Yearly Archives: 2023

Iran Asks Tajikistan Not To Use Iranian Drones in Dispute With Kyrgyzstan

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The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan

The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan.

“The drones should not be used in conflicts between the two countries…”

In September 2022, fighting erupted along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border for the fifth in less than a year between the two Central Asian states. Several dozen soldiers and civilians were killed on each side. While both states have pulled forces from the un-demarcated border, tensions remain high and neither state is prepared to renounce its claims.

The excerpted article from popular, reform-leaning Iranian news source Entekhab.ir, highlights another angle to the conflict—Iranian drones. Iran has long sought to cultivate allies across Central Asia, a region with which Iran has traditionally had deep ties. In recent months, this has paid dividends with Kyrgyzstan, who voted in favor if Iran joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the good relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Iran could be under pressure given Bishkek’s accusations, according to the Entekhab.ir article, that Tajikistan has used Iranian Ababil-2 drones along the disputed border. In an October 2022 statement released via Telegram, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security said there were at least 10 instances of Tajik drones violating its airspace along the border since in recent weeks. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has accused Kyrgyzstan of using Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones against Tajik forces and civilian targets.

Iran has become a drone-exporting power in recent years. and is unique compared to other drone exporters—principally Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates—in that it allows client countries to manufacture its drones under license. Such outsourcing affords Iran a modicum of plausible deniability in case there is blowback regarding their use by Iranian proxies or others. In this case, however, the use of drones by one Iranian ally against another country to which Iran seeks close ties has escalated into a diplomatic headache. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian Army Chief of Staff, sought to allay Kyrgyzistani concerns by saying the Ababil-2 was merely a surveillance drone, and it is unclear whether the drone might have broader functions, such as suicide operations. Forfeiting operational control might have once been an attractive tactic for Iran, but client autonomy can have a cost when its target holds Iran, rather than the client, accountable for the use of Iranian drones.

Source:

“Sarlashkar Bagheri: Pehpadha-ye Ababil-2-e Iran dar Dargiri Morzi Tajikistan va Qirqizstan Istifadeh Namishavad (Major General Bagheri: Iranian Ababil-2 Drones are not Used in Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan Border Dispute),” Entekhab.ir (popular reform-leaning Iranian website), 8 November 2022. https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/702471

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces, spoke by phone with Kyrgyz Defense Minister Gen. Baktybek Bekbolotov about important issues in the region…. The Chairman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces said, “Given the border disputes and conflicts between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in September [2022], the Islamic Republic of Iran has always stated its readiness for any assistance in order to resolve peacefully and prevent any conflict. Referring to the issue of sending Iranian drones to Tajikistan, Maj. Gen. Bagheri noted, “The Ababil-2 drones are only capable of reconnaissance, and such drones are not equipped with weapons and offensive equipment. In the border conflict between the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Iranian armed forces have always emphasized to the Tajik armed forces that the drones should not be used in conflicts between the two countries.

Notes:

[1] The Telegram statement can be found here: https://t.me/s/pogrankg/416.  

[2] For background on the Iranian drone program and its exports, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, August 2020. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/A-short-history-of-the-Iranian-drone-program.pdf?x91208

[3] For background, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Opens New Drone Plant in Tajikistan,” OEW, July 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420285

Image Information:

Image: The Ababil-2 drone which the Islamic Republic of Iran exported to Tajikistan.
Source: https://img9.irna.ir/d/r2/2022/05/17/4/169684358.jpg?ts=1652774226121
Attribution: Islamic Republic News Agency

Little Evidence That Algeria Is Shifting From Russian to Chinese Arms Imports Amid Ukraine Conflict

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SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL).

SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL).

“… The Russian official’s visit coincided with media reports about Algeria allocating a huge budget for armaments in the coming years …”

The Algerian government recently announced a substantial increase to its 2023 defense budget, thanks largely to windfall profits from high global energy prices. The announcement has led to various rumors about the weapons systems that Algeria may seek to purchase from abroad. For years, the preponderance of Algerian advanced weaponry has been sourced from Russia. Russian weapons sales, however, are expected to decline as international sanctions and Ukraine-related domestic needs cut into export production. This had led to speculation that Chinese manufacturers will compete for market share in traditional Russian markets, including Algeria. 

Belying speculation of declines in Russian arms exports to Algeria, the English-language news website Africa Intelligence recently published an unverified claim that Algeria will soon ink a 10-year “mega-contract” for Russian equipment, worth more than $10 billion dollars.[i] The report, which is behind a paywall, was picked up and amplified by prominent Arabic-language news outlets. As reported in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Russian news website RT Arabic, the deal would likely include submarines, advanced Sukhoi aircraft, and long-range air defense systems. The rumored deal received some indirect support with the early November visit to Algiers by Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation.

