine newspaper Clarín, a lieutenant colonel who was part of the illegal wiretapping and polygraph scheme to recover the stolen money was found dead, fueling speculations of potential foul play, although the death has been ruled a suicide.

The allegations against Petro, exacerbated by the president’s own obfuscation, are likely to pose the most serious challenge that Petro’s government has faced. The inability to adequately counter these accusations will impact the government’s stability and could even lead to Petro’s impeachment. As a result of these accusations, it is likely that Petro’s planned reforms—such as his proposal for “total peace” with guerrilla groups and criminal organizations[ii]—will stall in the country’s congress.[iii]

Sources:

“‘El presidente falta a la verdad:’ Fiscalía General: Duro choque con Petro por inspección judicial en caso de la exniñera de Laura Sarabia (“The president is not telling the truth:” Attorney General’s Office: Hard clash with Petro for judicial inspection in the case of Laura Sarabia’s ex-nanny),” Semana (Colombia’s leading weekly magazine), 30 May 2023. https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/el-presidente-falta-a-la-verdad-fiscal-general-duro-choque-con-petro-por-allanamiento-a-la-casa-de-narino-en-caso-de-la-exninera/202302/ 

They took her [the nanny] to the Casa de Nariño, that is, to the Presidential Palace, for the polygraphy part… During the time she was there, they never gave her access to a lawyer, despite the fact that they were accusing her of having committed a crime, and they also kept her incommunicado…When they did the polygraph, the Police told her that she was a thief and that she should return the money. The boss said that if she spent part of the money that nothing happened, and that she should return the rest.

“Crece el escándalo por una supuesta trama de corrupción en Colombia y Gustavo Petro sale a defenderse (The scandal grows over an alleged corruption plot in Colombia and Gustavo Petro comes out to defend himself),” Clarín (largest Argentine newspaper with excellent regional coverage), 15 June 2023. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/crece-escandalo-supuesta-trama-corrupcion-colombia-gustavo-petro-sale-defenderse_0_9qVh0AODUc.html 

The money stolen from Sarabia’s house, which gave rise to a scandal in the government, was allegedly Petro’s, there were five suitcases and 3,000 million pesos (about $718,000)…the scandal led to the resignation of Sarabia and the ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti, who was the one who allegedly leaked what happened to the press…In another twist to the crisis, police lieutenant colonel Óscar Dávila, assigned to presidential security and involved in the interrogation and illegal interceptions of Meza [the nanny], was found dead.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the scandal itself from one of Colombia’s most respected political scientists, see: Sergio Guzmán, “Gustavo Petro’s Biggest Crisis Yet,” Americas Quarterly, 5 June 2023. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/gustavo-petros-biggest-crisis-yet/

[ii] OE Watch has covered Petro’s political and security reforms in several different articles. For example, see: Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Gustavo Petro Promises New Approach to Security and Drugs,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428038

[iii] OE Watch has covered Petro’s plans for and the prospects of Total Peace extensively. For more information, see: Ryan Berg, “Colombia’s Congress Authorizes ‘Total Peace’ Negotiation With Guerrilla and Criminal Groups,” OE Watch, 1-2023, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434199

Image Information:

Image:  Senator Armando Benedetti campaigns for Colombian President Gustavo Petro 
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Senador_Benedetti.jpg        
Attribution: CC-BY-SA 4.0

Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants

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Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda

“Niger’s approach [to addressing jihadists threats]… starkly contrasts with the regional trend.”

