Yearly Archives: 2023

Russia Justifies Bringing Back T-62 Tank

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T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

T-62M Tank.

“…there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense, MTO Journal, discusses Russian reasoning for bringing the T-62 tank back into service for use in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The T-62 [R1] was retired from active service in the Russian Armed Forces after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War because it was seen as outdated and obsolete compared to newer tanks. In considering the T-62’s reintroduction, the author argues that the move is not due to recent massive tank losses, or the impact of international sanctions on the ability of UralVagonZavod, Russia’s tank manufacturer, to produce modern tanks such as the T-72B3[R2] , T-80BVM[R3] , and T-90M[R4] . Instead, he says that it is because in 2021, even before the start of its conflict in Ukraine, Russia had already established a new refurbishment program for the T-62[R5] . Furthermore, the author posits that more modern tanks should be conserved in the event of “a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries.” T-62 Russian Medium Tank

Source:

Boris Dzherelievsky, “Т-62: ветеран снова в строю (T-62: The Veteran Returns to the Ranks),”

MTO Journal (official logistics publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense), January 2023.  https://mto.ric.mil.ru/upload/site193/3jW5JVFpXH.pdf

The launch of UralVagonZavod’s large-scale modernization program of the Soviet-era T-62 main battle tank has been the cause of interpretations by both potential and real opponents. Almost all of these interpretations stem from the fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, due to “huge losses of armored vehicles” in the SMO (special military operation), can only produce old vehicles, since the production of modern models has stopped due to sanctions. In fact, the production of the T-72B3M, T-80BVM, T-90M MBTs (main battle tanks) did not stop. And, by the way, the losses of our tanks in the SMO in comparison with other campaigns is not so great. In addition, the modernization program for the T-62 MBT was launched long before the SMO and is more likely associated with military operations in the Middle East, as well as with certain export plans…

It should be noted that the statements about the “complete obsolescence” of this tank are nothing more than a myth. The T-62 is the same age as the American M-60, which is still in service with Israel, Turkey, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Spain and many other countries, while surpassing it in most parameters. It is quite possible to compare it with the German Leopard MBT (adopted for service 4 years later than the T-62), the supply of which from Germany, Spain and Greece is being sought by the Kyiv regime. It is worth noting that our vehicle also surpasses this tank in a number of parameters, for example, in terms of gun power. The T-62 can hit the frontal armor of the “Leopard” from a distance of 3 km, while the German tank still needs to close to a distance of 1.5-2 km in order to break through the armor of the “62”…

The modernization program, launched by Uralvagonzavod in 2021, includes equipping the tank with a multispectral gyro-stabilized electro-optical system, an electromechanical mast and a new thermal imaging sight with a 1PN-96MT-02 laser rangefinder. The new thermal imager allows the tank gunner to detect targets at a distance of up to 3,000 meters. The dynamic protection “Kontakt-1” and lattice screens are installed on the sides of the vehicle.  According to experts, the first modernized T-62M[R1] s sent to the SMO zone were supposed to only be used in the second echelon, as well as to protect stationary objects or in “self-propelled gun mode” to support the advancing infantry, so they are not intended to be “dueling” with more modern MBTs with 125 mm guns. However, at the moment, most (Ukrainian) T-64[R2] s and T-72[R3] s have been knocked out, and the enemy is happy to use T-55[R4] s received from the countries of Eastern Europe, or even various infantry fighting vehicles including the old American M113[R5]  armored personnel carrier. It is clear that in such a situation, the modernized “62” can become a real king of the battlefield.  To this we can add that it is much easier to train reservists called up for partial mobilization on these vehicles, especially since many of the reservists served on them while they were in military service. Finally, there is little doubt that the SMO could become a prelude to a more serious armed conflict with countries that have more advanced militaries. And that is why more modern and advanced vehicles should be reserved for this hypothetical war, since the modernized T-62 is more than enough for the current stage of the SMO.

Image Information:

Image 1: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/T-62M-in-Kubinka-Tank-Museum/i-pr9rCnS/0/a00d74a4/X2/T-62M-Kubinka-04-X2.jpg  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Image 2: T-62M Tank
Source: https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-6jZc4FQ/0/X3/i-6jZc4FQ-X3.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Hong Kong Firm To Develop Satellite and Rocket Launch Site in Djibouti

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Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

“The MOU signed this time not only involves the construction of 7 satellite launch pads and 3 rocket testing pads, but also covers supporting projects such as power stations, water plants, aerospace ports, roads, and ports.”

On 9 January 2023, Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group (HKATG)[i] and Touchroad International Holdings[ii] to develop a $1 billion satellite and rocket launch site in Djibouti. The project includes seven launch pads and three rocket test pads in addition to power stations, water plants, spaceports, roads, and maritime ports in Djibouti’s northern Obock region. The MOU stipulates that the government of Djibouti will provide the necessary land (a minimum of 10 square kilometers) with a co-managed lease that runs for a minimum of 35 years. The government of Djibouti will take over the lease after 30 years of co-management.