As reported in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language website of the Turkish Anadolu News Agency, Shugaev heads a Russian state institution that oversees arms deals and foreign military cooperation. Some days prior, an Algeria-focused military observer who goes by the Twitter handle @fares4302 circulated a photograph of an Algerian-Chinese meeting purportedly discussing the Chinese SY-400 [RG1] platform, which can be configured as a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or Short-Range Ballistic Missile System (SRBM).[ii] The same user had earlier circulated a photograph that showed what appeared to be a model SY-400 in the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces.[iii] The timing of the tweets suggested a link between Algerian interest in these systems and the current context, specifically the expected attrition of Russian SRBM exports due to the Ukraine conflict. However, the photograph of Chinese-Algerian SY-400 discussions turned out to be from Abu Dhabi’s biannual IDEX weapons expo, which last occurred in February 2021—a full year before the Ukraine invasion. The photo displaying a model SY-400 in the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces, furthermore, was from 2020 and may well depict a visually similar system possessed by Algerian forces, such as the Chinese SR-5 [RG2] MLRS, which Algeria acquired in 2017. In sum, while China may indeed be moving to compete with Russia in certain market segments, there is of yet no hard evidence that it is doing so in response to a Ukraine-related decline in Russian exports, at least insofar as Algeria is concerned.

In mid-November, the Algerian president’s office issued a decree forbidding government officials from talking to the media about defense issues without permission from the Defense Ministry. As reported in the third accompanying excerpt, from the Qatar-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, it is unclear whether the measure applies to media-friendly Army Chief of Staff Said Chengriha. The measure may well be related to the various rumors surrounding Algerian arms purchases, but it should also be considered in the context of an ongoing and highly opaque power struggle between competing factions in the Algerian military.

Sources:

“مصدر إعلامي: الجزائر تتجه لتوقيع صفقة أسلحة ضخمة مع روسيا

(Media source: Algeria plans to sign huge weapons deal with Russia),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 31 October 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4s6f8c74

“Africa Intelligence” reported that negotiations are underway to conclude an agreement on Russian military supplies to Algeria over the next ten years. The deal will occur within the framework of Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s official visit to Moscow next December. The Algerian military leadership is particularly interested in acquiring submarines, aircraft including the Su-57[RG1] , Su-34 [RG2] and Su-30[RG3] , and new air defense systems such as the S-400[RG4] , Viking (Buk-M3[RG5] ) and Antey-4000.

“قائد الجيش الجزائري يبحث مع مسؤول روسي التعاون العسكري

(Algerian military leader discusses military cooperation with Russian official),” Anadolu News Agency, 10 November 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4tfdc5m5

“The Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation is a state institution that reports to the presidency in Moscow and oversees all arms deals and foreign military cooperation. The Russian official’s visit coincided with media reports about Algeria allocating a huge budget for armaments in the coming years, amounting to about $10 billion, though the Algerian authorities have not confirmed this information.”

“الرئيس الجزائري يقرر منع الحديث في مسائل الدفاع إلا بترخيص منه

(Algerian president forbids talking about defense matters without his permission),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 14 November 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8m36te

On Monday, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune issued a decree banning military and government officials from speaking to the press about information about military issues without permission from the Minister of Defense… It is not known whether this decision also includes the statements of the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Said Chengriha, who constantly appears in speeches on state television during army-related activities.

Notes:

[i] The paywalled article can be found at: https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2022/10/31/armaments-algiers-to-sign-new-dollars12bn-mega-contract-with-moscow,109839871-art.

[ii]The tweet reads: “An Algerian military delegation in China is probably receiving explanations about the Sy-400 missile system.” A comment below notes that the picture is from IDEX. https://twitter.com/fares4302/status/1588516913541705729

[iii]The tweet reads: “From the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces a mock-up of a surface-to-surface missile system appears, apparently the Chinese system SY-400.” https://twitter.com/fares4302/status/1583753579399036928

Image Information:

Image: SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL)
Source: TRADOC Worldwide Equipment Guide,  https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/mediawiki/images/1/1a/SR-5_Chines_Guided_%28D%29.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Ukraine Narratives Find Appeal in Arab Countries

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RT Arabic Logo.

RT Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.