The countries of the Sahel are undertaking divergent paths when it comes to the question of negotiating with terror groups as the African region cements itself as the new epicenter of global jihadist terrorism.[i] Most countries in the Sahel, and wider West Africa, have shown a reluctance to negotiate with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ)[ii] or the Islamic State (IS),[iii] as well as with secular separatist insurgencies. Burkina Faso’s prime minister, Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela, was emphatic that his country, which has seen one of the most significant spikes of jihadist violence of any in the world, would “never negotiate” with the militants in his country, according to the pan-African news aggregator allafrica.com,. He articulated, “The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield.” Burkina Faso looks to rely heavily on its armed self-defense force, The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, or VDP (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie). The VDP is an auxiliary unit working alongside the armed forces of Burkina Faso, which has been criticized for providing civilians arms and authority for violence with as little as two weeks of training.[iv] Burkina Faso is also presumed to be receiving some assistance from the Wagner Group to facilitate this kinetic response, which it has officially denied.[v] Niger has taken a different approach, combining negotiations with AQ and IS elements with kinetic counterterror efforts. Niger’s counterterrorism strategy is seen as being much more effective than the zero-tolerance negotiation policy of other Sahelian states, according to a second article from the centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies.. Niger’s approach is modeled after the successes of two other regional states, Algeria and Mauritania, to their own insurgencies, and it derived from its own successful history of addressing Tuareg rebellions that plagued the country for years. The military-first approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has shown its limits over the past decade. The authors of the second article give advise: “Niger’s neighbors in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations.”

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: Prime Minister Rules Out Any Deal With Jihadists, Boosts Civil Militias,” Allafrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 31 May 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202305310419.html  

Burkina Faso’s prime minister on Tuesday ruled out any negotiations with jihadist insurgents that have taken control of swathes of the West African country since 2015. 

“We will never negotiate, either over Burkina Faso’s territorial integrity or its sovereignty,” Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela told parliament, adding that the government aimed to double the number of volunteers for the VDP civil defence militia to 100,000. 

“The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield,” de Tambela told the Transitional Legislative Assembly. 

Hassane Koné and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Is Niger’s counter-terrorism approach an exception in the Sahel?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 5 April 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-nigers-counter-terrorism-approach-an-exception-in-the-sahel  

In early 2022, Nigerien authorities recognised the need for dialogue with jihadist leaders in Tillabéri. This was inspired after several Nigeriens defected from their extremist groups, and violence in the Diffa region decreased after a disarmament and reintegration process launched in 2016…. 

The use of dialogue in Tillabéri shows strong political will on the part of the government, which is keen to disincentivise engagement with extremist groups, and stabilise the region. Niger’s approach, which combines dialogue and military action, starkly contrasts with the regional trend. Neighbouring countries have reinforced their military tactics through diversifying strategic alliance and employing armed civilians…  

By including dialogue in its counter-terrorism efforts, Niger is experimenting with an approach similar to those in Algeria and Mauritania, underpin their decade-long protection against jihadist violence. 

Niger’s neighbours in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations. A coordinated regional approach would also exert pressure on terrorist groups and ultimately deprive them of human resources.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Sahel’s role as the new center of global jihadism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[ii] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

[iii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “”UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iv] For more on the VDP and critiques of it, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

[v] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda  
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa

“[African critics] no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.”

Unprecedented waves of anti-French sentiment have swept over many francophone African countries over the past four years. These manifest in large-scale civil society protests in Mali and Burkina Faso, the targeting of French counterterror convoys throughout the Sahel, and accusations from both Mali and the Central African Republic that France is actively funding terrorists. [i]

The reasons why anti-French sentiment has become so pervasive are detailed in the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com. . The article is based on the findings of an upcoming report from noted French think tank, the Institute for International Relations (IFRI). The report suggests there are three issues: African critiques of the French military and counterterrorism presence, a lack of development, and disdain over the CFA (Communauté financière d’Afrique) currency. The report also notes that France is consistently scapegoated by African political and military leaders for their own failures: “It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” The pervasiveness of simple untruths maligning French military and counterterror presence in the Sahel—what some researchers have called “Afrancaux News”[ii]—is similarly driving the pervasiveness of the anti-French sentiment. The IFRI report notes that African critics “no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.” While Russian disinformation campaigns vilifying France and promoting Russia exacerbate the sentiment, the report’s authors recognize that France itself does bear some responsibility for its declining reputation on the continent, with French leaders long believing that anti-French sentiment was merely tied to episodic crises and was not part of longstanding grievances tied to the colonial legacy of France in Africa. Understanding African public opinion remains imperative as many countries in francophone Africa—Mali, Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic most prominently—move even further away from France and toward Russia.[iii]