According to the state-affiliated China Daily, the project would alleviate high demand for commercial satellite launching facilities in China, which are largely dependent on the Wenchang Space Launch Site and Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center for commercial launches. China currently maintains four official space launch centers, all state-owned and operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A 2021 State Council Information Office white paper identified the country’s demand for “commercial launch pads and launch sites to meet different commercial needs” as a priority for China’s space capabilities through 2026.[iii]

For its part, Africa’s expanding space industry relies heavily on international partners, including private firms, universities, and national space programs. Several countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Tunisia, have already ventured into the space domain relying on Beijing’s capabilities. In 2007, China launched Nigeria’s first communications satellite. Moreover, Beijing launched Algeria’s first communication satellite, and in 2019 it launched Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s first satellites. In 2020, China’s launch of a second satellite for Ethiopia from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center was aired live on Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation.

The announcement represents a major expansion of China’s involvement in Djibouti, where it has hosted its first official overseas military base since 2017. It remains to be seen what launch capabilities the site will support or to what extent Chinese firms will use the facility upon its projected completion in 2028. However, the involvement of HKATG and Touchroad, with their close ties to state-owned corporations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects—coupled with a permanent PLA presence and other strategic investments—may allow China to be looked to as African states’ space partner of preference.[iv]

Sources:

“与吉布提政府合作建太空港 助力商业航天突破限制 (Partnership with Djibouti Government to Build Spaceport Aids Commercial Aerospace Breakthroughs),” China Daily (PRC state-affiliated media), 12 January 2023. https://tech.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202301/12/WS63bfb3d4a3102ada8b22ae3e.html

The construction of the spaceport in the Republic of Djibouti is expected to take at least five years, that said, from a commercial point of view, the project is still of great benefit to the business of HKATG.

At present, most commercial satellites are launched in the new mode of “carpooling” of shared rockets, that is, “one rocket with multiple satellites” at the Wenchang Space Launch Site and China’s Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. Facing the high demand for commercial satellite launches in China in recent years, the demand for launch pads has been far outstripping supply, the development of Djibouti’s Spaceport will break the restrictions of the existing business model and have a positive impact on HKATG’s business development.

It is noteworthy that the parties will work together to establish research centers, universities and provide aerospace technologies, products, services and programs in addition to infrastructure development.

“驻吉布提大使胡斌会见香港航天科技集团有限公司 (Ambassador to Djibouti Hu Bin Meets with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. Vice-President),” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 5 January 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/jghd_673046/202301/t20230106_11002946.shtml

Ambassador Hu Bin expressed his affirmation of the cooperation between Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. and encouraged the enterprise to strengthen feasible research, to establish a firm sense of compliance, to balance corporate interests and social responsibilities, to promote the diversified economic development of Djibouti, and to contribute to Sino-Djiboutian cooperation. The embassy will actively provide the necessary support and assurances.

He Liehui, vice president of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, attended the meeting.

Notes:

[i] HKATG (香港航天科技集团有限公司) maintains close ties with Chinese state-owned and affiliated giants Huawei Technologies (华为) and China Aerospace Technology Corporations (中国航天科技集团公司), both of which are main players in China’s military-civil fusion research and development programs. HKATG’s board members maintain strong ties to the CCP and its united front system. Vice Chairman and Executive Director Claire Ku previously served as the founding CEO of the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), a documented CCP united front organization. Vice President of Business Development, Allen Fung, is a member of the CCP’s All-China Youth Federation and a Standing Committee Member of the Guangdong Youth Federation.

[ii] Touchroad International Holdings is owned by Africa-focused Chinese investor He Liehui, who is the current Vice President of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, another known united front organization with development projects across the African continent.

[iii] For more on China’s space ambitions, see “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office, 28 January 2022, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465645/n6465648/c6813088/content.html

[iv] Other strategic BRI investments include China Merchant Ports Holdings’ operation and ownership stake in the Port of Doraleh’s Terminal Container and a high-capacity standard gauge railway that terminates at the Port of Doraleh.

Image Information:

Image:  Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).
Source: Djiboutian Government https://twitter.com/IsmailOguelleh/status/1612488089603309568
Attribution:  Public Domain

China Addresses Challenges to Critical Mineral Supply

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PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

“International geopolitics has become an important factor affecting China’s resource supply.” – Wang Yunmin

In an interview with Chinese party-owned media outlet People’s Daily this January, Chinese Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua explains that Beijing will launch a new round of domestic strategic mineral mining operations to offset dependence on foreign suppliers of critical energy resources. Recent external shocks, including a global pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a growing trend toward “resource nationalism,” threaten to disrupt Beijing’s access to the strategic minerals necessary to power its economy and military technologies.[i] The new Chinese initiative includes policies to stimulate domestic exploration, prospecting, and processing of raw strategic minerals, with particular emphasis on oil- and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts.[ii] According to the director of the State Key Laboratory of Safety and Health for Metal Mines, Wang Yunmin, around two-thirds of China’s strategic mineral production and supply for minerals like iron, chrome, manganese, cobalt, nickel, copper and oil is highly dependent on foreign sources.