“… The war saved everyone from the Corona virus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population …”

The “Arab street” has largely supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine several polls indicating that Arabs are more likely to blame the conflict on Ukraine or the West than on Russia.[i] Russian influence campaigns have almost certainly played a role given ample evidence that Russia’s Arabic-language outlets have deliberately sought to shape perceptions vis-à-vis Ukraine. There is also data showing that Russian Arabic-language media outlets RT and Sputnik Arabic are more popular than their Western counterparts, such as BBC Arabic or the U.S.-funded al-Hurra.[ii]Several national news agencies in the Middle East have signed content sharing agreements with these Russian outlets. However, focusing primarily on Russian influence operations misses the important social contexts in which these pro-Russian opinions are being formed.

The first accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website of the German media outlet Deutsche Welle, cites an Egyptian media expert who highlights the extent to which Arabs are registering “protest support” for Russia, based on opposition to Western policies that are seen as biased against Arabs and Muslims. Russian influence campaigns, he argues, need not be particularly strong, as “the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that the propaganda is good or effective.” The second accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website al-Bawaba, illustrates the extent to which Russian misinformation has spread to new segments of the Arab public. The excerpt is from an interview with an archbishop in Egypt’s Coptic Church. When asked about the impact of the Ukraine conflict on Egypt, he claims that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has ended COVID-19, which was purportedly created by the United States in Ukrainian laboratoriese to trim the global population to 2 billion people. 

According to the third accompanying excerpt, an opinion piece published in the Qatar-aligned English-language news website The New Arab, the current global environment has “opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations.”  The author notes how the combined effects of COVID-19, extreme weather events, and war in Ukraine have led many in the region to seek answers in scripture. Arab skepticism toward the U.S. role in Ukraine is neither novel nor surprising, since narratives portraying the United States as a latent source of regional conflict and instability are pervasive. What is new, however, is that fanciful, apocalyptic-tinted anti-U.S. narratives—made popular last decade by Islamic State ideologues—may be pushing their way into the region’s Christian minority populations with a little help from Russian media outlets.

Sources:

“غزو أوكرانيا.. هل ربحت روسيا حرب المعلومات في الشرق الأوسط؟

(Ukraine invasion… did Russia win the information war in the Middle East?),” Deutsche Welle Arabic (German media outlet), 25 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/49783hk2

Yasser Abdel Aziz, an international lecturer and Egyptian media expert… says: “I believe that this support is ‘protest support’ because there are large segments of the Arab public who feel that the Western media is biased and that the West in general is biased against Arab and Islamic issues. There is historical and other bitterness, and because of this the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that this propaganda is good or effective… Abdel Aziz added, “The West has the right to feel resentment in light of this situation, because its effective and successful communication tools and its prestigious and venerable media outlets are sometimes unconvincing, while the ‘miserable’ Russian media tools, or others that do not have the same luster or capabilities, find popularity at times.

“الأنبا بنيامين مطران المنوفية: الزواج استشهاد دون سفك دماء..

(Anba Benjamin, Bishop of Monofia: Marriage is martyrdom without blood…).” al-Bawaba (Arabic-language news website), 20 October 2022. https://www.albawabhnews.com/4674878

Q: The Ukrainian-Russian crisis. How do you see its impact on the world and Egypt in particular?

A: The war saved everyone from the Coronavirus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population, there are 7.5 billion people and they want to reduce it to 2 billion.

Emad Mousa. “MENA’s misguided climate change schadenfreude towards Europe,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned English-language news website), 19 October 2022. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/menas-misguided-climate-change-schadenfreude-towards-europeBecause the unusual weather conditions came shortly after a global pandemic and coincided with the Ukraine war and a global economic meltdown, it opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations – similar to the height of the Covid-19 global emergency. During the pandemic, Egyptians reportedly ranked highest in Google searches

Notes:

[i] Per the May 2022 ArabNews/YouGov poll on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://www.arabnews.com/sites/default/files/anyg_rusukr_report_web_compressed.pdf), 24 percent of respondents hold NATO responsible; 13 percent hold the current U.S. President responsible; 16 percent hold Russia responsible; six percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 42 percent do not know or are unsure who is responsible. Per the September 2022 Arab Youth Survey on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://arabyouthsurvey.com/en/findings/#my-global-citizenship-10),

31 percent of respondents hold the United States/NATO responsible; 18 percent hold Russia responsible; 15 percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 37 percent do not know or cannot say who is responsible.

