Yearly Archives: 2023

China Developing Ultra-Low Earth Orbit Satellites With Possible Military Applications

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Flatpack Starlink communications satellites aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.

Flatpack Starlink communications satellites aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.

“Compared with traditional orbits, ultra-low orbits can effectively reduce satellite development and launch costs, improve efficiency in collecting and transmitting data, and is suitable for satellite mass production with high-frequency launches.”

The following excerpt from Science & Technology Daily, the official newspaper of China’s Ministry of Science & Technology, quotes a senior leader of one of China’s main developers[i] of space and missile technologies discussing ultra-low earth orbit satellites, which could potentially be used for military applications. The article notes that ultra-low orbits range between 150-300 km. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is typically defined as orbits at an altitude between 160-1000 km; the “Kármán line” at 100 km above sea level is typically used to describe where space begins.

As explained by Song Xiaoming, President of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s Second Academy, China plans to begin testing ultra-low-earth orbit satellites in September 2023. These satellites have higher revisit rates and can achieve superior or equal resolution in imaging at lower costs in both financial and weight terms, allowing mass production. Separate reporting claims that a manufacturing facility for the satellites could produce upwards of 240 such satellites per year.

Spacecraft in ultra-low and low-earth orbits experience greater drag from the atmosphere than those in higher orbits, shortening their service life. Two efforts could help address these issues: miniature engines to raise their orbits, and orbital refueling to replenish maneuver and altitude-control thrusters. Chinese media reports suggest that progress has already been made in these areas. In September 2022, China successfully completed tests of Hall thrusters on its satellites, raising the altitude of a satellite in LEO by nearly 300 km.[ii] Hall-effect thrusters use magnetic fields to ionize and accelerate propellants at very efficient levels with minimal weight requirements, making them optimal for spacecraft. China reportedly first tested on-orbit refueling in 2016 with the Tianyuan-1 satellite.[iii] China has also recently tested orbital sails, which help de-orbit debris, as well as improved data-transmission satellites, space-based debris detection satellites, and other technologies.[iv]  If successful, the development of ultra-low earth orbit satellite constellations will further improve the revisit rate and volume of satellite imagery it is able to gather. However, the rapid revisit times, high-resolution imagery, quick manufacturing, and mass launch capabilities of satellites into these orbits strongly suggest they could be used for military applications as well.

Source:

“宋晓明委员：超低轨卫星星座首发星在研制 9月具备发射条件” (Committee Member Song Xiaoming: First Ultra-Low Earth Orbit Satellite is Under Development; Launch Planned for September), Science & Technology Daily [科技日报] (Official newspaper of PRC Ministry of Science & Technology [MOST]), 3 March 2023. http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2023-03/03/content_549908.htm?div=-1  According to Song Xiaoming, President of CASIC’s Second Academy, his institution is currently developing satellites for an ultra-low orbit satellite constellation, the first of which is planned for launch in September. After being placed into orbit, tests of key technologies are planned, including flight technology, high-resolution ground imaging, on-board intelligent processing, and information transmission to user terminals. Ultra-low orbit usually refers to an orbit at an altitude of 150-300 kilometers. Compared with traditional orbits, ultra-low orbits can effectively reduce satellite development and launch costs, improve efficiency in collecting and transmitting data, and is suitable for satellite mass production with high-frequency launches. Satellites in lower orbits can achieve the same resolution as satellites in higher orbits at a significant reduction in weight and cost. During the “14th Five-Year Plan” period (2021-2025), China proposed development of a remote sensing space infrastructure system with global coverage and efficient operation. Song Xiaoming said that in the face of urgent requirements such as higher resolution, shorter revisit cycles, and faster transmission speed, the Second Academy used its institutional advantages in small satellite, low-earth orbit communications and intelligent manufacturing to quickly carry out research on ultra-low orbits. The development of ultra-low orbit satellite constellations is intended to achieve similar performance as traditional satellite systems at lower costs and with a faster response time superior to other satellites. Other goals involve mass production and efficient, high tempo launches.

Notes:

[i] China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (中国航天科工) Second Academy [二院] has historically had responsibility for the development of surface-to-air missiles. See: Peter Wood, Alex Stone China’s Ballistic Missile Industry, China Aerospace Studies Institute (Affiliated with USAF Air University), 11 May 2021. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2021-05-11%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Industry.pdf

[ii] “我国电推进系统首次完成低轨卫星升轨任务 (China’s Electric Propulsion System Carried Out Altitude Raising Mission for Low-Earth Orbit Satellites for First Time),” Xinhuanet, 21 September 2022.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/techpro/20220921/0239ec258f514bc7a23d846a1be49735/c.html

[iii] The name of the satellite translates literally “space resources No. 1.” Wang Yaowen [王握文] Zhang Feibo [章飞钹], “我国实现在轨卫星 ‘太空加油’ (China Achieves ‘Space Refueling’ with a satellite in Orbit),” PLA Daily (the official newspaper of PRC military), 1 July 2016. http://www.81.cn/201311jxjjh/2016-07/01/content_7182369.htm

[iv] See: Peter Wood, “China Debuts New Space Capabilities,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427695

Image Information:

Image: Flatpack Starlink communications satellites aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Starlink_Mission_%2847926144123%29.jpg
Attribution: CC0, 24 May 2019

China Developing Improved Equipment for Deep Sea, Polar Exploration

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Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of icebreaker Xue Long.

Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of icebreaker Xue Long.

“The Xuelong 2 is like a mobile laboratory at sea, sailing into many areas that were inaccessible in the past.”

China regards deep-sea[i] areas and polar regions as critical to its future development due to their abundant resources. President Xi Jinping even included them in his Holistic National Security Concept, which lays out domains that he regards as critical to China’s development and national security.[ii] However, both deep-sea exploration and polar regions pose significant technical challenges due to the extreme pressure or weather conditions encountered. As the following excerpts explain, China has made significant progress in overcoming these challenges.

The first excerpted article, from an early March 2023 edition of the official newspaper of China’s Ministry of Science & Technology, examines some of the equipment China has completed or is developing to explore deep sea and polar regions as part of its efforts to become a powerful maritime country. The article focuses on two technologies: icebreakers and deep-sea drilling rigs. The Xue Long 1 [GRLCUT(1] and Xue Long 2 [GRLCUT(2] icebreakers, originally based on a Ukrainian design, have improved China’s ability to explore polar regions. The article cites an acoustic engineer with experience studying polar environments, who highlighted how the Xuelong 2 had opened many previously inaccessible areas to exploration.

The latter half of the article focuses on deep sea drilling, noting the advances made with the “Manatee II” deep sea drilling rig, which is reportedly capable of operating at depths of 2,000 m or more and has set world records by drilling over 200 m into the ocean floor. A major priority for exploitation by this and future rigs is “combustible ice,” a mixture of frozen water and natural gas present on the sea floor in the deep sea. According to the article, the Manatee II has carried out exploration missions searching for combustible ice in many areas surrounding China, as well as for traditional offshore oil and gas deposits. Due to the experience from operating the Manatee, China has improved its technologies in this niche but important area, and the first of China’s next generation of deep-sea drilling ships is expected to be completed in 2024.[iii] It will reportedly be capable of drilling in waters deeper than 10,000 m.[iv] The minerals and natural gas potentially recoverable by these drills could create an economic bonanza and help China offset its reliance on imported energy.   The second article is based on an interview with Sun Bo, Party Secretary of the China Polar Research Center Polar Research Institute of China, which is part of China’s Ministry of Natural Resources. Sun Bo noted how vital China’s second icebreaker, the Xuelong 2, completed in 2019,[v] has been for China’s polar exploration efforts, highlighting that having two icebreakers now allows China to effectively support research teams at both poles at the same time. While these articles underscore how China has clearly made important strides in overcoming technical bottlenecks, it might now face legal ones. The UN recently concluded negotiations about exploiting biological and mineral resources on the high seas, which might constrain China’s activities in polar and deep-sea regions.[vi]

Sources:

He Liang [何亮], “科技扬帆，引领海洋探索挺进深蓝” (Science and Technology Set Sail, Setting a Course for Ocean Exploration into the Deepest Blue Sea), Science & Technology Daily [科技日报] (Official newspaper of PRC Ministry of Science & Technology [MOST]), 6 March 2023. http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_
www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2023-03/06/content_550015.htm?div=0

Accelerating [China’s] development into a maritime great power and making good use of marine resources is not possible the important support of science and technology. To protect the marine ecological environment, it is necessary to strengthen basic research and fully understand the ocean’s riches; to develop marine resources, it is necessary to address the urgent requirements of improving development of technologies and equipment of scientific research for technology and equipment, and concentrate efforts to develop more “national strategic weapons.”[i]

“With the help of more and more advanced equipment, China’s polar scientific research has maritime, land and aerial capabilities.” Yin Jingwei [殷敬伟], vice president of Harbin Engineering University[ii], has long been engaged in research on polar acoustic technology….According to Yin [Xuelong 2’s] superior ice-breaking capabilities allow more scientific research facilities and supplies to be transported into the Antarctic regions. “It is like a mobile laboratory at sea, sailing into many areas that were inaccessible in the past.”

As of September 28, 2021, China has completed 12 Arctic expeditions. However, China is not an Arctic nation, and its deep-sea and polar-related research work started relatively late compared to other countries, and its support capabilities have also been limited to a certain extent. There are still many weak links and capabilities in the fields of polar science and technology research, polar equipment development, and deep-sea polar exploration. missing.

Yin Jingwei told the Science and Technology Daily reporter of that China does not yet have nuclear-powered icebreakers and underwater equipment capable of breaking ice in the polar regions, and the ability to collect maritime below the ice is also very weak. Additional efforts are needed to overcome technological and environmental hurdles to move forward.