One of Beijing’s greatest concerns over strategic minerals lies in its ability to transition energy supply from fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal to cleaner alternatives. China is the world’s single largest consumer of lithium-ion batteries, relying on them to not only power its electric car and renewable energy industries, but also military weaponry, including drones and submarines.[iii] Three core ingredients for the lithium-ion battery traditional recipe include cobalt, lithium, and nickel.

China’s critical mineral supply faces challenges from resource rich countries where local governments have announced restrictions on mining and exports of cobalt, lithium, and nickel. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Zimbabwe are among China’s top lithium supplier states while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Indonesia are among its largest cobalt and nickel suppliers respectively. Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, collectively known as the ‘lithium triangle’ for their prospected vast lithium reserves, are reportedly discussing a possible OPEC-like agreement for lithium.[iv] In December 2022, Indonesia and Zimbabwe announced export restrictions requiring firms to processing raw materials in-country.[v] While Chinese lithium-ion battery production firms like CATL and SVOLT have recently reported production of lithium-ion batteries that rely on little or no nickel or cobalt, China is still far off from integrating these technologies across its military-economic structure.[vi]

Sources:

Shi Yimin (施毅敏), “工程院院士：中国战略性矿产对外依存度高地缘政治影响资源供给 (Chinese Academy of Engineering Scholar: High Degree of Chinese Foreign Dependence on Strategic Mineral Production, Geopolitics Influencing Resource Supply),” Caixin News (Beijing-based Chinese non-state media organization), 24 December 2022. https://companies.caixin.com/m/2022-12-24/101981473.html

Wang Yunmin introduced, Chinese foreign dependence on 10 types of minerals exceeds 50%. Among these, iron ore at 82%, chrome ore at 98%, manganese ore at 96%, cobalt ore at 95%, nickel ore at 90%, and both copper ore and oil at 78%. Wang said, “This determines the external environment’s strong influence over China’s resource supply and production.”

“优化要素保障 建设美丽中国 (Optimizing Factors to Ensure Construction of a Beautiful China),” People’s Daily (official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), 5 January 2023. http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0105/c1001-32599955.html

China has a high degree of foreign dependence on some important mineral resources, and once the international situation changes, it will certainly affect economic security or even national security.

A new round of domestic prospecting for strategic minerals will be launched in an all-round way. The focus will be on strategic minerals, particularly important oil and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts. New policies will be implemented to promote exploration, prospecting and processing.

Notes:

[i] Resource nationalism (资源民族主义) refers to the tendency of people and governments to assert control over natural resources located within their territories.

[ii] In 2021, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published its plan to facilitate the development of the country’s raw materials industry during the 14th Five-Year Period (2021-2025).

[iii] For more on China’s use of lithium-ion batteries in military weaponry, see: Stephen Chen, “China’s submarine fleet may soon be powered by lithium batteries,” 29 October 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3197670/chinas-submarine-fleet-may-soon-be-powered-lithium-batteries; Zhang Tong, “Chinese scientists’ new gel filling could triple lifespan of lithium batteries for EVs, drones,” 4 November 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3198333/chinese-scientists-new-gel-filling-could-triple-lifespan-lithium-batteries-evs-drones

[iv] Connor Mycroft, “China’s lithium hold won’t be undercut by Opec-style cartel as Argentina, Chile, Bolivia consider alliance,” 5 November 2022, South China Morning Post,  https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3198440/chinas-lithium-hold-wont-be-undercut-opec-style-cartel-argentina-chile-bolivia-consider-alliance

[v] For more on recent Indonesia and Zimbabwe’s export restrictions, see: Fransiska Nangoy and Bernadette Christina, “Indonesia confirms bauxite export ban to proceed as scheduled,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/indonesia-announce-ban-exports-commodity-without-saying-which-2022-12-21/ and “Zimbabwe bans raw lithium exports to curb artisanal mining,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-bans-raw-lithium-exports-curb-artisanal-mining-2022-12-21/

[vi] Keith Bradsher and Michael Forsythe, “Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries,”” 22 December 2021, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/business/china-catl-electric-car-batteries.html and “Completely Cobalt-Free Battery Cells from SVOLT Available for Order Now,” 2 February 2021, SVOLT, https://svolt-eu.com/en/completely-cobalt-free-battery-cells-from-svolt-available-for-order-now/

Image Information:

Image: PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua
Source: Chinese Government, https://baike.baidu.com/item/王广华/69366
Attribution: Public Domain

A Chinese Perspective on the Pitfalls of Military Intelligentization

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“The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis.”