Sources:

“Pourquoi le sentiment anti-français imprègne l’Afrique francophone? (Why is anti-French sentiment so pervasive in Africa?) Africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator),” 15 June 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/06/14/pourquoi-le-sentiment-anti-francais-impregne-lafrique-francophone/ 

Anti-French rhetoric in French-speaking Africa has spread beyond the educated urban elite, and the phenomenon could “take root for a long time,” says Alain Antil, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), in an interview. 

In recent years, criticism of France’s policies has been accompanied by violent demonstrations against French companies such as Total and against diplomatic representations in Chad, Mali, and, more recently, Burkina Faso. 

The depth of the phenomenon is “nothing like what we saw in previous decades,” points out Antil, who heads Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Centre and who on Wednesday, with his colleague Thierry Vircoulon, is publishing a study devoted to “Themes, actors, and functions of anti-French discourse in French-speaking Africa”. 

We are a long way from the days ”when highly articulate criticism (…) was confined to leading circles of intellectuals and sometimes, during serious political crises, spilled out onto the streets,” he says. 

It is striking to note that critics no longer even try to demonstrate untruths: ”We no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. We just say so,” he observes. 

For the researcher, the intensification of anti-French sentiment can be explained by ”disappointing economic and political trajectories” in countries where the population had once pinned their hopes on economic progress and democracy. 

Faced with the failure of their own policies, the leaders of these countries resort to ”scapegoating techniques”: “France is ultimately responsible for the non-development of these countries and the corruption of their elites,” explains Antil. ”It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” 

At the same time, this anti-French rhetoric has been able to flourish because French leaders have been slow to react. 

Until very recently, the French authorities ”were in a kind of denial,” seeing it simply as a correlation with crises, ”outbreaks of hives” or manipulation by the Russians, explains the researcher. 

The study does show ”a link between this Russian propaganda war and certain segments of African social networks.” 

It is undeniable that social networks have massively circulated false information, such as videos or photos showing French soldiers ”supposedly” stealing gold or ”consorting with jihadists,” stresses Alain Antil. 

But the expert warns against the temptation to explain everything in terms of Russian propaganda. 

“Obviously, the Russians are playing their part, having an impact and funding anti-French campaigns,” he says.  

However, he warns that it would be a mistake to think that ”explaining to Africans that they are being manipulated by the Russians will put an end to it.” 

Far from abating, this rhetoric will take root ”for a long time in the politics and public opinion of these countries,” he adds, citing three factors fuelling anti-French sentiment: the military presence, the development aid policy, and the currency. 

While the number of French troops has fallen drastically from 30,000 in the early 1960s to around 6,100 today, ”interventionism has not diminished,” notes the researcher.

Notes:

[i] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

[ii] For more information on the anti-French counterterror sentiment, see: Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iii] For more on African states’ growing alliances with Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Top Ugandan General Adds to List of Growing Pro-Russian African Military Personnel” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/top-ugandan-general-adds-to-growing-list-of-pro-russian-african-military-personnel/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429302

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa  
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Taliban Responds to UN Reports Claiming Taliban Rule Aids Terrorist Expansion

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The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) decries a UN report “biased and far from reality”

“A range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of manoeuvre under the Taliban de facto authorities. They are making good use of this, and the threat of terrorism is rising in both Afghanistan and the region.”

The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team for the Taliban released a report in June 2023 critically assessing the status of the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan since the group took over the country in August 2021. For its part, the Taliban released an equally scathing rebuke of the UN’s report. The Monitoring Team report, which draws from reporting by UN member states, underscores the link between the Taliban’s rule and the greater latitude of movement that certain terror groups have in the region. Most notably, it articulates that “the link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic,” and that there “are indications that Al-Qaida is rebuilding operational capability [and] that the TTP is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban.” The report does note that not all terrorist groups enjoy equal latitude: the Taliban has attacked members of the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K), though not to a degree that the operations of the latter have declined in a meaningful way. To the contrary, the report suggests that IS-K’s numbers have grown substantially, now estimated to be between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters, a number that members of the U.S. intelligence community have claimed is significantly higher than their estimates.[i] IS-K has taken advantage of the lack of Taliban control to consolidate its power in more remote locations. As the UN report notes, “Attacks against high-profile Taliban figures raised [IS-K] morale, prevented defections, and boosted recruitment, including from within the Taliban’s ranks.”

Representatives of the Taliban government responded, calling the UN’s report “biased and far from reality” and “full of prejudice.” The Taliban press release notes that contrary to what the UN report claims, the Taliban government does not allow its territory to be used to threaten neighboring countries, the region, or the world writ large. From the perspective of the Taliban, “the publication of such reports…does not help Afghanistan…rather, it increases worry among the people… [and casts] doubts on [sic] the impartiality and independence of the United Nations.” The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has widened the window of growth for Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups. The same threat actors that have consumed it for nearly two decades—the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State—still remain pernicious challenges even as the United States has shifted to focus most acutely on near-peer competition with China and Russia. [ii]

Sources:

“Letter dated 23 May 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 1 June 2023, United Nations Security Council Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports

The Taliban, in power as the de facto authorities in Afghanistan under Hibatullah Akhundzada, have reverted to the exclusionary, Pashtun-centred, autocratic policies of the Taliban administration of the late 1990s. 

The link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic. A range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of manoeuvre under the Taliban de facto authorities. They are making good use of this, and the threat of terrorism is rising in both Afghanistan and the region. While they have sought to reduce the profile of these groups and have conducted operations against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-K), in general, the Taliban have not delivered on the counter-terrorism provisions under the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the United States of America and the Taliban. 

There are indications that Al-Qaida is rebuilding operational capability, that TTP is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban, that groups of foreign terrorist fighters are projecting threat across Afghanistan’s borders and that the operations of ISIL-K are becoming more sophisticated and lethal (if not more numerous). 

It is too early to judge the impact of the decree by the Taliban in April 2022 banning poppy cultivation. At this point, prices have increased, as has production of the more profitable methamphetamine. Key Taliban individuals remain closely involved in production and trafficking.  The Taliban de facto authorities have had some success in revenue generation and budgetary management, with the caveat that data on expenditures is scant and opaque.  The effectiveness of the sanctions regime appears mixed. There is little evidence that it substantially impacts Hibatullah’s decision-making, but lifting sanctions measures is a constant demand by the Taliban engaging Member States.  Widespread availability and proliferation of weapons and materiel already in Afghanistan undermines the arms embargo.  A number of travel ban exemptions have been sought since the end of the group exemption for the Taliban in August 2022, but information regarding unauthorized travel and late requests is concerning.

Notes:

[i] Jeff Seldin, “UN Report Warns Al-Qaida, Islamic State Growing in Afghanistan,” Voice of America, 15 June 2023. https://www-voanews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.voanews.com/amp/un-report-warns-al-qaida-islamic-state-growing-in-afghanistan/7138133.html

[ii] For more on the state of the global terrorist landscape, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 5-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303; Jason Warner, “Global Reactions Vary After Death of Al-Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri,” OE Watch, 9-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425695

Image Information:

Image: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) decries a UN report “biased and far from reality”
Source: https://www.alemarahenglish.af/the-statement-of-ieas-spokesperson-on-the-recent-report-of-the-united-nations-security-council/
Attribution: Public Domain

Iran’s Persistent and Growing Influence in Latin America

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Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi delivers a campaign speech.

“Our common position with these three countries is opposition to the hegemonic and unilateral system,” Raisi said.

Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere is often underestimated. Recent events have underscored that Iran is trying to grow its regional influence through a patient campaign that seeks to expand relations in authoritarian states in Latin America: namely, in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Additionally, observers saw some unexpected activity when Iranian warships made a port call in Brazil in March 2023,[i] and Iran engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity to solidify its Western Hemisphere presence in June 2023. Iran first sent its Foreign Minister and now President, Ebrahim Raisi, whose entourage was comprised of a “large political, economic, and scientific delegation,” aimed at signing strategic agreements with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba according to Infobae, an Argentine outlet covering South America. Raisi spoke of a desire for a more multipolar world and denounced sanctions regimes at all three stops. Iran signed 19 strategic agreements to cooperate in various domains, most notably the oil industry during the trip to Venezuela reported in another article in Infobae. This cooperation is important because of how both countries use their cooperative agreements to flout international sanctions on their governments. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega supported the right of Iran to pursue more nuclear weapons, according to Infobae. Iran’s engagement in the Western Hemisphere is often overshadowed by the efforts of China and Russia. However, Iran has close relationships with the region’s three dictatorships and seeks to build beyond those relationships by diversifying its regional partners.[ii] Authoritarian regimes under pressure from the international community continue to view Iran’s friendship as a critical lifeline for survival.

Sources:

“El presidente de Irán llegó a Venezuela, primera parada de su gira por Latinoamérica con visitas a regímenes aliados (The president of Iran arrived in Venezuela, the first stop on his tour of Latin America with visits to allied regimes),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 12 June 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/06/12/el-presidente-de-iran-partio-hacia-venezuela-primera-parada-de-su-gira-por-latinoamerica-con-visitas-a-regimenes-aliados/

“Our common position with these three countries is opposition to the hegemonic and unilateral system,” Raisi said…The Iranian president defined relations with Caracas, Havana and Managua as ‘strategic’ and affirmed that this visit will mean ‘a turning point’ in the deepening of their ties…“We have important cooperation in the fields of defense, energy, oil, gas, refineries and the petrochemical sector,” Maduro said…On the trip to Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, the Nicaraguan president, defended Iran’s right to acquire nuclear weapons.

“El régimen de Irán pretende consolidar su influencia en la región: su presidente visitará Venezuela, Nicaragua y Cuba (The Iranian regime intends to consolidate its influence in the region: its president will visit Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 7 June 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/06/07/el-regimen-de-iran-pretende-consolidar-su-influencia-en-la-region-su-presidente-visitara-venezuela-nicaragua-y-cuba/

The trip will strengthen relations with the countries that Tehran considers ‘friends’ in economic, political and scientific matters…This is Raisi’s first trip to Latin America since he took office in August 2021…Last year Tehran and Havana agreed to strengthen their cooperation in technology and food security, during the visit to the Persian country of the Cuban deputy prime minister, Ricardo Cabrisas.

Notes;

[i] For more information and context on this incident, please see: David Biller, “Iranian Warships in Rio de Janeiro Stirring Concern Abroad,” Associated Press, 2 March  2023, https://apnews.com/article/iran-ships-brazil-us-navy-rio-de-janeiro-2b6d98aca758c040e5e75293a05d9db9.

[ii] Iran’s attempts to broaden its engagement in Latin America have not been uniformly successful. See, for instance, the debacle that ensued when a plane full of suspected IRGC members landed and was seized in Argentina. See: Ryan Berg, “Venezuela’s Mystery Plane Shows Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America,” OE Watch, 07-2022, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420434.

Image Information:

Image: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi delivers a campaign speech.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ebrahim_Raisi_delivers_speech_at_a_rally.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY 4.0