“深耕新疆域，推动极地科考再上新台阶——海洋领域专家谈建设海洋强国” (Exploring New Frontiers and Taking Polar Scientific Research to a New Level—Maritime Experts Discuss Building a Maritime Great Power), Science & Technology Daily [科技日报] (Official newspaper of PRC Ministry of Science & Technology [MOST]), 19 January 2023 http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_
www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2023-01/19/content_547740.htm?div=0In today’s world polar regions have become a “new frontier” for development and a focal point for global governance, a new high ground for technological competition, an area with new sea routes and a new source of resources. The China Polar Research Center of the Ministry of Natural Resources adheres to the principle of “understanding, protecting, and using” these regions proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping, and is committed to providing support for China’s polar scientific research. China continues to improve its independent innovation capabilities and overall there is momentum to continue improvements. The China Polar Research Center independently built the “Xuelong 2” icebreaker with, filling a major gap in China’s capabilities required for polar scientific research and developed a way to use both the Xuelong and Xuelong two effectively in concert. This new pattern of “Double Xuelong” Polar exploration (one assigned to each polar region) has greatly improved the on-site support capabilities for China’s polar scientific investigations.

Notes:

[i] Deep-sea areas are typically defined as those below 200 meters. According to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 80 percent of the Earth’s ocean floor remains unmapped and unexplored. “How much of the ocean have we explored?,” NOAA [Accessed March 2023]. https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/exploration.html

[ii] See: Peter Wood, “China’s Holistic Security Concept Explained,” OE Watch, 07-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/275650

 [iii] The ship was developed by China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s (CSSC) 708 Research Institute and is subordinate to the China Geological Survey Bureau. The bureau also operates ships involved in mapping the seafloor in potential sensitive areas, which has drawn the alarm of nearby nations. See for example, Naoki Inoue, Tsukasa Hadano and Jun Endo, “Chinese survey ships straying into other nation’s EEZs, data shows”, Nikkei, 31 January 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/Chinese-survey-ships-straying-into-other-nations-EEZs-data-shows

 [iv] “China’s first ultra-deepwater scientific research drilling ship achieved main hull penetration today” [我国首艘超深水科考钻探船今日实现主船体贯通], China Mining News [中国矿业报 ], 18 December 2022. https://www.cgs.gov.cn/xwl/ddyw/202212/t20221218_720062.html

 [v] See: Les Grau, “China Developing More High Latitude Equipment”, OE Watch, 11-2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/337636

 [vi] “UN delegates reach historic agreement on protecting marine biodiversity in international waters,” United Nations, 5 March 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134157   

Notes:

 [i] This phrase, 国之重器, is frequently used to describe strategically impactful or game-changing weapons systems (ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers etc.,) and civilian technologies such as nuclear reactors.

 [ii] Harbin Engineering University is one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense,” which are universities that work closely with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Image Information:

Image: Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of icebreaker Xue Long.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Teadlased_j%C3%A4%C3%A4l.jpg
Attribution: Timo Palo, CC BY-SA 3.0


Philippine Interest in Trilateral Security Pact With United States and Japan Possibly Increasing

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Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.

“Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring ‘small’ countries.”

In March 2023, the nationalist Japan Times published the excerpted article written by Kuni Miyake, the research director for foreign and national security affairs at the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo. Miyake argues the Philippines has growing concerns about Chinese policies in the South China Sea, including the building of military outposts on atolls claimed by the Philippines.[i] Therefore, the Philippines is more likely than in previous decades to be open to a trilateral partnership with Japan and the United States.

Miyake acknowledges that Philippines leader Rodrigo Duterte has signed economic agreements with Beijing related to issues ranging from oil and gas exploration to fishing rights. However, provocative actions by the Chinese navy, including targeting a Philippine Coast Guard ship with a laser device in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and China’s harassing other smaller Southeast Asian countries, has contributed to momentum building in the Philippines government for closer security partnerships with Japan and the United States. In contrast to Beijing, Miyake argues that Japan must stress to the Philippine government the important geopolitical role of the Philippines in their bilateral relations. Miyake’s article comes after the Philippines began contemplating a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with Japan.[ii] For example, the second excerpted article in the Philippine publication Inquirer from November 2022 quoted the country’s Senate President, Juan Miguel Zubiri, who supports a VFA. Another senator stated a VFA would not only be beneficial to the Philippines because of the training Japan can provide, but also because the VFA would increase mutual preparedness between Japan and the Philippines for natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies.

Sources:

Kuni Miyake, “The geopolitical trajectory of the Philippines is changing,” japantimes.co.jp (English-language daily with a nationalistic editorial perspective), 8 March 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/philippine-trilateral-cooperation/

Returning to Manila this time, I was struck by a series of developments: a growing anxiety toward China among the populace, dramatic improvement in U.S.-Philippine relations and growing momentum to advance trilateral-security cooperation between Japan, the Philippines and the United States, which until a few years ago would have been only a dream.

In January of this year, Marcos was invited to China as a state guest and signed 14 agreements as the Chinese business community expressed intentions to invest $22.8 billion in the Philippines. Nevertheless, Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring “small” countries. In February this year, for example, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel blocked the path of a Philippine Coast Guard ship within the island nation’s exclusive economic zone while another Chinese vessel targeted a Philippine ship with a laser device…. What I found most fascinating in Manila was the idea that security cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines is gaining momentum these days.