Chinese military strategists are increasingly focused on developing practices of military “intelligentization,” the next generation of warfare expected to improve the military’s combat efficiency.[i] Intelligentization, also referred to as intelligent warfare, is the Chinese concept of applying machine speed and processing power of artificial intelligence (AI) to military planning, operational command, and decision support.[ii] The rate of developing intelligent weapons and systems is progressing at such a rapid pace, however, that it comes with potential risks, according to the following article published in the People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper PLA Daily. According to the article, the anti-jamming ability of current intelligent systems is too weak, making intelligent systems more vulnerable. For example, drone command and control relies on communication links that connect the drones to rear personnel. If the communication link is jammed, the operator will lose control of the drone. Therefore, improved anti-jamming capability is necessary to ensure communications links are not disrupted. The article also explains that the reliability of today’s AI technology is questionable. While the AI systems’ level of intelligence is superior to that of a human, there is not yet a reliable test to ensure they will not fail in a complex combat scenario.

The article also warns that using intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis. For example, military operations that rely on intelligent weapons and equipment could surpass the speed of political decision making. This could weaken the decision-maker’s ability to control the situation. The article further warns that the use of intelligent weapons and equipment in large-scale combat could increase tension between countries as well as lead to changing the psychology of combatants, potentially causing them to become more desensitized to killing because of their greater distance from the battlefield and gradually reducing caution in decision-making.

The article notes that countries are increasingly pouring money into AI technology to gain military advantage, and this struggle for predominance could lead to a dangerous arms race. With current AI technology, for example, the algorithms used to distinguish civilians from combatants are not yet reliable, thereby potentially putting the lives of civilians at risk. Based on the article, there is still a long way to go before China has perfected the software to not only drive AI weapons and equipment, but also to test them to ensure they are ready to meet all the demands of the battlefield.

Source:

Luo Zhaocheng, “关注智能化武器装备运用风险 (Pay Attention to Risks in Using Intelligentized Weapons and Equipment),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 5 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/ll/2023-01/05/content_10209877.htm

… Currently, the world’s major countries are vigorously pursuing the development of military intelligentization of weapons and equipment across the different operational domains. While the new technology greatly enhances combat capabilities, it also could pose some great risks.

…the anti-jamming capability of intelligent weapons and equipment is weak. This could cause a loss of operational control over systems. The intelligent weapons and equipment currently used by various countries often require command and control to be conducted by rear area personnel who rely on communications links. As these links are jammed, it will be difficult to return them to operational effectiveness… Iran’s successful capturing of U.S. drones through jamming technology is a typical example…

Artificial intelligence technology in certain fields is shown to far exceed human intelligence. However, its reliability and interpretability are questionable… Presently, countries have conducted repeated simulation tests and even actual combat using intelligent weapons and equipment. However, there is still no reliable testing method to ensure its dependability should it run into a complex battlefield environment.

Wide-scale application of intelligent operations could trigger an arms race, leading to the risk of disposition for unsafe AI systems…

The use of intelligent weapons and equipment can impact the international strategic balance and increase the risk of war breaking out. The use of smart weapons and equipment increases the risk of “firing the first shot.”

The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis…

…Intelligent weapons and equipment put participating personnel further away from the battlefield. Participants’ apathy will grow as distance increases…

Notes:

[i] For other Chinese insights on intelligentization, see Cindy Hurst, “China: ‘New Concepts’ in Unmanned Combat,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376077 and Peter Wood, “A Chinese Perspective on Intelligent Warfare and Future Urban Operations,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376999

[ii] For an example of intelligent warfare, see Cindy Hurst, “The ‘Blade of Victory’: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms,” OE Watch, March 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/358341

New Domain Forces and Combat Capabilities in Chinese Military Thinking

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“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.”

In 2021 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted “Multidomain Precision Warfare” as its core operational concept. While few sources address this topic in much detail, a related concept has remained prominent in Chinese media. In October 2022, in his speech at the 20th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping declared that China must “increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities.[i] New-domain forces with new combat capabilities are also a focus area for Chinese military force development for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). While these concepts are abstract and rarely include more than vague descriptions of what they entail, Chinese media emphasize them as essential to the PLA’s evolution from informatization toward intelligent warfare. The following excerpt from Chinese party-owned media outlet PLA Daily provides some insights into what is meant by these ideas and how they may take shape in coming years.

The excerpt, a commentary, acknowledges that clarity about the “newness” of some of the domains covered in this effort is important. The author provides an overview of the characteristics of these new domain forces and capabilities, which include flexible architectures, dynamic reorganization, and mutation of operational concepts in response to new technologies.