[ii] According to a 2015 Nielsen study, RT’s Arabic-language news channel had higher daily audiences than BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, al-Hurra and China’s CCTV in Arabic in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Iraq. (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rt-arabic-is-among-top-3-most-watched-news-channels-in-6-arabic-countries-300039119.html)

See also: Norman Cigar, “COVID-19 and the Arab World: Opportunity for Russian Anti-American Disinformation?” MES Insights, Volume 11, Issue 2, The Krulak Center at Marine Corps University, April 2020. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES/Insights/MES%20Insights%20Volume%2011%20Issue%202%20April%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-01-133622-630

Image Information:

Image 1:  RT Arabic Logo
Source: Twitter, https://twitter.com/RTarabic/photo
Attribution: Fair Use

Image 2:  Sputnik Arabic Logo
Source: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=293803939457940
Attribution: Fair Use

Russian-Led Military Alliance in Central Asia Weakening Amid Quagmire in Ukraine

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Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

“In particular, it directly hits the unity within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as a result of which the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan were canceled…”

The excerpted article from the Moscow-based, Russian-language newspaper Kommersant discusses deepening fissures within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance in Central Asia. First, the ongoing border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulted in Kyrgyzstan withdrawing from the CSTO’s upcoming exercises in Tajikistan, which have a collective defense scenario.[i] Moreover, according to the article, Kyrgyzstan postponed the exercises that are scheduled to take place in Kyrgyzstan next year, arguing that not taking part is within its rights as a CSTO member-state. However, the article notes that Russia appreciated that Kyrgyzstan requested that Russia mediate its conflict with Tajikistan because it preserved Russia’s central role in the CSTO and Central Asian affairs generally. The article emphasizes how this role is especially important for Russia because the war in Ukraine has placed it in a difficult situation geopolitically and the CSTO remains Russia’s Central Asian security linchpin considering growing competition in the region over the past two decades from the United States, Turkey, and China.[ii]

Finally, the article asserts that countries like Tajikistan can now take advantage of Russia’s vulnerable position resulting from the war in Ukraine. For example, in a recent speech at the Russia-Central Asia Summit, Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon placed subtle demands on Russia to support Tajikistan. Tajikistan could, like Kyrgyzstan, decrease engagement with the CSTO and seek closer ties with China or other countries.

Source:

“Киргизия и Таджикистан громко ссорятся (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Fight Loudly),” kommersant.ru (Moscow-based Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 17 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619937

The conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which developed for many years, but previously concerned only the residents of the border regions of the two countries, became an important factor for the entire post-Soviet space. In particular, it directly effects the unity in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which resulted in the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan being canceled, and the Frontier-2022 maneuvers that began today in Tajikistan taking place without the Kyrgyz military. In this context, the statement of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon that Moscow allegedly does not respect its partners in the region sounded as strong as possible.

The Kyrgyz side formally stated that it would not participate in the [exercises], which is completely within its rights. As for the exercises that were supposed to take place in Kyrgyzstan, it was requested in Bishkek for them to be postponed to the next year…. Moscow liked that Bishkek was ready to see it as a mediator in resolving the conflict, while Dushanbe strongly demanded on a bilateral format.

According to a Kyrgyz source of Kommersant, the President of Tajikistan made a somewhat harsh speech at the “Russia-Central Asia Summit….” He recalled that the Russian language is being studied in the republic “from kindergarten” and a Russian military base is located there.

Notes:

[i] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had several intermittent clashes related to each country’s territorial exclaves within the other’s borders, creating competition regarding issues such as boundary demarcation and water and electricity use. Although these clashes often begin with local villagers using improvised weapons, in recent years the national armies have become involved, raising the risk that one of these localized clashes will eventually spiral into a national-level conflict. For more, see Matthew Stein, “Resolution to Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Problems?,” OE Watch, Issue 3, March 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353586

[ii] Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan during its 2020 military victory against Armenia over disputed territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as its military performance in Syria and Libya in the years prior, has resulted in Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, seeking Turkish support for their military modernization programs, especially related to unmanned aerial vehicles.


Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.
Source: Mil.ru
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Main_Cathedral_CSTO_Summit_02.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Laying Groundwork Ahead of July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit 

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South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

“Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce”

As Russia prepares to host the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2023, commentators from across the African continent are offering insights as to how they perceive Russia trying to making inroads. In the first excerpted article from central African news aggregator L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, writer Noël Ndong articulates the widely held perception that Russia seeks to expand its reach beyond its foothold of partners in Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and possibly Burkina Faso—most notably in other francophone African states. Ndong highlights former French stalwart ally Chad, as well as Morocco and Cameroon, noting Moscow’s rhetoric about aiding African states in their quests for energy independence.