“Senators push for VFA with Japan,” inquirer.net (popular pro-democracy newspaper in the Philippines), 14 November 2022. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1692799/senators-push-for-vfa-with-japan

Senators are keen to endorse a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with erstwhile invader Japan, making it only the third nation with which the country has such an extraordinary agreement, next to the United States and Australia. “I’m sure we can muster enough support in the Senate for a visiting forces agreement with Japan. They’re good partners,” Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri said during the Senate plenary’s marathon budget deliberations on Thursday night.

Forging a VFA with Japan would not only be helpful in joint training but also during natural disasters, said Senate President Pro Tempore Loren Legarda.“This is not just military training but it will also include disaster response and disaster risk reduction.”

China’s force buildup in the region and opportunities for trilateral coordination and cooperation will be among the key topics on the agenda.

Notes:

[i] One of the first significant South China Sea confrontations between China and the Philippines occurred with China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. At the time, the Philippines believed an agreement existed whereby both countries would withdraw naval patrols from the shoal as typhoon season approached. However, when Philippine ships left the shoal, China placed a barrier across the entrance to the shoal and stationed coast guard boats there to chase away Philippine fishing boats. See: Mark Raymond and David A. Welch, “What’s Really Going On in the South China Sea?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 42(2), 214-239, August 2022. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18681034221086291

[ii] Since the rise of China in the 1990s, Philippine and Japanese political leaders and high-ranking defense officials have conducted goodwill visits and high-level dialogues, while Japan has consistently provided emergency relief assistance to the Philippines in the wake of earthquakes and typhoons. However, a VFA between the two countries would represent a significant elevation of the two countries’ bilateral ties. See: Renato Cruz De Castro, “Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?,” Asian Survey Vol. 49 (4, 691-715), 2009. https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-abstract/49/4/691/24277/Exploring-a-21st-Century-Japan-Philippine-Security?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Image Information:

Image: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai01 – 04
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Japan_Maritime_Self-Defense_Force_butai01_-_04.jpg
Attribution: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, CC x 4.0

New Milestone in China’s Support for Egypt’s Space Program

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Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010).

Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010).

“We are achieving one of the main goals of Egypt, which is the localization of the satellite industry and technology … through this cooperation with China…”

Egypt’s domestic space program is slowly taking off, thanks in part to a modest Chinese investment that is likely to pay dividends for years to come.[i] The latest milestone in Sino-Egyptian space collaboration came in late February and early March 2023, when China launched into orbit two Egyptian-assembled, remote sensing, low-earth orbit satellites, Horus-1 and Horus-2. As remote sensing tools, the Horus satellites will have various uses for the Egyptian government, including monitoring the vast desert stretches that make up approximately 95 percent of the country’s surface. In space, they join two other Egyptian-owned satellites that were launched in 2019: EgyptSat A, a Russian-made earth-observation satellite, and Tiba 1 (Thebes 1), a French-made military communications satellite.[ii]

The accompanying excerpt from Egyptian news website El Watan cites the head of the Egyptian Space Agency (EgSA), who explained on a popular morning TV show that cooperation with China had put Egypt on the road toward achieving one of its key goals in space, namely the “localization of the satellite industry and technology.” The Horus satellites were made at an assembly, integration, and testing center built with Chinese grant money. Egypt hopes to eventually have a satellite launch site and a series of control stations for indigenously produced satellites.[iii] The EgSA, which was established in 2019, has collaborative agreements with the space agencies of several countries; however, Chinese financing and know-how may be playing an outsized role in its early development. Chinese support for Egypt’s space program dovetails with investments in other information and communications technology sectors that could eventually lead to deepening bilateral cooperation on military satellite and communications technology. Last February, at the IDEX 2023 arms fair in Abu Dhabi, Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization signed a deal with the China Aerospace Construction Group Company to “localize manufacturing technology in several defense industries fields, including co-producing a 3D radar to detect and track UAVs.”

Source:

“وكالة الفضاء المصرية: قمر «حورس 2» يستخدم في الكشف عن الثروات المعدنية

(Egyptian Space Agency: Horus-2 used to uncover mineral resources),” El Watan (Egyptian news website), 13 March 2023. https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/6473128e The CEO of the Egyptian Space Agency continued: “We are achieving one of the main goals of Egypt, which is the localization of the satellite industry and technology. We are talking about a major goal in the national space program, one that was partially achieved through this cooperation with China”…

Notes:

[i] The Chinese investment consists of three cumulative grants: $23 million in 2016, $45 million in 2018, and $72 million in 2019. See: “Egypt Commences Implementation Phase Of China-funded MisrSat II Satellite And AIT Centre,” al-Monitor, 9 September 2019. https://africanews.space/egypt-commences-implementation-phase-of-china-funded-misrsat-ii-satellite-and-ait-centre/

[ii] Egypt’s space program is still in its infancy, but its near-term ambitions should not be dismissed. A 100-acre tract of land has been set aside for “Space City” in the yet unfinished New Administrative Capital, to the east of Cairo. Space City hosts the African Space Agency (AfSA), whose headquarters were formally opened in January 2023. See: “African Space Agency formally inaugurated,” Spacewatch Africa, 30 January 2023. https://spacewatch.global/2023/01/african-space-agency-formally-inaugurated/

[iii] “Egypt considers space program,” al-Monitor, 28 September 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/09/egypt-manufacture-satellite-launch-space-technology.html

Image Information:

Image:  Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010)
Source:  NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, https://www.flickr.com/photos/gsfc/12868402644       
Attribution: CC 2.0

Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties

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“Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.”

A new nexus of West African allies is emerging that bears watching. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, which are all led by military dictators generally sympathetic to Russia and antagonistic towards France, continue to deepen their ties, especially regarding military and counterterrorism affairs. As detailed in the first article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com, in March 2023, the prime minister of Burkina Faso suggested on a visit to Mali that the two countries create what he called “a federation.” A similar idea had also been broadly discussed in February 2023, when leaders from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea—all of whom had faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for unconstitutional assumptions of power—also discussed the creation of a new regional organization to help them circumvent ECOWAS.[i] Of note is the inclusion of Guinea in the mix. Since Guinea faces no similar jihadist insurgency as Mali and Burkina Faso, it does not appear to have the same degree of pro-Russian sentiments as Mali[ii] and Burkina Faso,[iii] which host or are presumed to host mercenaries from the Russian private military company Wagner Group, respectively. Yet, the fact that Guinea is ruled by a military leader may be sufficient to pull Guinea into the pro-Russia orbit of the other two. As detailed in the second article from Africanews.com, this nexus of geopolitical affinities and antipathy was displayed at a January 2023 rally in Burkina Faso decrying French presence and promoting Burkinabè sovereignty. As the article articulates, “Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.” As this alliance deepens, other francophone West African countries with pro-Russian, anti-French sentiments from civil society, namely, the Central African Republic and Chad, may well be targeted for future recruitment.

Sources:

“Le Burkina Faso aspire à créer ‘une fédération’ avec le Mali (Burkina Faso seeks to create a federation with Mali),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 2 March 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/02/02/le-burkina-faso-aspire-a-creer-une-federation-avec-le-mali/

Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire Joachimson Kyelem de Tambela, visiting neighboring Mali this week, has suggested the creation of a “federation” between his country and Mali.

 The two states, faced with jihadist violence, and led by putschist soldiers who demanded the departure of French soldiers from their territories, have come closer in recent months.

In a speech during a dinner, the head of the Malian government, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, estimated that this working visit will strengthen the ties of cooperation on the security and economic levels between the Republic of Mali and Burkina Faso:

“Des milliers de Burkinabés manifestent pour la ‘souveraineté nationale’ (Thousands of Burkinabe protest for ‘national sovereignty’),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 30 January 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/01/29/des-milliers-de-burkinabes-manifestent-pour-la-souverainete-nationale/

Gathered in Place de la Nation, in the center of the capital, at the call of the coordination of associations and organizations of civil society, the demonstrators held up placards on which one could read: “Imperialism, down”, ” French policy in Africa, down”, “No to Macron’s diktat”, or “Forward for the sovereignty of Burkina”.

Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.“Sovereignty, freedom of choice of its partners, obstinate defense of the interests of the Malian people. I am certain that these principles are shared by all the countries which want to take charge of themselves and our brothers and friends of Faso, I am convinced of it, must have similar requirements.”

Notes:

[i] See: Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. Awaiting online publication.

[ii] See: Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332

[iii] See: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism with Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Western Efforts To Isolate Russia and Iran Falter in Latin America

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Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

“In recent days, Russian media in Spanish, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of…Berlin. ‘The arms race in Ukraine does not have the support of South America,’ the outlets declared.”

Latin American countries have often spoken in terms of “neutrality” as they have tried to remain “non-aligned” regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.[i] While some countries in the region have condemned Russia’s invasion, none has joined the Western-led sanctions campaign. Nor has any of the six Latin American countries with old Soviet weaponry stepped forward to donate it to Ukraine. Underscoring these trends is the first article from the Spanish-language outlet BBC Mundo, covering German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. At each stop, Scholz implored his counterparts to consider donating their Soviet weapons systems to Ukraine.[ii] All three leaders firmly declined. For his part, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva even blamed both Russia and Ukraine for the current conflict. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he would rather see Colombia’s equipment become “junk” than send it to Ukraine where it could prolong the war. Latin American countries have been similarly reluctant to turn away from Iran. According to the second accompanying article from Argentina’s leading daily newspaper, La Nación, two Iranian warships sanctioned by the United States recently docked in Rio de Janeiro. Taken together, these developments suggest neither Russia’s war in Ukraine nor Iran’s domestic crackdowns on protestors and its provision of kamikaze drones to Russia for use in Ukraine have managed to isolate these countries in Latin America.

Sources:

“Por qué los países latinoamericanos se han negado a enviar armas a Ucrania (Why Latin American countries have refused to send weapons to Ukraine),” BBC Mundo (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular British state-owned network), 3 February 2023. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-64506590

During a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is visiting several Latin American countries this week, Fernández clarified that Argentina “is not thinking of sending weapons” to the conflict zone. A few days earlier, his peers in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil had made similar claims…In recent days, Russian media in Spanish such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of Berlin.