Terms[ii]Characteristics and Examples
New Domain ForcesFlexible architecturesReliant on intelligent systems (integrated command platform, etc.)Dynamic reorganizationMutability in response to technological developmentsCross-domain strikesFocus on achieving strategic paralysis of the enemy
New Combat Capabilities[iii]Uncrewed systems (air, sea, and ground-based)PLA Strategic Support Force[iv]PLA Ground Force long-range rocket artillery (MLRS)[v]

Fundamentally, these concepts demonstrate a recognition that the most effective use of combat capabilities will not be the single-domain clash between similar forces and that the PLA must instead be able to flexibly deploy forces across domains against enemy weaknesses to maximize their effects. Of course, Chinese military thinking does not develop in a vacuum. Multi-domain precision operations appear to have many of the same core assumptions about the future of war as in other countries’ concepts, such as “Multidomain Operations” (MDO).[vi]  However, despite the rhetorical similarities to U.S. concepts, at a more basic level, Chinese warfighting is likely to unfold differently due to core differences resulting from the direction and structure of PLA, which has Chinese Communist Party committees and political officers throughout as an essential part. The PLA’s development of an integrated command platform and other informatized tools, such as those referenced in the article, appear intended to not only make its forces more survivable in modern informatized or intelligentized war but also to be “designed to” the PLA’s structure itself and improve the speed of decision making that its structure might otherwise impede.[vii] While China’s focus on achieving multidomain effects is noteworthy, in the interim much of these concepts may remain aspirational for the PLA, a military that has, for much of its recent history by its own admission, struggled to effectively train to the standard of being able to carry out combined arms operations, much less joint operations.

Source:

Liu Haijiang (刘海江), “新域新质作战力量 ‘新’在哪里 (Explaining the ‘new’ in new-domain forces with new combat capabilities),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of China’s armed forces), 29 November 2022. hxxp://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-11/29/content_328869.htm

With the expansion of the scope of human activities and the development of national interests, where military struggle takes place has moved beyond traditional domains such as land, sea, and air and continues to expand into the deep sea, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains. As required by the times, forces and types of combat power to be fielded in these domains have emerged.

Driven by advanced technology, new domain and new quality combat forces have broken through traditional spaces such as land, sea, air, and space, and the scope of activities has become more three-dimensional and diverse. Deep sea, space, underground, and polar regions have all become new territories where new domains and new quality combat forces compete.

New-domain forces with new combat capabilities involve dynamic reconfiguration and cross-domain integration of combat elements. With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.

Notes:

[i] “New combat capabilities” is the more anodyne translation used in the official version of Xi’s remarks, but the Chinese here means something closer to “enabled by new capabilities.” For consistency, “new combat capabilities” is used throughout.

[ii] This table is partially constructed from other articles in PLA Daily that were either too short or did not have enough details and explanation to warrant translation.

[iii] The delineation between “new combat capabilities” and “New Type Combat Forces” [新型作战力量], another buzzword of PLA modernization, is unclear.

[iv] China’s 2019 Defense White Paper describes the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The PLASSF is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities. China’s National Defense in the New Era [新时代的中国国防] State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室] 24 July 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm

[v] One article in August 2022 described new long-range rockets launched by PLA ground force units belonging to the Eastern Theater Command toward the vicinity of Taiwan in response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit using the same language. “Our ground forces’ development of new combat capabilities continues to advance long-range rocket forces represent a new era of precision firepower” [我陆军新质作战力量建设持续推进 远程火箭炮兵成为新一代火力精兵], PLA Daily, 29 October 2022. http://www.81.cn/xue-xi/2022-08/29/content_10180334.htm

[vi] In his article, Liu Haijiang also highlights the U.S. Army’s fielding of the AI decision-making assistant FIRES Synchronization to Optimize Responses in Multi-Domain Operations (FIRESTORM) as indicative of the future direction of intelligent warfare.

[vii] Peter Wood, “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400756

Image Information:

Image: “Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Author-created

People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition (Kevin McCauley) (January 2023)

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(Click image to download brief.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The PLA develops generic offensive, defensive, and special conditions campaign models
    to support planning and training for operational scenarios it believes are relevant to
    potential conflicts. These generic campaigns provide planning factors, force organization,
    and operational methods for combat.

  • The choice of campaigns reveals that Taiwan and Indian conflict scenarios are the key
    scenarios for which the PLA is planning and training.

  • Some of the campaigns do not appear to represent operational situations the PLA is likely
    to face in the near to mid-term.

  • PLA doctrinal change is evolutionary, and in the past slow. The available PLA sources on
    Army doctrine appear to show incremental change to date due to developing technologies
    such as artificial intelligence or research on operational methods exhibited in recent foreign
    conflicts such as the United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Marawi Reflections Reveal Urban Warfare Challenges for Philippine Army

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Boming on Marawi City.

Boming on Marawi City.

“Marawi showed all potential enemies the advantages of urban warfare [for insurgents].”