The second excerpted article from Malian newspaper Le Journal de l’économie Malienne confirms the leader of Mali’s junta government, Assimi Goïta, recently received his invitation to the July 2023 meeting. The amity between two international pariahs should be unsurprising given that Goïta’s government relies on Russian Wagner mercenaries to stave off its spiraling jihadist insurgency, reportedly paying Wagner $10 million a month. A noted commentator on African geopolitical affairs, Gustavo de Carvalho, argues in the South Africa’s The Daily Maverick that in advance of the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, the African Union needs to lead African efforts to have a unified front. While noting that in 2021, Russia was the largest arms supplier in Africa—supplying 44 percent of major arms to the continent—he also urges caution about what Moscow’s aggressive new posture means: “Given the continent’s relatively weak global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy.”

Sources:

Noël Ndong, “Coopération: la Russie à l’assaut de l’Afrique (Cooperation: Russia on the assault in Africa),” L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale (Central Africa news aggregator), 18 October 2022. https://www.adiac-congo.com/content/cooperation-la-russie-lassaut-de-lafrique-142170

After Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Moscow is now on the hunt to conquer Morocco, Chad, and Cameroon…

With Morocco, Russia has approved a cooperation agreement in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…. The agreement stipulates that Moscow will assist Rabat in the creation and improvement of nuclear energy infrastructure, the design and construction of nuclear reactors, as well as water desalination plants and particle accelerators. The agreement also consists of the provision of services in Morocco in the field of the fuel cycle, spent and radioactive nuclear fuel and waste management.

Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce. Ambassador Extraordinary Oleg Ozerov, Head of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: “We see that African countries currently want to ensure an industrial transition of their economies. It will nevertheless be impossible to solve the problem of industrialization without having solved the problems of energy, without having granted access to electricity to the population and to the companies which must create industry and production.”

The second summit of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum is scheduled for the summer of 2023. It aims to give new impetus to Russian-African political, trade, economic, investment, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation.

Aboubacar Traoré, “Mali: Le colonel Assimi Goïta invité au Sommet Russie-Afrique (Mali: Colonel Assimi Goïta invited to the Russia-Africa Summit),” Le Journal de l’économie Malienne (online Malian news source), 14 November 2022.  https://www.lejecom.com/Mali-Le-colonel-Assimi-Goita-invite-au-Sommet-Russie-afrique_a6505.html

According to the diplomatic source, the Russian ambassador had come to officially deliver to Minister [of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye] Diop the letter by which the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, invites his Malian counterpart, Colonel Assimi Goïta, to participate in the Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for July 2023 in St. Petersburg.

­­Also, the Russian diplomat took this opportunity to inform the Malian authorities of the upcoming visit to Africa, including to Mali, of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Gustavo de Carvalho, “Africa needs to forge a unified approach to Russia before 2023 Russia-Africa Summit,” The Daily Maverick (centrist South African newspaper), 3 August 2022. https://saiia.org.za/research/africa-needs-to-forge-a-unified-approach-to-russia-before-2023-russia-africa-summit/

For five days in July 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov traveled to four African nations to signal Russia’s push into the continent. The visit to Egypt, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia symbolises the Russian offensive to gain and reinforce international support…

While the July 2022 engagements in Africa yielded few tangible outcomes, Lavrov reinforced the criticism of Western policies in Africa, with a complementing narrative of the independent stance Africa has taken….

Russia has been ramping up its military relationships with several African countries for at least a decade. Its approach is often influenced by close ties between Russia’s arms industry and its infamous private security contractor, the Wagner Group. According to Sipri, a Swedish think tank, Russia was the largest arms supplier to Africa in 2021, accounting for 44% of continental imports of major arms. In total, Russia has signed military agreements with more than 20 African countries…

Given the continent’s relatively week global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy. To that end, the AU can — and should — engage with its members in a more structured manner and help them put together joint positions on critical issues related to Russia and other partners, like the US, China, Europe and others…

Image Information:

Image: South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/48951692933
Attribution: CC BY-ND 2.0

Kazakhstan’s Military Doctrine Raises Questions for Russia

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Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

“Building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…(and, the) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.”

When Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of Kazakhstan immediately stated that it would remain neutral in the conflict. While the Kazakhstani government has stuck to this neutrality since the war began, it has also taken certain measures to distance itself from Russia’s militarism, including canceling its Victory Day Parade in May 2022 and suspending defense exports (including to Russia) in August 2022.[i] Thus, when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev approved a new military doctrine in October 2022, it drew attention to how Kazakhstan perceives various threats, with some speculation that Russia would be considered a threat without being named.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kazakhstan’s Russian-language independent newspaper Vremya reports on the changes in the doctrine since it was last published in 2017. The article reports that Kazakhstan has increased the combat potential of its units in “strategic directions,” and that it has created new units to combat disinformation. Although the article notes that a border conflict will be handled by the country’s border guards and the armed forces, it is unclear in the doctrine how a border conflict would different from other types of conflicts, such as an attack from another state. Another change in the doctrine is the development of special operations forces and an articulation on how they will cooperate with specialized units in other government agencies.