“Brasil permite que dos buques de guerra iraníes atraquen en Río pese a las presiones de EE.UU (Brazil allows two Iranian warships to dock in Rio despite US pressure),” La Nación (Argentina’s leading daily newspaper), 28 February 2023. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/brasil-permite-que-dos-buques-de-guerra-iranies-atraquen-en-rio-pese-a-las-presiones-de-eeuu-nid28022023/

Once Lula’s trip [to the White House] ended, the docking of the ships was authorized. Vice Admiral Carlos Eduardo Horta Arentz, deputy chief of the Brazilian Navy General Staff, gave his approval for the ships to dock in Rio between February 26 and March 4, according to an announcement published on February 23…The Brazilian Navy authorizes a foreign ship to dock in Brazil, but only with prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes into account the request of the embassy in question and the logistics…Diplomacy with Iran was one of the highlights of Lula’s attempts to bolster Brazil’s international position during his previous presidential terms. In 2010, he traveled to Tehran to meet then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as he tried to broker a US-Iran nuclear deal.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Latin America’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America Has Been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more information on the estimated six countries in the region that could donate Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine, see: Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Pushing Central, South American Countries to Give Ukraine Quick Military Boost,” Voice of America, 20 January 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-pushing-central-south-american-countries-to-give-ukraine-quick-military-boost-/6927591.html

Image Information:

Image:  Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ceremony_to_welcome_the_33rd_and_send-off_the_34th_naval_groups_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Navy_%2813%29.jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-4.0

Georgian Separatist Republic Conducts Military Exercises

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Map of Abkhazia.

Map of Abkhazia.

“As part of a three-day exercise, employees of the State Security Service… will practice measures to counter terrorist attacks. The exercises of the security forces began on March 12 in the Gal[i] district, where military equipment and personnel were transferred.”

In March 2023, the government of the Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia conducted a series of military exercises in response to demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi calling for the retaking of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[i] According to the excerpted article from the independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet Abkhaz World, Abkhazia conducted a series of military and counterterrorism exercises in the Gali sector, the de facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia. The Gali sector is defined by the Ingury River, a natural but not impenetrable barrier between Georgia and Abkhazia and the scene of periodic infiltration, insurgency, and sabotage by Georgian nationals since 1993.[ii] According to the excerpted article from Bulgaria-based Bulgaria News, Abkhazian Major General Dmitry Dbar told reporters “that the Gal[iii] exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

The current tension between Abkhazia and Georgia is being fueled by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For months, Ukrainian officials have called on Georgia to open a second front against Russia by reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia to diverting Russian forces and attention from Ukraine. Yet, while this scenario might help Ukraine, it could be a military disaster for Georgia, which has taken a more neutral position regarding Ukraine despite numerous anti-Russian and pro-West public protests and hundreds of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine. There is a common presumption that Georgia could only attack Abkhazia if a Western power, most usually said to be the United States, were to facilitate the operation. At the same time, nearly everyone in Georgia and many in the West continue to think of Abkhazia only being able to defend itself with Russian forces.[iv] The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and the recent Abkhazian military exercises are meant to demonstrate to Georgia that Abkhazia can and will take care of itself, regardless of current nationalist and regional pressures to reignite the conflict.

Sources:

“Abkhazia’s Law Enforcement Agencies Practise Measures to Combat Terrorism and Sabotage,” Abkhaz World (independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Turkey), 13 March 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2223-practice-measures-to-combat-terrorism-and-sabotage

The head of State Security Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, Dmityr Dbar, stated that the exercises will simulate combat situations and will take place in several stages.

“We will conduct these exercises frequently to prepare for anti-terrorist threats. The fighters must know each other, interact, and be able to carry out coordinated combat missions,” he said.

Interior Minister Watler Butba added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff will practice measures to release hostages and neutralize attackers at the state border checkpoint.

“Абхазия следи с тревога събитията в Грузия (Abkhazia is watching events in Georgia with concern),” News Bulgaria (Bulgarian news source), 14 March 2023. https://news.bg/int-politics/abhaziya-sledi-s-trevoga-sabitiyata-v-gruziya.html

The head of Abkhazia’s State Security Service, Major General Dmitry Dbar, told reporters on Monday that “the exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

“We used to conduct such exercises regularly once a quarter, but given the situation in Georgia and possible threats, we will conduct such events more often, to work out mechanisms to ensure anti- terrorist protection of the population,” he said.

We remind you that on March 7 and 8 thousands of people protested against the foreign agents law in Tbilisi, which led to clashes between police and demonstrators. On March 7, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence”, developed by a group of deputies from the “People’s Power” faction, was adopted in the first reading by the Georgian parliament. On the morning of March 9, the ruling party “Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia” withdrew the bill.

Peskov: Russia is worried about what is happening in Georgia The Kremlin spokesman hinted that an outside power was trying to bring in an anti-Russian element

We recall that Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent more than a decade ago. Moscow has a significant military presence there. Georgia condemns the ongoing Russian “occupation” of the territory.

Notes:

[i] South Ossetia and Abkhazia are/were ethnic enclaves within Georgia that petitioned unsuccessfully for independence at the end of the 1980s. Georgia resisted the moves and a war between South Ossetia and Georgia was fought in 1990-1991. A year later war broke out between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993). Georgia lost both conflicts and both territories became de facto independent. Georgia has always maintained that it was defeated in both ethnic enclaves by Russia. The truth is complicated and subject to debate, but the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia (South Ossetia) consolidated the de facto independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

[ii] There has been much speculation and rumor as to the nature of the Georgian paramilitary individuals and units raiding Abkhazia. While many believe the Georgian government is behind the low-grade Georgian insurgency in Abkhazia, there are many individuals and groups that appear to be operating on their own initiative—a characteristic of Georgian forces during the war for Abkhazia 1992-1993. See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgia’s Lingering Border Security Issues,” OE Watch, 08-2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/315067

[iii] Georgian place names frequently end in “i,” whereas Abkhazian placenames omit the Georgian spelling and pronunciation.  For example, “Gali” in Georgian becomes “Gal” in Abkhazian.  Most Western scholarship and media coverage of Abkhazia refers to Abkhazian locations using the Georgian language spellings.

[iv] See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgian Defense Minister Offers Modernization Plan in Face of Russia Threat.” OE Watch, 09-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/395195

Image Information:

Image: Map of Abkhazia
Source: Sémhur, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abkhazia_map-fr.svg
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Georgians Consider Outcomes of War in Ukraine

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Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

“In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities.”

The Georgian government condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially but has not taken part in any sanctions against Russia out of concern of being drawn into the conflict. Additionally, Georgia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia’s, and the government continues to contend with the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been occupied by Russia-supported forces since the end of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.[i] While Georgia will likely maintain its neutrality on Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent, non-profit think tank Georgian Institute of Politics offers a Georgian perspective of five possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article is a follow up to the think tank’s initial assessment of possible outcomes, which was published just a few weeks after the war began in 2022. While the report acknowledges that Georgia will not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, each of the scenarios shows how Georgia will be affected in some way.

In the first scenario, Ukraine wins the war, which the article’s authors believes is probable, resulting in Georgia joining NATO and having deeper integration with Europe. Conversely, the article believes that this would come with the risk that Russia will then destabilize Georgia regardless of who is in power in Moscow. The second scenario examines what could happen if Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict or returns to the status quo before the war began. The article states that a frozen conflict would allow Russia time to restore its military but also would push additional Russian migrants into Georgia. Georgia could also become the focal point of Putin’s ire as he looks to claim a quick victory to compensate domestically for losses in Ukraine. This would in turn cause Georgian officials to move away from integrating with Europe and pursue a policy more in line with Russian interests. 

In the third scenario, Russia achieves its strategic goals in Ukraine, and in the fourth scenario, Russia and NATO engage in full-scale war. These are unlikely according to the article. The fifth and final scenario, which the authors believe is very likely, is that a war of attrition will continue for two or more years and that this will put Georgia in a difficult position. The article notes how Georgian Dream, the ruling party in Georgia’s parliament, has been improving ties with Russia, though many in Georgia still see Russia as a threat. In early March, the Georgian government withdrew a bill requiring NGOs to register as foreign agents in Georgia after facing protest that the bill had been influenced by Russia. Lastly, the article notes that Georgia will face “major strategic dilemmas” regardless of how the war ends and recommends that Georgian officials increase civil defense capabilities and cooperation with Turkey.[ii] While the article does not claim to be an official Georgian perspective, it makes clear that Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Source:

“One Year of War in Ukraine and Risk Assessment for Georgia: Five (updated) Scenarios,” Georgian Institute of Politics (an independent non-profit think tank in Georgia), 13 February 2023.

In March of 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russia launched the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, GIP proposed four possible scenarios of future developments and their possible implications for Georgia…However, almost one year since the invasion, the conflict seems to be reaching its decisive point…

As the war continues reshaping global geopolitics, the following piece will revisit GIP’s previous assessments and offer insights into what has changed over the last 11 months since its publication. Although the war is far from over and significant battles are still ahead, five scenarios discussed in detail below offer some insights into the dilemmas and potential risks that Georgia may face considering different possible developments in Ukraine.

Scenario 1: Ukraine wins the war (Probable)

As western support for Ukraine continues to increase, leading to a successful counteroffensive operation, and eventual victory, the geopolitical paradigm in the wider Black Sea region would change drastically…If the situation is going to develop in this direction and Ukraine is going to achieve full de-occupation of its territories (including the Crimean Peninsula), it’s not excluded that the window of opportunity may appear for NATO’s further enlargement to the East…In the best-case scenario, this would also imply Georgia joining the alliance. In addition to NATO enlargement, Russia’s defeat and retreat from the region will also make Georgia’s European integration irreversible…

…This scenario implies risks for Georgia from another perspective…Defeat in Ukraine may result in regime change in Russia, leading to internal instabilities and power struggles. This could lead to a spillover of chaos in the already volatile North Caucasus, creating a range of challenges on the border of Georgia. In other words, while a strong Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, an unstable Northern neighbor is no less dangerous for its security.

Risks will increase for Georgia even if the Russian regime survives defeat in Ukraine. Since it can still act as a spoiler, the Kremlin might be keen to restore its tarnished prestige by continuing adventurous foreign policy towards Georgia…

Scenario 2: Freezing the conflict and/or returning to status quo ante (Possible)

As the war drags on causing an immense number of causalities on both sides, there is a possibility that both Russia and Ukraine could reach the point of exhaustion…

This would be either freezing the conflict or returning to the status quo in the Eastern part of Ukraine…the existence conflicts with frozen solutions will also allow Russia to restore its forces and prepare for a new assault. This scenario also implies a risk for Georgia, as preparing for a new offensive would intensify the ongoing “silent” mobilization. This, in its turn, may lead to an increase in Russian migrants to Georgia…

Moreover, with conflict intensity decreased in Eastern Ukraine, Russian Federation could apply pressure on Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the first scenario, amid the upcoming presidential elections in 2024, Putin might need a quick victory on the foreign front to compensate for the damage caused by the failures in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, officials in Tbilisi might be forced to give up its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and align its external policies with the Kremlin’s…

Scenario 3: The Kremlin achieves its strategic goals (Unlikely)

In this scenario, Russia achieves a successful breakthrough in the upcoming major battles. With Western support decreasing, Ukrainian resources exhausting, and a raising death toll among civilians, Ukraine might be forced to concede. Ukraine’s concession would imply the change of the government in Kyiv, recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia and the end of Euro-Atlantic presence in the region for decades to come.

As it was outlined in our scenario 2: Georgian nightmare published in March 2022, there is no doubt that in case of such developments, the Kremlin may pose an ultimatum to Tbilisi or may even establish a puppet regime in Tbilisi. Georgia could be dragged into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…

Scenario 4: NATO-Russia Full-Scale War (Highly unlikely)

Out of all the possible scenarios outline here, this seems to be the least likely, yet still a possibility. Especially if, after a successful counteroffensive in the East, Ukraine will start military operations to free the Crimean Peninsula. Attacks on Crimea or deeper territories in Russia might further escalate the conflict and lead to the Kremlin using a tactical nuclear weapon…

In case of a war between Russia and NATO member states, the Black Sea region gains strategic importance. It includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, members of the alliance and most likely get involved in the conflict…In this context, Georgia’s strategic location gains vital importance for Russia and NATO allies…

Scenario 5: Attrition warfare continues for 2 or more years (Very likely)

There is also a possibility that neither Russia nor Ukraine is going to back down that might lead to the protracted attrition warfare. In this context, illicit trade and alternative imports of the western technology is going to gain even more importance for the Kremlin. This will put Georgia in a difficult position due to its transactional foreign and security policy towards Russia. And deliberately or not, by improving economic ties with Russia, Georgian Dream did end up moving Georgia closer to its erstwhile enemy…

Despite the GD’s rhetoric, existing occupied territories remain an obstacle to improving relations with the Kremlin. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the majority of Georgians perceive Russia as a threat and support the country’s pro-European foreign policy…

Conclusion…All the scenarios outlined above suggest that regardless which direction the situation is going to develop, Tbilisi will be facing major strategic dilemmas. In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities. Similar to what was suggested in our last year’s scenarios, Georgia needs to intensify its cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and a large regional military power that has a potential to counterbalance Russian regional dominance…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Georgia’s security issues in Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abhazia, see: Matthew Stein ““Borderization” Continues in Georgia,” OE Watch, 03-2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues See also Dodge Billingsley “Russia Flexes Its Muscles in Abkhazia While Citizens Recall Anniversary of War with Georgia,” OE Watch, 09-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/268081

[ii] For more background on Georgia’s security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein “Trilateral Security in the Caucasus,” OE Watch, 07-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georgia_Protest_2023_VOA.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment (Karen Kaya) (March 2023)

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Key Takeaways:

• Turkey has emerged as a drone superpower on the world stage. In just the past few years,
Turkey has become one of a select group of countries in the world that can produce, use
and export armed drones extensively, trailing only the United States, Israel, and China.
• Turkey’s innovative use of its cost-effective Bayraktar TB-2 drone involves using drone
squadrons effectively as a mobile air artillery, thereby achieving overmatch by emphasizing
quantity over quality. This strategy has impacted geopolitical outcomes in several regional
conflicts, and has provided a strategy for middle sized powers to emulate. Several such
powers—including Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan—are buying these cost-effective systems
from Turkey with a view to do so. Other midsize countries with limited defense budgets
are likely to replicate this approach, changing the nature of local conflicts and even the
calculations of larger observing nations.
• Drones and anti-aircraft technologies that merge ISR with strike capabilities will increasingly
impact the trajectories of conflicts. The entry barriers to these technologies are falling,
making it easier for geopolitical issues to turn to war.

The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare (Matthew Stein) (March 2023)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, specifically that they can be
utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution
• Russia’s past peacekeeping operations have shown how these involved ending the conflict
as quickly as possible and enforcing terms of any cease-fire agreement, including taking
action that favored one of the belligerents as long as Russia remains in the dominant position
• Russia’s Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping operation ended a conflict and helped the
Russian government maintain influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States with
a Russian military detachment in place for the foreseeable future, which can help explain
how conflicts involving Russia are likely to end.