The Filipino publication mindanews.com recently published the excerpted article featuring portions from a book by Filipino author Gail Ilagan about the 2017 occupation of Marawi, Mindanao by up to 2,000 militants loyal to the Islamic State (IS) and the military’s recapture of the city. The article recounts details of the occupation, noting that the trigger of the occupation was the Philippine army’s attempt to capture the militants’ leader, Isnon Hapilon. Unbeknownst to the army, the militants had already established sleeper cells in Marawi that they activated once the operation to capture Hapilon began, including attacking a prison to release group members, bombing a church, and sending fighters to control university campuses.[i]

The article points to missteps by the army, including interpreting the militants to be local fighters when, in fact, they not only had inspiration from IS, but also had invited foreign IS supporters to Mindanao and employed IS tactics. In addition, Philippine security forces overlooked earlier bombings at night markets near universities and occupations of smaller towns in Mindanao, which had displaced residents and should have been seen as a harbinger of the future occupation of the much larger city of Marawi. Ultimately, the article claims the military’s unpreparedness resulted in more soldiers’ lives lost than necessary. Military equipment, such as tanks, were unsuitable for maneuvering Marawi’s narrow alleyways, while the insurgents’ hijacking of fire trucks and other public vehicles made it difficult for soldiers to identify their adversaries in the urban combat environment. However, the article concludes that hard lessons were learned from the siege of Marawi that make a similar insurgent takeover unlikely in the near term.[ii] The military has changed its organizational structure, acquired new equipment, and improved training methods to prepare for urban warfare.

Source:

“Local Frontlines of Globalized Islamic States Network: The Emerging War Arena for the Filipino Soldier,” mindanews.com (regional newspapers focusing on Mindanao), 16 October 2022. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2022/10/local-frontlines-of-globalized-islamic-states-network-the-emerging-war-arena-for-the-filipino-soldier/

Violent extremists are rare among Muslim Filipinos. However, it does not take a lot of them to cause a scale of destruction such as was seen in the aftermath of the 2017 Marawi Siege.

Among its choices, the region of Mindanao seemed to be most appealing [to ISIS] because of its porous maritime boundaries and the safe haven that local extremist groups could provide. One such local extremist group was the Basilan-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that had pledged allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014. In 2016, al-Baghdadi accepted the Abu Sayyaf’s pledge and appointed ASG commander Isnilon Hapilon as the ISIS’ emir in Southeast Asia. Hapilon and his soldiers traveled soon after to Marawi where they were embraced by the Maute Group, as well as other local terrorist groups that shared the ISIS’ aspiration.

The Marawi Crisis was ignited in the early afternoon of 23 May 2017 when security forces tried to arrest Hapilon in Barangay Basak Malutlut in Marawi City. It was two days before the Muslim holiday of Eid’l Fitr. Intelligence sources would later reveal that the ISIS-inspired groups intended to mark Eid’l Fitr by taking over the only Islamic city in the Philippines and declaring it ISIS territory. At the time when the security team was sent to Marawi with the warrant of arrest, they were unaware that Hapilon’s forces were positioned in the adjoining buildings, ready to defend their leader. The arresting team immediately came under heavy fire as soon as they entered the narrow street where Hapilon’s quarters were located.

It would take five long months for the government to neutralize the extremists and rid Marawi of them.

Notes:

[i] In mid-2014, the longtime Abu Sayyaf commander Isnon Hapilon and around a dozen other militants released a video pledging allegiance to IS leader Umar al-Baghdadi. Hapilon noted in the video that these militants and other factions had made pledges separately but were now coming together, which signaled the unification of Abu Sayyaf factions and set the stage for the group’s eventual attack on Marawi under the leadership of the Maute Brothers and Hapilon, all of whom were killed during the battle. See: Jacob Zenn, “The Islamic State’s Provinces on the Peripheries: Juxtaposing the Pledges from Boko Haram in Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group in the Philippines.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 87–104.

[ii] The restoration of critical infrastructure in Marawi and the return of the city’s inhabitants to their original homes, which were destroyed during the battle in 2017, has been slow. This has also raised concerns that grievances of the local population regarding their treatment in post-conflict Marawi could result in their supporting antigovernment militant groups in the future or their remaining alienated from the government, which was one of the reasons why Abu Sayyaf was initially able to gain some traction from among the youths in Marawi. See: Jacob Zenn, “Marawi Rehabilitation Progress Slows in the Philippines,” OE Watch, July 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/277112 

Image Information:

Image: Boming on Marawi City.
Source: Mark Jhomel https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bombing_on_Marawi_City.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

South Africa Spotlighted for Links to Funding Islamic State in Africa

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Flag of the Islamic State.

Flag of the Islamic State.

“The impression created by recent events is that Washington rather than Pretoria is steering counter-terrorism operations in South Africa.”

South African reactions to the newest round of U.S. counterterrorism sanctions on its citizens underscore systemic policing challenges in the field of counterterrorism. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned four South Africans and eight South African businesses for offering material support to the Islamic State (IS),[i] namely, its newest branches in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique.[ii] This follows similar sanctions of four South Africans, also listed for supporting the IS, in March 2022.[iii] Commentaries from two noted South African geopolitical commentators shed light on how South Africans understand the degree of threat that the IS poses to their country and just why it has become a target for U.S. sanctions.

In the first of the two excerpted articles from the noted centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies, South African foreign policy analyst Peter Fabricius questions whether the threat of IS in South Africa is overblown. On the one hand, since the warnings of IS within South Africa are coming from external entities—namely the United States—some citizens perceive the threat as minimal and sanctions as simply being an extension of Western “obsession” with terrorism. On the other, he notes that there may well be an air of legitimacy to such sanctions, given that assessments by international monitoring entities have underscored South Africa’s lackluster counterthreat finance efforts.

In the excerpted article from The Conversation Africa, noted South Africa terrorism scholar Hussein Solomon articulates his lack of surprise that South Africa has emerged as a relative hotspot for terrorism threat financing. At the source of its institutional insufficiency in counterthreat financing, Solomon notes South African “corruption, general lawlessness, and a security apparatus focused on party factional battles.” Long regarded as a bastion of security in a continent recently beset by terrorism, cracks are beginning to show in South Africa as well.

Sources:

Peter Fabricius, “Are red flags about the Islamic State in South Africa alarmist?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 11 November 2022.

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/are-red-flags-about-islamic-state-in-south-africa-alarmist

Alarm bells about the threat of terrorism in South Africa have recently been sounding more stridently and more often. Are these false alarms or is the danger growing?

This question is complicated by the fact that the warnings are largely from foreigners, especially the United States (US). To many, this indicates alarmism or even outside interference. To others, panic buttons are being pressed because South Africa’s law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution services aren’t doing their jobs well enough.

South Africa’s failure to deal effectively with IS and terrorist financing has a host of causes. These include problems in the intelligence, detection and prosecution services still recovering from the ravages of state capture during Jacob Zuma’s presidency…These issues are aggravated by political factors such as an ideological disposition to underestimate the terror threat and see it as an obsession of the West….

The impression created by recent events is that Washington rather than Pretoria is steering counter-terrorism operations in South Africa. That obviously can’t be good.

Hussein Solomon, “South Africa Provides Fertile Ground for Funders of Terrorism. Here’s Why,” The Conversation Africa (centrist pan-African editorial site), 10 November 2022. https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282

There is a long history of concerns about [South Africa’s] deficiencies in dealing with terrorism financing activities within its borders…

The latest US action comes as South Africa is rushing to avert “greylisting”: being placed on the list of countries subject to increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force. The inter-governmental task force has identified deficiencies in the country’s policies and efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing…

In its last evaluation, published in October 2021, the task force said South Africa had a strong legal framework against money laundering and terrorism financing. But its implementation had significant shortcomings, including a failure to prosecute criminal cases….

Since 2007, the South African government has not done much to ensure that the country does not become a terrorist haven. Corruption, general lawlessness, and a security apparatus focused on party factional battles all account for why terrorist financiers thrive in the country.

Notes:  

[i] For the official statement from the November 2022 sanctions, see: “Treasury Designates Members of ISIS Cell in South Africa,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 7 November 2022.https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616

[ii] For an extensive overview of the emergence and evolution of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner et al., The Islamic State in Africa: Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, (Hurst/Oxford University Press), 2022.

[iii] For the official statement from the November 2022 sanctions, see: “Treasury Sanctions South Africa-based ISIS Organizers and Financial Facilitators,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1 March 2022.  https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Islamic State. 
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0.

Colombia’s Congress Authorizes “Total Peace” Negotiation With Guerrilla and Criminal Groups 

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Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.

“The law…empowers the president to initiate peace negotiations with groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who rejected a 2016 agreement and returned to the armed struggle, and another group that never signed the pact.”

Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, came to power promising to negotiate a peace deal with the country’s notorious guerrilla groups and sundry criminal organizations. As with the 2016 Peace Accords, which ended the decades-long conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Petro’s plan for what he calls “Total Peace” has become controversial. Broadly speaking, Petro plans to offer a blanket immunity in exchange for the demobilization of guerrilla groups, the disarming of criminal organizations, and the cessation of drug trafficking.[i] In the first excerpted article from CNN en Español, the Spanish-language affiliate of the popular U.S. outlet, the authors report that Colombia’s Congress approved enabling legislation permitting Petro to embark on peace negotiations with nearly all armed groups in the country. The article also notes that the legislation would set aside money to ensure development investment in demobilized areas. The second article, from Colombia’s generally left-leaning El Espectador, notes that rather than experiencing a decline, violence has instead surged under Petro, confounding the expectations of peace negotiations.