The new doctrine further notes that Kazakhstan will build capabilities in air defense, including in radar and missile defense. The doctrine references the “development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation,” which is the only time that Russia is mentioned, suggesting Kazakhstan still sees Russia as a useful partner or at least does not wish to openly label it a threat. Other notable changes include equipping the border guards with modern systems as well as expanding production of basic types of ammunition for the armed forces. The Kazakh government established ammunition production as one of the early efforts to build the country’s defense industry, and this expansion of it could help Kazakhstan rely less on defense imports.

Sources:

“Токаев изменил военную доктрину Казахстана (Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan),” Vremya (a semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 15 October 2022.

https://time.kz/news/politics/2022/10/15/tokaev-izmenil-voennuyu-doktrinu-kazahstana

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev changed the military doctrine of Kazakhstan…

Some of the changes are aimed at replacing the word “heading” with “section”, as indicated in the quote, but the bulk of the changes have affected the fundamental formulations of the doctrine. The document contains exceptions to the old doctrine and additions to it…The further text of the changes approved by Tokayev, in addition to those already indicated in the quote are provided in full:

“Chapter 3. The current state of the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”; Paragraphs 18 and 19 shall be stated as follows:

The combat potential of the land, air force and naval component of the military organization of the state has been increased by creating the necessary set of troops (forces), weapons, military equipment and supplies in strategic directions.

Subdivisions have been created in the Armed Forces to organize counteraction to information-psychological and software-technical (cyber) influences in the troops. Work is underway to increase their potential and capabilities…

“Section 3. Basic Provisions”;

“Chapter 5. Vision in the field of military security and defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Paragraph 39 shall be amended as follows:

39. The resolution of a border armed conflict in the border space of the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out by the Border Service together with the Aviation Service, the Border Academy of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, other national security bodies in cooperation with the authorities, formations and military units of the Armed Forces and the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if necessary, forces can be used and funds of other central state and local executive bodies.”…

“Chapter 6. Approaches to ensuring the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan”;

Heading “3.3.1. Maintenance of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations of the Republic of Kazakhstan” shall be stated as follows:

In paragraph 54: supplement with subparagraph 2-1) of the following content: “2-1) the development of the Special Operations Forces for effective operations in peacetime and wartime in cooperation with special forces units of other state bodies.”

Subparagraph 4) shall be stated in the following wording: “4) building up the radar field and increasing the potential and capabilities of the troops in conducting air and missile defense of the state…

Paragraph 57 shall be stated as follows: “1) development of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation…

Paragraph 61: subparagraphs 3), 4) and 5) shall be stated as follows: “3) equipping the Border and Aviation Services of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with modern weapons and military equipment, technical means of border protection; 4) bringing the infrastructure of the State Border in line with its categorization and modern requirements; 5) increasing the efficiency of interaction between the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan with central state, local executive bodies and the population of border areas in matters of protecting the State Border, including in the underwater environment of the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea”…

In paragraph 68: subparagraph 6) shall be stated in the following wording: “6) ensuring sustainability and expanding the production of basic types of ammunition for the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations”…

Notes:

[i] For more on the Kazakhstani government’s decision not to hold a Victory Day parade commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in May, angering some in Russia, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness,” OE Watch, June 2022. For more on Kazakhstan’s suspensionvof defense exports for one year starting in August 2022, leaving Russia with one fewer supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces, see: Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases,” OE Watch, October 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427937

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Armed_Forces_Flag.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Rationales for Russia’s Return to the Black Sea Grain Deal

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The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

“Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions… Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.”

Russian resumption of its participation in the Black Sea Grain Agreement, following Turkey’s facilitation and mediation, helped to alleviate some concerns of a global food crisis.[i]  However, it was not clear what benefits Russia received for returning to the deal. The accompanying passages by Turkish experts offer some such rationales.

In the first accompanying passage from the regionally focused independent news site al Monitor, journalist Amberin Zaman writes that Russia wants to export more grain and fertilizer through the Black Sea corridor at Ukraine’s expense. Zaman also writes that Russia wants to resume ammonia exports via Ukraine. She notes that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kiev shut down a pipeline carrying Russian ammonia—a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers—to the Black Sea port of Odessa..

In the second accompanying passage from the Turkish independent news platform Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube, Turkish foreign affairs commentatorFehim Tastekin claims that Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.[ii] He notes Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using that grain corridor. As such, he claims that Russia’s main benefit would be to spotlight this attack approach. He also claimed that Russia returned to the deal to avoid the perception that it was the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. Both of these views would support Russian narratives as part of their information operations.

Sources:

Amberin Zaman, “Turkey seeks to coax Russia back into Ukraine grain deal,” al-Monitor (independent news platform with local reporting from the Middle East), 1 November 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/11/turkey-seeks-coax-russia-back-ukraine-grain-deal#ixzz7k8s1EXZp

Analysts say Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions. “They want better terms for themselves via Turkey,” said Yevgeniya Gaber, a former Ukrainian diplomat… Gaber believes that Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia also wants a resumption of ammonia exports via Ukraine. A pipeline carrying Russian ammonia, a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers, to the Black Sea port of Odessa ceased to function following Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations has been pressing the sides to reach an agreement.

Russia likely also wants Ukraine to halt its offensive to retake Kherson, a critical port city in the country’s south, a demand that Ukraine will almost certainly spurn as it seeks to consolidate its recent battlefield gains.

Fehim Tastekin, “Arap Birliği’nin Türkiye’yi kınama iddiası ne anlama geliyor? (What does the Arab Union’s condemnation of Turkey mean?),” Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube (independent Turkish news and analysis platform on YouTube), 2 November 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruZyRUhjuE8&t=510s

Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.  An important detail that has been missed in the Turkish media is Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using the grain corridor.  So the most important concession that Russia received is likely a halting of attacks on its ships in the Black Sea, to move the conflict inland.   Russia also wants to avoid the perception that it is the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. 

Notes:

[i] For a background on Turkey’s control over access to the Black Sea and the Montreux Treaty, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey Views Treaty as Important to Limiting U.S. Naval Activity in Black Sea,” OE Watch, May 2021.

[ii] This video was later unavailable as Turkey suspended YouTube on 13 November 2022.

Image Information:

Image: The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IMO_welcomes_maritime_humanitarian_corridor_in_Black_Sea_(52233881214).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Israeli Embassy in South Korea Opens in the Metaverse

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The Metaverse Museum.

The Metaverse Museum.

“I’m quite sure this is the way forward… I think the embassy metaverse will become the essential standard just as websites became the essential standard about 20 years ago.”

The metaverse is a digital world that computers and smartphones can access on the internet, where users can interact with other users in a virtual environment. While initially seen as an entertainment tool, the metaverse is now becoming a tool of public diplomacy. According to the excerpted article from the oldest English-language daily in South Korea, The Korea Times, the Embassy of Israel became the first diplomatic mission in South Korea to gain a presence in the metaverse and one of the first embassies in the metaverse globally.[i] This likely represents the way forward for digital diplomacy, but it also carries the risk of becoming the next domain for cyber warfare to include security and privacy breaches, hacks, identity theft, ransomware, and deepfake videos. 

The Korea Times article also reports that the Israel-Korea Metaverse is available for download via the Google Play and Apple App Stores. It was launched to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Israel and South Korea and provides a virtual reality immersive experience that offers information about Israel and promotes exchanges between the two countries. As the passage reports, the Israeli Ambassador to South Korea said during the opening in Seoul that this is the “way forward” and that the “embassy metaverse” will become mainstream just as websites became mainstream 20 years ago. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website notes that the project comes amid flourishing relations between the two countries. This includes a recently ratified free trade agreement, expanded defense cooperation, arms trade, and rising cooperation in the health sector due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Sources:

“Israeli embassy opens in metaverse,” The Korea Times (the oldest English-language daily newspaper in South Korea), 27 September 2022. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/09/120_336705.html

The Embassy of Israel in Korea opened in the metaverse, becoming the first diplomatic mission in the country to gain a presence in the virtual world.

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Korea and Israel, the Israeli Embassy opened a pavilion in the metaverse to offer information about Israel and promote exchanges between the two countries.

“The Israel-Korea Metaverse is a truly unique platform for sharing a virtual reality immersive experience, the history of Israel-Korea relations and also for carrying out all kinds of interesting interactions between Israelis and Koreans. Even though they are 8,000 kilometers apart, yet in the metaverse, they are right next to each other,” Israeli ambassador to Korea Akiva Tor said during a launching event at a hotel in Seoul, Sept. 20… The embassy developed this with a Korean company called Vrillar.

“I’m quite sure that this is the way forward. It won’t be the only tool of public diplomacy and, of course, we will always want to bring real people to Korea and to hold in-person conferences and in-person cultural performances. But I think the embassy metaverse will become the essential standard just as websites became the essential standard about 20 years ago and SNS channels are now,” the ambassador said.

“I’m thinking of a metaverse with Hebrew and Korean language clubs, an Israel Film Festival, virtual meetings of the student clubs of Israel and Korea, a hangout for lovers of K-pop and the Hebrew Bible, a place for talk and debate about archaeology and the future of autonomous vehicles.”… The Israel-Korea Metaverse can be downloaded at Google Play Store and Apple App Store.

“Israel MFA initiates first diplomatic mission on Metaverse platform,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 October 2022. https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/first-diplomatic-mission-on-the-metaverse-platform

The current project initiated by the Israeli mission in South Korea comes on the background of flourishing relations between the countries. It is expected that Korean Air will renew direct flights between Israel and Korea at the end of the year; The new recently ratified trade agreement between the two countries—the first of its kind for Israel in Asia and the first for South Korea in the Middle East—will benefit the Israeli consumer. 

Notes:

[i] Other political presence in the metaverse include the metaverse office of the city of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UAE’s Ministry of Economy. In October 2022, INTERPOL became the world’s first law enforcement metaverse platform, allowing visitors to virtually tour its General Secretariat headquarters in France. Barbados has also recently announced plans to launch an embassy in the metaverse.

Image Information:

Image: The Metaverse Museum.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New_building_of_the_Metavers_Museum.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Deepening Cooperation in Latin America’s Sizeable Lithium Sector 

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Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.

“China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.”

The price of lithium, a key ingredient in battery technology, has skyrocketed amid the rush for critical minerals. Lithium can be found in abundance throughout South America’s so-called “Lithium Triangle,” which comprises Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile and contains approximately 55 percent of the world’s known lithium deposits.[i]  Mexico also has known lithium deposits. Collectively, Latin America’s lithium reserves has attracted global attention, especially from China. According to the first excerpted article from China’s state-run Global Times, Chile’s Consul General in Chengdu vowed to increase the country’s cooperation with China to stabilize the global supply and price of lithium. In Mexico’s case, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has sought to nationalize the metal known as “white gold.” According to the second excerpted article from privately held popular media outlet Radio Formúla, a new state company called Lithium for Mexico will control the metal in Mexico, demanding foreign partners to enter joint ventures and junior partnerships. The article reports that only one company has received a unique exception to this rule—China’s Ganfeng Lithium. Mexico’s government justifies this exception on the basis that Ganfeng had an existing agreement to control lithium at the Bacanora site before the mineral’s nationalization. These developments demonstrate China’s advances in Latin America with respect to its critical minerals strategy, as well as the success of its economic diplomacy in achieving carveouts for its companies.

Sources: 

“Chile vows to enhance cooperation with China in lithium sector,” Global Times (state-owned media outlet under the auspices of the People’s Daily), 9 November 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279134.shtml  

Chile’s consul general in Chengdu…Gustavo Díaz Hidalgo, on Wednesday vowed to further enhance cooperation with China in the lithium sector, in a bid to stabilize the global supply of the vital mineral for making batteries…Díaz predicted that the global demand for lithium each year would surpass 1 million tons by 2025, crossing 2.5 million tons by 2030.
 
The consul general said that China’s consumption of lithium accounted for 65 percent in the global lithium market, driven partly by the fast-developing new-energy vehicle sector and the energy storage industry, along with the country’s carbon emissions reduction goals.

“Litio para México: Empresa estatal lo explotará en exclusiva…salvo una excepción china (Lithium for Mexico: State company will exploit it exclusively…with one Chinese exception),” Radio Formúla (a popular outlet owned by the large media conglomerate Grupo Formúla), 24 August 2022. https://www.radioformula.com.mx/economia/2022/8/24/litio-para-mexico-empresa-estatal-lo-explotara-en-exclusiva-salvo-una-excepcion-china-728919.html

The Secretary of Energy, Rocío Nahle, explained that the current concession for exploration and exploitation of lithium at the hands of a private company will be maintained… Although concessions will no longer be granted to explore and exploit the mineral…the only one in force for exploitation before the reform to the Mining Law, in the hands of an Asian company, will remain in force.

Notes:

[i] For more information on U.S. opportunities in the Lithium Triangle and how the United States might effectively compete, see: Ryan C. Berg and T. Andrew Sady-Kennedy, “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden administration,” 17 August 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration

Image Information:

Image:  Lithium mines in Jujuy Province, Argentina.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/earthworks/47617675391
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl