Yearly Archives: 2023

Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems

Posted on by

“Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.”

The Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower issues related to its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine. What was envisioned as a quick operation with minimal forces has become a difficult slog requiring ever-more military personnel. The accompanying excerpt from an article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlights that after Russia’s September 2022 “partial mobilization,” which added 318,000 new soldiers, there are now questions regarding how to pay for this additional manpower, as well as growing pay disparities within the ranks of the Russian military. 

The article reminds readers that the Russian Defense Ministry reported “that the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195,000 rubles (USD $3,145) per month.” After calculating personnel costs for the entire military, the author asserts that now at least 30 percent of defense spending will go to manpower. Traditionally, personnel costs have hovered around 15 percent of the defense budget. The author complains that “defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation,” and that therefore, “he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives.” Mere patriotic rhetoric, however, has proven inadequate in motivating Russian soldiers.

Of note, the article also discusses the pay differential among those Russians who were recently mobilized and contract soldiers already serving in the military.[i] The article cites a retired general officer who claims that some of the recently mobilized are getting paid more than the officers who are training them. He warns that “social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.” Another excerpt talks about “the danger of the material stratification of military personnel,” wherein certain soldiers are getting paid more than others doing similar work merely because they were mobilized.  The article concludes by looking at some of the problems family members of mobilized soldiers have had in gaining access to their pay. In addition to causing morale problems in the Russian ranks, such high levels of manpower expenditures are likely to slow Russia’s investments in rearmament in the latter phases of the war and perhaps long after it ends.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Монетизация СВО способна привести к разложению армии (Monetization of the SVO can lead to the decomposition of the army),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent news source), 8 November 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-11-08/1_8584_monetization.html

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that “the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195 thousand rubles.” A simple calculation shows that at least 62 billion rubles ($1bn) a month will be spent on paying for the military labor of 318,000 mobilized people participating in a special military operation (SMO). And if we take into account similar expenses for more than a million military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then at least 1.5 trillion rubles will be spent on the payment of monetary allowances per year, that is, almost every third ruble planned in the expenditure side of the budget for national defense in 2023…. In any case, the conflict with Ukraine turned out to be costly for the Russian budget….

Attention is drawn to the fact that the lion’s share of the planned defense spending – at least 30% – will be directed to the material motivation of the military to serve. Russia has never foreseen such expenses in its recent history. Previously, the share of spending on military salaries in the defense budget was no more than 12-15%. But the defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation, and ideally, he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives….  

…Military expert, retired lieutenant general Yuri Netkachev believes that the state has correctly taken care of the material problems of the mobilized citizens and it is good that the families of the country’s defenders will receive financial support. “But why does this process apply only to the mobilized? There is a large stratum of servicemen in the Armed Forces who also participate in the SMO. But they do not have such material incentives as those announced by the Ministry of Defense for the mobilized,” General Netkachev told NG. “Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army. In all my military service, I have never seen ordinary soldiers get more than the officers who command them. Right now, mobilized servicemen are being trained by officers of training platoons and companies. They are regular military men who, as a rule, have extensive combat experience. But it turns out that these experienced warriors, who train “green soldiers” called up from the civilians, to whom the state has already pocketed 200,000 rubles, receive several times less.”

Andrey Poleshchuk, chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Military Personnel (OPSV), also speaks about the danger of the material stratification of military personnel. He believes that “the financial decisions of the president, taken at the suggestion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, cannot but raise questions.” “We understand that it is necessary to materially interest the mobilized, to stimulate them to successfully solve combat missions, to reduce the intensity of passions in society,” he says. – But how to explain the situation to the officers who command these mobilized in the combat area, and they are not subject to the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on additional monetary surcharges. It turns out that they, professionals, should receive less or, at best, commensurate with the monetary allowance of their subordinates.” 

…According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Mikischenko, at the request of a soldier, his family will be able to receive monetary allowance: “The monetary allowance of a serviceman is credited to his current account, which the serviceman submitted. At the request of a serviceman, monetary allowance can be transferred to his relatives; for this, the serviceman must issue a power of attorney…. Andrey Poleshchuk draws attention to the organizational problem associated with this: “We are faced with the fact that not everyone managed to issue powers of attorney for relatives to receive funds. Now they don’t have that option. Perhaps it makes sense to consider the issue of transferring notarial powers to the commanders of military units. A similar practice existed in the USSR.” 

Notes:

[i] For additional background on pay for Russian contract soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Increase in Pay and Benefits for Contract Soldiers,” OE Watch, September 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/323757

India Moves To Compete With China in Africa

Posted on by
3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

“Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.”

India has taken various steps to counter China since a series of border clashes took place along the Line of Actual Control in 2017 and 2020.[i] While most of these initiatives involved developing operational and tactical capabilities in the Indian Army, the Indian government has also taken a few strategic-level measures to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific region against China.[ii] However, a new playing field for Indian and Chinese competition is showing itself: the accompanying excerpted articles report on recent Indian efforts to sell weapon systems to governments in Africa, offering insights into Indian efforts to counter China at the strategic level.

The excerpted article from India’s independent think-tank Center for Land Warfare Studies examines Chinese exports of weapons in Africa. The author notes how China has been increasing arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa in recent years and that this has been taking place alongside the use of ports in the region. The author also points out how China is in a position to continue sales of weapons in Africa as the war in Ukraine could reduce Russia’s share of the arms market in the region. While India’s defense industry has yet to export significant numbers of weapon systems in the way that China can, a second article provides insight into Indian plans to change this status quo.

This excerpted article from India’s independent English-language news website, The Print, reports on the India-Africa Defense Dialogue, held in October in India alongside the most recent iteration of the country’s defense exposition. The article states that a number of participants from Africa attended and that India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh wanted to explore new areas of security cooperation between India and African states, “including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.” Singh also stated that India and Africa are “important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.” He further commented that India will partner with any African country on the “basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect.” Lastly, the article references an extensive list of weapons that might be of interest to African militaries, which could give India another opportunity to counter China if New Delhi is able to supply these systems as part of a different partnership than Beijing offers. 

Sources:

Dr. Manjari Singh, “China’s Increasing Arms Supply to the Middle East and Beyond: Another Dimension to the New Silk Road?,” Center for Land Warfare Studies (independent think-tank in India), 28 October 2022, No. 367.

https://www.claws.in/publication/chinas-increasing-arms-supply-to-the-middle-east-and-beyond-another-dimension-to-the-new-silk-road/

China has been expanding its arms export beyond Asia and for the last half a decade, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have become its favourite destinations. From the region’s side, China is emerging as the second-best choice for arms imports after the US. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has added a new dimension to the existing global arms industry with an anticipated boost to China’s overall arms diplomacy particularly in the Middle East…

China has been exporting armed drones to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan since 2020…This change in position is also reflective of the East Asian economy’s

increasing weapon’s platform outreach—from 40 countries to 53, over a span of one decade from 2010 to 2019…

It is noteworthy that between 2015 and 2022, China has leased ownership of as many as

10 ports. Apart from these ports, China has been building seven more ports which are strategically significant, and serves as economic and political outposts for its expansionist approach. The Karachi Deepwater Port in Pakistan, Sokhna port in Egypt, CICT Terminal in Sri Lanka, Chittagong and Payra Ports in Bangladesh, CSP Terminal, Khalifa Port in the UAE, Sudan Port, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam Ports in Tanzania, and Lamu & Mombasa ports in Kenya, are some of the other ports developed by Chinese firms…

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is likely to dent Russian economy and the former’s aggression will presumably lead to its diplomatic isolation, both of which are likely to provide a favourable environment to Chinese arms market. Additionally, maritime connectivity and building of Chinese ports in the Western Indian Ocean will further facilitate China’s arms sale…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “To counter China’s influence, India seeks to boost defence cooperation with African countries,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 18 October 2022.

https://theprint.in/defence/to-counter-chinas-influence-india-seeks-to-boost-defence-cooperation-with-african-countries/1173223/

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.

Fifty African countries participated in the India-Africa Defence Dialogue initiated during the last DefExpo held in Lucknow in 2020. Among the attendees were defence ministers of 20 African countries…

During his address Tuesday, the Defence Minister stressed the need to explore new areas of convergence for defence engagements between India and Africa, including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security and counterterrorism. He added that India and African countries are important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

“We do not believe in making or becoming a client or satellite state, and so, when we partner with any country, it is on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect…” he said.

Sources in the defence establishment also said equipment of interest to Africa includes light combat helicopters, patrol vessels, small arms, shoulder-fired rockets, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and surveillance drones, among others…

Notes:

[i] For more background on the clashes, see: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China,” War on the Rocks, 2 July 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/

[ii] The government of India increased its security cooperation with Vietnam in 2022 as one strategic-level measure to counter China. For more see: Matthew Stein, “India Strengthens Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” OE Watch, Issue #8, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/422297

Image Information:

Image: 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:3rd_India-Africa_Forum_Summit_4.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Russia Conducts Nuclear-Delivery Tests in the Arctic

Posted on by

“Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.”

In late October, Russia carried out a nuclear weapons exercise in the Arctic. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, it is the second major nuclear-delivery test of Russia’s sea-land-air Triad in 2022. The previous exercise was conducted in February, prior to the current Russian incursion into Ukraine.  President Putin oversaw the exercise, which included submarine, land, and bomber missile firings. The intended message is that Russia is a competent nuclear power in the Arctic. As the threat of the use of nuclear weapons circulates in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia’s nuclear delivery tests in the Arctic serve as a stark reminder to the world of its capabilities.

Source:

Thomas Nielsen, “Russia tested all legs of nuclear triad over the Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 26 October 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/10/russia-tested-all-legs-nuclear-triad-over-arctic

Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.

For the second time this year, President Vladimir Putin ordered a massive nuclear weapons exercise.  Last time was a few days before the invasion of Ukraine in late February.

The October 26 strategic drill included all three legs of Russia’s nuclear triad; submarine, land-based missiles and long-range bomber planes.

“During the event, the level of preparedness of military command and control structures, and the skills of the leadership and operation staff in the troops were checked,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

The President’s office added that all tasks were fulfilled, all missiles reached their targets.

While Putin oversaw the exercise, his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, gave the orders to the involved strategic nuclear forces.

Beijing’s Vision for Global Cyberspace Governance

Posted on by

“Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.” 

China identifies the Internet and cyberspace as a critical domain for ensuring national security, economic and social stability, and ultimately, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Recently, Beijing presented its vision for international cooperation in cyberspace via a white paper from the State Council Information Office. The white paper reflects Beijing’s tightening grip on information flows and fundamental freedoms, its growing concerns over Western digital advantages in its operational environment, and its expanding efforts to export digital authoritarianism to the developing world.

For Beijing to realize its global superpower aspirations and compete with the United States as a cyber superpower, it must present a vision for an equitable and inclusive global community. The 2022 white paper lays out Beijing’s vision for such a community through “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and promot[ion of] a multilateral, democratic, and transparent international internet governance system.” The document further highlights Beijing’s achievements in internet development (e.g. expansion of its internet penetration, digital economy, and tech sector) and cyberspace governance (e.g. the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Cybersecurity Review Measures)[i] while advocating for the rights of all countries to formulate their own national cybersecurity strategies. However, these seemingly liberal themes are trumped Beijing’s emphasis on cyber sovereignty as its core guiding principle in international cyberspace governance.

Cyber sovereignty is the notion that individual countries should maintain the exclusive right to govern their own territory’s cyberspace, superseding any supposed rights for the mutual interest of a future shared community in cyberspace. As such, reliance on the principle of cyber sovereignty serves to justify the CCP’s long-term strategic control over information flows available to Chinese internet users and to facilitate Beijing’s digital security apparatus’ ability to enforce social stability to buttress CCP legitimacy.

Simultaneously, China looks to promote this version of internet governance abroad.  This conception of cyberspace governance diverges from the principles of an “open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet” advocated for by the United States and 61 partner nation signatories of the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet.”[ii] Indeed, Beijing’s white paper presents China’s achievements and vision of shared internet development and cyberspace governance in stark contrast to its vision of Western “cyber hegemonism,” the idea that “certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance.” Despite the liberal rhetoric framing a “community with a shared future in cyberspace,” the more Beijing can affiliate cyber sovereignty with equitable and inclusive participation in cyberspace governance to developing countries, the wider its brand of digital authoritarianism will spread.

Source:

“携手构建网络空间命运共同体 (Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace),” State Council Information Office, 7 November 2022. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1732898/1732898.htm (Chinese) http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2022-11/07/content_78505694.htm (English).

Problems with the internet such as unbalanced development, unsound regulation, and unreasonable order are becoming more prominent. Cyber-hegemonism poses a new threat to world peace and development.

Certain countries are exploiting the internet and information technology as a tool to seek hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and engage in large-scale cyber theft and surveillance, raising the risk of conflict in cyberspace.

Some countries attempt to decouple with others, and create schism and confrontation in cyberspace. The increasingly complex cybersecurity situation calls for more just, reasonable and effective cyberspace governance. Global threats and challenges in cyberspace necessitate strong global responses.

All countries have the right to formulate public policies, laws, and regulations on cyberspace in the context of their national conditions and international experience. No country should seek cyber hegemony; use the internet to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs; engage in, incite, or support cyber activities that endanger other countries’ national security, or infringe on other countries’ key information infrastructure.

Notes:

[i] For more on the PRC’s evolving cyberspace and data governance legislation see: “China’s Evolving Data Governance Regime,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 July 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/Chinas_Evolving_Data_Governance_Regime.pdf

[ii] For more on the Biden administration’s articulation of the United States’ vision for cyberspace governance see: “A Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” The White House, 28 April 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf

China Addresses Food Security at Home, Uses “Food Diplomacy” Abroad

Posted on by
China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).

“China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation.”

The combination of COVID-19 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine have demonstrated the vulnerability of the global food supply through prevalence of price shocks leading to increasing hunger. For its part, China is taking threats caused by food insecurity seriously. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, included food security in his 2014 articulation of a “Holistic National Security Concept.”[i] As illustrated in the following excerpts, food security remains a driving force for Chinese policy, including efforts to improve its self-reliance and insulate itself from global food market shocks, while at the same time advancing relations with strategically important trade partners and diversifying its trade partners to reduce impacts from market fluctuations.

In March 2021, China issued its latest five-year plan, which will guide policy through 2025. The excerpted portion of the plan below lays out some of the core elements of China’s domestic initiatives to improve food security. These include efforts to better use mechanization and bring small agricultural plots together for greater efficiency. The plan also called for increasing soil restoration projects to return arable land that had been polluted. In January 2022, the State Council commissioned a national soil survey to systematically study the level of pollution, which previous surveys had found to be significant.[ii] In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi reinforced many of these themes, calling for greater efforts to ensure that China’s target of arable land is protected, existing land is used more efficiently, and better seed technologies are incorporated. 

Xi also sees food security as central to his foreign policy. Xi’s Global Development Initiative,[iii] introduced in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021 as a complement to China’s Belt and Road, makes food security and “food diplomacy” an important plank.[iv] The excerpted article by Zhang Lubiao, Director of China’sMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ Foreign Economic Cooperation Center in People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, lays out some examples of China’s food diplomacy. Zhang cites China’s historical commitment to the export of these technologies and the training of thousands of technical personnel since 1979. Notably, the article highlighted how China had helped several countries, including Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, improve yields and the variety of key staples, leading Nigeria to become a major rice-producing country itself. Going forward, food security—and China’s sprint to reduce its exposure to global markets—are likely to remain a major theme of both its foreign and domestic policies.

Sources:

“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要 (Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035),” Xinhua (PRC State Media), 13 March 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm

We will consolidate the foundation of grain production capacity and ensure the supply of important agricultural products…We will enforce the strictest possible system for protecting farmland, strengthen the protection of the quantity of available farmland and enhance its quality to ensure that the total area of China’s farmland remains above the red line of 120 million hectares [十八亿亩耕地红线] (~296.5 million acres[i]), prevent the use of farmland for non-agricultural and non-grain purposes… Focusing on functional zones for grain production and protected areas for the production of major agricultural products, we will build a ‘national food security industrial belt’, implement high-quality farmland development projects, and build contiguous high-quality farmland of more than 71.67 million hectares.

It is essential to improve the systems to guarantee the supply of major agricultural products and to the production, purchase, storage, marketing, and sale of grain, to ensure absolute security of staples, basic self-sufficiency of grain, and adequate supply of major agricultural products and byproducts products. Efforts will continue to develop grain production, further implement the strategy of sustainable farmland use and innovative application of agricultural technology for national food security, carry out research to overcome the technological bottleneck of superior seed sources, and improve self-reliance and control[ii] of seed types.

Zhang Lubiao, “中国杂交水稻技术助力维护全球粮食安全 (Hybrid Rice Technology is a Hallmark of China’s International Agricultural Cooperation),” People’s Daily (Official Newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee), 13 November 2022. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-11/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20221113_7-03.htm

While simultaneously addressing the problem of domestic self-sufficiency, China is actively committed to promoting international food security cooperation and working with all parties to enhance global sustainable agricultural production capacity…. China has also trained more than 14,000 hybrid rice professionals from more than 80 developing countries through international training courses.

In order to promote hybrid rice technology, China has sent a large number of agricultural technical experts. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 2021, under the framework of China-FAO South-South Cooperation alone, China has sent nearly 1,100 agricultural experts and technicians to more than 40 countries and regions, accounting for nearly 60% of the total number of dispatched experts.

…

Cooperative hybrid rice projects involving China, Nigeria, Uganda and other countries have also achieved remarkable results. China has helped Nigeria make great progress in the field of rice planting by sending experts, promoting improved crop varieties, and providing technical support, and has become one of the major rice-producing countries in Africa.

Sources Notes:

[i] The original phrase is 1.8 billion “mu,” a Chinese unit of measure. For comparison, in 2021 the U.S. had 895 million acres of farmland. While China is slightly larger than the U.S. in size, much of its land is mountainous, plateaus, or desert areas unsuitable for farming. See: “Farms and Land in Farms 2021 Summary,” USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, February 2022. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/fnlo0222.pdf  

[ii] Here, control is referring to rights including patents. China still relies heavily on seed types that are patented by foreign countries.

Notes:

[i] “Holistic National Security Concept” [总体国家安全观].

[ii] “The State Council Notice on the Third National Soil Survey” [国务院关于开展 第三次全国土壤普查的通知], PRC State Council (Chinese Government), 29 January 2022.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/16/content_5673906.htm

[iii] Global Development Initiative (GDI) [全球发展倡议].

[iv] Food security was mentioned second after poverty alleviation in a list of specific measures in a section discussing development. See: Xi Jinping, “Speech by Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (full text),” [ 习近平在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话（全文）], Xinhua, 22 September 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/22/content_5638597.htm

Image Information:

Image: China: Total Rice Production (2015-2019).
Source: US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/rssiws/al/crop_production_maps/China/China_Total_Rice.jpg
Attribution: USG/Public Domain

New Chinese Small Arms at Weapons Expo

Posted on by
Chinese Small Arms.

Chinese Small Arms.

“Compared to the previous Type-95 series of rifles, the Type-20 series are lightweight and more portable. A major technological breakthrough for the new rifles is improvements in reliability and service life.”

Several examples of China’s new series of small arms were recently shown at the Zhuhai airshow. Formally known as the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, the event is held every two years and includes displays of a wide range of new equipment. While most weapons are meant primarily for export, the expo also showcases equipment that has been adopted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The following excerpt from Chinese state media describes a new series of small arms developed by China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation[i] known as the “Type 20 New Weapon Series.”[ii]

In 2019, China showed troops equipped with a new battle rifle, the Type 191,[iii] during the military parade that was part of celebrations of the 70th founding of the People’s Republic of China. New camouflage uniforms were also shown for the first time.[iv] Since then, Chinese media reporting has shown more units being equipped with the new rifles and wearing the new camouflage. As highlighted by Zhang Lu in the excerpt, the Type 20 weapons feature improvements in their lifespan and reliability. The rifles use M-LOK and Picatinny rail systems to allow easy modification and use of accessories, including grips, lasers, and optics. When the Type 191 was initially introduced, it appeared with an optic using a loop of fiberoptic to provide illumination of the reticle without the need for batteries. Since then, numerous other optics have appeared in use, and images from the expo showed a wide variety of thermal and low-light optics. Other weapons belonging to the Type 20 series have appeared in other Chinese media reporting, including new dedicated marksman rifles, sniper rifles, and the Type 201 5.8mm Squad Machine Gun, a replacement for the Type 95-derived squad support weapon (QBB-95[RG1] ).[v] This new machine gun gives up the bull-pup design and drum magazine of the QBB-95 for a traditional belt-fed design. Other parts of the Type 20 series include a 9mm submachine gun with an extendable stock and holographic sight and a new handgun. While the new weapons will take some time to be fielded across the force, these minor improvements are important to increasing the combat power of Chinese military units and will help make them more effective in a variety of scenarios.

Source:

“‘硬核’的中国制造！20式新枪族 ‘组团’ 亮相 (“Hard core” made in China! The parts of the Type-20 series of weapons have appeared),” China Central Television [央视网] (PRC State Media), 8 November 2022. http://news.jstv.com/a/20221108/1667855745474.shtml

The 14th China Air Show began on 8 November. The new Type 20 series of firearms which was independently developed by China, made a “Group” appearance.

According to Zhang Lu [张路], Assistant to the General Manager of Chongqing Construction Industry [重庆建设工业](a subsidiary of China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation, developer of the weapons), “The Type 20 series have high reliability, and easy adaptability to the needs of global combat environments.”

Compared to the previous Type-95 series of rifles, the Type-20 series are lightweight and more portable. A major technological breakthrough for the new rifles is improvements in reliability and service life. In the past, a gun could only fire 5,000-10,000 rounds. The Type 20 series doubles this service life.

The largest group within the Type 20 series is the new generation of 5.8mm rifles which include standard battle rifles, carbines, and three precision variants.

Compared with the Type-95 series and the Type 20 series various optics can be used making them suitable for different combat requirements. The series also adopts a transparent magazine for rifles to make it clearer how many rounds remain.

Notes:

[i] China Ordnance Equipment Group Corporation [中国兵器装备集团有限公司].

[ii] Type 20 New Weapon Series [20式新枪族].

[iii] For greater detail regarding the new rifle see: Peter Wood, “China Introduces New Battle Rifle for the PLA,” OE Watch, December 2019.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/342827

[iv] For more details regarding the camouflage types see: Peter Wood, “PLA Adopts New Digital Camouflage for All Services,” OE Watch, May 2020.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/360519

[v] For background regarding China’s previous squad support weapons see: Peter Wood, “Why the PLA Adopted the Type 95 Light Support Weapon,” OE Watch, May 2020.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/362528

Image Information:

Image: Chinese Small Arms.
Source: Created by Author
Attribution: Image by Peter Wood

China Likely To Boost Nuclear Triad

Posted on by

“China’s second-strike capability is powerful enough to destroy the globe.”

The following article, published in South China Morning Post (SCMP), anticipates[RG1]  that China is going to upgrade its air-, ground-, and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s recent call for a “strong system of strategic deterrence.” SCMP, Hong Kong’s most prominent online English daily, based its information on interviews with various Chinese defense analysts. Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing, said that deterrence through conventional weapons during the Russia-Ukraine conflict revealed weakness on the battlefield, with both sides locked in endless fights and neither one able to use aircraft and tanks to overwhelm the other.[i] In contrast, according to Song Zhongping, a defense commentator and former instructor for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces, “Russia’s powerful nuclear triad” had “deterred the U.S. and NATO from direct combat with the Russian military.” Therefore, analysts see further boosting China’s nuclear triad as a wise option.

To do so, Zhou Chenming argued that developing the Xian H-20 supersonic stealth bomber will help to further boost China’s nuclear triad. While Chinese authorities over the past years have remained tight-lipped about its capabilities and progress in development, Chinese experts expect it to have good stealth characteristics to provide defense penetration capabilities; a range of about 10,000 km, extendable through aerial refueling; both nuclear and conventional capability; and a fully advanced electronic warfare capability.[ii] According to the SCMP excerpt, the H-20 is expected to double China’s nuclear strike range. Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy, explained that China’s nuclear arsenal has always been smaller than that of the United States and Russia.[iii] Therefore, China “must modernize its capabilities” and increase its nuclear arsenal to become more effective. In contrast, according to Zhou Chenming, because of China’s “no first use” policy, the country does not need to expand its nuclear arsenal because China’s second-strike capability is “powerful enough to destroy the globe.”

Source:

Minnie Chan, “Upgrades for China’s Nuclear Triad as Xi Jinping Pushes for Stronger Strategic Deterrence: Analysts,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong Chinese daily, once considered independent but now suspect of promoting China soft power abroad), 29 October 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3197705/upgrades-chinas-nuclear-triad-xi-jinping-pushes-stronger-strategic-deterrence-analysts

Defence experts say China is expected to upgrade its air, ground and sea-based nuclear delivery systems – or nuclear triad – following President Xi Jinping’s call for a “strong system of strategic deterrence.”

Defence analysts said the Ukraine war and an increasingly uncertain global order had reminded Beijing that conventional weapons were not enough for real “strategic deterrence.”

“Deterrence with conventional weapons revealed their weakness on the battlefield of the Ukraine war, which has seen the Russian military and Ukraine’s NATO-aided forces locked in endless fights, as neither could use aircraft and tanks to overwhelm each other,” said Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing.

China’s strategic deterrence will be significantly upgraded once the H-20 is put into service…

Chinese military magazines and social media suggested the H-20’s maiden flight could happen this year, but Beijing has been reluctant to announce any progress on the bomber.

Zhou Chenming of the Yuan Wang think tank said that Beijing’s best option was to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, rather than expand its nuclear arsenal and trigger an arms race.

“Since Beijing has promised to maintain its ‘no first use’ policy, China doesn’t need to expand its nuclear arsenal, as its nuclear technology is now on a par with the US and Russia, meaning China’s second-strike capability is also powerful enough to destroy the globe,” Zhou said.

Notes:

[i] The “Yuan Wang military science and technology think thank” can also be referred to as “Beijing Yuanwang Military Technology Think Tank” [北京远望军事科技智库] or simply “Yuan Wang Think Tank.” It appears to be an independent Chinese think tank that focuses oncutting-edgee technology and highlights aspects of defense.

[ii] See Zhang Lijun and Li Wei, “中国新一代远程轰炸机拥有五大突出特点 (The Five Outstanding Features of China’s New Generation of Long-range Bombers),” China Youth Daily (newspaper of the Communist Youth League of China), 16 February 2017. http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2017-02/16/nw.D110000zgqnb_20170216_1-12.htm

[iii] China is estimated to have 200 to 300 nuclear warheads.

Alexandros Tsipouras

Posted on by
Foreign Military Studies Office logo

Alexandros Tsipouras
alexandros.tsipouras23@gmail.com

Alexandros Tsipouras is a recent graduate of American University’s School of Internataional Service, earning a B.A. in International Relations with a focus on national security. Prior to being a FMSO/GCKN fellow, he interned at the United Nations and the European Union respectively, focusing on Russian PMC activities in Africa and Europe, illegal arms trafficking, and the Western Balkans. Most of his academic research centers on Chinese influence in Asia, the evolution of PLA doctrine, and wargaming. He is a native English speaker with elementary proficiency in Russian.

Amelia Cheatham

Posted on by

Amelia Cheatham
acc2248@columbia.edu

Amelia Cheatham holds a Master of International Affairs, focused on International Security Policy, from Columbia University and a Bachelor of Arts in Cultural Anthropology from Duke University. Between her undergraduate and graduate studies, she worked at the Council on Foreign Relations, where she conducted research and created multimedia content about Latin America and immigration.

She has also interned at The White House, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Most recently, she conducted research about the potential for cyber escalation at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

With a background in journalistic and legal investigations, she is interested in China’s presence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the U.S.-North Korea and China-North Korea relationships. Her analysis has been published by the Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy.

Artemis Hodoyan

Posted on by

Artemis Hodoyan
artemishodoyanmon@gmail.com

Artemis Hodoyan is currently pursuing a MS in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security from American University. She earned her B.A. in Political Science and Theology from Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and is currently a defense Legislative Assistant (policy advisor) in the U.S. House of Representatives and previously worked in the U.S. Senate.

Her academic and professional interests include foreign policy, defense, intelligence and national security. She is also an alumna of the Wilson Center’s Foreign Policy Fellowship Program. Artemis is a native English and Spanish speaker with elementary proficiency in Arabic.