Petro’s plans for “Total Peace” will face increasing challenges as negotiations take off in earnest. First, the Colombian government’s dialogue with leaders of the Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN) is a gamble. It is unclear how much control the leadership, exiled in Cuba for years, still has over the guerrillas operating in Colombia’s borderland area with Venezuela. During previous negotiations with the FARC, the Colombian government quickly realized the autonomy that some FARC groups had from its central leadership structure, meaning an inability to impose the terms of agreement on individual groups. Second, the Colombian government may find it difficult to commit to concessions and simultaneously entice guerrilla groups to lay down their arms. During previous negotiations with the FARC, vacuums created by the demobilized guerrillas quickly were filled by other criminal groups, suggesting at least some Colombian criminal organizations will not commit to this latest peace process so they can take advantage of the lack of law enforcement pressure to increase territory and revenues from illicit economies.

Sources: 

“Congreso de Colombia aprueba ley para negociar la paz con grupos armados como el ELN, facciones de las FARC y otros (Colombian Congress approves law to negotiate peace with armed groups such as the ELN, FARC factions and others),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language affiliate of the popular U.S. outlet), 27 October 2022. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/10/27/congreso-colombia-aprueba-ley-negociar-paz-reuters-reux/   

The law approved by the plenary session of the House of Representatives and previously by that of the Senate, empowers the president to initiate peace negotiations with groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who rejected a 2016 agreement and returned to the armed struggle, and another group that never signed the pact.

The legislation also authorizes the president to initiate dialogues with criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking and illegal mining such as the Clan del Golfo, whose leaders and members may receive benefits such as reduced sentences and non-extradition in exchange for the disclosure of routes to export cocaine and the delivery part of the fortunes obtained illegally.

“Violencia contra población civil: uno de los desafíos para alcanzar la Paz total (Violence against the civilian population: one of the challenges to achieve Total Peace),” El Espectador (Colombia’s oldest daily that generally leans left), 15 November 2022. https://www.elespectador.com/politica/violencia-contra-poblacion-civil-uno-de-los-principales-desafios-para-alcanzar-la-paz-total/

During the first 100 days of the current government, the highest peak of massacres of the year occurred.  The number of victims of acts of massacre and forced displacement in the country also increased.  The number of cases and victims of forced confinement…increased and was concentrated in three departments, specifically in territories inhabited by indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.

Notes:

[i] For greater context into Petro’s campaign promise and the outlines of his negotiation strategy, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Colombia’s Leftist President Seeks to Resume Negotiations with National Liberation Army,” OE Watch, Issue 9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425694

Image Information:

Image: Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs the Peace Accords with the FARC in 2016.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jefa_de_Estado_participa_en_ceremonia_de_la_Firma_de_la_Paz_entre_el_Gobierno_de_Colombia_y_las_FARC_E.P._(29953487045).jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-2.0

Iran Claim of Hypersonic Missile Capability Probably Exaggerated

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Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed Iran had successfully developed a hypersonic ballistic missile.

Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed Iran had successfully developed a hypersonic ballistic missile.

“The missile… represents a generational leap.”

The Iranian government takes great pride in its domestic military industry, particularly a robust drone fleet and ballistic missile capability courtesy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Indeed, many Iranian politicians argue that heavy investment in indigenous industry is a silver lining to international sanctions applied to Iran. However, Iranian leaders are also prone to exaggeration, which appears to be the case in the following article excerpted from Tasnim News, an outlet close to Iran’s security services. In the article, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, announced that Iran had developed hypersonic missiles capable of evading and destroying enemy air defense systems. He provided no detail and offered no ability for the Iranian press to photograph the alleged platform.

That said, such Iranian statements, even when seemingly exaggerated, often signal the direction of ongoing Iranian research. As Russia and China develop such capabilities, it is natural for Iran to try to follow suit given their diplomatic and military ties. While Iranian scientists and engineers probably cannot yet develop such systems, Iran would be likely to achieve the capability more quickly should either Moscow or Beijing assist. Hajizadeh’s statement may prove to be a potential starting point for a new Middle Eastern arms race given Iran’s willingness to directly, or indirectly by proxy, attack targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with drones or cruise missiles.

Source:

“Hajizadeh: Iran Mushak-e Ballistik-e Hipersonik Sokht (Hajizadeh: Iran Builds a Hypersonic Ballistic Missile),” Tasnim News (media outlet with close ties to Iranian security apparatus), 10 November 2022. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/08/19/2801922

General Hajizadeh, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, told reporters this morning about the construction of an advanced hypersonic ballistic missile is capable of passing through advanced air defense systems to target them. He added, “The missile has a high speed and can maneuver in the atmosphere and out of the atmosphere. This new missile passes through all missile shield systems, and I don’t think there will be any technology to counter it for several decades,” Hajizadeh said. The missile targets enemy anti-missile systems and represents a generational leap in the missile field.

Image Information:

Image: Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed Iran had successfully developed a hypersonic ballistic missile.
Source: Tasnim News
https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1399/10/27/1399102712313941922032824.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain